S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

PARS II.
De multitudine, fine et distinctione creaturarum.

PART II
On the multitude, end and distinction of creatures.

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 38-40.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 38-40.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Et quia non valet etc.

And because one cannot prevail etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Supra egit Magister de conditione rerum a parte principii, hic agit a parte finis.  Et quoniam res a fine et secundum illum respectum accipiunt distinctionem formarum, ideo pars ista habet tres particulas.  In prima8 ex comparatione rerum ad finem ostendit rerum distinctionem.  In secunda vero secun- / -dum . . .

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the foundation of things on the part of (their) principle, here he deals (with the same) on the part of (their) end.  And since things accept from (their) end, and according to that respect, a distinction of forms, for that reason this part has three subparts [particulas].  In the first8 he shows the distinction of things from the comparison of things to (their) end.  However in the second, according / to . . .

8  In Vat. additur praemisso, quare rationalis creatura facta sit.

8  In the Vatican edition there is added here having premised, for what reason the rational creature has been made [praemisso, quare rationalis creatura facta sit].

p. 39

secun- / -dum illam distinctionem assignat diversam comparationem ad finem, ibi:  Ideoque, si quaeritur, quare sit creatus homo etc.  Tertio vero breviter epilogat determinata, ex ipsis faciens sibi viam ad cetera sequentia determinanda, ibi:  Ex praemissis apparet.  —  Prima et ultima parte remanentibus indivisis, media dividitur in tres.  In prima determinat finem intellectualis substantiae; in secunda finem substantiae pure corporalis, ibi:  Et sicut factus est homo propter Deum etc.; in tertio vero determinat finem compositi ex utroque, in quantum est tale, ibi:  De homine quoque in Scriptura etc.  Et ibi primo determinat veritatem; secundo dissolvit dubitationem; ibi:  Solet etiam quaeri, cum maioris etc.

according / to that distinction he assigns a diverse comparison regarding (their) end, there (where he says):  And for this reason, if it be asked, “For what reason was man and/or Angel created?” etc..  But in the third he briefly summarizes the determined, making out of them his own way to determining all the other following ones, there (where he says):  From the aforementioned it appears etc..  —  The first and last part remaining undivided, the middle one is divided into three.  In the first he determines the end of the intellectual substance; in the second the end of the purely corporal substance, there (where he says):  And just as man has been made for God’s sake etc.; but in the third he determines the end of the one composed out of each, inasmuch as it is such, there (where he says):  Concerning man it is also sometimes found in writing etc..  And in the first he determines the truth; in the second he solves the doubt; there (where he says):  It is also customarily asked, “Since the soul would seem etc.”.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua agitur de rebus productis in comparatione ad finem, secundum ordinem et distinctionem, quaeruntur principaliter tria.

For an understanding of this part, in which one deals with things produces in comparison to (their) end, according to (their) order and distinction, there are principally asked three (things).

Primum est de rerum distinctione.

The first concerns the distinction of things.

Secundum de ordine. 

The second concerns (their) order.

Tertium de differentia Angeli et animae.

The third concerns the difference of the Angel and the soul.

Circa primum quaeruntur duo.

About the first two (things) are asked.

Primum est de multiplicatione rerum quantum ad principium.

The first concerns the multiplication of things as much as regards (its) principle.

Secundum quantum ad differentias, secundum quae distinguuntur.

The second (concerns the multiplication of things) as much as regards the differences, according to which they are distinguished.

ARTICULUS I.

 

De rerum distinctione.

ARTICLE I

 

On the distinction of things.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum a primo efficiente debuerit, vel potuerit esse rerum multitudo.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether from a first efficient (principle) there ought, and/or could be a multitude of things?

QUAERITUR ERGO primo, utrum a primo efficiente debuerit, vel potuerit esse rerum multitudo.  Et quod non, videtur primo sic:

THEREFORE THERE IS ASKED first, whether from a first efficient (principle) through ought, and/or could be a multitude of things.  And that (it is) not (so), seems first in this manner:

1. Per Philosophum:1  « Idem, uniformiter se habens, natum est efficere idem »; sed efficiens primum unum est omnino uniformiter se habens:  ergo videtur, quod nunquam multa facere potuerit, ergo unum solum.

1. Through the Philosopher:1  « The same, holding itself uniformly, is bound [natum est] to effect the same »; but the efficient, first One is one holding Itself entirely uniformly:  therefore it seems, that it could never make many (things), therefore only one.

2. Item, a summe bono nunquam possunt esse mala, a summe vero non2 possunt esse falsa:  ergo a summe uno non possunt esse multa.

2. Likewise, from one most highly good there can never be evils, from one most highly true there cannot2 be falsehoods [falsa]:  therefore from one most highly one there cannot be many (things).

3. Item, mundus sensibilis dicitur assimilari mundo archetypo, qui est in mente divina — ad illius enim expressionem factus est — sed in illo omnia sunt unum:  ergo et in hoc mundo:  ergo videtur, quod ab illo non potuerit esse multitudo.3

3. Likewise, the sensible world is said to be assimilated to the world archetype, which is in the Divine Mind — for (the world) was made for an expression of this — but in that all (things) are one [unum]:  therefore also in this world:  therefore it seems, that from that there could not be a multitude.3

4. Item, a Deo exitus est per generationem, per spirationem et per creationem; sed per generationem non emanat nisi una sola persona, et similiter per spirationem:  ergo per creationem non egreditur nisi una sola creatura.

4. Likewise, from God there is a going forth [exitus] through generation, through spiration and through creation; but through generation there does not emanate but one sole Person, and similarly through spiration:  therefore through creation there does not step forth [egreditur] but one sole creature.

CONTRA:  1. Quanto substantia producens est melior, tanto magis est sui diffusiva, et quanto magis est sui diffusiva, tanto pluribus nata est se communicare; sed primum efficiens est optimum inter omnia:  ergo4 etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. As much as a producing substance is better, so much more is it diffusive of itself, and as much as it is more diffusive of itself, so much is it bound to communicate itself to more; but the first efficient (Principle) is the best among all:  ergo4 etc..

2. Item, quanto substantia spiritualior, tanto plurium est cognitiva;5 sed suprema substantia est spiritualissima:  ergo multorum est cognitiva.  Sed non est cognitiva multorum praecedentium se vel comitantium:  ergo multorum ab ipsa exeuntium.

2. Likewise, as much as a substance (is) more spiritual, so much is it cognitive of more;5 but the supreme Substance is most spiritual:  therefore It is cognitive of many.  But It is not cognitive of many preceding It and/or accompanying (It):  therefore (It is cognitive) of the many going forth from It.

3. Item, quanto substantia simplicior, tanto potentior, quia « virtus quanto magis unita, tanto magis infinita »;6 sed quanto potentior, tanto in plura potest:  ergo si substantia primi principii est simplicissima, ergo potest et debet ad sui manifestationem producere multa, cum ipsa sit unica.

3. Likewise, as much as a substance (is) more simple, so much (is it) more potent, because « virtue as much as (it is) more united, so much (is it) more unlimited [infinita] »;6 but as much as (one is) more potent, so much is it able unto more:  therefore if the substance of the First Principle is most simple, therefore It can and ought, for its own manifestation, produce many (things), since It itself is unique.

4. Item, quanto causa prior, tanto universalior, unde prima est universalissima;7 et quanto universalior, tanto plurium principium:  ergo cum principium productivum universi sit simpliciter primum, debuit ergo et potuit exire ab ipso multitudo rerum.

4. Likewise, as much as a cause (is) prior, so much (is it) more universal, wherefore the First (Cause) is the most universal;7 and as much as (a cause is) more universal, so much (is it) the principle of more:  therefore since the productive Principle of the universe is simply First, therefore the multitude of things ought and could go forth from It.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Multitudo rerum est a principio uno, quia est principium et primum et unice unum.

CONCLUSION

 

The multitude of things is from one principle, because it is the Beginning and the First and the uniquely One.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod si de principio intrinseco quaeratur, unde veniat multitudo rerum, maxime secundum speciem, patet, quod a forma.  Sed unde veniat . . .

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that if there be asked concerning an intrinsic principle, whence comes the multitude of things, most of all according to species, it is clear, that (it comes) from form. But (if there be asked,) whence comes . . .

1  Libr. II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 56. (c. 10.).

2  Aliqui codd. ut aa bb nunquam.

3  Plato, in Timaeo ait:  Unus (mundus) profecto est:  si quidem factus sit ad exemplum . . . Ut autem hic mundus esset animanti absoluto simillimus, hoc ipso quod solus atque unus esset, idcirco non duos vel infinitos mundos, sed singularem et unigenum mundum Deus procreavit, qui quidem et est et erit (ed. Serrani, tom. III. pag. 31.).

4  Hoc argumentum fundatur in illa Dionysii propositione:  Bonum est diffusivum sui; de qua cfr. tom. I. pag. 804, nota 6.

5  Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 3. seqq. (c. 4.) et Liber de Causis, prop. 10.

6  Liber de Causis, prop. 17.

7  Vide Libr. de Causis, prop. 1, de qua cfr. tom. I. pag. 471, nota 3.

1  (Aristotle), On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, text 56 (ch. 10).

2  Some codices, such as aa and bb, have there can never [nunquam possunt].

3  Plato, in the Timaeus says:  Indeed there is one (world):  if, indeed, it has been made according to the Exemplar . . . Moreover so that this world would be most similar to the One absolute animating (it), by this very (thing) that it was the sole and one (world), on which account God did not procreate two and/or infinite worlds, but a singular and only-born [unigenum] world, which indeed both is and shall be. (Serrani edition, tome III, p. 31).

4  This argument is founded upon that proposition of (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite):  The good is diffusive of itself; concerning which, cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 45, a. 2, q. 1, p. 804, footnote 6.

5  Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 3 ff (ch. 4) and the Book of Causes, proposition 10.

6  Book of Causes., proposition 17.

7  See the Book of Causes, proposition 1, concerning which, cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 37, p. I, a. sole, q. 2, p. 471, footnote 3.

p. 40

multitudo formarum tanquam a principio effectivo extrinseco, patet, quod ab efficiente uno.  —  Sed qualiter potest venire multitudo a principio summe et perfectissime uno, difficile est intelligere.  Et aliqui circa hoc erraverunt.

the multitude of forms as from an extrinsic, effective principle, it is clear, that (it comes) from one efficient (principle).  —  But in what manner a multitude can come from a Principle most highly and most perfection One, is difficult to understand.  And some have erred about this.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod quamvis unus esset rerum Conditor, tamen multa et varia facit propter multitudinem formarum idealium.  —  Sed illud improbatum est in primo libro,1 ubi ostenditur, quod omnes illae unum sunt; nec est in Deo secundum rem alius numerus quam personarum.

For certain (authors) said, that though the Creator of things was one, yet He makes many and various (things) on account of a multitude of ideal forms.  —  But that has been disproved in the First Book,1 where it is shown, all those (ideal forms) are one [unum]; nor is there in God, according to thing, a number other than of the Persons.

Aliqui vero dicere voluerunt, quod hoc erat propter multitudinem mediorum.  Deus enim, cum sit unus et summe simplex, intellexit se; et se intelligendo et nihil aliud, produxit primam intelligentiam; et illa Intelligentia intellexit se et Deus, et ideo produxit duo, scilicet aliam Intelligentiam et orbem suum; et sic descendendo et multiplicando.  —  Et ista opinio in lectione praecedenti2 est improbata, ubi ostenditur, quod Deus immediate producit omnia.

However, some wanted to say, that this was on account of a multitude of means.  For God, since He is One and most highly Simple, understood Himself; and by understanding Himself and nothing else, produced the First Intelligence, and that Intelligence understood Itself and God, and for that reason produced two (things), namely another Intelligence and Its own orbit; and thus by descending and multiplying, (the multitude of things was made).  —  And that opinion of their in the preceding lesson2 has been disproved, where it is shown, that God produces all (things) immediately.

Tertii dixerunt, quod multitudo rerum erat a principio unico propter multitudinem et infinitatem reflexionum quibus divinus intellectus supra se reflectitur et intelligit se, et intelligit, se intelligere; et sic usque in infinitum.  —  Sed illud nihil est.  Primum, quia falsum est, quod in Deo sit multitudo reflexionum,3 cum Deus sit suum intelligere.  Item, ex hoc nunquam proveniret nisi diversitas secundum numerum.

The third said, that the multitude of tings was from the unique Principle on account of the multitude and infinite of reflections by which the Divine Intellect is reflected upon Itself and understands Itself, and understand, that It understands Itself; and thus even unto infinity.  —  But that is nothing.  First, because it is false, that in God there is a multitude of reflections,3 since God is His own act of understanding [intelligere].  Likewise, from this there would never have come but a diversity according to number.

Et ideo est positio recta, quod multitudo in rebus est a principio uno, quia est primum principium et unice unum.  Quia enim est principium simpliciter primum, ideo fecundum et potens est fecunditate infinita et immensa.  Si enim unitas, quae est prima in genere numeri, est principium, a quo possunt infiniti numeri egredi, et punctus, a quo infinitae lineae; quod est simpliciter primum est ita potens, quod omnino immensum.4  Propter ergo immensitatem infinita potest, sed propter immensitatis manifestationem multa de suis thesauris profert, non omnia, quia effectus non potest aequari virtuti ipsius primae causae.  —  Quia vero unice unum, ideo simplicissimum et spiritualissimum et perfectissimum:  quia simplicissimum, maximae potentiae; quia spiritualissimum, maximae sapientiae; quia pefectissimum est, bonitatis summae; quia maximae potentiae, multa potest; quia maximae sapientiae, multa novit; quia summae bonitatis, multa vult producere et se communicare.  —  Et ideo a principio uno, quia primum et unum, exit5 multitudo.

And for that reason the right position is, that the multitude in things is from one Principle, because It is the First Principle and uniquely the One.  For because it is the simply First Principle, for that reason It is fecund and potent by an infinite and immense fecundity.  For if the unity, which is first in the genus of number, is a principle, form which there can step forth infinite number, and the point, (a principle) form which (there step forth) infinite lines; what is simply the First is so potent, that (It is) entirely immense.4  Therefore, on account of (Its) immensity it can (cause) infinite (things), but on account of the manifestation of (Its) immensity It carries forth [profert] many from Its treasuries, not all, because the effect (of Its Virtue) cannot be equal to the Virtue Itself of the First Cause.  —  But because (It is) uniquely the One, for that reason (It is) the Most Simple, and the Most Spiritual and the Most Perfect:  because (It is) the Most Simple, (It is) of the greatest power, because (It is) the Most Spiritual, (It is) of the greatest wisdom; because It is the Most Perfect, (It is) of a most high goodness; because (It is) of the greatest power, It can (cause) many (things); because (It is) of the greatest wisdom, It knows many (things); because (It is) of a most high goodness, It wills to produce many (things) and to communicate Itself.  —  For that reason from the One Principle, because (It is) the First and the One, there goes forth5 a multitude.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod idem similiter se habens etc.; dicendum, quod intelligitur in his agentibus, quorum virtus est arctata et limitata; et hoc non habet locum in Deo.6

1. What, therefore, is objected, that the same holding itself similarly etc.; it must be said, that (this) is understood in those agents, the virtue of which is constrained and limited; and this has no place in God.6

2. Quod obiicitur, quod a bono non sunt mala; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia mala et falsa dicunt7 privationes et defectus, et ideo non habent causam efficientem, sed deficientem, qualem non decet esse Deum; sed multitudo est positio, et ideo causam habet effectivam.

2. What is objected, that from (something) good there are no evils; it must be said, that it is not similar, because “evils” and “falsehoods” mean7 privations and defects, and for that reason they do not have an efficient cause, but (rather) a deficient one, which it is not fitting that God be; but a multitude is a positing (of being), and for that reason it has an effective cause.

3. Quod obiicitur, quod de archetypo et sensibili mundo, dicendum, quod iste imitatur illum in quantum potest, sed deficit.  In illo enim est summa pulcritudo per omnimodam unitatem; hic autem, si esset unitas, non esset pulcritudo, quia non esset ordo nec perfectio.  Et ideo, ut mundus hic imitaretur in perfectione et pulcritudine, oportuit, quod haberet multitudinem, ut multa facerent quod unum facere per se non posset.8

3. What is objected, that concerning the archetype and the sensible world, it must be said, that the latter imitates the former inasmuch as it is able, but it fails.  For in the former there is a most high beauty through an omnimodal unity; but the latter, if it would be a unity, would not be beauty, because there would not be an order nor perfection (in it).  And for that reason, that this world might imitate (it) in perfection and beauty, it was necessary [oportuit], that it have a multitude (of things), so that many would do what the one could not do through itself.8

4. Quod ultimo obiicitur de generatione et spiratione, iam patet:  quia genitus aequalis generanti per omnia implet et imitatur ipsum, similiter et Spiritus sanctus; et ideo superflueret aliam ponere personam.8  Sed non sic est in creatura, quae est bonitatis finitae; ideo quod non potuit capere creatura in se, accepit quodam modo in sibi socia, ut sic ex multis una perficeretur mundialis machina.

4. What is objected last concerning generation and spiration, is already clear:  because the One begotten equal to the One generating fulfills through all (things) and imitates Him, similarly too the Holy Spirit; and for that reason it would be superfluous to posit another Person.  But not so is it in the creature, which is of finite goodness; for that reason what a creature could not grasp in itself, it accepted in a certain manner in itself as an associate, so that thus from the many there was perfected one, world machine [una mundialis machina].

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Haec quaestio cohaeret cum iis quae supra (p. I. a. 2. q. 1. 2.) disputata sunt, et militat contra multos philosophos Arabes.  Ad rem Scotus (de Rerum Princip. q. 2. a. 1. n. 7.):  « Avicenna veritati catholicae videtur maxime contrarius esse.  Nam IX. Metaphysicae suae c. 4. vult, quod a primo principio non possunt esse plura, nec secundum numerum, nec secundum divisionem ».  Huc spectant plures articuli condemnati Parisiis a. 1276 (cap. 6. de Deo, ut a. 15. 16; Collect. iudic. p. 189.

I. This Question compliments those things which have been disputed above (in p. I, a. 2, qq. 1 and 2), and militates against many Arabic philosophers.  On this matter (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (de Rerum Principio., q. 2, a. 1, n. 7) says:  « Avicenna seems most of all to be contrary to the Catholic truth.  For in his MetaphysicsΈ Bk. IX, ch. 4 he would have, that from the First Principle there cannot be more, neither according to number, nor according to division ».  To this pertain the several articles condemned at Paris in A. D. 1276 (chapter 6, “On God”, e. g. aa. 15 and 16; Collectio iudiciorum., p. 189).

II. Contra istos errores diffuse disputant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 11. m. 1. 2.  —  Scot., loc. cit., et IV. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.n. 16.  —  S. Thom., S. I. q. 47. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 45, III. c. 97; de Potent. q. 3. a. 16.  —  B. Albert., S. p. III. tr. 1. q. 3. m. 3. a. 1. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2.  —  Aegid. R., hic p. I. q. 3. a. 3.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

II. These errors are disputed against at length by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 11, m. 1 and 2.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, loc. cit., and Sent., Bk. IV, d. 1, q. 1, n. 16.  —  St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 47, aa. 1 and 2; Summa contra Gentiles., Bk. II, ch. 45,  and Bk. III, ch. 97; de Potentia., q. 3, a. 16.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. III, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, aa. 1 and 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 4, q. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, here in p. I, q. 3, a. 3.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 3.

1  Dist. 35. q. 2, ubi etiam haec positio fusius explicatur.

2  Hic p. I. a. 2. q. 2.  —  Paulo superius codd. U bb est multitudo, cod. N et intelligendo est multitudo, cod. I processit multiplicando pro et multiplicando, cui cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt ista.  Paulo inferius cod. bb produxit omnia pro producit omnia.

3  Ed. 3 prosequitur:  cum ratio vel causa ex parte Dei redditur ex parte creaturae, et haec est manifestatio divinae bonitatis in suo opere, quod Deus sit suum intelligere.

4  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3.  Pro sequentibus vide ibid., d. 42. q. 1, et d. 43. q. 1. seqq.

5  Plures codd. cum Vat. exiit.

6  Cod. F primo agente.

7  Multi codd. cum ed. 1 dicuntur.  —  Plura de hac solutione habentur infra d. 34. a. 1. q. 1 seqq.

8  Cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 41. et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 12.  —  Paulo superius post imitaretur codd. A Y aa interserunt illum.

9  Vide I. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. seq., et d. 7. q. 2.

1  Distinction 35, q. 2, where this position is also explained more at length.

2  Here in p. I, a. 2, q. 2.  —  A little above this codices U and bb have there is a multitude [est multitudo], codex N and understanding, there is a multitude [et intelligendo est multitudo], and codex I it proceeded by multiplying [processit multiplicando] for and multiplying, (the multitude of things was made) [et multiplicando], which codex cc and edition 1 read as and multiplying them, (the multitude of things was made) [et multiplicando ista].  A little below this codex bb reads produced [produxit] for produces [producit].

3  Edition 1 proceeds thus:  when the reckoning and/or cause on the part of God is rendered on the part of the creature, and this is the manifestation of the Divine Goodness in His work, because God is His own act of understanding [cum ratio vel causa ex parte Dei redditur ex parte creaturae, et haec est manifestatio divinae bonitatis in suo opere, quod Deus sit suum intelligere].

4  Cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 27, p. I, q. 2, in reply to n. 3.  For the following, see ibid., d. 42, q. 1, and d. 43, q. 1 ff..

5  Several codices, together with the Vatican edition, have there went forth [exiit].

6  Codex F has in the First Agent [in primo agente].

7  Many codices, together with edition 1, have are said (to be) [dicuntur].  —  More on this solution is had below in d. 34, a. 1. q. 1 ff.

8  Cf. (St.) Augustine, Of Eighty-Three Questions, q. 41, and On the City of God, Bk. XII, ch. 12.  —  A little above this after might imitate [imitaretur] codices A Y and aa insert the former [illum] for (it).

9  See Sent, Bk. I, d. 2, q. 3 f., and d. 7, q. 2.

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