COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. II, a. 1, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I
PARS II.	PART II
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE I Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 41-43. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 41-43. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Utrum rerum universitas triplici differentia distinguatur, scilicet substantia spirituali, corporali et ex utraque composita.	QUESTION 2 Whether the university of things is distinguished according to a threefold difference, namely, according to spiritual substance, corporal (substance) and (that) composed out of each?
SECUNDO QUAERITUR circa hoc de differentiis, secundum quas res multiplicatae sunt, quas Magister ponit in littera,¹ scilicet substantiam spiritualem et corporalem et ex utraque compositam. Quaeritur ergo, utrum haec distinctio debeat esse in universo. Et videtur, quod non:	SECOND THERE IS ASKED about this concerning the differences, according to which things have been multiplied, which (differences) Master (Peter) posits in (his) text,¹ namely spiritual and corporal substance and (that) composed out of each. There is asked, therefore, whether there ought to be this distinction in the universe. And it seems, that (there ought) not:
1. Primo de corporali. Nam, sicut tactum est,² omne quod Deus facit, facit salva ordinatione, ergo propter suam bonitatem, sed non facit propter bonitatem suam augendam, sed participandam; sed sola creatura spiritualis « Dei capax est et eius particeps esse potest »:³ ergo solam spiritualem debuit facere, non corporalem. Si tu dicas, quod corporalis est particeps in effectu, quamvis non in se; hoc nihil est, quia aliquid participare bonitatem divinam in effectu, non est aliud quam esse — hoc enim ipso quod est, participat effectum bonitatis — ergo idem est dicere, creaturam esse factam propter participationem divinae bonitatis, quod dicere, creaturam esse factam, ut sit; sed hoc nihil est: ergo etc.	1. First concerning the corporal. For, just as has been touched upon,² everything which God makes, He makes without a violation of (the Divine) Ordination [salva ordinatione] (of all things to the Good), therefore (He makes it) for the sake of His own Goodness, but He does not do so for the sake of (it) increasing His own Goodness, but (for the sake of it) partaking (of It); but a spiritual creature alone « is capable of God and can be a participant in Him »:³ therefore He ought to have made the spiritual alone, not the corporal. If you say, that the corporal is a participant in the effect, though not in itself; this is nothing, because ‘that something participate in the Divine Goodness in an effect’, is not other than ‘that it be’ — for by this very (thing), that it is, it is a participant in the effect of (His) Goodness — therefore it is the same to say, that a creature has been made for the sake of (its) participation in the Divine Goodness, as to say, that the creature has been made, to be; but this is nothing: ergo etc..
2. Item, de composito videtur. Omne enim compositum, quod Deus facit, facit salva proportione — semper enim formam coniungit materiae summe proportionabili⁴ — sed creaturae spiritualis ad corporalem nulla aut valde modica et longinqua est proportio: ergo nullo modo deberet Deus haec unire ut perfectionem perfectibili. Quod non sit proportio, patet: spirituale enim est simplex, corporale habet partium infinitatem.	2. Likewise, it seems concerning the composite. For everything composed, which God makes, He makes without a violation of proportion [salva proportione] — for He always conjoins form to matter according to what is most highly proportionable [summe proportionabili]⁴ — but of a spiritual creature to a corporal one there is no or a very little and distant proportion: therefore in no manner would God have united these as the perfection of a perfectible. That there is no proportion is clear: for the spiritual is simple, the corporal has an infinity of parts.
3. Item, corporale est corruptibile, et ita habet durationem finitam, spirituale autem incorruptibile, et ita habet durationem infinitam; si ergo « finiti ad infinitum nulla est proportio »,⁵ patet etc. Si tu dicas, quod corpus fuit incorruptibile a conditione prima; tunc ergo saltem, postquam corruptibile fuit, debet cessare unio.	3. Likewise, the corporal is corruptible, and thus it has a finite duration, but the spiritual (is) incorruptible, and thus it has an infinite duration; if, therefore, « of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion »,⁵ it is clear that etc.. If you say, that the body was incorruptible from (its) first foundation; therefore, then at least, after it was corruptible, (their) union ought to cease.
4. Item, de pure spirituali videtur. Omne quod Deus facit, debet facere salva connexione naturarum; sed natura generis essentialiter est connexa differentiae: ergo si animatum et sensibile est connexum rationali, ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid fiat habens rationem, quin habeat vegetationem et sensum, sive quin sit animal. Sed animal est substantia composita ex spirituali et corporali: ergo etc. Et hoc videtur dicere Philosophus,⁶ « quod vegetativum est in sensitivo, sicut trigonum in tetragono », et hoc in rationali, sicut tetragonum in pentagono; sed nunquam Deus facit tetragonum sine trigono, nec pentagonum sine tetragono et trigono: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, it seems concerning the purely spiritual. Everything which God makes, He ought to make without a violation of the connection of natures [salva connexione naturarum]; but the nature of a genus is essentially connected to a difference: therefore if the animate [animatum] and the sensible is connected to the rational, therefore it is impossible, that something come to be having reason, which does not have growth [vegetationem] and sense, or which is not an animal.* But an animal is a substance composed out of the spiritual and the corporal: ergo etc.. And the Philosopher⁶ seems to say this, « that the vegetative is in the sensitive, just as a triangle [trigonum] is in quadrilateral [tetragono] », and this (in turn, is) in the rational, just as a quadrilateral (is) in a pentagon [pentagono]; but God never makes a quadrilateral without a triangle, nor a pentagon without a quadrilateral and a triangle: ergo etc..
5. Item, nihil facit Deus nisi ex magna dilectione,⁷ ergo quod melius est naturae unicuique. Aut ergo naturae spirituali melius est esse separatum, aut melius et esse coniunctum; quocumque dato, altera differentia tollitur.	5. Likewise, God makes nothing except out of great love [ex magna dilectione],⁷ therefore (He makes) what is better for the nature of each one. Therefore, either for the spiritual nature it is better to be separated (from the corporal), or it is better to be conjoined (with it); with whichsoever granted, the other difference is taken away.
SED CONTRA: 1. Decuit Deum ita res facere, ut essent in manifestationem suae potentiae; sed potentia manifestatur in productione rerum multum distantium et in earum coniunctione — nam potentia tanto virtuosior ostenditur, quanto potest super magis distantia — sed prima et summa distantia substantiarum est inter corporeum et incorporeum, quia primae differentiae generis⁸ sunt: ergo ad hoc, quod divina potentia manifestetur plene, necesse fuit substantiam spiritualem et corporalem producere, rursus productas unire.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. It was fitting [Decuit] that God so make things, that they be unto the manifestation of His own Power; but power is manifested in the production of things very distant and in their conjunction — for power as much as it is shown (to be) more virtuous, so much can it be over more distance — but the first and most high distance of substances is among the corporeal and the incorporeal, be they belong to the first difference of (the supreme)⁸ genus: therefore for this, that the Divine Power be manifested fully, it was necessary that (God) produce a spiritual and corporal substance, (and) again that He unite (the substances which He) had produced.
2. Item, decuit Deum sic res producere, ut manifestaretur eius sapientia; sed sapientia artificis manifestatur in ordinis perfectione, omnis autem ordo habet de necessitate infimum et summum et medium. Si ergo infimum est natura pure corporalis, summum natura spiritualis, medium composita ex utraque; nisi haec omnia fecisset, non ostenderetur perfecte Dei sapientia: oportuit igitur haec omnia fieri. Unde Augustinus duodecimo Confessionum:⁹ « Duo fecisti Domine, unum prope te et aliud prope nihil ».	2. Likewise, it was fitting that God so produce things, that His Wisdom would be manifested; but the wisdom of a craftsman is manifested in the perfection of order, moreover every order has of necessity a lowest and a highest and a middle (point). Therefore, if the lowest is the purely corporal nature, the highest the spiritual nature, (and) the middle the (nature) composed out of each, if He had not made all these, the Wisdom of God would not be perfectly manifested: therefore it was necessary [oportuit] that all these be made. Wherefore (St.) Augustine in the twelfth (book of his) Confessions (says):⁹ « Two (things) has Thou made, Lord, one near Thee and the other near nothing ».
3. Item, Deum decuit sic res producere, ut manifestaretur eius bonitas; sed bonitas consistit in diffusione et communicatione sui in alterum: si ergo sua bonitas consistit in communicatione actus nobilissimi, qui est vivere et intelligere, decuit, ut non tantum daret alii potentiam vivendi et intelligendi, sed etiam potentiam alii¹⁰ communicandi. Si . . .	3. Likewise, it was fitting that God so produces things, that His Goodness would be manifested; but goodness consists in the diffusion and communication of itself unto the other: if, therefore, His Goodness consists in the communication of the most noble Act, which is to live and to understand, it was fitting, that He would not only give the power of living and understanding to another, but even the power of communicating (itself) to another¹⁰. If, . . .
¹ Hic c. 4. ² Quaest. praec. et supra p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 5; a. 2. q. 2. fundam. 2. — Mox post ordinatione ed. 1 cum cod. cc adiicit ad finem. ³ August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. Cfr. et Aristot., I. Eudem. c. 4. (c. 7.), ubi dicit, reliqua animantia homine inferiora participare non posse felicitatem. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum pluribus mss. participare pro aliquid participare. ⁴ Codd. W aa bb et ed. 3 proportionali. ⁵ Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 52. (c. 6.). — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. paulo inferius post conditione prima adiungit sed peccato factum est corruptibile. Dein codd. H aa debuit pro debet. ⁶ Libr. II. de Anima, text. 31. (c. 3.). — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 et si habet pro sive. ⁷ Vat. hic addit aut summa deliberatione, dein prosequitur ergo quod semper facit melius est etc. Plures codd. cum ed. 1 ex mera dilectione. Cod. N post melius est subiungit dat. ⁸ Supple: supremi, i. .e substantia. ⁹ Cap. 7. n. 7. ¹⁰ Cod. cc cum ed. 1 hic et paulo superius aliis, qui etiam hic addit se.	¹ Here in ch. 4. ² In the preceding Question and above in p. I, a. 1, q. 1, 5th argument of the fundament; and in a. 2. q. 2, 2nd argument of the fundament. — Next edition 1, together with codex cc, reads without the violation of (their) ordination to the End (of the universe) [salva ordinatione ad finem] for without the violation of the (Divine) Ordination (of all things to the Good) [salva ordinatione]. [Trans. note: The sense of the Latin here salva ordinatione is taken from the context of Lombard’s Distinction, ch. 4.] ³ (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, ch. 8, n. 11. Cf. also Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 4 (ch. 7), where he says, that the animate (beings) inferior to man cannot participate in felicity. — A little below this the Vatican edition, together with several manuscripts, omit something [aliquid]. ⁴ Codex W aa and bb and edition 3 have proportional [proportionali]. ⁵ Aristotle, On Heaven and the World, Bk. I, text 52 (ch. 6). — The Vatican edition, together with on or another codex, a little below this after from (its) first foundation [a conditione prima], adjoins but was made corruptible by sin [sed peccato factum est corruptibile]. Then codices H and aa have ought to have ceased [debuit cessare] for ought to cease [debet cessare]. ⁶ (Aristotle), On the Soul, Bk. II, text 31 (ch. 3). — A little above this codex cc and edition 1 have and if it has [et si habet] for or [sive]. ⁷ The Vatican edition here adds or most high deliberation [aut summa deliberatione], and then proceeds therefore, what He always makes is better etc. [ergo quod simper facit melius est]. Several codices, together with edition 1, have (before this) mere [mera] for great [magna]. Codex N reads therefore, what is better, He gives to the nature of each one [ergo quod melius est dat naturae unicuique]. ⁸ Supply. the supreme [supreme]: viz. the “supreme” genus is that of substance. ⁹ Chapter 7, n. 7. ¹⁰ Codex cc, together with edition 1, here and a little above this, has to others [aliis] for to another [alii], which codex adds here explicitly itself [se].
	* [Trans. note: Once again the reader should note that in Latin an animal is any living thing, not just those pertaining to the modern biological classification of the same name; which term is retained here in its cognate to manifest in an authentic manner categories of medieval biology..]

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ergo vivens et intelligens est substantia spiritualis, quod autem vivificatur et per intellectum perficitur est corpus: ergo ad perfectam bonitatis manifestationem necesse fuit, fieri substantiam spiritualem et corporalem. Sed hoc non perfecte manifestarent,¹ nisi una alteri communicaret, et hoc non potest esse nisi per unionem: ergo necesse fuit facere compositam ex utraque.	therefore, a spiritual substance is living and understanding, but, what is vivified and perfected through an intellect is a body: therefore for the perfect manifestation of Goodness it was necessary, that the spiritual and corporal substance be made. But they would not perfectly manifest this,¹ unless the one was communicated to the other, and this cannot be except through a union: therefore it was necessary that He make (a substance) composed out of each.
4. Item, hoc non solum videtur ratione theologica, sed etiam philosophica: quia si est ponere unam differentiam contrarietatis, et alteram:² si ergo corporale, et spirituale; et si ponere est extrema componibilia, ergo et medium: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, this not only seems (to be true) according to theological reckoning, but even according to the philosophical: because if there is a positing of one difference of contrariety, (then there is) also of the other:² therefore, if the corporal, (then) also the spiritual; and if there is a positing of extreme composeables, therefore also of a middle one: ergo etc..
CONCLUSIO. Triplex illud genus substantiae requiritur propter triplicem perfectionem universi.	CONCLUSION That threefold genus of substance is required for the sake of the threefold perfection of the universe.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod ad perfectionem universi hoc triplex genus substantiae³ requiritur; et hoc propter triplicem perfectionem universi, quae attenditur in amplitudine ambitus, sufficientia ordinis, influentia bonitatis, in quibus tribus exprimit in causa triplicem perfectionem, videlicet potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that for the perfection of the universe this threefold genus of substance³ is requires; and on account of the threefold perfection of the universe, which is attained in the amplitude of (its) ambit, the sufficiency of (its) order, the influence of (its) goodness, in which three there is expressed a threefold perfection in (its) Cause, namely (the perfection) of power, of wisdom and of goodness. Wherefore the reasons brought forward for this are to be conceded.
1. Ad oppositas respondendum est. Quod obiicitur, quod in operibus salva debet esse ordinatio, ut omnia fiant propter divinam bonitatem participandum; dicendum, quod fieri propter divinam bonitatem est dupliciter: aut ostendendam, et sic facta sunt cuncta;⁴ omnia enim exprimunt divinam bonitatem; aut participandam, et hoc dupliciter: aut quia sunt nata participare, aut quia serviunt participantibus. Primo modo conditae sunt creaturae spirituales, secundo modo corporales: ipsae tamen aliquo modo participant; sed in earum participatione status non est, sed ordinantur ad ulteriorem.	1. To the opposed (reasons) a response must be given [respondendum est]. What is objected, that in (God’s) works the (Divine) Ordination ought to be kept [salva debet esse ordinatio], so that all are made for the sake of participating in the Divine Goodness; it must be said, that ‘to be made for the sake of the Divine Goodness’ is twofold: either ‘(for the sake of) showing (the Divine Goodness)’, and thus all (things)⁴ have been made; for all express the Divine Goodness; or ‘(for the sake of) participating in (the Divine Goodness)’, and this (is) in a twofold manner: either because they are bound to participate (in It), or because they serve the ones participating. Spiritual creatures have been founded in the first manner, corporal ones in the second: yet these participate in some manner; but in their participation there is not a standing still, but they are ordered to (something) further.
2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod in omni coniunctione debet esse salva proportio; dicendum est, quod in coniunctione animae ad corpus salva est proportio, et absolute, et in relatione ad finem: absolute; nam quamvis supremum spiritus⁵ et infimum corporis multam habeant elongationem, tamen supremum corporis et infimum spiritus summam habent vicinitatem. Spiritus enim animalis sive rationalis habet potentiam vivificandi, potentiam vegetandi et sentiendi; corpus autem humanum habet complexionis aequalitatem, habet organorum multiplicitatem, habet rursus spirituum subtilitatem, et⁶ secundum triplicem differentiam: habet enim spiritum vitalem, spiritum naturalem et spiritum animalem. Comparando igitur complexionem aequalem ad vim vivificativum per medium et vinculum spiritus vitalis, optimus est nexus. Similiter comparando non solum complexionis aequalitatem, sed et organizationem⁷ et organizationis perfectionem ad vim vegetandi et sentiendi mediante spiritu naturali et animali, optima est proportio et mirabilis nexus. Unde sicut terra et ignis, quae multum distant, nectuntur duplici medio: uno, quod magis communicat cum terra, et reliquo, quod magis cum igne;⁸ similiter est in proposito.	2. 3. What is objected, that in every conjunction a proportion ought to be kept [debet esse salva]; it must be said, that in the conjunction of the soul to the body a proportion is kept, both absolutely, and in relation to (its) end: absolutely; for though the supreme (extreme) of spirit⁵ and the lowest (extreme) of body have a great separation [multam elongationem], yet the supreme (extreme) of body and the lowest (extreme) of spirit have a most high vicinity. For the spirit of an animal or of a rational (being) has the power of vivifying, the power of growing [vegetandi] and of sensing; but the human body has an equality of complexion,* has a multiplicity of organs, has again a subtlety of spirits, and (this)⁶ according to a threefold difference: for it has a vital spirit, a natural spirit and an animal spirit. Therefore comparing (its) equal complexion to (its) vivificative force through the medium and link [vinculum] of (its) vital spirit, the nexus (between body and soul) is the best. Similarly comparing not only the equality of (its) complexion, but also the organization (of its complexion)⁷ and the perfection of (its) organization to (its) force for growing and feeling by means of (its) natural and animal spirit, there is the best proportion and a wonderful nexus. Wherefore earth and fire, which are very distant, are joined in a twofold manner: in one, which communicates more with earth, and the remainder, which (communicates) more with fire;⁸ (and thus) it is similarly in the proposed.
Attenditur etiam perfecta proportio in relatione ad finem. Cum enim animae humanae data sit libertas arbitrii vertibilis et revertibilis, id est potens stare et cadere et resurgere; datum est ei corpus potens mori, et potens non mori, et deinde potens in sempiternum vivificari. Rursus, cum anima creata sit « veluti tabula rasa »,⁹ datum est ei corpus habens organa multiplicia, ut in illo posset perfici scientiis. — Similiter ex parte corporis optima proportio est in relatione ad finem. Cum enim sit ordo in formis corporalibus — quod patet, quia forma elementi¹⁰ ad formam mixti, et forma mixtionis ad formam complexionis, et rursus vegetebalis ad sensibilem — et non sit status in re corporali et imperfecta; non est status ibi, sed ultimo disponunt huiusmodi formae ad animam rationalem, per quam etiam corpus et natura corporalis efficitur particeps aeternae beatitudinis. Aut ergo omnis intentio naturae corporalis solvitur, aut necesse est pervenire mediante anima rationali in ultimum finem.	There is also attained a perfect proportion in relation to (its) end. For since to the human soul there has been given a vertible and revertible liberty of judgment, wherefore it is able [potens] to stand and fall and rise up again; there has been given to it a body able to die; and able not to die, and thereafter able to be vivified in sempiternity. Again, since the soul has been created « as a tabula rasa »,⁹ there has been given to it a body having multiple organs, so that in that it could be perfected by sciences. — Similarly on the part of the body there is an optimum proportion in relation to (its) end. For since there is an order among corporal forms — which is clear, because the form of an element (is ordered)¹⁰ to the form of (something) mixed, and the form of a mixture (is ordered) to the form of a complexion, and again the vegetable (is ordered) to the sensible — and (since) there is no standing still in a corporal and imperfect thing; there is no standing still there, but (these orders) at last [ultimo] dispose forms of this kind to the rational soul, through which even the body and corporal nature are made a participant in eternal beatitude. Therefore either every tendency [intention] of corporal nature is without purpose [solvitur], or it is necessary to arrive by means of the rational soul unto the ultimate End.
4. Quod obiicitur, quod in opere Dei debet salvari naturarum colligatio; dicendum, quod verum . . .	4. What is objected, what in God’s work the binding-together of natures ought to be kept; it must be said, that it is / true; . . .
¹ Codd. V W bb cc et ed. 1 manifestaretur. ² Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 18 (c. 3.): At vero si terram [necesse est esse], necesse est, et ignem esse; contrariorum enim, si alterum natura est, necesse, et alterum esse natura, si sit contrarium, et esse quandam ipsius naturam. ³ In multis mss. deest substantiae, pro quo a cod. Y rerum, a cod. aa scilicet spirituale, corporale et ex utroque nexum ponitur. Cod. bb legit haec triplex differentia. ⁴ Fere omnes codd. cum primis edd. cetera, cod. W omnia. ⁵ Ed. 1 et cod. cc addunt ut mens, secundum quam homo est imago Dei. — In sequentibus ostenditur, valere hic illam legem cosmicam, quae dicitur lex continuitatis, et quae a Dionysio sic enuntiatur: « Supremum inferioris naturae attingit infimum superioris », a Lebnitio autem: « Natura nunquam saltus facit ». — Paulo inferius et in solutione ad 3. Vat. sensificandi pro sentiendi. ⁶ Cod. N et hoc; cod. aa et secundum hanc triplicem etc. ⁷ Cod. N organum sentiendi, cod. cc et ed. 1 organa. ⁸ Aristot., II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 18. (c. 3.), duplici ratione probat, quod, si terra est, necesse sit, etiam ignem esse, qui terrae contrarius est: Eadem enim est materia contrariorum. Et privatione prior affirmatio; dico autem veluti calidum frigido; quies autem et gravitas [quae conveniunt terrae] dicuntur per privationem levitatis et motus [quae attribuuntur igni]. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 44. a. 1. q. 3. et Schol. ⁹ Arisot., III. de Anima, text. 14. (c. 4): Oportet autem sic [se habere], ut in tabula, in qua nihil est scriptum actu; quod quidem accidit in ipso intellectu. — Paulo inferius plurimi codd. ut illo pro ut in illo. ¹⁰ Codd. U Y supplent ordinatur, Vat. est, quae etiam paulo inferius ulterius substituit pro ultimo. Deinde cod. N post per quam adiicit est.	¹ Codices V W bb and cc and edition 1 have But this would not be perfectly manifested [Sed oc non perfecte manifestarent] for But they would not perfection manifest this [Sed hoc non perfecte manifestarent]. [Trans. note: Here, according to either reading, this [hoc] must be understood to refer to the perfection manifesting of the Good.] ² Aristotle, On Heaven and the World, Bk. II, text 18 (ch. 3): But, on the other hand, if (it is necessary) that the earth (be), it is necessary, that fire also be; for of contraries, if one of the two is a nature, (it is) necessary, that the other of the two also be a nature, if one is a contrary, that a certain nature belong to it. ³ In many manuscripts there is missing of substance [substantiae], in place of which codex Y has of things [rerum], in codex aa there is read namely, the spiritual, the corporal and the nexus of each [scilicet spirituale, corporale et ex utroque nexum]. Codex bb reads this threefold difference [haec triplex differentia]. ⁴ Nearly all the codices, together with the first editions, have all other (things) [cetera], codex W has all (things) [omnia]. ⁵ Edition 1 and codex cc add such as the mind, according to which man is the image of God [ut mens, secundum quam homo est imago Dei]. — In the following there is shown, that that cosmic law is valid here, which is called the law of continuity, and which is stated by (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) thus: « The supreme (extreme) of inferior nature touches alongside [attingit] the lowest (extreme) of superior (nature) », but by Leibniz as: « Nature never makes a leap ». — A little below this and in the solution to n. 3, the Vatican edition has and of sensifying [et sensificandi] for and of sensing [et sentiendi]. ⁶ Codex N has and this [et hoc]; codex aa has and according to this threefold etc. [et secundum hanc triplicem etc.]. ⁷ Codex N has (its) organ of sense [organum sentiendi], codex cc and edition 1 have (its) organs [organa]. ⁸ Aristotle, On Heaven and the World, Bk. II, text 18 (ch. 3), proves by a twofold reckoning, that, if there is earth, it is necessary, that there also be the first, which is the contrary of earth (saying): For the same matter belongs to contraries. And prior to a privation (is) an affirmation; moreover I say that just as hot (is prior to) cold; but the quiet and gravity (which convene with earth) are said through the privation of levity and movement (which are attributed to fire). Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 44, a. 1, q. 3 and (its) Scholium. ⁹ Aristotle, On the Soul., Bk. III, text 14 (ch. 4): Moreover it is necessary (that it hold itself) thus, as in a tablet, in which nothing has been actually written; which indeed happens in the intellect itself. — A little below this very many codices have according to that [illo] for in that [in illo]. [Trans. note: Here sciences refer to the various genera of knowledge which are acquired by the differing forms of sensing.] ¹⁰ Codices Y and Y supply is ordered [ordinatur], the Vatican edition supplies est and reads regards [est ad] for (is ordered) to [ad]; which edition also, a little below this, substitutes further [ulterius] for at last [ultimo].
	* [Trans. note: A complexion is a folding together and here has the sense of composition.]

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est; sed sensibile et vegetabile non sunt de necessitate rationalis, nisi quod est rationale per unionem. Anima enim, ut prius tactum est,¹ cum sit spiritus simplex et purus, non potest uniri carni nisi duplici medio ex parte sui; similiter nec corpus complexionatum. Et ideo necesse est, quod interveniat natura vivificandi sive vegetandi, et natura ulterius sentiendi; et ideo in omni homine haec cadunt. Sed quia Angelus est spiritus purus, ideo istis non indiget. — Patet igitur, quod contra veritatem et fidem errant Sadducaei, qui negant, esse spiritum.² Patet nihilominus, quod errant Manichaei, qui negant, animam uniri corpori ut perfectibili, sed ut carceri.	that it is / true; but the sensible and the vegetable do not of necessity belong to the rational, except as it is rational through the union (of body and soul). For the soul, as has been touched upon before,¹ since it is a simple and pure spirit, cannot be united to the flesh except by a twofold means on its own part; similarly neither the body folded together with (it) [corpus complexionatum]. And for that reason it is necessary, that there intervene a nature of vivifying and of growing, and a further nature of sensing; and for that reason in every man these occur. But because the Angel is a pure spirit, for that reason it does not need these. — Therefore it is clear, that against the truth and the Faith the Sadducees err, who deny, that there is a spirit.² Nevertheless it is clear, that the Manichees err, who deny, that the soul is united to the body as to a perfectible, but (who rather say that is united) as to a prison.
5. Quod obiicitur ultimo, quod Deus dat unicuique quod melius est; dicendum, quod Deus non dat unicuique quod simpliciter melius, quia tunc non faceret res ordinatas, sed aequaliter perfectas; et hoc repugnaret perfectioni, « quia, si essent aequalia, non esset omnia », ut dicit Augustinus.³ Cum ergo dicitur, quod Deus dat unicuique quod sibi melius est, hoc intelligitur secundum exigentiam ordinis et naturae. Naturae autem animae competit uniri corpori, naturae autem angelicae, separatam esse a corpore. Et ideo illa ratio non valet, quia dilectio Dei non excludit ordinem.	5. What is objected last, that God gives to each one what is better; it must be said, that God does not give to each one what (is) simply better, because then He would not make ordinate things, but (things) equally perfect; and this would be repugnant to perfection, « because, if (all) were equal, all would not be », as (St.) Augustine says.³ Therefore, when it is said, that God gives to each one what is better for itself, this is understood according to the exigency of order and of nature. But to the nature of the soul it is suitable that it be united to a body, but to the nature of an angel, that it be separate from a body. And for that reason that reckoning is not valid, because God’s love [dilectio Dei] does not exclude order.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Definitum est a Concilio Later. IV. c. Firmiter, et iisdem verbis a Concil. Vat. de Fide c. 1: quod Deus « simul ab initio temporis utramque de nihilo condidit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et corpore constitutam ». Rationes praeclaras et profundas, quibus Seraphicus conclusionem confirmat, esse potius magnae congruentiae quam stricte demonstrativas, verbum decuit in fundam. satis indicat. Cfr. Breviloq. p. II. c. 6. — Hanc quaestionem ab aliis non invenimus explicite tractatam. Tangitur tamen a pluribus in quaestione, utrum conveniens sit, animam uniri corpori, ut a Dionysio Carth., hic q. 9, vel in quaest. de existentia Angelorum sive in genere intellectualium creaturarum, ut a S. Thom., S. c. Gent. c. 46. et 91. Cfr. etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 11. m. 2, q. 18. m. 3; et B. Albert., II. Sent. d. 3. a. 1.	I.* It has been defined by the Fourth Lateran Council, in the chapter entitled “Firmiter”, and in the same words by the (First) Council of the Vatican, ch. 1: that God « founded together from the beginning of time each creature from nothing, the spiritual and the corporal, the angelic, namely and the mundane, and then the human, constituted as one common from spirit and body ». The brilliant and profound reasons, with which the Seraphic (Doctor) confirms the conclusion, that are of great congruence than strictly demonstrative, the verb decui indicates sufficiently in the fundament (of the Question). Cf. Breviloquium, p. II, ch. 6. — This Question we do not find explicitly treated by others. Yet it is touched upon by several (authors) in the question, whether it is fitting, that the soul be united to the body, such as (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian (does), here in q. 9, and or in the question concerning the existence of the Angels or in regard to the genus of intellectual creatures, as St. Thomas (does), in Summa contra Gentiles, chs. 46 and 91. Cf. also Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 11, m. 2, and q. 18, m . 3; and Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, a. 1.
¹ Hic ad 2. — Paulo superius pro nisi quod codd. F aa nisi quantum, cod. cc cum ed. 1 nisi illius quod, Vat. nisi secundum quod. Mox post duplici plures codd. ut A K N Y aa cc et ed. 1 addunt vel triplici. ² Matth. 22, 23: Sadducaei, qui dicunt, non esse resurrectionem. — Ultimam partem propositionis seq. aliqui codd. ut V Z sic exhibent: qui dicunt, animam uniri corpori non ut perfectibili etc. Vat. falso post corpori addit id est non. Cod. cc et ed. 1 post sed subiungunt tantum dicunt uniri. ³ Libr. 83 Qq. q. 41. et I. contra Adversar. Leg. et Proph. c. 4. n. 6: Quia non essent omnia, si essent aequalia. — Circa finem solut. plures codd. cum ed. 1 separatum esse pro separatam esse.	¹ Here in reply to n. 2. — A little above this for except as it [nisi quod] codices F and aa have except as much as it [nisi quantum], codex cc together with edition 1 has except of that which [nisi illius quod], the Vatican edition has except according to what [nisi secundum quod]. Next after a twofold [duplici] several codices, such as A K N Y aa and cc and edition 1, add and/or threefold [vel triplici]. ² Mt. 22:23: The Sadducees, who say, that there is not a resurrection [Sadducaei, qui dicunt, non esse resurrectionem]. The last part of the following proposition is exhibited by some codices, such as V and Z, thus: who say, that the soul is united to the body not as to a perfectible [qui dicunt, animam uniri corpori non ut perfectibili etc.]. The Vatican edition after to the body [corpori] adds falsely that is not [id est non]. Codex cc and edition 1 after but [sed] read (who) only say that it is united [tantum dicunt uniri]. ³ Of 83 Questions, q. 41, and Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets, Bk. I, ch. 4, n. 6: Because all would not be, if they were equal. — Near the end of the solution several codices, together with edition 1, have that (the Angel) be separate [separatum esse] for that it (i.e. the nature of the Angel) be separate [separatam esse].
	* [Trans. note: Contrary to their custom, the Quaracchi Editors number this paragraph, even though no other paragraph follows in their Scholium.]

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I