COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 1, p. II, a. 3, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I
PARS II.	PART II
ARTICULUS III. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE III Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 49-51. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 49-51. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Quae sit differentia, per quam Angelus et anima differunt.	QUESTION 2 What is the difference, through which an Angel and a soul differ?
SECUNDO CIRCA hoc quaeritur, quae sit illa differentia, per quam Angelus et anima differunt. Quod autem differant essentialiter per hoc quod est unibile, videtur primo sic.	SECOND ABOUT this there is asked, what that difference is, through which an Angel and a soul differ. Moreover, that they differ essentially through that which is unitable [unibile], seems first in this manner:
1. Sicut se habet corpus humanum ad corpus non unibile, sic se habet spiritus humanus ad spiritum non unibilem; sed corpus humanum differt specie, immo etiam genere, ut videtur, a corpore non unibili, utpote a lapide, per hoc quod est unibile animae vivificanti: ergo etc.	1. Just as the human body holds itself to body (which is) unable to be united (to a spirit), so the human spirit holds itself to a spirit (which is) unable to be united (to a body); but the human body differs in species, nay even in genus, as it seems, from a body (which is) unable to be united (to a spirit), as for example from a stone, through this, that it is unitable to a vivifying soul: ergo etc..
2. Item, esse unibile convenit animae rationali: aut ergo essentialiter, aut accidentaliter; sed non accidentaliter, constat; quia tunc ex corpore¹ et anima non fieret unum per essentiam: ergo essentialiter hoc convenit animae. Sed quaecumque differunt in aliquo essentiali, differunt specie: ergo anima et Angelus etc.	2. Likewise, it befits [convene] a rational soul to be unitable (to a body): therefore either essentially, or accidentally, but not accidentally, it is established, because then out of body¹ and soul there would not come to be one (being) through essence: therefore this befits a soul essentially. But whatsoever differ in anything essential, differ in species: therefore soul and Angel etc..
3. Item, pars unum esse completum non habet, nisi secundum quod est in toto: ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, suum esse completum non habet, nisi secundum quod est in suo toto, scilicet in homine, ut pars.² Sed non est pars hominis, nisi secundum quod est unibilis: ergo in unibilitate ad corpus consistit complementum animae. Sed per illud habet unumquodque essentialiter differre sive distingui ab aliquo, in quo consistit eius complementum: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, a part does not have one, complete ‘being’, except according to which it is in the whole: therefore since the rational soul is a part of a man, it does not have its own complete ‘being’, except according to which it is in its whole, that is, in a man, as a part.² But it is not a part of a man, except according to which it is unitable: therefore in (its) ability to be united [unibilitate] to a body consists the complement of the soul. But through that, in which consists its complement, each (being) has essentially (its) differing or being-distinguished from something: ergo etc..
4. Item, vivificare est actus animae rationalis, quem habet in corpus: aut ergo actus accidentalis, aut essentialis. Si accidentalis, ergo vita accidit homini; quod manifeste falsum est, quia tunc accideret ei esse animal. Si est actus substantialis sive essentialis, ergo inest animae ratione sui quo est, sive formalis et completivi. Ergo si penes illud accipitur differentia formalis et completiva uniuscuiusque, quod est formale et completivum, penes illud, quo anima nata est vivificare corpus, sumitur illa differentia; sed eo ipso nata est anima uniri corpori, quod nata est corpus vivificare: ergo penes unibilitatem sumitur animae ad Angelum differentia essentialis specifica.	4. Likewise, ‘to vivify’ is the act of a rational soul, which it has upon the body: therefore, either (this is) an accidental act, or an essential one. If accidental, therefore life accedes to a man; which is manifestly false, because then it would accede to him to be an animal. If it is a substantial act or an essential one, therefore it is in the soul by reason of its ‘that whereby it is’ [sui quo est], or (by reason) of (its) formal and completive (being). Therefore if the formal and completive difference of each one is accepted from within that, which is formal and completive, (then) from within that, by which a soul is born to vivify a body, that difference it taken; but a soul is born to be united to body by this very (thing), that it is born to vivify a body: therefore from within (its) ability to be united (to a body), the specific, essential difference of a soul to an Angel is taken.
CONTRA: 1. Omnis differentia prior est per naturam, quam illud cuius est differentia; sed unio sive unibilitas ad corpus consequitur animam, quia dicit relationem ad alterum, sine quo potest anima esse et intelligi:³ ergo unibilitas sive unibile non est illud, per quod differunt Angelus et anima.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Every difference is prior through nature, to that of which it is the difference; but (its) union or ability to be united to a body is consequent to the soul, because it means a relation to another, without which the soul can be and be understood:³ therefore the ability to be united or the unitable is not that, through which Angel and soul differ.
2. Item, differentia completiva debet esse propria eius cuius est differentia; sed esse unibile non solum rationali animae convenit, sed etiam vegetabili et sensibili: ergo non est animae rationalis completiva differentia.	2. Likewise, the completive difference ought to be proper to that of which it is the difference; but ‘being unitable’ [esse unibile] does not only convene with a rational soul, but also with the vegetable and sensible (soul): therefore it is not the completive difference of a rational soul.
3. Item, differentia specifica debet accipi penes id quod in re est optimum, quia unumquodque debet definiri per id quod est optimum in ipso;⁴ sed esse unibile convenit animae penes suum infimum: ergo penes illud differentia completiva non potest accipi.	3. Likewise, a specific difference ought to be accepted from within that which is the best in the thing, because each one ought to be defined through that which is the best in it;⁴ but ‘being unitable’ convenes with a soul from within its lowest: therefore (its) completive difference cannot be accepted from within that.
4. Item, differentia completiva ita essentialiter adhaeret, quod eius oppositum⁵ non potest inesse, vel si inest actu, non tamen naturaliter; sed anima rationalis sic est unibilis, quod separabilis; et praeterea, separabile esse convenit animae per naturam, et per hoc differt a vegetabili et sensibili: ergo esse unibile corpori nullo modo potest esse specifica differentia, per quam differunt Angelus et anima.	4. Likewise, a completive difference adheres so essentially (to a thing), that its opposite⁵ cannot be in (it); and/or if it is actually in (it), yet (it is not such) naturally; but a rational soul is so unitable, that (it is) separable; and moreover, ‘being separable’ [separabile esse] convenes with a soul through nature, and through this it differs from the vegetable and sensible: therefore ‘being unitable’ to a body can in no manner be (its) specific difference, through which Angel and soul differ.
CONCLUSIO. Differentia specifica inter Angelum et animam humanam recte sumitur ab eo, quod anima est naturaliter unibilis corpori, Angelus vero non.	CONCLUSION The specific difference between an Angel and a human soul is rightly taken from this, that the soul is naturally unitable to a body, but an Angel (is) not.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that about this there is a threefold manner of speaking.
Quidam enim conati sunt assignare differentiam specificam Angeli et animae per comparationem ad Deum. Et ratio, quae movit eos, haec fuit, quia . . .	For certain (authors) strove to assign the specific difference of an Angel and a soul through a comparison to God. And the reason, which moved them, was this, because . . .
¹ Fide codd. U aa cc et ed. 1 substituimus corpore pro homine. ² Posuimus lectionem cod. N, quae et in se planior est, et qua aliae lectiones, quae hic in codd. occurrunt, explicantur; sic plures codd. legunt cum ergo anima rationalis sit pars, esse suum completum consistit, ut est pars hominis; cod. I similiter cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, non habet suum esse completum; plures codd. ut H T U W ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis. Sed non est etc. — De ultima propositione huius arg. cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, ubi et plura alia huc spectantia tanguntur. ³ Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6: Quod vero per se est et substantia prius eo natura est, quod est ad aliquid; esse enim hoc appendix quaedam videtur atque accidens eius quod est. — In principio argumenti pro prior multi codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue primo. ⁴ Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.), ubi ostendit, quod differentia ultima et finalis est primum sive substantia rei. Cfr. etiam X. Ethic. c. 5. (c. 7.), ubi ostendit, optimum et praestantissimum omnium, quae in homine sunt, esse intellectum. Vide quaest. praeced. arg. 3. ad opposit. ⁵ Plures codd. ut C F K O R S T opposita.	¹ Trusting in codices U aa and cc and edition 1, we have substituted body [corpore] for man [homine]. ² We have given the reading of codex N, which both in itself is plainer, and that by which the other readings, which occur here in codices, are explained; thus several codices read therefore, since the rational soul is a part, its own complete ‘being’, as it is a part of man [cum ergo anima rationalis sit pars, esse suum completum consistit, ut est pars hominis]; codex I has similarly since the rational soul is a part of man, it does not have its own complete ‘being’ [similiter cum anima ratinalis sit pars hominis, non habet suum esse completum]; several codices, such as H T U and W, have therefore, since the rational soul is part of man. But it is not etc. [ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis. Sed non est etc.]. — On the final proposition of this argument, cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables., ch. “On Difference”, where several other (things) pertaining to this are touched upon. ³ Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 6: But what is per se and a substance is before this a nature, wherefore it is for something; for to be this seems (to be) a certain appendix and accident of that which is. — At the beginning of the argument for prior [prior] many codices, together with edition 1, have incongruously first [primo]. ⁴ Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 43 (Bk. VI, ch. 12), where he shows, that the ultimate and final difference is the first (being) or substance of a thing. Cf. also Ethics, Bk. X, ch. 5 (ch. 7), where he shows, that the best and most outstanding of all, which are in man, is the intellect. See the preceding Question, 3rd opposed argument. ⁵ Several codices, such as C F K O R S and T, have opposites [opposita].

p. 50

differentia ultimo completiva penes id quod nobilius est in re, debet accipi; et ideo voluerunt dicere, quod anima et Angelus differunt, quia Angelus habet intellectum deiformem, ut vult Dionysius;¹ unde habet sibi species innatas et videt aspectu simplici. Sed anima habet intellectum potentialem sive collativum et inquisitivum, et hoc per naturam, quidquid sit de gloria. — Sed iste modus assignandi differentiam non videtur esse omnino conveniens. Primo, quia differentiae rerum accipiuntur secundum comparationem, quam habent ad se,² non in relatione ad Deum, respectu cuius potius conveniunt. Amplius, deiformitas intellectus respicit potentiam intellectivam; nos autem quaerimus de differentia essentiarum, non de differentia potentiarum. Postremo, quod obtinetur per gratiam³ non est contra naturam institutam; sed deiformitatem acquirit intellectus per gloriam: ergo haec intellectui humano non est aliena: ergo per hanc non differt Angelus ab anima. Et quod plus est, anima separata modum intelligendi habet, quem habet Angelus;⁴ et anima Adae habuit species innatas, ut etiam Angelus; et hoc totum quid accidentale videtur dicere: ergo penes hoc essentialis differentia non debet sumi.	the ultimately completive difference ought to be accepted from within that which is more noble in a thing; and for that reason they wanted to say, that a soul and an Angel differ, because the Angel has a deiform intellect, as (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) wants,¹ wherefore it has species innate itself and sees by a simply gaze [aspectu simplici]. But the soul has a potential or a conferring [collative] and inquisitive intellect, and this through nature, whatever may concern (the state of) glory. — But that manner of assigning the difference does not seem to be entirely fitting [conveniens]. First, because differences of things are accepted through the comparison, which they have to themselves,² not in relation to God, in respect of which they rather convene. Furthermore, the deiformity [deiformitas] of an intellect respects (its) intellective power; but we are asking about [de] the difference of essences, not about the difference of powers. Finally, what is obtained through grace³ is not contrary to instituted nature; but an intellect acquires deiformity through glory: therefore this is not alien to a human intellect: therefore through this an Angel does not differ from a soul. And what is more, a separated soul has the manner of understanding, which the Angel has;⁴ and the soul of Adam had innate species, as even the Angel (does); and this whole seems to be something accidental: therefore (their) essential difference ought not be taken from within this.
Alii vero fuerunt, qui conati sunt differentiam invenire secundum comparationem rerum⁵ ad invicem; et quia non potuerunt invenire actus differentes formaliter, per quos venirent in cognitionem diversarum differentiarum, sed invenerunt actus differentes gradu et dignitate; dixerunt, quod anima et Angelus differunt specie propter maiorem excessum in simplicitate et bonitate naturae. Et iste excessus in essentialibus variat speciem, quando excessus ille exit limitem speciei debitum, sicut calidum in quarto gradu est alterius speciei, quam calidum in primo; sic dicunt esse in proposito. — Sed hoc valde dubium est, quod Angelus tantum excedat animam, quod ex ipso excessu differentia specierum⁶ fiat, cum optima anima, scilicet Christi, nobilissima sit creatura nec exeat speciem humanam. Et praeterea, esto quod esset ibi excessus, penes ipsum non debet sumi differentia specifica, quia potius videtur consequi differentiam specificam quam e converso. Potius enim res diversarum bonitatum⁷ gradus habent in nobilitate propter naturas diversas specierum, quae sunt natae capere plus et minus, quam e converso. Et iterum, haec differentia valde generalis et transcendens esse videtur, quia, si ita potest accipi hic, pari ratione ubique.	On the other hand, there were others, who strove to find the difference according to the comparison of things⁶ to one another; and because they could not find acts differing formally, through which they might come unto the cognition of diverse differences, but found acts differing in grade and dignity; they said, that the soul and the angel differ in species on account of a greater excess in simplicity and goodness of nature. And that excess in essentials varies the species, when that excess goes outside of [exit] the due limit of the species, just as heat in the forth degree [gradu] is of another species, that heat in the first; so they say that it is in the proposed. — But it is very doubtful, that an Angel only exceeds a soul, because a difference of species⁶ comes to be from that excess, since the best soul, namely (that) of Christ, is the most noble creature nor does it exceed [exit] the human species. And moreover, let it be that there would be an excess there, (yet) from within that the specific difference ought not be taken, because it seems rather to be consequent to the specific difference than the other way around. For things of diverse goodnesses⁷ rather have grades in nobility on account of the diverse natures of the species, which they are bound to grasp more and less, than the other way around. And again, this difference seems to be very general and transcendent, because, if it can be thus accepted here, for an equal reason everywhere.
Et ideo tertius est hic modus dicendi, quem probabiliorem aestimo, qui sumitur per comparationem animae rationalis ad corpus humanum, ex qua parte innotescit nobis anima non solum secundum accidentia, sed etiam secundum substantiam et naturam, et non solum secundum id quod indignitatis est, sed etiam secundum id quod nobilitatis. Hoc enim, quod est animam uniri corpori humano sive vivificare corpus humanum, non dicit actum accidentalem nec dicit actum ignobilem: non accidentalem, quia ratione illius est anima forma substantialis;⁸ non ignobilem, quia ratione illius est in anima stat appetitus totius naturae. Corpus enim humanum nobilissima complexione et organizatione, quae sit in natura, est organizatum et complexionatum; ideo non completur nec natum est compleri nisi nobilissima forma sive natura.⁹ Illud ergo, quo anima est unibilis corpori, tale dicit quid essentiale respiciens, quod est nobilisssimum in anima; et ita penes illud recte sumitur specifica differentia, secundum quam differt anima a natura angelica. — Unde rationes ad hoc inductae concedendae sunt. Ad illa quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, ex praedictis patet responsio.	And for that reason there is this third manner of speaking, which I estimate (is) the more probable, which is taken through a comparison of the rational soul to the human body, on which side the soul is made known to us not only according to accidents, but even according to substance and nature, and not only according to that which belongs to indignity, but even according to that which (belongs) to nobility. For by that, which it is that a soul be united to a human body or vivify a human body, does not mean an accidental act nor does not mean an ignoble act: not an accidental (act), because by reason of that the soul is a substantial form;⁸ not an ignoble (act), because by reason of that there stands in the soul an appetite for the whole nature. For the human body by the most noble complexion and organization, which is in nature, has been organized and folded together [complexionatum]; and for that reason it is not completed nor has it been born to be completed except by a most noble form or nature.⁹ Therefore that, by which the soul is unitable to the body, means some such essential respecting, that which is most noble in the soul; and thus from within that there is rightly taken the specific difference, according to which the soul differs from the angelic nature. — Wherefore the reasons brought forward for this are to be conceded. Regarding those which are objected unto the contrary, the response is clear from the aforesaid.
1. Quod enim dicit primo, quod differentia debet esse prior; dicendum, quod verum est; et differentia illa, quae est esse unibile, non dicit puram relationem, sed naturalem aptitudinem, quae inest animae secundum principia intrinseca, quae priora sunt anima per naturam, sicut rationale respectu hominis.	1. For what it says first, that a difference ought to be prior; it must be said, that it is true; and that difference, which is ‘being unitable’, does not mean a pure relation, but an natural aptitude, which is in the soul according to intrinsic principles, which are prior to the soul through nature, just as the ‘rational’ (is) in respect of ‘man’.
2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod differentia completiva debet esse propria; dicendum, quod uniri corpori non est proprium animae rationalis; sed tamen¹⁰ uniri corpori humano, sicut dicit illud quod est animae essentiale et nobile, sic etiam importat, quod est proprium. — Et per hoc patet aliud. Nam illud quo mediante anima perficit corpus humanum, est illud quo anima est anima rationalis, et quod etiam est principium aliarum nobilium operationum;¹¹ sed . . .	2. 3. What is objected, that a completive difference ought to be a proper one; it must be said, that ‘to be united to a body’ is not proper to a rational soul; but yet¹⁰ ‘to be united to a human body’ (is), just it means that which is essential and noble to the soul, so also does it convey, what is proper (to it). — And through this the other (objection) is clear. For that by means of which the soul perfects the human body, is that by which the soul is a rational soul, and (is) that which is also the principle of (its) other noble operations;¹¹ but . . .
¹ De Div. Nom. c. 7. § 2, ubi exponit, quod Angeli non ratiocinando neque per sensus, sed per propriam deiformis animi virtutem et naturam cognoscant. Cfr. ibid. c. 4. § 22 et c. 5. § 8. ² Ita plures codd. ut X Y Z aa bb; plures alii codd. a se, Vat. inter se. ³ Cod. bb gloriam; econtra codd. N aa paulo inferius per gratiam pro per gloriam. Vat dein post ergo haec non bene adiicit differentia. ⁴ Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — De cognitione, quae data est animae Adae, vide infra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. ⁵ Cod. K eorum, scil. Angeli et animae. ⁶ Codd. F K specifica. ⁷ Cod. F dignitatum. Cod. I paulo inferius post in nobilitate adiungit et bonitate, et dein cod. F ponit diversarum pro diversas. ⁸ Cod. I addit: Accidentalem actum non dicit, quia anima naturalem appetitum habet ad corpus, quod (ita quod?) ab ea separari non possit, sicut dicit Augustinus super Gen. ad litteram. — Ibi (VII. c. 27. n. 38.) dicitur: Sed melius creditur hoc [ut in corpus mittatur] naturaliter velle i. e. in ea natura creari ut velit, sicut naturale nobis est velle vivere. ⁹ Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. ¹⁰ Vat. incongrue tantum; melior est lectio ed. 1, in qua, retento tantum, post corpori humano additur et. Cod. aa optime: sed uniri corpori humano; sicut enim uniri corpori humano dicit illud quod est etc. ¹¹ Nonnulli codd. ut V aa cum Vat. hic subiungunt perficit autem (Vat. nam perficit) non mediante potentia. Cod. T (in marg.) post sed perficit se ipsa addit non mediante potentia. Plurimi codd. sed (cod. N et hoc) respicit se ipso pro sed perficit se ipsa.	¹ On the Divine Names., ch. 7, § 2, where he expounds, that Angels cognize not by reasoning nor through senses, but through their own virtue and the nature of a deiform spirit. Cf. ibid., ch. 4, §22, and ch. 5, § 8. ² Thus several codices, such as X Y Z aa and bb, several other codices have by themselves [a se], the Vatican edition as between themselves [inter se]. ³ Codex bb reads through glory [per gloriam]; codices N and aa, contrariwise, read a little below this through grace [per gratiam] for through glory [per gloriam]. The Vatican edition then, after therefore this [ergo haec], adds not well difference [differentia]. ⁴ Cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 50, p. II, a. 1. q. 1 f.. — On the cognition, which was given to Adam’s soul, see below d. 23, a. 2, q. 1. ⁵ Codex K reads of these [eorum], that is of an Angel and a soul. ⁶ Codices F and K have a specific difference [differentia specifica] for a difference of species [differentia specierum]. ⁷ Codex F has dignities [dignitatum]. Cod I, a little below this after in nobility [in nobilitate], adjoins and goodness [et bonitate], and then codex F puts of the natures of diverse species [naturas diversarum specierum] for of the diverse natures of the species [naturas diversas specierum]. ⁸ Codex I adds: It does not mean an accidental act, because the soul has a natural appetite for the body, which (body) cannot be separated from it (i. e. from the soul), just as (St.) Augustine says On a Literal Interpretation of Genesis. — There (in Bk. VII, ch. 27, n. 38) he says: But it is better to believe that it wills this naturally, i. e. that it is created to will (to be) in that nature, just as it is natural for us to will to live. ⁹ Cf. above a. 2. q. 2. ¹⁰ The Vatican edition reads incongruous only [tantum]; the better reading is that of edition 1, in which, having retained the only [tantum], after to a human body’ (is) [corpori humano], there is added and [et]. Codex aa has optimally: but ‘to be united to a human body’; for just as ‘to be united to a human body’ means that which is etc. [sed uniri corpori humano; sicut enim uniri corpori humano dicit illud quod est] instead of but yet ‘to be united to a human body’ (is), just it means that which is [sed tamen uniri corpori humano, sicut dicit illud quod est]. ¹¹ Not a few codices, such as V and aa, together with the Vatican edition, here subjoin but it perfects (the body) not by means of a power [perficit autem non mediante potentia], yet the Vatican edition had for it perfects [nam perficit] for but it perfects [perficit autem]. Cod. T (in the margin) after but it perfects (the body) by its very self [sed perficit se ipsa] adds not by means of a power [non mediante potentia]. Very many codices have but (the body) looks back (to it) by its very self [sed respicit se ipso], codex N and it (i. e. the body) looks back (to it) by its very self [et hoc respicit se ipso] for but it perfects (the body) by its very self [sed perficit se ipa].

p. 51

perficit se ipsa; se ipsa enim anima perficit corpus, sicut forma se ipsa unitur materiae.

it perfects (the body) by its very self; for the soul perfects the body by its very self, just as a form by its very self is united to matter.

4. Quod obiicitur ultimo, quod differentia essentialiter adhaeret; dicendum, quod esse unibile adhaeret inseparabiliter, quia aptitudo semper inest, quamvis non semper insit actus, sicut patet in rationabilitate et gressibilitate. Et sicut gressibilis truncatur, et rationalis anima stulta efficitur non natura, sed propter defectum naturae; ita quod anima separatur,¹ hoc est in poenam peccati. Et ideo esse separabile non sic assignatur differentia animae, sicut esse unibile. — Amplius, anima rationalis eo ipso, quod nata est perficere corpus sic perfectum et ordinatum per naturam ad immortalitatem, est immortalis; et eo ipso nata est separari ab hoc corpore iam mortuo propter peccatum; et ita nunc² non dicit aliam differentiam, quam hoc quod est esse unibile, sed consequitur illam, quia, sicut non est separatio nisi prioris uniti, sic non est separabilitas in aliquo, nisi prius fuerit unibilitas per naturam. Et ideo, si aliquid potest esse differentia animae, videtur, quod hoc maxime sit, id est illud quod per hoc nomen³ significatur. Intellectus enim noster rarissime pervenit ad cognitionem formae substantialis nisi a posteriori; et quia sicut cognoscit, sic nominat, ideo differentias per naturam priores ut plurimum nominat a posteriori. Et sic patet quaesita.⁴

4. What is objected last, that a difference adheres essentially; it must be said, that ‘being unitable’ adheres inseparably, because an aptitude is always in (the thing), even though it is not always in (its) act, just as is clear in the ability to reason and to walk [rationabilitate et gressibilitate]. And just as one able to walk is maimed, and the rational soul is made foolish not by nature, but on account of a defect of nature; so, that a soul is separated (from its body),¹ this is in punishment for sin. And for that reason ‘being separable’ is no assigned as the difference of the soul in the same manner, as ‘being unitable’ (is). — Furthermore, the rational soul by this very (thing), that it is born to perfect a body thus perfected and ordained through nature to immortality, is immortal; and for this very (reason) it has been born to be separated from this body now dead on account of sin; and thus (‘being separable’)² does not now mean a difference other, than that which ‘being unitable’ is, but is consequent to that, because, just as there is no separation except of (that which is) united before, so there is no separability in anything, unless there was beforehand an ‘ability to be united’ (in that thing) through nature. And for that reason, if anything can be the difference of a soul, it seems, that it most of all may be this, that is, that which is signified through this name (“unibility”).³ For our intellect arrives very rarely at the cognition of a substantial form except a posteriori; and because as it cognizes, so it names, for that reason, for the most part [ut plurimum], it names differences, (which are) prior through nature, a posteriori. And thus the question is clear.⁴

¹ Cod. N ita quoque anima separatur, et hoc est etc.

² Subaudi: esse separabile. — Cod. aa et ideo pro et ita tunc. Mox non pauci codd. sed non consequitur illam pro sed consequitur illam; falso. Aliquanto superius codd. F P Q sicut perfectum pro sic perfectum; dein cod. N omittit immortalis.

³ Subaudi cum cod. N unibilitas. Codd. F H cum ed. 3 omittunt id est.

⁴ Vide Scholion ad q. 1.

¹ Codex N reads thus too a soul is separated (from its body), and this is etc [ita quoque anima separatur, et hoc est etc.].

² Understand: ‘being separable’ [esse separabile]. — Codex aa has and for this reason [et ideo] for and thus . . . now [ita nunc]. Next not a few codices read but is not consequent to that [sed non consequitur illam] for but is consequent to that [sed consequitur ilam], falsely. Somewhat above this, codices F P and Q have as [sicut] for thus [sic]; then codex N omits immortal [immortalis].

³ Understand with codex N unibility [uniblitas] (that is, “the ability to be united”). Codices F and H, together with edition 3, omit that is [id est].

⁴ See the Scholium on Question 1.

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup, all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2007, 2008 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I