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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I |
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PARS I. |
PART I |
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ARTICULUS III.
Quaestio II. |
ARTICLE III
Question 2 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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QUAESTIO II.
Utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam. |
QUESTION 2
Whether creation means a medium between Creator and creature? |
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SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam. Et quod sic, videtur. |
SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether creation means a medium between Creator and creature. And it seems that (it is) so. |
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1. Sicut se habet generari ad generatum esse et fieri ad factum esse, ita creari ad creatum esse; sed fieri est medium inter facientem et factum, et generari inter generantem et generatum:2 ergo etc. |
1. Just as ‘being generated’ [generari] holds itself to ‘having been generated’ [generatum esse] and ‘being made’ [fieri] to ‘having been made’ [factum esse], so ‘being created’ [creari] to ‘having been created’ [creatum esse]; but ‘being made’ [fieri] is a medium between the one making and the one made, and ‘being generated’ [generari] (is a medium) between the one generating the one generated:2 ergo etc.. |
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2. Item, in omnibus creatis entibus « differt quod est et quo est »,3 etiam formaliter: ergo differt similiter quo creatur et quod creatur. Sed quod creatur est creatura; quo creatur formaliter est creatio: ergo differt creatio a creatura, et similiter a Creatore creatio-passio: ergo est inter utrumque. |
2. Likewise, in all created beings « that which it is and that by which it is differ »,3 even formally: therefore there similarly differ that by which it is created and that which is created. But that which is created is the creature; that by which it is created is formally (an act of) creation: therefore creation differs from the creature, and the creation-passion from the Creator: therefore (creation) is between each. |
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3. Item, quod transit non est idem cum eo quod permanet; sed creari rei est in instanti, et non amplius: ergo cum esse creaturae4 duret et maneat post creationem, ergo differt creari et esse, ergo creatio et creatura. |
3. Likewise, what passes by is not the same with that which remains throughout; but the ‘being created’ of a thing is in an instant, and not more: therefore since the ‘being’ of a creature4 endures and remains after (its) creation; therefore (its) ‘being created’ and (its) ‘being’ differ, therefore creation and the creature (also differ). |
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4. Item, omnis mutatio est via,5 et omnis via differt a termino, quia nihil terminatur ad se ipsum; si ergo creatio est mutatio et habet creaturam pro termino, ergo differt a creatura ut via a termino. Sed via cadit media inter extrema: ergo etc. |
4. Likewise, every change is a way (to a terminus),5 and every way differs from (its) terminus, because nothing is terminated at its very self; if, therefore, creation is a change and has a creature as (its) terminus; therefore it differs from the creature as a way (differs) from (its) terminus. |
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5. Item, per impossibile: si creatio est creatura, et omnis creatura creatur, ergo creatio creatur; sed omne quod creatur, creatur per creationem mediam: ergo creatio per aliam creationem, et sic deinceps usque in infinitum. Si ergo non est abire in infinitum, patet6 etc. |
5. Likewise, through the impossible: if (an act of) creation is a creature, and every creature is created, therefore (the act of) creation is created; but everything which is created, is created through an intermediary (act of) creation [creationem mediam]: therefore (an act of) creation (is created) through another (act of) creation, and thus from the beginning even unto infinity. If, therefore, there is no regress to infinity, it is clear6 that, etc.. |
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CONTRA: 1. Philosophus de Causis:7 « Prima rerum creatarum est esse »; sed nihil ex parte crea- / -turae . . . |
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The Philosopher (of the Book) of Causes (says):7 « The first of things created is (their) ‘being’ [esse] »; but nothing on the part of the crea- / -ture . . . |
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2 Cod. cc et ed. 1 supplent hic sicut et paulo superius post factum verbum esse. 3 Secundum Boeth. et eius commentatorem Gilbert. Porret., cfr. tom. I. pag. 85, nota 7. — Aliquanto inferius pro ergo differt creatio Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, habet ergo differt creatio-actio, qua lectione punctum comparationis aufertur. 4 Cod. F creatum. 5 Sub quo respectu Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 40. (c. 5.) ait: Quoniam autem omne quod mutatur, ex quodam in quoddam mutatur . . . Quod enim mutatur ab eo, ex quo mutatur, discedit aut relinquit ipsum. Cfr. II. Phys. text. 14. (c. 1.). — Cod. cc cum ed. 1 addit ad terminum. 6 Simile argumentum occurrit in Aristot., V. Phys. text. 13. (c. 2.), quo probatur, quod non possit esse generatio generationis neque mutatio mutationis. 7 Prop. 4. — Paulo inferius post ergo nec creatio supple cum Vat. et cod. aa aliud. |
2 Codex cc and edition 1 supply here, just as a little above this, after between [factum] being [esse]. 3 According to (St. Severinus) Boethius and his commentator Gilbert of Porretain, cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, p. 85, footnote 7. — Somewhat below this for therefore creation differs [ergo differt creatio] the Vatican edition, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, has therefore creation-action differs [ergo differt creatio-actio], by which reading the point of the comparison is taken away. 4 Codex F has the created ‘being’ [esse creatum] for the ‘being’ of the creature [esse creaturae]. 5 Under which respect Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VI, text 40 (ch. 5) says: Moreover, since everything which is changed, is changed out of a certain (something) into a certain (something) . . . For what is changed from this, out of which it is changed, departs or relinquishes it. Cf. Physics., Bk. II, text. 14 (ch. 1). — Codex cc, together with edition 1, adds to a terminus [ad terminum]. 6 A similar argument occurs in Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, text 13 (ch. 2), in which there is proven, that there cannot be a generation of a generation nor a change of a change. 7 Proposition 4. — A little below this after therefore neither (is its) creation [ergo nec creatio] supply together with the Vatican edition and codex aa (something) other [aliud]. [Trans. note: This supplying of something other [aliud] seems lest apt that a supplying of other [alia], since the neuter form would, on account of the syntax, be reckoned as a supposit, and this would impose upon the entire phrase an additional meaning, which is not necessitated by the previous other [aliud], which agrees with the infinitive. — This entire 1st argument perhaps could be read in English by replacing the first instance and subsequent occurrences of ‘being’ [esse] with ‘to be’, however, since the argument concludes by saying: neither (is its) creation (other) than (its) essence [ergo nec creation quam essentia], the sense of the argument requires the reading of ‘being’ for esse, to clearly distinguish that it is made according to that understanding of essence [essentia] which does not distinguished it from the act of existence.] |
p. 34
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crea- / -turae est ante creari: ergo creari non et aliud quam esse, ergo nec creatio quam essentia: ergo nulla est differentia creationis ad creaturam. |
crea- / -ture is before (its) ‘being created’ [creari]: therefore (its) ‘being created’ is not other than (its) ‘being’, therefore neither (is its) creation (other) than (its) essence: therefore there is no difference of the creation to the creature. |
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2. Item, inter ens ab alio et non ab alio non est medium; sed omne quod non est ab alio, est Creator, omne autem quod est ab alio essentialiter, est creatura: ergo inter se nihil est medium. |
2. Likewise, between a being from another and (one) not from another there is no medium; but everything which is not from another, is the Creator; however, everything which is from another essentially, is a creature: therefore between them nothing is a medium. |
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3. Item, per impossibile ostenditur. Creatura refertur ad Creatorem; aut ergo se ipsa, aut per aliud. Si per aliud, quaeritur de illo, utrum referatur se ipso, aut alio, et sic procedendo in infinitum. Si vero refertur se ipsa — sed refertur per creationem — ergo creatio non est aliud quam creatura. |
3. Likewise, it is shown through the impossible. The creature is referred to the Creator; therefore, either by its very self, or through another. If through another, there is asked of this, whether it is referred by its very self, or by another, and thus by proceeding unto infinity. But if it is referred by its very self — but it is referred through (an act of) creation — therefore (the act of) creation is not other than the creature. |
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4. Item, si creatio est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam, aut ergo aeternum, aut temporale.1 Quod si aeternum, ergo aliquid aeternum est aliud a Deo; si temporale, ergo ante omnem creaturam est aliquod temporale. Horum autem utrumque est haereticum dicere et reprobatum in Concilio Senonensi de ideis, quae ponebantur a quibusdam mediae inter Deum et res. |
4. Likewise, if (an act of) creation is a medium between the Creator and the creature, therefore either (it is something) eternal, or a temporal.1 Wherefore, if (it is) eternal, therefore there is something eternal other than God; if temporal, therefore before every creature there is some temporal. But each of these is heretical to say and (has been) reproved in the Council of Sens concerning the ideas, which were posited by certain (authors) as media between God and things. |
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5. Item, a proportione videtur hoc posse ostendi. Sicut enim se habet Creator ad creaturam, ita creatio-actio ad creationem-passionem: ergo, a permutata proportione, sicut se habet Creator ad creationem activam, ita creatura ad creationem passivam; sed Creator non differt secundum rem a creatione-actione: ergo etc. |
5. Likewise, it seems that this can be shown by a proportion. For just as the Creator holds Himself to the creature, so the creation-action to the creation-passion: therefore, by a permutated proportion, just as the Creator holds Himself to active creation, so the creature to passive creation; but the Creator does not differ according to thing from the creation-action: ergo etc.. |
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CONCLUSIO.
Creatio est mutatio, sed distincta a mutatione naturali. |
CONCLUSION
Creation is a change, but distinct from natural change. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod est loqui de creatione-actione, et de creatione-passione. Si de creatione-actione loquamur, sic dico, quod non est medium secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem intelligendi, pro eo quod Deus, cum sit summe simplex, est sua actio. Si autem loquamur de creatione-passione, tunc distinguendum,2 quia per creaturae nomen potest significari et importari omne quod est ab alio, ita quod habet esse post omnino non-esse. Et hoc modo in nomine creaturae clauditur ipsa creatio, quoniam creatura non tantum nominat ipsa creata, sed etiam concreata; et sic non est medium nec re nec ratione. Alio modo creatura nominat ipsam substantiam rei ab aliquo productae de nihilo; et sic creatio tenet medium non secundum rem et naturam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem.3 |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that there is a speaking of the creation-action, and of the creation-passion. If we speak of the creation-action, thus I say, that it is not a medium according to thing, but only according to the reckoning of understanding, in virtue of this, that God, since He is most highly simple, is His own Action. But if we speak of the creation-passion, then one must distinguish,2 because through the name of “creature” there can be signified and conveyed everything which is from the other, such that it has a ‘to be’ after entirely not-being [non-esse]. And in this manner in the name of “creature” there is enclosed (the act of) creation itself, since “creature” not only names the created (thing) itself, but even the (creature’s) co-created (act of being); and thus it is not a medium neither according to thing nor according to reason. In another manner “creature” names the substance itself of the thing produced by something from nothing; and in this manner “creation” holds an intermediary (place) not according to thing and nature, but according to reckoning and habitude.3 |
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Illa tamen ratio non nihil dicit, sed non dicit aliquid per essentiam diversum a creatura, et hoc patet sic. Creatio enim dicitur de nihilo esse, creatio nihilominus dicitur esse a Deo; unde habitudinem dicit ipsius ad non esse praecedens et ad suum esse producens,4 de ratione sui nominis. Creari enim non significat esse principaliter, sed exire de non-esse in esse, et hoc ab aliquo. |
Yet that reckoning does not mean that (there is) nothing, but (rather) it does not mean that (there is) something through essence diverse from the creature, and this is clear in this manner. For (an act of) creation is said to be “from nothing” [de nihilo], nevertheless (an act of) creation is said to be “from God “; wherefore it means a habitude of itself to ‘not being proceeding’ and to the One producing its own ‘being’,4 from the reckoning of its own name. For “to be created” does not principally signify “to be”, but “to go forth from ‘not-being’ into ‘being’”, and this (is wrought) by something. |
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Si ergo quaeratur, quae sit habitudo, quae importatur in comparatione ad non-esse; dicendum, quod illa habitudo dicitur mutatio. — Et si quaeras, quid sit illa mutatio; dico, quod non est aliud quam ipsa res. — Et hoc patet, quia est mutatio ad esse, et mutatio ab esse, et mutatio in esse. Mutatio ad esse nihil ponit nisi a parte termini; mutatio ab esse nihil ponit nisi a parte prinicipii; mutatio in esse ponit ex parte utriusque; et ideo mutari primo modo nihil aliud est, quam nunc primo esse. Mutatio secundo modo nihil aliud est, quam nunc ultimo esse; et ideo non ponit aliquid aliud secundum rem,5 sed solum secundum intentionem. Mutatio vero in esse utrumque extremum habet et subiectum, quod est prius natura quam terminus. Ideo et talis mutatio aliquid potest esse natura praecedens terminum, et diversum ab illo secundum rem, quamvis non sit ens actu completum. — Et ideo non sic creatio est medium inter Creatorem et creaturam, sicut generatio inter generantem et generatum. Dicendo igitur comparationem ad non-esse, dicit6 medium non diversum per essentiam, sed secundum rationem. |
Therefore, if there be asked, “What is the habitude, which is conveyed in the comparison to ‘not-being’ [non-esse] ?”; it must be said that that habitude is said (to be) a “change”. — And if you ask, “What is that change?”; I say, that it is not other than the thing itself. — And this is clear, because there is a change toward ‘being’ [ad esse], and a change from ‘being’ [ab esse], and a change into ‘being’ [in esse]. A change toward ‘being’ posits nothing but on the part of the terminus; a change from ‘being’ posits nothing except on the part of the principle; a change into ‘being’ posits on the part of each; and for that reason ‘to be changed’ in the first manner is nothing other, than ‘to be now for the first (time)’. A change in the second manner is nothing other, than ‘to be now for the last (time)’; and for that reason it does not posit something else according to thing,5 but only according to meaning [intentionem]. But a change into ‘being’ has each extreme and a subject, which is prior according to nature than the terminus. For that reason such a change also posits that there is something precedent according to nature to the terminus, and diverse from it according to thing, even though it is not a being complete according to act. — And for that reason creation is not a medium between the Creator and the creature in the same manner, as generation (is) between the one generating and the one generated. Therefore speaking of the comparison to ‘not-being’, (creation)6 means a medium not diverse through essence, but according to reckoning. |
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Similiter dicendo comparationem ad Creatorem. Triplex enim est relatio: quaedam, quae fundatur super proprietatem accidentalem, sicut aliqui dicuntur similes, quia albi; quaedam, quae fundatur super dependentiam essentialem, sicut comparatio materiae ad formam; quaedam, quae super originem naturalem. Prima relatio addit aliud per essentiam;7 tertia relatio nihil aliud nisi pure . . . |
(It signifies) similarly when speaking of the comparison to the Creator. For there is a threefold relation: a certain one, which is founded upon an accidental property, just as some are said (to be) “similar”, because (they are) white; a certain one, which is founded upon essential dependence, just as the comparison of matter to form; a certain one, which is (founded) upon natural origin. The first relation adds (something) other through essence;7 the third relation (adds) nothing else except purely . . . |
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1 Plurimi codd. habent aut temporale quid. Si aeternum; nostra lectio invenitur in codd. I cc et edd. 1, 3, 4. Quoad Concilium Senonense, de quo paulo inferius loquitur S. Doctor, cfr. hic Scholion. n. III. 2 In cod. A additur quando quaeritur, utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam. 3 Cod. cc et ed. 1 subiungunt: « quia creatio-passio dat esse creaturae cum negatione praeexistente; dicit enim, creaturam primo esse, ita quod creatura modo est et prius non fuit; unde pro illo instanti, pro quo dicitur creatura est modo et prius non fuit, potest dici, quod creatura creatur ». Immediate post cod. F Illa tamen non omnino nihil pro Illa tamen ratio non nihil. 4 Intellige: et ad causam, quae suum esse producit. Vat. sola et ad suum producens. Mox codd. M U W de non-esse ad esse pro de non-esse in esse, quae lectio cum subnexis magis convenit. 5 Codd. inter se dissentiunt; maior eorum pars habet aliquid aliud quam secundum rem esse, sed secundum etc.; cod. Q (cod. T a sec. manu) quam nunc ultimo secundum rem esse, ergo solum etc.; codd. F K brevius aliquid aliud secundum rem, quos sequimur. Forte legendum aliquid aliud quantum ad esse secundum rem. 6 Cod. Y creatio dicit. 7 Cod. F aliud ad esse, quia aliud est albedo, et aliud cui inhaeret per essentiam; Vat. aliud super essentiam. Paulo post aliqui codd. ut K aa quod pure est pro pure esse. — De triplici hac relatione cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 3, ubi de tertia relatione dicatur: Tertia est in Deo, sed non respectu creaturae, sed respectu personae; haec enim non dicit compositionem nec dependentiae inclinationem, sicut prima et secunda, sed ponit distinctionem et ordinem. Et quoniam vere una persona ordinatur ad aliam etc. |
1 Very many codices have (it is) something eternal or temporal. If (it is) eternal [aeternum aut temporale quid. Si aeternum] for (it is something) eternal or temporal. Wherefore if (it is) eternal [aeternum atu temporale. Quod si aeternum]; our reading is found in codices I and cc and in editions 1, 3, and 4. In regard to the Council of Sens, of which the Seraphic Doctor speaks a little below this, cf. the Scholium here in n. III. 2 In codex A there is added when there is asked, whether (an act of) creation means a medium between the Creator and the creature [quando quaeritur, utrum creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam]. 3 Codex cc and edition 1 subjoin: « because the creation-passion grants ‘being’ to the creature with a pre-existing negation; for it means, that the creature is for the first time, such that the creature is now and before it was not; wherefore for that instant, in which there is said, “the creature is now and before it was not”, it can be said, that the creature is created [quia creatio-passio dat esse creaturae cum negatione praeexistente; dicit enim, creaturam primo esse, ita quod creatura modo est et prius non fuit; unde pro illo instanti, pro quo dicitur creatura est modo et prius non fuit, potest dici, quod creatura creatur] ». Immediately after this codex F has Yet that (reckoning) does not mean (that there is) entirely nothing [Illa tamen non omnino nihil dicit] for Yet that reckoning does not mean that (there is) nothing [Illa tamen ratio non nihil dicit]. 4 Understand: and to the Cause, which produces its own ‘being’ [et ad causam, quae suum esse producit]. The Vatican edition alone reads and to the One producing its own (‘being’) [et ad suum producens]. Next codices M U and W have to ‘being’ [ad esse] for into ‘being’ [in esse], which reading convenes more with what is subjoined. 5 The codices disagree among themselves; the greater part of them have that there is something other than according to thing, but according to etc. [aliquid aliud quam secundum rem esse, sed secundum etc.]; codex Q (codex Y by a second hand) reads than there is now for the last (time) according to thing, therefore only etc. [quam nunc ultimo secundum rem esse, ergo solum]; codices F and K read more briefly something else according to thing [aliquid aliud secundum rem], which (codices) we follow. Perhaps one must read something else as much as regards ‘being’ according to thing [aliquid aliud quantum ad esse secundum rem]. 6 Codex Y supplies creation [creatio]. 7 Codex F reads (something) other regarding ‘being’, because whiteness is one (thing), and that in which it inheres through essence (is) another [aliud ad esse, quia aliud est albedo, et aliud cui inhaeret per essentiam]; the Vatican edition has (something) else upon the essence [aliud super essentiam]. A little after this some codices, such as K and aa, have what purely is [quod pure est] for purely ‘being’ [pure esse]. — On this threefold relation, cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 30, q. 3, p. 525, where of the third relation there is said: The third is in God, but not in respect of the creature, but in respect of a Person; for this one does not mean a composition nor the inclination of a dependence, just as the first and second (do), but posits a distinction and an order. And since one Person is truly ordered to Another etc. |
p. 35
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esse, sicut patet in divinis; media relatio dicit aliquid, quod est quodam modo idem, quodam modo aliud. — Creatio autem dicit relationem secundum medium modum, quoniam ipsa creatura essentialiter et totaliter a Creatore dependet. |
‘being’, just as clear among the divine; the intermediary relation means something, which is in a certain manner the same, in a certain manner other. — But ‘creation’ means a relation according to the intermediary manner, since the creature itself depends essentially and totally from the Creator. |
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Et ideo concedendum, quod creatio non est aliud secundum rem a creatura, nec medium inter ipsam et Deum secundum essentiam, sed secundum rationem et habitudinem; unde est prius natura creari quam esse, non duratione.1 Plus tamen est idem creatio-actio cum creante quam creatio-passio cum creatura, quia ibi non est differentia nisi solum secundum modum nostrum accipiendi; hic autem est differentia rationis et etiam habitudinis, quae non facit diversitatem per essentiam, quia habitudo illa est essentialis.2 Similiter iudicandum est de unitate, bonitate, veritate essentiali. |
And for that reason it must be conceded, that creation is not other than the creature according to thing nor a medium between it and God according to essence, but according to reckoning and habitude; wherefore ‘to be created’ is prior according to nature than ‘to be’, but not according to duration.1 Yet the same creation-action is more with the One creating than the creation-passion (is) with the creature, because there is no difference in the former except solely according to our manner of accepting; but in the latter there is a difference of reckoning and even of the habitude, which does not cause a diversity through essence, because that habitude is essential.2 Similarly must it be judged concerning the unity, goodness, (and) essential truth (of the creature). |
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His visis patent obiecta. Concedendae enim sunt rationes probantes, quod non est verum medium secundum rem. |
With these (things) see the objections are clear. For the reasons proving, that (creation) is not a true medium according to thing, are to be conceded. |
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1. Quod obiicitur de generari et generatum esse, patet responsio ex dictis, quia generatio non est secundum totum, immo aliquid praeexigitur de generando, cuius est entelichia3 ipsa generatio natura praecedens ipsam formam, ac per hoc diveristatem notat. Non sic creatio, secundum quam fit tota rei substantia a virtute divina immediate, quae rem creat volendo, eam primo esse, cum non sit. |
1. What is objected concerning ‘being generated’ and ‘having been generated’, the response is clear from what has been said [ex dicits], because generation is not according to the whole, nay something is required before from the one generating, whose very entelekia3 is the generation preceding the form itself according to nature, and (which) through this notes a diversity. Not so the creation, according to which there comes to be the whole substance of the thing from Divine Virtue immediately, which (Virtue) creates the thing by willing, that it be for the first (time), when it is not. |
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2. Quod obiicitur, quod differt quod et quo; dicendum, quod illa non est differentia per essentiam, sed quodam modo differt, quodam modo convenit. — Vel dicendum, quod non est simile, quia creatio complectitur totam rei substantiam, quae constare dicitur ex quo est et quod est. |
2. What is objected, that what and whereby (a creature is) differ; it must be said, that that is not a difference through essence, but in a certain manner it does differ, in a certain manner it convenes. — And/or it must be said, that it is not similar, because creation comprises the whole substance of the thing, which is said to be established out of “that whereby it is” and “that which it is”. |
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3. Quod obiicitur, quod transit; dicendum, quod non transit ratione eius quod significationi suae substernitur, sed solum ratione connotati; quod patet. Si enim creari est nunc primo esse, desinit creari non ratione eius quod ponit, sed ratione immediatae collationis ad nihilum. |
3. What is objected, that it passes by; it must be said, that, it does not pass by, by reason of that which underlies its signification, but only by reason of what is connotes [ratione connotati], which is clear. For if ‘to be created’ is (its) ‘to be now for the first (time)’, (the creature’s) ‘being created’ ceases not by reason of that which it posits, but by reason of the immediate conferral (of being) upon nothing. |
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4. Quod obiicitur, quod mutatio est via; dicendum, quod mutatio, quae habet duo extrema,4 illa est, quae necessario differt a termino, cuiusmodi est mutatio in esse; mutatio vero, quae habet tantum ultimum extremum ens, non potest dicere medium, sed necessario oportet, quod se teneat cum altero extremorum. |
4. What is objected, that a change is a way; it must be said, that the change, which has two extremes,4 is that, which necessarily differs from (its) terminus, of which manner is the change into ‘being’; but the change, which has only the last extreme being, cannot mean a medium, but it is bound [oportet] necessarily, that it hold itself with one of the two extremes. |
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5. Quod obiicitur, quod omnis creatura creatur; dicendum, quod verum est de creatura proprie dicta; si autem large dicatur, non solum creatura dicitur quod creatur, sed quod concreatur et quod est creaturae annexum; et hoc modo est creatio. — Si ergo quaeritur, quomodo potest esse; dicendum, quod in primis est status, ut prius tactum fuit.5 Unde sicut unitas, quae facit subiectum unum, non est una alia unitate, sic nec creatio, qua substantia exit in esse, per aliam creationem producitur sive concreatur. |
5. What is objected, that every creature is created; it must be said, that it is true of a “creature” properly said; but if (“creature”) be said broadly, not only is what is created said (to be) a “creature”, but what is co-created and what is annexed to the creature; and in this manner is the creation (of a creature). — If, therefore, there is asked, “In what manner can it be?”; it must be said, that there is a standing still in first (intentions), as has been touched upon before.5 Wherefore just as the unity, which makes a subject one, is not one by another unity, so neither the creation, by which a substance goes forth into ‘being’ [exit in esse], produced or co-created through another creation. |
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SCHOLION. |
SCHOLIUM |
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I. Creatio activa secundum principale significatum manifeste est ipsa essentia Dei creatrix. Quid autem sit formaliter, vel utrum dici possit vera actio sive immanens sive transiens, an potius mera relatio rationis cum denominatione extrinseca, disputatur inter doctores. S. Bonav. (hic in corp. et hic q. 1. fundam. 2. et ad 1.), sicut creationem passivam vult esse quandam mutationem et per consequens passionem, sic activam nominat actionem, tamen sine mutatione aliisque imperfectionibus, quae comitantur actiones creaturarum, ipsamque esse virtualiter sive quoad connotata transeuntem (q. 1. ad 1.). Unde in Deo non importat nisi relationem secundum rationem. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 45. a. 3. in corp.) paulo aliter secundum sua principia, ad praeced. quaest. notata, resolvit dicens: « Subtracto motu ab actione et passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio quaedam ad Creatorem ut principium sui esse ». |
I. Active creation (i. e. the act of creating) according to its principal signified (i. e. what it principally signifies) is manifestly the very creative Essence of God. But what it is formally, or whether it can be said (to be) a true “action”, whether immanent or transient, or rather a mere “relation of reason” with an extrinsic denomination, is disputed among the doctors (of theology). St. Bonaventure (here in the body of the Question and here in q. 1, 2nd argument of the fundament and in reply to n. 1), just as he would have that the passive creation (i. e. the ‘being created’ of the creature) be a certain change and per consequens a “passion”, so he names active (creation) an “action”, yet without a change and any of the imperfections, which accompany the actions of creatures, and (would have it) that it be transient virtually or in regard to those which it connotes (q. 1, in reply to n. 1). Wherefore in God it does not convey but a relation according to reckoning. St. Thomas (Summa, I, q. 45, a. 3, in the body of the Article) resolves (this) in a slightly different manner according to his own principles, as noted in the preceding Question, saying: « With movement subtracted from action and passion, nothing remains except a certain relation to the Creator as the principle of (the creatures’) own ‘being’ ». |
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II. Creatio passiva secundum S. Bonaventuram duplicem importat relationem, scil. respectum ad non-esse, quae tantum est rationis, et respectum ad Creatorem (cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.). Haec relatio omni creaturae est essentialis. Quid autem sit, et utrum idem cum suo fundamento sive cum ispa creatura, an realiter ab ea distincta et aliquid ei superadditum; subtilibus disputationibus ventilatum est. Qui dicunt, ipsam esse quid realiter distinctum ab ipsa creatura, per consequens statuunt, eam esse aliquid medium, sed concreatum, inter Deum et creaturae essentiam. Ita Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2: « Alii probabilius dicunt, quod differt secundum rem, quia est accidens quoddam in creatura, et significat quandam rem, non quae sit in praedicamento passionis, proprie loquendo, sed quae est in genere relationis ». De hoc diffuse disputat Scot. (hic q. 4; Report. hic q. 5. 6.) et concludit, relationem creaturae ad Deum esse idem realiter cum suo fundamento, tamen formaliter distinctum. S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2. ad 4; de Potent. q. 3. a. 3. ad 3.) consentit Petro a Tar., docens, eam esse aliquid entitati creaturae superadditum ut accidens in praedicamento relationis. S. Bonav., media via incedens, in corp. tres distinguit relationes, quarum media hic locum habet. Haec ex una parte identificatur realiter cum creatura — et sic non est medium aliquod inter Deum et creaturam — ex altera parte formaliter distinguitur et relationem importat — et sic aliquomodo potest dici medium, . . . |
II. Passive creation, according to St. Bonaventure, conveys a twofold relation, namely a looking back to ‘not-being’, which is only one of a reckoning, and a looking back to the Creator (cf. above a. 1. q. 1, in reply to n. 6). This relation is essential to every creature. But what it is, and whether (it is) the same with its fundament or with the creature itself, or whether (it is) really distinct from it and something superadded to it; has been considered with subtle distinctions. Those who say, that it is something really distinct from the creature itself, establish per consequens, that it is something intermediary, but co-created, between God and the essence of the creature. Thus (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a, 2, quaestiunc. 2: « Others say more probably, that it differs according to thing, because it is a certain accident in the creature, and signifies a certain thing, not (a thing) which is in the predicament of passion, properly speaking, but that which is in the genus of relation ». On this (Bl. John Duns) Scotus disputes at length (here in q. 4; Reportatio, here in qq. 5 and 6) and concludes, that the relation of the creature to God is the same really with its fundament, yet formally distinct. St. Thomas (here in q. 1, a. 2, in reply to n. 4; de Potentia, q. 3, q. 3, in reply to n. 3) consents with (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, (himself) teaching, that it is something superadded to the entity of the creature as an accident in the predicament of relation. St. Bonaventure, walking a middle path, distinguishes in the body of the Question three relations, the middle of which hold this place. This (relation) on one part is really identified with the creature — and thus it is not some medium between God and the creature — on the other part it is formally distinguished and conveys a relation — and thus can be said in some manner (to be) a “medium”, . . . |
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1 Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 unde non est prius natura creari quam esse, nec duratione; perperam. 2 Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 3. et dub. 4. — Dein plures codd. Similiter dicendum est. 3 Enteleceia in operibus Aristotelis significat perfectionem sive actum vel formam. Cod. F addendo explicat perfectio rei secundum actum et habitudinem. 4 Vat. subiungit entia positiva, et paulo inferius unum extremum substituit pro ultimum extremum. 5 Hic, a. 1. q. 2. ad 2. et 3; I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. dub. 3. — Paulo inferius non pauci codd. non est unum pro non est una. |
1 Not a few codices, together with edition 1, read wherefore ‘to be created’ is not prior according to nature than ‘to be’, nor according to duration [unde non est prius natura creari quam esse, nec duratione], faultily. 2 Cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 30, q. 3, and Doubt 4. — Then several codices have Similarly it must be said [Similiter dicendum est] for Similarly it must be judged [Similiter iudicandum est]. 3 Enteleceia in the works of Aristotle signifies “perfection” or “act” and/or “form”. Codex F explains (this) by adding the perfection of the thing according to act and habitude [perfectio rei secundum actum et habitudinem]. 4 The Vatican edition by subjoining reads positive beings as (its) two extremes [duo extrema entia positiva] for two extremes [duo extrema], and a little below this it substitutes one extreme [unum extremum] for the last extreme [ultimum extremum]. 5 Here in a. 1, q. 2, in reply to nn. 2 and 3; Sent, Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, Doubt 3. — A little below this not a few codices have is not ‘one’ [non est unum] for is not one [non est una]. [Trans. note: See the “Rationale for the Translation of Peculiar Latin Terms”, in the Introduction to this English translation.] |
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si concreatum distinguitur a creato. — Notanda est etiam thesis a Gulielmo Episc. Paris. a 1240 damnata: « Quod primum nunc et creatio-passio non sunt creator, vel creatura ». (Vide infra d. 23. in fine et Collectio iudic. pag. 186). |
if the co-created is distinguished from the created. — There must also be noted the thesis condemned by William, Bishop of Paris, in A. D. 1240: « That the first now and creation-passion are not the Creator, and/or the creature ». (See below d. 23, at the end, and the Collectio iudiciorum, p. 186). |
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III. In fundam. 4 commemoratur quaedam propositio damnata in Concilio Senonensi. In nullo libro recentiore huius damnatae propositionis, quod scimus, mentio fit. Tamen Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 9. m. 3.) de eadem thesi dicit: « Pro damnata thesi haberetur, quod dicitur in libro Prisision [sic corrupte in editionibus Alexandri pro Perifiseon sive rectius Peri physeon], quod ideae erant medium inter creatorem et creaturam ». Iste liber est Ioan. Scoti. Erigenae opus peri jusewV (sive jusewn) merismou, vel de Divisione naturae (Patrolog. lat. Migne. t. 122.). Auctor eiusdem, quem editor Dr. Floss nomine Ierugena secundum codices vocandum esse censet, vixit plures annos in aula imperatoris Caroli Calvi. Ipse Neoplatonicos sequitur et in suo libro inter alios errores docet pantheismum, quem vocant emanativum. Distinguit quadruplicem naturam: natura, quae creat et non creatur — quae creatur et creat — quae creatur et non creat —quae nec creat nec creatur. Secundum speciem naturae nominat causas primordiales sive ideas, quas ponit factas quidem esse, sed Deo coaeternas (III. n. 16; II. n. 20. 24.) et se ipsis intelligentes (II. n. 18. 20; III. n. 1, seqq.). De eisdem pronuntiat illam propositionem a S. Bonav. notatam. Nam (III. n. 20, Patrolog. col. 683, cfr. ibid. n. 4. et n. 23.) ait: « Deinde ex primordialibus causis, quae medietatem quandam inter Deum et creaturam obtinent, hoc est, inter illam ineffabilem superessentialitatem super omnem intellectum, et manifestam substantialiter naturam ». |
III. In the 4th argument of the fundament there is commemorated a certain proposition condemned in the Council of Sens (France). In no more recent book is mention made of this condemned proposition, as far as we know. Yet Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. II, q. 9, m. 3) says of the same thesis: « In favor of the condemned thesis would be had, that which is said in the book Prisision (which is the corrupted reading of its title in the editions of Alexander of Hales for Perifiseon or more corretly Peri physeon), that ideas were a medium between the Creator and the creature ». This book is to John Scotus Erigena’s work Peri YusewV Merismou (or Peri Yusewn Merismou), that is, On the Division of Nature (Patrologia latina, Migne, tome 122). The author of the same, whom the edition judges is to be called Ierugena according to the codices, lived for several years in the palace of the Emperor Charles the Bald. He himself follows the Neo-Platonists and in this book teaches, among other errors, pantheism, which they call “emanative” [emanativum]. He distinguishes a fourfold nature: the nature, which creates and is not created; that which is created and creates; that which is created and does not create; and that which neither creates nor is created. According to the species of nature he names the primordial causes or ideas, which he posits as having been made by, but coeternal to God (Bk. III, n. 16; Bk. II, nn. 20 and 24) and which understand themselves (Bk. II, nn. 18 and 20; Bk. III, n. 1 ff.). Concerning the same, he pronounces that proposition noted by St. Bonaventure. For (Bk. III, n. 20, Patrologia latina., col. 683, cf. ibid, n. 4 and n. 32) he says: « Then out of the primordial causes, which obtain a certain mediateness [medietatem] between God and the creature, that is, between that ineffable Super-Essentiality above every understanding, and the nature manifested substantially ». |
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Cum saec. 13. haeretici Almaricus et David de Dinanto ex dicto libro arma pro defendendis suis erroribus depromerent, a quadam Concilio provinciali Senonensi (circa a. 1224) opus Erigenae igni adiudicatum est; quae sententia confirmata est ab Honorio III. De isto Conc. Senonensi legitur in opere: Sacr. Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio, Mansi, Venetiis, t. 22. col. 1211.: « Concilii huius memoria unice (?) superest ex bulla Honorii III, qua liber a Ioanne Erigena scriptus, quoque Albigenses abutabantur, igni damnatur. — Honorius Episcopus servus serv. Dei Archiepiscopis et Episcopis etc. inimicus homo zizania bono semini superseminare non cessat . . . Nuper siquidem, sicut nobis significavit venerabilis frater noster Parisiensis Episcopus, est quidam liber, Periphysis intitulatus, inventus, tot scatens vermibus haereticae pravitatis, unde a vener. frate nostro Archiepiscopo Senonensi et suffraganeis eius, in provinciali Concilio congregatis, iusto est Dei iudicio reprobatus » etc. Eandem bullam editor Dr. Floss in sua praefatione (loc. cit. col. 439 seq.) imprimendam curavit. — Sed iam antea alii Scoti Erigenae errores saepius reprobati erant, scil. errores, quos docet in libro de Praedestinatione, in synodo Valentina, a. 855 (in dicto opere Mansi, t. 15. I. col. 1.) et Lingonensi, a. 859 (ibid. col. 538); etiam errores circa Eucharistiam ipsi imputati et repobati sunt in synodo Parisiensi, a. 1050 (ibid. t. 19. col. 782) et Vercellensi et Romana (ibid. col. 757). |
When in the 13th century the heretics Almaricus and David of Dinan took from the said book weapons for defending their own errors, the work of Erigena was condemned to the flames by a certain provincial Council, held at Sens (c. 1224 A. D.), which sentence was confirmed by (Pope) Honorius III. Of this Council of Sens there is read in the work, Sacr. Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio, Mansi, Venice, tome 22, col. 1211, « Memor of this Council remains solely in the Bull of Honorius III, in which the book written by John Erigena, and abused by the Albigensians, was condemned to the flames: Honorius, Bishop servant of the servants of God, to the Archbishop and Bishops etc., Does Man’s Enemy does not cease to sow tares upon the good seed ? . . . Not long ago, indeed, just as our venerable brother, the Bishop of Paris has signified to us, there was a certain book, entitled the Periphysis, overflowing with all the maggots of heretical depravity, wherefore it was reproved by our venerable brother the Archbishop of Sens and his suffragans, gathered together in provincial Council, by the just judgment of God » etc.. The editor, Dr. Floss, has taken care to publish the same Bull in his Preface (loc. cit., col. 439 f.). — But even before this other errors of Scotus Erigena had been often reproved, namely the errors, which he teaches in his book On Predestination, in the (French) Synods of Valence, A. D. 855 (in the aforesaid work of Mansi, tome 15, Bk. I, col. 1) and Langres, A. D. 859 (ibid., col. 538); even errors about the Eucharist were imputed to him and reproved in the Synod of Paris, A. D. 1050 (ibid., tome 19, col. 782) and (and those of) Vercelli and Rome (ibid., col. 757). |
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IV. Praeter loco citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 9. m. 2. 3. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 53. m. 2. q. incid. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. 4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 9. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. in fine. |
IV. In addition to the passages cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 9, m. 2 and 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 13, q. 53, m. 2, 1st incidental q.. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, qq. 3 and 4. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 3, a. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals. 9, q. 3. — Durandus, here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian., here in q. 2, at the end. |
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