S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION II

PARS I.

PART I

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 58-61.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 58-61.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum omnium aeviternorum sit unum aevum.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether of all eviternals there is one aevum.

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram unam per essentiam; et hoc est quaerere, utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum.  Et quod non, videtur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether spiritual (beings) have one measure through essence; and this is to ask, whether there is one aevum for all eviternals.  And it seems, that (there is) not.

1. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus:1  « Ipse est aevum aevorum »:  ergo plura sunt aeva; non per interruptionem, ita quod unum post aliud:  ergo per diversitatem simul existentium.

1. (St.) Dionysius (says) On the Divine Names:1  « He is the aevum of aeva »:  therefore there are many aeva; not through interruption, so that one (is) after another:  therefore through a diversity of (aeva) existing together.

2. Item, unitas accidentis venit ab unitate subiecti;2 sed non est ponere unum subiectum omnium aeviternorum, cum quaedam spiritualia non habeant aliquod commune, ad cuius aspectum mensurentur:  ergo non est ponere, aevum esse unum.  Quod autem nullum habeant tale subiectum, quod sit contentivum spiritualium, hoc apparet, quod illud haberet excellentiam et influentiam et continentiam respectu aeviternorum, sicut primum mobile respectu temporalium; sed tale respectu substantiarum spiritualium inveniri non potest, ut patet discurrenti per singula:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, the unity of an accident comes from the unity of the subject;2 but there is no positing of one subject of all eviternals, since certain spirituals do not have something common, according to which aspect they are measured:  therefore there is no positing, that there is one aevum.  But that they have no such subject, which is contentive of spirituals, appears by this, that (such a subject) would have an excellence and influence and continence* in respect of eviternals, just as the first mobile (sphere does) in respect of (things) temporal; but such in respect of spiritual substances cannot be found, as is clear to the one examining them individually [discurrenti per singula]:  ergo etc..

3. Item, omnibus aliis3 corruptis, possibile est, unicum Angelum remanere, cum non dependeat ab aliis; et si remanet in esse completo, habet mensuram consequentem illud esse, et hoc est aevum:  ergo remanet aevum, quolibet Angelo remanente, et totum remanet et perfectum:  ergo quot sunt Angeli, tot sunt aeva.

3. Likewise, with all others3 corrupted, it is possible, that a unique Angel remains, since he does not depend upon the others; and if he remains in (his) complete ‘to be’, he has a measure consequent to that ‘to be’, and this is an aevum:  therefore an aevum remains, with any Angel remaining; and it remains whole and perfect:  therefore as many as are the Angels, so many are the aeva.

4. Item, aevum est mensura rei perfectae et multum habentis de specie sive de forma:  si ergo4 aevum maxime consequitur esse completum, cum illud non sit unum numero, sed tantum specie, videtur, quod aevum sit unum tantum secundum speciem.

4. Likewise, an aevum is the measure of a perfect thing and of one having much of species or of form:  if, therefore,4 an aevum is consequent most of all to a complete ‘to be’, since that is not one in number, but only in species, it seems, that an aevum is one only according to species.

CONTRA HOC 1. arguitur a simili.  Sicut se habet tempus ad temporalia, ita aevum ad aeviterna; sed tempus est unum, quod mensurat omnia temporalia, sicut Anselmus5 dicit et Philosophus:  ergo similiter unum est aevum, quod mensurat omnia aeviterna.

AGAINST THIS 1. one argues from a simile.  Just as time holds itself to temporals, so an aevum to eviternals; but the time, which measures all temporals, is one, just as (St.) Anselm5 says and the Philosopher (too):  therefore similarly one is the aevum, which measures all eviternals.

2. Item, hoc videtur a minori.  Maior est varietas et difformitas in rebus mutabilibus quam in rebus immutabilibus:  si ergo mutabilia omnia possunt unica mensura per essentiam mensurari, ergo multo fortius aeviterna.

2. Likewise, this seems from the lesser.  Greater is the variety and difformity in mutable things than in immutable things:  if, therefore, all mutables can be measured by a measure unique through essence, therefore much more strongly eviternals.

3. Item, hoc videtur a causa.  Positio enim multorum est, quare tempus unum potest esse:  quia, quamvis sit accidens, tamen est mensura extrinseca, sicut locus, et quia non est accidens situale; sed hoc totum invenitur in aevo:  ergo etc.

3. Likewise, this seems from the cause.  For the position of many is, (that) time can be one for this reason:  because, though it is an accident, yet it is an extrinsic measure, just as place (is), and because it is not the accident of a location [accidens situale]; but this whole (reckoning) is found in the aevum:  ergo etc..

1  Cap. 5. § 5, et c. 10. § 3. in fine, ubi loquitur de Deo, ut est origo et auctor omnis temporis et aevi.

2  Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.), de quo vide tom. I. pag. 411, nota 6.  Cfr. etiam Boeth., de Unitate et Uno.

3  Cod. Q interserit Angelis, quod Vat. ponit inferius post ab aliis.

4  Plurimi codd. minus congrue enim.

5  Dialog. de Veritate, c. 13. in fine, ubi ad probandum, quod veritas improprie dicatur huius vel illius rei, cum res secundum illam sint, adducit simile de tempore:  « Quemadmodum dicitur tempus huius vel illius rei, cum unum et idem sit tempus omnium, quae sunt in eodem tempore simul; et si non esset haec vel illa res, non minus esset idem tempus ».  Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 93. (c. 10.), contra opinionem Platonis, secundum quam tempus est motus totius caeli, et partes eius sunt partes temporis, arguit sic:  « Si plures essent caeli, similiter utique esset tempus cuiuslibet ipsorum motus; quare multa tempora simul ».  Ex quibus verbis deducitur, iuxta mentem Aristotelis unum tantum esse tempus, etiamsi essent plures caeli. Cfr. etiam XII. Metaph. text. 49. (XI. c. 8.).

1  Chapter 5, § 5, and ch. 10, § 3 at the end, where he speaks of God, as the origin and author of every time and aevum.

2  Aristotle, Topics., Bk. I, ch. 6 (ch. 5), concerning which, see Sent., Bk. I, d. 33, a. 2, q. 1, p. 411, footnote 6.  Cf. also (St. Severinus) Boethius, On Unity and the One.

3  Codex O inserts all other Angels [omnibus aliis Angelis] for all others [omnibus aliis]; the Vatican edition, below this, also reads upon the other Angels [ab aliis Angelis] for upon the others [ab aliis].

4  Very many codices have less congruously for if [si enim] for if, therefore, [si ergo].

5  Dialogue on the Truth., ch. 13, at the end, where to prove, that “truth” is improperly said of this and that thing, since they are according to it, he adduces a simile concerning time:  « According to which standard of measure “time” is said of this and/or that thing, since there is one and the same time of all, which are together in the same time; and if this and/or that thing were not, time would be no less the same ».  Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text. 93 (ch. 10), against the opinion of Plato, according to which time is the movement of the whole heaven, and its parts are the parts of time, argues thus:  « If there were several heavens, there would indeed be, similarly, a time for any of their movements; wherefore many times (would be) at once ».  From which words there is deduced, according to the mind of Aristotle, that there is only one time, even if there were several heavens.  Cf. also Metaphysics., Bk. XII, text 49 (Bk. XI, ch. 8),

 

* [Trans. note:  Here continence, which renders the Latin continentiam, is to be understood in a sense in which it is no longer or perhaps has never been used in English, namely as the ability to contain another; likewise contentive is the inclination to contain another.]

p. 59

4. Item, si plura sunt aeva, aut ergo simul, aut consequenter.  Non consequenter, cum quodlibet sit infinitum a parte post; non simul, quia quae sunt simul, sunt in eodem instanti, ergo si aeviterna sunt simul, sunt in eodem nunc aevi:  ergo si omnium aeviternorum est unum nunc, ergo unum aevum per essentiam.

4. Likewise, if there are more aeva, therefore (they are) either together, or in a consequent manner.  Not in a consequent manner, since any is infinite on the part of an after; not together, because what are together, are in the same instant, therefore if eviternals are together, they are in the same now of an aevum:  therefore if of all eviternals there is one now, therefore (there is) one aevum through essence.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Licet omnium temporalium sit unum tempus, tamen quot sunt aeviterna, tot sunt aeva.

CONCLUSION

 

Though of all temporals there is one time, yet as many as are eviternals, so many are the aeva.

RESPONDEO:  Ad huius quaestionis intelligentiam praenotandum est, qualiter intelligitur unitas in tempore.  Sciendum autem, quod tripliciter tentaverunt aliqui unitatem temporis accipere, secundum quod accidens habet tripliciter comparari ad subiectum.  Habet enim ibi causam, existentiam et apparentiam.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of this Question there must be noted beforehand, in what manner a unity in time is understood.  Moreover, it must be known, that some tried to accept the ‘unity’ of time in a threefold manner, according to which an accident has (its) being-compared to a subject in a threefold manner.  For it has in this (subject its) cause, existence and appearance.

Dixerunt ergo aliqui, quod tempus est unum ratione subiecti, in quo primo est et per se, quo remoto, removetur et tempus.  Unde dixerunt, quod tempus est unum, quia est in primo mobili, cuius motu cessante, cessat et tempus.1  —  Sed illud non sufficit dicere, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus, si cessaret motus primi mobilis, adhuc posset moveri rota figuli; et constat, quod mensuraretur ille motus:  ergo non tantum est ibi, immo et in aliis rebus mobilibus.  Item, tempus est in affectionibus et cogitationibus liberi arbitrii, quod non subest motui caelesti, sicut vult Augustinus.2

Therefore some said, that time is one by reason of the subject, in which it first is and (is) per se, with which (subject) removed, there is also removed time.  Wherefore they said, that time is one, because in the first mobile (sphere), with whose movement ceasing, there ceases also time.1  —  But it is not sufficient to say that, because, just as (St.) Augustine says, if the movement of the first mobile (sphere) would cease, a potter’s wheel could still move; and it is established, that the latter movement would be measured:  therefore not only is (time) there, nay (it is) also in all other mobile things.  Likewise, time is in the affections and thoughts of free will, which is not subject to the celestial movement, just as (St.) Augustine wants.2

Et ideo dixerunt alii, quod tempus est unum ratione subiecti, in quo primo apparet.  Cum enim tempus sit numerus sive mensura motuum, et numerus iste secundum essentiam et habitum sit in re mobili vel mota, in qua est prius et posterius, secundum actualem vero numerationem sit a parte animae, sicut vult Philosophus3 et Augustinus, cum anima omnes motus et mutationes numeret aspiciendo ad mensuram motus primi mobilis, scilicet per diem, annum et horam; voluerunt dicere, quod unum est tempus ratione subiecti, in quo primo apparet; quia, etsi omnia habeant proprias periodos, tamen omnia numerantur et mensurantur per mensuram motus regularis et certi et nobis notissimi, scilicet motus mobilis primi.  —  Sed illud non sufficit, quia dicit Philosophus de Caelo et mundo,4 quod si essent duo mobilia prima, adhuc unum esset tempus.  Tunc non posset dici unum ratione subiecti, in quo primo esset, nec in quo primo appareret, cum utrumque esset aeque primum et evidens; nec ratione animae, quia tempus non est numerus numerans, sed numeratus, ut Philosophus5 vult, et tempus est dispositio rei extra, non fictio animae.

And for that reason others said, that time is one by reason of the subject, in which it first appears.  For since time is a number or measure of movements, and that number according to essence and habit is in the movable or moved thing, in which there is a before and an after, but according to the actual numbering it is on the part of the soul, just as the Philosopher3 wants and (St.) Augustine (too), since the soul numbers all movements and changes by looking to the measure of the movement of the first mobile (sphere), that is by day, year and hour; they wanted to say, that there is one time by reason of the subject, in which it first appears; because, even if all have their own periods, yet all are numbered and measured through the regular and certain and most-known-to-us movement, namely the movement of the first mobile (sphere).  —  But that does not suffice, because the Philosopher says On Heaven and the World,4 that if there were two first mobile (spheres), there would still be one time.  Then it could not be said (to be) one by reason of the subject in which it first was, nor in which it first appeared, since each would be equally first and evident; nor by reason of the soul, because time is not a numbering number, but a numbered (number), as the Philosopher5 wants, and time is a disposition of a thing outside (of itself), not a fiction of the soul.

Et ideo dixerunt tertii profundius, quod unitas temporis sumitur ab unitate subiecti, a quo causatur; subiectum autem, a quo causatur, est materia ut mutabilis, et ita ut ens in potentia.  Nam materia ut est in acquisitione formae, mutatur, et sic est ens in potentia; et ideo tempus maxime inter omnia accidentia se tenet plus cum materia.  Sicut igitur materia una est per essentiam, differens per esse, una non unitate universalitatis nec singularitatis, sed medio modo, sic et tempus in omnibus temporalibus.6

And for that reason the third said more profoundly, that the unity of time is taken from the unity of the subject, by which it is caused, but the subject, by which it is caused, is matter as mutable, and thus as a being in potency.  For matter as it is in the acquisition of a form, is changed, and thus it is a being in potency; and for that reason time, most of all among all accidents, holds itself more with matter.  Therefore, just as matter is one through essence, differing through a ‘to be’, one not by a unity of universality nor of singularity, but in an intermediary manner [medio modo], so also (is) time in all temporals.6

Et si quaeras, unde est hoc, quod tempus est unum, cum tamen motus sint varii; dicendum, quod motus definitur per id ad quod est,7 unde motus respicit motorem et mobile et terminum; tempus autem respicit ipsam durationem variam et successivam, quae venit ex potentia rei mobilis.  Et quia motus naturae durantis consimilis est,8 et natura illa, supra quam fundatur, est una numero; ideo tempus non tantum est unum specie in omnibus temporalibus, immo etiam quantum ad essentiam unum numero, differens per esse, sicut posuerunt omnes sapientes, qui circa hanc materiam locuti sunt.

And if you ask, “Whence is this, that time is one, when movements are yet various?”; it must be said, that movement is defined through that toward which it is,7 wherefore a movement respects a mover and a movable and a terminus; but time respects the duration itself, various and successive, which comes out of the potency of the movable thing.  And because a movement belongs to a consimilar, enduring nature,8 and that nature, upon which it is founded, is one in number; for that reason time is not only one in species in all temporals, nay (it is) also, as much as regards essence, one in number, differing through (its) ‘to be’, just as all the wise men, who have spoken about this matter, have posited.

Si autem quaeras, quare non sic est in aliis quantitatibus,9 cum omnes respiciant materiam; dicendum, quod omnes aliae, etsi esse incompletum habeant in materia — nam sunt in materia dimensiones infinitae — tamen esse completum ipsarum est a materia existente sub forma.  Tempus autem habet esse ex hoc, quod materia tendit ad formam, propter hoc quod causatur a motu, qui est « entelechia entis in potentia »,10 et ideo tenet se maxime ex parte . . .

But if you ask, “For what reason is it not thus in the other quantities,9 since all respect matter?”; it must be said, that all the others, even if they have an incomplete ‘to be’ in matter — for they are infinite dimensions in matter — yet their complete ‘to be’ is from the matter existing under a form.  Moreover time has (its) ‘to be’ out of this, that matter tends to form, on account of this that it is caused by the movement, which is « the entelechy of a being in potency »,10 and for that reason it holds itself most of all on the part . . .

1  Cfr. Averroes, IV. Phys. text. 98. et 130, ubi dicit, tempus sequi motum corporis caelestis et primo inveniri in caelo.  —  Verba Augustini, quae mox allegantur, sumta sunt ex XI. Confess. c. 23. n. 29:  Audivi a quodam homine docto, quod solis et lunae ac siderum motus ipsa sunt tempora; et nil annui.  Cur enim non potius omnium corporum motus sint tempora?  An vero, si cessarent caeli lumina, et moveretur rota figuli, non esset tempus, quo metieremur eos gyros?  etc.

2  Libr XI. Confess. c. 27. n. 36; VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 20. 24. 26; Quaest. ad Orosium, q. 41.

3  Libr. IV. Phys. text. 100. seq. et 130. seq. (c. 11. et 14.).  —  August., XI. Confess. c. 23. n. 30 seqq. et XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 15. n. 1. seq.

4  In cod. T ad marg. a manu quasi suppari habetur:  Immo hoc dicit Philosophus quarto Physicorum (text. 95.); unde haec auctoritas male citatur hic.  Verba Aristotelis vide supra pag. 58, nota 5.  —  Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 recti pro certi.

5  Libr. IV. Phys. text. 102. et 131. seq. (c. 11. et 14.).

6  Cod. cc cum ed. 1 adiungit est unum per essentiam, differens per esse.  Paulo superius plures codd. cum ed. 1 universalis nec singularis pro universalitatis nec singularitatis.  —  De unitate materiae cfr. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.

7  Aristot., V. Phys. text. 4:  Magis autem ab eo in quod, quam ex quo movetur, denominatur mutatio.

8  Vat. Et quia tempus naturae duranti consimilius est; cui lectioni etiam cod. bb concordat in verbis naturae duranti.

9  Quae supra q. 1. argum. ult. ad opp. enumeratae sunt.

10  Aristot., III. Phys. text. 6. (c. 1.).  Cfr. supra pag. 31, nota 6.

1  Cf. Averroës, Physics, Bk. IV, texts 98 and 130, where he says, that time follows the movement of a celestial body and can be first found in heaven.  —  The words of (St.) Augustine, which are next cited, are taken from the Confessions, Bk. XI, ch. 23, n. 29:  I have heard from a certain learned man, that the movements of the sun, moon and stars are themselves times; and I agreed with none of it [nihil annui].  For why are the movements of all bodies not rather times?  Or, on the other hand, if the lights of the heavens ceased, and a potter’s wheel moved, would there not be time, by which we would measure those gyrations? etc..

2  Confessions, Bk. XI, ch. 27, n. 36; On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, chs. 20, 24 and 26; Question to Orosius, q. 41.

3  (Aristotle), Physics., Bk. IV, text 100 f. and 130 f. (chs. 11 and 14).  —  (St.) Augustine, Confessions., Bk. XI, ch. 23, n. 30 ff., and On the City of God., Bk. XII, ch. 15, n. 1 f..

4  In codex T along the margin there is had in a quasi-equal hand:  Nay the Philosopher says this in the fourth (book) of Physics (text 95); wherefore this authority is badly cited here [Immo hoc dicit Philosophus quarto Physicorum (text. 95.); unde haec auctoritas male citatur hic]  See the words of Aristotle here on the previous page, footnote 5.  —  A little above this codex cc and edition 1 have straight [recti] for certain [certi].

5  (Aristotle), Physics., Bk. IV, texts 102 and 131 f. (chs. 11 and 14).

6  Codex cc, together with edition 1, adjoins is one through essence, differing through a ‘to be’ [est unum per essentiam, differens per esse].  A little above this several codices, together with edition 1, have of a universal nor of a singular [universalis nec singularis] for of universality nor of singularity [universalitatis nec singularitatis].  —  On the unity of matter, cf. (here below) d. 3, p. I, a. 1, qq. 2 and 3.

7  Aristotle, Physics., Bk. V, text 4:  But more from that unto which (it is moved), than (that) out of which it is moved, is a change denominated.

8  The Vatican edition reads And because time belongs to a consimilar, enduring nature [Et quia tempus naturae duranti consimilius est]; with which reading even codec bb agrees in the words enduring nature [naturae duranti].

9  Which have been enumerated above in q. 1, in the last opposed argument.

10  Aristotle, Physics., Bk. III, text 6 (ch. 1).  Cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 1, p. 31, footnote 6.

p. 60

materiae, et ideo minime distinctum.  Nec dico, quod tempus sit in ipsa materia, omni forma circumscripta, quia hoc esset contra Augustinum, duodecimo Confessionum,1 quia non est vicissitudo aliqua in materia, nisi cum in ea est aliqua forma; sed quamvis sit in materia, quae est sub forma et ab ipsa causetur, magis tamen causatur a materia, ut tendit ad formam, et hoc est in materia ratione suae potentiae.

of matter, and for that reason (time is) least of all distinct (from it).  Nor do I mean, that time is in matter itself, abstracted from all form, because this would be against (St.) Augustine, in the twelfth (book of his) Confessions,1 because there is no vicissitude in matter, except when there is some form in it; but even though (time) is in the matter, which is under a form and caused by it (i. e. the form), yet it is caused more by matter, as it tends toward a form, and this (tending) is in matter by reason of its potency.

Secundum hunc triplicem modum nisi sunt aliqui unitatem in aevo ponere, primo ratione subiecti, in quo primo est.  Posuerunt enim ordinem in intelligentiis secundum continentiam virtualem, sicut in visibilibus est reperire continentiam localem.  Et sicut tempus in primo mobili fundatur, sic aevum2 in prima intelligentia, quae virtualiter alias continet et in alias influit.  —  Sed ista positio non potest stare.  Primo, quia omnes intelligentiae in incorruptione habent aequalitatem, sicut in sequenti distinctione3 dicitur.  Secundo, quia conservatio intelligentiarum immediate pendet ex Deo.  Tertio, quia, si illa intelligentia destrueretur, tunc fundamentum aevi periret; et possibile fuit, illam peccasse, immo forte peccavit, cum diabolus credatur fuisse excellentissimus Angelorum.4

According to this threefold measure some have striven to posit a unity in the aevum, first by reason of the subject, in which it first is.  For they posited that (there is) an order among Intelligences according to virtual continence, just as among visibles there is a finding of a local continence.  And just as time  is founded in the first mobile (sphere), so the aevum (is)2 in the first Intelligence, which virtually contains the others and influences the others.  —  But this position of their cannot stand.  First, because all Intelligences have in (their) incorruption an equality, just as is said in the following Distinction.3  Second, because the conservation of Intelligences depends immediately from God.  Third, because, if that Intelligence were destroyed, then the fundament of the aevum would perish; and it was possible, that that one sinned, nay perhaps he did sin, since the Devil is believed to have been the most excellent of the Angels.4

Et ideo alii conati sunt assignare unitatem ratione subiecti, in quo primo apparet, quod quidem est caelum empyreum, in quo non cadit variatio, immo omnimode quietum est.5  —  Sed nec illud sufficit, quoniam immortalitas et immutabilitas per prius est in substantiis spiritualibus quam corporalibus, cum sint digniores, et dignius non habeat mensurari per aspectum ad minus dignum

And for that reason others tried to assign a unity by reason of the subject, in which it first appears, which indeed is the empyrean Heaven, in which there falls no variation, nay it is at rest [quietum est] in an omnimodal manner.5  —  But neither is that sufficient, since immortality and immutability is, through (a consideration of what is) prior, in spiritual substances rather than in corporals, since they are more worthy, and the more worthy does not have (his) being-measured through a gaze to the less worthy.

Et ideo tentaverunt alii accipere unitatem ex parte causae, quid dixerunt, quod duratio intelligentiarum continuatur et conservatur per divinam influentiam, quae quoniam una est, unum est aevum, mensurans ipsam.  —  Sed nec illud potest stare, quoniam influentia illa aut active, aut passive intelligitur.  Si de activa, non est aliud quam Deus, et ita non habet aevum mensuram.  Si de passiva, tot sunt, quot sunt suscipientes.

And for that reason others attempted to accept a unity on the part of a cause, wherefore they said, that the duration of Intelligences is contained and conserved through a divine influence, which since it is one, there is one aevum, measuring it.  —  But neither can that stand, since that influence is understood either actively, or passively.  If (it is understood) of an active (influence), it is not other than God, and thus the aevum does not have a measure.  If of a passive (influence), there are as many (aeva), as there are suscipients.

Et ideo non restat alius modus nisi unitatem materiae, sicut prius dictum est de tempore.  Sed multi negant, intelligentias habere materiam.  Sed quidquid sit de hoc, tamen aevum respicit esse actuale et esse stabile, sed tempus materiam ut in potentia.  Et ideo sicut unitas temporis conformatur materiae, sic unitas aevi conformatur formae, non inquam formae, in quantum haec vel illa, sed in quantum immutabilis.

And for that reason there remains no other standard of measure but the unity of matter, just as has been said before concerning time.  But many deny, that Intelligences have a matter.  But whatever concerns this, nevertheless an aevum respects an actual ‘to be’ and a stable ‘to be’, but time (respects) matter as (it is) in potency.  And for that reason, just as the unity of time is conformed to matter, so the unity of an aevum is conformed to a form, not, I say, to a form, inasmuch as (it is) this and/or that (form), but inasmuch (as it is) immutable.

Unde sicut linea in corporibus quantumcumque diversis ponitur eadem specie, sic aevum habet unitatem universalis, non unitatem, quam habet tempus.

Wherefore, just as a line among bodies, howsoever diverse, is posited as the same in species, so an aevum has the unity of a universal, not the unity, which time has.

Et sic concedendae sunt rationes probantes, non esse unum aevum aeviternorum, sed multa.6

And thus the reasons proving, that there is not one aevum of eviternals, but many,6 are to be conceded.

1. Quod ergo obiicitur:  sicut se habet tempus ad temporalia; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia cum tempus, quantum est de se, respiciat variationem et motum, consequitur ipsa, quorum est mensura, ratione illius principii,7 per quod sunt entia in potentia; et quia illud unicum dicitur esse per essentiam, ideo et tempus.  Aevum autem de sui ratione propria respicit esse completum et stabile, et ideo magis respicit formam; et ideo non habet unitatem nisi universalitatis sive conformitatis, sicut et alia accidentia.

1. What, therefore, is objected:  “just as time holds itself to temporals” (etc.); it must be said, that it is not similar, because since time, as much as it concerns itself, respects a variation and movement, it is consequent to those, of which it is the measure, by reason of that principle,7 through which they are beings in potency; and because that (principle) is said to be unique through essence, for that reason time (is) also.  But an aevum from its own reckoning respects a complete and stable ‘to be’, and for that reason it rather respects form; and for that reason it does not have but a unity of universality or of conformity, just as the other accidents also (do).

2. Quod arguitur a minori, quod temporalia habent unam mensuram; iam patet,8 quod non est locus a minori, quia illa variatio, ratione qua dicitur esse in potentia, respicit ipsum materiale principium, et ideo facit recedere a distinctione; non sic est in aevo.

2. What is argued from the lesser, that temporals have one measure; it is already clear,8 that there is no point (of arguing) from the lesser, because that variation, by reason of which (the lesser) is said to be in potency, respects the material principle itself, and for that reason (this variation) causes (time) to recede from distinction; not so is it in an aevum.

3. Quod obicitur, quod tempus est unum, quia est accidens extrinsecum, non situatum vel situale; dicendum, quod falsum est; ista enim non est causa, sed magis illa quae praedicta est.

3. What is objected, that time is one, because it is an extrinsic accident, not a situated (one) and/or of a location [situale]; it must be said, that it is false; for this (i. e. its location) is not (its) cause, but rather (its cause is) that (matter) which has been aforesaid.

4. Quod obiicitur:  si sunt plura aeva, aut simul, aut non simul; dicendum, quod simul.  —  Quod ergo obiicitur:  ergo in eodem nunc; dicendum, quod esse simul in duratione est dupliciter:  aut per mensurae concomitantiam, aut per mensurae unitatem et indifferentiam.  Cum autem dicitur Deus, homo et Angelus esse simul; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur per mensurae concomitantiam.  Cum autem dicitur:  Petrus et Paulus simul sunt vel currunt, hoc potest dici per mensurae unitatem et indifferentiam; et ideo non sequitur, quod si aeva aeviternorum sunt simul, quod sint unum.

4. What is objected:  “if there are many aeva, either (they are) together, or (they are) not together”; it must be said, that (they are) together.  —  What, therefore, is objected:  “therefore (they are) in the same now”; it must be said, that ‘to be together in duration’ is in a twofold manner:  either through the concomitance of a measure, or through the unity and indifference of  measure.  But when there is said, that “God, man and Angel are together”; it must be said, that this is said through the concomitance of a measure.  But when there is said:  “Peter and Paul are and/or run together”, this can be said through a unity and indifference of measure; and for that reason it does not follow, that is the aeva of eviternals are together, that they are one [unum].

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Hic agitur de unitate tum temporis, tum aevi, et non de unitate specifica, sed de unitate secundum numerum, ut pluries notatur in corp.  —  Loquendo de tempore, quatenus est mensura rei successivae et non eiusdem intrinseca duratio, communior sententia unitatem temporis affirmabat.  In quo autem huiusmodi unitas rationem suam habeat, disputabatur. /  Tres opiniones . . .

I. Here one deals with both the unity of time, and the (unity) of the aevum, and not of a specific unity (i.e. a unity according to species), but of a unity according to number, as is frequently noted in the body (of the Question).  —  Speaking of time, to the extent that it is the measure of a successive thing and not its intrinsic duration, the more common sentence used to affirm a unity of time.  However, in what a unity of this kind has its reason (for being), was disputed. / St. Thomas . . .

1  Cap. 12. n. 15:  Duo reperio, quae fecisti carentia temporibus, cum tibi neutrum coaeternum sit.  Unum, quod ita formatum est, ut sine ullo defectu contemplationis, sine ullo intervallo mutationis, quamvis mutabile, tamen non mutatum, tua aeternitate atque incommutabilitate perfruatur.  Alterum, quod ita informe erat, ut ex qua forma in quam formam vel motionis vel stationis mutaretur, quo tempori subderetur, non haberet.  —   Aliquanto inferius Vat. et sic est pro et hoc est.

2  Non pauci codd. supplent est.

3  Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, et dub. 4.

4  Cfr. infra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1.

5  Vide p. II. huius dist. a. 1. q. 1.

6  Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. adiungunt sicut sunt plures formae.

7  Scilicet materiae, quae per essentiam una dicitur, infra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. 3.

8  Ed. 1 cum cod. cc patet responsio. Dein non pauci codd. quia pro quod.

1  Chapter 12, n. 15:  Two do I find, which Thou has made lacking times, though neither is coeternal to Thee.  The one, which has been thus formed, that without any defect of contemplation, without any interval of change, though mutable, yet not changed, thoroughly enjoys Thy Eternity and Incommutability.  The other, which was so formless, that out of which form into which form, either of motion and/or of standing still, it was changed, it would have no time to which it would be submitted.  —  Somewhat below this the Vatican edition has and thus it is [et sic est] for and this (tending) is [et hoc est].

2  Not a few codices supply is [est].

3  Distinction 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and Doubt 4.

4  Cf. below d. 6, a. 1, q. 1.

5  See p. II of this Distinction, a. 1, q. 1.

6  Codex cc, edition 1 and the Vatican edition adjoin just as there are several forms [sicut sunt plures formae].

7  Namely matter, which is said to be one through essence, below in d. 3, p. I, a. 1, qq. 2 and 3.

8  Edition 1, together with codex cc, has the response is already clear [iam patet responsio] for is already clear [iam patet].  Then not a few codices have that [quia] for that [quod].

p. 61

Tres opiniones hic recensitas affert etiam S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 10. a. 6.), et ipse cum Richard. a Med. primam opinionem approbat, quae rationem unitatis ponit in unitate primi mobilis; tertia vero (quam praefert S. Bonav.), quae hanc unitatem repetit ab unitate subiecti, a quo causatur, quod est materia, iuxta eundem « non sufficiens videtur ».  Sententiae S. Thomae adhaeret B. Albert. (S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 3. a. 2.), et quoad perfectam rationem temporis etiam Scotus, IV. Sent. d. 48. q. 2, et praecipue de Rerum princ. q. 20. in quo opere a quaestione 18. usque ad q. 24. de tempore et annexis quaestionibus diffuse et subtiliter disputat.

disputed. / St. Thomas (here in q. 1, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 10, a. 6) also mentions the three opinions cited here, and he together with Richard of Middleton approves the first opinion, which posit the reason for the unity in the unity of the first mobile (sphere); but the third (which St. Bonaventure prefers), which seeks this unity from the unity of the subject, by which it is caused, which is matter, « does not seem sufficient » according to him.  The Sentence of St. Thomas adheres with Bl. (now St.) Albertus Magnus (Summa., p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 3, a. 2), and in regard to the perfect reason for time (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (does) also in Sent, Bk. IV, d. 48, q. 2, and chiefly in (his) de Rerum princ, q. 20, in which work from question 18 through to question 24, he disputes at length and subtle concerning time and (its) annexed questions.

II. Quoad unitatem aevi, utrum sit admittenda, et quae sit eius ratio, maior fuit opinionum dissensus.  Et praenotandum est, opinionem Aristotelis, quod etiam corpora caelestia, saltem primum mobile, inter incorruptibilia et aeviterna locum obtineant, illa aetate communiter receptam fuisse.  S. Thom. in Commentar. et cum quadam restrictione etiam in Summa (« concedimus ad praesens ») docet, quod aevum « est unum ab unitate esse simplicissimi aeviternorum, quod est primus Angelus ».  Hanc sententiam aliquatenus approbat Richard. a Med. (« quodam modo habet rationem mensurae, quamvis non plenam »).  Sed Petr. a Tar. praefert opinionem secundam, « quod primum subiectum aevi est primum immobile, id est caelum empyreum ».  Etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 2.) unitatem aevi sustinet, et quoad rationem eius tertiae opinioni innititur.  —  E contrario S. Bonav. negat unitatem aevi et aevum ut mensuram extrinsecam.  Si autem accipitur aevum pro mensura intrinseca, patet quod tot sunt admittenda aeva, quot aeviterna.  Huic sententiae assentit Aegid. R., et favet etiam Scotus, quia praefert opinionem, non esse unum aevum omnium aeviternorum ut mensura extrinseca, sicut est unum tempus omnium temporalium (hic q. 3. n. 5, q. 2. n. 10; Report. hic q. 1. n. 2, ubi dicit:  « Mensurare Angelum inferiorem per esse Angeli superioris est aequivocare vocabulum ad mensuram perfectionis »).  Tamen idem censet, etiam opinionem S. Thomae esse probabilem, si intelligitur de mensura extrinseca.

II. In regard to the unity of the aevum, whether it is to be admitted, and what is its reason (for being), there was a greater dissension of opinion.  And it must be noted beforehand, that the opinion of Aristotle, that even celestial bodies, at least the first mobile (sphere), obtain a place among incorruptibles and eviternals, was commonly received in that age.  St. Thomas, in (his) Commentary and with a certain restriction even in (his) Summa (« we concede for the present ») teaches, that the aevum « is one from the unity of eviternals’ most simple ‘to be’, which is the first Angel ».  Richard of Middleton approves this sentence to some extent (« in a certain manner it has a reckoning of a measure, though not a full one »).  But (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise prefers the second opinion, « that the first subject of the aevum is the first immobile (being), that is the empyrean Heaven ».  Even Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 2) sustains the unity of the aevum, and supports the third opinion in regard to its reckoning.  —  On the contrary St. Bonaventure denies the unity of the aevum and the aevum as an extrinsic measure.  But if the aevum is accepted as an intrinsic measure, it is clear that there are to be admitted as many aeva, as eviternals.  To this sentence Giles the Roman assents, and even (Bl.) Scotus favors (it), because he prefers the opinion, that there is not one aevum of all eviternals as (their) extrinsic measure, as the time of all temporals is one (here in q. 3, n. 5; q. 2, n. 10, Reportatio., here in q. 1, n. 2, where he says:  « To measure an inferior Angel through the ‘to be’ of a superior Angel is to equivocate the term for the measure of perfection »).  Yet the same judges, that the opinion of St. Thomas is probable, if it is understood of an extrinsic measure.

III. Praeter laudatos:  B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 2. a. 2. partic. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1.  —  Durand., hic q. 5.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

III. Besides those mentioned:  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 2, a. 2, partic. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 3.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 1.  —  Durandus, here in q. 5.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2.

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