COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I
PARS I.	PART I
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE II Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 28-30. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 28-30. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Utrum primum principium produxerit omnia se ipso, aut mediante alio.	QUESTION 2 Whether the First Principle produced all (things) by Itself, or by means of another?
SECUNDO, SUPPOSITO quod omnia sint ab uno principio, quaeritur, utrum illud produxerit omnia se ipso, aut mediante alio.	SECOND, HAVING SUPPOSED that all (things) are from one principle, there is asked, whether that produced all by itself, or by means of another.
1. Et quod mediante alio, videtur congruum. De liberalitate agentis est, ut non tantum communicet alii actum, sed etiam potentiam multiplicandi et diffundendi;¹ sed Deus est agens liberalissimum: ergo videtur, quod primae creaturae, quam fecit, dederit potentiam faciendi aliam, et illa dat alii, et sic procedendo usque ad ultimam. Si dicas, quod creatura non est capax tantae potentiae; contra: maius est facere aliquid, cum² est resistentia, quam ubi nulla; sed creatura in faciendo ex contrario habet resistentiam, in faciendo ex nihilo, nullam: ergo si capax est primae potentiae, et secundae.	1. And that (It does) by means of another, seems congruous. It is from the liberality of an agent, that it does not only communicate (its) act to another, but even (its) power of multiplying and diffusing;¹ but God is the most liberal agent: therefore it seems, that to the first creature, which He made, He gave the power of making another, and that one gave (this) to another, and thus proceeding even to the last. If you say, that a creature is not capable of so great a power; on the contrary: it is greater to make something, when² there is resistance, than where (there is) none; but a creature in making (something) out of a contrary has resistance, in making (something) out of nothing, (it has) none: therefore if it is capable of the first power, (it is) also (capable) of the second.
2. Item, de nobilitate agentis est facere nobiliora opera per se ipsum, et minus nobilia per ministrum,³ ut patet — decet enim regem iudicare, sed non debet eum coquinam facere — ergo si primus rex est nobilissimus et producit res, secundum quod decet eius nobilitatem, videtur, quod ipse debuerit unum producere, et per illud minus nobilia, et sic procedendo usque ad ultimum. Si tu dicas, quod non est simile de Deo et aliquo agente creato, quia Deus non perficitur ab aliquo opere; obiicitur, quod opus regiminis, propagationis et gubernationis divinum est, et tamen Deus regit et gubernat unam creaturam per aliam, et hoc est ad ostensionem suae nobilitatis: quare non similiter creat?⁴	2. Likewise, it is from the nobility of an agent that it makes more noble works through itself, and less nobles ones through a minister,³ as is clear — for it is fitting [decet] that a king judge, but he ought not to make a sewer — therefore if the First King is most noble and produces things, according to what befits [decet] His Nobility, it seems, that He Himself ought to have produced one (being), and through that the less noble (beings), and thus by proceeding even to the last. If you say, that it is not similar concerning God and any created agent, because God is not perfected by any work; it is objected, that the work of ruling [opus regiminis], of propagation and governing [gubernationis] is a divine one, and yet God rules and governs one creature through another, and this to show His Nobility [ad ostensionem suae nobilitatis]: for what reason does He not similarly create?⁴
3. Item, ostenditur, quod necessarium sit ita esse, sic: omnis effectus, qui exit ab aliqua causa universali, exit ab ea vel per aliam causam propriam, vel per se ipsam appropriatam; sed Deus est causa universalissima, non valens arctari nec appropriari, cum nulla possit ei fieri additio: ergo cum producit multa, producit per aliam causam propriam.	3. Likewise, it is show, that it is necessary that it be such, in this manner: every effect, which goes forth from any universal cause, goes forth from it either from another proper cause, and/or through one appropriated through itself; but God is a most universal cause, not prevailing to be constrained nor to be appropriated, since there can come to be no addition to Him: therefore since He produces many (things), He produces through another proper cause.
4. Item, ego video, quod virtus unitatis est ad numeros infinitos; tamen unitas nullum numerum producit, quin producatur pariter a numero, qui immediate ipsam sequitur, scilicet dualitate — unde nullo modo unitas faceret ternarium numerum nisi per dualitate, et sic in aliis procedendo — ergo videtur similiter, quod non procedit a Deo multitudo rerum, cum ipse sit summe unus, nisi per ipsas res.⁵	4. Likewise, I see, that the virtue of a unity regards infinite numbers; yet a unity produces no number, which is not equally produced by the number, which immediately follows it, namely a duality — wherefore in no manner does a unity cause the number three [ternarium numerum] except through a duality, and in this manner by proceeding in the other (numbers) — therefore it similarly seems, that there does not proceed from God a multitude of things, since He is most highly One [summe unus], except through things themselves.⁵
SED CONTRA: 1. Quod illud non sit congruum, videtur. Quantum homo recipit ab alio, in tantum ei tenetur; sed ad solum Deum tenetur creatura ex toto — solum enim Deum debet diligere homo ex toto corde,⁶ et nihil aliud aequaliter — ergo solus Deus dat totum. Sed creatio est actio, in qua totum producitur: ergo etc.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It seems, that it is not congruous. As much as a man receives from another, in so much is he bound to him; but to God alone is a creature bound out of (its) whole (being) [ex toto] — for God alone ought a man love with his whole heart,⁶ and nothing else equally — therefore God alone gives the whole (being of the creature). But creation is an action, in which the whole (being of a creature) is produced: ergo etc..
2. Item, maius est rem de non-esse ad esse producere quam conservare et perficere: ergo si Deus mediante alio produceret res, videtur, quod mediante alio conservaret et perficeret: ergo res nullo modo Deo indigerent, ergo nec ad Deum tenderent. Sed omnia sunt bona, quia tendunt ad ipsum, et ordinata:⁷ ergo nihil esset bonum nec ordinatum; in quo enim principaliter est ratio finis, in eodem est ratio boni.	2. Likewise, it is greater to produce a thing from ‘non-being’ [non-esse] to ’being’ than to conserve and perfect (it in ‘being’): therefore if God produced things by means of another, it seem, that he would conserve and perfect (it) by means of another: therefore things would in no manner need God, therefore neither would they tend toward God. But all (things) are good, because they tend to Him, and (have) been ordered (to Him):⁷ therefore nothing would be good nor ordered; for in that which there is principally the reckoning of an end, in the same is the reckoning of the good.
3. Item, quod sit impossibile, videtur. Impossibile est, creaturam agere se tota, cum nulla sit omnino simplex:⁸ ergo impossibile est, quod agat totum, ergo solum partem.	3. Likewise, it seems that it is impossible. It is impossible, that a creature act by its entire self [se tota], since no (creature) is entirely simple:⁸ therefore it is impossible, that the whole acts, therefore only a part (does).
4. Item, impossibile est, creaturam agere per potentiam infinitam; sed inter omnino nihil et ali- / -quid . . .	4. Likewise, it is impossible, that a creature act through an infinite power; but between entirely nothing and some- / -thing . . .
¹ Vat. addit se. ² Nonnulli codd. ut P V W aa ubi. Paulo inferius Vat. verbis ex contrario praemittit aliquid. ³ Sub simili respectu Dionys., de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 4. § 3. ait: Quasi id ordo divinae legis sanxerit, ut per superiora ista quae inferiora sunt, ad divinum numen adducantur. ⁴ Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 creatur. ⁵ Processus creaturarum a primo comparatur processui numeri ab unitate secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. § 6: Siquidem in unitate omnis numerus uniformiter praeexistitit, habetque unitas in se ipsa singulariter omnem numerum, et omnis numerus in unum copulatus est et in unitate est, et quanto longius ab unitate procedit, tanto magis dividitur et multiplicatur. — Aliquanto superius post ternarium plures codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt numerum, pro quo aliqui ut C L R T ponunt et novum, cod. bb et nonum, cui lectioni assentit Vat. legens et novum, procedendo; cod. T exhibet lectionem nostram. ⁶ Deut. 6, 5; Matth. 22, 37. Cfr. August., de Quant. animae, c. 34. n. 78: Deus igitur solus ei colendus est, qui solus eius est auctor. — Mox non pauci codd. cum ed. 4 Deus creat pro Deus dat, quod maior pars codd. cum edd. 1, 2 exhibet. ⁷ Cfr. August., de Natura boni, c. 1. seqq. et Boeth. de Hebdomad. seu Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bona sint. — De ultima prop. argumenti cfr. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 2. seqq. et I. Magn. Moral. c. 2. seq., ubi ostendit, in ultimo fine summum consistere bonum. — Vat. ut ordinata pro et ordinata. Paulo inferius codd. Z cc cum ed. 1 principalis pro principaliter. ⁸ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. q. 2. et hic a. 1. q. 1. fund. 3.	¹ The Vatican edition adds itself [se]. ² Not a few codices, such as P V W and aa, have where [ubi] for when [cum]. A little below this the Vatican edition prefixes something [aliquid] to the words out of a contrary [ex contrario]. ³ Under a similar respect (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Celestial Hierarchies, ch. 4, § 3, says: As if the order of the Divine Law has sanctioned this, that through superiors those which are inferior, be lead forth according to the Divine Pleasure [ad divinum numen]. ⁴ Codices aa and cc and edition 1 have for what reason is (a creature) not similarly created? [quare non similiter creatur?] instead of for what reason does He not similarly create? [quare non similiter creat?] ⁵ The procession of creatures from the First (Principle) is compared to the procession of a number from a unity, according to (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names., ch. 5, § 6: If indeed every number uniformly preexisted in a unity, and every number has been joined into one and is in a unity, both as much further it proceeds from a unity, so much more is it divided and multiplied. — Somewhat above this several codices, together with edition 1, read three [ternarium] for the number three [ternarium numerum], in place of which some, such as C L R and T, have three and a new (number) [ternarium et novum], codex bb has three and nine [ternarium et nonum], to which reading the Vatican edition assents, reading three and nine, by proceeding [ternarium et nonum, procedendo]; codex T exhibits our reading. ⁶ Dt. 6:5; Mt. 22:37. Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Quanity of the Soul, ch. 34, n. 78: God, therefore, alone tends it (i. e. the soul), who alone is its Author. — Next not a few codices, together with edition 1, have God alone creates [Deus creat] for God alone gives [Deus dat], which the greater part of the codices, together with editions 1 and 2, exhibit. ⁷ Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Nature of the Good., ch. 1 ff., and (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Seven Rules, also known as “In what manner are substances in this that they are, are good”. — On the last proposition of the argument, cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 2 ff., and Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 2 f., where he shows, that in the last end consists the greatest good. — The Vatican edition has as having [ut ordinata] for and (have) [et ordinata]. A little below this codices Z and cc, together with edition 1, have the principle [principalis] for principally the [principaliter]. ⁸ Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. I, q. 2, and here in a. 1, q. 1, 3rd argument of the fundament.

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ali- / -quid est distantia infinita: ergo non potest reduci nisi ab agente virtutis infinitae; tale autem est solus Deus: ergo¹ etc.	some- / -thing there is an infinite distance: therefore it cannot be reduced except by an agent of infinite virtue; but such is God alone: ergo¹ etc..
CONCLUSIO. Deus omnia immediate produxit.	CONCLUSION God produced all (things) immediately.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod ponere, quod Deus produxerit res per aliud agens, est contra veritatem et contra fidem, sed solum per Filium suum: Dixit enim, et facta sunt;² nec solum contra fidem, verum etiam contra rationem.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that to posit, that God produced things through another agent, is contrary to the truth and contrary to the Faith, but only through His Son: For He spoke, and they were made;² nor (is it) only against the Faith, but even against reason.
Et ponenti res omnes productas ex nihilo, omnino est contra rationem, ita ut non possit capi, quomodo agens potentiae finitae aliquid ex nihilo producat. Nec credo, aliquem philosophorum hoc posuisse.	And to the one positing that all things (have) been produced out of nothing, (it must be said that) it is entirely contrary to reason, thus that it cannot be understood, in what manner an agent of finite power produces something out of nothing. Nor do I believe, that any philosopher posited this.
Sed supposito potentiali sive materiali principio, plures fuerunt philosophi,³ qui posuerunt ordinem in producendo gradatim descendendo hoc modo: Deus, cum sit omnino simplex, cuius actus est intelligere, non produxit nisi intelligentiam primam et unicam. Illa vero propter distare a primo⁴ intellexit se et primum, et ita aliquomodo fuit composita, et ita producit orbem suum et intelligentiam secundi orbis; et sic deinceps usque ad orbem lunae et intelligentiam decimam, quae irradiat super animas rationales; et sicut ordo est in producendo, ita in irradiando. — Sed iste error falsum habet fundamentum, videlicet quod materiale principium non sit productum, sicut supra probatum est.⁵ Item, falsam habet rationem. Dicit enim, quod, quia simplicissimus est Deus, non producit nisi unum; sed hoc magis est ad oppositum, quia quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto potentius,⁶ et quanto potentius, tanto in plura potest: ergo si Deus simplicissimus, hoc ipso potest in omnia sine medio. Rursus, haec ratio repugnat eis. Si enim propter simplicitatem non producit nisi unum, cum intelligentia secunda sit simplicior inter omnes, unde venit⁷ in orbe eius maior varietas stellarum, quam in aliquo orbium inferiorum? Quia videtur per rationem suam, quod uniformes sint; et ita ratio positionis contradicit positioni.	But having supposed a principle of potency or matter, there were very many philosophers,³ who posited an order in producing, descending step-by-step in this manner: God, since He is entirely simple, whose Act is to understand, did not produce except the first and unique Intelligence. But That on account of being distant from the First (Principle)⁴ understood Itself and the First, and thus in some manner was composed, and thus It produces its own orbit and the intelligence of the second orbit, and thus one after the other [deinceps] even to the orbit of the Moon and the tenth Intelligence, which irradiates upon rational souls; and just as there is an order in producing, so in irradiating. — But this error has a false fundament, namely that the material principle has not been produced, just as has been proven above.⁵ Likewise, it has a false reckoning. For it says, that, because God is most simple, He does not produce but one (being); and this regards rather the opposite, because as much as anything (is) more simple, so much (is it) more potent,⁶ and as much as (it is) more potent, so much is it able unto more: therefore if God (is) most simple, by this very (thing) He is able unto all without a medium. Again, this reckoning is repugnant to these (both). For if on account of (His) Simplicity He does not produce but one (being), since the second Intelligence is more simple among all (others), whence comes⁷ the greater variety of stars in Its orbit, than in any of the inferior orbits? Because it seems through its reckoning, that (the stars) are uniform, and thus the reckoning of the position contradicts the position.
Propter hoc dicendum, sicut dicit fides nostra, quod omnia in prima conditione immediate a Deo sunt producta. Quia enim creatio est totius substantiae secundum totum, ideo decuit esse solius Dei, nec potuit esse alterius sive per alterum, ut probant rationes ad hanc partem inductae.	On this account it must be said, just as our Faith says, that all (things) in the first foundation [in prima conditione] were produced immediately by God. For because creation is of a whole substance according to the whole, for that reason it was fitting [decuit] that it be God’s alone, nor could it have been another’s or through another, as the reasons induced for this side prove.
1. 2. Quod obiicitur de liberalitate et nobilitate, dicendum, quod tam liberalitas quam nobilitas supponit ordinem et possibilitatem in actu.⁸ In actu autem creationis non attenditur ordo; aequalis enim virtutis et dignitatis est producere asinum ex nihilo et Angelum, quia utrumque est infinitae potentiae. Non est etiam in hoc actu possibilitas creaturae, ut visum est,⁹ propter infinitatem. Non sic est de actu regiminis et propagationis; ideo patet, quod non est simile.	1. 2. What is objected concerning liberality and nobility, it must be said, that both liberality and nobility suppose order and possibility in act.⁸ Moreover in the act of creation [in actu creationis] there is not attained an order; for it is of equal virtue and dignity to produce a donkey and an Angel out of nothing, because each belongs to infinite power. There is not even in this act the possibility of the creature, as has been seen,⁹ on account of the infinity (of distance). Not so is it concerning the act of ruling and propagation; for that reason it is clear, that it is not similar.
Quod obiicitur, quod creatura est capax, quia non habet resistens; dicendum, quod in contrariis resistentia confert ad operationem. Praeterea, esto quod impediat, nihilominus habet iuvans, scilicet fundamentum et appetitum materiae; sed in creatione nullum habet iuvamentum; ideo difficilius: ideo non est locus a minori,¹⁰ ut patet.	What is objected, that a creature is capable (of creating something out of nothing), because does not have (something) resisting (it); it must be said, that in contraries resistance confers for operation. Moreover, let it be that it impedes, nevertheless it has (something) helping it, namely the fundament of and appetite for matter; but in creation it has no help; for that reason (it is) more difficult (to create): for that reason there is no point a minori,¹⁰ as is clear.
3. Quod obiicitur, quod causa universalis non potest in effectus proprios; dicendum, quod causa universalis, quae non est actus purus, indiget actualitate causae particularis; sed illa quae omnino est actus, simul habet in se rationem universalis causae et particularis, quia simul habet primitatem et actualitatem: ideo potest in multa, et secundum totum potest in illa.¹¹	3. What is objected, that a universal cause is not able unto proper effects; it must be said, that a universal cause, which is not a pure act, needs the actuality of a particular cause; but That which is entirely an act, has together in Itself the reckoning of a universal cause and of a particular one, because together It has a primacy and an actuality: for that reason It is able unto many, and is able unto them according to the whole.¹¹
4. Quod ultimo obiicitur, quod unitas non potest in numeros posteriores sine prioribus; dicendum, quod nec in puncto est omnino potentia activa et sufficiens ad lineam, nec in unitate ad numerum. Nam ipsa unitas est potentia omnis nu- / -meri, . . .	4. What is objected last, that a unity is not able unto posterior numbers without prior ones; it must be said, that there is neither in a point an entirely active and sufficient power for a line, nor in a unity for a number. For a unity itself is a power for every num- / -ber, . . .
¹ Vide I. Sent. d. 43. q. 1. ad 4, ubi obiectio contra hoc argumentum solvitur. ² Psalm. 148, 5: Ipse dixit, et facta sunt. — Mox Vat. Ponere enim pro Et ponenti. ³ Scil. Neoplatonici, inter quos eminent Plotinus (205-270 p. Chr.) et Proclus (411-.485), ex cuius libro stoiceiwsiV qeologich etiam compositus est liber de Causis, in quo prop. 3, 9 et 16 eadem insinuatur opinio; nec non Arabes, quorum praecipui sunt: Alfarabi († 950), cuius opinionem invenies in eius operibus de Intellectu et intellecto (invenitur in ed. Venet. operum Avicennae, 1508) et in eiusdem Fontibus quaestionum, c. 6. seqq. (habetur in opere: Documenta philosophiae Arabum, auct. Schomoelders, Bonnae 1835); Avicenna, qui de hac re tractat in sua Metaph. IX. c. 4; Avicebron, qui de hac re scripsit in suo libro de Forma et materia sive de Fonte vitae, de quo cfr. B. Albert., de Caus. et processu universitatis, I. tract. 1. c. 5; Averroes, qui Avicennae et suam opinionem breviter proponit in suo Epitome in libros Metaph. tract. 4. ⁴ Haec phrasis « propter distare a primo » iam occurrit in Aristot., II. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.): dia to porrw thV archV apistasqai. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 180, nota 8. — Plures codd. ut I N X Z post primo adiungunt principio; dein cod. cc et ed. 1 ponunt intellexit se ipsam pro intellexit se, et paulo inferius plures codd. ut C H O R cum edd. 3, 4 irradiabat pro irradiat. ⁵ Art. I. q. 1. ⁶ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 2. ad 3, ubi haec propositio explicatur. ⁷ Cod. K unde non erit. — Ante uniformes supple stellae. ⁸ Scilicet in illo actu, in quo se manifestat liberalitas, et qui alteri communicatur. — Plures codd. ut F S cc cum edd. 1, 4 in actum; plures codd. ut R X Z aa bb omittunt in actu. Paulo inferius ex codd. I M Q U Z aa cc et ed. 1 pro infinite substituimus est infinitae potentiae; codd. F K infinitae virtutis. ⁹ Hic in fundam. 4. — Sententia est: Actus creandi nec est possibilis creaturae. ¹⁰ De hoc modo argumentandi cfr. tom. I. pag. 835, nota 5. ¹¹ Plura de hoc vide I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 3. et d. 40. dub. 7.	¹ See Sent., Bk. I, d. 43, q. 1, in reply to n. 4, where the objection against this argument is solved. ² Ps. 148:5: He spoke, and they were made [Ipse dixit, et facta sunt]. — Next the Vatican edition has For to posit [Ponere enim] for And to the one positing [Et ponenti]. ³ Namely the Neo-Platonists, among whom there stands forth Plotinus (A. D. 205-270, born in Egypt) and Proclus (411-485 A. D., born at Constantinople), from whose book StoiceiwsiV Qeologich there was even composed the Book of Causes, in which propositions 3, 9 and 16 insinuate the same opinion; and also the Arabic (Philosophers), the chief of which are: Al-Farabi († 950 A. D., born at Damascus, Syria), whose opinion (on this matter) can be found in this works on the Intellect and the understood (found in the Venetian edition of the works of Avicenna of 1508 A. D.), and in his Fountains of Questions, ch. 6 ff (which is had in the work: Documenta philosophiae Arabum, by Schomoelders, Bonn, 1835); Avicenna (whose real name was Ibn Sina: 980-1037 A. D., born at Bukhara, in central Asia), who treats of this matter in his Metaphysics, Bk. IX, ch. 4; Avicebron (whose real name was Solomon ben Judha ibn Gabirol: c. 1021-1058 A.D., a Jew from Malaga, Spain), who wrote (in Arabic) of this matter in his book On Form and Matter, also known as On the Fount of Life, concerning which, cf. Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), On the Cause and the Process of the University of Things, Bk. I, tract 1, ch. 5; Averroës (whose real name was Ibn Rushd: 1126-1198 A. D., of Cordoba, Spain), who proposes Avicenna’s and his own opinion briefly in his Epitome on the Books of Metaphysics, tract 4. ⁴ This phrase: « on account of being distant from the First » occurs already in Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, text 59 (ch. 10): dia to porrw thV archV apistasqai [Trans. note: I have supplied Principle on account of the Greek thV archV]; then codex cc and edition 1 have Itself [se ipsam] for Itself [se], and a little below this several codices, such as C H O and R, together with editions 3 and 4, have which irradiated [quae irradiabat] for which irradiates [quae irradiat]. ⁵ In Article 1, q. 1. ⁶ Cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 17, p. II, q. 2, in reply to n. 3, where this proposition is explained. ⁷ Codex K has whence will there not be [unde non erit]. — Before uniform [uniformes] supply the starts [stellae]. ⁸ Namely in that act, in which liberality manifests itself, and which is communicated to the other. — Several codices, such as F S and cc, together with editions 1 and 4, have upon the act [in actum]; several codices, such as R X Z aa and bb, omit in act [in actu]. A little below this, from codices I M Q U Z aa and cc and from edition 1, we have substituted belongs to infinite power [est infinitae potentiae] for (is) in an infinite manner [infinite]; codices F and K read (belongs) to infinite virtue [infinitae virtutis]. ⁹ Here in the 4th argument of the fundament. — The sense is: Nor is the act of creating possible to the creature. ¹⁰ On this manner of argumentation, cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 46, Doubt 4, p. 835, footnote 5. ¹¹ See more on this in Sent., Bk. I, d. 35, q. 2, in reply to n. 3, and d. 40, Doubt 7.

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nu- / -meri,¹ non potentia sufficiens per se, et ideo non omnino actualis, verum etiam aliquo modo passiva, quoniam est pars numeri. Deus autem in omnia potest potentia omnino activa, et ideo sine omni medio potest creare omnia.	num- / -ber,¹ not sufficient through itself, and for that reason not entirely actual, but even in some manner passive, since it is part of a number. But God is able unto all by an entirely active power, and for that reason He can create all without any medium.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Ex libris philosophorum Arabum multi errores irrepserunt etiam in scholas catholicas medii aevi, inter quos condemnatus fuit a Stephano Tempier, Parisiensi Episcopo, etiam hic: « Quod primum principium non potest immediate producere generabilia, quia sunt effectus novi. Effectus autem novi exigunt causam immediatam, quae potest aliter se habere » (D’Argentré, Collect. iudicior. t. I. pag. 190, cap. VI. de Deo, n. 27.) et (ibid. n. 36.): « Quod effectus immediatus a primo debet esse unus tantum et simillimus primo » (cfr. etiam n. 30.).	I. From the books of Arabic philosophers many errors broke forth, even in the Catholic schools of the middle ages, among which there was condemned by Stephen Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, even this: « That the First Principle cannot immediately produce (things) generable, because they are new effects. Moreover new effects require an immediate cause, which can hold itself in another manner » (D’Argentré, Collect. iudiciorum, tome I, p. 190, ch. VI, “On God”, n. 27) and (ibid., n. 36)): « That an immediate effect from the First (Principle) ought to be one only and the most similar to the First (Principle) » (cf. also n. 30).
Cum saepius articulorum censuratorum ab Episcopis Parisiensibus cum consilio theologorum mentionem fecerimus et facturi simus, non inutile erit, pauca de eis hic annotare. Prima istarum censurarum facta est a Gulielmo, Episcopo Parisiensi, c. 1240 in octava Epiphaniae, cum consilio doctorum, inter quos eminebat Alexander Hal. Haec censura reprobat 10 articulos, infra d. 23. in fine a S. Bonaventura integre recensitos; ipsa autem ab omnibus est recepta. Secundum censuram promulgavit Stephanus Tempier a. 1270, die Mercurri post festum B. Nicholai hiemalis, contra 13 articulos communiter reprobatos. Tertia ab eodem facta est post mortem Ss. Thomae et Bonaventurae, a. 1276, dominica Laetare; et cum modo nominatis 13 reprobavit articulos 219. Hi articuli cum litteris Episcopi Stephani impressi sunt in citato libro Collectio iudicior. pag. 175-184. — Adiectis pluribus aliis in Anglia condemnatis, postea facta est collectio harum censurarum, secundum materiam in 22 capitula distributa. Haec autem collectio saepissime impressa est, praesertim in plurimis editionibus libri Sententiarum et in antiquis editionibus Commentatorum Lombardi. Magis correcti et cum multis observationibus editi sunt iterum in Collectio iudicior. pag. 184-225. — Sed imprimis observandum est, secundum Stephani censuram, licet plerumque manifestos errores philosophorum praesertim Arabum reprobet, tamen in nonnullis thesibus condemnandis limites veritatis et moderationis excessisse.	Since we have more often mad mention and are to make mention of the articles censured by the Bishops of Paris, with the counsel of theologians, it will not be unuseful here to note a few (things) concerning these. The first of these censures was done by William, the Bishop of Paris, c. 1240 A. D., in the Octave of Ephiphany, with the counsel of doctors (of theology), among whom Alexander of Hales was eminent. This censure reproved the 10 articles, cited below at the end of d. 23 by St. Bonaventure in their entirely; moreover this one was received by all. The second censure (Bishop) Stephen Tempier promulgated, in 1270 A. D., on the Wednesday after the Feast of St. Nicholas in December, against 13 commonly reproved articles. The third was made by the same after the death of Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure, in 1276 A. D., on Laetare Sunday; and together with the 13 named articles, reproved 219 articles. These articles were published with the letters of Bishop Stephen in the book cited, Collectio iudiciorum, p. 175-184. — Afterwards, with several others condemned in England, a collection of these censures was made, distributed according to the matterial in 22 chapters. Moreover this collection was very frequently published, especially in the several editions of the Book of Sentences and in the ancient editions of the Commentators on Lombard. They were corrected more and published togethe with many observationis again in the Collectio iudicorum, p. 184-225. — But first of all it must be observed, that according to the censure of (Bishop) Stephen, even though it reproves very many manifest errors of philosophers, especially of the Arabic ones, yet in not a few condemned theses it exceeded the limits of truth and moderation.
Nonnullae enim positiones S. Thomae, v. g. de Angelis, de unitate formae substantialis, vel directe vel indirecte impetuntur, ut videri potest in libro Collectio iudiciorum. Unde a non paucis viris doctis illius aetatis contra has censuras instantiae factae sunt, et a. 1324 vel 1325 (iuxta computationem anni civilis) ab altero Stephano Episc. Paris. omnes censurae revocatae sunt, « in quantum doctrinam B. Thomae praedicti, doctoris eximii tangere possunt ». Hinc patet, ex istius censuris nullum praeiudicium fieri posse auctoritati doctrinae Angelici; nec nos, quando interdum veritatis historicae causa praedictos articulos citamus, ullam eis contra doctrinam S. Thomae auctoritatem tribuimus. Hoc semel dictum sufficiat.	For not a few positions of St. Thomas, v. g. concerning the Angels, concerning the unity of the substantial form, are (by this last censure) either directly and/or indirectly attacked, as can be seen in the book Collectio iudiciorum. Wherefore by not a few learned men of that age instances were made against these censures, and in the year 1324 and/or 1325 (according to the computation of the civil year), all the censures were revoked by another Bishop Stephen of Paris, « inasmuch as they can touch upon the doctrine of the aforesaid Blessed Thomas, the outstanding doctor ». Hence it is clear, that no prejudice can be formed from these censures against the authority of the doctrine of the Angelic (Doctor); nor do we, when we sometimes cite the aforesaid articles for the sake of historical truth, attribute any authority to them against the doctrin of St. Thomas. Let it suffice to say this once.
II. Constat apud omnes doctores, soli Deo propriam esse potentiam creativam, et de facto ipsum solum omnia immediate creasse. Sed de quaestione, utrum possibile sit, quod Deus alicui creaturae communicet potentiam vel actum creandi, non eodem modo omnes sentiebant. Durandus (hic q. 4.) putat, probari non posse, impossibile esse, quod Deus suae creaturae communicet potentiam et actum creandi, non quidem secundum totum suum ambitum, sed ad aliquem specialem effectum. Alii ut Magister (IV. Sent. d. 5. c. 3.) docent, repugnare quidem, creaturam fieri causam creandi principalem, non vero, fieri causam instrumentalem. Alii recentiores iterum potentiam instrumentalem distinguunt in naturalem et obedientialem, de qua ultima opinantur, eam a Deo communicari posse. Quidquid sit de hac ultima opinione, communior sententia, cui suffragantur Alex. Hal., S. Thom., S. Bonav., Scot. aliique, simpliciter negat, hoc esse possibile. Cfr. S. Bonav., hic fundam. 3. 4, et d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in fine; III. Sent. d. 11. dub. 1, d. 40. dub. 3; I. Sent. d. 14. a. 2. q. 2. ad a. 6; IV. Sent. d. 1. p. I. q. 4. in fine; et Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 4; de Scoto cfr. Montefortino Sum. t. II. q. 65. a. 5.	II. It is established among all doctors, that creative power is proper to God alone, and that He alone de facto has created all immediately. But concerning the question, whether it is possible, that God communicates to any creature (this) power and/or the act of creating, all do not think in the same manner. Durandus (here in q. 4) thinks, that it cannot be proved, that it is impossible, that God communicates to His own creature the power and act of creating, not indeed according to the whole of its extent, but according to some special effect. Others, such as Master Peter (Sent, Bk. IV, d. 5, ch. 3), teach, that it is indeed repugnant, that a creature be made a principle cause of creating, but not, that it be made an instrumental cause. Other more recent (authors), again, distinguish “instrumental power” into “natural” and “obediential” (instrumental power), concerning the last of which they opine, that it can be communicated by God. Whatever concerns this last opinion, the more common sentence, which is supported by Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, (Bl. John Duns) Scotus and others, simply denies, that this is possible. Cf. St. Bonaventure, here in the 3rd and 4th argument of the fundament, and in d. 7, p. II. a. 2, q. 1, at the end; Sent, Bk. III, d. 11, dubium 1, d. 40, dubium 3; Sent., Bk. I, d. 14, a. 2, q. 2, in reply to n. 6; Sent., Bk. IV, d. 1, p. I, q. 4, at the end; and Richard of Middleton, here in a. 4, q. 4; concerning (Bl.) Scotus, cf. Montefortino, Summa., tome II, q. 65, a. 5.
III. Alex. Hal. S. p. II. q. 9. m. 7. 8. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 1. q. 1; et de Rerum princip. q. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q . 45. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 5. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 25. q. 6; Quodl. 4. q. 37. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 4.	III. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 9, m. 7 and 8. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. IV, d. 1, q. 1; and de Rerum princip., q. 6. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3; Summa. , I. q . 45, a. 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 7. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 4, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 5. — Henry of Ghent, S umma., a. 25, q. 6; Quodlibetals., 4, q. 37. — Durandus, here in q. 4. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 6. — (Gabriel) Biel, hic q. 4.
¹ Sequimur codd. F N bb ponentes omnis numeri pro omnis numerus, quae lectio non bene retineri potest propter constructionem grammaticalem sequentium propositionum, respectu quarum etiam in codd. invenitur mira varietas; sic cod. Y sufficiens per se et omnino actualis, cod. M sufficiens per se et ideo non omnis (omnino?) actualis; plures codd. et ideo actualis; Vat. cum pluribus codd. et ideo non solum actualis; eadem Vat. cum paucis mss. post actualis addit et omnino activa. Dein aliqui codd. ut P Q potestas numeri, plures cum Vat. potentia numeri pro quoniam est pars numeri, quam lectionem ex codd. M aa (bb a secunda manu) in textum recepimus, et a qua cod. V cum ed. 1 in hoc recedit, quod omittit quoniam est.	¹ We follow codices F N and bb, placing a power for every number [potentia omni numeri] for according to potency every number [potentia omnis numerus], which reading cannot well be retained on account of the grammatical construction of the following propositions (which would have to be read as not according to potency sufficient through itself, etc.), in respect of which there is even found in the codices a wonderful variety (of readings); thus codex Y reads sufficient through itself and entirely actual [sufficiens per se et omnino actualis], codex M sufficient through itself and for that reason not every (entirely?) actual [sufficiens per se et ideo non omnis actualis]; several codices have and for that reason actual [et ideo actualis]; the Vatican edition, together with several codices, reads and for that reason not only actual [et ideo non solum actualis]; the same Vatican edition, together with a few manuscripts, after actual [actualis] adds and entirely active [et omnino activa]. then some codices, such as P and Q, have according to the potency of number [passiva, potestas numeri] for since it is a part of a number [quoniam est pars numeri], which reading we have received from codices M and aa (bb by a second hand), and from which codex V, together with edition 1, recede in this, that they omit since it is [quoniam est].

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I