S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

PRAELOCUTIO SANCTI BONAVENTURAE

PROOEMIO IN SECUNDUM LIBRUM SENTENTIARUM PRAEMISSA.1

SAINT BONAVENTURE’S PREFACE

PREMISED TO THE FOREWORD OF THE SECOND BOOK OF SENTENCES1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 1-3.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 1-3.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Salvatoris opitulante gratia, ex quo perventum est ad completionem primi Sententiarum, Patrum interveniente instantia, oportet inchoare secundum.  At quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi et communibus opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime magistri et patris nostri bonae memoriae fratris Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ab eorum vestigiis non recedem.  Non enim intendo novas opiniones adversare, sed communes et approbatas retexere.  Nec quisquam aestimet, quod novi scripti velim esse fabricator; hoc enim sentio et fateor, quod sum pauper et tenuis compilator. — Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me declinasse a positionibus Magisteri Sententiarum maxime in duobus:  in hoc scilicet, quod, cum Magister primi libri distinctione tertia,2 in secunda assignatione trinitatis, quam dicit consistere in mente, notitia et amore, dicat, mentem accipi non pro anima, sed pro superiori portione, a me dictum reperitur, mentem ibi pro substantia animae stare.  Rursus, cum Magister dicat distinctione septima., quod potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, utpote nomen significans essentiam, magis illi opinioni adhaesi, quae dicit, potentiam generandi dictam esse propter relationem. —  Sed si quis recte inspiciat, in neutro praedictorum inveniet me nec a positione Magistri nec a veritatis tramite declinasse.  Nam quando dixi in illa trinitatis assignatione mentem accipi pro animae substantia ratione superioris partis, hoc ideo dictum est, quia si mens staret ibi pro superiori portione, cum illa sit animae potentia, et non sit unius potentiae nosse et amare, sicut videbitur infra,3 iam non esset ibi trinitas, sed quaternitas. Iterum, potentiae proprie non est,4  sed substantiae per potentiam; et ideo, si proprie et vere loquitur Augustinus, cum dicit, mens novit etc., mens ibi supponit animae substantiam.  Et hoc iterum innuit Augustinus, cum postea occasione huius trinitatis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam nosse se ipsam.  Postremo, cum illi habitus notitiae et amoris sint animae consubstantiales, non addunt novam essentiam super potentiam, sed se ipsis potentiae sunt habiles, et ita non possunt ipsis potentiis communicari sive cum superiori parte rationis.  Et propterea non negat Magister, quod mens non accipiatur pro ipsa anima, sed quod non accipitur pro tota, id est pro anima secundum omnes potentias, sed pro ipsa substantia ratione superioris portionis.  In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi

By the Savior's helping grace, on account of which one has arrived at the completion of the First (Book) of the Sentences, with the intervening insistence [instantia] of the Fathers, one is bound to undertake the second. But just as in the First Book I adhered to the considerations [sententiis] and common opinions of the masters (of theology), and most of all (to those) of our master and father of good memory, Friar Alexander (of Hales), so in the following books I will not retreat [recedem] from their footprints.  For I do not intend defend [adversare] new opinions, but to explain in detail [retexere] the common and approved ones.  Nor may anyone appraise, that I want to be the craftsman [fabricator] of a new writing; for this I think and admit, that I am a poor and feeble compiler.  —  But perhaps it will seem to someone, that I have departed from the positions of the Master of Sentences most of all on two (points):  that is in this, that, when Master (Peter) in the Third Distinction of the First Book, in the second assignation of the Trinity, which he says consists in mind, knowledge and love, says, that “mind” is to be accepted not for the soul, but for the superior portion (of it), one discovers (what was) said by myself, that “mind” there stands for the substance of the soul.  Again, when Master (Peter) says in the Seventh Distinction, that the “power of generating” is common to the Three Persons, as [utpote] a name signifying essence, I adhered more to that opinion, which says, that the “power of generating” has been said on account of relation.  —  But if anyone rightly inspects (the matter), in neither of the aforesaid shall he find me (standing) nor that I have departed from the position of Master (Peter) or from the foot-path of truth.  For when I said, that in that assignation of a trinity “mind” is accepted for the substance of the soul by reason of (its) superior part, for that reason this was said, because, if “mind” stood there fore the superior portion, since that is a power of the soul, and (since) it does not belong to one power to know and to love, as is seen below,3 there would not be a trinity there, but a quaternity.  Again, it does not belong properly to a power (to know itself and to love itself),4 but to a substance through a power; and for that reason, if (St.) Augustine is speaking properly and truly, when he says, “the mind knows” etc., “mind” there supposes the substance of the soul. And this again does (St.) Augustine hint at [innuit], when after the occasion of this trinity he shows throughout almost the whole tenth (book) On the Trinity, that the soul knows its very self.  Finally, since those habits of knowledge and love are consubstantial to the soul, they do not add a new essence upon (its) power, but are by themselves handy powers [potentiae habiles], and thus they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves nor to the superior part of the reason.  And moreover Master (Peter) does not deny, that “mind” is accepted for the soul itself, but (he denies) that it is accepted for the whole (soul), that is, for the soul according to all (its) powers, but (it is thus accepted) for the substance (of the soul) itself by reason of (its) superior portion.  In this, therefore, I have not contradicted Master (Peter), but rather have explained his word in accord with the rule of truth, as I estimate it.

Similiter nec in alio, scilicet in potentia generandi, discordavi ab ipso. Quod idem Magister distinctione septima innuit, potentiam generandi esse dictam secundum substantiam, et quod alii dicunt, esse dictam secundum relationem et esse proprium, non est controversia, immo utrumque verum est, si quis attendat.  Nam si divisim loquimur de potentia generandi, secundum quod significatur per haec duo

Similarly neither in the other, namely in the power of generating did I disagree with him. Because the same Master indicates [innuit] in the Seventh Distinction, that the “power of generating” has said to be according to substance, and that others say, that it has been said according to relation and that it is a proper (name), there is no controversy, nay rather each is true, if one is attentive.  For if we speak separately of the power of generating, according to that which is signified through these two . . .

1  Hucusque inedita remansit haec praelocutio, qua S. Bonaventura dilucidam reddit rationem nonnullarum sententiarum, quas in libro I. sui Commentarii posuit, et quae quibusdam displicuerant. Eam primus detexit in codice (sign. 193) bibliothecae civitatis Andegavensis atque transcripsit P. Fidelis a Fanna, ut in Prolegomenis nostrae editionis t. I. p. LVII (col. II.) iam notavimus. Magnam eiusdem praelocutionis partem iam in scholiis primi tomi publicavimus. Eandem integram et quantum ope unici codicis fieri potuit, satis correctam hoc loco exhibemus.
2  Cap. 3; et S. Bonav. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1; alter locus est d. VII. c. 2. in fine, et S. Bonav. d. 7. a. 1.
3  II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. q. 2. a. 1.
4  Supple: nosse se et amare se. — Pro maiore explicatione doctrinae huius praefationis consulendi sunt loci I. libri Sententiarum, de quibus hic tractatur.

1  This preface, in which St. Bonaventure gives an enlightening [dilucidam] explanation of not a few considerations [sententiarum] which he put forward in the First Book of his Commentary, and which displeased certain persons, remained unedited until the publication of this volume.  Father Fidelis of Fanna first recovered it and transcribed it from a codex (sign. 193) in the library of the city of Angers (France), as we have already noted in the Prolegomena of our edition t. I. p. LVII (col. II).  A great part of the same Foreword we have already published in the Scholia of the first volume.  And the same whole, and corrected as much as can be with the help of a single codex, we exhibit here above.
2  Chapter 3; cf. St. Bonaventure's Commentary, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 of the same book; the other reference is to d. VII c. 2. at the end, and St. Bonaventure's Commentary on d. 7, a. 1.
3 Sent. Bk. II, d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. 
4   Supply: to know itself and to love itself.  —  For a more detailed explanation of the teaching [set forth] in this preface, the passages in the First Book of the Sentences, which are treated of here, are to be consulted.

p. 2

nomina, sic, cum nomen potentiae de se sit essentiale, et nomen virtutis generativae sit personale, dicit essentiam vel naturam ut in persona.  Si autem loquimur de eo quod per illa duo vocabula significatur, ita quod concurrant1 in unius vocabuli intellectum, tunc, cum nihil aliud sit potentiae generandi quam fecunditas potentiae, et fecunditas in producendo personam aliquam omnino sit dictum secundum relationem, nec sit commune, sed proprium, sic absque dubio potentia generandi vel posse generare dicitur secundum relationem.  Et sic patet, quod utraque istarum opinionum est vera, nec una repugnat alteri.  Sed hanc sententiam magis approbavi, quia plus attingit ad veritatem rei, licet ad plenam veritatis expressionem utramque oporteat sustinere.  —  In his igitur et in aliis verbis Magistri adhaerens, debita servata reverentia2 . . .et proposui et propono iuxta tenuitatem in genii et paupertatem scientiae in his, in quibus potuero, sustinere, his dumtaxat exceptis, in quibus magis communiter non sustinetur, immo communis opinio tenet contrarium.  Haec autem sunt octo, ita quod in quolibet libro sunt duae de illis positionibus.

names, thus, since the name for power of itself is essential, and the name for the generative virtue is personal, (“power of generating”) means the Essence and/or Nature as (It is) in a Person.  If however we speak of that which is signified through those two words, so that they concurr1 in being understood as one word [in unius vocabuli intellectum], then, since nothing else belongs to the power of generating than a fecundity of power, and a fecundity in producing another Person is entirely a saying according to relation, and not common (to all the Persons), but a proper (name), thus without doubt the “power of generating” or the “being able to generate” is said according to relation. And thus it is clear, that each of these opinions are true, and one is not repugnant to the other. But I approved rather of the latter sentence, because it touches more upon the truth of the matter, though for full expression of the truth one must [oporteat] to sustain each.  —  Therefore adhering (to each) to these and to the other words of the Master, with due reverence observed2 . . . I both proposed and I do propose in accord with (my) thinness of genius and poverty in knowledge in regard to these, in which I will have been able, to sustain (my own opinion), at least with these excepted, in which more commonly there is not sustained, nay rather the common opinion holds the contrary.  Moreover these (improbable opinions of Master Peter) are eight, thus that in whatever book (of his), there are (to be found) two of these positions.

In primo enim libro haec duo dicit Magister quae communiter non tenentur, videlicet quod caritas, quae est amor Dei et proximi, non sit quid creatum, sed increatum, ut Spiritus sanctus. Aliud est, quod haec nomina trinus, trinitas, et alia numeralia non ponunt, sed tantum privant.3

For in the First Book Master (Peter) speaks of those two (opinions of his) which are commonly not held, namely that charity, which is the love of God and of neighbor, is not something created, but uncreated, such as the Holy Spirit.  The other is, that these names “triune”, “trinity”, and the other numeral (names) do posit (something), but only deprive (it).3

In his autem duabus positionibus deceptum credimus Magistrum, occasione sumta ex verbis Hilarii et Augustini.  Unde utraque istarum fuit improbata.

However in these two positions we believe that Master (Peter was) deceived, by a turn of phrase [occasione] taken from the words of (Sts.) Hilary (of Poitiers) and Augustine.  Wherefore each of these has been disproved.

In secundo libro similiter duae sunt, quarum una est, quod in Angelis beatis praemium praecessit meritum, meritum, inquam, respectu praemii substantialis; quod etsi valde videatur probabile, communiter tamen non tenetur.  Altera est, quod nihil de cibo transit in veritatem humanae naturae, sed tota veritas humanae naturae fuit in Adam.4

In the second book, similarly, there are two, one of which is, that in the blessed Angels reward preceded merit, merit, I say, in respect of the substantial reward; which even if it seems to be very probable, yet it is not, commonly held.  The other is, that nothing of food passes into the truth of human nature, but the whole truth of human nature was in Adam.4

In tertio libro similiter duae invenitur opiniones:  una est, quod anima soluta a corpore est persona; alia est, quod Christus in triduo fuit homo.5

In the third book similarly one finds two opinions:  one is, that the soul released [soluta] from the body is a person; the other is, that Christ was a man during the Triduum (i.e. Good Friday, Holy Saturday and Easter Sunday).5

In quarto similiter duae reperiuntur:  una de baptismo Ioannis; altera de potestate baptizandi sive dimittendi peccata, quam potuit conferre creaturae.6

In the fourth, similarly, two are found:  one concerning the baptism of (St.) John (the Baptist); the other concerning the power of baptizing or of forgiving sins, which could be conferred upon a creature.6

In his positionibus Magister a communi via recessit, et sicut in suis locis tractabuntur, ad minus probabilem partem declinavit, et ideo non sustinetur communiter a magistris.  Et licet fortassis aliquis eum in aliquibus harum opinionum sustineat, verumtamen pater et magister noster bonae memoriae frater Alexander in nulla harum ipsum sustinuit, sed potius contrarium sensit, suis vestigiis praecipue inhaerere propono.

In these positions Master (Peter) retreated from the common way, and as will treated in their own places, he turned aside towards the less probable side, and for that reason he is not supported commonly by the masters (of theology).  And though perhaps someone may sustain him in some of these opinions, nevertheless our father and master of good memory, Friar Alexander (of Hales) sustained him in none of these, but rather thought the contrary, (and) I chiefly propose to adhere [inhaerere] to his footprints.

Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me ab eius7 sententia deviasse, cum sermo fuit de generatione aeterna in primo libro, distinctione vigesima septima.8 Cum enim scribatur in Summa,9 quod ideo generat, quia est pater, magis visus sum adhaerere illi opinioni, quae dicit, quod Pater ideo generat, quia Deus innascibilis. Cum iterum ab eodem scribatur,10 quod est aliquod dicere in divinis, cui non respondet verbum, magis adhaesi11 illi opinioni, quae dicit, quod non est dicere sine verbo, ac per hoc ab eius recessisse vestigio. — Sed si quis recte intelligat, non discordavi ab ipso nec in primo nec in secundo, quia verum non contrariatur vero.

But perhaps it will seem to some, that I have deviated from his7 sentence, when there was a discussion of the eternal generation in the First Book, in the Twenty-Seventh Distinction.8  For when there was written in his Summa.,9 that (the Father) generates for this reason, because He is the Father, I seemed rather to adhere to that opinion, which says, that the Father generates for this reason, because (He is) the innascible God.  When, again, there was written by the same,10 that there is the saying of something among the divine, to which a word does not respond, I adhered11 more to that opinion, which says, that there is no saying without a word, and through this that I have receded from his path.  —  But if anyone understands rightly, I did not disagree with him, neither in the first, nor in the second, because a truth is not contrary to a truth.

Verum autem esse arbitror, et quod Pater generat, quia innascibilis, et quod generat, quia Deus pater; et hoc patet sic.  Planum est enim et secundum omnem opinionem verum, quod ideo potentia Patris generat, quia fecunda est.  Illud ergo recte dicitur esse ratio generandi, quod fecunditatem potentiae Patris importat. Fecunditas autem importatur et nomine innascibilitatis et nomine paternitatis, sed aliter et aliter.  Nam paternitas importat fecunditatem quasi praesupponendo et praeintelligendo, licet principaliter imponatur ab habitudine.  Dicitur enim paternitas habitudo Patris ad Filium. Innascibilitas autem importat fecunditatem ex consequenti intellectu:  nam ex primo intellectu importat privationem habitudinis ad prius; sed ex illa sola privatione non posset esse proprietas, cum sit consequens essentiam.  Et ideo innascibilis non solummodo dicitur Pater, quia ab alio non accipit esse, sed quia ab alio non accipit esse, et quia habet unde alii det esse.

But I judge it to be true, both that the Father generates, because (He is) innascible, and that He generates, because (He is) God (and) father, and this is clear in this manner.  For it is plain and according to the common opinion true, that the Power of the Father generates for this reason, because It is fecund.  Therefore rightly is that said to be the reason for generating, which conveys the fecundity of the Power of the Father.  But the fecundity is conveyed both by the name for the innascibility and by the name for the paternity, but in different manners [aliter et aliter].  For the paternity conveys the fecundity as if by presupposing and by understanding (it) beforehand, though principally it is imposed by a habitude.  For the paternity is said to be the habitude of the Father to the Son.  But the innascibility conveys the fecundity out of (its) consequent understanding:  for from (its) first understanding it conveys a privation of habitude to the prior; but out of this privation alone it could not be a property, since (that privation) is consequent to the Essence.  And for that reason the “Innascible One” is not only said (to be) the Father, because He does not accept (His) ‘being’ from Another, but because He does not accept (His) ‘being’ from Another and because He has whence He gives ‘being’ to Another.

Qui igitur superficialiter intelligit, attendendo vel aspiciendo, a quo primo nomen imponitur, utrumque negabit dicens, Patrem non ideo generare, quia pater est, nec ideo generare, quia innascibilis est, quia nec habitudo nec habitudinis privatio est ratio producendi personam. Et quantum ad hoc verum dicet, sed non plene. Qui autem plenarium intellectum capit utriusque, attendens fecunditatem importari per utrumque nomen, utrumque dicet: et quod generat, quia Deus innascibilis, et quod generat, quia Deus pater. Verum est enim, quod Pater generat, quia ipse nihil habet ab alio, sed habet unde det alii. Verum est etiam, quod Pater generat, quia fecunditatem habet in producendo sibi per omnia similem per modum naturae.

Who, therefore, superficially understands by attending and/or looking into (the reason), by which the name is first imposed, will deny each, saying that the Father does not generate for this reason, because He is a “father”, nor that He generates for this reason, because He is “innascible”, because neither a habitude nor a privation is a reason for producing a Person.  And as much (he speaks) according to this, he will speak the truth, but not fully.  But, he who grasps the full [plenarium] understanding of each, by attending (to the fact) that the fecundity is conveyed through each name, will say each:  both that He generates, because (He is) the innascible God, and that He generates, because (He is) God (and) a father.  For it is true, that the Father generates, because He has nothing from Another, but He (also) has whence He gives to Another.  It is also true, that the Father generates, because He has a fecundity in producing One similar to Himself in all things [per omnia] through the manner of nature.

1  Lectio huius vocabuli est dubia.
2  Aliqua verba desunt.
3  De his agitur I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 1; et d. 24. a. 1. q. 1, a. 2. q. 1.
4  De his II. Sent. d. 5. a. 3. q. 2; et d. 30. a. 3. q. 2.
5  De his III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 3; et d. 22. a. 1. q. 1.
6  De his IV Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 3; et d. 5. a. 3. q. 1.
7  Scilicet Alexandri.
8  Pars I. q. 2.
9  Pars I. q. 59. m. 3.
10  Sum. p. I. q. 62. m. 2.
11  Dist. 27. p. II. q. 1.

1  The reading of this word is doubtful.
2  Some of the (following) words following here are missing.
3  These things concern Sent., Bk. I, d. 17, p. ,. q. 1; and d. 24, a. 1, q. 1,and a. 2. q. 1.
4  These things concern Sent., Bk. II, d. 5, a. 3, q. 2; and d. 30, a. 3, q. 2.
5  These things concern Sent., Bk. III, d. 5, a. 2, q. 3; and d. 22, a. 1, q. 1.
6 These things concern Sent., Bk. IV, d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 3; and d. 5, a. 3, q. 1.
7  Namely that of Alexander (of Hales).
8  Part I, q. 2.
9  Part I, q. 59, m. 3.
10  (Alexander of Hales), Summa., p. I, q. 62, m. 2.
11  Dist. 27, p. II, q. 1.

p. 3

Cum ergo dixi, quod Pater ideo est pater, quia generat, et non ideo generat, quia pater, non hoc dixi ratione fecunditatis, quam importat hoc nomen paternitas in divinis, sed ratione habitudinis, a qua verius nomen patris imponitur; et ideo magistro non contradixi, sed hoc ibi dicere omisi et nunc suppleo, quod paternitas non tantummodo dicit habitudinem, sed etiam fecunditatem. Unde licet rationes ibi inductae ostendant, quod non ideo generat, quia pater, et concessae sint, quia verum concludebant, secundum quod pater imponitur ab habitudine; addendum fuit, quod non concludunt, secundum quod nomen patris importat fecunditatem. Cum autem dixi, quod Pater generat, quia Deus innascibilis, non hoc dixi, in quantum hoc quod est innascibilis importat privationem habitudinis; sic enim negat magister; sed hoc dixi, in quantum in nomine innascibilitatis clauditur potentia fecunditatis. Et hoc necessarium est ponere ad hoc, quod innascibilitas sit proprietas, sicut ibi multipliciter ostensum fuit. Magis autem adhaesi huius positioni, quod Pater generat, quia Deus innascibilis, non quia innascibilitas magis sit ratio generandi quam paternitas, vel quod sit adeo propria ratio sicut paternitas, sed quia magis est ibi status, ultra quem non contingit quaerere. Si enim quaeratur, quare Pater generat, et respondeatur, quia pater est, id est, fecundus fecunditate naturae, ad huc dubitabis et quaeret, quare illa potentia magis est fecunda quam alia? Et respondebitur: hoc est, quia ipsa a nullo alio habet esse. Ideo enim Pater est totius deitatis principium, quia a nullo, ut dicit Magister;1 hac ratione reddita, ibi status est, nec est ultra procedere. Et ideo dixi, quod Pater generat, quia Deus innascibilis, non ut assignarem generationis propriam rationem, sed magis propter inquisitionis terminationem. Nam in nomine patris importatur ratio generationis, ut propria, nomine vero innascibilitatis, ut prima; in uno antecedenter, in alio consequenter; in uno communiter, in altero specialiter.

When, therefore, I said, that the Father is a father for this reason, because He generates, and not that He generates for this reason, that (He is) a father, I did not say this according to the reckoning of fecundity, which this name “paternity” conveys among the divine, but according to the reckoning of the habitude, by which the name for a father is imposed; and for that reason I did not contradict Master (Alexander), but there I did omit to say this and I now add it, that the paternity means not only a habitude, but also a fecundity.  Whence though the reasons induced there show, that He does not generate for this reason, because (He is) a father, and (though) it is conceded, that they conclude truly, according to which “father” is imposed from a habitude; it had to be added, that they do not conclude, according to which the name for a father conveys a fecundity.  Moreover, when I said, that the Father generates, because (He is) the innascible God, I did not say this, inasmuch as that which is “innascible” conveys a privation of habitude; for thus Master (Alexander) denies it, but I said this, inasmuch as in a man the power of innascibility encloses one of fecundity.  And that is necessary to posit for this, that the innascibility is a property, just as has been shown there in a manifold manner.  Moreover I adhered rather to this position, that the Father generates, because (He is) the innascible God, not because the innascibility is more the reason for generating than the paternity, but because there is a greater standing still in it, beyond which it is not fitting to seek.  For, if there is asked, “Why (for what reason?) does the Father generate?”, and there is answered:  “Because He is a father, that is, (He is) fecund by a fecundity of nature”, still there will be a doubt and one will ask, “For what reason is that power more fecund than another?  And there will be the response:  “This is (so), because it has ‘being’ from no other”.  For, for this reason « the Father is the beginning of the whole Deity, because (He is) from none », as Master (Peter) says;1 with this reckoning rendered, the argument stands [ibi status est] nor is there further proceeding.  And for that reason I said, that the Father generates, because (He is) the innascible God, not to assign a proper reckoning of the generation, but rather for the sake of ending the inquiry.  For in the name for a father there is conveyed the reckoning of generation, as a proper (reckoning), but in the name for the innascibility, as a prime (reckoning); in the one antecedently, in the other consequently; in the one commonly, in the other specially

In secundo autem nemo me arbitrabitur discordasse qui sciat distinguere inter propria et transumta.  Sicut enim dicens, non esse verum risum sine ore, nec esse verum volatum sine alis, non contradicit ei qui dicit, pratum sine ore ridere, et sagittas sine alis volare; sic qui dicit, nomen loquendi vel dicendi proprie sumtum non esse sine verbo, sicut nec generare sine filio, non contradicit ei qui dicit, loqui vel dicere sic transumi posse et secundum aliquam significationem transumtivam dici de aliquo sine verbo generato.

However in the Second (Book) no one will judge that I have disagreed (Alexander of Hales) who knows how to distinguish among proper and transferred (names).  For just as saying, that there is not true laughter without a mouth, and that there is not true flight without wings, one does not contradict him who says, that the meadow laughs without a mouth, and the arrow flies without wings; thus he who says, that the name for speaking or for saying taken properly is not without a word, just as that neither (is) there a generating without a son, does not contradict him who says, that speaking or saying can be thus transferred, that it can also be said according to some transumptive signification of anything without a generate word.

In his igitur et in omnibus aliis, si quis aspiciat diligenter et pie, inveniet, me a patrum et maiorum vestigiis non fuisse ausum recedere; quoniam iuxta consilium Gregorii2 sanius est alieno intellectui cedere quam contentionibus deservire, pro eo quod, sicut dicit documentum Doctoris gentium ad Timotheum:3  Servum Domini non oportet litigere, sed mansuetum esse ad omnes, docibilem, patientem, cum modestia corripientem eos qui renitent veritati.

Therefore in these thing and in all others, if one looks at them diligently and piously, he will find, that I have not dared to retreat from the footprints of my father and elders; since in accord with the counsel of (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great)2 it is healthier to cede to another's understanding than to be a slave to contentions, in virtue of this that, as the document of the Doctor of the nations to Timothy says:3  A slave of the Lord must not argue, but be meek towards all, teachable, patient, correcting with modesty those who resist the truth.

His igitur praelibatis, cum invocatione gratiae Dei calamus sumatur. Exordium: Solummodo hoc inveni etc.

Therefore with these thing removed beforehand, with the invocation of the grace of God, let the pen be taken up.  The Exordium: Only in this have I found etc.

1  Dist. XXIX. c. 1.
2  Libr. XXVIII Moral. c. 14. n. 27, secundum sensum.
3  II. Tim. 2, 24. 25.

1  Distinction XXIX, c. 1
2  Morals., Bk. XXVIII, c. 14, n. 27, according to its sense.
3  2 Tim. 2:24,25.

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