COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I
PARS II.	PART II
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE II Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 43-45. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 43-45. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
ARTICULUS II. De rerum ordine ad finem et ad invicem.	ARTICLE II On the order of things to (their) end and to one another.
Consequenter secundo loco quaeritur de rebus productis quantum ad ordinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.	Consequently in the second place there is the question concerning the things produced as much as regards (their) order. And about this two (things) are asked.
Primum est de ordine rerum in comparatione ad finem.	The first concerns the order of things in comparison to (their) end.
Secundum est de ordine earum, quem habent ad invicem.	The second concerns their order, which they have to one another.
QUAESTIO I. Quis sit finis principalior rerum conditarum, utrum divina gloria, an utilitas nostra.	QUESTION 1 Which is the more principal end of founded things, whether the Divine Glory, or our utility?
CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur: cum omnes creaturae conditae sint propter divinam gloriam et utilitatem propriam, sicut dicit Magister⁴ et accipi potest ex Scriptura, et Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctrina christiana, quod Deus nos fecit et diligit non propter utilitatem suam, sed propter bonitatem suam et utilitatem nostram; quaeritur ergo, quis sit finis principalior conditionis rerum, utrum divina gloria, vel utilitas nostra. Et quod gloria Dei, videtur.	ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced in this manner: since all creatures have been founded for the sake of the Divine Glory and their own utility, just as Master (Peter)⁴ says and (as) can be accepted from Scripture, and (because St.) Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine, that God made and loves us not for the sake of His own utility, but for the sake of His Goodness and our utility; it is asked, therefore, which is the more principal, founded end of things, whether the Divine Glory, and/or our utility. And it seems, that (it is) the Divine Glory.
1. Ille est finis principalior, qui est ulterior — finis enim ultimus est potissimus⁵ — sed ulterior finis est Dei gloria quam utilitas nostra — nam non gloria Dei propter utilitatem, sed utilitas ad gloriam ordinatur — ergo videtur, quod gloria Dei sit principalior.	1. That end is more principal, which is further [ulterior] — for the furthest end [finis ultimus] is the most potent⁵ — but God’s Glory is a further end than our utility — for the Glory of God is not ordered for the sake of (our) utility, but (our) utility for (God’s) Glory — therefore it seems, that the Glory of God is more principal.
⁴ Hic c. 4, ubi etiam idem probatur ex s. Scriptura. — Textus Augustini est I. de Doctr. chirst. c. 31. seq. n. 34. seq., ubi ostenditur, quod Deus nos diligendo nobis non fruatur, sed utatur: « Quia enim bonus est, sumus, et in quantum sumus, boni sumus . . . Ille igitur usus, qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur, non ad eius, sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius autem tantummodo bonitatem ». Cfr. etiam liber de Diligendo Deo, c. 2, qui olim Augustino adscribebatur. — Aliquanto superius verbum proceditur deest in multis mss. ⁵ Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. seq. Ibid. c. 7. ait: Id autem, quod per se sectandum est, eo perfectius dicimus, quod propter aliud appetimus . . . absolute autem perfectum, quod semper per se, nunquam ob aliud expetendum est.	⁴ Here in ch. 4, where the same is also proven from Sacred Scripture. — The text from (St.) Augustine is On Christian Doctrine, Bk. I, ch. 31 f., n. 34 f., where there is shown, that God by loving us does not enjoy us, but uses (us): « For because He is good, we are, and inasmuch as we are, we are good . . . Therefore, that use, which is said (to belong) to God, by which He uses us, is referred not to His, but to our utility, but only to His Goodness ». Cf. also the book On Loving God., ch. 2, which was at one time ascribed to (St.) Augustine. — Somewhat above this the verb one proceeds [proceditur] is missing in many manuscripts. ⁵ Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1 f.. Ibid., ch. 7 he says: But that, which it to be followed per se, we say (is) for this (reason) more perfect, which we desire for the sake of another . . . but absolutely perfect, what must be sought out always per se, never on account of another.

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2. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est perfectior; sed gloria Dei est perfectior: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: perfectior finis est, qui perfectiorem reddit operationem ordinatam ad ipsum; sed multo melius est opus, quod quis facit propter gloriam Dei quam propter utilitatem suam. Unde Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo.¹ Omnia in gloriam Dei facite. ergo etc.	2. Likewise, that end is more principal, which is more perfect; but the Glory of God is more perfect: ergo etc.. The proof of the middle: more perfect is the end, which renders more perfect the operation ordered to it; but much better is the work, which one does for the sake of the Glory of God, than for the sake of his own utility. Wherefore the Apostle (says) in the tenth (chapter) of (his) First (Letter) to the Corinthians:¹ Do all for [in] the Glory of God: ergo etc..
3. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est essentialior; sed gloria Dei est essentialior unicuique rei conditae, maxime rationali, quam utilitas sua. Nam res propter malitiam potest privari sua utilitate, sed non potest unquam privari, quin sit ad Dei gloriam.	3. Likewise, that end is more principal, which is more essential; but the Glory of God is more essential to each founded thing, most of all to the rational, than its own utility. For a thing can be deprived of its own utility on account of (its) malice, but it can never be deprived, so that it not be for God’s Glory.
4. Item, ille finis est principalior, qui est universalior, propter hoc quod principalis finis totum debet complecti;² sed gloria Dei est finis, quem assequitur omnis natura, sive humana sive angelica, sive bona sive mala: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, that end is more principal, which is more universal, on this account that the principal end ought to comprise² the whole; but the Glory of God is the end, which every nature follows after, whether human or angelic, whether good or evil: ergo etc..
CONTRA: 1. Ille est finis principalior rei conditae, quem efficiens magis intendit; sed Deus magis intendit in conditione creaturae eius utilitatem quam gloriam suam: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: sicut dicit Apostolus primae ad Corinthios decimo tertio:³ Caritas non quaerit quae sua sunt, sed quod alterius; sed Deus quae agit facit ex perfectissima caritate: ergo nec quaerit nec intendit quod suum est, ergo non suam gloriam, sed utilitatem alienam.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. That is the more principal end of a founded thing, which (its) efficient cause more intended; but God intended in the foundation of a creature its utility more than His own Glory: ergo etc.. The proof of the middle: just as the Apostle says in the thirteenth (chapter) of (his) First (Letter) to the Corinthians:³ Charity does not seek what are its own, but what (is) the other’s; but God does [facit] what He does [agit] out of the most perfect charity: therefore He neither seeks nor intends what is His own; therefore not His own Glory; but the utility of another.
2. Item, ille finis est principalior conditionis rei, quem res condita magis appetit; sed unaquaeque res ita appetit suum commodum vel utilitatem, quod nullo modo potest velle oppositum,⁴ sed oppositum gloriae divinae potest velle, sicut patet in blasphemis: ergo utilitas etc.	2. Likewise, that is the more principal end of the founding of a thing, which the founded thing more desires [appetit]; but each thing thus desires its own convenience [commodum] and/or utility, that it cannot will the opposite, but the opposite⁴ of the Divine glory* can be willed, just as is clear in blasphemies: therefore the utility (of a thing is the more principal end) etc..
3. Item, ille finis est principalior conditionis rei, ad quem efficiens non pervenit nisi per effectum; hoc patet, quia, si aeque bene defenderer a pluviis absque domo sicut cum domo, si facerem domum propter talem defensionem, facerem frustra. Si ergo Deus non est magis gloriosus post conditionem rerum quam ante, si faceret res principaliter propter gloriam suam, faceret frustra: quodsi non frustra facit,⁵ non producit ergo principaliter propter gloriam suam, sed propter utilitatem alienam.	3. Likewise, that is the more principal end of the founding of a thing, to which the efficient (cause) does not arrive except through an effect; this is clear, because, if I would be equally defended from the rain [a pluviis] without a home as with a home, if I made a home for the sake of such a defense, I would make (it) in vain [frustra]. If, therefore, God is not more glorious after the founding of things than before, if He made things principally for the sake of His Glory, He would make (them) in vain: wherefore if He does not make⁵ (them) in vain, therefore He does not produce (them) principally for the sake of His own Glory; but for the sake of another’s utility.
4. Item, ille finis principalior est, qui effectum magis perficit, cum ad ipsum pervenit; sed Dei fruitio magis animam perficit quam Dei laudatio: ergo principalius facta est anima propter fruitionem quam propter Dei gloriam et laudem.	4. Likewise, that end is more principal, which perfects the effect more, when one arrives at it; but the enjoyment of God perfects the soul more than the praise of God: therefore the soul has been more principally made for the sake of the enjoyment (of God) than for the sake of God’s glory and praise.
CONCLUSIO. Rerum conditarum principalior finis est Dei gloria sive bonitas, non quidem acquirenda vel augenda, sed manifestanda et communicanda.	CONCLUSION The more principle end of founded things is God’s Glory or Goodness, not, indeed, to be acquired and/or increased, but to be manifested and communicated.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod finis conditionis rei sive rerum conditarum principalior est Dei gloria sive bonitas, quam creaturae utilitas. — Sicut enim patet Proverbiorum decimo sexto:⁶ Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus; sed non propter suam utilitatem vel indigentiam, quia Psalmus:⁷ Dixi Domino: Deus meus est tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges: ergo propter suam gloriam, non, inquam, propter gloriam augendam, sed propter gloriam manifestandam et propter gloriam suam communicandam; in cuius manifestatione et participatione attenditur summa utilitas creaturae, videlicet eius glorificatio sive beatificatio.	I RESPOND: It must be said, God’s Glory or Goodness is the more principal end of the founding of a thing or of thing founded, than (is) the creatures’ utility. — For just as is clear in the sixteenth (chapter of the Book) of Proverbs:⁶ Each and every (thing) has the Lord worked for the sake of Himself; but not for the sake of His own utility and/or indigence, because the Psalm (says): I said to the Lord: “My God art Thou, since Thou does not need my goods”: therefore for the sake of His own Glory, not, I say, for the sake of increasing (His) glory, but for the sake of manifesting (His) Glory and for the sake of communicating His Glory; in the manifestation of which and participation (in which) there is attained the most high utility of the creature; namely its glorification or beatification.
1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod caritas alienum commodum quaerit; dicendum, quod secus est in nobis et in Deo. Nam in nobis bonum proprium differt a bono communi; sed in Deo bonum suum est bonum commune, nam ipse est « bonum omnis boni ».⁸ Si ergo effectum non ordinaret ad se vel non faceret propter se, cum ipse sit bonum, a quo omne bonum, iam effectus non esset bonus. Quoniam ergo utilitas creaturae tota attenditur in ordinatione ad bonum, quod Deus est; ideo caritas Dei omnia rectissime fecit et convertit ad se. Non sic est in nobis.	1. What, therefore, is objected, that charity seeks another’s convenience [commodum]; it must be said, that not so [secus] is it in us and in God. For in us one’s own good differs from the common good; but in God His own Good is the common good, for He Himself is « the Good for every good ».⁸ If, therefore, He did not order the effect to Himself and/or did not make (it) for His own sake, since He is the Good, from which every good (is), the effects would already not be good. Therefore, since the whole utility of the creature is attained in (its) ordination to the Good, which is God; for that reason God’s Charity most uprightly made all (things for) and converts (all things) to Himself. Not so is it in us.
2. Quod obiicitur, quod ille finis est principalior, quem natura magis appetit; dicendum, quod est loqui de natura dupliciter: aut de natura ut deficiente, vel ut perfecta. Dico ergo, quod natura deficiens in se recurvatur; ideo proprium bonum desiderat, et ideo suum commodum. Natura vero perfecta amore caritatis sursum elevatur, et multo magis improportionaliter Dei gloriam desiderat quam utilitatem propriam; ut patet in habentibus caritatem. — Quod ergo dicitur, quod ille finis est principalior, quem natura magis desiderat; verum est de natura recta et perfecta.⁹	2. What is objected, that that end is more principal, which nature desires more; it must be said, that there is a speaking of nature in a twofold manner: either of nature as failing [deficiente], and/or as perfected. I say, therefore, that nature failing turns back upon itself [in se recurvatur]; for that reason it desires its own good, and for that reason its own convenience [commodum]. But nature perfected by the love of charity is elevated above (itself), and desires much more improportionally God’s Glory than its own utility; as is clear among those having charity. — Therefore what is said, that “that end is more principal, which nature desires more”; (this) is true concerning upright and perfected nature.⁹
3. Quod obiicitur, quod ille est principalior finis conditionis rei, ad quem res facta¹⁰ pertingit; . . .	3. What is objected, that that is the more principle end of the founding of a thing, to which the thing, having been made,¹⁰ thoroughly attains [pertingit]; . . .
¹ Vers. 31. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., I. Magn. Moral. c. 3. (c. 2.), ubi dicit, quod ipsorum finium praestat semper qui perfectus est imperfecto . . . Imperfectus autem, cuius adventu alium desideramus. ² Sub hoc respectu ait Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 13. (IX. c. 4.): Extra finem autem nihil est; ultimum enim in re omni est et continet. ³ Vers. 5. — Mox cod. T sed quae alterius pro sed quod alterius. ⁴ Cfr. Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 11. ⁵ Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 32. (c. 4.): Deus autem et natura nihil frustra faciunt. ⁶ Vers. 4. ⁷ Psalm. 15, 2. ⁸ August., VIII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 4. Cfr. etiam Enarrat. in Ps. 134. n. 3. seqq., ubi haec fusius exponuntur. ⁹ Cod. I prosequitur non autem verum est de natura deficiente et imperfecta. ¹⁰ Vat. per effectum.	¹ Verse 31. — On the major (proposition of the argument), cf. Aristotle, Greater Morals., Bk. I, ch. 3 (ch. 2), where he says, that of ends themselves that which is perfect always stands before the imperfect . . . But the imperfect (is), that at whose advent we desire another. ² Under this respect Aristotle, Metaphysics., Bk. X, text. 13 (Bk. IX, ch. 4) says: But outside of the end there is nothing; for it is and contains the furthest in every thing. ³ Verse 5. — Next codex T has but what (are) the other’s [sed quae alterius] for but what (is) the other’s [sed quod alterius]. ⁴ Cf. (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy., Bk. III, prose 11. ⁵ Aristotle, On Heaven and Earth., Bk. I, text 32 (ch. 4): But God and nature make nothing in vain. ⁶ Verse 4. ⁷ Psalm 15:2. ⁸ (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. VIII, ch. 3, n. 4. Cf. also Enarrations on the Psalms., Ps. 134, n. 3 ff., where these are expounded more at length. ⁹ Codex I proceeds thus: but it is not true concerning failing and imperfect nature [non autem verum est de natura deficiente et imperfecta]. ¹⁰ The Vatican edition reads through an effect [per effectum].
	* [Trans. note: Here a distinction is made between the Divine Glory which is God Himself, and the Divine glory, which is the exultation of God’s Name among creatures; on which account the Seraphic Doctor in the body of the Question speaks of the Divine Glory or Goodness.]

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responderi potest dupliciter. Primo, quod hoc habet veritatem, quando operans operatur propter indigentiam alicuius finis, ad quem non potest pervenire nisi per opus, quod producit; sed talis operans non est Deus, sicut patet: et ideo non habet locum hic. — Vel aliter dicendum, quod res factae sunt propter Dei gloriam, non, inquam, acquirendam vel ampliandam, sed ostendendam et communicandam. Et quamvis gloria Dei sit sine rebus factis, non tamen communicatur vel manifestatur nisi per res productas.	one can respond in a twofold manner. First, what this has truth, when the one working works on account of the indigence for some end, to which one cannot arrive except through the work, which one produces; but such a worker [operans] God is not, just as is clear: and for that reason it does not have a place here. — And/or in another manner it must be said, that things have been made for the sake of God’s Glory, not, I say, to acquire and/or amplify (It), but to show and communicate (It). And though God’s Glory is without things made, yet It is not communicated and/or manifested except through produced things.
4. Quod obiicitur, quod fruitio magis perficit; dicendum, quod laus dupliciter est, scilicet perfecta et imperfecta. Laus imperfecta minus perficit animam quam fruitio; sed non sic laus perfecta, quia anima magis laetatur in gloria et plus gaudebit de Dei gloria et honore quam de sua glorificatione, et plus iucundabitur in laudando¹ quam in considerando proprium bonum. Et ideo patet, quod ille finis est ulterior.	4. What is objected, that the enjoyment (of God) perfects more; it must be said, that the praise (of God) is in a twofold manner, namely the perfect and the imperfect. The imperfect praise (of God) perfects the soul less than the enjoyment (of God); but not so the perfect praise (of God); because a soul is glad more in glory and will rejoice more over God’s Glory and Honor than over its own glorification, and it will take more delight [iucundabitur] in praising (God)¹ than in considering its own good. And for that reason it is clear, that that end is the further one.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Finis distinguitur multipliciter; hoc loco notandus est duplex finis: finis operantis, qui est id quod principaliter intendit operans, et hic est semper in ipso operante; et finis operis, qui est ratio operis, ad quam opus natura sua ordinatur, et hic saepe est extra agentem in alio (cfr. infra d. 11. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6.). Hic autem dupliciter concipi potest: aut propter desiderium acquirendae rei non habitae, ut est in nobis; aut proper complacentiam finis iam habiti, quem operans intendit communicare aliis, ut est in Deo (ad 3.). — Facile intelligitur, finem ultimum, ex parte creaturae consideratum, non esse nisi in Deo, qui est eius primum principium. Omnia enim appetunt bonum sibi competens, quod non est nisi bonum a summo bono participatum et ad idem ultimo reducendum. — Maior difficultas est de fine ex parte Dei operantis, cum Deus nec intrinsecus aliquid acquirere, nec eius voluntas a bono aliquo extra ipsum ultimo moveri possit, sicut voluntas creata (cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. dub. 3; Breviloq. p. II. c. 1.). Unde Durandus, finem operantis in Deo esse, perperam negavit, arguens contra rationes S. Thomae (hic q. 2. a. 1.); aliique multi recentiores circa capitale hoc ethicae christianae fundamentum erraverunt. Hinc Conc. Vatican. de Fide non tantum in ca. 5. de Deo anathemate percussit eum, qui « mundum ad Dei gloriam conditum esse negaverit », sed etiam in cap. 1. luculenter doctrinam communem explanavit sic: « Hic solus verus Deus bonitate sua et omnipotenti virtute non ad augendam suam beatitudinem, nec ad acquirendam, sed ad manifestandam perfectionem suam per bona, quae creaturis impertitur . . . de nihilo condidit creaturam ». Quod decretum fere ad verbum convenit cum dicits a S. Bonaventura (hic in corp. et ad 3.). Cfr. I. Sent. d. 45. a. 2. q. 1. 2, et infra d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. — De speciebus finis cfr. hic d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. 3, et ibid. dub. 4, d. 11. a. 2. q. 3. ad 6, d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. 2; I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 15; IV. Sent. d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.	I. “End” is distinguished in a multiple manner; in this Question a twofold end must be noted: the end of the one working, which is that which the one working principally intends, and this is always in the worker himself; and the end of the work, which is the reason for the work, to which the work is ordained by its own nature, and this often is outside the one acting in another (cf. below d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, in reply to n. 6). Moreover this can be conceived in a twofold manner: either on account of the desire of acquiring a thing not had, such as it is in us; or on account of the complacency of an end already had, which the one working intends to communicate to others, such as is in God (in reply to n. 3). — It is easily understood, that the furthest end, considered on the part of the creature, is not but in God, who is its First Principle. For all desire a good suitable to themselves, which is not but a good partaken [participatum] from the Most High Good and leading back ultimately to the Same. — There is a greater difficulty (in understanding) concerning the end on the part of God working, since God (can) neither intrinsically acquire anything, nor can His Will be moved ultimately by some good outside of Himself, just as a created will can (cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 45, Doubt 3; Breviloquium, p. II, ch. 1). Wherefore Durandus faultily denied, that there is an end of the one working [finem operantis] in God, arguing (as he did) against the reasons of St. Thomas (here in a. 2, a. 1); and many other more recent (authors) have erred about this principle foundation of Christian Ethics. Hence the (First) Vatican Council, (in its Decree) on Faith, not only in Chapter 5, “on God”, struck down with anathema him, who « will have denied that the world has been founded for God’s glory », but also brilliantly explained in Chapter 1, the common doctrine, in this manner: « This only True God by His own Goodness and omnipotent Virtue founded the creature from nothing, not to increase His beatitude, nor to acquire (it), but to manifest His own Perfection through the goods, which He imparts to creatures . . . ». Which Decree convenes nearly verbatim with the sayings of St. Bonaventure (here in the body of the Question, and in reply to n. 3). Cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 45, a. 2, qq. 1 and 2; and below in d. 15, a. 2, q. 1. — On the species of ‘end’, cf. here d. 38, a. 1. qq. 2 and 3, and ibid., Doubt 4; d. 11, a. 2, q. 3, in reply to n. 6; d. 40, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2; Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, Doubt 15; Sent, Bk. IV, d. 6, p. II, a. 2, q. 2.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 4. n. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 8. n. 7. ad arg. 4; de Rerum princ. q. 1. a. 3. n. 25. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 44. a. 3, et q. 103. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 17. 18. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 55. n. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 1. a. 2. 3. 4. — Durand., hic q. 6. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 8. — Biel, hic q. 5.	II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 4, nn. 1, 2 and 3. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. IV, d. 49, q. 8, n. 7, in reply to n. 4; de Rerum princ., q. 1, a. 3, n. 25. — St . Thomas, here in q. 2, aa. 1 and 2; Summa., I, q. 44, a. 3, and q. 103, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles., Bk. III, chs. 17 and 18. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 13, q. 55, n. 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, aa. 1 and 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 5, q. 2. — Giles the Roman., here in p. II, q. 1, aa. 2, 3 and 4. — Durandus, here in q. 6. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 8. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 5.
¹ Subaudi cum cod. N. Deum.	¹ Understand with codex N God [Deum].

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I