COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I
PARS I.	PART I
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE I Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 19-25. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 19-25. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Utrum mundus productus sit ab aeterno, an ex tempore.	QUESTION 2 Whether the world was produced from eternity, or in time?
CIRCA SECUNDUM quaeritur, utrum mundus productus fuerit ex tempore, an ab aeterno. Et quod non ex tempore, ostenditur:	ABOUT THE SECOND there is asked, whether the world was produced in time [ex tempore],* or from eternity. And that (it was not produced) in time, is shown:
1. Duabus rationibus sumtis a motu:¹	1. By two reason taken from movement.¹
Prima est ostensiva sic: ante omnem motum et mutationem est motus primi mobilis; sed omne quod incipit, incipit per motum vel mutationem: ergo ante omne illud quod incipit, est motus ille. Sed ille motus non potuit esse ante se nec ante suum mobile: ergo impossibile est incipere. Prima propositio supponitur, et eius probatio patet sic: quia suppositio est in philosophia,² quod « in omni genere perfectum est ante imperfectum »; sed inter omnia genera motuum motus ad situm est perfectior, quia est entis completi; et inter omnia genera motuum localium motus circularis et velocior est et perfectior; sed talis est motus caeli: ergo perfectissimus, ergo primus: patet ergo etc.	The first (reason) is ostensive in this manner: ‘before every movement and change there is a movement of the first mobile (sphere); but everything which starts, starts through a movement and/or change: therefore before every that which starts, there is that movement. But that movement could not be before itself nor before its own movable: therefore it is impossible that it starts.’ The first proposition is supposed, and its proof is clear in this manner: because there is in Philosophy² the supposition, that « in every genus the perfect is before the imperfect »; but among all the genera of movements movement to a site is more perfect, because it is of a complete being; and among all the genera of local movements circular and swifter movement is also more perfect; but such is the movement of heaven; therefore (it is) the most perfect, therefore the first: therefore it is clear that etc..
2. Item, ostenditur per impossibile. Omne quod exit in esse, exit per motum vel mutationem: ergo si motus exit in esse, exit per motum vel mutationem; et similiter de illo quaeritur: ergo vel est abire in infinitum, vel est ponere aliquem motum sine principio; si motum: ergo mobile, ergo et mundum.	2. Likewise, it is shown through the impossible [per impossibile]. ‘Everything which goes forth into ‘being’, goes forth through a movement and/or change: therefore if a movement goes forth into ‘being’, it goes forth through a movement and/or change; and similarly of the latter (a movement) is sought: therefore either there is a regress to infinity, and/or there is a positing that (there is) some movement without a beginning [motum sine principio]; if (there is such) a movement: therefore (if one posits that there is) a movable, (one), therefore, (must posit that) the world (is) also (movable).’
3. Similiter ratio sumitur ostensiva a tempore sic:³ omne quod incipit, aut incipit in instanti, aut in tempore: si ergo mundus incipit, aut in instanti, aut in tempore. Sed ante omne tempus est tempus, et ante omne instans est tempus: ergo tempus est ante omnia quae inceperunt. Sed non potuit esse ante mundum et motum: ergo mundus non . . .	3. Similarly there is an ostensive reason taken from time in this manner:³ ‘everything which starts, either starts in an instant, or in time [in tempore]: if, therefore, the world starts, either (it does so) in an instant, or in time. But before every time there is time, and before every instant there is time: therefore there is time before all which have started. But there could not be (time) before the world and movement: therefore the world did not . .
¹ Et innuuntur ab Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 4-7. (c. 1.). — De minori primi arg. cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 75. (c. 8.), V. Phys. text. 7. seqq. (c. 1.) et I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 11. seqq. (c. 3.), ubi, exclusa creatione, modos incipiendi reducit ad tres, scil. ad generationem, corruptionem et alterationem, quorum duos priores vocat mutationem, tertium vero motum. ² Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 75. (c. 9.) et II. de Caelo. text. 23. (c. 4.). — Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 55-60. (c. 7.) probatur, motum ad situm sive localem esse perfectiorem aliis; et ibid. text. 73-78. (c. 8. seq.) ac II. de Caelo, text. 22-32.(c. 4.) ostenditur, motum circularem inter alios esse perfectiorem ipsumque convenire caelo, quod ratione huius motus est mensura omnium aliorum motuum. ³ Hoc et sequens arg. insinuantur ab Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 10. seqq. (c. 1.) et XII. Metaph. text 29. (XI. c. 6.). — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut B E F H K V mundus incepit pro mundus incipit.	¹ And given the nod by Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII, texts 4-7 (ch. 1). — On the minor of the first argument, cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 75 (ch. 8), Bk. V, text 7 ff. (ch. 1) and On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 11 ff. (ch. 3), where, having excluded creation, he reduces the manners of beginning to three, namely, to generation, corruption and alteration, the two first of which he calls a “change”, but the third a “motion”. ² Physics, Bk. VIII, text 75 (ch. 9) and On Heaven, Bk. II, text 23 (ch. 4). — In Physics, Bk. VIII, texts 55-60 (ch. 7) there is proved, that movement to a site or local (movement) is more perfect than the others; and ibid., texts 73-78 (ch. 8 f.) and in On Heaven, Bk. II, texts 22.32 (ch. 4) it is shown, that circular movement is the more perfect among the others and that it befits heaven, which by reason of this movement is the measure of all the other movements. ³ This and the following argument are hinted at by Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII, text 10 ff. (ch. 1), and Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 29 (Bk.XI, ch. 6). — A little below this several codices, such as B E F H K and V, have the world started [mundus incepit] for the world starts [incipit].
	* [Trans. note: See the “Rationale for the Translation of Peculiar Latin Terms”, in the Introduction to this English Translation.]

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incepit. Prima propositio per se nota est. Secunda, scilicet quod ante omne tempus sit tempus, patet ex hoc, quod, si currit, currebat prius de necessitate.¹ — Similiter, quod ante omne instans sit tempus, patet sic: tempus est mensura circularis conveniens motui et mobili; sed omnis punctus, qui est in circulo, ita est principium, quod finis: ergo omne instans temporis ita est principium futuri, quod terminus praeteriti: ergo ante omne nunc fuit praeteritum: patet ergo etc.	start.’ The first proposition is self-evident [per se nota]. The second, namely, that before every time there is time, is clear from this, that, if one is running, of necessity one ran before.¹ — Similarly, that before every instant there is time, is clear in this manner: time is a circular measure convening with movement and a movable; but every point, which is in a circle, is thus a beginning, as (it is) an end: therefore every instant of time is thus the beginning of the future, that (it is) the terminus of the past: therefore before every now there was a past: therefore it is clear, that etc..
4. Item, per impossibile. Si tempus producitur, aut in tempore, aut in instanti. Non in instanti, cum non sit in instanti: ergo in tempore. Sed in omni tempore est ponere prius et posterius, et praeteritum et futurum: ergo si tempus in tempore fuit productum,² ante omne tempus fuit tempus; et hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, through the impossible. ‘If time is produced, either (it is produced) in time, or in an instant. Non in an instant, since there is no (time) in an instant: therefore in time. But in every time there is a positing of a prior and a posterior, and a past and a future: therefore if time had been produced² in time, there was time before every time; and this is impossible: ergo etc..’
Hae sunt rationes Philosophi, quae sunt sumtae a parte ipsius mundi.	These are the reasons of the Philosopher, which have been taken on the part of the world itself.
5. Item, aliae rationes philosophorum sumuntur ex parte causae producentis; et generaliter ad duas possunt reduci, quarum prima est ostensiva, secunda vero per impossibile. Prima est haec: posita causa sufficienti et actuali, ponitur effectus;³ sed Deus ab aeterno fuit causa sufficiens et actualis ipsius mundi: ergo etc. Maior propositio per se nota est. Minor patet, scilicet quod Deus sit causa sufficiens; quia cum nullo extrinseco indigeat ad mundi creationem, sed solum potentia, sapientia et bonitate, et haec in Deo fuerunt perfectissima ab aeterno, patet quod ab aeterno fuit sufficiens. Quod etiam actualis, patet: Deus enim est actus purus et suum velle, ut dicit Philosophus;⁴ et Sancti dicunt, quod est suum agere: restat ergo etc.	5. Likewise, the other reasons of the philosophers are taken on the part of the producing cause; and can be generally reduced to two, the first of which is ostensive, but the second per impossibile. The first is this: ‘with a sufficient and actual cause posited, there is posited the effect;³ but God was from eternity the sufficient and actual Cause of the world itself: ergo etc.’. The major proposition is self evident. The minor is clear, namely, that God is a sufficient cause, because since He needs nothing extrinsic for the creation of the world, but only power, wisdom and goodness, and these were in God most perfect from eternity, it is clear that He was sufficient from eternity. That (He is) also actual, is clear: for God is a pure Act and (is) His own willing, as the Philosopher says;⁴ and the Saints say, that He is His own acting: therefore, it remains that etc..
6. Item, per impossibile:⁵ Omne illud quod incipit agere vel producere, cum prius non produceret, exit ab otio in actum; si ergo Deus incipit mundum producere, exit ab otio in actum; sed circa omne tale cadit otiositas et mutatio sive mutabilitas: ergo circa Deum est otiositas et mutabilitas. Hoc autem est contra summam bonitatem et contra summam simplicitatem: ergo hoc est impossibile, et blasphemia dicere de Deo, et ita, quod mundus coeperit. — Hae sunt rationes, quas commentatores⁶ et moderniores superaddunt rationibus Aristotelis, sive ad has possunt reduci.	6. Likewise, through the impossible:⁵ ‘Every that which starts to act and/or produce, since it did not produce before, goes from (being) idle [exit ab otio] into act”; if, therefore, God starts to produce the world, He goes from (being) idle into act; but about every such there occurs an idleness and changeability. But this is contrary to most high goodness and contrary to most high simplicity: therefore this is impossible, and (it is) a blasphemy to say (this) of God, and thus (it is a blasphemy to say), that the world began.’ — These are the reasons, which commentators⁶ and more modern (authors) add to the reasons of Aristotle, or to these they can be reduced.
Sed ad oppositum sunt rationes ex propositionibus per se notis secundum rationem et philosophiam.	But for the opposite (side) there are reasons (taken) from self-evident propositions according to reason and philosophy.
1. Prima est haec. Impossibile est infinito addi — haec est manifesta per se, quia omne illud quod recipit additionem, fit maius, « infinito autem nihil maius »⁷ — sed si mundus est sine principio, duravit in infinitum: ergo durationi eius non potest . . .	1. The first is this. “It is impossible that to the infinite (something) be added” — this is manifest through itself, because every that which receives an addition, comes to be greater, « than the infinite (there is) nothing greater »⁷ — but if the world is without a beginning [principio], it has endured for infinite (time) [duravit in infinitum]: therefore to its duration no(thing) can be . . .
¹ Tempus ab Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 108. (c. 11.) ita definitur: « numerus motus secundum prius et posterius et continuum ». De his quae sequuntur, notentur haec ex Aristot., qui IV. Phys. text. 114. (c. 12.) ait: « Tempus est mensura motus ipsiusque moveri; metitur autem hoc motum determinando quaendam motum, qui mensurabit totum ». Text. 133. (c. 14.): Quoniam autem est latio, et huius [prima] species est circularis . . . si igitur primum mensura omnium cognatorum est circumlatio regularis mensura maxime erit, quia numerus huius notissimus est . . . Quapropter et videtur tempus esse sphaerae motus . . . Etenim tempus ipsum esse videtur circulus quidam ». Ibid. text. 121. (c. 13.): Ipsum autem nunc est continuatio temporis . . . continuat enim tempus praeteritum et futurum et omnino terminus temporis est; est enim huius [futuri] quidem principium, illius [praeteriti] autem finis. — Aliquanto inferius cod. cc cum ed. 1 quod et finis pro quod finis, et dein cod. aa quod est terminus pro quod terminus. ² Verba fuit productum desunt in codd. et primis edd., sed cum Vat. sunt supplenda (melius suppleretur producitur), pro quibus cod. cc et ed. 1 ponunt coepit. Conclusionem argumenti integre cod. F exhibet ergo tempus non producitur. ³ Aristot., II. Phys. text. 37. (c. 3.) ait: « Quod [causae] actu quidem existentes et singulares et ea quorum sunt causae, simul sunt et non sunt ». Cfr. IX. Metaph. text. 10. (VIII. c. 5.). Avicenna, cuius est hoc argumentum IX. Metaph. c. 1. dicit: Quod causa, quantum in se est, facit necessario esse causatum; quae si fuerit semper, facit causatum necessario esse semper. Cfr. eius Tractatus de definitionibus et quaesitis, ed. Venet. 1546, fol. 136. ⁴ Libr. XII. Metaph. text. 30. (XI. c. 6.): « Oportet igitur esse tale principium, cuius substantia actus sit ». Idem dicitur ibid. text. 35. (c. 7.). Text. 39. (c. 7.) autem ait: « Delectatio actus huius [primi principii] est », de quo textu vide tom. I. pag. 798, nota 6. — De iis quae sequuntur, cfr. tom. I. pag. 135, nota 5, et ibid. d. 8, p. II. q. 2. in corp. — Post et Sancti dicunt ex codd. aa cc et ed. 1 supplevimus quod. ⁵ Haec ratio innuitur ab Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 7-10. et 15. (c. 1.), et XII. Metaph. text. 30. seqq. (XI. c. 6.), eamque recitat August., XI. Confess. c. 10. n. 12. et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 17. n. 1. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 157, nota 6. et 8. — In maiori argumenti plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 post quod incipit agere perperam inserunt prius, pro quo cod. cc et ed. 1 bene ponunt nunc. Aliquanto inferius cod. bb pro sed circa omne tale habet sed contra, in omni tali, Vat. vero sed in omni tali, quae etiam circa finem argumenti cum pluribus mss. legit et blasphemum pro et blasphemia. ⁶ Inter quos eminent Alexander de Aphrodisia (circa a. 200 post Chr.) et Themistius; et quidam philosophi Arabes, scil. Avicenna (980-1037) in IX. Metaph. c. 1. et in Tractum de defin. et quaes., et Averroes, qui nomine Commentatoris insignitur et vixit saec. 12, in opere Destructio destructionum, disp. 1. et 3, et in Epitome Metaph. tract. 4. Argumenta istarum philosophorum collegerunt et refutarunt Algazel († 1111) et Rabbi Moyses Maimonides (1135-1204), simul addentes argumenta pro impossibilitate aeternae creationis, quae tamen a Moyse Maimonide non demonstrationes, sed probationes maioris probabilitatis esse iudicantur in libro, cui titulus: Doctor perplexorum, p. II. c. 16. seq., ubi etiam dicit: « Illos, qui gloriantur, se demonstrationes conficere in quaestione aliqua per fallacias, nequaquam robur afferre . . . sed potius . . . occasionem ad contradicendum praebere; quando enim defectus et infirmitas rationum illarum detegitur, tum anima debilitatur ad fidem adhibendam illi rei, de qua probationes afferuntur » etc. Hisce verbis similia profert S. Thomas (Sum. p. I. q. 46. a. 2; II. Sent. d. 1. q 1. a. 5. et Quodl. 3. a 31.). ⁷ Aristot. I. de Caelo, text. 130. (c. 12.), ubi tempus infinitum definit, quo non est maius. Cfr. etiam III. Phys. text. 62. seqq. (c. 6.). — In prima propositione cod. cc et ed. 1 verbo addi praemittunt aliquid. — Vocabulum revolutio, quod sequitur, intelligendum est de circumactionibus corporum caelestium.	¹ Time is defined by Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text 108 (ch. 11) thus: « the number of a movement according to a before and an after and a continuum ». concerning those which follow, let these be noted from Aristotle, who in Physics, Bk. IV. text 114 (ch. 12) says: « Time is the measure of movement and of moving itself; but one measures [metitur] that this (has) moved by determining a certain movement, which will measure [mensurabitur] the whole ». Text 133 (ch. 14): But since there is a conveyance [latio], and the (first) species of this is circular . . . if, therefore, there is a first (movement) according to the measure of all related (things), there will be most of all a regular circum-conveyance [circumlatio] according to measure, because the number of this (movement) is most known . . . On which account it also seems that time is the movement of a sphere . . . For indeed it seems that time itself is a certain circle ». Ibid., text 121 (ch. 13): Moreover the very now is a continuation of time . . . for it continues past and future time and is entirely the terminus of time; for it is indeed the beginning of the latter (i. e. of the future), but of the former (i. e. of the past) the end. — Somewhat below this codex cc, together with edition 1, has as (it is) also an end [quod et finis] for as (it is) an end [quod finis],a nd then codex aa has that it is the terminus [quod est terminus] for that (it is) the terminus [quod terminus]. ² The words had been produced [fuit productum] are missing in the codices and first editions, but with the Vatican edition they are to be supplied (though it would be better to supply is produced [producitur]), in place of which codex cc and edition 1 put began [coepit]. ³ Aristotle in Physics, Bk. II, text 37 (ch. 3) says: « Wherefore by the act (of a cause) those things existing and singular and of which there are causes, together are and are not ». Cf. Metaphysics, Bk. IX, text. 10 (Bk. VIII, ch. 5). Avicenna, to whom this argument belongs, says on Metaphysics, Bk. IX, ch. 1: Wherefore a cause, as much as it is in itself, necessarily cases the caused to be; which if it was always, necessarily causes the caused always to be. Cf. his Tract on Definitions and Questions, in the Venetian Edition of 1546, folio 136. ⁴ Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 30 (Bk. XI, ch. 6): « Therefore it is necessary [oportet] that such be a beginning, the substance of which is an act ». The same is said ibid., text. 35 (ch. 7). But in text. 39 (ch. 7) he says: « Delight belongs to this act (of the First Principle) », concerning which see Sent., Bk. I, d. 45, a. 1. q. 1, p. 798, footnote 6. — On those which follow, cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 7, a. sole, q. 1, p. 135, footnote 5, and, d. 7, p. II. q. 2, in the body of the Question. — After and the Saints say [et Sancti dicunt] we have supplied from codices aa and cc and from edition 1 that [quod]. ⁵ This reason is hinted at by Aristotle in Physics., Bk. VIII, texts. 7-10 and 15 (ch. 1), and in Metaphysics., Bk. XII, text 30 ff. (Bk. XI, ch. 6), and (St.) Augustine cites it in (his) Confessions, Bk. XI, ch. 10, n. 12, and On the City of God, Bk. XII, ch. 17, n. 1. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, p. 157, footnotes 6 and 8. — In the major of the argument very many codices, together with editions 2, 3 and 4, after which starts to act [quod incipit agere] faultily insert beforehand [prius], in place of which codex cc and edition 1 have well now [nunc]. Somewhat below this codex bb for but about every such [sed circa omne tale] has but on the contrary, in every such [sed contra, in omni tali], but the Vatican edition has but in every such [sed in omni tali], which (edition) also reads near the end of the argument, together with several manuscripts, and (it is) a blasphemous saying concerning God [et blasphemum] for and (it is) a blasphemy to say (this) of God [et blasphemia]. ⁶ Among which there stands forth Alexander of Aprhodisias (c. A. D. 200) and Themistius (c. A. D. 317 to c. 388); and certain Arabic philosophers, namely Avicenna (A. D. 980-1037) on Metaphysics, Bk. IX, ch. 1 and in his Tract on Definitions and Questions, and Averroës, who was known under the name of the “Commentator” and lived in the 12th century, in (his) work The Destruction of destructions, disputations 1 and 3, and in Epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, tract 4. The arguments of these philosophers were collected and refuted by Al-Ghazel († A. D. 1111) and Rabbi Moses Maimonides (A. D. 1135.1204), who together add arguments in favor of the impossibility of an eternal creation, yet which are not demonstrations in Moses Maimonides’, but are judged to be proofs of greater possibility in the book entitled, Doctor of the Perplexed, p. II, ch. 16 f., where he also says: « Those, who glory, that they have confected demonstrations in any question through fallacies, (will) never bear off the strength (of their adversaries) . . .but (will) rather . . . offer occasion to be contradicted; for when the defect and infirmity of their reasons is detected, then let (their) soul be debilitated for employing faith in that thing, concerning which proofs were brought forward » etc.. St. Thomas proffers similar (arguments) to these words (Summa., p. I, q. 46, a. 2; Sent., Bk. II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, and Quodlibetals, q. 3, a. 31). ⁷ Aristotle, On Heaven, Bk. I, text 130 (ch. 12), where he defines “infinite time”, as “(that) than which there is no greater”. Cf. also Physics, Bk. III, text 62 ff (ch. 6). — In the first proposition codex cc and edition 1, to the word be added [addi] preface something [aliquid]. — The word revolution [revolutio], which follows, is to be understood of the circular movements of celestial bodies.

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addi. Sed constat, hoc esse falsum, quia revolutio additur revolutioni omni die: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod infinitum est quantum ad praeterita, tamen quantum ad praesens, quod nunc est, est finitum actu, et ideo ex ea parte, qua finitum est actu, est reperire maius;¹ contra, ostenditur, quod in praeterito est reperire maius: haec est veritas infallibilis, quod, si mundus est aeternus, revolutiones solis in orbe suo sunt infinitae; rursus, pro una revolutione solis necesse est fuisse duodecim ipsius lunae: ergo plus revoluta est luna quam sol; et sol infinities: ergo infinitorum ex ea parte, qua infinita sunt, est reperire excessum. Hoc autem est impossibile: ergo² etc.	added. But it is established, that this is false, because revolution is added to revolution every day: ergo etc.. If you say, what is infinite as much as regards (things) past, yet as much as regards the present, which is now, is finite in act, and for that reason on that part, by which it is finite in act, there is a finding of (something) greater;¹ on the contrary, it is shown, that in the past there is a finding of (something) greater: this is an infallible truth, that, if the world is eternal, the revolutions of the Sun in its orbit (i. e. a solar year) are infinite; again, for one revolution of the Sun it is necessary that there have been twelve of the Moon itself: therefore the Moon has revolved more than the Sun; and the Sun (has revolved) infinite times: therefore on account of that reckoning [ex ea parte] of infinites, by which they are infinite, there is a finding of (something which has) exceeded (them). But this is impossible: ergo² etc..
2. Secunda propositio est ista. Impossibile est infinita ordinari. Omnis enim ordo fluit a principio in medium,³ si ergo non est primum, non est ordo; sed duratio mundi sive revolutiones caeli, si sunt infinitae, non habent primum: ergo non habent ordinem, ergo una non est ante aliam. Sed hoc est falsum: restat ergo, quod habeant primum. Si dicas, quod statum ordinis non est necesse ponere, nisi in his quae ordinantur secundum ordinem causalitatis, quia in causis necessario est status;⁴ quaero, quare non in aliis? Praeterea, tu ex hoc non evades: nunquam enim fuit revolutio caeli, quin fuisset generatio animalis ex animali; sed constat, quod animal ordinatur ad animal, ex quo generatur secundum ordinem causae: ergo si secundum Philosophum⁵ et rationem necesse est ponere statum in his quae ordinatur secundum ordinem causae, ergo in generatione animalium necesse est ponere primum animal. Et mundus non fuit sine animalibus: ergo etc.	2. The second proposition is this. “It is impossible that (things) infinite be ordered.” For every order flows from a principle into a medium,³ therefore, if it is no first, there is no order; but the duration of the world or the revolutions of heaven, if they are infinite, have not first: therefore they do not have an order, therefore one is not before the other. But this is false: therefore it remains, that they have a first. If you say, that it is not necessary to posit a standing still of an order, except among those which are ordered according to the order of causality, because among causes there is necessarily a standing still;⁴ I ask, “For what reason (is there) not (such) among others?” Moreover, you will not escape from this: for there was never a revolution of heaven, without there being [quin fuisset] the generation of an animal from an animal;* but it is established, that an animal is ordered to the animal, out of which it is generated according to the order of cause: therefore if, according to the Philosopher⁵ and to reason, it is necessary to posit a standing still among those which are ordered according to the order of cause, therefore in the generation of animals it is necessary to posit a first animal. But the world was not without animals: ergo etc..
3. Tertia propositio est ista. « Impossibile est infinita pertransiri »;⁶ sed si mundus non coepit, infinitae revolutiones fuerunt: ergo impossibile est illas pertransire: ergo impossibile fuit devenire usque ad hanc. Si tu dicas, quod non sunt pertransita, quia nulla fuit prima,⁷ vel, quod etiam bene possunt pertransire in tempore infinito; per hoc non evades. Quaeram enim a te, utrum aliqua revolutio praecesserit hodiernam in infinitum, an nulla. Si nulla: ergo omnes finitae distant ab hac, ergo sunt omnes finitae, ergo habent principium. Si aliqua in infinitum distat; quaero de revolutione, quae immediate sequitur illam, utrum distet in infinitum. Si non: ergo nec illa distat, quoniam finita distantia est inter utramque. Si vero distat in infinitum, similiter quaero de tertia et de quarta et sic in infinitum: ergo non magis distat ab hac una quam ab alia: ergo una non est ante aliam: ergo omnes sunt simul.	3. The third proposition is this. « It is impossible that (things) infinite be thoroughly passed by [pertransiri] »,⁶ but if the world has not begun, there have been infinite revolutions: therefore it is impossible that these have thoroughly passed by: therefore it was impossible to arrive as this (revolution). If you say, that (things infinite) have not be passed by, because none was first,⁷ and/or, that even they can well pass by in an infinite time; you will not escape through this. For let me ask you, whether any revolution has preceded the one today [hodiernam] to an infinite (degree), or none (has). If none: therefore all finished (revolutions) are distant from this one, therefore all (are) finite, therefore they have a beginning. If any are distant unto an infinite degree; I ask concerning the revolution, which immediately follows that one, whether it is distant unto an infinite degree. If not: therefore neither is that one distant, since there is a finite distance between each. But if it is distant unto an infinite degree, I similarly ask concerning the third, and concerning the fourth, and thus unto infinity: therefore one is not more distant from this one than from another: therefore one is not before the other: therefore all are together.
4. Quarta propositio est ista. Impossibile est infinita a virtute finita comprehendi;⁸ sed si mundus non coepit, infinita comprehenduntur a virtute finita: ergo etc. Probatio maioris per se patet. Minor ostenditur sic. Suppono, solum Deum esse virtutis actu infinitae, et omnia alia habere finitatem. Rursus suppono, quod motus caeli nunquam fuit sine spirituali substantia creata, quae vel ipsum faceret, vel saltem cognosceret.⁹ Rursus etiam hoc suppono, quod spiritualis substantia nihil obliviscitur. — Si ergo aliqua spiritualis substantia virtutis finitae simul fuit cum caelo, nulla fuit revolutio caeli, quam non cognosceret; et non est oblita: ergo omnes actu cognoscit; et fuerunt infinitae: ergo aliqua spiritualis substantia virtutis finitae simul comprehendit infinita. Si dicas, quod non est inconveniens, quod unica similitudine cognoscat omnes revolutiones, quae sunt eiusdem speciei et omnino consimiles; obiicitur, quod non tantum cognoverit circulationes, sed earum effectus; et effectus varii et diversi sunt infiniti: patet ergo¹⁰ etc.	4. The fourth proposition is this. “It is impossible that (things) infinite be comprehended⁸ by finite virtue”; but if the world did not begin, (things) infinite are comprehended by finite virtue: ergo etc.. The proof of the major is clear through itself. The minor is shown in this manner. I suppose, that God alone is of infinite virtue according to act, and that all others have a finity. Again, I suppose, that the movement of heaven never was without a spiritual, created substance, which either caused it, and/or at least cognized (it).⁹ Again, I also suppose this, that a spiritual substance forgets nothing. — If, therefore, any spiritual substance of finite virtue existed [fuit] together with the heavens [cum caelo], there was no revolution of heaven, which it did not cognize; and it has not forgotten (any): therefore it cognizes all in act; and they were infinite: therefore some spiritual substance of finite virtue comprehends together (things) infinite. If you say, that it is not unfitting, that by a unique similitude it cognize all the revolutions, which are of the same species and entirely consimilar [consimiles]; it is objected, that it cognized not only the circulations, but (also) their effects; and the various and diverse effects are infinite: therefore¹⁰ it is clear that etc..
5. Quinta est ista. Impossibile est infinita simul esse;¹¹ sed si mundus est aeternus sine principio, cum non sit sine homine — propter hominem enim sunt quodam modo omnia¹² — et homo duret finito tempore: ergo infiniti homines fuerunt. Sed quot fuerunt homines, tot animae rationales: ergo infinitae animae fuerunt. Sed quot animae fuerunt, tot sunt, quia sunt formae incorruptibiles: ergo infinitae animae sunt. Si tu dicas propter hoc, quod circulatio est in animabus, vel quod una anima est in . . .	5. The fifth is this. “It is impossible that infinite (things) be together”;¹¹ but if the world is eternal without a beginning, since it is not without man — for on account of man all (things) in a certain manner are¹² — and a man endures for a finite time: therefore there were infinite men. But (there are) as many rational souls, as there were men: therefore there were infinite rational souls. But there are as many souls, as there were, because they are incorruptible forms: therefore there are infinite rational souls. If you say on this account, that there is a circulation among souls, and/or that one soul is in . . .
¹ Ita S. Thomas, hic q. 1. a. 5. ad 3. et 4. ² Similiter argumentatur Algazel, ut refert Averroes, Destr. destr. disp. 1. dub. 5. — Aliquanto superius in plurimis mss. et ed. 1 perperam omittitur et sol. ³ Sub hoc respectu Philo Iudaeus, de Mundi opificio, dicit: Ordo est consequentia et series rerum praecedentium et sequentium. — De minori nota verba Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 34. (c. 5.): Infinitorum enim nihil est primum. — In eadem minori et conclusione huius argumenti plures codd. principium, nonnulli alii cum edd. 1, 2, 3 primam pro primum. ⁴ Aristoteles hoc demonstrat VIII. Phys. text. 34. seqq. (c. 5.) et II. Metaph. text. 5. seqq. (I. brevior, c. 2.). ⁵ Vide notam praeced. — Cod. F finem argumenti sic exhibet: ergo mundus non est infinitus, sed habet principium. ⁶ Aristot., I. Poster. c. 18. (c. 22.), XI. Metaph. c. 9. (X. c. 10.) et multis aliis locis, ubi textus originalis pro pertransiri habet pertransire (dielqein), quod etiam paulo inferius fere omnes codd. contra ed. 1 et Vat. ponunt. ⁷ Secundum intentionem S. Thomae, S. p. I. q. 46. a. 2. ad 6. et hic q. 1. a. 5. ad 3. et 4. — Post pertransita supple: infinita. — Paulo inferius plurimi codd. cum primis edd. praecessit pro praecesserit. ⁸ Codd. P Q in marg. addunt octavo Physicorum, in fine (text. 79. seqq.), ubi Aristot. probat, in magnitudine finita non posse esse infinitam potentiam. ⁹ Haec suppositio fit secundum systema Aristotelicum. ¹⁰ Cod. F prosequitur: quod virtus finita comprehendit infinita, si mundus non coepit; quod est impossibile etc. ¹¹ Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 40. seqq. (c. 5.), I. de Caelo, text. 33. seqq. (c. 5.) et XI. Metaph. c. 9. (X. c. 10.), quibus locis ostendit, in rebus naturalibus dari non posse infinitum actu sive in magnitudine sive in multitudine. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ¹² Aristot., II. Phys. text. 24. (c. 2.): Et utimur tanquam propter nos omnibus, quae sunt; sumus enim quodammodo et nos finis.	¹ Thus St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 5, in reply to nn. 3 and 4. ² Al-Ghazel argues similarly, as Averroës remarks in The Destruction of Destructions, disputation 1, dubium 5. [Trans. note: Al-Ghazel is the Latin name for the famous Iranian scholar Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammand at-Tusi al-Ghazali, (b. A. D. 1058, d. A. D. 1111, whose most famous works are The Deliverance from Error, The Revival of the Religious Sciences, and The Destruction of the Philosophers, of which the aforementioned work of Averroës is a refutation.] — Somewhat above this in very many manuscripts and edition 1 there is faultily omitted and the Sun [et sol]. ³ In this respect Philo the Jews, On the Workshop of the World, says: Order is the consequent and series of things preceding and following. — On the minor note the words of Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII,. text 34 (ch. 5): For of (things) infinite there is nothing first. — In the same minor and in the conclusion of this argument several codices read beginning [principium], not a few others, together with editions 1, 2 and 3, have instead first (thing or revolution or order) for first (being or beginning) [primum]. ⁴ Aristotle demonstrates this in Physics, Bk. VIII, text 34 (ch. 5) and in Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 5 ff. (in the shorter version, Bk. I, ch. 2). ⁵ See the preceding footnote. — Codex F exhibits the end of the argument thus: therefore the world is not infinite, but has a beginning [ergo mundus non est infinitus, sed habet principium]. ⁶ Aristotle in Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 18 (ch. 22), Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 9 (Bk. X, ch. 10) and in many other passages, where the original text has be thoroughly passed by [pertransiri] for thoroughly pass by [pertransire] (dielqein), which even a little below this nearly all the codices, contrary to edition 1 and the Vatican edition have. ⁷ According to the understanding of St. Thomas, Summa., p. I, q. 46, a. 2, in reply to n. 6, and here in q. 1, a. 5, in reply to nn. 3 and 4. — Supply things infinite [infinita] for the verb have passed by [sunt pertransita]. — A little below this very many codices, together with the first editions, have the indicative has preceded [praecessit] for the subjunctive has preceded [praecesserit]. ⁸ Codices P and Q in the margin add in the eighth (book) of Physics, at the end (text. 79 ff.) [octavo Physicorum, in fine], where Aristotle proves, that in a finite magnitude there cannot be infinite power. ⁹ This supposition is made according to the Aristotelian system. ¹⁰ Codex F proceeds (thus): that a finite virtue comprehends infinite (things), if the word did not being; which is impossible etc. [quod virtus finita comprehendit infinita, si mundus non coepit; quod est impossibile]. ¹¹ Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text. 40 ff. (ch. 5), On Heaven, Bk. I, text 33 ff. (ch. 5), and Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 9 (Bk. X, ch. 10), in which passages he shows, that in natural things one cannot grant the infinite in act or in magnitude or in multitude. See also Sent., Bk. I, d. 43, q. 3. ¹² Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 24 (ch. 2): And we use all (things), which are, for our own sake; for we ourselves are in a certain manner an end.
	* [Trans. note: One must remember that in Latin an “animal” is understood to be any living thing, not as the term is used in the more restrictive senses, v. g. as distinguished against “vegetable” or “plant”.]

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omnibus hominibus;¹ primum est error in philosophia, quia, ut vult Philosophus, « proprius actus est in propria materia »: ergo non potest anima, quae fuit perfectio unius, esse perfectio alterius, etiam secundum Philosophum. Secundum etiam magis est erroneum, quia multo minus una est anima omnium.²	all men;¹ the first is an error in philosophy, because, as the Philosopher would have it, « one’s own act is in one’s own matter »: therefore a soul, which was the perfection of one (body), cannot be the perfection of another, even according to the Philosopher. The second is even more erroneous, because much less is there one soul of all (men).²
6. Ultima ratio ad hoc est: impossibile est, quod habet esse post non-esse habere esse aeternum, quoniam hic est implicatio contradictionis; sed mundus habet esse post non-esse: ergo impossibile est esse aeternum. Quod autem habeat esse post non-esse, probatur sic: omne illud quod totaliter habet esse ab aliquo, producitur ab illo ex nihilo; sed mundus totaliter habet esse a Deo: ergo mundus ex nihilo; sed non ex nihilo materialiter: ergo orginaliter.³ Quod autem omne quod totaliter producitur ab aliquo differente per essentiam, habeat esse ex nihilo, patens est. Nam quod totaliter producitur, producitur secundum materiam et formam; sed materia non habet ex quo producatur, quia non ex Deo: manifestum est igitur, quod ex nihilo. Minor autem, scilicet quod mundus a Deo totaliter producatur, patet ex alio problemate.⁴	6. The last reason for this is: “it is impossible, that what has a ‘to be’ [esse] after a ‘not-to-be’ [non-esse] have an eternal ‘to be’”, since this is the implication of a contradiction; but the world has a ‘to be’ after a ‘not-to-be’: therefore it is impossible that it is eternal. But that it has a ‘to be’ after a ‘not-to-be’, is proven thus: ‘every that which has (its) ‘to be’ totally by something, is produced by that out of nothing; but the world has (its) ‘to be’ totally from God: therefore the world (has been produced) out of nothing; but not out of nothing materially: therefore originally.³ But that everything which is produced totally by something differing through essence, has (its) ‘to be’ out of nothing, is patent. For what is totally produced, is produced according to matter and form; but matter does not have (that) out of which it is produced, because (it is) not (made) out of God: it is manifest, therefore, that (it is made) out of nothing. Moreover, the minor, namely that the world is produced totally by God, is clear from the other problem.⁴
CONCLUSIO. Si ponitur res omnes ex nihilo esse productas, implicat dicere, mundum aeternum esse sive ab aeterno productum.	CONCLUSION If one posits that all things have been produced out of nothing, one implies the saying, that the world is eternal or (has been) produced from eternity.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod ponere, mundum aeternum esse sive aeternaliter productum, ponendo⁵ res omnes ex nihilo productas, omnino est contra veritatem et rationem, sicut ultima ratio probat; et adeo contra rationem, ut nullum philosophorum quantumcumque parvi intellectus crediderim hoc posuisse. Hoc enim implicat in se manifestam contradictionem. — Ponere autem mundum aeternum, praesupposita aeternitate materiae, rationabile videtur et intelligibile, et hoc duplici exemplo. Egressus enim rerum mundanarum a Deo est per modum vestigii. Unde si pes esset aeternus, et pulvis, in quo formatur vestigium, esset aeternus; nihil prohiberet intelligere, vestigium pedi esse coaeternum, et tamen a pede esset vestigium.⁶ Per hunc modum, si materia sive principium potentiale esse coaeternum auctori, quid prohibet ipsum vestigium esse aeternum? immo videtur congruum. — Rursus aliud exemplum rationabile.⁷ Creatura enim procedit a Deo ut umbra, Filius procedit ut splendor; sed quam cito est lux, statim est splendor, et statim est umbra, si sit corpus opacum ei obiectum. Si ergo materia coaeterna est auctori tanquam opacum;⁸ sicut rationabile est ponere Filium, qui est splendor Patris, coaeternum: ita rationabile videtur, creaturas sive mundum, qui est umbra summae lucis, esse aeternum. Et magis rationabile est quam suum oppositum, scilicet quod materia fuerit aeternaliter imperfecta, sine forma vel divina influentia, sicut posuerunt quidam philosophorum; et adeo rationabilius, ut etiam ille excellentior inter philosophos, Aristoteles, secundum quod Sancti imponunt, et commentatores exponunt, et verba eis praetendunt, in hunc errorem dilapsus fuerit.⁹	I RESPOND: It must be said, that to posit, that the world is eternal and (has) not (been) eternally produced, by positing⁵ that all things (have been) produced out of nothing, is entirely contrary to the truth and to reason, just as the last reason proves; and so contrary to reason, that none of the philosophers, howsoever small (their) understanding, believed that this was posited. For this implies in itself a manifest contradiction. — Moreover to posit an eternal world, with the eternity of matter presupposed, seems reasonable and intelligible, and this according to a twofold example. For the stepping forth of mundane things from God is through the manner of a vestige [vestigium]. Wherefore if a foot were eternal, and the dust, in which a footprint [vestigium] is formed, were eternal; nothing would prohibit the understanding, that the footprint is coeternal to the foot, and yet it would be the footprint from the foot.⁶ Through this manner, if matter or the principle of potency [principium potentiale] is coeternal to the Author (of the world), what will prohibit that the vestige be eternal? nay it seems congruous. — Again, (there is) another reasonable example.⁷ For the creature proceeds from God as a shadow, the Son proceeds as the Splendor, but as swift as there is light, there is immediately splendor, and there is immediately a shadow, if the body is an opaque [opacum] object to it. Therefore, if matter is coeternal to the Author (of creation) as (something) opaque;⁸ just as it is reasonable to posit that the Son, who is the Splendor of the Father, (is) coeternal (to Him): so it seems reasonable (to posit), that creatures or the world, which is the shadow of the Most High Light, are eternal. And it is more reasonable than its opposite, namely, that matter was eternally imperfect, without form and/or divine influence, just as certain of the philosophers posited; and so much more reasonable, that that more excellent one among philosophers, Aristotle, according to which the Saints interpret (him) [imponut], and commentators expound, and his words show forth, fell into this error.⁹
Quidam tamen moderni dicunt, Philosophum . . .	However certain modern (authors) say, that the Philosopher . . .
¹ Prima opinio, quae vocatur metempsychosis, est Pythagorae et Platonis, X. de Republ. circa finem, (ed. Serrani, tom. II. p. 620); Tim. Locri de Anima mundi (tom. III. pag. 104), de qua August. XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 26. Secunda opinio est Averrois, quam diversis locis proponit, v. g. III. de Anima, text. 4. et 17. seq. ac in tractatibus de Animae beatitudine, et de Connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine. Contra errorem hunc Averrois tum B. Albertus tum S. Thomas composuerunt specialem librum, cui titulus: de Unitate intellectus contra Averroem. — Verba paulo inferius ex Aristotele citata inveniuntur, II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.): Uniuscuiusque enim actus in eo quod potentia existit, et in propria materia aptus natura est fieri. Cfr. I. de Anima, text. 53. (c. 3.). — Aliquanto superius cod. Q Si tu dicas, quod non est inconveniens propter hoc pro Si tu dicas propter hoc. Paulo inferius codd. V aa quae fuit corporis perfectio unius pro quae fuit perfectio unius. ² De hac 5. ratione, quam etiam Algazel adducit (cfr. Averroes, Destr. destr. disp. 1. dub. 7.), ait S. Thomas hic q. 1. a. 5. ad 6: « quod illa obiectio inter alias fortior est », et S. p. I. q. 46. a. 2. ad 8: « quod haec ratio particularis est. Unde posset dicere aliquis, quod mundus fuit aeternus vel saltem aliqua creatura, ut Angelus, non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus universaliter, an aliqua creatura fuerit ab aeterno ». Similia his dicit etiam in opusculo de Aeternitate mundi contra murmurantes. Hinc ii qui S. Thomam sequuntur, communiter tenent, quod mundus potuerit esse ab aeterno quantum ad entia permanentia, non autem quantum ad entia successiva, ut sunt generationes et corruptiones, motus et tempus. ³ Vat. sed non ex nihilo materialiter, nec causaliter: ergo ordinaliter, quae lectio convenit cum iis, quae in fine quaest. praeced. habentur, sed non cum codd. et ed. 1. Aliquanto superius post ab aliquo sola Vat. adiicit donante (differente?) per essentiam, et dein ponit ergo mundus producitur ex nihilo a Deo pro ergo mundus ex nihilo, ubi codd. aa cc cum ed. 1 post mundus interserunt est. Cod. I post habet esse a Deo addit sicut supra probatum est in primo problemata. ⁴ Scil. ex quaest. praeced. ⁵ Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 ponenti. ⁶ August. X. de Civ. Dei. c. 31: Sicut enim, inquiunt [Platonici], si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret, nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset; sic, inquiunt, et mundus atque in illo dii creati et semper fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit, et tamen facti sunt. — Vat.: vestigium pedis esse . . . a pede esse vestigium. Mox cod. T materiale pro potentiale, et dein codd. U aa bb prohiberet pro prohibet. ⁷ Vat. interpunctione mutata: Rursus aliud exemplum. Rationalis enim creatura procedit, quae lectio minus congruit cum iis, quae S. Bonav. docuit de differentia umbrae, vestigii et imaginis, I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. in fine. — In hoc exemplo alluditur ad illud Hebr. 1, 3: Qui cum sit splendor gloriae etc. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. ut C K R T et statim est ibi umbra pro et statim est umbra, dein non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 3 vel (cod. I velut) obiectum, cod. aa vel obscurum pro ei obiectum. ⁸ In cod. I. additur quod obiiciatur, in Vat. luci. Mox non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 aeternum, cod. Z aeterni pro coaeternum, et dein cod. T est ponere pro videtur. ⁹ Cfr. quaest. praeced.; Aristot., III. de Caelo, text. 21 (c. 2), ubi etiam recitat opinionem Platonis ex Timaeo, nempe quod elementa inordinate movebantur, antequam mundus factus esset. Idem asserit Augustinus, X. de Civ. Dei, c. 31. et XII. c. 12. — Paulo superius post secundum quod Sancti cod. aa interserit ei.	¹ The first opinion, which is called metempsychosis, is (that) of Pythagoras and Plato, The Republic, Bk. X, near the end (in Serrani’s Edition, tome II, p. 620): Timaeus of Locrus, On the Soul of the World., (tome III, p. 104), concerning which (St.) Augustine (speaks) in On the City of God, Bk. XII, ch. 26. The second opinion is (that) of Averroës, which he proposes in diverse passages, v. g. , On the Soul, Bk. III, texts 4 and 17 f., and in (his) tracts On the Beatitude of the Soul, and On the Connection of the Abstract Intellect with Man. Against this error of Averroës both Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) as well as St. Thomas composed a special book, entitled: On the Unity of the Intellect against Averroës. — The words cited a little below this from Aristotle are found in On the Soul, Bk. II, text 26 (ch. 2): For the act of each one exists in that which (is its) power, and it is apt according to nature to come to be in its own matter. Cf. On the Soul, Bk. I, text 53 8ch. 3). — Somewhat above this codex Q reads If you say, that it is not fitting on this account [Si tu dicas, quod non est inconveniens propter hoc] for If you say on this account [Sit u dicas propter hoc]. A little below this codices V and aa have which was the perfection of one body [quae fuit corporis perfectio unius] for which was the perfection of one (body) [quae fuit perfectio unius]. ² On this 5th reason, which even Al-Ghazel adduces (cf. Averroës, Destruction of Destructions, disputation 1, doubt 7), St. Thomas says here in q. 1, a. 5, in reply to n. 6: « that that objection is the stronger among the others », and in Summa., p. I, q. 46, a. 2, in reply to n. 8: « that this reason is particular. Wherefore someone could say, that the world was eternal and/or at least some creature (was), such as an Angel, but not a man. But we intend (our sentence) universally, whether any creature was from eternity ». He says (things) similar to these in (his) Opuscle On the Eternity of the World against Murmurers. Hence those who follow St. Thomas, commonly hold, that the world could have been from eternity, as much as regards permanent beings, but not as much as regard successive beings, such as are generations and corruptions, movements and time. ³ The Vatican edition has but not out of nothing materially, nor causally: therefore ordinally [sed non ex nihilo materialiter, nec causaliter: ergo ordinaliter], which reading convenes with those, which are had at the end of the Question, but not with the codices and edition 1. Somewhat above this after by something [ab aliquo] the Vatican edition alone adds granting (differing [differente]?) through essence [donante per essentiam], and then it posits therefore the world is produced out of nothing by God [ergo mundus producitur ex nihilo a Deo] for therefore the world (has been produced) out of nothing [ergo mundus ex nihilo], where codices aa and cc, together with edition 1, after the world [mundus], insert is [est]. Codex I after has ‘being’ from God [habet esse a Deo] adds just as has been proven above in the first problem (i. e. Question) [sicut supra probatum est in primo problemata] . ⁴ Namely in the preceding Question. ⁵ Very many codices, together with edition 1, have with one positing [ponenti] for by positing [ponendo]. ⁶ (St.) Augustine, On the City of God¸ Bk. X, ch. 31: For just as, as (the Platonists) say, if a foot had always been in the dust, there would always be a footprint under it, which footprint, however, no one would doubt (had) been made by the one stepping (there); so, they say, both the world and the gods created in it also always were, with the One, who made it, always existing, and yet they have been made. — The Vatican edition reads of the foot is coeternal [pedis esse coaeternum] for is coeternal to the foot [pedi esse coaeternum] and is the footprint [esse vestigium] for it would be [esset vestigium]. Next codex T reads of matter [materiale] for of potency [potentiale], and then codices U aa and bb have would prohibit [prohiberet] for will prohibit [prohibet]. ⁷ The Vatican edition, with changed punctuation, reads: Again, another example. For the rational creature proceeds etc. [Rursus aliud exemplum. Rationalis enim creatura procedit etc.] for Again, (there is) another reasonable example. For the creature proceeds etc. [Rursus aliud exemplum rationabile. Creatura enim procedit etc.], which reading (of the Vatican edition) is less congruent with those (things), which St. Bonaventure taught concerning the difference of a shadow, vestige and image, in Sent, Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 2, at the end. ⁸ In codex I there is added which is the object (of His creation) [quod obiiciatur], in the Vatican edition to (His) Light [luci]. Next not a few codices, together with edition 1, have read if matter is an eternal, as (something) opaque to the Author (of creation) [si materia aeternum est. etc.], codex Z if the matter of an eternal is (something) opaque to the Author (of creation) [si material aeterni est etc.] for if matter is coeternal to the Author (of creation) as (something) opaque [si material coaeterna est auctori tanquam opacum], and then codex T has so it is reasonable to posit [ita rationabile est ponere] for so it seems reasonable (to posit) [it rationabile videtur]. ⁹ Cf. the preceding Question; Aristotle, On Heaven, Bk. III, text 21 (ch. 2), where he also cites the opinion of Plato from the Timaeus, namely that the elements moved inordinately, before the world had been made. (St.) Augustine asserts the same, On the City of God., Bk. X, ch. 31, and Bk. XII, ch. 12. — A little above this after according to which the Saints interpret [secundum quod Sancti] codex aa inserts him [ei].

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nequaquam illud sensisse nec intendisse probare, quod mundus omnino non coeperit, sed quod non coeperit naturali motu.¹ — Quod horum magis verum sit, ego nescio; hoc unum scio, quod si posuit, mundum non incepisse secundum naturam, verum posuit, et rationes eius sumtae a motu et tempore sunt efficaces. Si autem hoc sensit, quod nullo modo coeperit; manifeste erravit, sicut pluribus rationibus ostensum est supra.² Et necesse fuit, eum ad vitandam contradictionem ponere, aut mundum non esse factum, aut non esse factum ex nihilo. Ad vitandum autem infinitatem actualem necesse fuit ponere aut animae rationalis corruptionem, aut unitatem, aut circulationem; et ita auferre beatitudinem.³ Unde iste error et malum habet initium et pessimum habet finem.	never thought that nor intended to prove, that the world did not entirely begin, but that it did not begin by a natural movement.¹ — Which of these is more true, I do not know; this one (thing) I do know, what if he posited, that the world did not begin according to nature, he posited a truth, and his reasons taken from movement and time are efficacious. But if he thought this, that it in no manner began; he manifestly erred, just as has been shown above with many reasons.² It was necessary, to avoid a contradiction, that he posit, either that the world was not made, or that it was not made out of nothing. But to avoid an actual infinity it was necessary to posit either the corruption, or the unity, or the circulation of the rational soul; and thus to bear off beatitude.³ Wherefore this error of his both has a bad start and has the worst end.
1. Quod ergo obiicitur primo de motu,⁴ quod est primus inter omnes motus et mutationes, quia perfectissimus; dicendum, quod loquendo de motibus et mutationibus naturalibus, verum dicit et non habet instantiam; loquendo autem de mutatione supernaturali,⁵ per quam ipsum mobile processit in esse, non habet veritatem. Nam illa praecedit omne creatum, et ita mobile primum, ac per hoc et eius motum.	1. What, therefore, is objected first concerning movement,⁴ that (one movement) is first among all movements and changes, because (it is) the most perfect; it must be said, that speaking of natural movements and changes, it speaks a truth and has no instance;* but speaking of supernatural change,⁵ through which the movable itself proceeds into ‘being’, it does not have truth. For that precedes every created (being), and thus (precedes) the first mobile (sphere), and through this (precedes) its movement.
2. Quod⁶ obiicitur: omnis motus exit in esse per motum; dicendum, quod motus non exit in esse per se, nec in se, sed cum alio et in alio. Et quoniam Deus in eodem instanti mobile fecit et ut motor super mobile influxit; ideo motum mobili concreavit. — Si autem quaeras de illa creatione, dicendum, quod ibi stare est sicut in primis. Et hoc melius infra patebit.⁷	2. What is objected:⁶ “every movement goes forth into ‘being’ through a movement”; it must be said, that a movement does not go forth into ‘being’ through itself, nor in itself, but with another and in another. And since God in the same instant made the movable (sphere) and as a mover inflowed upon the movable (sphere); for that reason movement was created together [concreavit] with the movable. — But if you ask concerning that creation, it must be said, that there is a standing still there just as in first (intentions).ª And this will be clear better, below.⁷
3. Quod tertio obiicitur de nunc temporis etc., dicendum, quod, sicut in circulo est dupliciter assignare punctum, aut cum fit, aut postquam factus est; et sicut,⁸ dum fit, est ponere et assignare primum punctum, dum vero iam est, non est ponere primum; sic est accipere in tempore nunc dupliciter: et in ipsa productione temporis fuit nunc primum, ante quod non fuit aliud, quod fuit principium temporis, in quo omnia dicuntur esse producta. Si autem de tempore, postquam factum est, verum est, quod est terminus praeteriti et se habet per modum circuli; sed hoc modo non fuerunt res productae in tempore iam perfecto. Et ita patet, quod rationes Philosophi nihil valent omnino ad hanc conclusionem. — Et quod dicitur, quod ante omne tempus est tempus; verum est accipiendo intus dividendo,⁹ non extra anterius procedendo.	3. What is objected third concerning the now of time etc., it must be said, that, just as in a circle there is an assigning of a point in a twofold manner, either when (the circle) is made, or after it has been made; and just as,⁸ so long as it is being made, there is a positing and assigning of a first point, but so long as it is already, there is not a first point; so there is an accepting in time of a “now” in a twofold manner: and in the very production of time was the first now, before which there was no other, which was the beginning of time, in which all (beings) are said to have been produced. But if (one speaks) of the time, after which (time) was made, it is true, that (the now of time) is the terminus of the past and it holds itself (to time) in the manner of a circle; but in this manner things had not been produced in an already perfected time. And thus it is clear, that the reasons of the Philosopher are worth entirely nothing regarding this conclusion. — And what is said, that before every time there is time; it is true by accepting (it) from within (time) by dividing (time),⁹ not by proceeding outside of (time) anteriorly.
4. Quod obiicitur de tempore, quando coepit; dicendum, quod coepit in suo principio; principium autem temporis est instans vel nunc; et ita coepit in instanti. Et non valet illa ratio: non fuit in instanti, ergo non coepit in instanti; quia successiva¹⁰ non sunt in sui initio. — Potest tamen et aliter dici, quod dupliciter est loqui de tempore: aut secundum essentiam, aut secundum esse. Si secundum essentiam, sic nunc est tota essentia temporis, et illud incepit cum re mobili, non in alio nunc, sed in se ipso, quia status est in primis, unde non habuit aliam mensuram. Si secundum esse, sic coepit cum motu variationis, scilicet¹¹ nec coepit per creationem, sed potius per ipsorum mutabilium mutationem, et maxime primi mobilis.	4. What is objected concerning time, “When did it begin?”; it must be said; that it began in its own beginning; but the beginning of time is an instant and/or a now; and thus it begat in an instant. And that reason: “it was not in an instant, therefore it did not begin in an instant”, is not valid; because successive (things)¹⁰ do not exist [non sunt] at their own start. — Yet it can also be said in another manner, that there is a speaking of time in a twofold manner: either according to essence, or according to ‘being’. If according to essence, thus now is the whole essence of time, and that began with the movable thing, not in another now, but in itself, because there is a standing still in first (intentions), wherefore it has no other measure. If according to ‘being’, thus it began with the movement of variation, that is,¹¹ it neither began through creation, but rather through the change of changeables themselves, and most of all (through the change) of the first mobile (sphere).
5. Quod obiicitur de causae sufficientia et actualitate, dicendum, quod causa sufficiens ad aliquid est duobus modis: aut operans per naturam, aut per voluntatem et rationem. Si operans per naturam, sic statim cum est, producit. Si autem operans per voluntatem,¹² quamvis sit sufficiens, non oportet, quod statim cum est operetur; operatur enim secundum sapientiam et discretionem, et ita considerat congruitatem. Quoniam igitur non conveniebat naturae ipsius creaturae aeternitas, nec decebat, Deum alicui hanc nobilissimam conditionem donare: ideo divina voluntas, quae operatur secundum sapientiam, produxit non ab aeterno, sed in tempore; quia sicut produxit, sic disposuit et sic voluit. Ab aeterno enim voluit producere tunc, quando produxit; sicut ego nunc volo cras audire missam. Et ita patet, quod sufficientia non cogit.	5. What is objected concerning the sufficiency and actuality of a cause, it must be said, that a cause sufficient for something is according to two manners: either one operating through nature, or through will and reason. If as one operating through nature, thus immediately when it is, it produces. But if one operating through will,¹² even though it is sufficient, it is not necessary, that immediately when it is, it operates; for it operates according to wisdom and discretion, and thus considers congruity. Therefore since eternity did not convene with the nature of a creature itself, nor was it fitting [decebat], that God grant this most noble condition to anyone: for that reason the Divine Will, which works according to wisdom, produces not from eternity, but in time; because just as It produced, so It disposed and so It willed. For from eternity He willed to produce then, when He produced; just as I now will to hear Mass tomorrow. And thus it is clear, that He is not driven by sufficiency.
Similiter de actualitate dicendum, quod causa duobus modis potest esse in actu: aut in se, ut si dicam: sol lucet; aut in effectu, ut si dicam: sol . . .	Similarly concerning the actuality (of a cause) it must be said, that a cause can be in act in two manners: either in itself, as if to say: “The Sun gives light”; or in effect, as if to say: “The Sun . . .
¹ Scilicet generatione, quae supponit subiectum et in tempore peragitur. ² Hic in fundam. — Infra primum disiunctionis membrum Vat. ita exhibet: aut mundum esse factum ex tempore, quae lectio contradicit verbis praecedentibus Si autem hoc sensit, quod nullo modo coeperit, et est contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3. ³ Cfr. August., X. de Civ. Dei, c. 30; XI. c. 4. n. 2; et XII. c. 20. ⁴ Cod. L supplet caeli, cod. R circulari, Vat. habet primi mobilis, qui est etc. ⁵ Sive creatione. ⁶ In cod. U additur secundo. ⁷ Hic a. 3. q. 2. ad 5. — Ad verba in primis supple: intentionibus. ⁸ Plures codd. etsi; dein cod. U in prima productione pro in ipsa productione. In seq. prop post Si autem de tempore cod. A prosequitur et de nunc postquam factum est loquamur, verum est. ⁹ Cod. F interserit et tunc clauditur inter extrema primi et ultimi temporis; cod. Y post non extra addit vel. Paulo superius codd. V aa quaestionem pro conclusionem. ¹⁰ Intellige: successiva quatenus successiva. — Paulo superius Vat. et non valet illatio, quae etiam circa principium solutionis ponit quod pro quando. ¹¹ Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. omittit scilicet; codd. V aa habent sed non pro scilicet nec. ¹² In mss. et primis edd. hic additur et; forte excidit rationem.	¹ Namely by generation, which supposes a subject and is accomplished in time. ² Here in the fundament. — Below the first member of the distinction the Vatican edition exhibits either that the would was made out of time [aut mundum esse factum ex tempore] for either that the world was not made [aut mundum non esse factum], which reading (of the Vatican edition) contradicts the preceding words But if he thought this, that it in no manner began [Si autem hoc sensit, quod nullo modo coeperit], and is contrary to the codices and editions 1, 2 and 3. ³ Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk X, ch. 30, Bk. XI, ch. 4, n. 2; and Bk. XII, ch. 20. ⁴ Codex L reads the movement of heaven [motu caeli] for movement [motu], codex R instead reads circular movement [motu circulari], and the Vatican edition reads the movement of the first mobile (sphere), which is [motu primi mobilis, qui est etc.]. ⁵ Or an act of creation. ⁶ In codex Y there is added second [secundo]. ⁷ Here in a. 3, q. 2, in reply to n. 5. — At the words in the first [in primis], supply intentions [intentionibus]. ⁸ Several codices read even if [etsi] for and just as [et sicut]; then codex U reads in the first production [in prima productione] for in the very production [in ipsa productione]. In the following proposition codex A reads But if we speak of time and of the now after which (time) has been made, it is true [Si autem de tempore et de nunc postquam factum est loquamur, verum est] for But if (one speaks) of the time, after which (time) was made, it is true [Si autem de tempore, postquam factum est, verum est]. ⁹ Codex F inserts and then it is enclosed between the extremes of the first and last time [et tunc clauditur inter extrema primi et ultimi temporis], codex Y after outside of (time) [extra] adds and/or [vel]. A little above this codices V and aa have question [quaestionem] for conclusion [conclusionem]. ¹⁰ Understand: successive to the extent that they are successives. — A little above this the Vatican edit ion reads the illation [illatio] for that reason [illa ratio], which edition also near the beginning of the solution has When it [Quando] for What [Quod]. ¹¹ The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, omits that is [scilicet]; codices V and aa have but it did not [sed non] for that is, it neither [scilicet nec]. ¹² In the manuscripts and first editions there is added here and [et], where perhaps there has falled from the text (the additional word) reason [rationem].
	* [Trans. note: Here instance [instantia] is a technical term of medieval logic for an example or instance which argues for or proves the contrary.] ª [Trans. note: The first intentions according to Medieval Philosophy are the transcendentals of being: the good, the true, the beautiful, one, being.]

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illuminat. Primo modo Deus semper fuit in actu, quoniam ipse est actus purus, nihil habens admixtum de possibili; alio modo non semper in actu; non enim semper fuit producens.¹	illumines.” In the first manner God was always in act, since He Himself is a pure act, having nothing mixed together with [admixtum de] the possible; in another manner (He is) not always in act; for He was not always producing.¹
6. Quod obiicitur secundo:² si de non producente factus est producens, mutatus est ab otio in actum; dicendum, quod quoddam est agens, in quo actio et productio addit aliquid supra agentem et producentem. Tale, cum de non agente fit agens, variatur aliquo modo;³ et in tali ante operationem cadit otium, et in operatione additur complementum. Aliud est agens, quod est sua actio; et tali nihil omnino advenit, cum producit, nec etiam in eo fit aliquid, quod non prius erat;⁴ et tale nec in operando recipit complementum, nec in non-operando est otiosum, nec cum de non-producente fit producens, mutatur ab otio in actum. Tale autem est Deus etiam secundum philosophos, qui posuerunt Deum simplicissimum. — Patet igitur, quod stulta est eorum ratio. Si enim propter otium vitandum res ab aeterno produxisset, sine rebus perfectum bonum non esset, ac per hoc nec cum rebus, quia perfectissimum se ipso perfectum est. Rursus, si propter immutabilitatem⁵ oporteret res ab aeterno esse, nihil posset nunc de novo producere. Qualis igitur Deus esset, qui nunc nihil per se posset? Haec omnia dementiam indicant magis quam philosophiam vel rationem aliquam. — Si tu quaeras, qualiter possit capi, quod Deus agat se ipso, et tamen non incipiat agere⁶; dicendum, quod, etsi hoc non possit plene capi propter imaginationem coniunctam, potest tamen necessaria ratione convinci; et si quis a sensibus se retrahat ad intelligibilia aspicienda,⁷ aliquo modo percipiet. Si enim aliquis quaerat, utrum Angelus possit facere potum figuli, cum non habeat manus, vel proiicere lapidem; respondetur, quod potest, quia hoc potest sola virtute sua absque organo, quod potest anima cum corpore et membro suo. Si igitur Angelus propter suam simplicitatem et perfectionem tantum excedit hominem, ut possit facere sine organo medio illud, ad quod homo necessario indiget organo; possit etiam facere per unum, quod homo potest per plura: quanto magis Deus, qui est in fine totius simplicitatis et perfectionis,⁸ absque omni medio suae voluntatis imperio, quae non est aliud quam ipse, potest omnia producere, ac per hoc in producendo immutabilis permanere! Sic potest homo manuduci ad hoc intelligendum. — Hoc autem perfectius capiet, si quis ista duo potest in suo opifice contemplari, scilicet quod est perfectissimus et simplicissimus. Quia perfectissimus, omnia quae sunt perfectionis ei attribuuntur; quia simplicissimus, nullam diversitatem in eo ponunt, ac per hoc nullam varietatem nec mutabilitatem; ideo « stabilis manes dat cuncta moveri ».⁹	6. What is objected second:² “if from one not producing He is made one producing, He has been changed from (being) idle into acting”; it must be said, that there is a certain agent, in which action and production adds something upon the one acting and producing. Such, since it is made acting from not acting, is varied in some manner;³ and in such before the operation there does occur a (being) idle, and in the operation there is added a complement. The other is the agent, which is its own action; and entirely nothing comes upon such, when it produces, nor does anything come to be in it, which was not before;⁴ and such neither in working receives a complement, nor in not-working is idle, nor when it is made producing from not producing is it changed from (being) idle into acting. Moreover such is God, even according to the philosophers, who posited that God (is) the Most Simple. — It is clear, therefore, that their reason is foolish. For if on account of avoiding idleness He had produced things from eternity, He would not be the Perfect Good without things, and through this neither (would He be such) with things, because the Most Perfect is perfect by Itself. Again, if on account of immutability⁵ it were necessary that things be from eternity, He could now produce nothing anew. Therefore what would God be, who now could (do) nothing through Himself? All these indicate a madness [dementia] greater than any philosophy and/or reckoning. — If you ask, “In what manner can it be grasped, that God acts by Himself, and yet does not start to act?”;⁶ it must be said, that, even if this cannot be fully grasped on account of the imagination conjoined, yet one ca be convinced by the necessary reason; and if one withdraws himself from the senses to look upon intelligible (things),⁷ he will perceive (it) in some manner. For if anyone asks, whether an Angel could make a potter’s pot [potum figuli], since he does not have hands, and/or throw a stone; one responds, that he can, because he can (do) that by his own virtue alone without an organ, which a soul can (do) with its own body and member. If, therefore, an Angel on account of his own simplicity and perfection exceeds a man so much, as to be able to do without the means of an organ [sine organo medio] that, for which a man necessarily needs an organ; he can also do through one, what a man can through more: how much more can God, who is at the boundary of all [in fine totius] simplicity and perfection,⁸ produce without any medium [absque omni medio]. by the command of His Will, which is not other than Himself, and through this remain throughout immutable in producing! In this manner can a man be led by hand to understand this. — But one will more perfectly grasp this, if he can contemplate these two (things) in His work, namely, that He is most perfect and most simple. Because (He is) most perfect, all which belong to perfection are attributed to Him; because (He is) most simple, (all which belong to perfection) posit no diversity in Him, and through this no variety nor mutability; for that reason « remaining stable He grants all others to move ».⁹
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Aristoteles cum plurimis, ut non dicam omnibus, antiquis philosophis docuit, mundum fuisse ab aeterno. Eundem errorem philosophi Arabes, ut Avicenna, Averroes aliique, lata sparserunt, ut videri potest ex multis thesibus reprobatis ab Episcopo Parisiensi (Collectio iudicior. d’Argentré, tom. I. pag. 496. cap. XI: Errores de mundo et mundi aeternitate). Fide autem constat, tum mundum secundum totam suam substantiam esse a Deo creatum, tum eum incepisse in tempore vel cum tempore. Conveniebant praecipui Scholastici etiam in assertione, sola duce ratione probari posse, mundum a Deo in sensu proprio creatum esse; sed quoad alterum dogma, quod scilicet non ab aeterno productus sit, celebris fuit controversia, utrum hoc a sola ratione efficaciter possit demonstrari, an sola fide teneatur.	I. Aristotle together with very many, if not so say all, the ancient philosophers taught, that the world was from eternity. The same error did the Arab philosophers, such as Avicenna, Averroës and others, spread abroad, as can be seen from the many theses, reproved by the Bishop of Paris (Collectio iudicor., d’Argentré, tome I, p. 496, ch. XI, “Errores de mundo et mundi aeternitate”). Moreover it is established by the Faith, both that the world has been created by God according to its whole substance, and that began in time and/or with time. The chief Scholastics convened in the assertion, that with the lead of reason alone could it be proved, that the world was created by God in the proper sense; but in regard to the other dogma, that, namely, it was not produced from eternity, there was a celebrated controversy, whether this could be demonstrated efficaciously by reason alone, or be held by faith alone.
II. Ad hanc quaestionem S. Bonav. respondet cum distinctione. Si supponitur error philosophorum, qui est fidei et rationi est contrarius, mundum non fuisse secundum totam substantiam de nihilo creatum, tunc nec probari posse dicit, eum non esse productum ab aeterno; supposita autem creatione, omnino impossibile esse, ipsum, ab aeterno creatum, semper fuisse. Haec impossibilitas non est parte Dei creantis, sed ex parte mundi, qui non est creabilis ab aeterno, sive aliis verbis: ab aeterno potuit Deus mundum creare, sed mundus ab aeterno creari non potuit. Hoc probare nituntur qui hanc sententiam profitentur partim ex ipso conceptu creationis, qui importet quandam mutationem de non-esse ad esse, sive ad esse post non-esse, partim et praecipue per demonstrationem a posteriori et per deductionem ad impossibilia.	II. To this Question St. Bonaventure responds with a distinction. If one supposes the error of the philosophers, which is contrary to faith and reason, that the world has not been created from nothing according to its whole substance, then one is saying that it neither can be proven, that it has not been produced from eternity; but that having supposed creation, it is entirely impossible, that it, having been created from eternity, always was. This impossibility is not on the part of God creating, but on the part of the world, which is not creatable from eternity, or in other words: from eternity God could create the world, but the world could not from eternity be created. This do those, who profess this sentence, strive to prove partly from the very concept of creation, which conveys a certain change from ‘non-being’ [non-esse] to ‘being’ [esse], or to ‘being’ after ‘non-being’, partly both through a demonstration a posteriori and through a deduction to the impossible.
III. Sententiam S. Bonaventura, quam Matth. ab Aquasparta in quadam egregia quaestione disputata inedita magis explanat, profitentur Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petrus a Tar., Ulricus ab Argentina, Richard. a Med., Henr. Gand. et plurimi ex recentioribus. — Durandus media via incedens putat, creationem aeternam repugnare quoad res successioni et motui subiectas, non autem quoad res, quae sunt naturae permanentis. In eodem sensu verba S. Thomae, qui oppositam sententiam defendit, a suis discipulis plerumque explicantur, ut supra p. 22, nota 2. dictum est. S. Thomae consentit Aegid. Rom. Scotus praecipue . . .	III. St. Bonaventure’s sentence, which Matthew of Aquasparta explains in a certain, outstanding, unpublished, disputed Question, is profess by Alexander of Hales, Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Ulrich of Strasbourg, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent and very many, more recent (authors). — Durandus, walking a middle path, thinks, that an eternal creation is repugnant in regard to things subjected to succession and movement, but not in regard to things, which belong to permanent nature. In the same sense the words of St. Thomas, who defends the opposite sentence, are explained by most of his disciples , as has been said above on p. 22, in footnote 2. Giles the Roman consents with St. Thomas. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus chiefly . . .
¹ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q.