S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

PARS I.

PART I

ARTICULUS III.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE III

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 30-33.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 30-33.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS III.

 

De ipsa productione sive creatione.

ARTICLE III

 

On the very production or creation (of things).

Viso de entitate et quidditate principii producentis, quaeritur hic tertio de ipsa productione, quae creatio appellatur.  Circa quam quaeruntur duo.

Having seen (something) of the entity and quiddity of the producing Principle, there is here asked third concerning the production (of things), which is named “creation”.  About which two (things) are asked.

Primum est, utrum dicat mutationem aliquam.

The first is, whether it means any change [mutationem].

Secundum est, utrum dicat aliquid2 medium inter Creatorem et creaturam.

The second is, whether it means that something (is)2 a medium between the Creator and the creature.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum creatio mutationem dicat.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether ‘creation’ means a change?

QUOD AUTEM dicat mutatione, videtur:

MOREOVER THAT ‘creation’ means a change, seems:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Augustini, duodecimo de Civitate Dei:3  « Omnia quae creata sunt, mutabilia sunt, quia de nihilo facta sunt »; si ergo creabile est mutabile, ergo creatum est mutatum, et creatio est mutatio.  Si tu dicas, quod est mu- / -tabile, . . .

1. First through the authority of (St.) Augustine, in the twelfth (book) On the City of God:3  «  All which have been created, are mutable [mutabilia], because they have been made from nothing »; if, therefore, the creatable is mutable, therefore the created has been changed [est mutatum], and creation is a change [mutatio].  If you say, that it is mu- / -table, . . .

2  Codd. F K aliquod.

3  Cap. 1. n. 3:  Ea vero, quae fecit, bona quidem esse, quod ab illo; verumtamen mutabilia, quod non de illo, sed de nihilo facta sunt.

2  Codices F and K read some medium [aliquod medium] for that something (is) a medium [aliquid medium].

3  Chapter 1, n. 3:  But that those, which He has made, are indeed good, because (they are) from Him; nevertheless (they are) mutable, not because (they are) from Him, but (because) they have been made from nothing.

p. 31

mu- / -tabile, quia potest in nihil cedere, et non, quia productum est; contra:  sicut destrui dicit viam devendiendi in non-esse, ita creari in esse:  si ergo destructio ponit mutationem, ergo pari ratione et productio.

mu- / -table, because it can pass [cedere] into nothing, and not, because it has been produced; on the contrary:  just as “to be destroyed” means a way of coming down unto ‘non-being’ [non-esse], so “to be created” unto ‘being’:  if, therefore, destruction posits change, therefore for an equal reason production (does) too.

2. Item, creatio est actio; sed « omnis actio est in motu, et omnis motus in actione »:1  ergo qui creat, vere agit:  ergo vere movet.  Si tu dicas, quod actio divina magis est substantia quam actio, et talis est creatio; obiicitur de passione, quia creari est ipsius creaturae.  Si ergo creatura susceptibilis est vere passionis et mutationis, ergo creatio-passio est mutatio.

2. Likewise, creation is an action; but « every action is in a movement and every movement in an action »:1  therefore he who creates, truly acts:  therefore he truly moves.  If you say, that the Divine Action is more a substance than an action, and such is creation; there is objected concerning the passion (of the act), because ‘to be created’ belongs to the creature itself.  If, therefore, the creature is susceptible truly of a passion and change, therefore the creation-passion (i. e. the creature’s act of being created) is a change.

3. Item, per Damascenum,2 qui philosophus et theologus est:  « Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit » — loquitur de creatione — ergo secundum ipsum creatio est versio; sed omnis versio est mutatio, sicut ipse idem dicit, quod creata sunt mutabilia, quia vertibilia:  ergo creatio est mutatio.

3. Likewise, through (St. John) Damascene,2 who is a philosopher and a theologian:  « Everything which starts from an act of being turned [a versione], tends unto an act of being turned » — he is speaking of creation — therefore according to this creation is an act of turning [versio]; but every act of turning is a change, just as the same says, that created (things) are mutable, because (they are) vertible [vertibilia];  therefore creation is a change.

4. Item, quanto aliqua sunt magis distantia, tanto in perveniendo ab uno ad alterum maior est mutatio et variatio; sed ens et non-ens summe distant:  ergo cum creatione de non-ente fiat ens, creatio verissime est mutatio.

4. Likewise, as much as any are more distant, so much is there a greater change and variation in traveling [pervendiendo] from one to the other; but a being [ens] and a non-being [non-ens] are most highly distant:  therefore since by creation a being comes to be from a non-being, creation is most truly a change.

5. Item, magis mutatur res, quando suscipit formam novam, quam quando acquirit novum situm; et rursus adhuc magis, quando acquirit formam substantialem, quam quando acquirit dispositionem accidentalem:  ergo quando totum de novo recipit et accipit, tunc mutatur maxime.  Sed hoc est in creatione:  ergo ibi vere est mutatio.

5. Likewise, a thing changes more, when it undertakes [suscipit] a new form, than when it acquires a new location [situm]; and again still more, when it acquires a substantial form, than when it acquires an accidental disposition:  therefore when it receives and accepts the whole (of its being) anew, it is then changed most of all.  But this is in (its) creation:  therefore in that [ibi] there is truly a change.

6. Item, si creatio dicit actionem absque omni mutatione, ergo absque omni tempore; et talia possunt inesse et insunt Deo ab aeterno:  ergo videtur, quod Deus res produxerit ab aeterno.

6. Likewise, if creation means an action apart from every change, therefore apart from every time; and such can be and are in God from eternity:  therefore it seems, that God produced things from eternity.

1. Ad oppositum Magister dicit, et habetur in littera:3  « Cum dicimus, Deum facere aliquid, non aliquem in operando motum intelligimus inesse ».  Si dicas, quod creatio-actio non dicit motum, sed creatio-passio tantum; contra:  idem manet significatum in activo et passivo, sicut dicit grammaticus, sicut recti et obliqui:  si ergo in actione non dicit motum, ergo nec in passione.

1. For the opposite (side) Master (Peter) says, and it is had in (his) text:3  « When we say, that He makes something, we do not understand that there is any movement in Him in operating ».  If you say, that ‘creation-action’ (i. e. the act of creating) does not mean a movement, but only ‘creation-passion’ (does); on the contrary:  the same signified remains in the active and passive, just as the grammarian says, just as (belongs) to the right and oblique (senses):  therefore, if in the action (creation) does not mean a movement, therefore neither (does it) in the passion.

2. Item, mutari est aliter se habere nunc quam prius;4 sed quod creatur non se habet aliter nunc et prius, quia nunquam se habuit aliter, quam sicut se habet in creatione — nunquam enim fuit aliquo modo nec se habuit aliqualiter, nec ergo aliter quam nunc — ergo non mutatur, dum creatur:  ergo creatio non est mutatio.

2. Likewise, ‘to be changed’ is ‘to hold oneself now in a manner other than before’;4 but what is created does not hold itself differently [aliter] now and before, because it never held itself otherwise, than just as it holds itself in the act of being created [in creatione] — for it never in any manner was nor did it hold itself in any kind of manner, therefore, neither in any manner other than now — therefore it is not changed, while it is being created [dum creatur]:  therefore creation is not a change.

3. Item, immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo nunc et prius:  ergo mutabile, quod se habet aliter, cum sit eius oppositum; sed creatum non se habet aliter nunc quam prius, quia nullo modo se habuit prius:  ergo non est mutatum:  ergo creatio non est mutatio.5

3. Likewise, the immutable is what holds itself in the same manner now and before:  therefore the mutable (is that),which holds itself in another manner, since it is its opposite; but the created does not hold itself now in another manner than before, because in no manner did it hold itself before:  therefore it has not changed:  therefore creation is not a change.5

4. Item, « omnis motus et mutatio est perfectio entis in potentia »; creatio autem est nullo modo entis:  ergo creatio non est motus nec mutatio.  Prima patet per Philosophum,6 secunda vero per Magistrum.

4. Likewise, « every movement and change is a perfection of a being in potency [entis in potentia] »; but creation is in no manner of a being:  therefore creation is not a movement nor a change.  The first is clear through the Philosopher,6 but the second through Master (Peter).

5. Item, omnis mutatio fundatur super aliquod mobile;7 sed creatio non praeexigit aliquod mobile, quia omne mobile per creationem inducitur in esse:  ergo creatio non est mutatio.

5. Likewise, every change is founded upon something mobile;7 but creation does not require beforehand something mobile, because every mobile through creation is lead into ‘being’:  therefore creation is not a change.

6. Item, si creatio est mutatio, aut ergo secundum accidens, aut secundum substantiam.8  Non secundum accidens, quia tunc sola accidentia crearentur; sed nec secundum substantiam, quia tunc esset generatio, vel corruptio.  Si dicas, quod sub nulla harum specierum continetur; obiicitur, quod non solum secundum Philosophum, sed secundum Augustinum9 « omnis motus aut est ad . . .

6. Likewise, if creation is a change, therefore either (it is a change) according to accident, or according to substance.8  Non according to accident, because then only accidents would be created; but neither according to substance, because then it would be a generation, and/or a corruption.  If you say, that it is contained under none of these species, there is objected, that not only according to the Philosopher, but according to (St.) Augustine9 « every movement either regards . . .

1  Gilbert. Porret., de Sex princip. c. de Actione:  Scire autem oportet, quod omne quod in motu est, in actione est; moveri enim actio est; si quid enim movetur, agit necessario:  omnis ergo actio in motu est, omnisque motus in actione firmabitur; propium igitur actionis est in motu esse sicut proprium motus in actione.  Cfr. Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 3. (II. c. 2.) et II. Moral. Eudem. c. 5. (c. 3.), ubi dicit, omnem actionem esse motum sive cum motu.

2  Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3. et II. c. 27.  Cfr. tom. I. pag. 158, nota 13.  —  Pro textu sequenti Damasceni vide locc. citt. et II. de Fide orthod. c. 3, ubi docet, omne creatum, eo ipso quod creatum, esse mutabile, solum increatum esse immutabile.  —  Ibi ex codd. U bb substituimus creata pro cetera.

3  Hic, c. 3.  —  Paulo inferius non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 passio tantum pro creatio-passio tantum; minus distincte.

4  Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.) et VI. text. 32. 49. et 73. (c. 4. 5. et 8.).

5  Hoc argumentum in nulla editione est et solummodo in cod. Q; in aliis videtur excidisse, quia iisdem verbis desinit hoc argum. ac praecedens.  Et cum explicite hoc argum. infra solvatur, recipiendum erat in textum.  Loco eiusdem sola Vat. praecedenti argum. adiecit:  « Probatio primae.  Immutabile et mutabile opponuntur privative; sed immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo:  igitur mutabile est quod non se habet eodem modo; sed hoc est aliter se habere nunc quam prius: igitur ».

6  Aristot., III. Phys. text. 6. (c. 1.), ubi secundum translationem Arabico-latinam:  Motus erit perfectio (enteleceia) eius quod est in potentia, secundum quod est tale.  —  De Magistro cfr. hic, c. 2.

7  Id est subiectum, quod mutatur.  Nam tria, secundum Aristotelem, V. Phys. text 3. seqq., ad mutationem et motum requiruntur:  id quod movetur seu mobile, id in quod movetur, et id ex quo, ut lignum, calidum et frigidum.  VI. Phys. text. 49. (c. 5.) ait:  « Tria namque sunt quae esse dicuntur in mutatione:  et quod mutatur, et in quo, et secundum quod mutatur, ut homo, et tempus, et album ».  Et III. Phys. text. 16. (c. 2.) secundum hoc definit motum, quod sit actus mobilis, secundum quod mobile existit.

8  Aristot., V. Phys. text. 1. seqq.

9  Libr. VIII. de Genes. ad lit. c. 26. n. 48. Augustinus dicit, quod Deus « movet per tempus et locum creaturam corporalem ».  His verbis, ut S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 37. p. II. dub. 2 exponit, duplex ab Aristotele propositus motus insinuatur, scil. motu per locum exprimitur motus ad situm, et motu per tempus (eo quod tempus de se dicit mensuram variabilem et rei variabilis) motus ad formam.  Cfr. tom. I. pag. 663, nota 8, et 664, nota 4.

1  Gilbert of Porretain, On the Six Principles, ch on Action:  Moreover, it is necessary [oportet] to know, that everything which is in movement, is in action, for ‘to move’ [moveri] is an action; for if anything moves, it necessarily acts:  therefore every action is in a movement, and every movement is confirmed [firmabitur] in an action; therefore it is proper for an action to be in a movement just as (it is) proper for a movement (to be) in an action.  Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. III, text 3 (Bk. II; ch. 2), and Eudemian Ethics., Bk. II, ch. 5, (ch. 3), where he says, that every action is a movement or with a movement.

2  On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 3, and Bk. II, ch. 27.  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, p. 158, footnote 13.  —  For the following text from (St. John) Damascene, see locc. citt., and ibid., Bk. II, ch. 3, where he teaches, that every created (being), by the very (fact) that (it has) been created, is mutable, only the Uncreated is immutable.  —  In this (final allusion to St. John Damascene) we have substituted from codices U and bb created (things) [creata] for all other (things) [cetera].

3  Here in ch. 3.  —  A little below this not a few codices, together with edition 1, have only ‘passion’ (does) [passio tantum] for only ‘creation-passion’ (does) [creation-passio tantum].

4  Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, text 7 (ch. 1), and Bk. VI, texts 32, 49, and 73 (chs. 4, 5 and 8).

5  This argument is in none of the editions and is (found) only in codex Q; it seems to have fallen away in the others, because this argument and the preceding one end with the same words.  And since this argument is explicitly solved below, it had to be received into the text.  In its place the Vatican edition alone adjoins to the preceding argument:  « The proof of the first.  The immutable and the mutable are opposed privatively; but the immutable is that which holds itself in the same manner:  therefore the mutable is that which does not hold itself in the same manner; but this is to hold oneself now in a manner other than before:  therefore [Probatio primae.  Immutabile et mutabile opponuntur privative; sed immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo:  igitur mutabile est quod non se habet eodem modo; sed hoc est aliter se habere nunc quam prius: igitur] ».

6  Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text 6 (ch. 1), where according to the Arabic-Latin translation (there is read):  A movement will be a perfection (enteleceia) of that which is in potency, according to which it is such.  —  Concerning Master (Peter), cf. here, ch. 2.

7  That is the subject, which is changed.  For according to Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VI, text 3 ff., three (things) are required for change and movement:  that which moves or the mobile, that in which it moves, and that out of which (it moves), for example:  a log, heat, and cold.  In Physics, Bk. VI, text 49 (ch. 5) he says:  « For indeed there are three which are said to be in a change:  both that which is changed, and in which (it is changed), and according to which it is changed, such as a man, and time, and white ».  And in Physics., Bk. III, text 16 (ch. 2) he defines movement according to this, that it is an act of the mobile, according to which it exists as a mobile.

8  Aristotle, Physics., Bk. V, text 1 ff..

9  On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, ch. 26, n. 48, (St.) Augustine says, that God « moves through time and place the corporal creature ».  With these words, as St. Bonaventure expounds (them) in Sent., Bk. I, d. 37, p. II, Doubt 2, a twofold movement, proposed by Aristotle, is hinted at, namely, by a movement through place there is expressed a movement according to disposition [ad situm], and by a movement through time (by this that time of itself means a variable measure and speaks of a variable thing) a movement according to form.  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, p. 663, footnote 8, and d. 37, Doubt 2, p 664, footnote 4.

p. 32

situm, aut ad formam »; sed creatio est ad materiam recte ac proprie:  ergo videtur, quod non sit mutatio.

disposition [ad situm], or form »; but creation rightly and properly regards matter:  therefore it seems, that it is not a change.

7. Item, ex tanta potentia creat Deus, ex quanta generat, quia utrumque facit per potentiam infinitam;1 sed Deus potest generare sine mutatione sui et etiam personae genitae:  ergo pari ratione potest creare sine mutatione sui et creaturae; aut si non, quaero, quare non?

7. Likewise, out of as much power as God creates, out of so much does He generate, because He causes each through infinite power;1 but God can generate without a change of Himself and even (without a change) of the Person generated:  therefore for an equal reason He can create without a change of Himself and of the creature; or if (He can)not, I ask, “For what reason (can He) not?”

CONCLUSIO.

 

Creatio est mutatio, sed distincta a mutatione naturali.

CONCLUSION

 

Creation is a change, but distinct from natural change.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod quaedam est productio, in qua productum se habet aliter nunc et prius, quia secundum aliquid sui fuit prius sub una dispositione, et nunc est sub alia; et talis est productio, quae est ex materiali principio, in qua productum omni2 modo se habet nunc et nullo modo prius; et talis est productio, quae est ex nihilo.  Tertia est producito, in qua productum aeque omnino se habet nunc et prius, si tamen est ibi dicere prius; et talis est Filii generatio ab aeterno.  Ab aeterno enim sic processit ut nunc.3  —  Prima habet rationem motus et mutationis et productionis:  motus, ratione praeparationis materiae, quae fit per dispositiones accidentales, et haec indiget successione et tempore; mutationis, ratione exitus in esse sive receptionis substantialis formae, quae fit in instanti; productionis vero, ratione eius, quod illam formam non a se habet, sed ab alio effectivo.4  —  Secunda caret ratione motus, habet tamen rationem mutationis et productionis.  Ratione motus caret, quia cum non habeat materiam, nulla potest praeire dispositio; habet tamen rationem mutationis, quia ibi est subita et nova formae inductio; habet rationem productionis, quoniam hoc5 habet ab alio effectivo principio.  —  Tertia caret ratione motus et mutationis, habet tamen rationem productionis.  Ratione motus et mutationis caret, quia nec est ex materiali principio, nec ex nihilo; sed tamen est ab aliquo,6 et sempiternaliter est ab ipso.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that there is a certain production, in which the one produced holds itself in a different manner now and before, because according to something of itself it was under one disposition before, and now is under another; and such is the production, which is out of a material principle, in which the one produced holds itself in every2 manner now and in no manner before; and such is the production, which is out of nothing.  The third is the production, in which the One produced holds Himself entirely equally now and before, if, however, there is a saying of “before” There, and such is the generation of the Son from eternity.  For from eternity He proceeded thus as now.3  —  The first has a reckoning of movement and of change and of production:  of movement, by reason of the preparation of the matter, which is made through accidental dispositions, and this needs succession and time; of change, by reason of a going forth into ‘being’ or (by reason) of the reception of a substantial form, which is done in an instant; but of production, by reason of that, which does not have that form by itself, but by another effective (principle).4  —  The second lacks a reckoning of movement, yet it has the reckoning of change and of production.  It lacks the reckoning of movement, because, since it does not have matter, no disposition can go before (it); yet it has the reckoning of change, because there is a sudden and new induction of a form; it has the reckoning of production, since it has this (induction of form)5 from another effective principle.  —  The third lacks the reckoning of movement and of change, yet it has the reckoning of production.  It lacks the reckoning of movement and of change, because it is neither out of a material principle, nor out of nothing; but yet is from Someone,6 and is sempiternally from Him.

Concedendum est igitur, quod productio creaturae est mutatio; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, licet aliquae videantur sophisticae.

It must be conceded, therefore, that the production of a creature is a change; and the reasons for this are to be conceded, though some seem (to be) sophistic.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod est sine motu; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur sine motu agentis, non tamen sine mutatione producti.  Si enim, ut dicit Philosophus,7 anima, dum movet corpus, immobilis perseverat, quanto magis Deus, dum creat et mutat omnia, « ipse stabilis manens dat cuncta mutari ».  —  Si ergo obiiciat, quod verbum activum et passivum idem significant; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia actio et passio dicunt diversa genera;8 tamen in coniugatione unum ponitur iuxta alterum, quia secundum vocis formationem unum venit ab alio.

1. What, therefore, is objected, that (creation) is without movement; it must be said, that that is understood without the movement of the One acting, yet not without the change of the one produced.  For if, as the Philosopher says,7 the soul, while it moves the body, persevered immobile, how much more God, while He creates and changes all, « remaining Himself stable grants all others to move ».  Therefore, if one objects, that an active and passive verb signify the same (thing); it must be said, that it is false, because action and passion mean diverse genera;8 yet in a conjugation (of a Latin verb) the one is placed alongside the other, because according to the formation of the spoken word [vocis], one comes from the other.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod mutari est aliter se habere nunc et prius; dicendum, quod ista non est generalis ratio eius quod est mutari sive mutationis, sed solius mutationis naturalis.

2. What is objected, that ‘to be changed’ is ‘to hold oneself in a different manner now and before’; it must be said, that that is not the general reckoning of that which it is ‘to be changed’ or of a change, but (is the reckoning) of a natural change alone.

3. Quod ergo obiicitur:  immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo, et mutabile quod se habet aliter; dicendum, quod hic est consequens,9 quia si mutabile et immutabile opponuntur, ut privatio et habitus, et immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo; tunc mutabile est sive mutatum quod non se habet eodem modo.  Sed hoc habet tres causas veritatis:  aut quia nullo modo se habet prius et posterius; aut10 nullo modo prius, et aliquo modo posterius, et ita non eodem modo; aut quia simpliciter aliter se habet prius, et aliter posterius:  et ideo, cum procedit a pluribus causis veritatis ad unam, peccat secundum consequens.

3. What, therefore, is objected:  “the immutable is that which holds itself in the same manner”, and “the mutable (is) that which holds itself in a different manner”; it must be said, that there is a (fallacy of)9 the consequent here, because if the mutable and the immutable are opposed, as a privation and a having, and the immutable is that which holds itself in the same manner; then (that) which does not hold itself in the same manner is the mutable or the changed.  But this has three causes of (its) truth:  either because in no manner does it hold itself before and after; or10 in no manner before, and in some manner after, and thus not in the same manner; or because simply it holds itself in one manner before, and in another after:  and for that reason, when (the objection) proceeds from several causes of truth to the one, it sins according to the consequent.

4. 5. 6. Ad tres rationes sequentes patet responsio, quia omnes procedunt de mutatione naturali, quae preexigit materiam et ens in potentia, et quae est generatio; tali autem modo creatio non est mutatio, sed supra hanc mutationem; unde potest dici supernaturalis mutatio.  Et si quaeras, utrum sit mutatio ad formam aut ad situm; dico, . . .

4. 5. 6.  To the three following reckonings the response is clear, because all proceed from a natural change, which requires beforehand matter and a being in potency, and which is a generation; but in such a manner creation is not a change, but (is) above this change; wherefore it can be said (to be) a “supernatural change”.  And if you ask, whether it is a change according to form or according to disposition [ad situm]; I say, . . .

1  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 7. q. 3. et 4.

2  Vat. aliquo.

3  Vide I. Sent. d. 9. q. 4.  —  De differentia inter motum et mutationem, quam in seqq. inducit S. Doctor, cfr. tom. I. pag. 662, nota 4.

4  In paucis mss. et Vat. additur principio.

5  Cod. N hanc formam.

6  Cod. A sed habet rationem productionis, quia est ab aliquo.  Aliqui codd. cum edd. 1, 3 sed tantum pro sed tamen.

7  Aristoteles, VIII. Phys. text. 34. seqq. (c. 5.) generaliter probat, omnem motum procedere ab immobili, sive primum motorem in omni genere motus immobile esse.  Libr. I. de Anima, text. 19. seqq. (c. 2.) insinuat, antiquos philosophos, ignorato hoc axiomate, in diversos errores de essentia animae incidisse, iisque refutatis, ipse ibid. II. text. 18. seqq. (c. 2.) docet, animam esse « principium, quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo ».  « Verumtamen principium, in quantum principium, quiescit, mota particula, quae subest; veluti brachio moto cubitus, toto autem membro humerus » etc., ut dicitur in eius libro de Animalium motu, c. 1; et c. 6. (c. 8.) concludit, movens non motum in animalibus esse ipsam animam.  Cfr. I. de Anima, text. 69. (c. 4.)  Idem docet August., VIII de Gen. ad lit. c. 21. n. 41. seq.  —  In sequente Boethii verbo, III. de Consol. Metro 9, codd., paucis exceptis, et edd. 1, 2, 3 ponunt mutari pro moveri, quod exhibet textus originalis.

8  Intellige:  genera suprema sive praedicamenta, ut ponit Aristoteles in libro de Praedicamentis, c. de Actione et passione.

9  Scilicet fallacia seu sophisma consequentis, de quo vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.).  Cfr. tom. I. pag. 628, nota 1. et pag. 691, nota 5.

10  Cod. K repetit quia.  Cod. F unicuique horum trium membrorum adiungit exemplum  primo ut Deus (?), secundo ut privatio (?), tertio ut mutatio rei naturaliter (?).

1  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 7, qq. 3 and 4.

2  The Vatican edition reads some [aliquo].

3  See Sent., Bk. I, d. 9, q. 4.  —  On the difference between movement and change, which the Seraphic Doctor brings forward in the following (considerations), cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 3, p. 662, footnote 4.

4  In a few manuscripts and in the Vatican edition there is added principle [principio].

5  Codex N reads this form [hanc formam] for this (induction of form) [hoc].

6  Codex A reads but it has the reckoning of production, because it is from Someone [sed habet rationem productionis, quia est ab aliquo].  Some codices, together with editions 1 and 3, have but only [sed tantum] for but yet [sed tamen].

7  Aristotle in Physics., Bk. VIII, text 34 ff (ch. 5) generally proves, that every movement proceeds from an immobile, or that the prime mover in every genus of movement is immobile  In On the Soul, Bk. I, text 19 ff. (ch. 2) he insinuates, that the ancient philosophers, ignorant of this axiom, fell into diverse errors concerning the essence of the soul, and having refuted these, he himself, in Bk. II, text 18 ff. (ch. 2), teaches, that the soul is « the principle, by which we live and sense and move and first understand ».  « Nevertheless the principle, in as much as (it is) a principle, rests, with the particle moved, which is under it; just as if having moved one’s lower arm to lie down, but the upper arm according to the whole member » etc., as is said in his book On the Movement of Animals, ch. 1; and in ch. 6 (ch. 8) he concludes, that the one movement, not the one moved, is in animals the soul itself.  Cf. On the Soul., Bk. I, text 69 (ch. 4).  (St.) Augustine teaches the same, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, ch. 21, n. 41 f..  —  In the following verse from (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, meter 8, the codices, with few excepted, and editions 1, 2 and 3, have to be changed [mutari] for to move [moveri], which the original text exhibits.  [Trans. note:  Here St. Augustine uses the semi-deponent moveri , in its classical usage, which has the active sense in regard to movement, since one who moves is moved; yet a little before this the Seraphic Doctor uses movere for the same sense, according to the more usual Medieval usage.]

8  Understand:  the supreme genera or predicaments, as Aristotle posits in his book On Predicaments, ch. on Action and passion.

9  Namely the fallacy or sophism of the consequent, concerning which see Aristotle, List of Sophistic Errors, Bk. I, ch. 4 (ch. 5).  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 36, a. 3, q. 1, p. 628, footnote 1, and d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, p. 691, footnote 5.

10  Codex K repeats because (it holds itself) [quia].  Codex F adjoins to each one of these three members an example, the first such as God [ut Deus], the second such as a privation [ut privatio], the third such as the change of a thing naturally [ut mutation rei naturalier] (in a questionable assertion).

p. 33

quod est ad totam rei substantiam, et ita ad formam, ac per hoc sub mutatione ad formam potest comprehendi.

that it is (a change) according to the whole substance of the thing, and thus according to form, and through this it can be comprehended under a change according to form.

7. Quod quaeritur de generatione Filii, dicendum, quod non est simile:  quamvis enim utraque sit ab aequali potentia, tamen creatio ex nihilo.  Sed ex non potest dicere identitatem nec causalitatem, ergo ordinem:  ergo fieri ex nihilo habet esse post nihil, et ita post non-esse:  ergo aliquo modo se habet nunc, quo non se habebat prius; et ideo necessario ponitur per productionem de nihilo, vel1 inceptio.  Filius autem est de Patris substantia per identitatem, nec oportet, quod habeat ordinem ad nihil sive ad non-esse:  ergo potest semper esse, et ita produci sine initio et mutatione.  Unde productio rei non ponit inchoationem rei necessario, sed productio ex nihilo necessario ponit; et ideo creatio includit mutationem, generatio vero Filii minime.

7. What is asked concerning the generation of the Son, it must be said, that it is not similar:  for though each is from an equal power, yet creation (is) out of nothing.  But “out of” [ex] cannot mean an identity nor a causality, therefore (it means) an order:  therefore ‘to be made out of nothing’ has a ‘being’ after nothing, and thus a ‘non-being’:  therefore in some manner it holds itself now, in which it did not hold itself before; and for that reason it is necessarily posited through a production from nothing, and/or1 an inception.  But the Son is from the Substance of the Father through an identity, and it is not necessary [nec oportet], that He have an order to nothing or to ‘non-being’:  therefore He can always be, and thus be produced without a start and a change.  Wherefore the production of a thing does not posit the beginning of a thing [inchoationem rei] necessarily, but a production out of nothing necessarily posits (this); and for that reason creation includes change, but the generation of the Son (does so) least of all.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Creatio accipi potest in sensu activo sive ex parte Dei, et in sensu passivo sive ex parte creaturae.  De utroque sensu agitur in hoc articulo; sed in hac 1. quaest. solummodo de creatione passiva, quatenus est quaedam mutatio; in seq. quaest. tractatur tum de creatione activa, tum iterum de passiva, quatenus importat habitudinem sive relationem.

I. “Creation” can be accepted in the active sense (or on the part of God), and in the passive sense (or on the part of the creature).  Each sense is dealt with in this Article; but in this first Question only passive creation (is dealt) with, to the extent that it is a certain change; in the following Question one treats of both active creation, and again the passive, to the extent that it conveys a habitude or relation.

II. S. Bonav. (hic. q. 2.) triplicem distinguit mutationem, scilicet ad esse, ab esse, in esse, quarum tantum ultima est mutatio in sensu proprio et ab Aristotele (cfr. pag. 31, nota 7.) definito.  Ipse concedit (hic ad 4. 5. 6.), in hoc stricto sensu creationem passivam non esse mutationem; tamen asserit, in sensu largiore eam vere esse mutationem.  Quo sensu hoc intelligatur, hic in corp. (cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2.), adhibita triplici distinctione termini productio, accurate determinatur.  —  Creationem illam esse mutationem, negat S. Thom. (S. I. q. 45. a. 2. ad 2; et de Potent. q. 3. a. 2), insistens definitioni Aristotelicae; addit tamen, quod creatio in sensu minus dici possit mutatio.  —  Cum S. Bonav. loquuntur Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 9. m 1.) et Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2.), qui clare istum triplicem modum mutationis* explicat et in fine addit:  « Unde illi errant, qui dicunt, quod creatio non debet dici mutatio ad esse, si intelligant de omni modo mutationis, quia produci non de aliquo includit productum de novo esse vel incipere esse ».  Hoc fortasse adiecit propter quandam thesis a Stephano Paris. Episc. a 1276 reprobatam, quae talis est:  « Quod creatio non debet dici mutatio ad esse ».  Censura est:  « Error, si intelligatur de omni modo mutationis » (Collectio iudic. pag. 199, cap. XI. n. 28.).  —  Dissensus doctorum est potius de nomine, quam de re; tamen non est sine aliquo momento pro determinanda quaestione (supra a. 1. q. 2.), utrum creatio fieri possit ab aeterno.

II. St. Bonaventure (here in q. 2) distinguishes a threefold change, namely toward ‘being’ [ad esse], from ‘being’ [ab esse], into ‘being’ [in esse], only the last of which is a change in the proper sense and (that) defined by Aristotle (cf. here p. 31, footnote 7).  He concedes (here in the reply to nn. 4, 5 and 6), in this strict sense that passive creation is not a change; yet he asserts, in the broader sense that it truly is a change.  In which sense this is understood, is accurately determined here in the body of the Question (cf. also Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in reply to n. 2), by employing the threefold distinction of the term “production”.  —  That creation is that (kind of) change, St. Thomas denies (Summa., I, q. 45, a. 2, in reply to n. 2; and de Potentia, q. 3, a. 2), insisting upon the Aristotelian definition; yet he adds, that creation can be said (to be) a “change” in the lesser sense.  —  Along with St. Bonaventure speak Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. III, q. 9, m. 1) and Richard of Middleton (here in a. 1, q. 2), who clearly explains this threefold manner of change and at the end adds:  « Wherefore those err, who say, that creation out not be said (to be) a change toward ‘being’ [mutatio ad esse], if they understand (this) of every manner of change, because ‘to be produced not from something’ includes that the one produced is anew and/or starts to be ».  He, perhaps, added this on account of a certain thesis, reproved by Bishop Stephen of Paris in 1276 A. D., which is:  « That creation ought not be said (to be) a “change toward ‘being’”  ».  The censure reads:  « An error, if it be understood of every manner of change » (Collectio iudiciorum, p. 199, chapter XI, n. 28).  —  The dissension of the Doctors concerns rather the name, than the thing; yet it is not without some moment for determining the question (above in a. 1, q. 2), whether a creation can be made from eternity.

III. Praeter laudatos:  B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 53. m. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 1.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. in fine.

III. Besides those mentioned:  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 13, q. 53, m. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 2, questiuncula 1.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2, near the end.

1  Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 et, Vat. et ita, quae etiam circa finem solutionis ponit necessario includit pro includit.

1  Not a few codices, together with edition 1, have and [et], the Vatican edition and thus [et ita], which (edition) near the end of the solution has necesarily includes [necessario includit] for includes [includit].

* [Trans. nota:  Hic videtur quod scholionis originalis legivit perperam matutionis pro mutationis, quod correxi ex contextu argumentationis.]

 

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