S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

PRIMI LIBRI

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XLVIII

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XLVIII

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 853-854.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 853-854.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam faciat eam iustam.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether the conformity of our will to the Divine (Will) makes it just.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam faciat eam iustam.  Et quod sic, videtur:

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the conformity of our will to the Divine (Will) makes it just.  And it seems, that (it is) so:

1. Quia super illud Psalmi:1  Rectos decet collaudatio, Glossa:  « Recti sunt qui dirigunt cor suum secundum voluntatem Dei, quae recta est ».

1. Because on that (verse) of the Psalm:1  Complete praise befits the upright, the Gloss (says):  « The upright are those who direct their heart according to the Will of God, which is upright ».

2. Item, secundae ad Corinthios sexto:2  Quae participatio iustitiae cum iniquitate? aut quae societas lucis ad tenebras? quasi dicat:  nulla.  Si ergo divina voluntas iustitia est et lux, si humana voluntas sit iniqua, non potest esse conformis:  ergo si est conformis, necesset est esse iustam.

2. Likewise, in the sixth (chapter of St. Paul’s) Second (Letter) to the Corinthians (there is written):2  What participation of justice (is there) with iniquity? or what society of the light (is there) for darkness? as if to say:  “none”.  If, therefore, the Divine Will be Justice and Light, if a human will be iniquitous, it cannot be conform (with It):  therefore if it is conform, it is necessary that it be just.

3. Item, conformari regulae iustitiae nihil aliud est quam iustificari; sed voluntas divina est regula iustitiae, quia non potest obliquari ad aliquod iniquum:  ergo conformari voluntati divinae est iustificari.3

3. Likewise, ‘to be conformed to a rule of justice’ is nothing other than ‘to be justified’; but the Divine Will is the Rule of Justice, because It cannot be turned aside [obliquari] to anything iniquitous:  therefore ‘to be conformed to the Divine Will’ is ‘to be justified’.3

4. Item, intellectus noster non potest conformari divino, quin efficiatur verus:  ergo nec affectus noster potest conformari divino, quin efficiatur iustus; sicut enim veritas est rectitudo intellectus, sic iustitia est rectitudo affectus.4

4. Likewise, our intellect cannot be conformed to the Divine (Intellect), if it is not made true:  therefore neither can our affection [affectus] be conformed to the Divine (Affection), if its is not made just; for just as truth is the rectitude of the intellect, so justice is the rectitude of the affection.4

CONTRA:  1. Magister5 dicit, et est verbum Augustini, quod « voluntas Dei bona per hominum malas voluntates impletur »; sed unus effectus non procedit ab una causa per aliam, nisi illae causae ad invicem conformentur:  ergo contingit malam voluntatem divinae conformari.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. Master (Peter) says,5 and it is a saying [verbum] of (St.) Augustine, that « the good Will of God is fulfilled through the evil wills of men »; but the one effect does not proceed from the one cause through another, unless those causes are conformed to one another:  therefore it happens that a evil will is conformed to the Divine (Will).

1  Psalm. 32, 1.  —  Glossa, quae mox afferter, deprompta est ex August., Enarrat. 2. in dictum Psalm. n. 2.

2  Vers. 14.  Vulgata:  Quae enim participatio . . . societas luci ad tenebras?  —  Paulo post pro si humana Vat. et humana.

3  Cfr. de hoc argumento August., Enarrat. in Psalm. 93. 15. sub. n. 18. seq.

4  Cfr. Anselm., Dialog. de veritate, c. 12, ubi iustitia definitur « rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata »; et Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 8, ubi S. Doctor ait:  « nulla autem est iusta voluntas, nisi quae vult quod Deus vult eam velle »; nec non libr. de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 1. c. 6, ubi sic legitur:  Sed quoniam iustitiam, qua iustus est aliquis, constat esse rectitudinem voluntatis, quam dixi; quae rectitudo tunc tantum est in aliquo, cum ipse vult quod Deus vult eum velle.

5  Hic c. 2, ubi et verbum Augustini, mox citatum, invenies integrum.

1  Ps. 32:1.  — The Gloss, which is cited next, has been taken from (St.) Augustine, Enarrations. 2, on the said Psalm, n. 2.

2  Verse 14.  The Vulgate reads:  For what participation etc. [Quae enim participatio iustitiae cum iniquitate? aut quae societas luci ad tenebras?].  —  A little after this for if a human will [si humana] for and a human will [et humana].

3  On this argument, cf. (St.) Augustine, Enarrations, on Ps. 93:15, under n. 18 f..

4  Cf. (St.) Anselm, Dialogue on the Truth, ch. 12, where “justice” is defined as « the rectitude of the will observed [servata] for its own sake »; and Dialogue on Free Will, ch. 8, where the holy Doctor says:  « but no will is just, except that which wills what Gods that it wills »; and also (his) book On the Concordance of God’s Foreknowledge with Free Will, q. 1, ch. 6, where there is read:  But since it is established that the justice, by which anyone is just, is the rectitude of the will, which I spoke about; which rectitude is then only in someone, when he himself wills what God wills that he wills.

5  Here in ch. 2, where you will also find the entire verse of (St.) Augustine, cited next.

p. 854

2. Item, conformitas voluntatum consistit in volendo et nolendo idem; sed impius potest velle et nolle quod Deus vult et non vult, ut ponit exemplum Augustinus1 de pravo filio, qui vult patrem mori, quod et Deus vult:  ergo conformitas non facit voluntatem iustam.

2. Likewise, a conformity of wills consists in willing and not willing the same (thing); but a impious (man) can will and not will what God wills and does not will, as (St.) Augustine1 posits the example of the depraved son, who wills that (his) father die, which God also wills:  therefore conformity does not make the will just.

3. Item, quamvis voluntas Dei sit beata, tamen voluntas illi conformis non propter hoc est beata:  ergo pari ratione, quamvis sit iusta, non propter hoc voluntas conformis est iusta.

3. Likewise, although the Will of God is blessed, yet a will conform to That is not on this account blessed:  therefore for an equal reason, though It be just, not on account of this is a will conform (to It) just.

4. Item, si conformitas facit voluntatem iustam, cum2 velit hominem, qui patitur iniuriam, vindicare, si ille qui patitur iniuriam, vult se vindicare, iuste vult:  ergo iustum est exigere vindictam.  Si tu dicas, quod Deus vult hominem vindicare, sed non vult, quod homo vindicet se; hoc non solvit, quia saltem tunc liceret homini appetere, quod Deus ipsum vindicaret.

4. Likewise, if a conformity makes the will just, when (God)2 wills to vindicate a man, who suffers injury, if the latter who suffers injury, wills to vindicate himself, he wills (this) justly:  therefore it is just to exact vengeance [exigere vindicatam].  If you say, that God wills to vindicate a man, but does not will, that a man vindicate himself; this does not solve (the matter), because it would then at least be licit for a man to desire [appetere], that God vindicate him.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam et secundum actum et secundum volitum facit eam iustam; non autem sola conformitas in volito.

CONCLUSION

 

The conformity of our will to the Divine (Will) both according to act and according to willed makes it just;  however a conformity alone in the willed (does) not.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod conformitas voluntatis nostrae ad divinam attenditur secundum proportionem, sicut dictum est.3  Duplex est autem proportio voluntatis, scilicet ad actum et ad volitum.  Similis proportio ad actum consistit in hoc, quod, sicut Deus quod vult vult ex caritate et liberaliter sive iuste et recto fine, sic et homo velit.  Similis proportio ad obiectum4 est, ut quod vult Deus, etiam homo velit.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the conformity of our will to the Divine (Will) is attained according to a proportion, just as has been said.3  There is, however, a twofold proportion of the will, namely, regarding the act and regarding the willed.  A similar proportion regarding the act consists in this, that, just as God wills, what He wills, out of charity and liberally or justly and for a right end, so also does the man will (this).  A similar proportion regarding the object4 is, that what God wills, a man also wills.

Potest igitur conformitas attendi secundum hanc duplicem similitudinem5 et comparationem; et sic est sufficiens et facit voluntatem iustam.  Potest iterum attendi solum secundum alteram, ut puta secundum volitum; et sic est deficiens, cum careat simili habitudine, et hoc non sufficit ad iustitiam.

A conformity, therefore, can be attained according to this twofold similitude5 and comparison; and in this manner it is sufficient and makes the will just.  Again, it can be attained solely according to the second, as for example the willed; and in this manner it is deficient, since it lacks a similar habitude, and this does not suffice for justice.

De prima conformitate procedunt primae rationes, de secunda secundae.

Concerning the first conformity the first reasons procede, concerning the second (those) second.

3. Ad illud tamen quod tertio obiicitur, quod conformitas non facit beatam animam, ergo nec iustam; dicendum, quod beatitudo dicit iustitiam consummatam.  Unde plus requiritur ad hoc, ut voluntas fiat beata, quam ut fiat iusta; et ideo non sequitur, quodsi non facit beatam, quod non faciat iustam.  Tamen, sicut conformitas sufficiens, quae est in volito et ratione volendi, facit voluntatem iustam, sic conformitas superexcellens facit eam beatam.  Illa autem est superexcellens, quando in omnibus divinae conformatur et ex nulla parte est difformis, nec in aliquo, saltem in modico.6

3. To that, however, which is objected third, that a conformity does not make the soul blessed, therefore neither just; it must be said, that “beatitude” means a consummated justice.  Wherefore more is required for this, that a will be made blessed, than that it be made just; and for that reason it does not follow, that if it does not make (it) blessed, that it does not make it just.  Yet, just as the sufficient conformity, which is in the willed and according to the reckoning of willing [ratione volendi], makes the will just, so the superexcellent conformity makes it just.  But the former is superexcellent, when in all (things) it is conformed to the Divine (Will) and (when) in no part is it difform, nor in anything, even in the least [saltem in modico].6

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, iam patet responsio; quia appetens vindictam non conformat se Deo in modo sive in ratione volendi.  Deus enim tanquam iustus iudex vult hoc zelo iustitiae; qui autem appetit ultionem sui sive suae iniuriae ut plurimum vult libidine vindictae.  Si autem aliquis appetat solum zelo iustitiae, sicut Deus, et ex caritate, tunc dicerem, eum habere voluntatem iustam.

4. To that which is objected last, the response is already clear; because the one desiring vengeance does not conform himself to God in the manner of or in the reason for willing [in ratione volendi].  For God, as a just judge, wills this from the zeal for justice; but he who desires avenging punishment [ultionem] for himself or for his injury, wills (this), as most (do), from a lust for vengeance [libidine vindictae].  But if some one desires (this) solely from the zeal for justice, just as God (does), and out of charity, then I would say, that he has a just will.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Pro maiori elucidatione servire possunt verba Alexandri Hal. (S. p. I. q. 41. m. 2.):  « Conformatio potest attendi secundum quatuor genera causarum, scil. in volendo quod Deus vult, in volendo ut vult, in volendo quod scimus ipsum velle, in volendo ad quid vult.  Prima est conformitas materialis, secunda formalis, tertia est in ratione causae efficientis, quarta in ratione finis.  Dicendum ergo, quod si ista quatuor concurrunt, est conformitas perfecta sive conformatio.  Sufficiens autem conformitas attenditur in duobus, ut scil, velit homo sicut vult Deus, et propter quod vult.  Imperfecta vero conformatio, cum homo vult quod vult [Deus], vel quod scit Deum velle ».  —  Eandem distinctionem secundum quatuor genera causarum adhibet S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2.

I. For a greater elucidation (of the aforesaid) there can serve the words of Alexander of Hales (Summa., p. I, q. 41, m. 2):  «  A conformation can be attained according to four genera of causes, that is, in willing what God wills, in willing as He wills, in willing what we know Him to will, in willing for what He wills (it).  The first is a material conformity, the second a formal one, the third is in the reckoning of an efficient cause, the fourth in the reckoning of an end.  It must be said, therefore, that if these four concur, there is a perfect conformity or conformation.  But a sufficient conformity is attained in the two, that is, that a man will just as God wills, and on account of which He wills.  But (there is) an imperfect conformation, when a man wills what He wills, and/or what he knows that God wills ».  —  St. Thomas employs the same distinction according to the four genera of causes, here in q. 1, a. 2.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 41. m. 2.  —  Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. unica.  —  S. Thom., S. I. II. q. 19. a. 9.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 2.   —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 3.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.  —  Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 41, m. 2.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each version (of his Commentary), here in the q. sole.  —  St. Thomas, Summa., I, II, q. 19, a. 9.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 2.   —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2, quaestiunc. 3.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, here in 1st princ., q. 2.

1  Enchirid. c. 101. n. 26.  Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.  —  De propos. maiori cfr. Aristot., IX. Ethic. c. 6, ubi de concordia amicorum agitur; nec non Cicero, de Amicitia, c. 6, de quo vide infra a. 2. q. 2. arg. 3.

2  Supple cum cod. T (a secunda manu) Deus.

3  Quaest. praeced.

4  Pro obiectum Vat. volitum; cod. R voci obiectum adiungit et volitum.

5  Plures codd. ut H K V X (M T in marg.) et ed. 1 habitudinem.

6  Cfr. August., de Beata Vita, n. 17-36, et XIII. de Trin. c. 5-9.

1  Enchiridion., ch. 101, n. 26.  See the text of Master (Peter) here in ch. 1.  —  On the major proposition, cf. Aristotle, Ethics¸ Bk. IX, ch. 6, where he deals with the concord of friends; and also Cicero, On Friendship, ch. 6, concerning which, see below, a. 2, q. 2, argument 3.

2  Supply together with codex T (by a second hand) God [Deus].

3  In the preceding Question.

4  For the object [obiectum] the Vatican edition has the willed [volitum]; codex R adjoins to the object [obiectum] and the willed [et volitum].

5  Very many codices, such as H K V X (M and T in the margin) and edition 1 have habitude [habitudinem].

6  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Blessed Life, nn. 17-36, and On the Trinity, Bk. XIII, ch. 5-9.

The English translation here has been released to the public domain by its author. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.