S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

PARS I.
De creatione humanae naturae quantum ad principium efficiens in generali.

PART I
On the creation of human nature as much as regards its efficient principle in general.

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 13-19.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 13-19.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Creationem rerum etc.

Scripture introducing at its first beginning etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Unde liber iste secundus, qui incipit:  Creationem rerum etc., dividitur in duas partes.1  In prima agit de hominis conditione; in secunda de lapsu eius et tentatione, infra distinctione vigesima prima:  Videns igitur diabolus etc.  Prima pars habet duas; quia enim homo communicat cum . . .

Wherefore this Second Book of his, which begins:  Scripture introducing at its first beginning etc., is divided into two parts.1  In the first (Master Peter) deals with the foundation of man [de hominis conditione]; in the second with his fall and temptation, below in the Twenty-First Distinction, (where he says):  Therefore, the Devil seeing, that etc..  The first part has two (parts); for, because man communicates with . . .

1  Coniungenda est haec propositio cum fine Prooemii.  Cfr. supra pag. 6, nota 5.  —  Vat., contradicentibus mss. legit sic:  Postquam Magister supra in primo libro determinavit de mysterio Trinitatis, consequenter in hoc secundo libro determinat de rebus creatis.  Et dividitur ista pars in duas.  In prima etc.

1  This proposition is to be conjoined with the end of (St. Bonaventure’s) Foreword.  Cf. above p. 6, footnote 5.  —  The Vatican edition, contradicting the manuscripts, reads thus:  After Master (Peter) determined above in the First Book concerning the Mystery of the Trinity, he consequently determines in this Second Book concerning created things.  And this part is divided into two (parts).  In the first etc. [Postquam Magister supra in primo libro determinavit de mysterio Trinitatis, consequenter in hoc secundo libro determinat de rebus creatis.  Et dividitur ista pars in duas.  In prima etc.]

p. 14

cum omnibus creaturis, et cetera facta sunt propter hominem, ideo primo agit de conditione rerum in generali, secundo vero in speciali, infra distinctione secunda:  De angelica vero natura etc.

all creatures, and all others have been made for the sake of man, for that reason he first deals with the foundation of things in general, but second in particular, below in the Second Distinction (where he says):  And so of angelic nature etc..

Prima pars habet duas.  In prima determinat de conditione rerum quantum ad principium efficiens, in secunda vero quantum ad finem, ibi:  Et quia non valet eius beatitudinis1 etc.  Prima pars habet tres particulas.  In prima proponit veritatem, quae exprimitur in Scripturae sacrae auctoritate.  In secunda vero auctoritatem explanat, ibi:  Creare est de nihilo2 etc.  In tertia vero, quia per illam auctoritatem positiones erroneae eliduntur, concludit ultimo earum evacuationem, ibi:  Horum ergo et similium errorum etc.  Et quaelibet harum partium habet duas.  In prima namque parte proponit auctoritatem veritatis; in secunda errorem Platonis ibi:  Plato namque etc.  Similiter et secunda duas habet.  In prima explanat auctoritatem et verba auctoritatis.  In secunda ponit errorem Aristotelis, ibi:  Aristoteles vero duo etc.  Eodem modo tertia habet duas.  Prima enim concludit errorum improbationem, secunda vero fidei confirmationem, ibi:  Credamus igitur etc.

The first part has two (parts).  In the first (Master Peter) makes a determination [determinat] concerning the foundation of things as much as regards (their) efficient Principle, but in the second as much as regards (their) End, there (where he says):  And since no one can prevail to exist as a sharer of His Beatitude etc..1  The first part has three subparts [particulas].  In the first he proposes the truth, which is expressed in the authority of Sacred Scripture.  In the second, however, he explains the authority, there (where he says):  “to create” is properly ‘to make something from nothing’ etc.2  In the third, however, because the erroneous positions are crushed through that authority, he concludes, last, their refutation [evacuationem], there (where he says):  Refuting the error, therefore, of these and similar (men)* etc..  And each of these parts has two (parts).  And indeed in the first part he proposes the authority of the truth; in the second the error of Plato there (where he says):  For indeed Plato etc..  Similarly also the second (part) has two (parts).  In the first he explains the authority and the words of the authority.  In the second he posits the error of Aristotle, there (where he says):  But Aristotle said that (there are) two etc..  In the same manner the third (part) has two (parts).  For the first concludes the refutation [improbationem] of the errors, but the second the confirmation of the Faith, there (where he says):  Let us believe, therefore, etc..

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam vero eorum quae in hac parte3 dicuntur, quaeritur hic de exitu rerum in esse.

For an understanding, however, of those (things) which are said in this part,3 there is here asked of the coming forth [exitu] of things into ‘being’.

Primo quantum ad principii entitatem.

First as much as regards the entity of (their) principle.

Secundo quantum ad unitatem.

Second as much as regards (its) unity.

Circa primum duo quaeruntur.

About the first two (questions) are asked.

Primo quaeritur, utrum res habeant principium causale. 

First there is asked, whether things have a causal principle.

Secundo, utrum habeant principium initiale. 

Second whether they have an initial principle.

ARTICULUS I.

 

De entitate principii.

ARTICLE I

 

On the entity of the principle (of things).

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum res habeant principium causale.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether things have a causal principle?

QUANTUM AD PRIMUM sic proceditur.

MOREOVER REGARDING THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced in this manner:

Cum constet secundum Sanctos et philosophos, quod omnes res mundanae habuerint principium productivum tum propter rerum varietatem, tum propter rerum mutabilitatem, tum propter rerum ordinem, tum etiam propter imperfectionem — multitudo enim ortum habet ab unitate, et motus sive mutabile ab immutabili, et ordo ad primum, et imperfectum ad perfectum originaliter reducuntur4 — ideo hoc supposito, scilicet quod res habeant principium causale aliquo modo, est quaestio, utrum res sint productae omnino, hoc est secundum principium materiale et formale, an tantum secundum alterum principiorum.  Et quod secundum utrumque, videtur:

Since it is established according to the Saints and philosophers, that all mundane things had a productive principle both on account the variety of things, and on account of the mutability of things, and on account of the order of things, and even on account of the imperfection (of things) — for a multitude has (its) rise from a unity, and movement or the mutable from the immutable, and order is originally lead back to the first, and the imperfect to the perfect4 — for that reason with this supposed, namely, that things have a causal principle in some manner, there is the question, whether things have been entirely produced, that is according to (their) material and formal principle, or whether (they have been produced) only according to one of (these) principles.  And that (they have been produced) according to each, seems:

1. Primo a parte producentis sic.  Quanto producens est prius et perfectius, tanto plus influit in rem:5  ergo primum et perfectissimum influit totum et in totum; et si hoc, ergo totum producit.  Sed primum agens est huiusmodi:  ergo etc.

1. First on the part of the one Producing in this manner:  As much as the one producing is prior and more perfect, so much more does He inflow [influit] into the thing (produced):5  therefore the First and Most Perfect influences [influit] the whole and (inflows) unto the whole; and if this, therefore He produces the whole.  But the Prime Agent is of this kind:  ergo etc..

2. Item, nobilius et perfectius est agens, quanto paucioribus indiget ad agendum,6 ergo agens nobilissimum nullo extra se eget:  ergo si ipsum solum esset, adhuc res produceret; sed non ex se, cum ipse nullius sit pars:  ergo ex nihilo:  patet ergo, quod Deus potest in totam substantiam creaturae.

2. Likewise, more noble and more perfect is the agent, as much as it needs fewer (things) for acting,6 therefore the most noble agent will need nothing outside of itself:  therefore if it alone were, it would still produce things; but not out of itself, since it is a part of nothing:  therefore out of nothing:  therefore it is clear, that God is able unto [potest in] the whole substance of a creature.

3. Item, agens secundum formam potest producere formam:  ergo pari ratione agens secundum se totum potest producere totum; sed Deus se . . .

3. Likewise, one acting according to form can produce a form:  therefore for an equal reason one acting according to its whole self can produce a whole; but God acts according to His whole / self [se toto agit] . . .

1  Plurimi codd. bonitatis.

2  Vat. Creator enim est etc.  Sed haec propositio in textu Magistri praecedit immediate illam, quam nos fide fere omnium codd. posuimus.  Mox codd. cum ed. 1 minus congrue Tertio pro In tertia, et includit pro concludit.

3  Codd. N Z in littera.  Paulo inferius Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. post entitatem subiungit vel causalitatem.

4  De his cfr. tom. I. pag. 342, nota 5; pag. 420, nota 5. et 7, et pag. 421, nota 2; — pag. 78, nota 2, et pag. 157, nota 11; — d. 43. q. 3. in corp.; infra q. 2. fund. 2, et Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 2. (X. c. 2.):  Quo namque pacto ordo erit, non existente aliquo perpetuo, separato ac permanente? — pag. 326, nota 7; pag. 421, nota 2; pag. 77, dub. 1; et Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 10:  Omne enim, quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id imminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquod esse necesse sit.  Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur, exstiterit, ne fingi quidem potest etc.

5  Haec propositio formata est ex prop. I. libri de Causis, quam vide tom. I. pag. 471, nota 3, et pag. 638, nota 2.

6  Secundum Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 62. seqq. (c. 12.).  —  Paulo inferius ed. 1 producere posset pro produceret.  Verborum immediate sequentium sed non ex se etc. fusiorem probationem invenies I. Sent. d. 8, p. II. q. 2; d. 19. p. II. q. 3, et d. 31. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

7  Supponitur hic et in tota fere quaestione Aristotelis de materia et forma doctrina, in specie, quoad omnis actio naturalis praesupponit subiectum, in quod transit, et hoc est materia, utpote principium passionis, et quod forma est principium actionis, mediante qua similis forma producitur.  Cfr. I. Phys. text. 81. seq. (c. 9.); I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 55. (c. 7.) et II. text. 53. (c. 9.).

1  Very many codices have Goodness [bonitatis] for Beatitude [beatitudinis].

2  The Vatican edition reads For a “creator” is he etc. [Creator enim est].  but this proposition in the text of Master (Peter)’s precedes immediately that, which we have placed here, trusting in nearly all the codices.  Next the codices, together with edition 1, have less congruously Third [Tertio] for In the third [In tertia], and includes [includit] for concludes [concludit].

3  Codices N and Z have in the text [in littera] for in this part [in hac parte].  A little below this the Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, after entity [entitatem] subjoins and/or causality [causalitatem].

4  On these (doctrines) cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 19, p. I, a. sole, q. 1, p. 342, footnote 5; d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, p. 420, footnote 5 and 7, and p. 421, footnote 2; — d. 3, p. I, Doubt 1, p. 78, footnote 2, and d. 8, p. I, a. 3, q. 1, p. 157, footnote 11; — d. 43, q. 3, in the body of the Question; (and) below in q. 2, 2nd argument of the fundament, and Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 2 (Bk. X, ch. 2):  For by what pact will there be an order, with nothing perpetual, separate and permanent existing ? — d. 18, a. sole, q. 3, p. 326, footnote 7; d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, p. 421, footnote 2; d. 3, p. I, Doubt 1, p. 77; and (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III; prose 10:  For everything which is said to be “imperfect”, is held to be imperfect according to the lessening of the perfect.  Whence it comes to be, that if something seems to be imperfect in any genus, it is  necessary, that in that (genus) there also be something perfect.  For indeed with perfection borne away, from which that, which is held (to be) imperfect, existed, etc.

5  This proposition has been formed from the proposition in the first Book of Causes, which is cited in Sent., Bk. I, d. 27, p. I, a. sole, q. 2, p. 471, footnote 3, and d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 638, footnote 2.

6  According to Aristotle, On Heaven and the World, Bk. II, text 62 ff. (ch. 12).  —  A little below this edition 1 has it could still produce [producere posset] for it would still produce [produceret].  You will find a more lengthy proof of the words immediately following:  but not out of itself etc. [sed non ex se etc], in Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q. 2; d. 19, p. II, q. 3, and d. 31, p. II; a. 2, q. 1.

7  There is supposed here and in nearly the entire Question the doctrine of Aristotle concerning matter and form, in particular, that every natural action presupposes a subject, into which it passes, and this is the matter, or rather the principle of the passion, and that form is the principle of the action, by means of which there is produced a similar form.  Cf. Physics, Bk. I, text 81 f. (ch. 9); On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 55 (ch. 7), and Bk. II, text 53 (ch. 9).

 

* [Trans. note:  Here the critical text reads the equivalent of Refuting (the assertions), therefore, of these and similar errors [errorum] instead of Refuting the error, therefore, of these and similar (men) [errorem], on account of the fact, as often will occur, that the codices of st. Bonaventure’s commentaries have a variant reading of Lombard’s work than that employed here by the Quaracchi editors; in fact, in the 1493 Freiburg Edition of St. Bonventure’s Commentary, folio Aa 2 v, and Aa 3 r, respectively, the reading of Bonaventure here seems to be errorum, where as that of Lombard on the next page is errorem, the same as that of the Quaracchi edition.  Accordingly, I have changed the English to conform with the Latin text of Lombard used by the Quaracchi Editors, for the sake of the reader’s facility and comprehension.]

p. 15

toto agit, cum sit omnino simplex:  ergo producit totum.

according to His whole / self [se toto agit], since He is entirely simple:  therefore He produces the whole (of a creature).

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur a parte rei conditae sic:  quod non est ab alio, est a se ipso; nihil autem tale quod a se ipso est, indiget alio, ut sit;1 sed omne intrinsecum principium rei indiget alio, ut sit, nam forma indiget materia, et e converso:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown on the part of the thing founded in this manner:  ‘what is not from another, is from its very self [a se ipso]; but nothing such which is from its very self, needs another, to be;1 but every intrinsic principle of a thing needs another, to be, for form needs matter, and vice versa:  ergo etc.’.

5. Item, efficiens et finis sunt causae correlativae,2 ergo quod non est ab alio, non est ad aliud; sed omnia sunt ad aliud secundum omne quod sunt, quia secundum omne quod sunt, appetunt bonum; et status non est nisi in summo bono.  Et quod ista ratio sit bona, ostenditur.  Si enim bonum et ens convertuntur3, ergo quod est se ipso ens se ipso est bonum; sed quod se ipso est bonum, non est propter aliquid aliud: ergo quod non est ab alio, non est propter aliud.  Si ergo omnia mundana secundum se tota sunt propter aliud, ergo sunt ab alio.

5. Likewise, the one effecting (the thing) and the end (of the end) are correlative causes (of the thing),2 therefore what is not from another [ab alio], is not for another [ad aliud]; but all are for another according to everything which they are, because according to everything which they are, they seek after [appetunt] the good; and there is no standing still but in the Most High Good. And that this reason is a good one, is shown (thus):  For if the good and being are convertible [convertuntur],3 therefore what is by its very self a being, is by itself very self good; but what by its very self is good, is not for the sake of anything else [propter aliquid aliud]:  therefore what is not from another, is not for the sake of another.  If therefore all mundane (beings) according to their whole selves [secundum se tota] are for the sake of another, therefore they are from another.

6. Item, si res non est totaliter ab alio, aut hoc est ratione formae, aut ratione materiae.  Constat quod non formae,4 quia videmus, formas produci, et si formae non producerentur, omnino nihil produceretur.  Si ratione materiae; sed contra:  ut dicit Philosophus in Prima Philosophia,5 « actus est ante potentiam »; constat, quod non loquitur de potentia activa, sed passiva:  ergo cum actus rei sit ab alio, similiter et materia.  Si tu dicas, quod intelligitur non de actu, qui est forma, sed efficiens; idem concluditur.  —  Et iterum, ego quaero, quare materia non sit ab alio.  Si quia est principium, ex quo fiunt cetera, nec habet unde fiat;6 tunc ego quaero de forma, utrum fiat ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo.  Si ex nihilo, pari ratione et materia ex nihilo.  Si ex aliquo, quaero, quid sit illud.  Non essentia materiae; constat, quia forma simplex est:  ergo forma non fit ex materia, ita quod materia sit eius principium constitutivum.  Nec fit ex materia, ita quod materia fiat forma:  fit ergo ex aliquo, quod est in materia.7  Tunc ego quaero:  de quo est illud?  Et constat, quod non est ex materia, pari ratione:  ergo vel erit abire in infinitum in causando,8 vel necesse est ponere, essentias formarum a primo opifice productas ex nihilo:  ergo pari ratione et materiam.

6. Likewise, if a thing is not entirely from another, either this is by reason of (its) form, or by reason of (its) matter.  It is established that (it is) not (by reason) of (its) form,4 because we see, that forms are produced, and if forms were not produced, nothing entirely would be produced.  If by reason of (its) matter; but on the contrary:  as the Philosopher says in (his) First Philosophy,5 « act is before potency [potentia] »; it is established, that he is not speaking of active power [potentia activa], but passive (power):  therefore since the act of a thing is from another, similarly too the matter (of a thing).  If you say, that (his saying) is not understood of the act, which is a form, but (of the act which is) the one effecting, the same is concluded.  —  And again, I ask, “For what reason is matter not from another?”  If because it is a principle, out of which all others are made, and (because) it does not have whence it is made;6 then I ask concerning form, whether it is made out of something, and/or out of nothing.  If out of nothing, for an equal reason matter too (is made) out of nothing.  If out of something, I ask, what that is.  Not the essence of matter; (that) is established, because a form is simple:  therefore a form is not made out of matter, so that matter be its constitutive principle.  Neither is it made out of matter, so that matter be made a form:  therefore it is made out of something, which is in matter.7  Then I ask:  “Of what is it?”  And it is established, that it has not (been made) out of matter, for an equal reason:  therefore either there will be an regress unto infinity [abire in infinitum] in causing,8 and/or it is necessary to posit, that the essences of forms (have) been produced by the First Worker out of nothing:  therefore for an equal reason matter also.

1. Ad oppositum sunt rationes primo a parte efficientis.  Prima haec est:  omnis effectus aliquo modo assimilatur causae;9 sed principium primum est actus purus, nihil habens de possibili, materia autem rerum est possibile purum per sui essentiam, nihil habens de actu:  ergo cum materia in nullo assimiletur opifici, non est ab ipso.

1. For the opposite (side) the reasons are first on the part of the one effecting.  The first is:  every effect is in some manner assimilated to a cause;9 but the First Principle is a pure act, having nothing of the possible, but the matter of things is a pure possible through its own essence, having nothing of act:  therefore since matter is assimilated in nothing to the Worker, it is not from Him.

2. Item, ab agente pulcherrimo et luminosissimo non procedit turpe et tenebrosum; sed Deus est ipsa pulcritudo et ipsa lux,10 materiale principium est turpe et tenebrosum:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, from a most beautiful and most luminous agent there does not proceed (anything) ugly [turpe] and shadowy [tenebrosum]; but God is Beauty Itself and Light Itself,10 (and) the material principle is ugly and shadowy:  ergo etc.

3. A parte rerum ostenditur de formali principio:  « Omne enim quod producitur et fit, fit a sibi simili nomine et specie, ut homo ab homine », secundum quod dicit Philosophus septimo Philosophiae primae.11  Si ergo formae rerum sunt principia producendi, et principium producendi praecedit rerum productionem; ergo res non sunt productae quoad principium formale.

3. On the part of things it is shown concerning (their) formal principle:  « For everything which is produced and is made, is made by (something) similar to itself in name and species, such as a man (is produced) by a man », according to what the Philosopher says in the seventh (book) of (his) First Philosophy.11  If, therefore, the forms of things are the principles of producing, and the principle of producing precedes the production of things; therefore things have not been produced in regard to (their) formal principle.

1  Cfr. Anselm., Monol. c. 3. seqq.  —  De minori vide tom. I. pag. 169, nota 4.  —  Pro a se ipso, quod bis occurit, plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 secundo loco habent se ipso, quod etiam a paucioribus mss. primo loco ponitur (cod. bb et ed. 1 in se ipso).

2  Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.) ostendit, tres causas, scil. efficientem, formalem, et finalem, esse connexas inter se, immo multoties in unam concurrere.  De maiori eiusque addita ratione cfr. Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11.  —  Simili argumento S. Doctor, libr. I. d. 2. q. 1. fundam 3. probat, unum tantum esse Deum.  —  Paulo inferius non pauci codd. in summe bonum pro in summo bono, incongrue.

3  Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5; cfr. tom. I. pag. 32, nota 2.  —  Mox plures codd. se ipso est ens bonum pro primo se ipso est bonum, ubi Vat. cum paucis mss. adiungit et e converso.

4  Cod. Q ratione formae.

5  Libr. IX. Metaph. text. 13. seqq. (VIII. c. 8.), ubi probat, actum potentia priorem esse ratione (definitione), substantia (perfectione) et quandoque tempore; ac XII. text. 30. (XI. c. 6.), ubi eadem ratione monstrat, praeter substantias naturales unam esse, quae sempiterna sit et actus.  —  Verba, quae sequuntur:  constat, quod non loquitur etc. intellige secundum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 2. a. 3:  « et loquitur de potentia, quae perficitur per actum ».  —  Paulo inferius multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt similiter.

6  Aristot., I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.):  Si enim (materia) fiat, subiici aliquid oportet primum, ex quo inexistente fiat.  Hoc autem est ipsius natura.  Quare, erit antequam fiat.  Dico enim, materiam primum subiectum uniuscuiusque, ex quo fit aliquid, cum insit, non secundum accidens.

7  Quod vocatur ratio seminalis, de qua infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 3, vel secundum alios potentia materiae.

8  Quod est impossibile in omni genere causarum, ut ostendit Aristot., II: Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brevior. c. 2.).  —  Cod. aa inquirendo pro in causando).

9  Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 2. § 8. et c. 9. § 6.  —  Quod materia sit pura potentia, docet Aristot., I. Phys. text. 69. (c. 7.) et VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.), de quo tom. I. pag. 358, nota 11, et infra d. 12. a. 1.  —  Paulo inferius plures codd. ut B C I O P R T de materia possibili pro de possibili; dein Vat. potentiale pro possibile.

10  Epist. I. Ioan. 1, 5.  —  De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.), ubi docet, materiam appetere forma, sicut turpe pulchrum.  —  Aliquanto superius cod. W lucidissimo pro luminosissimo.  Cod. F conclusionem argumenti supplet ergo nullo modo est ab ipso.

11  Text. 28. (VI. c. 8.):  « In quibusdam etenim etiam manifestum est, quod generans tale est, quale quod generatur, non tamen idem nec unum numero, sed unum specie, ut in naturalibus; homo namque hominem generat ».  Et text. 30. (VI. c. 9.) iuxta translationem Arabico-latinam:  « Manifestum est igitur ex dictis, quod quoquo modo omne quod fit, fit a conveniente in nomine (ex omwnumou), sicut illud quod est per naturam ».  Averroes in hunc textum:  Manifestum est igitur ex praedictis, quod omne quod generatur, generatur a conveniente in nomine et ratione, ut illud quod est per naturam, i. e. homo ab homine.  De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 22. seqq. (VI. c. 7), ubi contra Platonem ostendit, formas existentes in rebus corporalibus esse a formis, quae sunt in materia.

1  Cf. (St.) Anselm, Monologion., ch. 3 ff.  —  On the minor see Sent, Bk. I, d, 8, p. II, a. sole, q. 2, p. 169, footnote 4.  —  For from its very self [a se ipso], which occurs twice, very many codices, together with edition 1, have in the second position by its very self [se ipso], which is even the reading of a few manuscripts in the first position (cod. bb and edition 1 read in its very self [in se ipso].

2  Aristotle in Physics, Bk. II, text 70 (ch. 7), shows, that the three causes, namely the efficient, formal and final, have been conjoined among themselves, indeed very often to concur in one (thing).  On the major and its added reason, cf. (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prosa 11.  —  By a similar argument the Seraphic Doctor, in Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 1, in 3rd argument of the fundament, proves that there is only one God.  —  A little below this not a few codices have incongruously in One most highly good [in summe bono] for in the Most High Good [in summo bono].

3  (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 5; cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, p. 32, footnote 2.  —  Next several codices have is by its very self a good being [se ipso est ens bonum] for the first is by its very self good [se ipso est bonum], where the Vatican edition, together with a few manuscripts, adjoins and vice versa [et e converso].

4  Codez Q reads by reason of (its) form [ratione formae] for not (by reason) of (its) form [non formae].

5  Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text 13 ff. (Bk. VII, ch. 8), where he proves, that act is prior to potency according to reckoning (definition), according to substance (perfection) and whenever according to time; and in Bk. XII, text 30 (Bk. XI, ch. 6), where by the same reckoning he shows, that besides the natural substances, there is one (substance), which is sempiternal and an act.  —  Understand the words which follow:  it is established, that he is not speaking etc. [constat, quod non loquitur etc.] according to Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 1, m. 2, a. 3:  « and he is speaking of the potency, which is perfected through act ».  —  A little below this many codices, together with edition 1, omit similarly [similiter].

6  Aristotle (says) in Physics, Bk. I, text 82 (ch. 9):  For if (matter) is made, it is necessary that something first be subjected, out of which non-existing (thing) it is made.  But this is its nature.  Wherefore it will be before it is made.  For I say, that matter (is) the first subject of each (thing) [uniuscuiusque], out of which something is made, since it is in (it), not according to accident.

7  Which is called the “seminal reason” [ratio seminalis], concerning which see below d. 18, q. 1, q. 3, and/or, according to others, the “potency of matter” [potential materia].

8  Which is impossible in every genera of cause, as Aristotle shows in Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 5 ff (Bk. I, in the shorter version, ch. 2).  —  Codex aa has in inquiring [inquirendo] for in causing [in causando].

9  (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 2, § 8 and ch. 9, § 6.  —  Aristotle teaches, that matter is pure potency, in Physics, Bk. I, text 69, (ch. 7), and Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 8 (Bk. VI, ch. 3), concerning which see Sent., Bk. I, d. 19, p. II, a. sole, q. 2, p. 358, footnote 11, and below in d. 12, a. 1.  —  A little below this several codices, such as B C I O P R T, have of possible matter [de material possibili] for of the possible [de possibili]; then the Vatican edition has a pure potential [potentiale purum] for a pure possible [possibile purum].

10  1 Jn. 1:5.  —  On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 81 (ch. 9), where he teaches, that matter desires form, as the ugly (desires) the beautiful.  —  Somewhat above this codex X has most lucid [lucidissimo] for most luminous [luminossissimo].  Codex F supplies the conclusion of the argument:  therefore in no manner is it from Him [ergo nullo modo est ab ipso].

11  (That is, his Metaphysics): Text 28, (Bk. VI, ch. 8):  « For indeed in certain (things) it is manifest, that as such is the one generating, so that which is generated, yet not the same nor one in number, but one in species, as in natural (things); for indeed a man generates a man ».  And text. 30 (Bk. VI, ch. 9) according to the Arabic-Latin translation:  « It is manifest, therefore, from (what has) been said, that in whatever manner everything which is made, it is made from one convening in name (ex omwnumou), just as that which is (made) through nature ».  Averroës on this text (says):  It is manifest, therefore, from the aforesaid, that everything which is generated, is generated from one convening in name and reckoning, such as that which is (generated) through nature, i. e. a man from a man.  On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 22 ff. (Bk. VI, ch. 7), where against Plato he shows, that forms existing in corporal things are from the forms, which are in matter.

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4. Item, artifex non potest producere, nisi praecognoscat; non potest praecognoscere nisi per formas;1 non potest per formas cognoscere, quae nullo modo sunt:  ergo impossibile fuit, quod summus artifex mundum formaret, nisi formae prius essent, per quas cognosceret; et illae non potuerunt produci similiter nisi per formas:  ergo si non est in infinitum abire, est ponere, formas rerum non esse productas.

4. Likewise, a craftsman cannot produce, unless he cognizes (the thing) beforehand; he cannot cognize (it) before hand except through forms;1 he cannot cognize through forms (those), which in no manner are:  therefore it was impossible, that the Most High Craftsman form the world, unless there were forms beforehand, through which He cognized (it); and those could not be produced, similarly, except through forms:  therefore if there is not a regress unto infinity, there is a positing, that the forms of things have not been produced.

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur quoad materiale principium.  « Omne quod producitur, producitur ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo; sed ex nihilo nihil:  ergo omnia ex aliquo »;2 illud autem est materia:  ergo si stare est et non abire in infinitum, illud non est productum.  Quod autem ex nihilo nihil fiat, videtur.  Productio enim rei est actio; sed omnis actio requirit in quid agat,3 ergo et omnis productio:  ergo omni productioni subiicitur aliquid; non nisi materia:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown in regard to a material principle.  « Everything which is produced, is produced out of something, and/or out of nothing; but out of nothing nothing (is produced):  therefore all (are produced) out of something »;2 but that (something) is matter:  therefore, if there is a standing still and not an regress unto infinity, that (something) has not been produced.  But it seems that out of nothing nothing is made.  For the production of a thing is an action; but every action requires (that) upon which it acts,3 therefore also every production:  therefore to every production there is subjected something; (and this something is) not but matter:  ergo etc..

6. Item, ego quaero de productione sive creatione passiva,4 utrum illa sit substantia, vel accidens; non substantia, ergo accidens.  Sed omne accidens fundatur in aliquo; sed hoc non potest esse creatum, cum illud sequatur naturaliter ipsam creationem:  ergo necesse est, quod sit increatum et aliud a Deo, quia creatio-passio in alio est:  ergo necesse est, omne quod producitur, ex aliquo produci; et ideo Philosophus in primo Physicorum5 dicit, quod materia est ingenita.

6. Likewise, I ask concerning production or passive creation,4 “Whether that is a substance, and/or an accident?”; not a substance, therefore an accident.  But every accident is founded in something; but this cannot be a created (being), since that follows naturally creation itself:  therefore it is necessary, that it be (something) created and other than God, because the creation-passion (i.e. the act of creation, reckoned as a passion) is in another:  therefore it is necessary, that everything which is produced, be produced out of something; and for that reason the Philosopher in the first (book) of (his) Physics5 says, that matter is unbegotten.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Mundus de nihilo est productus et secundum se totum et secundum sua principia intrinseca.

CONCLUSION

 

The world was produced from nothing both according to its whole self and according to its intrinsic principles.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod haec veritas est:  mundus in esse productus est, et non solum secundum se totum, sed etiam secundum sua intrinseca princpia, quae non ex aliis, sed de nihilo sunt producta.  —  Haec autem veritas, etsi nunc cuilibet fideli6 sit aperta et lucida, latuit tamen prudentiam philosophicam, quae in huius quaestionis inquistione longo tempore ambulavit per devia.  Fuerunt enim quidam antiqui philosophi,7 qui dixerunt, mundum factum esse a Deo et de sui essentia, quia non videbant, quomodo aliquid posset fieri ex nihilo; et solus Deus fuit in principio, et ideo dixerunt, quod fecit omnia de se ipso.  —  Sed haec positio non solum fidelibus, sed etiam sequentibus philosophis apparuit improbabilis, quod Dei essentia8 omnino invariabilis et nobilissima fieret corporalium et variabilium materia, quae de se est imperfecta, nisi perficiatur per formam.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that this is true:  “The world has been led forth  into ‘being’ [in esse productus est], and not only according to its whole self, but even according to its intrinsic principles, which have been produced not out of others, but from nothing.”  —  But this truth, even if it is now open and lucid to any of the faithful [cuilibet fideli],6 it belied [latuit], however, the prudence of the philosopher, which in the inquisition of this question walked for a long time through devious (paths).  For there were indeed certain, ancient philosophers,7 who said, that the world had been made by God and from His own Essence, because they did not seen, in what manner something could be made out of nothing; and in the beginning there was God alone, and for that reason they said, that He made all (things) from His very self.  —  But this position appeared improbable not only to the faithful, but even to subsequent [sequentibus] philosophers, that God’s entirely invariable and most noble Essence8 would become the matter of (things) corporal and variable, which (matter) is imperfect, if it is not perfected through form.

Fuerunt et alii, qui dixerunt, mundum factum esse ex principiis praeexistentibus, scilicet ex materia et forma; sed formae latebant in materia, antequam intellectus illas distingueret.  Et hoc posuit Anaxagoras.9  —  Sed quia formas esse omnes simul in materia, non capit ratio recta, ideo per sequentes philosophos ista positio improbata est.

There were also others, who said, that the world was made out of pre-existing principles, namely out of matter and form; but forms lay hidden in matter, before an intellect distinguished them.  And this did Anaxagoras9 posit.  —  But because right reason does not grasp that all forms are together in matter, for that reason this position of theirs was disproved by subsequent philosophers.

Fuerunt et tertii, qui mundum ex principibus praeexistentibus factum posuerunt, scilicet materia et forma; sed materiam per se posuerunt, formas separatas et postmodum ex tempore ab opifice summo esse coniunctas.  Et hi fuerunt Platonici.10  —  Sed quia illud irrationabile videtur, quod materia ab aeterno fuerit imperfecta, et quod eadem forma sit separata pariter et coniuncta; et absurdum videtur triplicem hominem ponere, scilicet naturalem, mathematicum et divinum:  ideo etiam per sequentes philosophos haec positio reprobata est.

There were also (those) third, who posited that the world (had) been made out of pre-existing principles, namely matter and form; but the posited that matter (existed) through itself, (and) that separated forms were after a while conjoined in time by the Most High Worker.  And these were the Platonists.10  —  But because it seems irrational, that matter was imperfect from eternity, and that the same form is equally separate and conjoined; (because) it seems absurd to posit a threefold man, namely the natural (man), the mathematical (man) and the divine (man):  for that reason this position was also reproved through subsequent philosophers.

1  Plato, Gorg. (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 465) ait:  « Ego autem artis nomine dignam minime eam rem esse existimo, quae careat ratione ».  Et X. de Republ. (tom. II. pag. 596):  « Nonne solemus etiam dicere supellectilis utriusque artificem sic opus suum absolvere, ut in formulam illam [ideam] intueatur . . .?  Non enim ullus artifex ideam ipsam fabricat.  Qui enim posset »?  Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 4:  « Ars igitur, sicut dictum est, habitus quidam est cum ratione vera effectivus »; et VII. Metaph. text. 23. (VI. c. 7.):  « Ab arte autem fiunt quorum forma in anima ».  Cfr. tom. I. pag. 600, nota 7.  —  Paulo post Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. praecognoscere pro cognoscere, et est pro fuit.  Deinde aliqui codd. ut H bb poterant pro potuerunt.  —  Hoc argumentum est Platonis dicentis in Timaeo (tom. III. pag. 28.):  Quidquid autem gignitur, ex aliqua causa gigni necesse est; fieri enim nullo modo potest, ut quidquam sine causa gignatur aut fiat.  Quocirca, si is qui aliquod opus efficere molitur, eam speciem, quae semper est eadem, intuetur atque eam sibi proponit exemplar, et quidem illam cogitationisque suae vim educit in opus, ita omnino necesse est, rem totam praeclare absolvi; sin autem in illam, quae gignitur, inspicit, genitum exemplar sibi proponens, non praeclarum certe opus perficiet . . . Atqui si pulcher est hic mundus, si bonus est eius opifex, perspicuum est, ipsum ad sempiternum illud exemplar respexisse etc.

2  Vide Aristot., I. Phys. text. 34. et 71. (c. 4. et 8.), ubi hoc argumentum antiquis philosophis, praecipue Anaxagorae, tribuitur.  Ibid. text. 82. (c. 9.) insinuatur minor seq. de materia.  —  Vat. primam minorem exhibet sic:  Si ex nihilo; ex nihilo nihil fit.

3  Gilbert. Porret. in libro Sex princip. c. 2 ait:  « Actio vero est, secundum quam in id quod subiicitur, agere dicimur, ut secans quis, in eo quod secet, secans dicitur ».  Quare etiam cod. P hic addit in Sex principiorum.  —  Paulo inferius cod. F et hoc est, non pauci alii codd. falso non igitur pro non nisi.

4  De qua vide infra a. 3. q. 2. in corp.

5  Text. 82. (c. 9.).  —  Cod. O aliquanto superius creatio passiva pro creatio-passio, et dein Vat. post ex aliquo addit in producto.

6  Vat. etsi cuilibet fides, quae etiam cum uno alteroque cod. post latuit tamen subiungit providentiam vel.

7  Eleatae, qui docebant monismum, quorum dux fuit Xenophanes (versus a. 569 ante Chr.).  Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.), I. Metaph. c. 9. (c. 5.).

8  Cod. P quod Dei natura, quae est.

9  Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. seqq. (c. 4.), I. Metaph. c. 4-7. (c. 3. seq.); et August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2. seqq; ubi placita antiquorum philosophorum breviter enumerantur.

10  Plato in Timaeo, ex quo iam (nota 1.), aliqua retulimus.  Cfr. etiam Aristot., I. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.), I. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (c. 6.), VII. text. 51. seqq. (VI. c. 14.) et XIII. c. 4. usque in finem libri (XII. c. 4. seqq.), ubi inter cetera argumenta etiam illa afferuntur, quorum S. Doctor mentionem facit.  —  Paulo inferius cod. aa generalius, sed minus conformiter dictis Aristotelis loc. cit., mundum pro hominem.

1  Plato in his Gorgias (in the edition of Serrano, tome I, p. 465) says:  « But I judge that this thing, which lacks a reckoning, is least of all worthy of the name of “art” ».  And in The Republic, Bk. X (tome II; p. 596):  « Are we not accustomed to even say that the craftsman of each (piece) of household furniture absolves his work thus, that he intuits that (idea) upon (its) design [in formulam]?  For no craftsman fabricates that idea itself.  For who could »?  Aristotle in (his) Ethics, Bk. VI, ch. 4 (says):  « Art, therefore, just as has been said, is a certain habit, effective with a true reckoning »; and in (he says) in Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 23 (Bk. VI, ch. 7):  « Moreover from art there are made (those) whose form (is) in the soul ».  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 35, a. sole, q. 1, p. 600, footnote 7.  —  A little after this the Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, has precognize [praecognoscere] for cognize [cognoscere], and it is [est] for it was [fuit].  Then some codices, such as H and bb, have could not have been [potuerant] for could not be [potuerunt].  —  This is Plato’s argument in the Timaeus (tome III, p. 28):  But whatever is begotten, it is necessary that it be begotten out of some cause; for it can in no manner come to be, that anything be begotten or come to be without a cause.  On which account, if he who contrives to work any work, intuits that species, which always is the same, and proposes it to himself as (his) exemplar, and indeed also leads that and the force of his own thought upon the work, it is thus entirely necessary, that the whole thing be completed in an outstanding manner; but if, however, he looks upon that, which is begotten, proposing the begotten to himself as (his) exemplar, he will certainly not perfect an outstanding work . . . Nevertheless, if this world is beautiful, if its Worker is good, it is obvious, that He has looked back to that sempiternal Exemplar etc..

2  See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, texts 34 and 71 (chs. 4 and 8), where this argument is attributed to the ancient philosophers, chiefly to Anaxagoras.  Ibid., text 82 (ch. 9), he insinuates the following minor, concerning matter.  —  The Vatican edition exhibits the first minor thus:  If out of nothing; (then) nothing comes to be out of nothing [Si ex nihilo; ex nihilo nihil fit] for but out of nothing nothing (is produced) [sed ex nihilo nihil].

3  Gilbert of Porretain in (his) book Of Six Principles, ch. 2, says:  « However an action is, (that) according to which we say (there is) an acting upon that which is subjected, so that anyone cutting, in this that he is cutting, is said (to be) one (who is) “cutting” ».  Wherefore codex P also here adds in Of Six Principles [in Sex principiorum].  —  A little below this codex F reads and this is [et hoc est], but not a few other codices falsely not therefore [non igitur], for (and this something is) not but [non nisi].

4  Concerning which, see below a. 3, q. 2, in the body of the Question.

5  Text 82, (ch. 9).  —  Codex O somewhat above this has passive creation [creation passiva] for creation-passion, and then the Vatican edition after out of something [ex aliquo] adds in the one produced [in producto].

6  The Vatican edition reads even if the Faith is revealed and lucid to anyone [etsi cuilibet fides sit aperta et lucida] for  even if it is now open and lucid to any of the faithful [etsi nunc cuilibet fideli sit aperta et lucida], which (edition) also, together with one or the other codex, after it belied, however [latui tamen] subjoins the foresight and/or [providentiam vel].

7  The Eleatics, who taught Monism, whose leader was Xenophanes of Colophon (born c. 569 B.C.; died c. 499 B.C.).  Cf. Aristotle, Physics., Bk. I, text. 32 (ch. 4), Metaphysics¸ Bk. I, ch. 9 (ch. 5).

8  Codex P has God’s Nature, which is entirely invariable and most noble, [Dei natura, quae est omnino invariabilis et nobilissima] for God’s entirely invariable and most noble Essence [Dei essentia omnino invariabilis et nobilissima].

9  Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 32 ff (ch. 4), Metaphysics, Bk. I, chs. 4-7 (ch. 3 f.); and (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. VIII. ch. 2 ff.; where the opinions of the ancient philosophers are briefly enumerated.

10  Plato in the Timaeus, from which (book) we have already cited a few things (in footnote 1).  Cf. also Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 32 (ch. 4), Metaphysics, Bk. I, text 5 ff., (ch. 6), Bk. VII, text 51 ff., (Bk. VI, ch. 14) and Bk. XIII, ch. 4, unto the end of the book (Bk. XII, ch. 4 ff.), where among all the other arguments there are also cited those, of which the Seraphic Doctor makes mention.  —  A little below this codex aa more generally, but in a manner less conformed to the sayings of Aristotle, loc. cit., has world [mundum] for man [hominem].

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Fuerunt etiam quarti, scilicet Peripatetici, quorum princeps et dux fuit Aristoteles, qui veritati magis appropinquantes dixerunt mundum factum, sicut legitur in secundo Metereorum:1  « Dico igitur, quod mare factum est », et in principio de Caelo et mundo; et de pluribus aliis locis potest elici.  Sed dixerunt, non esse factum ex principiis praeexistentibus.  Sicut enim vult in primo Vegetabilium,2 mundus semper fuit plantis et animalibus plenus, ubi loquitur contra Abrucalem.  Utrum autem posuerit materiam et formam factam de nihilo, hoc nescio; credo tamen, quod non pervenit ad hoc, sicut melius videbitur in problemate secundo:  ideo et ipse etiam defecit, licet minus quam alii.

There were also (those) fourth, namely the Peripatetics, whose prince and leader was Aristotle, who, approaching the truth more, said that the world (was) made, just as is read in the second (book) Of Meteorology:1  « I say, therefore, that the see has been made », and in the beginning of On Heaven and the World; and (as) can be elicited from many other passages.  But they said, that it was not made out of pre-existing principles.  For just as he would have it in the first (book) Of Vegetables,2 the world was always full of plants and animal, where he speaks against Empedocles [Abrucalem].  But whether he posited that matter and form (was) made from nothing, this I do not know; yet I believe, that he did not come to this, just as will be better seen in the second Question [problemate secundo]:  for that reason he was also deficient, though less than the others.

Ubi autem deficit philosophorum peritia, subvenit nobis sacrosancta Scriptura, quae dicit,3 omnia esse creata et secundum omne quod sunt in esse producta.  Et ratio etiam a fide non discordat, sicut supra in opponendo ostensum est.

Moreover, where the expertise of philosophers fails, there comes to our aid the Sacrosanct Scripture, which says,3 that all have been created and produced in ‘being’ according to everything which they are. And reason too does not discord from the Faith, just as has been shown in the opposing (side) above.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur de similitudine, quod materia est ens omnino in potentia; dicendum, quod materia non propter se facta est, sed propter sustentationem formae, quae eius est actus; quamvis ergo materia non sit Deo actu similis, tamen assimilabilis est per formam.  Unde Augustinus4 dicit, quod ispa materia, etsi non habeat de se et in se actum formae, ipsa tamen capacitas formae est ei pro forma.  Ideo patet illud.

1. What, therefore, is objected concerning a similitude, that matter is a being entirely in potency; it must be said, that matter has not been made for its own sake, but for the sake of the sustenance of the form, which is its act; therefore, although matter is not similar to God in act, yet it is able to be assimilated [assimilabilis] through form.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine says,4 that matter itself, even if it does not have the act of form of itself and in itself, yet the very capacity for form is its own in virtue of form [est ei pro forma].  For that reason that (objection) is clear.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod turpis etc.; dicendum, quod nec turpis nec tenebrosa dicitur nisi comparative.  Nam materia non est privatio pura, immo ratione suae essentiae habet aliquid de pulchritudine et aliquid de luce.  Unde Augustinus5 dicit, quod habet modum, speciem et ordinem, quamvis imperfecte.  Non opportet autem, quod Deus omnes res producat sibi aequaliter similes, immo secundum gradum.  Et ideo ad hoc, quod gradus sint perfecti, necesse est ponere aliquid prope Deum, et hoc simillimum; et aliquid prope nihil, et hoc aliquo modo simile, licet non omnino nec perfecte, quod quamvis in se minimum habeat de bono, tamen optime ordinatum est.6

2. What is objected, that what is ugly etc.; it must be said, that (matter) is said (to be) neither “ugly” nor “shadowy”, except in a comparative manner.  For matter is not a pure privation, nay by reason of its own essence it has something of beauty and something of light.  Wherefore (St.) Augustine5 says, that it has a standard of measure, a beauty and an order [modum, speciem et ordinem], though imperfectly.  It is not necessary, moreover, that God produces all things equally similar to Himself, nay according to a gradation [secundum gradum].  And for that reason, for this, that the grades be perfect, it is necessary that one posit something near God, and that this (belongs) to (those) most similar (to Him); and something near nothing, and that this (is) in some manner similar (to Him9, though not entirely nor perfectly, because, though it has in itself a minimum of the good, yet it has been ordered in an optimum manner.6

3. 4. Quod obiicitur, quod omne quod producitur, producitur per simile in forma, et cognoscitur similiter; dicendum, quod est agens secundum naturam, et secundum intellectum.7  Agens secundum naturam producit per formas, quae sunt vere naturae, sicut homo homine, et asinus asinum; agens per intellectum producit per formas, quae non sunt aliquid rei, sed ideae in mente, sicut artifex producit arcam; et sic productae sunt res, et hoc modo sunt formae rerum aeternae, quia sunt Deus.  Et si sic posuit Plato, commendandus est, et sic imponit ei Augustinus.8  Si autem ultra processit, ut imponit ei Aristoteles, absque dubio erravit, et ratio sua, quae praedicta est, omnino nihil cogit.  Nam sicut ostendit Philosophus,9 formae rerum extra Deum a singularibus separatae nihil omnino faciunt, nec ad operationem, nec ad cognitionem.

3. 4. What is objected, that everything which is produced, is produced through (something) similar in form, and is cognized similarly; it must be said, that there is an agent according to nature, and according to intellect.7  An agent according to nature produces through forms, which are truly of the nature, just as a man (produces) a man, and a donkey a donkey; an agent through intellect produces through forms, which are not anything of a thing, but ideas in the mind, just as a craftsman produces a chest; and thus have things been produced, and in this manner there are eternal forms of things, because they are God.  And if Plato posited (it) thus, he is to be commended, and thus does (St.) Augustine interpret [imponit] him.8  But if he proceeded further, as Aristotle interprets him, without doubt he erred, and his own reckoning, which is aforesaid, compels entirely nothing (in this regard).  For just as the Philosopher says,9 outside of God the forms of things separated from singulars cause entirely nothing, neither regarding operation, nor regarding cognition.

5. Quod ultimo obiicitur de materia:  materia . . .

5. What is objected last concerning matter.  “matter . . .

1  Cap. 3:  « Hoc igitur visi sunt omnes confiteri, quod [mare] factum est, siquidem et omnis mundus ».  Textum sequentem ex principio de Caelo et mundo S. Doctor secundum translationem Arabico-latinam iam in libro I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4. in fine corp. (pag. 58) allegavit, in quo dicitur:  « Hoc [ternario] numero adhibuimus nosmetipsos magnificare Deum unum, creatorem omnium, eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae sunt creata ».  Cfr. etiam I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 102. seqq. (c. 10.), ubi recitat diversas antiquorum opiniones de origine mundi ostenditque, impossibile esse, ipsum fuisse ortum per generationem, sed esse sempiternum.  Sed I. Topic. c. 9. hanc quaestionem:  utrum mundus sit aeternus necne, inter ea recenset problemata, « de quibus contrarii sunt syllogismi . . . eo quod de utriusque sunt rationes suasibiles, et de quibus rationem non habemus, cum sint magna, difficile arbitrantes esse propter quid assignare ».

2  Seu de Plantis, c. 1. in fine (c. 7.):  Dixitque Empedocles, quod plantae habent generationem in mundo, diminuto tamen et non suis modis perfecto absolutoque, et quod eo completo animal non generabitur; qui sermo aptus non est, quia mundus integer est ac sempiternus et animalia generare cessavit nunquam ac plantas et omnis generis species alias.  —  Codd. cum Vat. Abrutalum pro Abrucalem, quo nomine ex versione Arabica in hoc libro Empedocles vocabatur.  Aliquanto superius plures codd. ut F I Y Z Sed non dixerunt, cod. aa Sed dixerunt pro Sed dixerunt, non.

3  Gen. 1, 1.  —  Paulo inferius multi codd. habent esse producta pro in esse producta, et in fine corp. aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 opposito pro opponendo.

4  Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 6. ad 2:  Ad aliud dicendum secundum illud Augustini [de Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seq.]:  « Illud quod in comparatione perfectorum informe dicitur, si habet aliquid formae, quamvis exiguum [ed. Augus. addit:  quamvis inchoatum], nondum est nihil . . . nonnullum ergo bonum est et capacitas formae; et ideo [bonorum omnium auctor], qui praestitit formam, fecit etiam posse formari ».  Secundum ergo Augustinum dicitur natura [materiae] capacitas formae, secundum quam dicimus, quod materia est possibilis ad capiendas formas et ipsi materiae est pro forma, secundum quam dicimus in materia esse speciem.  Et hoc est etiam quod dicit Augustinus [de Natura boni, c. 18.], quod materia « habet capacitatem formarum suarum; nam si capere impositam formam ab artifice non posset, nec materies diceretur ».  Cfr. etiam de Fide et symbolo, c. 2. n. 2; XII. Confess. c. 6. n. 6, et de Gen. ad lit. (liber imperf.) c. 15. n. 51.  —  Aliquanto superius Vat. post sed propter inserit substrationem seu; deinde permulti codd. cum ed. 1 ponunt quae est actus pro quae eius est actus; tandem cod. U circa finem solutionis et per se pro et in se, ac est ei forma pro est ei pro forma.

5  De Vera Relig. c. 18. n. 35. seq. et de Natura boni, c. 18, ex quibus locis iam in nota praecedente aliqua retulimus.  —  Paulo superius plures codd. cum edd. 1, 3 tenebra pro tenebrosa.

6  Cfr. August., XII. Confess. c. 7. n. 7. seq.                                        

7  Vide Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 22. seq. (VI. c. 7.).  —  Paulo inferius plures codd. agens secundum intellectum pro agens per intellectum; deinde aliqui codd. verbis transpositis non quae sunt pro quae non sunt, et cod. F aliquid in re pro aliquid rei.

8  Libr. 83. Qq. q. 46. n. 2, et VII. de Civ. Dei, c. 28.  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 35.

9  Libr. I. Metaph. text. 32. seqq. (c. 9.), VII. text. 28. et 51. seqq. (VI. c. 8. et 14.) et XIII. c. 3. (XII. c. 5.).  —  Mox cod. I. formae rerum quamdiu sint pro formae rerum extra Deum.

1  Chapter 3:  « This, therefore, it seems all confessed, that (the sea) has been made, if indeed even all the world ».  The following text from the beginning of On Heaven and the World, the Seraphic Doctor has already cited according the Arabic-Latin translation, in Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, q. 4 at the end of the body of the Question (on p. 58), in which there is said:  « For we say everything perfect in threes, and by this number we invite our very selves to magnify the one God, the Creator of all things, eminent in the properties of those things which have been created ». Cf. Also On Heaven and the World, Bk. I, text 102 ff. (ch. 19), where he recites the diverse opinions of the ancients concerning the origin of the world and shows, that it is impossible, that it had arisen through generation, but that it is sempiternal.  But in Topics, Bk. I, ch. 9, he cites among these problems this question:  “Whether the world is eternal or not?”, « concerning which there are contrary syllogisms . . . to this (extent), that concerning each there are persuasive reasons [rationes suasibiles], and concerning which we have no reckoning, since there are great (arguments), that judge that it is difficult to assign (that) on account of which (any one of them is truer) ».

2  Or On Plants, ch. 1, at the end (ch. 7):  And Empedocles said, that plants have a generation in the world, yet in a diminished manner and one not perfected and absolute according to their standards of measures, because the entire world is also sempiternal and it has never ceased to generate animals and plants and the other species of every genus.  —  The codices, together with the Vatican edition have Abrutalem for Abrucalem, by which name Empedocles is known in the Arabic version of this book.  Somewhat above this, several codices, such as F I Y and Z, have But they did not say, that it was [Sed non dixerunt], and codex z But they said, that it was [Sed dixerunt] for But they said, that it was not [Sed dixerunt, non].

3  Gen. 1:1.  —  A little below this many codices have have been produced [esse producta] for produced in ‘being’ [in esse producta], and at the end of the body of the Question in an opposite manner [in opposito] for in the opposing (side) [in opponendo].

4  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 18, m. 6, in reply to n. 2:  To the other it must be said, according to that (saying) of (St.) Augustine (On the True Religion, ch. 18, n. 35 f.):  « That which is said (to be) “unformed” in comparison to perfect (beings), if it has anything of form, even though it requires (it) (in the edition of St. Augustine’s works there is added:  even though (it is) inchoate), it is still nothing . . therefore there is some good and a capacity for form; and for that reason (the Author of all goods), who proffers the form, made also (its) ‘being able to be formed’ ».  Therefore, according to (St.) Augustine the nature (of matter) is said (to be) a “capacity for form”, according to which we say, that matter is able [possibilis] to grasp forms and (this) belongs to matter itself in virtue of form, according to which we say that in matter there is a species.  And this is also what (St.) Augustine says (On the Nature of the Good, ch. 18), that matter « has a capacity for its own forms; for if it were not able to grasp the form imposed by a craftsman, neither would it be said (to be) “material” [materies] ».  Cf. also On Faith and the Creed, ch. 2, n. 2; Confessions., Bk. XII, ch. 6, n. 6, and On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, the unfinished Book, ch. 15, n. 51.  —  Somewhat above this the Vatican edition after but for the sake of [sed propter] inserts the under-paving or [substrationem seu]; then very many codices, together with edition 1, have which is (its) act [quae est actus] for which is its act [quae eius est actus]; finally codex U, near the end of the solution, has and through itself [et per se] for and in itself [et in se], and is its own form [est ei forma] for is its own in virtue of form [est ei pro forma].

5  On the True Religion, ch. 18, n. 35 ff. and On the Nature of the Good, ch. 18, from which passages where have already, in the preceding note, cites some (things).  —  A little above this, several codices, together with editions 1 and 3, have shadows [tenebra] for shadowy [tenebrosa].

6  Cf. (St.) Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, ch. 7, n. 7 f..

7  See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 22 f. (Bk. VI, ch. 7).  —  A little below this several codices read an agent according to intellect [agens secundum intellectum] for an agent through intellect [agens per intellectum]; then some codices, having transposed the words, have not (those) which are [non quae sunt] for which are not [quae non sunt], and codex F has anything in a thing [aliquid in re] for anything of the thing [aliquid rei].

8  In the book Of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 46, n. 2, and On the City of God, Bk. VII, ch. 28.  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 35.

9  Metaphysics., Bk. I, text 32 ff. (ch. 9), Bk. VII, texts 28 and 52 ff. (Bk. VI, chs. 8 and 14) and Bk. XIII, ch. 3 (Bk. XII. ch. 5.).  —  Next codex I has the forms of things, so long as they are, [formae rerum quamdiu sint] for outside of God the forms of things [formae rerum extra Deum].

p. 18

non potest fieri, quia1 vel ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo; dicendum, quod ex nihilo, et hoc per creationem.  —  Quod obiicitur, quod actio est in quid;2 dicendum, quod creare non est agere, sed facere, et hoc refert inter agere et facere; nam agere in quid, non quid agat exigit; facere autem e converso.

cannot be made, because1 either (it is made) out of something, and/or out of nothing”; it must be said, that (it is made) out of nothing, and this through (an act of) creation.  —  What is objected, that there is an action upon something;2 it must be said, that ‘to create’ is not ‘to act’, but ‘to make’ (is), and it refers (to an operation) between acting and making; for ‘to act upon something’, does not require something to act; but ‘to make’ on the other hand [e converso] (does).

6. Quod ulterius quaeritur, in quo sit creatio-passio; dupliciter respondetur.  Quidam dicunt, quod non est substantia nec accidens, sed via ad utrumque; et tale praecedit illud, ad quod est naturaliter, quamvis in eo habeat esse.  —  Aliter dicunt alii, quod aliquid creari non est aliud quam nunc primo esse; nec creatio dicit naturam aliquam mediam inter Deum et creaturam, sed solum dicit esse rei, connotando ordinem ad primum efficiens a quo, et ad non-esse, ita tamen quod ordo ille totaliter est in re creata, et non in nihilo.3  Unde cum dicitur, ex nihilo aliquid fieri, potest intelligi tripliciter:  aut materialiter, ut ex ferro cultellus; aut causaliter, ut ex patre filius; aut ordinaliter, ut de mane fit meridies.  Primis duobus modis verum est, ex nihilo nihil fieri; tertio vero modo verum est secundum naturam, sed falsum supra naturam.  Per virtutem enim infinitam, quae non indiget fulcimento materiae, ita faciliter potest aliquid produci ex nihilo, sicut de aliquo; alioquin non esset virtus primi principii infinita, sed egeret materiae fundamento; et ideo illi virtuti soli hoc attribuendum est necessario, quamvis non possit consimile reperiri in aliquo creato.  Hoc enim est eius proprium, sicut et ipsa omnipotentia.4

6. What is further asked, “In what is the creation-passion?”; is responded to in a twofold manner.  Certain (authors) say, that it is not a substance nor an accident, but a way to each; and such precedes that, to which it is naturally, though it has (its) ‘being’ in it.  —  Others say otherwise, that ‘that something be created’ is not other than ‘to be now for the first (time)’; nor does “creation” mean some natural medium between God and the creature, but it only means the ‘to be’ of the thing, by connoting (its) order to the First Efficient (Cause) from which (it comes to be), and (its order) to ‘non-being’ [non-esse], yet thus that that order is entirely in the created thing, and not in nothing.3  Whence when it is said, that something is made out of nothing, it can be understood in a threefold manner:  either materially, as a knife (comes to be) out of iron, or causally, as a son (comes to be) out of a father; or ordinally, as noon comes to be out of morning.  In the first two manners it is true, that nothing is made out of nothing; but in the third manner it is true according to nature, but false above nature.  For through infinite virtue, which does not need the support [fulcimento] of matter, something can be as easily produced out of nothing, as from something; otherwise it would not be the Infinite Virtue of the First Principle, but would be in want of a fundament of matter; and for that reason to that Virtue alone this must necessarily be attributed, though the completely similar cannot be found in any created (being).  For this is proper to It, just as omnipotence itself.4

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. In hac quaestione supponitur, mundum sive aggregationem omnium rerum finitarum aliquomodo productum esse ab aliqua causa; et pro hac suppositione in principio quaestionis tanguntur quatuor rationes, quas in quadam quaestione disputata inedita diffuse exponit S. Doctoris discipulus et succesor in ministerio generali Ordinis et cardinalitia dignitate, Matth. ab Aquasparta (cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 1. m. 1. in princ.).  Quaeritur autem de modo productionis mundi.  Triplex autem concipi potest modus productionis:  vel ex natura producentis, ut in generatione; vel ex natura aliena rei iam existentis, ut artifex novas formas accidentales rebus praeexistentibus inducit; vel tertio, quando tota rei substantia, nihil extra producentem supponendo, producitur, qui modus productionis proprie est creatio.  Deum hoc tertio modo mundum produxisse hic probatur, et confutantur quatuor errores antiquorum philosophorum, qui hic in corp. recensentur et diffusius infra dub. 2. (ubi dicitur etiam multiplex explicatio verborum, Gen. 1, 1.:  In principio etc.).  De eisdem erroribus multum disputat B. Albert., hic a. 3. seqq. et S. Thom., de Potent. q. 3. a. 5.  Pro intelligentia sententiae Aristotelis observandum est, aliud ipse esse principia praeexistentia, aliud principia non producta.  Negabant quidem Peripatetici, principia mundi, licet sint aeterna, fuisse praeexistentia, cum etiam productio mundi secundum eos sit aeque aeterna.  Utrum autem Aristoteles docuerit, ista principia fuisse ab aeterno, quin sint producta, an ea esse ab aeterno a Deo producta, secundum S. Bonaventuram est dubium.

I. In this Question it is supposed, that the world or the aggregation of all finite things has been produced in some manner by some cause; and in favor of this supposition, at the beginning of the Question, there are touched upon four reasons, which are expounded in a certain, unpublished Question by (Friar) Matthew of Aquasparta, the disciple and successor of Seraphic Doctor, in the Minister Generalship of the Order and in the dignity of the Cardinalate (cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 1, m. 1, at the beginning).  Moreover there is the question concerning the manner of the production of the world.  However, the manner of (its) production can be conceived in a threefold manner:  either out of the nature of the One producing, as in generation; and/or out of another nature of a thing already existing, as a craftsman induces new accidental forms upon pre-existing things; and/or third, when the whole substance of a thing, by supposing nothing outside of the one producing, is produced, which manner of production is properly a creation.  Here it is proven that God produced the world in this third manner, and there are confuted the four errors of the ancient philosophers, which are cited here in the body of the Question and more diffusely below, in Doubt 2 (where there is even given a manifold explication of the words of Genesis 1:1:  In the beginning etc.).  On the same errors Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 3 ff., and St. Thomas, de Potentia, q. 3, a. 5, dispute at length.  For an understanding of the sentence of Aristotle it must be observed, that it is one thing that principles are pre-existing, another that principles (are) not produced.  Indeed the Peripatetics deny, that the principles of the world, though they are eternal, had been pre-existent, since even the production of the world, according to them, is equally eternal.  Moreover, whether Aristotle taught, that these principles, which were not produced, were from eternity, or whether that these were produced by God from eternity, is doubtful according to St. Bonaventure.

II. In hac quaestione (fundam. 6. et ad 1.) et alibi passim termini actus et potentia usurpantur in sensu Peripateticis et Scholasticis familiari, sed valde diverso a significatione vulgari et in philosophia recentiore recepta; quae diversa significatio facile confundare poterit non versatos in philosophia scholastica. Iuvat igitur haec notare:

II. In this Question (fundament 6, and in reply to n. 1) and elsewhere passim, the terms actus (“act”) and potentia (“power” in the active sense, or “potency” in the passive sense) are used in the sense familiar to Peripatetics and Scholastics, but in a very diverse manner from the popular signification and (that) received in recent philosophy; which diverse signification could easily confound (those) not versed in Scholastic Philosophy.  Therefore, it will help to note these (points):

1. In rerum phaenomenis distinguimus mutationes secundum agere et pati; principium autem proximum actionis, communiter vocamus potentiam activam (activitatem), passionis autem proximum principium dicimus potentiam passivam:  illa active producit actum ut suum effectum, haec autem ab alio agente passionem in se recipit.  In hoc sensu actio (actus) et passio cum suis principiis proximis (potentia activa et passiva) non spectant ad ordinem rerum substantialem, sed accidentalem, nec faciunt compositionem essentialem, sed accidentalem.

1. Among the phenomena of thins we distinguish changes according to acting [agere] and suffering [pati]; but the proximate principle of an action, we commonly call the “active power” [potentiam activam] (or “activity”), but the proximate principle of a passion we call the “passive power” (or “potency”):  the former actively produces the act as its effect, but the latter receives from another agent the passion in itself.  In this sense the action (or actus) et passion together with their proximate principels (the active and passive powers) do not pertain to the substantial order of things, but the accidental one, nor do they cause an essential composition, but an accidental one.

2. Duce Aristotele Scholastici terminos actus et potentia secundum analogiam transferebant ad ordinem substantialem et essentialem, et quidem dupliciter, scilicet in sensu metaphysico et physico.  In utroque sensu mutatur significatio utriusque termini, ita ut tunc actus non importet operationem, sed in ordine essendi intrinsecum principium actuale; potentia non activitatem, sed principium passivum, quod suscipit ab actu suam actuationem.  —  In sensu metaphysico duo communiter distinguuntur actus, scil. substantia et existentia, ad quos ipsa essentia comparatur ut potentia, quae passive recipit illos actus.  In specie de existentia dicit S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 53.):  « Ipsum igitur esse comparatur ad omnes substantias creatas sicut actus earum; ex quo relinquitur, quod in qualibet substantia creata sit compositio actus et potentiae ».  —  In sensu autem physico isti termini transferuntur ad duo principia sive elementa substantialia, scil. materiam et formam, ex quarum unione substantiali resultat unum compositum, una substantia completa (cfr. infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. Scholion.).  Unde in composito humano ipsa anima rationalis, quae secundum decretum Concilii Viennensis « est forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter », vocabatur actus corporis organici, iuxta definitionem Aristotelis communiter receptam:  « Anima est actus primus corporis physici, organici, potentia vitam habentis ».  Manifestum autem est, quod anima non est actus, quem elicit corpus, sed e contra- / -rio . . .

2. Following Aristotle, the  Scholastics transferred the terms actus and potentia according to analogy to the substantial and essential order, and indeed in a twofold manner, namely, in the metaphysical and physical sense.  In each sense the signification of each term is changed, thus that actus no longer conveys an operation, but the intrinsic actual principle in the order of being; potentia not an activity, but a passive principle, which takes up from act its own actuation.  —  In the metaphysical sense two acts [actus] are commonly distinguished, namely substance and existence, to which the essence itself is compared as a potency, which passively receives those acts.  In the species of existence St. Thomas  (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 53) says:  « Therefore ‘to be’ is itself compared to all created substances just as their act; from which it results, that in any created substance there is a composition of act and potency ».  —  But in the physical sense these terms are transferred to two principles or substantial elements, namely, to matter and form, out of the substantial union of which there results one composite, one complete substance (cf. below d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in the Scholium).  Wherefore in the human composite the rational soul itself, which according to the Decree of the Council of Vienne « is, per se and essentially, the form of the human body », is called the “act” of the organic body, in accord with the definition of Aristotle commonly received:  « The soul is the first act of the physical, organic body, having the power of life ».  Moreover it is manifest, that the soul is not the act, which the body elicits, but on the contrary . . .

1  Codd. I. cc cum ed. 1 nisi; cod. aa bis nec pro vel.

2  Cod. cc et ed. 1:  Quod obiicitur de actione, quod requirit in quid agat.  Paulo inferius sola Vat. et in hoc differunt pro et hoc refert inter.  —  Solutio huius obiectionis fundatur in definitionibus verborum agere et facere, prout a Gilberto Porretano in libro de Sex principiis, c. de Actione dantur:  « Dico autem actionem non quid, sed in quid agat exigere . . . Facere vero id, quod quale est ex se gignit ».  Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 2. seqq. hanc differentiam inter agere et facere assign