S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

PARS I.

PART I 

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 36-37.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 36-37.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

DUB. I.

DOUBT I

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de ordine istius libri ad praecedentem.  Cum enim nos cognoscamus Creatorem per creaturas, quia videmus per speculum;1 et « scientia debeat inchoari a notioribus nobis »:  ergo prius debuit agere de creaturis quam de Creatore:  ergo liber iste primus, non secundus debet esse.

In this part are the doubts about (Master Peter’s) text, and there is the question, first, of the order of this Book to the preceding one.  For since we cognize the Creator through creatures, because we see through a mirror; and « knowledge ought to be undertaken [inchoari] from the (things) more known to us »:1  therefore he ought to have dealt with creatures before the Creator:  therefore this Book ought to be the First (Book of Sentences), not the Second.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod supra, cum actum est de Creatore, actum est etiam de creaturis, prout sunt via ad perveniendum in cognitionem Creatoris;2 nunc autem agitur de cognitione rerum, prout cognitio de Creatore adminiculatur ei, quia agitur de conditione et lapsu.  Non potest autem cognosci conditio, nisi prius cognoscatur eius principium; principium autem huius conditionis solus Deus est:  ideo oportet, doctrinam huius libri sequi doctrinam praecedentis; et patet obiectum.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that above, when the Creator was dealt with, creatures were also dealt with, insofar as they are a way to coming thoroughly unto the cognition of the Creator;2 but now one deals with the foundation of things, insofar as the cognition of the Creator supports this, because one deals with (their) foundation and (their) fall.  Moreover, (their) foundation cannot be cognized, unless its principle be cognized beforehand; but the principle of this foundation is God alone:  for that reason it is necessary [oportet], that the doctrine of this Book follow the doctrine of the preceding one; and (thus) the objection is clear.

DUB. II.

DOUBT II

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  In uno principio a Deo creatore mundum factum refert.  Quaero, pro quo supponat ille terminus principio:  aut pro creato, aut pro increato.  Non pro increato, quia praepositiones sunt transitivae.3  Non pro creato, quia nihil creatum erat, in quo fieret.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (Walafrid Strabo) says:  reports that the world (had) been made in one beginning [in uno principio] by God the Creator.  I ask, “On behalf of what does that term principio suppose:  either on behalf of (something) created, or on behalf of (something) uncreated?”  Not on behalf of (something) uncreated, because prepositions are transitive.3  Not on behalf of (something) created, because there was nothing created, in which it might come to be.

Item, ab aeterno fuerunt res in principio suo, scilicet Deo:  si ergo productio respicit egressum a Deo, nullo modo potest stare pro principio increato; nec pro creato, quia nondum erat aliquid:  ergo etc.

Likewise, from eternity things were in their own principle [principio], namely  God:  if, therefore, (their) production respects (their) egress from God, in no manner can (the term principio above) stand for an uncreated principle; nor for a created one, because there was not yet anything:  ergo etc.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod praepositio4 cum suo casuali tripliciter potest accipi.  Uno modo ut dicat pure ordinem, sicut idem est facere in principio quod facere ante alia, ita quod connotet privationem respectu alicuius temporalis prioris, et connotet positionem posterioris.  Alio modo potest importare habitudinem mensurae; et tunc in principio idem est, quod in primo instanti temporis.  Tertio modo potest importare habitudinem causae; et tunc sensus est, in principio, id est in Filio.  In Filio enim dicitur creasse, secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo:5  Omnia in sapientia fecisti, Domine, ut sic notetur non tantum causa efficiens, sed etiam exemplaris.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the (Latin) preposition (in),4 with what accompanies it in its phrase (i. e. uno principio), can be accepted in a threefold manner.  In one manner so that (in uno principio) means purely an order, just as ‘to make at the beginning’ [facere in principio] is the same as ‘to make before others’, such that it connotes a privation in respect of some prior temporal, and connotes the position of the posterior.  In another manner it can convey the habitude of a measure; and then in principio is the same as, what (is) in the first instant of time.  In a third manner it can convey the habitude of a cause; and then the sense is, “in the Principle” [in principio], that is in the Son.  For in the Son (God) is said to have created, according to what is said in the Psalm:5  All (things) in Wisdom has Thou wrought, Lord, so that there is not only noted an efficient cause, but even an exemplary one.

1  Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12:  Videmus nunc per speculum.  Cfr. de his I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2.  —  Seq. propositio est Aristotelis, I. Phys. text. 2:  Innata autem est ex notioribus via et manifestioribus ad manifestiora naturae et notiora; non enim sunt eadem et nobis nota et simpliciter.  Quapropter necesse est ad hunc modum procedere ex immanifestoribus quidem naturae, nobis autem manifestioribus ad manifestiora naturae et notiora.

2  Ex cod. Y (cod. Q in marg.) supplevimus Creatoris, pro quo cod. V ponit Dei.  Paulo inferius plures codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt prius.

3  Cfr. tom. I. pag. 116. Scholion. I.

4  Cod. Y quod haec praepositio in cum.

5  Psalm. 103, 24.  —  Paulo superius fide plurium codd. ut H K M N T W aa adiecimus In Filio enim; particulam enim exhibent tantum codd. W aa, quorum posterior insuper post dicitur bene supplet Deus.

1  1 Cor. 13:12:  Now we see through a mirror [Videmus nunc per speculum].  On these (words), cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 2.  —  The following proposition is Aristotle’s, Physics¸ Bk. I, text 2:  Moreover, innate is the way from (things) more known and more manifest to the more manifest and known (things) of nature; for (the things) known to us and (things) simply, are not the same.  On which account it is necessary according to this standard of measure to proceed indeed from the less manifest (things) of nature, but more manifest to us, to the (those) more manifest and known of nature.

2  From codex Y (codex Q in the margin) we have supplied of the Creator [Creatoris], in place of which codex V has of God [Dei].  A little below this several codices, together with edition 1, omit beforehand [prius].

3  Cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 5, a. 1, q. 2, p. 116, Scholium I.

4  Codex Y reads that this preposition “in”, with [quod haec praepositin in cum].

5  Ps. 103:24.  —  A little above this, trusting in several codices, such as H K M N T W and aa, we have added For in the Son [In Filio enim]; the particle For [enim] is exhibited only by codices W and aa, the second of which supplys God [Deus] after the Son [dicitur].

 

p. 37

Omnes istae expositiones verae sunt et catholicae, et per eas eliduntur tres errores circa mundi productionem.  Ex prima eliditur error quorundam modernorum philosophantium, qui dixerunt, mundum ex tempore factum, sed mediate Intelligentia, ita quod Deus primo fecit Angelos et cum illis condidit mundum;1 contra quos est prima expositio.  Si enim Deus in principio conditionis creavit mundum, non ergo post Angelos vel Intelligentias, ita quod per illos condiderit mundum; et hic error ortum habet ex illo verbo:  Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram,2 quasi Deus loquatur Angelis.  —  Ex secunda expositione eliditur error Aristotelicorum,3 qui dixerunt, mundum conditum ab aeterno.  Si enim in principio temporis factus est ex nihilo, non ergo fuit sine principio; et hic error ortum habuit ex hoc, quod non potuerunt videre, qualiter mundus inceperit, et quare tunc et non ante.  —  Ex tertia expositione eliditur error tertius Platonicorum,4 qui dixerunt, principia mundi tria esse aeterna, scilicet Deum, materiam et exemplar.  Si enim Deus in Filio sicut per exemplar aeternum condidit de nihilo mundum, non ergo requiritur secundum principium, quod est exemplar, nec tertium, quod sit materia; et hic5 ortum habuit ex hoc, quod non potuerunt intelligere omnino, quomodo aliquid fiat ex nihilo.  —  Ex omnibus his eliditur error Manichaeorum, qui posuerunt principia mundi effectiva duo; et iste eliditur per subiectum dictae locutionis:  Creavit Deus caelum et terram,6 lucem et tenebras; et hic error est omnibus vilior.

All these expositions are true and Catholic, and through them three errors about the production of the world are crushed.  On account of the first there is crushed the error of certain modern philosophizers [philosophantium], who said, that the world (has) been made in time, but by means of an Intelligence, thus that God first made the Angels and with them founded the world;1 against whom is the first exposition.  For if God at the beginning of the foundation (of things) created the world, therefore (He did so) not after the Angels and/or the Intelligences, such that He founded the world through them; and this error has (its) rise from that verse:  Let us make man according to Our Image and Similitude,2 as if God is speaking to the Angels.  —  From the second exposition there is crushed the error of the Aristotelians,3 who said, that the world (has) been founded from eternity.  For if in the beginning of time it was made out of nothing, therefore it was not without a beginning; and this error had (its) rise out of this, that they could not see, in what manner the world began, and for what reason (it was made) then and not before.  —  From the third exposition there is crushed the third error of the Platonists,4 who said, that there are three, eternal principles of the world, namely God, matter and the Exemplar.  For if God founded the world in the Son, as through an eternal exemplar, from nothing, therefore the second principles, which is the Exemplar, is not required, nor the third, which is matter; and this (error)5 had (its) rise out of this, that they could not entirely understand, in what manner something comes to be out of nothing.  —  From all these (expositions) there is crushed the error of the Manichees, who posited two effective principles of the world; and this is crushed through the subject of the (afore)said expression:  God created Heaven and Earth,6 light and darkness, and this error is more vile than all (the others).

Et habent se gradatim.  Nam primus solum errat in eo a quo.  Secundus errat in eo de quo, et quando, quia ex aliquo et ab aeterno.  Tertius errat in eo de quo, quia dicit factum esse de materia, non ex nihilo; et in eo per quod, scilicet circa exemplar, quod posuit aliud a Deo, ut apparet; et in quando, quia posuit materiam ab aeterno imperfectam.  Et iste error est multo vilior quam error Aristotelis, qui posuit, ab aeterno materiam fuisse perfectam sua forma.  Quartus error Manichaeorum omnibus est abominabilior, quia deficit in primo principio, in quo philosophi communiter concordaverunt, ponens prima duo principia, ac per hoc auferens ordinem et decorem universi, et bonitatem et Dei potestatem.  Et hunc errorem inter ceteros non humanam malitiam, sed diabolicam astutiam credo adinvenisse, ut se alterum Deum esse persuadeat7 mentibus peccatorum.

And (these errors) hold themselves in a graduated manner [gradatim].  For the first errs solely in that by which (the world was made).  The second errs in that from which, and when (it was made), because (it holds that it was made) out of something and from eternity.  The third errors in that from which (it was made), because it says that it was made from matter, not out of nothing; and in that through which (it was made), namely about the Exemplar, which it posited as (something) other than God, as it appears; and in when (it was made), because it posited that matter (was) imperfect from eternity.  And this error is much more vile than the error of Aristotle, who posited, that matter was perfect according to its own form from eternity. The fourth error of the Manichees is more abominable than all, because it fails in regard to the First Principle, in which philosophers commonly agreed, positing (as it does) two first principles, and through this taking away  the order and ornament [decorem] of the universe, and the Goodness and Power of God.  And I believe that this error, among all the rest, was invented not by human malice, but by diabolical craftiness, to persuade7 the minds of sinners that he is another God.

Ex dictis igitur patet, pro quo supponat hoc nomen principium.  Potest enim supponere pro Filio, et Deus pro Patre; et ex modo8 construendi fit talis appropriatio.  Potest etiam supponere pro creatura, utpote pro principio temporis; sed non dicit tunc ordinem, sed concomitantiam mensurae ad mensuratum, scilicet quod caelum et terra cum principio temporis esse coeperunt. Et sic patet illud.9

From (what has) bee said, therefore, it is clear, on behalf of what this name principium supposes.  For it can suppose on behalf of the Son, and “God” (in that sentence) on behalf of the Father; and such an appropriation is made from the manner8 of (its) being construed. It can also suppose on behalf of a creature, as for example on behalf of the beginning of time; but it then does not mean an order, but a concomitance of a measure to the measured, namely that Heaven and Earth undertook to be with the beginning of time:  And in this manner that (doubt) is clear.9

DUB. III.

DOUBT III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Aristoteles tria posuit esse principia, duo etc., quaere distinguit illa duo a tertio?  Et iterum videtur illud non esse verum perscrutanti libros Philosophi, quia ipse non ponit nisi ista tria, materiam, formam et privationem, in principio novae Metaphysicae10 et in libro primo Physicorum:  non ergo ista quae ponit Magister.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says:  Aristotle posited that there are three principles, two etc.,* “For what reason did he distinguish the former two from the third?”  And again it seems that this is not true for those scrutinizing thoroughly the books of the Philosopher, because he himself did not posit but those three, matter, form and privation, at the beginning of the new Metaphysics10 and in the first book of Physics:  not, therefore, those which Master (Peter) posits.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod ideo duo distinguit a tertio, quia duo sunt intrinseca tanquam elementa, et unum est extrinsecum.  Ubi autem Philosophus ista tria ponit, si quaeratur, expresse invenitur in secundo de Generatione circa finem.11

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that he distinguished two from the third for this reason, because two are intrinsic as elements, and one is extrinsic.  Moreover, where the Philosopher posits these three, if one asks, is expressly found in the second (book) On Generation, near the end.11

1  Vide supra a. 2. q. 2.  —  Aliquanto inferius codd. K U prius Angelos, cod. G per Angelos, cod. bb cum Vat. primo Angelos pro post Angelos.

2  Gen. 1, 26.

3  Plures codd. aliquorum; cod. A antiquorum; non pauci cum ed. 1 aliorum, forte propter abbreviationem seducti.  —  Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. et 2.

4  Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1.

5  Supple cum cod. M error.

6  Gen. 1, 1.  —  De errore Manichaeorum vide supra a. 2. q. 1.

7  Codd. A X persuaderet.

8  Cod. cc et ed. 1 et ex hoc modo.  Aliquanto inferius cod. F post concomitantiam addit sive convenientiam.

9  Idem dubium resolvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 45. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 1, et S. p. II. tract. 12. q. 47; S. Thom., hic a. 6; Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit; Aegid. R., hic q. 4. a. 3.

10  Aetate media duae versiones librorum Metaphysicorum Aristotelis vulgo in usu erant, nempe Graeco-latina et Arabico-latina, quae inter se non parum discrepant, etiam in librorum huius operis divisione et ordine et numero.  Sic v. g. in versione Arabico-latina deest prima pars primi libri (quam Arabes non Aristoteli, sed Theophrasto adiudicabant) et liber undecimus; liber vero duodecimus in mss. invenitur primo loco positus.  Versio Graeco-latina in multis mss. intitulatur translatio nova sive nova Metaphysica, in aliis autem mss. hoc nomine insignitur versio Arabico-latina, versio autem Graeco-latina vocatur Metaphysica vetus.  Cfr. Recherches critiques sur l’âge et l’origine des traductions latines d’Aristote, par Charles Jourdain. Paris. 1843. pag. 177. et 370, qui etiam ostendit, quod Vincentius Bellovacensis († 1264) in suo libro Speculum doctrinale nomine Metaphysica nova intellexerit versionem Arabico-latinam.  Huic assertioni suffragantur S. Bonaventurae verba hic posita in principio novae Metaphysicae.  Nam in principio libri duodecimi, relatis opinionibus antiquorum philosophorum de substantiis, Aristoteles ait, text. 12. (XI. c. 2.):  « Tres itaque causae et tria principia; duo quidem ipsa contrarietas, cuius hoc quidem ratio et forma, hoc vero privatio; tertium vero materia ».  —  Vat. cum ceteris edd. legit in principio noni Metaphysicorum, quae lectio quidem non est falsa, quia etiam ibi Aristoteles haec tria principia nominat, cum loquatur de potentia activa et passiva nec non de potentia et actu, sed haec lectio est contra codd. antiquiores. —  De I. Phys. cfr. text. 75. seqq. (c. 8. seq.). 

11  Text. 51. seq. (c. 9.), ubi de causis et principiis generationis et corruptionis inquirens ait:  « Illud enim ut materia est, hoc autem ut forma; oportet et tertium adhuc adesse », scil. principium efficiens, ut deinceps probatur.

1  See above a. 2, q. 2.  —  Somewhat below this codices K and U have therefore (He did) not first (made) the Angels [non ergo prius Angelos], codex G has therefore (He did) not (make it) through the Angels [non ergo per Angelos], codex bb together with the Vatican edition, therefore (He did) not (make) first the Angels [non ergo primo Angelos] for (He did so) not after the Angels [non ergo post Angelos].

2  Gen. 1:26.

3  Several codices have of some [aliquorum] for of the Aristotelians [Aristotelicorum]; codex A has instead of the ancients [antiquorum]; not a few (codices) together with edition 1 have of others [aliorum], perhaps mislead on account of an abbrieviation.  —  Cf. above a. 1, qq. 1 and 2.

4  Cf. above a. 1. q. 1.

5  Supply together with codex M error [error].

6  Gen. 1:1.  —  On the error of the Manichees, see above a. 2, q. 1.

7  Codices A and Z have as would persuade [persuaderet] for to persuade [persuadeat].

8  Codex cc and edition 1 read from this manner [ex hoc modo] for from the manner [ex modo].  Somewhat below this codex F, after concomitance [concomitantiam], adds or convening [sive convenientiam].

9  The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 45, m. 1; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1, and Summa., p. II, tr. 12, q. 47; St. Thomas, here in a. 6; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in a. 4, q. 3.

10  In the Middle Ages there were in popular use two versions of Aristotle’s books of Metaphysics, namely the Greco-Latin and the Arabic-Latin, among which there were not a few discrepancies, even in the division and order and number of the books of this work.  Thus, v. g. in the Arabic-latin version there is missing the first part of the first book (which the Arabs judged to belong not to Aristotle, but to Theophrastus) and the eleventh book; but the twelfth book is found in the manuscripts, placed in the first position.  The Greco-Latin version is entitled in many manuscripts “the new translation” [translatio nova] or the “new Metaphysics” [nova Metaphysica], but in other manuscripts this title is given to the Arabic-Latin version, the Greco-Latin version being called the “old Metaphysics” [Metaphysica vetus].  Cf. Recharches critiques sur l’àge el’origine des traductions latines d’Aristote, par Charles Jourdain: Paris, 1843, pp. 177. and 370, who also shows, that Vincentius Bellovacensis († 1264) in his book Speculum doctrinale understood by the name Metaphysica nova the Arabic-Latin version.  This assertion is supported by the words of St. Bonaventure here:  at the beginning of the new Metaphysics [in principio novae Metaphysicae]. For at the beginning of the twelfth book, having related the opinions of the ancient philosophers concerning substances, Aristotle says, in text 12 (Bk. XI, ch. 2):  « And so (there are) three causes and three principles; two, indeed, (are) themselves a contrariety, the one of which (is) indeed reckoning and form, but the other privation, but the third matter ».  —  The Vatican edition, together with all the other editions, reads at the beginning of the ninth (book) of Metaphysics [in principio noni Metaphysicorum], which reading inded is not false, because even there Aristotle names these three principles, when he speaks of active and passive power, and also (when he speaks) of power and act, but this reading is contrary to the more ancient codices.  —  On (citation which follows) from Physics, Bk. I, cf. text 75 ff. (ch. 8 f.).

11  Text 51 f. (ch. 9), where inquiring concerning the causes and principles of generation and corruption, he says:  « For the former is as matter, but the latter as form; it is necessary [oportet] that there be also still a third », namely an efficient principle (i. e. the operative cause), as is then proven.

* [Trans. nota:  Auctoritas istam non invenitur in prima distinctione Magistri secundum editionem patrum Ad Claras Aquas; sed Aristoteles vero duo principia dixit, scilicet materiam et species, et tertium operatorium dictum, quae inveniuntur in medio capituli tertii.  In editione autem Friburgi 1493 Commentariorum S. Bonav., fol. Aa 3r, textum in eodem loco legit:  Aristotelis vero tria posuit principia, duo, scilicet materiam et speciem, tertium operatorium dictum etc., et illum S. Bonaventurae in dubio tertio: Aristoteles vero tria posuit principia etc.]

* [Trans. note:  In the Quaracchi edition of Lombard’s First Distinction, there is no sentence corresponding to this quote; rather there is found:  But Aristotle said that (there are) two principles, namely, matter and form, and a third called a “efficient (cause)” [Aristoteles vero duo principia dixit, scilicet materiam et species, et tertium operatorium dictum], at the end of the first paragraph of the third chapter.  However in the Freiburg Edition of 1493 of Bonaventure’s Commentary, folio Aa 3r, the text of Master Peter in the same passage reads:  But Aristotle posited three principles, two, namely matter and form, (and) a third called “the efficient (cause)” [Aristotelis vero tria posuit principia, duo, scilicet materiam et speciem, tertium operatorium dictum etc.] and that of St. Bonaventure’s third Doubt reads:  But Aristotle posited three principles, etc. [Aristoteles vero tria posuit principia etc.] simply.]

 

p. 38

Sed tunc est quaestio, quia videtur non sufficienter principia in Physicis1 assignasse; immo si ibi assignavit tria praeter operatorium, tunc ergo sunt quatuor.  —  Et dicendum ad hoc, quod privatio non differt a forma, vel a materia.  Sive enim privatio nominet appetitum formae cum eius carentia, sive nominet ipsam formae essentiam, prout est in materia in potentia, non differt ab his duobus, scilicet materia et specie.2  Nam appetitus ad materiam reducitur nec est aliud; et essentia formae ad speciem secundum rem.  Et haec duo principia determinat in primo.3  Postmodum adiungit tertium, operatorium, dum omnia reducit ad motorem primum, in octavo.4  Et sic patet, quod Magister vere et proprie loquitur.

But then there is a question, because it seems that the did not sufficiently assign the principles in (his) Physics;1 nay if he assigned three there besides the operative [operatorium], then, therefore, there are four.  —  And there must be said to this, that privation does not differ from form, and/or from matter.  For whether “privation” names the appetite for form with a lack of it, or whether it names the essence itself of the form, insofar as it is in potency in matter, it does not differ from these two, namely matter and species.2  For the appetite (for form) is reduced to matter, nor is it (something) else; and the essence of a form (is reduced) to the species according to thing.  And these two principles he determines in the first (book of his Physics).3  Afterwards he adjoined a third, the operative [operatorium], when he reduces all to the Prime Mover, in the eighth (book).4  And in this manner it is clear, that Master (Peter) speaks truly and properly.

DUB. IV.

DOUBT IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  In principio temporum mundum creasse.  Si enim tempus coepit cum primo mobili, et illud coepit in secundo die:5  non ergo in principio temporis, sed ante.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says:  In the beginning of times created the world.  For if time began with the first mobile (sphere), and that began on the second day (of Creation):  therefore (God did) not (created the world) at the beginning of time,5 but before.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod tempus dicitur tripliciter:  communissime, communiter et proprie.  Communissime dicitur mensura exitus de non-esse in esse.  Communiter dicitur tempus mensura cuiuslibet mutationis, maxime illius quae fuit ante primum mobile.  Tertio modo dicitur proprie mensura motus primi mobilis, ut communiter consuevit distingui.  Et quia primo modo dictum est primum omnium, et in illo conditum est saeculum:  ideo dicit:  in principio temporum.6

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that “time” is said in a threefold manner:  most commonly, commonly and properly.  Most commonly it is said (to be) the measure of the going forth from ‘not-being’ into ‘being’.  Commonly “time” is said (to be) the measure of any change, most of all of that which was before the first mobile (sphere).  In a third manner it is said properly (to be) the measure of the movement of the first mobile (sphere), as it is accustomed to be commonly distinguished.  And because the first manner has been said first of all, and in that the age [saeculum] has been founded:  for that reason he says:  at the beginning of times.6

DUB. V.

DOUBT V

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit:  Omnipotentissimi est nocere non posse.

Likewise is asked concerning this which (Hugh of St. Victor) says:  to the Most Omnipotent to be unable to harm.

CONTRA:  Omnis poena affligit et laedit, et si laedit, nocet:  ergo si Deus non potest nocere, non potest punire.

ON THE CONTRARY:  Every punishment afflicts and wounds, and if it wounds, it harms:  therefore if God cannot harm, He cannot punish.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod sicut duplex est malum, scilicet culpae et poenae, sic etiam duplex est nocumentum.  Cum ergo dicitur, quod non potest nocere, non intelligitur quantum ad nocumentum, quod facit malum poenae, sed quod facit malum culpae.7

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that just as evil is twofold, namely (the evil) of fault and (that) of punishment, so also harm is twofold.  Therefore, when it is said, that He cannot harm, it is not understood as much as regards the harm, which the evil of punishment works, but (as regards that), which the evil of fault works.7

1  Intellige secundum obiectionem, libro primo Physicorum, quod etiam Vat. ponit.  Paulo inferius et circa finem solutionis plurimi codd. cum primis edd. operationem pro operatorium, sed contra textum Ambrosii a Magistro, hic c. 3, relatum.  —  Pro intelligentia eorum, quae sequuntur, observandum, quod secundum Aristotelem res naturales, si considerantur in statu constitutionis seu in facto esse, duo habent principia intrinseca, nempe materiam et formam; si vero considerantur in statu generationis seu in fieri, tria, scil. materiam, formam et privationem.  Privatio, cum generatim sit carentia formae in subiecto apto ad formam, sumi potest tum respectu materiae, tum respectu formae.  Si sumitur respectu materiae, tunc privatio erit ipsa materia, quatenus forma caret, apta tamen est (inclinatur, appetitum habet) ad illam, sive, ut S. Bonav. ait:  « Appetitus formae (i. e. appetitus materiae ad formam) cum carentia eius ».  Si sumitur respectu formae, cum ipsa secundum Aristotelem ex materia sive ex potentia materiae sit educenda, privatio erit forma ex materia educenda.

2  Graece morjh, quod latine vertitur modo forma, modo species.  —  Cod. I addit aliter:  quod privatio non est principium secundum rem, sed tantum secundum rationem.  Dein cod. cc et ed. 1 post appetitus supplent materiae.

3  Subaudi:  libro Physicorum, de quo in ipsa obiectione.

4  Text. 45 seqq. (c. 6).  —  Notandum, quod in determinatione, quae sit vera de hac re sententia Aristotelis, nec recentiores nec antiqui eiusdem interpretes conveniunt.  S. Bonav. hic approbat sententiam Magistri, sed B. Albertus, II. Sent. d. 1. a. 11, asserit:  Aristoteles in veritate non dicit hoc, quod tria vel duo sint principia mundi; sed ipse probat, duo non incepisse per motum, scilicet materiam primam et motorem primum; et ideo imponitur ei, quod duo dixerit esse ab aeterno.  Et quando dicuntur duo, tunc tanguntur principia naturae essentialiter constituentia naturam, ut materia et forma; quia privatio non constituit, sed abiicitur per motum ad formam.  Quando autem dicitur tertium, tunc dicitur seu tangitur primum movens.  Cfr. idem, S. p. II. tr. 1. q. 4. m. 2. a. 3. et 4; et S. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 1, qui B. Alberto consentit.  Cfr. etiam Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., et Aegid. R. hic in exposit. textus.  Idem dissensus est circa sententiam Platonis, de qua re diffuse disputat Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5.

5  Gen. 1, 6-8:  Dixit quoque Deus:  Fiat firmamentum . . et factum est vespere et mane, dies secundus.

6  Cfr. infra d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.

7  Vide infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1.

1  Understand according to (the context of) the objection, in the first book of (his) Physics [libro primo Physicorum], which even the Vatican edition has.  A little below this and near the end of the solution, very many codices, together with the first editions, have the operation [operationem] for operative [operatorium], but contrary to the context of (St.) Ambrose, cited by Master (Peter), here in ch. 3.  —  For an understanding of those (things), which follow, it must be observed, that according to Aristotle natural things, if they are considered in (their) state of constitution or in having been made [in facto esse], have two intrinsic principles, namely matter and form; but if they are considered in (their) state of generation or in being made [in fieri], (they have) three, namely matter, form and privation.  Privation, since it is generaly (understood as) a lack of form in a subject apt for form, can be taken both in respect of matter, and in respect of form.  If it is taken in respect of matter, then the privation will be matter itself, to the extent that it lacks form, yet it is apt ( or inclined or has an appetite) for it, or, as St. Bonaventure says:  « The appetite (of matter) for form with a lack of it ».  If it  is taken in respect of form, since according to Aristotle it is to be lead forth from matter or from the potency of mater, a privation will be the form to be lead forth from the matter.

2  In Greek morjh, which in Latin is rendered sometimes as form [forma] sometimes as species [species].  —  Codex I adds here in another manner:  that privation is not a principle according to thing, but only according to reckoning [aliter:  quod privatio non est principium secundum rem, sed tantum secundum rationem].  Then codex cc and edition 1 after appetite [appetitus] supply of matter [materiae].

3  Understand:  in the (first) book of Physics, which is mentioned in the objection itself.

4  Text 45 ff. (ch. 6).  —  It must be noted, that in the determination of what is true concerning this teaching of Aristotle, neither the more recent nor the ancient interpreters of the same agree.  St. Bonaventure here approves the sentence of Master (Peter), but Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 11, asserts:  Aristotle, in truth, does not say this, that there are three and/or two principles of the world; but he proves, that two did not being through a movement, namely prime matter and the Prime Mover; and for that reason it has been imposed upon him, that he said that there are two (principles) from eternity.  And when two are meant, then the principles of nature essentially constituting the nature are touched upon, such as matter and form; because privation does not constitute (a nature), but is discarded [abiicitur] through a movement to form.  But when the third is meant, then there is meant or touched upon the Prime Mover.  Cf. also (St. Albert’s), Summa, p. II, tr. 1, q. 4, m. 2, aa. 3 and 4; and St. Thomas, Sent, Bk. II, d. 1, who consents with Bl. (now St.) Albert.  Cf. also (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, and Giles the Roman, here in the exposition of the text.  There is the same disagreement concerning the sentence of Plato, concerning which manner (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 5, disputes at length.

5  Ge. 1:6-8:  And God also said:  Let there be a firmament . . . and there came to be evening and morning, the second day [Dixit quoque Deus:  Fiat firmamentum . . et factum est vespere et mane, dies secundus].

6  Cf. below d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. [Trans. note:  On what the saeculum is, cf. below d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, at the end, and esp. in footnote 8.]

7  See belo d. 36, a. 3, q. 1.

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