S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I

PARS II.

PART II

ARTICULUS III.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE III

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 47-49.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 47-49.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS III.

 

De modo distinguendi spiritum angelicum ab anima rationali.

ARTICLE III

 

On the manner of distinguishing the angelic spirit from the rational soul.

Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur de modo distinguendi spiritum angelicum ab anima rationali.  Et quaeruntur duo.

Consequently in the third place there is asked concerning the manner of distinguishing the angelic spirit from the rational soul.  And two (questions) are asked.

Primo quaeritur, utrum differant specie, an tantum numero.

First there is asked, whether they differ in species [specie], or only in number.

Secundo, quae sit illa differentia, per quam differunt.

Second (there is asked), what is that difference, through which they differ.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum Angelus et anima differant specie.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether the Angel and the soul differ in species?

QUOD AUTEM differant specie, videtur.

MOREOVER IT SEEMS that they differ in species.

1. Quae differunt specie habent diversas perfectiones secundum speciem;3 sed homo et Angelus differunt specie, constat, et anima dat speciem homini et actum specificum:  ergo et anima et Angelus.

1. What differ in species have diverse perfections according to species;3 but man and Angel differ in species, it is established, and the soul gives man (his) species and specific act:  therefore both soul and Angel (differ).

2. Item, quae sunt similia specie, vel simul producuntur, vel unum facit ad productionem alterius, ubi producuntur4 per propagationem; sed animae non simul cum Angelis sunt productae, nec Angeli faciunt ad animarum productionem:  ergo etc.  Si tu dicas, quod similiter potest argui de animabus; hoc falsum est, quia pater facit ad generationem prolis.

2. Likewise, what are similar in species, either are produced together, and/or one works for the production of the other, where they are produced4 through propagation; but souls have not been produced together with Angels, nor do Angels work for the production of souls:  ergo etc..  If you say, that it can be similarly argued concerning souls, this is false, because a father works for the generation of an offspring.

3. Item, plus convenit sensibile et vegetabile cum sensibili et vegetabili, quam sensibile et vegetabile cum non-sensibili et non-vegetabile; sed anima humana per essentiam est sensibilis et vegetabilis, alioquin non faceret animal:  ergo cum differat specie ab anima sensibili tantum et vegetabili, multo plus differt a spiritu angelico, qui nec est sensibilis nec vegetabilis.

3. Likewise, the sensible and vegetable convenes more with the sensible and vegetable, than the sensible and the vegetable (do) with the non-sensible and non-vegetable; but the human soul through essence is sensible and vegetable; otherwise it could not cause an animal:  therefore since it differs in species from the sensible and vegetable soul so much, it differs much more from the angelic spirit, which is neither sensible nor vegetable.

CONTRA:  1. Quorum perfectio et complementum ultimum est unum specie, ipsa sunt unum;5 sed ad eandem beatitudinem ordinatur homo et Angelus, quae est visio et fruitio Dei:  ergo homo et Angelus, sive anima et Angelus sunt specie unum.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. Whose perfection and ultimate compliment is one in species, they themselves are one [unum];5 but man and Angel are ordered to the same beatitude, which is the vision and enjoyment of God:  therefore man and Angel, or the soul and the Angel are in species one [unum].

2. Item, quorum differentia ultimo completiva est specie una, ipsa sunt specie unum; sed differentia ultimo completiva animae rationalis et Angeli est hoc quod est rationale sive intellectuale, et in hoc communicant, sicut dicit Gregorius,6 quod homo communicat « esse cum lapidibus, intelligere cum Angelis »:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, whose difference is ultimately completive [completiva] according to one species, they themselves are in species one [unum]; but the ultimately completive difference of a rational soul and an Angel is that which is rational or intellectual, and in this they communicate, just as (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great) says,6 that man communicates (in) « ‘being’ with stones, (in) understanding with Angels »:  ergo etc..

3. Item, quorum optimum naturale est unum, ipsa sunt specie unum; sed optimum naturale hominis et Angeli est unum, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium:7  « Optimum, inquit, tui et Angeli ratio est »:  ergo cum species accipiatur ab optimo, patet etc.

3. Likewise, whose best natural (ability) is one, they themselves are in species one [unum]; but the best natural (ability) of man and Angel is one [unum], just as (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux) says to (Pope) Eugenius:7  « The best of you and an Angel is reason »:  therefore since the species (of a thing) is accepted from the best (ability), it is clear that etc..

CONCLUSIO.

 

Anima rationalis ab Angelo specie differt, et quidem in genere substantiae.

CONCLUSION

 

A rational soul differs from an Angel in species, and indeed in the genus of substance.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc fuit triplex opinio.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that about this there was a threefold opinion.

3  Observamus, quod argumenta ista fundantur in hoc, quod ea, quae in essentia et cum ipsa necessario connexis conveniunt vel differunt, etiam in specie conveniant vel differant necesse est.  Cfr. Porphyr., de Predicab. c. de Specie et seqq.

4  Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 nisi producantur, perperam, ut constat ex seqq.

5  Aliis verbis:  Quorum est finis unus, ipsa sunt specie unum, quia cuilibet rei proprius finis respondet.  —  Codd. aa bb cc et ed. 1 unum specie.

6  Hom. 29. in Evang. n. 2, et VI. Moral. c. 16. n. 20, in quo textu cod. F in esse pro esse.  —  Nonnulli codd. ut F H in minori post et Angeli est adiungunt eadem, Vat. una et eadem scilicet.

7  Libr. V. de Consid. c. 3. n. 5:  Unum siquidem tui et Angeli optimum ratio est.

3  We observe, that these arguments are founded upon this, that it is necessary that that those, which convene and/or differ in essence and in those necessarily connected to it, also convene and/or differ in species.  Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables., ch. “On Species”, and the ff..

4  Not a few codices, together with editions 1, 2, 3 read if they are not produced [nisi producantur], faultily, as is established from what follows.

5  In other words:  Whose end is one, they themselvs are in species one, because to each thing there responds a proper end.  —  Codices aa bb and cc and edition 1 have one in species [unum specie].

6  Homilies on the Gospel, Homily 29, n. 2, and Morals, Bk. VI, ch. 16, n. 20, in which text codex F has explicitly in [in] before ‘being’ [esse].  —  Not a few codices, such as F and H, have in the minor (of the argument), after and an Angel is [et Angeli est] have the same as [eadem], the Vatican edition has one and the same, namely [una et eadem scilicet].

7  On Considerations, Bk. V, ch. 3, n. 5:  Because reason is the one best of you and an Angel.

p. 48

Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod quaestio ista nulla est.  Cum enim quaeritur, utrum aliqua differant specie, supponitur, quod utrumque sit in genere ut species; et quoniam anima non est species, sed speciei pars, nec est in genere secundum rectam lineam ut species vel individuum, sed a latere, vel magis per reductionem sicut principium:1  ideo dicunt, quod quaestio ista nulla est, cum anima non sit species.  —  Sed haec responsio potius est evasio ad hominem quam solutio ad orationem.  Nam adhuc restat quaestio:  cum anima sit substantia et forma substantialis, vel habens formam substantialem, in qua omnes animae conveniunt, utrum in eadem conveniat anima et Angelus, an sit ibi solum differentia accidentalis.  Praeterea, anima separata spiritus est et substantia, prout est res per se existens, et per se substans accidentibus, et secundum sui mutationem susceptibilis contrariorum:2  ergo proprie est substantia et recte in genere substantiae sicut substantia prima, et Angelus similiter; constat.  Si ergo de omnibus primis substantiis rationabiliter contingit quaerere, utrum specie conveniant vel differant; patet, quod quaestio est bona et recta, et responsio est fuga.

For indeed certain (authors) wanted to say, that there is no question of this [quaestio ista nulla est].  For when it is asked, whether some differ in species, there is supposed, that each is in a genus, as a species (is); and since the soul is not a species, but a part of a species, neither is it in a genus according to a straight line [secundum rectam lineam] as a species and/or individual (is), but on the side [a latere], and/or more through reduction as a principle (is):1  for that reason they say, that there is no question of this, since the soul is not a species.  —  But this response is rather an evasion ad hominem than a solution ad orationem.  For there still remains the question:  “Since the soul is a substance and a substantial form, and/or one having a substantial form, in which all souls convene, whether soul and Angel convene in the same, or is there only an accidental difference there?”  Moreover, the separated soul is a spirit and a substance, insofar as it is a thing existing through itself [res per se existens], and through itself standing under accidents [per se subtans accidentibus], and according to its own change susceptible of contraries:2  therefore it is properly a substance and rightly in the genus of substance just as a first substance, and an Angel similarly; (this) is established.  If, therefore, of all first substances one reasonably happens to ask, whether they convene and/or differ in species; it is clear, that this question is good and right, and (their) response is flight.

Secunda vero positio est, quod3 si consideratur anima ut spiritus, est eadem specie cum Angelo, sed differt in hoc, quod animarum ad animas est aliqua validior similitudo, sicut aqua eadem aquae dicitur esse.  Et ratio, quae movet eos, est propter convenientiam in optimo et nobilissimo suo, sicut ostensum est in obiiciendo.  —  Sed haec positio communiter non tenetur, quia planum est, hominem et Angelum non solum specie, sed etiam genere differre:  ergo et perfectio sive forma dans speciem homini ab Angelo differt; haec autem est anima:  ergo differt specie ab Angelo.  Et hoc melius patebit infra.4

However the second position is, that3 if the soul is considered as a spirit, it is the same in species with an Angel, but differs in this, that of souls to souls there is some more valid similitude, just as water is said to be the “same” as water.  And the reason, which moves these, is on account of the convening in their best and most noble (ability), just as has been shown in objecting.  —  But this position is not commonly held, because it is plain, that man and Angel differ not only in species, but even in genus:  therefore the perfection or form giving species to man also differs from the Angel; but this is the soul:  therefore it differs in species from the Angel.  And this will be more clear below.4

Tertia positio est, quod Angelus et anima specie differunt; quae sit autem illa differentia, quaeretur iam.5  Nunc autem iuxta communem positionem tenendum est, quod essentialiter differant et in genere substantiae.  —  Unde concedendae sunt rationes probantes, Angelum et animam esse specie differentes, eo modo, quo licet dicere animam rationalem esse speciem.  Nam, proprie loquendo, potius est forma speciei sive pars formalis, quam species; extenso tamen nomine potest species appellari.

The third position is, that Angel and soul differ in species; but what that difference is, will soon be sought.5  Now, however, in accord with the common position, it must be held, that they differ essentially and in the genus of substance.  —  Wherefore the reasons proving, that Angel and soul are different in species, are to be conceded, according to that standard of measure, by which it is licit to say that a rational soul is a “species”.  For, properly speaking, it is rather a form of a species or a formal part (of a species), than a species; yet with the name extended it can be called a “species”.

1. Quod obiicitur, quod perfectio Angeli et hominis eadem sunt specie; dicendum, quod est perfectio in esse primo, et in esse secundo; quorum perfectio in esse secundo est eadem, ipsa propter hoc non sunt eadem — nam cygnus et nix sunt alba eadem albedine secundum speciem6 — sed illud habet veritatem in perfectione quantum ad primum esse: hoc autem modo non est gloria vel gratia perfectio.

1. What is objected, that the perfection of Angel and man is the same in species; it must be said, that there is perfection in prime ‘being’ [esse primo] and in second ‘being’ [esse secundo]; whose perfection in second ‘being’  is the same, they themselves are not on this account the same — for the swan and snow are white by the same whiteness, according to species6 — but that (argument) does not have truth in (their) perfection as much as regards first ‘being’:  moreover in this manner there is no perfection according to glory and/or grace.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur:  quorum differentia ultimo completiva est eadem etc.; dicendum, quod rationale, secundum quod est differentia animae et Angeli, differt.  Nam rationale Angeli est intellectuale;7 sed rationale animae proprie est rationale.  Nam Angelus natus est intelligere secundum intellectum simplicem et deiformem, anima secundum intellectum inquisitivum et possibilem.  —  Et per hoc patet solutio ad sequens.  Nam quamvis ratio sit optimum mei et Angeli, tamen ratio mea et ratio Angeli est alia et alia, non tantum secundum accidens, sed etiam secundum speciem et essentiam, ut patet.

2. 3. What is objected:  “whose ultimately completive difference is the same” etc.; it must be said, that the ‘rational’, according to which there is a difference of soul and Angel, differs.  For the ‘rational’ of an Angel is (its) intellectual (being);7 but the ‘rational’ of a soul is properly its rational (being).  For an Angel is born to understand according to a simple and deiform intellect, the soul according to an inquisitive and possible intellect.  —  And through this the solution to the following is clear.  For though reason is the best of me and of the Angel, yet my reason and the reason of the Angel is one (thing) and another, not only according to accident, but even according to species and essence, as is clear.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Duas huius articuli quaestiones alii Commentatores una sola quaestione absolvunt.  Et cum expositio S. Doctoris facile intelligatur, pauca hic notata sufficiant etiam pro quaest. seq.  —  Communiter tenetur, animam humanam et genere et specie differre a substantia angelica; sed disputatur, in quo praecise haec differentia ponenda sit, quod discutitur in quaest. seq.  S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 6.) quinque opiniones de hac differentia recenset, et quoad rem cum S. Bonaventura consentit (cfr. S. I. q. 75. a. 7; S. c. Gent. II. c. 92.), sicut etiam B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. aliique.  Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 5. plures differentias recenset, et in fine concludit:  « Si quis in esse theologico potuit convenientiorem differentiam invenire, acquiescendum est, cum res huiusmodi sint altissimae speculationis ».  Scotus autem (hic q. 5.) plura opponit, et resolvit, animam et Angelum essentialiter distingui per suas entitates absolutas, et non per respectus unionis vel potentiae.  Dionys. Carth. argumenta Scoti solvere nititur, sed, ni fallimur, dissensus magis in modo loquendi consistit quam in re.

I. The two Questions of this Article other commentators address in one question only.  And since the exposition of the Seraphic Doctor is easily understood, let these few notes suffice also for the following Question.  —  It is commonly held, that the human soul differs both in genus and in species from the substance of an Angel; but there is disputed, in what precisely this difference is to be posited, which is discussed in the following question.  St. Thomas (Sent, Bk. II, d. 3, q, 1, a. 6) cites five opinions concerning this difference, and in regard to the matter (at hand) consents with St. Bonaventure (cf. St. Thomas, Summa, I, q. 75, a. 7; Summa contra Gentiles., Bk. II, ch. 92), just as also Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, and others (do).  Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 20, m. 5 cites more differences, and at last concludes:  « If one could find a more fitting difference in theological ‘being’, it would have to be acquiesced to, since things of this kind are of the highest speculation ».  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, however, (here in q. 5), opposes many (objections), and resolves, that soul and Angel are distinguished essentially through their absolute entities [entitates absolutas], and not through a regard to union and/or power.  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian strives to solve the argument of (Bl.) Scotus here, but, if we do not err, the dissension consists more in a manner of speaking than in the matter (itself).

II. In seq. quaest. notanda est solut. ad 3, qua S. Doctor error Petri Ioan. Olivi, quod anima rationalis non per se et im- / -mediate, . . .

II. In the following Question the solution to n. 3 is to be noted, in which the Seraphic Doctor precludes the error of Peter John Olivi, that the rational soul is not per se and im- / -mediately, . . .

1  Secundum doctrinam Scholasticorum aliquid ponitur in praedicamento, i. e. ordinatione supremorum generum, tripliciter, scil. directe, i. e. aliquid est in linea recta praedicamentali, cuiusmodi sunt genera, species et individua; indirecte, i. e. quando aliquid tanquam divisivum generis et constitutivum speciei ponitur a latere, cuiusmodi sunt differentiae; reductive, i. e. quando aliquid est vel proprietas vel pars essentialis (principium), vel pars integralis etc. eorum, quae directe ponuntur in praedicamento, sic v. g. anima, utpote pars essentialis hominis, est in eodem praedicamento, in quo homo est.  —  Paulo inferius Vat. solutio ad rem pro solutio ad orationem, sed contra codd. et modum loquendi Aristotelicum, de quo cfr. tom. I. pag. 431, nota 6.

2  Cfr. Aristot., de Predicam. c. de Substantia.

3  Codd. et primae edd. hic addunt anima et Angelus, incongrue.  Paulo post cod. P est in eadem specie pro est eadem specie.  Dein cod. N sicut aqua similior aquae, cod. cc et ed. 1 sicut aqua eadem omni aquae pro sicut aqua eadem aquae.

4  Quaest. seq.

5  Cod. bb infra, nempe in quaest. seq.  —  Aliquanto inferius Vat. cum sola ed. 4 in genere et specie pro in genere substantiae.

6  In cod. I. bene additur et non sunt eadem specie.  In fine solutionis Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus mss. perperam gratiae perfectio pro gratia perfectio.

7  Secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 7. § 2.  —  Plures codd. intelligibile, Vat. intelligere.  Paulo superius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 differunt pro differt.

1  According to the doctrine of the Scholastics, something is posited in a predicament, i. e. in the order of the supreme genera, in a threefold manner, namely directly, i. e. something is in the straight line of a predicament [in linea recta praedicamentali], of which manner are genera, species, and individuals; indirectly, i.e. when something, as divisive of genus and constitutive of species is posited on the side [a latere], of which manner are differences; reductively, i. e. when something is either a property and/or an essential part (or principle), and/or an integral part etc., of those, which are posited directly in the predicament, thus, v. g. the soul, as it is an essential part of man, is in the same predicament, in which man is.  —  A little below this the Vatican edition has a solution ad rem [solution ad rem] for a solution ad orationem [solution ad orationem], but contrary to the codices and the Aristotelian manner of speaking, concerning which, cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 24, Notanda, p. 431, footnote 6.

2  Cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments., ch “On Substance”.

3  The codices and the first editions here read if a soul and Angel is considered (to be) a soul etc.  [anima et Angelus si quidem consideratur etc.], incongruously.   A little after this codex P has it is in the same species [est in eadem specie] for it is the same in species [est eadem specie].  Then codex N has just as water . . . “more similar” to water [sicut aqua similior aquae], codex cc and edition 1 have just as water . . . the “same” as every water [sicut aqua eadem omni aquae] for just as water . . . the “same” as water [sicut aqua eadem aquae].

4  In the following Question.

5  Codex bb has below [infra], namely in the following Question.  —  Somewhat below this the Vatican edition, together with edition 4 alone, has in genus and species [in genere et specie] for in the genus of substance [in genere substantiae].

6  In codex I there is well added and they are not the same in species [et non sunt eadem specie].  At the end of the solution the Vatican edition, together with edition 1 and some manuscripts, has faultily glory and/or the perfection of grace [gratiae perfectio] for perfection according to glory and/or grace [gratia perfectio].

7  According to (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names., ch. 7, § 2.  —  Several codices have (its) intelligible (being) [intelligible], the Vatican edition has (its) understanding [intelligere].  A little above this not a few codices, together with editions 1 and 2, have differ [differt] for differs [differt] (faultily).

p. 49

im- / -mediate, sed per partem sensitivam sit forma substantialis corporis, praevenit docens, quod anima se ipsa, et quatenus rationalis est, perficit corpus ut forma substantialis.  Quae doctrina decreto Concilii Vienn. sancita est.  Cfr. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. Schol.

im- / -mediately, but through (its) sensitive part the substantial form of the body, by teaching, that the soul by its very self, and to the extent that it is rational, perfects the body as (its) substantial form.  Which doctrine was sanctioned by the decree of the Council of Vienne.  Cf. d. 3, p. I. a. 1, q. 1, Scholium.

III. Praeter citatos:  B. Albert., hic a. 13. 14.  —  Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 3; cfr. etiam hic q. 3. a. 3.  —  Aegid. R., hic p. II q. 2. a. 3.  —  Henr. Gand., Quodl. 12. q. 10.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 10.  —  Biel, hic q. 6.

III. Besides (those) cited:  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in aa. 13 and 14.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. II, d. 3, q. 2, a. 3; cf. also here in q. 3, a. 3.  —  Giles the Roman., here in p. II, q. 2, a. 3.  —  Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals., Q. 12, q. 10.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 10.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, hic q. 6.

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