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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM I. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION I |
PARS II. |
PART II |
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DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. |
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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DUB. I. |
DOUBT I |
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In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera:5 Quia bonus est Deus, sumus. Videtur enim falsum dicere. Nam si consequentia est bona: ergo, si non essemus, Deus non esset bonus. Si dicas, quod non est consequentia necessaria, et5 quia non dicit ibi consequentiam, sed causam; obiicitur contra hoc, quia bonitas Dei aut est causa sufficiens, aut non. Si sufficiens, ergo ponit effectum eo modo, quo inest; sed necessarium est, Deum esse bonum: ergo necessarium fuit, creaturas exire in esse, ergo non voluntarium; cuius oppositum monstratum est in libro primo in tractatu de voluntate.7 — Item, videtur male appropriare. In vestigio enim est correspondentia causae ad effectum, ita quod essentia creaturae repraesentat essentiam Creatoris, potentia potentiam, veritas veritatem et bonitas bonitatem: ergo deberet dicere: quia Deus est, sumus. Propter hoc est quaestio: cum ad nostrum esse concurrat potentia, sapientia, bonitas, quare causalitas nostri esse potius attribuitur bonitati quam aliis? |
In this part are the doubts about (Master Peter’s) text, and there is first asked concerning that which (St.) Augustine says and is had in the text:5 Because God is good, we are. For it seems that he says (something) false. For if there is a valid consequence [consequential bona]: therefore, if we were not, God would not be good. If you say, that the consequence is not necessary, and6 “because” there does not mean a consequence, but a cause; it is objected against this, that God’s Goodness either is a sufficient cause (of our existence), or (is) not (a sufficient cause). If (It is) a sufficient (cause), therefore It posits an effect in that measure, in which it is; but it is necessary, that God is good: therefore it was necessary, that creatures go forth into being, therefore (it was) not voluntary; the opposite of which has been demonstrated in the First book in the Tract on the (Divine) Will.7 — Likewise it seems that he badly appropriates (terms). For in a vestige there is a correspondence of cause to effect, thus that the essence of the creature represents the Essence of the Creator, the power the Power, the truth the Truth and the goodness the Goodness: therefore he ought to have said: “because God is, we are.” On this account there is the question: “Since for our ‘being’ there concurs the Power, Wisdom, (and) Goodness (of God, for what reason is the causality of our ‘being’ attributed rather to (His) Goodness, than to the other (attributes)?” |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod causa in actu est ex concursu efficientis et finis, quia finis movet efficientem in his inferioribus. Et quoniam voluntas dicit illud quo efficiens iungitur fini in habentibus intellectum, hinc est, quod voluntas est causa immediata; et ita dictum est et ostensum in primo libro.8 Quoniam ergo bonum dicit rationem duplicis causae, scilicet efficientis et finis, hinc est, quod bonum est ratio, quare voluntas est in actu, et ita potissima ratio productionis effectum. Et ideo nostrum esse attribuitur bonitati, non per modum repraesentandi, vel appropriationis in repraesentando, sed rationis in causando. Unde prima consequentia includit hanc, scilicet: quia bonus est Deus vult se diffundere; et quia Deus vult creaturam producere, vult creaturam esse; et ita, quia bonus est, sumus.9 |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that a cause is in act out of a concursus of the efficient (cause) and the end, because the end moves the efficient (cause) in those (things) inferior (to it). And since “will” means that by which the one effecting is joined to the end, in those having an intellect, hence it is, that the will is the immediate cause (of the action of an intellectual being); and thus has it been said and shown in the First Book.8 Therefore, since the “good” means the reckoning of a twofold cause, namely of the efficient (cause) and the end, hence it is, that the good is the reason, for which the will is in act, and thus the most potent reason for the production of the effect. And for that reason our ‘being’ is attributed to the (Divine) Goodness, not through a manner of representing (It), and/or of an appropriation in representing (It), but (through a manner) of reckoning (It) in causing. Wherefore the first consequence includes this, namely: ‘because God is Good, He wills to diffuse Himself; and because God wills to produce a creature, He wills that the creature be’; and thus, ‘because He is good, we are’.9 |
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DUB. II. |
DOUBT II |
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Item quaeritur de hac propositione: In quantum sumus, boni sumus. Ergo videtur, quod nos boni sumus per essentiam, quod est contra Boethium in libro de Hebdomadibus,10 qui dicit, quod sumus boni participatione. — Item, si in quantum sumus, boni sumus: ergo non est intelligere esse, abstracta bonitate; quod falsum est, cum intelligatur veritas, bonitate abstracta. |
Likewise is asked concerning this proposition: Inasmuch as we are, we are good. Therefore it seems, that we are good through (our) essence, which is contrary to (St. Severinus) Boethius in (his) book On the Seven Rules,10 who says, that we are good by participation. — Likewise, if inasmuch as we are, we are good: therefore there is not understanding of ‘being’, abstracted from goodness; which is false, since the truth is understood, abstracted from goodness. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod bonitas est duplex in creatura: una quae est ex forma dante esse, alia quae est ex forma dante bene esse. Prima est bonitas substantialis, quae non addit supra formam novam essentiam,11 sed solum relationem ad finalem . . . |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that there is a twofold goodness in a creature: one which is from the form giving (it its) ‘being’, the other which is from the form giving (it its) ‘well being’ [bene esse]. The first is (its) substantial goodness, which does not add upon the form a new essence,11 but only a relation to the final . . . |
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5 Hic c. 4. 6 Sequimur cod. bb addendo et, quod contextus requirit. Cod. I quia haec conditio i. e. particula conditionalis quia. 7 Dist. 45. 8 Dist. 45. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. 9 De hoc dubio vide I. Sent. d. 1, dub. 13. seq.; Alex. Hal. S. p. I. q. 17. m. 9, et p. II. q. 4. m. 2. et q. 5. m. 2; B. Albert., S. p. I. tract. 6. q. 26. m. 2. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 5. q. 1. et 2; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. dub. 4; Aegid. R., hic circa lit. dub. 4. seqq. 10 Sive: « Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bona sint, cum non sunt substantialia bona ». 11 Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. novum esse. |
5 Here in ch. 4. 6 We follow codex bb by adding and [et], which the context requires. Codex I reads because this condition [quia haec conditio], i. e. this conditional particle “because”. 7 Distinction 45. 8 Distinction 45, a. 2, qq. 1 and 2. 9 On this doubt see Sent, Bk. I, d. 1, Doubt 13 f., Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 17, m. 9, and p. II, 1. 4, m. 2, and q. 5, m. 2; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 6, q. 26, m. 2, a. 2; Richard of Middleton, here in a. 5, qq. 1 and 2; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text, dubium 4; Giles the Roman, here on the text, dubium 4 ff.. 10 Also known as: “In what manner substances, in this that they are, are good, when they are not substantial goods.” 11 The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, reads a new ‘being’ [novum ese]. |
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causam, ex qua comparatione omne aliud a Deo habet esse bonum. Et quia illa comparatio ad causam essentialem sive finalem est essentialis, nec unquam esse relinquit nec potest relinquere; hinc est, quod Augustinus dicit: « In quantum sumus, boni sumus ». — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Boethio, dicendum, quod ipse vocat bonum per essentiam illud bonum, quod est absolute bonum, non ex dependentia ad aliud. Hoc autem modo nulla creatura bona est, immo ex comparatione, et ideo participatione. Nec sequitur, quod accidentaliter; quia participatio non est accidentalis respectu primae bonitatis, quae est ex forma dante esse, quamvis sit accidentalis, secundum quod est ex forma dante bene esse.1 |
cause, out of which comparison every other has from God that it is good. And because that comparison to the essential or final cause is essential, neither does it ever relinquish its ‘being’ nor can it relinquish (it); hence it is, that (St.) Augustine says: « Inasmuch as we are, we are good ». — Therefore to that which is objected from (St. Severinus) Boethius, it must be said, that he calls the “good through essence” [bonum per essentiam] that good, which is absolutely good, not (that which is good) out of a dependence to another. But in this manner no creature is good, nay (it is good) out of a comparison, and for that reason by participation. Nor does it follow, that (it is good) accidentally, because (its) participation (in the Good) is not accidental in respect of the first goodness, which is out of the Form giving (it its) ‘being’, even though it is accidental, according to which it is From the form giving (it its) ‘well being’.1 |
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Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est intelligere esse etc.; dicendum, quod illud quod attribuitur alicui secundum quod ipsum, potest dupliciter attribui: aut enim consequitur, aut praecedit. Si praecedit, sic est ita essentiale, quod sine ipso nec est nec potest intelligi. Sed si aliquo modo consequitur, non tamen cadit in aliud genus, potest quidem intelligi intellectu apprehendente et intellectu semiplene resolvente; sed intellectu plene ad causas comparante non potest intelligi, non intellecto illo, maxime cum illud dicit habitudinem necessarium et relationem ad causam, sicut verum et bonum.2 |
To that which is objected, that there is no understanding of ‘being’ etc.; it must be said, that that which is attributed to something according to which (it is) itself, can be attributed in a twofold manner: for either (that which is attributed) is consequent (to that according to which it is itself), or precedes (this same). If it precedes, thus it is so essential, that without it (the thing) neither is nor can be understood. But if it is consequent in any manner, yet does not fall in another genus, it can indeed be understood by an apprehending intellect and an intellect resolving semi-fully; but it cannot be understood by an intellect fully comparing (it) according to (its) causes, with that not understood, most of all when it means a necessary habitude and relation to (its) cause, as “true” and “good” (do).2 |
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DUB. III. |
DOUBT III |
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Item quaeritur de his causis, quas assignat Magister circa unionem animae rationalis. Dicit enim primo, quod causa est Dei voluntas; secundo, quod est causa instructio nostra. Et videtur, quod utraque sit inartificialis. Prima enim responsio potest ad omnia dari; in secunda videtur principium peti, quia, si non esset unita, limpide videret Deum nec indigeret exemplo:3 ergo si exemplo indiguit, non fuit nisi propter minorationem suae cognitionis. |
Likewise is asked concerning those causes, which Master (Peter) assigns about the union of the rational soul (with the body). For he says first, that the cause is God’s will; second, that the cause is our instruction. And it seems, that each is unskillful [inartificialis]. For the first response can be given to all (things); in the second there seems (to be) the begging of a principle, because, if it were not united (to the body), it would clearly [limpide] see God nor would it need an example (for its instruction):3 therefore if it did need an example, it was not but for the sake of the lessening of its cognition. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod Magister respondet sufficienter et bene. Sufficienter quidem, quia cum sit duplex via cognoscendi opera Dei, scilicet fide et intelligentia, ad soliditatem fidei sufficit scire, quod Deus voluit, quem credit nihil velle nisi rationabile; unde in prima responsione satisfacit fidei, et haec responsio in omnibus fideli,4 ut fidelis est, plene sufficit. — Ad soliditatem intellegentiae redditur ratio; et cum non possit reddi ratio vel causa ex parte Dei, redditur ex parte creaturae. Et haec est manifestatio divinae bonitatis in suo opere, in quo debet se manifestare non solum propter nostram indigentiam, verum etiam ad suam gloriam;5 et sic patent obiecta. Respondetur etiam hic causa efficiens et finalis, et sic sufficienter et plene. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that Master (Peter) responds sufficiently and well. Sufficiently, indeed, because since there is a twofold way of cognizing the works of God, namely by faith and by understanding [intelligentia], for the solidity of faith it suffices to know, that God willed (it so), Whom it believes wills nothing except (what is) reasonable; wherefore in the first response he satisfies faith, and this response plainly suffices in all (things) the faithful,4 as one (who) is faithful. — For the solidity of understanding an reason is given [redditur ratio]; and since a reason and/or cause cannot be given on the part of God, one is given on the part of the creature. And this (reason) is the manifestation of the Divine Goodness in His work, in which He ought not only manifest Himself on account of our indigence, but also for His glory;5 and thus the objections are clear. One is also given in response [Respondetur], here, the efficient and final cause, and thus (he answers) sufficiently and fully. |
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1 In hac responsione continetur summa Boethiani opusculi, cuius finis est: bonum esse essentiam, iustum vero esse actum respicit . . . Amplius, bonum quidem generale est, iustum vero speciale, nec species descendit in omnia; idcirco alia quidem iusta, alia aliud, omnia vero bona. 2 Cfr. de hoc I. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 17. m. 4; B. Albert., S. p. I. tract. 6. q. 26. m. 1. a. 3. partic. 1; Aegid. R., hic circa lit. dub. 7. 3 Alluditur ad verba Magistri, hic c. 6: Pro exemplo ergo futurae societatis, quae inter Deum et spiritum rationalem in glorificatione eiusdem perficienda erat, animam corporeis indumentis et terrenis mansionibus copulavit etc. 4 Plures codd. ut H K P Q cc et ed 1 in omni fideli, nonnulli ut F M in omnibus fidelibus. Paulo inferius fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 3 respondetur pro redditur, et dein plurimi codd. cum ed. 3 responderi pro reddi. 5 Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. — Idem dubium solvit B. Albert., hic a. 14. |
1 In this response there is contained a summary of (St. Severinus) Boethius’ opuscle, the end of which is: “that it is good (respects) the essence, but that it is just respects the act . . . Furthermore, the good is indeed general, but the just special, nor does the species descend unto all (inferiors); wherefore some indeed (are) just, others (are something) else, but all (are) good. 2 Cf. on this, Sent, Bk. I, d. 28, Doubt 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 17, m. 4; Bl. (now St. ) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 6, q. 26, m. 1, a. 3, subpart 1; Giles the Roman, here on the text, dubium 7. 3 An allusion to the words of Master (Peter), here in ch. 6: « Therefore, as an example of the society to come, which was going to be perfected between God and the rational spirit in its own glorification, He joined the soul to corporeal garments and earthly mansions etc. ».. 4 Several codices, such as H K P Q and cc, and edition 1 have in everything the faithful [in omni fideli], not a few, such as F and M, have in all (things) the faithful [in omnibus fidelibus]. A little below this nearly all the codices, together with editions 1 and 3, have is given in response [respondetur] for is given [redditur], and then very many codices, together with edition 1, have be given in response [responderi] for be given [reddi]. 5 Cf. above a. 2. q, 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) solves the same doubt, her ein a. 14. |
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