COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION II
PARS I. Quando creati sunt Angeli et de mensura durationis eorum.	PART I When the Angels were created and on the measures of their duration.
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE I Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 54-58. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 54-58. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
De angelica itaque natura etc.	And so concerning the nature of the Angel etc..
DIVISIO TEXTUS.	DIVISION OF THE TEXT
Supra egit Magister de rerum productione in generali. In hac parte agit de productione rerum in speciali. Et quoniam triplex est differentia creaturae, scilicet spiritualis et corporalis et composita ex utraque, ideo haec pars habet tres. In prima agit de conditione spiritualis creaturae. In secunda de conditione corporalis creaturae, infra distinctione duodecima: Haec de angelicae naturae etc. In tertia de conditione naturae ex utrisque compositae, scilicet humanae, infra distinctione decima sexta: His excursis, quae supra de homine. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, quales facti sunt Angeli ex prima conditione. In secunda determinat, quales facti sunt ex aversione et conversione, infra distinctione quinta: Post haec consideratio adducit etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat, quando et ubi creati sunt Angeli. In secunda vero, quales creati sunt, infra distinctione tertia: Ecce ostensum est, ubi Angeli etc.	Above Master (Peter) dealt with the production of things in general. In this part he deals with the production of things in particular [in speciali]. And since there is a threefold difference for a creature, namely the spiritual and the corporal and the one composed out of each, for that reason this part has three (parts). In the first he deals with the foundation of the spiritual creature. In the second with the foundation of the corporal creature, below in the Twelfth Distinction (where he says): These (things) said concerning the nature of the Angel etc.. In the third with the foundation of the nature composed out of each, namely the human, below in the Sixteenth Distinction (where he says): Having run through those (things), which we have premised above concerning the creation of man etc.. The first part has two (parts). In the first he determines, the quality in which [quales] the Angels were made on account of (their) first foundation. In the second he determines, the quality in which [quales] they came to be from (their) aversion and conversion, below in the Fifth Distinction (where he says): After these (things), consideration leads one to inquire etc.. The first part has two (parts). In the first he determines, when and where the Angels were created. However, in the second, the quality in which [quales] they were created, below in the Third Distinction (where he says): Behold it has been shown, where the Angels etc..
Prima pars habet duas. Primo enim determinat, quando Angeli creati fuerunt; in secunda, ubi, infra distinctione eadem: Iam ostensum est etc. Prima pars habet quatuor particulas. In prima praemittit prooemium, in quo aperit suam intentionem. In secunda vero movet¹ dubitationem circa durationem sive initium vel mensuram angelicae conditionis, ibi: Quaedam auctoritates videntur. In tertia determinat veritatem et confirmat, ibi: Videtur itaque, hoc esse tenendum. Quarto vero et ultimo veritatem praedeterminatam et probatam concludit, et auctoritatem in oppositum determinat, ibi: Simul ergo cum tempore etc.	The first part has two (parts). For he first determines, when the Angels were created; in the second, where, below in the same Distinction (where he says): It has already been shown etc.. The first part has four subparts [particulas]. In the first he prefaces a foreword [proemium], in the second he reveals [aperit] his intention. However, in the second he moves¹ a doubt about the duration or start and/or measure of the foundation of the Angels, there (where he says): Certain authorities seem etc.. In the third he determines and confirms the truth, there (where he says): And so it seems that this must be held etc.. But fourth and last he concludes the predetermined and proven truth, and determines the authority for the opposite, there (where he says): Therefore the corporal and spiritual creature etc..
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.	TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua quaeritur de mensura conditionis angelicae naturae, duo principaliter quaeruntur.	For an understanding of this part, in which there is the question concerning the measure of the foundation of the angelic nature, two (things) are principally asked.
Primo de mensura eius in se.	First concerning the measure of it in itself.
Secundo per comparationem ad mensuram esse corporalis naturae.	Second through a comparison to the measure of the ‘being’ of corporal nature.
Circa primum tria quaeruntur.	About the first three (things) are asked.
Primo, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram propriam.	First, whether spiritual (beings) have their own measure.
Secundo, utrum habeant mensuram unicam.	Second, whether they have a unique measure.
Tertio, utrum habeant mensuram simplicem aut compositam, sive stantem vel successivam.	Third, whether they have a simple or composed measure, or a stationary [stantem] and/or successive (measure).
¹ In Vat. additur ex auctoritatibus.	¹ In the Vatican edition there is added out of the authorities [ex auctoritatibus].

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ARTICULUS I. De mensura angelicae naturae in se.	ARTICLE I On the measure of the angelic nature in itself.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum spiritualia habeant propriam mensuram.	QUESTION 1 Whether spiritual (beings) have their own measure.
CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur. Quod habeant propriam mensuram, primo videtur:	ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced in this manner.. That they have their own measure, seems first:
1. Per Philosophum in libro de Causis, in penultima propositione: « Inter rem, cuius substantia et operatio est in aeternitate, et rem, cuius substantia et operatio est in tempore, est res media, cuius substantia est in aeternitate et actio in tempore »; sed hoc non potest intelligi de aeternitate increata: ergo de creata; et hanc distinguit a tempore et ponit¹ mensuram substantiarum spiritualium et incorruptibilium: ergo videtur etc.	1. Through the Philosopher in the Book of Causes, in the penultimate proposition: « Between the thing, whose substance and operation is in eternity, and the thing, whose substance and operation is in time, there is an intermediary thing [res media], whose substance is in eternity and (whose) action (is) in time »; but this cannot be understood of the uncreated Eternity: therefore of the created one; and he distinguished this from time and posits¹ a measure for spiritual and incorruptible substances: therefore it seems that etc..
2. Item, Ecclesiastici primo:² Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est, usque ibi, ante aevum: ergo si ante aevum dicit quod increatum, aevum dicit quid creatum; non substantiam: ergo mensuram; non rerum materialium, sed spiritualium; et haec differt a tempore, unde Boethius de Consolatione:³	2. Likewise, according to the first (chapter) of Ecclesiasticus:² Every wisdom is from the Lord God, up to there (where it says): before the aevum: therefore if “before the aevum” means something uncreated, “aevum” means something created; not a substance: therefore a measure; not of material things, but of spiritual ones; and this (aevum) differs from time, wherefore (St. Severinus) Boethius On the Consolation (of Philosophy says):³
Qui tempus ab aevo Ire iubes:	Who time from the aevum doest command to go:
ergo etc. Omne enim quod exit ab alio, differt ab eo.	ergo etc.. For everything, which goes forth from another, differs from it.
3. Item, Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus in capitulo de aevo:⁴ « Proprietas aevi est antiquum, inveteratum, secundum totum esse mensurans, temporis vero in alteratione aliter et aliter se habens »: ergo si idem non se habet sic et aliter simul et semel, non est eadem mensura tempus et aevum. Sed aevum est mensura durantium perpetuo, et talis est natura angelica: ergo.	3. Likewise, (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite says) On the Divine Names in the chapter on the aevum:⁴ « It is the property of the aevum to be measuring the ancient, (and) the inveterate, according to the whole, but of time (to be) holding itself in one and another manner in alteration »: therefore if it does not hold itself the same in this and another manner, together and once for all [simul et semel], time and the aevum is not the same measure. But the aevum is the measure of (things) enduring perpetually, and such is the angelic nature: ergo (etc.).
4. Item, sicut se habet unitas ad distinctionem, ita nunc ad durationem; sed in spiritualibus non solum est reperire distinctionem secundum substantiam, verum etiam⁵ eius mensuram: ergo pari ratione et esse Angeli mensuram durationis habet; sed non tempus, cum non varietur nec mutetur: ergo aliam mensuram propriam.	4. Likewise, just as unity holds itself to distinction, so the now to duration; but in (things) spiritual there is not only a finding of distinction according to substance, but also⁵ its measure: therefore for an equal reason the ‘to be’ of the Angel has a measure of (its) duration, but (this is) not time, since (its ‘to be’) is not varied nor is it changed: therefore (it has) another proper measure.
5. Item, omne quod habet esse limitatum actu, habet mensuram,⁶ per quam potest cognosci eius limitatio; sed tale est esse omnis creati: ergo etc.; arguatur ut prius.	5. Likewise, everything which has a ‘to be’ limited in act, has a measure,⁶ through which its limitation can be cognized; but such is the ‘to be’ of every created (being): ergo etc..; let it be argued as before.
6. Item, mensura durationis respicit modum durandi; sed spiritualia habent modum suae durationis differentem a corporalibus, maxime a mutabilibus, cum durent perpetualiter et immutabiliter: ergo per istam mensuram habent mensurari.	6. Likewise a measure of duration respects the manner of enduring; but spiritual (beings) have a manner of their own duration different from corporal (things), most of all from changeable (things), since they endure perpetually and immutably: therefore through that measure they have (their) ‘being measured’.
CONTRA: 1. Augustinus ad Orosium:⁷ « Deus movet spiritualem naturam per tempora, corporalem vero per loca et tempora »: ergo spiritualis naturae mensura est tempus.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Augustine (says) To Orosius:⁷ « God moves the spiritual nature through times, but the corporal through places and times »: therefore time is the measure of a spiritual nature.
2. Item, Beda:⁸ « Quatuor fuerunt primo creata: angelica natura, materia prima, caelum empyreum et tempus ». Si ergo tempus stat pro mensura, ergo aut spiritualia in principio non habuerunt mensuram, aut non habuerunt aliam a corporalibus, aut Beda fuit insufficiens in illa enumeratione.	2. Likewise, (St.) Bede (the Venerable says):⁸ « Four (things) were created first: the angelic nature, prime matter, the empyrean Heaven and time ». If, therefore “time” stands for a measure, therefore either spiritual (beings) in the beginning did not have a measure, or they did not have (a measure) other than corporal (beings), or (St.) Bede was insufficient in that enumeration.
3. Item, ratione videtur. Unus est locus, qui est continentia visibilium et invisibilium, ut empyreum: ergo si mensura, quae est tempus, non est minoris⁹ appropriationis quam locus, ergo videtur quod unum sit tempus, in quo sint spiritualia et corporalia: non ergo habent mensuram propriam.	3. Likewise, it seems by reason. There is one (created) place, which is for the containing of (things) visible and invisible, such as (is) the empyrean (Heaven): therefore if (its) measure, which is time, is not of a lesser⁹ appropriation than place (is), therefore it seems, that there is one time, in which spiritual and corporal (beings) are: therefore they do not have their own measure.
4. Item, sicut¹⁰ idem est numerus, quo mensurantur decem canes et decem homines, sic idem est numerus, quo numerantur decem Angeli et decem homines: si ergo spiritualia non habent aliam mensuram distinctionis quam corporalia, ergo nec aliam mensuram durationis.	4. Likewise, just as¹⁰ the number, by which ten dogs and ten men are measured, is the same, so the number, by which ten Angels and ten men are numbered, is the same: if, therefore, spiritual (beings) do not have a measure of distinction other than corporal (beings do), therefore neither (do they have) another measure of duration.
5. Item, homo beatus et Angelus mensurantur eadem mensura, quia omnes beati; sed homo beatus habet idem esse cum se non beato, ergo et eandem mensuram: ergo eadem mensura mensuratur homo viator, qua Angelus, ergo et quaelibet natura corporalis: non ergo habet mensuram propriam.	5. Likewise, a beatified man [homo beatus] and an Angel are measured by the same measure, because all (have been) beatified; but a beatified man has the same ‘to be’ with the non-beatified (man), therefore also the same measure: therefore the wayfaring man [homo viator] is measured by the same measure, by which the Angel (is measured), therefore too any corporal nature (is measured by the same): therefore (the Angel) does not have his own measure.
¹ Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 interserunt esse. ² Ver. 1: Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est et cum illo fuit semper et est ante aevum. — In sequente propositione ex cod. cc et ed. 1 supplevimus verba si ante aevum dicit quid increatum, quibus additis argumentatio redditur planior et magis congruit Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. n. 9. a. 1. arg. 1. ³ Libr. III. Metro 9. — Paulo inferius codd. P Q exit ab aliquo pro exit ab alio. ⁴ Cap. 10. § 3. ⁵ Plures codd. ut F L U cc et ed. 1 adiiciunt secundum. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 105. (c. 11.). ⁶ Cod. aa limitatam habet mensuram; in cod. F autem hic additur propriam. ⁷ Quaest. 65 ad Oros. q. 40: Movet itaque se ipsum sine tempore et loco, movet creatum spiritum sine loco temporaliter, movet creaturam corpoream temporaliter et localiter. Cfr. VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. n. 39. ⁸ Expost. in c. 1. Gen., ubi etiam a Lyrano allegatur. ⁹ Vat. maioris. In multis mss. et ed. 1 omittitur particula non. ¹⁰ Cod. O sicut vult Philosophus, qui IV. Phys. text. 134. (c. 14.) ait: Dicitur autem recte, quod numerus quidem est idem ovium [versio Arabico-latina hominum] et canum, si aequalis uterque est; denarius autem non idem, neque decem eadem. Cfr. ibid. text. 132. — Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. post mensurantur adiungit et numerantur.	¹ Some codices, together with edition 1, insert that there is [esse]. ² Verse 1: All wisdom is from the Lord God and with Him it always was and it is before the aevum [Omnis sapientia a Domino Deo est et cum illo fuit semper et est ante aevum]. — In the following proposition from codex cc and edition 1 we have supplied the words if “before the aevum” means something uncreated [si ante aevum dicit quid increatum], with which added the argument is rendered plainer and more congruent with Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 12, n. 9, a. 1, 1st argument. ³ Book III, Meter 9. — A little below this codices P and Q have from something [ab aliquo] for from another [ab alio]. ⁴ Chapter 10, § 3. ⁵ Several codices, such as F L U and cc, and edition 1 add according to [secundum]. — On the major (of the argument), cf. Aristotle, Physics., Bk. IV, text 105, (ch. 11). ⁶ Codex aa reads has a ‘to be’, has a limited measure [habet esse limitatam habet mensuram] for has a ‘to be’ limited in act, has a measure [habet esse limitatum actu, habet mensuram]; in codex F, however, there is read has its own measure [habet mensuram propriam] for has a measure [habet mensuram]. ⁷ Sixty-Five Questions to Orosius, Q. 40: And so He moves Himself without time and place, He moves the created spirit without place temporally, He moves the corporeal creature temporally and locally. Cf. On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, ch. 20, n. 39. ⁸ In his Exposition on Genesis, Chapter 1, where he is even cited by (Nicholas) of Lyra. ⁹ The Vatican edition has a greater [maioris]. In many manuscripts and edition 1 there is omitted the particle not [non]. ¹⁰ Codex O reads just as the Philosopher would have it [sicut vult Philosophus], who in Physics, Bk. IV, text 134 (ch. 14) says: Moreover it is rightly said, that there is indeed the same number of eggs [in the Arabic-Latin version of men] and of dogs, if each is equal; but the group of ten (is) not the same, nor (are) the ten the same. Cf. ibid., text 132. — The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, after are measured [mensurantur] adjoins and are numbered [et numerantur].

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6. Item, per impossibile: si habent mensuram, aut est substantia, aut est accidens; non substantia: ergo accidens. Si accidens, in quo genere? Non nisi in genere quantitatis; non discretae: ergo continuae. Sed non est linea neque superficies, nec corpus nec locus: ergo vel est tempus, vel nihil:¹ aut ergo angelica natura nullam habet mensuram, aut si habet, non habet propriam.	6. Likewise, (it seems) through the impossible: if (spiritual beings) have a measure, either (their measure) is a substance, or it is an accident; (but it is) not a substance: therefore (it is) an accident. If (it is) an accident, in what genus (is it)? Not but in the genus of quantity; not a discrete (quantity): therefore a continuous one. But (their measure) is not a line nor a surface, nor a body nor a place: therefore either (their measure) is time, and/or nothing:¹ therefore either the angelic nature has no measure, or if it does have (one), it does not have its own (measure).
CONCLUSIO. Creaturae spirituales secundum earum esse immutabile habent propriam mensuram, diversam a tempore, quae dicitur aeviternitas.	CONCLUSION Spiritual creatures according to their immutable ‘being’ have their own measure, diverse from time, which (measure) is said (to be) “eviternity”.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum angelica natura habeat mensuram propriam, diversam a tempore, distinguendum est, quia aut loquimur de mensura spiritualium secundum esse, quod non mutatur, aut secundum affectiones. Si ergo de mensura loquimur, quae respicit esse, et quae dicitur aevum, hoc modo consuevit ab antiquis doctoribus responderi: aut loqueris de diversitate in genere mensurae, aut in genere entis. Si in genere mensurae, sic oportet ponere differentiam, sicut ostendunt auctoritates et rationes ad primam partem² inductae. Si vero loqueris de diversitate in genere entis, sic triplex fuit opinio.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that when one is asked, whether angelic nature has its own measure, diverse from time, one must distinguish, because either we are speaking of the measure of spiritual (beings) according to (their) ‘to be’, which is not changed, or according to (their) affections. Therefore, if we speak of the measure, which respects (their) ‘to be’, and which is said (to be) the “aevum”, in this manner one is accustomed from the ancient doctors to respond: “Either you are speaking of a diversity in the genus of the measure, or in the genus of being.” If in the genus of measure, thus it is necessary [oportet] to posit a difference, just as the authorities and reasons brought forward for the first side² show. But if you are speaking of a diversity in the genus of being, thus there was a threefold opinion.
Nam quidam dixerunt, quod sicut locus et superficies idem sunt per essentiam, differentia secundum comparationem, sic idem est nunc aevi et temporis, sola comparatione differens. Nunc enim respicit substantiam rei;³ substantia autem primi mobilis quantum ad esse omnino est immobilis; comparata autem ad situm, est mobilis. Et primo modo mensuratur nunc aevi, secundo modo nunc temporis, ita quod idem est nunc, diversimode comparatum, sicut idem ultimum, comparatum ad corpus ambiens, est superficies, comparatum ad corpus ambitum, est locus.⁴ — Sed illud non potest stare, quia circa ultimum corporis illae duae comparationes non sunt incompossibiles; sed nunc temporis et aevi habent proprietates incompossibiles circa idem. Nam, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum,⁵ hoc, scilicet nunc aevi, est stabile, illud, scilicet nunc temporis, est fluxibile; sed impossibile est, quod unum et idem et secundum idem simul moveatur et stet.	For certain (authors) have said, that just as place and surface are the same through essence, differing according to a comparison, so the now of the aevum and (the now) of time is the same, differing by a comparison alone. For the now respects the substance of the thing;³ but the substance of the first mobile (sphere) as much as regards (its) ‘to be’ is entirely immobile; but compared to (its) location [situm], it is mobile. And in the first manner the now of the aevum is measured, in the second manner the now of time (is measured; so that there is the same now, compared in a diverse manner, just as (there is) the same end [ultimum], compared to a surrounding body [corpus ambiens], is a surface, compared to a surrounded body [corpus ambitum], is a place.⁴ — But that cannot stand, because concerning [circa] the end of a body those two comparisons are not co-impossible [incompossibiles]; but the now of time and (the now) of the aevum have co-impossible properties about the same. For, just as (St.) Augustine says in the book Of Eighty-Three Questions,⁵ the latter, that is the now of the aevum, is stable, the former, that is the now of time, is flexible (i. e. able to flow); but it is impossible, that the one and the same both together move and stand still according to the same.
Et ideo est secunda positio, quod ipsum nunc sequitur essentiam materiae primae. Sicut igitur materia in omnibus est eadem per essentiam, differens per esse;⁶ sic nunc temporis et aevi idem est per essentiam, non sicut individuum, sed ad modum materiae idem per essentiam,⁷ differens autem solum quantum ad esse. Et hi posuerunt, quod omnis rei quidditas mensura eadem per essentiam mensuratur. — Sed nec illud multum est intelligibile. Cum enim aevum esse stabile et quietum respiciat, quod quidem habet materia a forma perfecta, et haec mensura non respiciat nisi esse actuale et modum essendi completum; videtur, quod aevum non possit sic accipi ex parte materiae, quidquid sit de tempore. Cum ergo modus durandi essentialiter et formaliter differat hinc inde, patet etiam, quod mensura propria.	And for that reason there is a second position, that the very now (of a thing) follows the essence of prime matter. Therefore, must as the matter in all (things) is the same through essence, differing through a ‘to be’,⁶ so the now of time and (the now) of the aevum is the same through essence, not as an individual, but the same through essence⁷ according to matter’s standard of measure [ad modum materiae], but differing only as much as regards (their) ‘to be’. And these posited, that the quiddity of every thing is measured by the same measure through essence. — But neither is that very intelligible. For since the aevum respects a stable and quiet ‘to be’, which matter indeed has from a perfect form, and (since) this measure does not respect but an actual ‘to be’ and a complete manner of being; it seems, that the aevum cannot thus be accepted on the part of matter, whatever may concern time. Therefore since (its) manner of enduring differs essentially and formally from the latter, hence, it is clear too, that (its) measure (is) its own.
Et ideo est tertia positio, quod spiritualia habent mensuram diversam a tempore, non solum in genere mensurae, verum etiam in genere entis; et hoc non solum comparatione, sed etiam secundum substantiam et formam. Quidquid autem sit de diversitate in genere entis, diversitatem tamen secundum modum mensurandi nemo est qui negare possit. Et hoc sufficit quaestioni praesenti, qua quaeritur, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram diversam a corporalibus. Dicendum enim, quod sic.	And for that reason there is a third position, that spiritual (beings) have measure diverse from time, not only in the genus of the measure, but even in the genus of being; and this not only by a comparison, but even according to substance and form. Moreover whatever concerns the diversity in the genus of being, yet there is no one who can deny that there can (be) a diversity according to the manner of measuring. And this suffices for the present Question, by which there is asked, “Whether spiritual (beings) have a measure diverse from corporal (beings)?” For it must be said, that yes (they do).
Quod si quaeras, quae sit illa; respondendum secundum Sanctos et philosophos,⁸ quod dicitur aeternitas creata aut aevum; sed quoniam aeternitas proprie accipitur pro increato, et aevum frequenter accipitur pro tempore, ideo proprio nomine potest aeviternitas appellari. Sic respondendum est, si quaeratur de mensura, quae respicit ipsum esse spiritualis creaturae, esse, inquam, immutabile et perpetuum. — Si autem quaeratur de mensura an- / -gelicarum affectionum, . . .	Wherefore if you ask, what that (measure) is; one must respond according to the Saints and philosophers,⁸ that it is called [dicitur] the “created eternity” or the “aevum”, but since “eternity” is properly accepted for the uncreated, and “aevum” is frequently accepted for time, for that reason it can be called with a proper name “the eviternity” [aeviternitas]. Thus must one respond, if one is asked concerning the measure, which respects the very ’to be’ of a spiritual creature, the ‘to be’, I say, (which is) immutable and perpetual. — But if one is asks concerning the measure of the an- / -gelic affections, . . .
¹ Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quantitate, ubi hae species enumerantur. ² Verba ad primam partem supplevimus fide cod. cc et ed. 1. ³ Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 104. (c. 11.): « Nunc sequitur id quod fertur, ut tempus motum ». Quae verba S. Thomas in Commentario super hunc locum (lect. 18.) ita exponit: « Sicut tempus ad motum (se habet), ita et nunc ad mobile . . . Ex hac autem consideratione de facili potest accipi, intellectus aeternitatis. Ipsum enim nunc, in quantum respondet mobili se habenti aliter et aliter, discernit prius et posterius in tempore et suo fluxu tempus facit, sicut punctus lineam. Sublata igitur alia et alia dispositione a mobili, remanet substantia semper eodem modo se habens; unde intelligitur nunc ut semper stans, et non ut fluens nec habens prius et posterius ». Secundum Fr. Gulielmum de Marra, II. Sent. d. 2. q. 1. propositio de substantia primi mobilis, quae modo sequitur, est Averrois (VIII. Metaph. text. 12. et I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 95.), qui etiam IV. Phys. text. 104. ait: Instans quodammodo est quasi idem et nunquam transmutabile, et quodammodo est transmutabile et multiplicabile, et causa in hoc est, quia translatum est tale. — Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 Nunc aevi pro Nunc enim. ⁴ Qui ideo ab Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 39. seqq. (c. 4.) definitur: terminus corporis continentis. ⁵ Quaest. 72: An tempora aeterna aevum significavit, inter quod et tempus, hoc distat, quod illud stabile est, tempus autem mutabile? ⁶ Cfr. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3. ⁷ Solummodo Vat. omittit idem per essentiam. ⁸ Cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 100. (c. 9.), ubi caelo et rebus caelestibus attribuit hoc nomen aiwn, quod diversimode vertitur: aeternitas, sempiternitas, saeculum, aevum. Paulo superius Vat. a tempore pro a corporalibus.	¹ Cf. Aristotle, On the Predicaments., ch. “On Quantity”, where these species are enumerated. ² We have supplied the words for the first side [ad primam partem], trusting in codex cc and edition 1. ³ Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text 104 (ch. 11): « A now follows that which is borne, as time (follows) movement ». Which words St. Thomas expounds in his Commentary on this passage (lecture 18) thus: « Just as time (holds itself) to movement, so also now to the movable . . . Moreover from this there can be accepted from an easy consideration, the understanding of eternity. For the very now, inasmuch as it responds to a movable holding itself in one and another manner, discerns the before and after in time and by its flowing makes time, just as a point (by it flowing makes) a line. Therefore, with this and that disposition withdrawn from the movable, there remains a substance holding itself always in the same manner; wherefore the now (of a thing) is understood as always standing still, and not as flowing, nor as having a before and an after ». According to Father Guigliemo de Marra, Sent, Bk. II, d. 2, q. 1, the proposition concerning the substance of the first mobile (sphere), which next follows, is that of Averroës (Metaphysics., Bk. VIII, text. 12, and On Heaven and the World., Bk. I, text 95), who also on Physics., Bk. IV, text 104 says: The instant in a certain manner is a quasi same and never transmutable, and in a certain manner is a transmutable and a multipliable, and is a cause in this, because (when) transferred it is such. — The Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2 and 3, has The now of the aevum [Nunc aevi] instead of For the now [Nunc enim]. ⁴ Which is therefore defined by Aristotle, Physics., Bk. IV, text 39 ff. (ch. 4) as: “the terminus of a containing body”. ⁵ Question 72: “Whether the aevum signified eternal times, between which (aevum) and time, there is this distance, that the former is stable, but time (is) mutable?” ⁶ Cf. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, qq. 2 and 3. ⁷ Only the Vatican edition omits the same through essence [idem per essentiam]. ⁸ Cf. Aristotle, On Heaven and the World, Bk. I, text 100 (ch. 9), where he attributes to Heaven and celestial things this name: aiwn, which is diversely rendered as eternity [aeternitas], sempiternity [sempiternitas], the age [saeculum], the aevum [aevum]. A little above this the Vatican edition has from time [a tempore] for from corporal (beings) [a coporalibus].

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an- / -gelicarum affectionum, utrum illa sit a tempore diversa; hoc habebit quaestionem infra.¹ Nunc autem planum est, quod illa mensura, quae dicitur aeviternitas, variationem affectionum non mensurat, ut dicit Augustinus ad Orosium.² Aevum enim solius esse incommutabilis est mensura.	the an- / -gelic affections, whether that is diverse from time; this will have a Question below.¹ But now it is plain, that that measure, which is called “the eviternity”, does not measure the variation of affections, as (St.) Augustine says To Orosius.² For the aevum is the measure of incommutable ‘being’ alone.
Concedendum igitur, sicut ostendunt rationes, quod aliquo modo spiritualia habent mensuram propriam respectu temporis et temporalium.	It must be conceded, therefore, just as the reason show, that in some manner spiritual (beings) do have their own measure in respect of time and of (things) temporal.
1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod spiritualis natura movetur per tempora; iam patet responsio: hoc enim dicit quantum ad affectiones, non quantum ad esse.	1. What, therefore, is objected, that the spiritual nature is moved through times; the response is already clear: for (St. Augustine) says this as much as regards (their) affections, not as much as regards their ‘to be’.
2. Quod obiicitur de quatuor primo creatis, dicendum, quod nomen temporis extenditur ibi ad omnis durationis mensuram, cuius est ponere principium; unde valde large accipitur et comprehendit aevum, ut melius infra patebit.³	2. What is objected concerning the four, first created (things), it must be said, that the name of “time” is extended there to the measure of every duration, for which there is a positing of a beginning; wherefore it is accepted very broadly [vale large] and comprehends the aevum, as will be more clear below.³
3. Quod obiicitur de loco, non valet, quia locus corporalis non est mensura spiritualium, quamvis contineat; aevum autem mensurat et conformatur;⁴ ideo non valet: est unus locus non mensurans, ergo unum tempus mensurans. — Si quaeras a me, unde hoc; dicendum, quod Angelus vere habet durationem, sed non habet extensionem; et ideo habet mensuram durationis, non extensionis.	3. What is objected concerning place, is not valid, because a corporal place is not the measure of spiritual (beings), even though it may contain (them); but the aevum does measure (them) and is conformed (to them);⁴ for that reason (this argument) is not valid: ‘there is one place not measuring, therefore (there is) one time measuring’. — If you ask me, “Whence (is) this?”; it must be said, that an Angel truly has a duration, but does not have an extension; and for that reason he has a measure of duration, not of extension.
4. Quod obiicitur de numero, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia idem est modus distinctionis in spiritualibus et corporalibus; sed non est idem modus durationis. Ideo eadem est secundum speciem mensura distinctionis, non sic eadem mensura durationis.	4. What is objected concerning number, it must be said, that it is not similar, because there is the same manner of distinction among spiritual and corporal (beings); but the manner of duration is not the same. For that reason there is the same measure of distinction according to (its) species, not so the same measure of duration.
5. Quod obiicitur de homine beato et Angelo, dicendum, quod mensura consimili mensurantur, scilicet aevo, quia consimilem habent modum durandi; sed homo viator non mensuratur consimili mensura, quia, quamvis habeat idem esse, habet tamen modum essendi et durandi alium; et mensura non tantum esse, sed etiam modum durandi respicit.	5. What is objected concerning the beatified man and the Angel, it must be said, that they are measured by a consimilar measure [mensura consimili], namely, by the aevum, because they have a consimilar manner of enduring; but the wayfaring man is not measured by a consimilar measure, because, though he has the same ‘to be’, yet he has another manner of being and enduring; and a measure does not only respects the ‘to be’ (of a thing), but also (its) manner of enduring.
6. Quod quaeritur: in quo genere sit mensura angelicae durationis; aliqui dicunt, quod non est quantitas nisi quantitas virtutis, et ideo non est in genere quantitatis proprie.⁵ — Sed si vere mensura est, quomodo non est quantitas vera?	6. What is asked: “In which genus is the measure of the duration of an Angel?”; some say, that it is no quantity but the quantity of virtue, and for that reason it is not in the genus of quantity properly (speaking).⁵ — But if it truly is a measure, in what manner is it not a true quantity?
Ideo dicunt alii, quod est in genere quantitatis sicut principium. — Si tamen quaeratur, cuius sit principium, cum dicat mensuram diversam a tempore, ut ostensum est; difficile erit assignare.⁶	For that reason others say, that it is in the genus of quantity as a beginning. — However, if it be asked, “Of what is it a beginning, since, as has been shown, it means a measure diverse from time?”; it will be difficult to assign.⁶
Et ideo sanius potest dici, quod sicut tempus ponitur in substantiis spiritualibus quantum ad affectiones, secundum Augustinum, licet consideratio Philosophi ad illud non conscenderit; sic et⁷ mensura ponitur differens specie ab aliis quantitatibus, licet de illa non loquatur Philosophus, quia mensuras rerum inferiorum determinare intendebat. Nec ponitur ex hoc in ipso insufficientia; et si etiam poneretur, non esset propter hoc a veritatis tramite aliquatenus discedendum.⁸	And for that reason it can be more sanely said, that just as time is posited in spiritual substances as much as regards (their) affections, according to (St.) Augustine, though the consideration of the Philosopher did not ascend [conscenderit] to this; thus too (as much as regards the ‘to be’ of spiritual substances)⁷ there is posited a measure differing in species from other quantities, even though the Philosopher does not speak of this, because he intended to determine the measure of inferior things. Nor is there posited from this an insufficiently in him; and even if (such) were posited, one would not, on account of this, have to depart to any extent from the foot-path of the truth.⁸
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. De multis mensurae speciebus copiose tractat Richard. a Med. (hic. a. 2. q. 1.). Mensura, de qua hic agitur, refertur ad existentiam actualem. Differt autem vale existentia in creatis rebus corruptibilibus, in incorruptibilibus et in Deo. Hinc est etiam triplex existentiae duratio, quae importat permanentiam existentiae, et triplex durationis mensura, scil. tempus, aevum, aeternitas. — Patet autem, quod etiam rerum corruptibilium motibus continuo fluentibus substat aliquod esse permanens, licet variabile et transmutabile tum secundum existentiam, tum secundum operationem. Harum propria mensura est tempus, quod secundum Aristotelem definitur: numerus motus secundum prius et posterius (cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 1). — In Deo vero essentia, existentia, operatio idem sunt et invariabile; unde divinae existentiae mensura est aeternitas, carens initio, fine, mutabilitate, unde cum Boethio apte definitur: interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio (cfr. I. Sent. d. 9. q. 3.). — Aevum denique, quasi medium tenens inter tempus et aeternitatem, mensurat durationem entis creati, quod quidem naturaliter quoad esse habet incorruptibilitatem, initium tamen, et quoad operationes et affectionis variationem. — Doctores, exceptis paucis Nominalibus, recte tenent, tum aevum realiter differre a tempore, tum rationi aevi et temporis respondere aliquid reale, sive, ut dicit S. Bonv. (hic q. 2. in corp.), est « dispositio rei extra, non fictio animae », licet actualis numeratio sit a parte animae. Hinc a Stephano Parisiensi Episc. a 1276 condemnata est thesis, « quod aevum et tempus nihil sunt in re, sed solum in apprehensione ». (Collect. iudic. t. I. p. 197. Cap. XI. Errores de mundo etc. n. 19.).	I. Richard of Middleton treats copiously of the many species of measure (here in a. 2, q. 1). The measure, which is dealt with hear, refers to the actual existence (of a thing). However existence differs very much in created, corruptible things, in incorruptible (things), and in God. Hence there is also a threefold duration of existence, which conveys the permanence of existence, and a threefold measure of (its) duration, namely time, the aevum, and eternity. — Moreover it is clear, that some permanent ‘being’ also stands beneath the continual flowing movements of corruptible things, even though (it is) variable and transmutable both according to existence, and according to operation. The proper measure of these (corruptible beings) is time, which according to Aristotle is defined as: “the number of a movement according to a before and an after” (cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, p. 20, footnote 1). — But in God essence, existence, (and) operation are the Same and (are) invariable; wherefore the measure of the Divine Existence is eternity, lacking a start, an end, (and) a mutability; wherefore with (St. Severinus) Boethius it is aptly defined as: “the entire and perfect possession together of an interminable life” (cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 8, q. 3). — Next the aevum, holding (itself) as a quasi medium between time and eternity, measures the duration of created being, which indeed in regard to (its) ‘to be’, naturally has an incorruptibility, yet (also) a start, and in regard to (its) operations and affections (also) a variation. — The doctors (of theology), except a few Nominalists, rightly hold, that the aevum both really differs from time, and that something real responds to the reckoning of the aevum and of time, or, as St. Bonaventure says (here in q. 2, in the body of the Response), there is « a disposition of the thing outside (the thing), not a fiction of the soul », though (its) actual numeration is on the part of the soul. Hence by Bishop Stephen of Paris in A. D. 1276 there was condemned the thesis, « that the aevum and time are nothing in reality [nihil in re], but only in apprehension ». (Collectio iudiciorum. tome I, p. 197, chapter XI, “Errors concerning the world” etc., n. 19.
II. Pro faciliore intelligentia plurium locorum in haec et seqq. quaest., ex Richardo a Med. (loc. cit.) notamus, quod . . .	II. For an easier understanding of the many passages in this and the following questions, we note from Richard of Middleton, that . . .
¹ Art. 2. q. 1. et. 2. ² Quaest. 40. et 41, ubi affectionibus Angelorum assignat tempus tanquam mensuram eorum. Cfr. supra argum. 1. ad opp. et eius solutio, una cum verbis Augustini, 83 Qq. q. 72, hic in corp. citatis. ³ Art. 2. q. 3. ⁴ Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 115. seqq. (c. 12.), ubi ostendit, in tempore esse idem esse ac tempore mensurari, non autem idem esse cum tempore esse, sicut nec idem est in loco esse et cum loco esse, adeoque sempiterna, licet sint cum tempore, non esse in tempore. — Mox aliqui codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4 in sensu obiectionis mensurans pro non mensurans, quod explicat Vat. ponendo continens. Paulo superius post quamvis contineat supplet cod. N spiritualia. ⁵ Huius sententiae videtur fuisse Alex. Hal. S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. ad 3. Cfr. infra q. 3. fund. 4. et in corp. — De quantitate virtutis I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1, d. 19, p. I. q. 2; infra d. 15. a. 1. q. 2. ⁶ Cod. aa rationem assignare. — Cfr. q. 3. fundam. 4. ⁷ Subaudi: quantum ad esse substantiarum spiritualium. Hinc cod. O mox perperam indifferens pro differens. ⁸ Guliel. de Mara (Marra) hic q. 1, ad eandem obiectionem respondet: Dicendum, quod Philosophus non enumerat omnes species quantitatis in libro Praedicamentorum, sed tantum famosas, sicut ait Commentator (Averroes), V. Metaph. cap. de Quantitate (text. 18.), ubi ponit Philosophus, motum esse speciem quantitatis.	¹ Article 2, qq. 1 and 2. ² Questions 40 and 41, where to the affections of the Angels he assigns time as their measure. Cf. above 1st opposed argument and its solution, together with the words of (St.) Augustine, Of Eight-Three Questions, Q. 72, cited here in the body of the Question. ³ Article 2, q. 3. ⁴ Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text 115 ff., (ch. 12), where he shows, that ‘to be in time’ is the same as ‘to be measured by time’, but is not the same ‘to be with time’, just as it is neither the same ‘to be in a place’ and ‘to be with a place’, and to this extent sempiternals, though they are with time, are not in time. — Next some codices, together with editions 2, 3, and 4, have measuring [mensurans] for not measuring [non measurans] in the sense of an objection, which the Vatican edition explains by putting containing [continens]. A little above this after it may contain [contineat] codex N supplies spiritual (beings) [spiritualia]. ⁵ Alexander of Hales seems to have held this sentence, Summa., p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1, in reply to n. 3. Cf. below q. 3, 4th argument of the fundament and in the body of the Question. — On the quantity of virtue, (cf.) Sent., Bk. I, d. 17, p. II, q. 1; d. 19, p. I, q. 2; and below in d. 15, a. 1. q. 2. ⁶ Codex aa reads (it is) difficult to assign a reason [difficile rationem assignare] for it will be difficult to assign [difficile erit assignare]. ⁷ Understand: as much as regards the ‘to be’ of spiritual substances [quantum ad esse substantiarum spiritualium]. Hence codex O next has faultily undiffering [differens] for differing [differens]. ⁸ Fr. Guigliemo de Marra here in q. 1, responds to this objection (saying): It must be said, that the Philosopher does not enumerate every species of quantity in (his) book On Predicaments, but only the noteworthy ones, just as the Commentator (Averroës) says, Metaphysics., Bk. V, ch. “on Quantity” (text 18), where the Philosopher posits, that movement is a species of quantity.

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in existentia rerum corruptibilium est triplex mensura: « una intrinseca existens in ipso [scil. in esse variabili] sicut in subiecto. Haec est propria continuatio illius, quae extenso nomine temporis tempus posset vocari [apud recentiores tempus intrinsecum], quamvis improprie, quia sic possent dici multa tempora, eo quod numerantur secundum numerationem motuum. — Alia extrinseca et in genere; et illa est tempus proprie dictum, quod idem est quod continuatio durationis motus, ab anima numerata, qua, mediante motu, cuius est passio, mensurat anima durationes motuum aliorum [tempus extrinsecum]. Et haec est in motu primi mobilis manifeste nobis noti, sicut in subiecto. Ad alios autem motus non comparatur sicut accidens ad subiectum, sed sicut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde illius solius motus, in quo est sicut in subiecto, est mensura intrinseca; aliorum autem motuum est mensura extrinseca. — Praedicto etiam esse debetur mensura extrinseca et extra genus, et illa Deus est sub ratione, qua est in se habens superexcellenter quidquid est perfectionis in durationibus omnium motionum ». — Simili modo Richardus in esse uniformiter se habente et stabili sive aeviterno triplicem distinguit mensuram: « una intrinseca, scil. propria duratio cuiuslibet aeviterni, existens in suo esse sicut in subiecto, quae extenso nomine aevi posset vocari aevum, quamvis non proprie; et sic tot sunt aeva, quot aeviterna. Alia est extrinseca et in genere; et illa est duratio nobilissimi aeviterni, existens in esse illius sicut in subiecto, ad esse autem aliorum aeviternorum non comparatur sicut accidens ad subiectum, sed sicut mensura ad mensuratum [in hoc non consentit S. Bonv. hic q. 2.], quamvis non ita plene habeat rationem mensurae, sicut tempus respectu temporalium . . . Tertia est extrinseca et extra genus; et illa est ipse Deus, sub ratione qua aeternitas ». Et his facile intelligitur, quid Seraphico sit « diversitas in genere entis et in genere mensurandi » (hic in corp.).

in the existence of corruptible things there is a threefold measure: « one intrinsic, existing in it (namely, in the variable ‘being’), just as in a subject. This is the proper continuation of it, which under an extended name could be called “time” (which more recent authors term “intrinsic time”), though improperly, because thus there could be said to be many “times”, by this that they are numbered according to the numbering of movements. — Another is extrinsic and in a genus (of the thing); and that is “time” properly said, which is the same as the continuation of the duration of the movement (of the thing), numbered by the soul, by which, by means of the movement, whose passion it is, the soul measures the durations of other movements (which more recent authors term “extrinsic time”). And this is manifestly in the movement of the first mobile (sphere) known to us, as in a subject. But it is not compared to other movements as an accident to a subject, but as a measure to the measured. Wherefore the movement of that alone, in which it is as in a subject, is an intrinsic measure; but it is the extrinsic measure of other movements. — According to the aforesaid, ‘being’ ought also the measure extrinsic and outside of a genus, and that is God under the reckoning, by which He is one having in Himself whatever belongs super-excellently to perfection in the durations of all movements ». — In a similar manner Richard distinguished a threefold measure in a ‘to be’ holding itself uniformly and stable or in eviternal (‘being’): « one intrinsic, namely the proper duration of any eviternal, existing in its own ‘to be’ as in a subject, which under the extended name of “aevum” could be called an “aevum”, though not properly; and in this manner there are as many aeva, as eviternals. Another is extrinsic and in a genus; and that is the duration of the most noble eviternal, existing in its ‘to be’ as in a subject, but (which) is not compared to the ‘to be’ of other eviternals as an accident (is) to a subject, but as a measure to a measured (St. Bonaventure does not consent to this, here in q. 2), though it does not have fully the reckoning of a measure, as time (does) in respect of temporals . . . The third is extrinsic and outside of a genus; and that is God Himself, under the reckoning by which (He is) Eternity ». And with these there is easily understood, what according to the Seraphic (Doctor) is « a diversity in the genus of being » and « in the genus of measuring » (here in the body of the Question).

III. In solutione huius quaestionis doctores communiter conveniunt; sed in determinandis seqq. et aliis quaestionibus de aevo diversae fuerunt opiniones. Ad rem Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.): « Multa, quae de ea materia dicuntur, certitudine carent et opinative promuntur magis quam assertive ». — Alii auctores plerumque hanc praecise quaestionem non explicite tractant, excepto Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1.); plures de eadem re loquuntur in duabus seqq. qq., vel in quaest. de differentia aeternitatis, aevi, et temporis, ut Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 10. a. 4. 5. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. dub. lat. 6. 7. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 9. q. 7. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.

III. In the solution to this question the doctors (of theology) commonly convene; but in determining the following and other questions concerning the aevum there were diverse opinions. Regarding this (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian says (here in q. 2): « Many (things), which are said concerning this matter, lack certitude and are advanced more in the manner of an opinion than an assertion ». — For the most part, other authors do explicitly treat precisely of this question, except Richard of Middleton (here in a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, q. 1); several speak of the same matter in the two subsequent questions, and/or in the question concerning the difference of eternity, the aevum, and time, such as Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 10, aa. 4 and 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, lateral doubts 6 and 7. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals., 9, q. 7. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION II