S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM II.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION II

PARS I.

PART I

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio III.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 3

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 61-63.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 61-63.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO III.

 

Utrum spiritualia habeant permanentem, vel successivam mensuram.

QUESTION 3

 

Whether spiritual (beings) have a permanent, and/or a successive measure?

TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum spiritualia habeant mensuram permanentem, aut successivam.  Et quod permanentem, carentem priori et posteriori, videtur primo auctoritate, deinde ratione.

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether spiritual (beings) have a permanent, or a successive measure.  And that (they have) a permanent one, lacking a before and after, seems first by authority, then by reason.

1. Et auctoritate sic:  Augustinus duodecimo de Civitate Dei:1  « Immortalitas Angelorum non transit in tempore nec est praeterita, quasi iam non sit, nec futura, quasi nondum sit »:  ergo tota est praesens, ergo permanens, non succedens.

1. And by authority in this manner:  (St.) Augustine in the twelfth (book) On the City of God (says):1  « The immortality of the Angels does not pass by [transit] in time nor is it past, as if it already is not, nor (is it) future, as if it is not yet »:  therefore the whole (immortality of an Angel) is present, therefore permanent, not succeeding.

2. Item, Augustinus undecimo Confessionum:2  « Si praesens tempus staret et non transiret in praeteritum, esset aeternitas »; sed non propter hoc esset aeternitas increata:  ergo esset aeternitas creata; et hoc est aevum:  ergo aevum habet nunc non transiens:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says) in the eleventh (book) of the Confessions:2  « If the present time would stand still and not pass over [transiret] into the past, it would be eternity »; but on this account it would not be the uncreated Eternity:  therefore it would be a created eternity; and this is an aevum:  therefore an aevum has a now, not passing away [non transiens]:  ergo etc..

3. Item, Philosophus:3  « In perpetuis non differt esse et posse »:  ergo potentia est in toto suo actu, ergo nihil exspectat, ergo totum simul:  ergo nulla est ibi successio vel prioritas.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher (says):3  « In perpetual (beings) ‘being’ and ‘being able’ do not differ »:  therefore (an Angel’s) power is in his whole act, therefore he expects nothing, therefore the whole (act is) at once:  therefore there is there no succession and/or priority.

4. Item, ratione:  proprietas debet respondere substantiae, ergo substantiae simplicis mensura debet esse simplex; sed substantia spiritualis est simplex:  ergo et eius mensura.  Sed eius mensura est aevum:  ergo simplex est:  ergo non habet prius et posterius.

4. Likewise, by reason:  a property ought to respond to the substance, therefore the measure of a simple substance ought to be simple; but the substance of a spiritual (being) is simple:  therefore its measure (is) also (simple).  But its measure is an aevum:  therefore it is simple:  therefore it does not have a before and after.

5. Item, omne successivum reducitur ad permanens, ergo prius et posterius successivum ad prius et posterius permanens;4 sed prius et posterius permanens est in sola magnitudine:  ergo quod caret priori et posteriori permanente caret et successivo.  Sed talis est Angelus:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, everything successive reduced to (something) permanent, therefore a successive ‘before and after’ (is reduced) to a permanent ‘before and after’;4 but there is a permanent ‘before and after’ in a magnitude alone:  therefore what lacks a permanent ‘before and after’ lacks also a successive (‘before and after’).  But such is the Angel:  ergo etc..

6. Item, ubi est prius et posterius, ibi necessario cadit aliquid novum, quod de posteriori fit prius, et per hoc lapsus in praeteritum, et aliquid in vetus;5 sed in perpetuis non est aliqua mutatio nec innovatio:  ergo nec successio.

6. Likewise, where there is a before and after, there necessarily occurs something new, which is made prior from the posterior, and through this a gradual movement [lapsus] into the past, and something (growing) old [in vetus];5 but in perpetuals there is no change nor innovation:  therefore neither succession.

7. Item, ubi est prius, ibi est aliqua exspectatio respectu eius quod posterius est et nondum habitum est; sed in Beatis perfecte nulla cadit exspectatio, quia evacuatur omnino fides et spes, et habent omne quod habituri sunt:6  ergo nullo modo est ibi prius et posterius.

7. Likewise, where there is a before, there is some expectation in respect of that which is after and is not yet had; but among the perfectly Blessed there occurs no expectation, because faith and hope are entirely extinguished [evacuatur], and they have everything which they are going to have:6  therefore in not manner is there a before and after There.

CONTRA: 1. Hieronymus ad Marcellam:7  « Tantum Deus est, qui non novit fuisse vel futurum esse »:  omnis ergo creatura in sui esse habet praeteritionem sive fuisse et fore:  ergo habet in sui duratione successionem.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Jerome (says) To Marcella:7  « God is so great, that He knows not a ‘have been’ and/or a ‘going to be’ »:  therefore, every creature in its ‘being’ has a preterition [praeteritionem] or a ‘have been’ and a ’will be’:  therefore it has in its duration a succession.

2. Item, Anselmus in Proslogio8 tractans illud verbum:  Dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra, dicit, quod hoc dictum est, non quia post aeterni- / -tatem . . .

2. Likewise, (St.) Anselm in (his) Proslogion,8 treating of that verse:  The Lord shall reign in eternity and beyond, says, that this has been said, not because there is / anything after eternity, . . .

1  Cap. 15. n. 2.

2  Cap. 14. n. 17.

3  Libr. III. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.).  —  Post primum ergo cod. N supplet in perpetuis, dein cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt toto; Vat. ponit exspectatur pro exspectat et in fine argumenti adiungit et posterioritas.

4  Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quantitate, duplicem quantitatem distinguit, scil. permanentem et successivam; prior competit iis, « quae constant ex partibus, quae in eis sunt, positionem habentibus ad se invicem » i. e. quae constant ex partibus simul existentibus v. g. linea, superficies; posterior vero convenit iis, quae constant ex non habentibus positionem, sed magis ordinem prioritatis et posterioritatis v. g. tempus.  Libr. IV. Phys. text. 99. (c. 11.) dicit, quod prius et posterius in loco, qui habet positionem, primum sunt, deinde etiam in motu et in tempore.

5  Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 97. seqq. (c. 11.).

6  Vide I. Cor. 13, 10. seqq.

7  Verba, quae sequuntur, non sunt Hieronymi, sed Isidori, VII. Etym. c. 1. n. 12.  Cfr. de hoc tom. I. pag 146, nota 4.

8  Cap. 20, ubi tripliciter exponitur, quod Deus sit etiam ultra ea, quae finem non habebunt, scil. quia ipsa sine Dei conservatione esse non possunt, tum quia ipse cogitari possunt habere finem, tum quia ipsa de sua aeternitate nondum habent quod futurum est, et iam non habent quod est praeteritum, cum Dei et illorum aeternitas sit Deo tota praesens.  —  Textus s. Scripturae est Exod. 15, 18.  —  Circa finem argumenti cod. cc et ed. 1 excedit creaturam pro excedit aeternitatem creaturae.

1  Chapter 15, n. 2.

2  Chapter 14, n. 17.

3  (Aristotle), Physics, Bk. III, text 32 (ch. 4).  —  After the first therefore [ergo] codex N reads [Trans. note:  less congruently on the basis of the context of the reply to this objection, below] among perpetuals, power is in its whole act, therefore it expects nothing [in perpetuis potentia in toto suo actu, ergo nihil exspectat] for (an Angel’s) power is in his whole act etc. [potentia in toto suo actu etc.], then codex cc and edition 1 omits whole [toto]; the Vatican edition has nothing is expected [nihil expectatur] for he expects nothing [nihil exspectatur] and at the end of the argument it adjoins and posteriority [et posterioritas].

4  Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “on Quantity”, distinguishes a twofold quantity, namely, the permanent and the successive; the former befits those, « which are constituted out of the parts, which are in them, having a position regarding one another », i. e. which are constituted out of parts simultaneously existing [simul existentibus], v. g. a line, a surface; but the latter befits those, which are constituted out of those not having a position, but rather an order of priority and posteriority, v. g. time.  In Physics, Bk. IV, text 99, (ch. 11) he says, that a before and an after are first in a place, which has a position, then also in a movement and in time.

5  Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text. 97 ff. (ch. 11.).

6  See 1 Cor. 13:10 ff..

7  The words, which follow are not those of (St.) Jerome, but of (St.) Isidore, Etymologies, Bk. VII, ch. 1, n. 12.  On this, cf. Master Peter Lombard, First Book of Sentences, d. VII, p. I, ch. 1:  in tome I, p. 146, footnote 4.

8  Chapter 20, where there is expounded in a threefold manner, that God is also beyond those, which will not have an end, namely, because they without God’s conservation cannot be, both because they cannot be thought to have an end, and because they, from their own eternity, do not yet have what is going to be, and already do not have what is past, even though the eternity of God and of them is present as a whole to God.  —  The text of Sacred Scripture is Exodus 15:18.  —  Near the end of the argument (on the next page) codex cc and edition 1 has exceeds the creature [excedit creaturam] for exceeds the eternity of a creature [excedit aeternitatem creaturae].

p. 62

aeterni- / -tatem sit aliquid, sed quia Dei aeternitas, quae tota simul est, excedit aeternitatem creaturae, quae non omnino est tota simul; ista est sententia:  ergo idem quod prius.

because there is / anything after eternity, but because God’s Eternity, the whole of which is at once, exceeds the eternity of a creature, the whole of which is not at once; this is his sentence:  therefore (the conclusion is) the same as before.

3. Item, ratione videtur:  unitas angelica deficit ab unitate divina, ergo simplicitas aeternitatis creatae a simplicitate aeternitatis increatae:  si ergo hoc verum est, ergo habet compositionem aliquo modo.  Sed compositio in duratione ponit prius et posterius:  ergo etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason.  the unity of an Angel fails from the Divine Unity, therefore the simplicity of a created eternity (fails) from the simplicity on an uncreated Eternity:  if, therefore, this is true, therefore (the unity of an Angel) has a composition in some manner.  But composition in duration posits a before and after:  ergo etc..

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur, quia mensura durationis angelicae non est ipse Angelus, immo differt ab Angelo, sicut mensura a mensurato; sed mensura secundum veritatem est in genere quantitatis,1 et talis est divisibilis, ergo habens partes:  ergo etc.  Si tu dicas, quod est quantitatis principium sicut punctus; contra:  punctus non habet complete rationem mensurae, sed est principium mensurae; aevum autem vere et proprie est mensura:  ergo non potest esse sicut principium.

4. Likewise, this very (things) seems, because the measure of the duration of an Angel is not the Angel himself, nay it differs from the Angel, just as a measure (differs) from the measured; but a measure according to truth is in the genus of quantity,1 and such is a divisible, therefore (it is) one having parts:  ergo etc..  If you say, that it is a principle of quantity just as a point (is); on the contrary:  a point does not have completely the reckoning of a measure, but is the principle of a measure; but an aevum truly and properly is a measure:  therefore it cannot be as a principle.

5. Item, Angeli duratio est infinita:  si ergo est tota simul in actu, ergo aliquod creatum est infinitum actu.  Sed hoc est impossibile:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, the duration of an Angel is infinite:  if, therefore, the whole (duration) is at once in act, therefore something created is infinite in act.  But this is impossible:  ergo etc..

6. Item, in eo quod habet totum esse simul, idem est fuisse et esse et futurum esse, sed quod fuit, impossibile est cogitari non fuisse, si intelligatur fuisse:  ergo si in aeviterno idem est fuisse et fore, ergo impossibile est cogitari non fore.  Hoc autem falsum est, quia hoc est proprium solius Dei:  ergo etc.

6. Likewise, in that which has (its) whole ‘to be’ at once, ‘having been’ and ‘being’ and ‘going to be’ is the same, but it is impossible that what was, be thought not to have been, if it be understood to have been:  therefore, if in an eviternal (being) ‘having been’ and ‘will be’ is the same, therefore it is impossible that it be thought that it will not be.  But this is false, because this is proper to God alone:  ergo etc..

7. Item, si totum esse praesens est, ergo non differt esse et fuisse:  ergo quod nunc non est, nunquam fuit, et si fuit, est.  Sed Deus non potest facere, quod fuit non fuisse:2  ergo non potest facere, aeviternum non esse.  Sed hoc est manifeste falsum:  ergo etc.

7. Likewise, if (its) whole ‘to be’ is present, therefore (its) ‘being’ and ‘having been’ does not differ:  therefore what now is not, never was, and if it was, it is.  But God cannot cause, that what was, was not:2  therefore He cannot cause, that an eviternal is not.  But this is manifestly false:  ergo etc..

8. Item, si totum esse aeviterni simul est, et tota duratio sine priori et posteriori, ergo non est ibi magis longum et minus longum:  ergo anima beati Petri nec prius nec diutius fuit in gloria quam anima beati Francisci.  Si ergo hoc manifeste falsum est, patet etc.

8. Likewise, if the whole ‘to be’ of an eviternal is at once, and the whole duration without a before and after, therefore there is in it nothing more long and less long:  therefore the soul of Blessed Peter (the Apostle) was neither before nor longer in glory than the soul of Blessed Francis (of Assisi).  If, therefore, this is manifestly false, it is clear etc..

CONCLUSIO.

 

In aevo est aliqua successio, quae non importat prius et posterius cum variatione et innovatione, ut in tempore, sed tantum durationis extensionem.

CONCLUSION

 

In an aevum there is some succession, which does not convey a before and after with a variation and innovation, as in time, but only an extension of duration.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod circa hoc duplex fuit opinio.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that about this there was a twofold opinion.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod aevum est totum simplex, sicut et illud quod mensurat; et esse substantiae aeviternae et eius duratio est tota simul, non habens successionem prioris et posterioris.  Unde dixerunt, aevum non esse proprie quantitatem, sed in genere quantitatis solum esse per reductionem; unde simplex est extensione, sed tamen est quantum virtute, et adeo quantum, quod sua virtute excedat omne esse temporale ad similitudinem aeternitatis increatae.  Nam sicut anima simplex est quantum ad quantitatem molis, tamen propter suam virtutem et simplicitatem est in qualibet parte sui corporis; sic in proposito intelligendum est.  —  Sed, sicut in opponendo tactum est, si quis ponat aevum omnino simplex, ponet ex hoc non esse veram mensuram; ponet etiam durationem creatam actu infinitam; ponet etiam durationem creatam adeo entem,3 quod nec Deus destruere, nec intellectus possit cogitare non esse; quae omnia, cum non sint intelligibilia, faciunt, praedictam positionem nec esse rationabilem nec intelligibilem.

For certain (authors) said, that an aevum is a simple whole, just as (is) also that which measures (it); and (that) the ‘to be’ of an eviternal substance and its duration is at once whole, not having a succession of a before and after.  Wherefore they said, that an aevum is not properly a quantity, but that is only in the genus of quantity through a reduction; wherefore it is simple by extension, but yet it is a quantum according to virtue, and to such an extent a quantum, that by its own virtue it exceeds every temporal ‘to be’ according to (its) similitude to the uncreated Eternity.  For just as the simple soul is a quantum regarding a quantity of mass, yet on account of its own virtue and simplicity it is in any part of its body; so must it be understood in the proposed.  —  But, just as it has been touched upon in the Contrary [in opponendo], if anyone posits an entirely simple aevum, he will posit from this that it is not a true measure; he will also posit a created duration, infinite in act; he will also posit a created duration, being [entem]3 to such an extent, that neither (can) God destroy (it), nor can the intellect think that it is not; all of which, since they are not intelligible, cause the aforesaid position to be neither reasonable nor intelligible.

Et ideo, cum Sanctorum auctoritates aliud videantur sonare, est aliorum positio probabilior et intelligibilior, quod in aevo est ponere prius et posterius, et est ponere aliquam successionem, aliam tamen successionem quam in tempore.  In tempore enim est successio cum variatione, et prius et posterius cum inveteratione et renovatione.  In aevo vero est prius et posterius, quod dicit durationis extensionem, quod tamen nullam dicit variationem nec innnovationem.  Et per hanc distinctionem ad omnia obiecta in contrarium facile est solvere, si quis eam intelligat.

And for that reason, since the authorities of the Saints seem to mean (something) else [aliud sonare], there is the more probable and more intelligible position of the others, that in an aevum there is a positing of a before and after, and there is a positing of some succession, yet a succession other than in time.  For in time there is a succession with a variation, and a before and after with a growing-old [inveteratione] and being-renewed [renovatione].  But in an aevum there is a before and after, which means an extension of duration, which, however, means no variation nor innovation.  And through this distinction it is easy to solve for all the objections unto the contrary, if one understands it.

Quod si forte quaeratur:  quomodo potest esse prius et posterius sine novitate circa esse; dicendum, quod sicut videmus, quod aliter egreditur rivulus4 a fonte, aliter radius a sole, sic in proposito videmus.  Nam rivulus sic egreditur a fonte, quod nova aqua semper exit, non eadem; radius a sole continue egreditur, non quia semper novum aliquid emitatur, sed quia quod emissum est continuatur; unde solis influentia non est aliud quam continuatio dati.  Similiter in motu, et in esse rei mobilis aliqua proprietas habita amittitur, vel non habita acquiritur; sed in esse rei aeviternae quod primo datum est per continuam Dei influentiam continuatur.  Nulla enim aevi creatura est omnino actus, nec aliqua eius virtute, unde continue indiget divina virtute cooperante.  Ideo, etsi esse totum habeat, tamen continuationem esse non habet totam simul, et ideo . . .

Wherefore, if perchance it be asked:  “In what manner can there be a before and after without a newness about the ‘to be’ [sine novitate cira esse]?”; it must be said, that just as we see, that a rivulet4 steps froth forth from a spring in one manner, a ray from the Sun in another, so do we see (it) in the proposed.  For a rivulet steps forth from a spring thus, that the water always comes forth new, not the same; a ray from the Son steps froth continually, not because something new is emitted, but because what has been emitted is continued; wherefore the influence of the Sun is not other than the continuation of (what has been) given.  Similarly  in the movement, and in the ‘to be’ of a movable thing, some had property is lost, and/or not had (property) is acquired; but in the ‘to be’ of an eviternal thing, what has been first given is, through the continuous influence of God, continued.  For no creature of an aevum is entirely an act, nor (is) any by its (own) virtue, wherefore it continually needs the Divine cooperating Virtue.  For that reason, even if it has a whole ’to be’, yet it does not have at once the whole continuation of (its) ‘to be’, and for that reason . . .

1  Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 2. (IX. c. 1.):  Maxime autem mensuram esse cuiusque generis primum et maxime proprie quanti; hinc enim et ad alia advenit; mensura enim id est, quo quantum cognoscitur.  Cfr. q. 1. ad 6.

2  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3.

3  Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. existentem; Vat. insuper a Deo pro adeo.

4  Multi codd. cum Vat. fluvius contra codd. A cc et ed. 1.  Mox non pauci codd. videndum, aliqui vide, cod. aa esse videtur, cod. cc et ed. 1 videtur pro videmus.

1  Aristotle (says in his), Metaphysics, Bk. X, text 2 (Bk. IX, ch. 1):  But most of all there is a measure first of any genus and most of all, properly of a quantum; for from this it comes to the others; for a measure is that, by which a quantum is cognized.  Cf. (here) in q. 1, in reply to n. 6.

2  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 42, q. 3.

3  Codex cc, edition 1 and the Vatican edition read existing [existentem]; the Vatican edition, moreover, has from God [a Deo] for to such an extent [adeo].

4  Many codices, together with the Vatican edition, have a river [fluvius], contrary to codices A and cc and edition 1.  Next not a few codices have must it be seen [videndum], some see (it) [vide], codex aa does it seem to be [esse videtur], codex cc and edition 1 does it seem [videtur] for do we see (it) [videmus].

p. 63

est ibi successio sine aliqua innovatione circa esse vel proprietatem absolutam; tamen ibi est vera continuatio, respectu cuius creatura habet esse quodam modo in potentia, ac per hoc habet successionem.  Solus igitur Deus, qui est actus purus, est actu infinitus, et totum esse et possessionem sui esse simul habet.1  His visis, satis de facili solvuntur obiecta.

there is a succession there without any innovation about a ‘to be’ and/or absolute property; yet there is a true continuation there, in respect of which the creature has a ‘to be’ (which is) in a certain manner in potency, and through this it has a succession.  Therefore, God alone, who is a pure act, is infinite in act, and has at once (His) whole ‘to be’ and the possession of His own ‘to be’.1  With these seen, the objections are solved in a sufficiently easy manner [satis de facili].

1. 2. Quod enim obiicitur de praeterito et futuro et de transitu, dicendum breviter, quod intelligitur de istis, ut dicunt variationem.

1. 2. For what is objected concerning the past and future and concerning a passing away, it must be said briefly, that (the objection) is understood concerning these, as they mean a variation.

3. Quod obicitur, quod non differt esse et posse; dicendum, quod verum est de posse et esse, quod non differt, id est, quod non distat; motus enim et tempus facit distare; in solo autem aeterno verum est, quod potentia omnino sit actus, non in aliqua creatura.2

3. What is objected, that ‘being’ and ‘being able’ do not differ; it must be said, that it is true concerning ‘being able’ and ‘being’, that it does not differ, that is, that (the one) is not distant (from the other); for movement and time causes (these) to be distant; but in an eternal (being) alone — not in any creature — is it true, that power is entirely in act.2

4. Quod obiicitur, quod substantiae simplicis proprietas non potest esse composita; dicendum, quod verum est, si illa proprietas habeat compositionem partium simul entium; nunc3 autem non est sic, immo de aevo nunquam est nisi nunc, sicut et de tempore dicitur.  Et ita bene potest esse in simplici, ut in composito; unde tantam extensionem habet duratio unius grani milii, sicut et unius montis.

4. What is objected, that the property of a simple substance cannot be composite; it must be said, that it is true, if that property has a composition of parts simultaneously existing [simul entium]; but now3 it is not so, nay concerning an aevum there is never but a now, just as is also said concerning time.  And thus (such a property) can be in a simple, as well as in a composite; wherefore the duration of one grain of millet [milii] has a duration as great, as (the duration) of even one mountain.

5. Quod obiicitur, quod prius et posterius reducitur ad permanens; dicendum, quod verum est, quod ad permanens reducitur; sed non oportet, quod ad prius et posterius permanens.  Empyreum enim durationem habet aeviternam et aeque simplex est sicut duratio Angeli:  ergo prius et posterius in partibus permanentibus non facit aliquid ad hoc.

5. What is objected, that a before and after is reduced to (something) permanent; it must be said, that it is true, that it is reduced to (something) permanent; but it is not necessary [non oportet], that (it be reduced) to a permanent before and after.  For the empyrean (Heaven) has an eviternal duration and is as equally simple as the duration of an Angel:  therefore a before and after in permanent parts does not cause anything regarding this.

6. Quod obiicitur de novo et veteri, iam patet:  quia nihil est ibi alterationis, est tamen ibi crementum durationis absque omni alteratione absolutae proprietatis.  Verum enim est dicere, quod diutius fuit anima Petri, quam anima Francisci,4 quando in gloriam introivit, sed non est ita circa Deum; non enim diutius duravit hodie quam ante heri.

6. What is objected concerning the new and old, is already clear:  because there is nothing belonging to an alteration there, yet there is the growth [crementum] of a duration there, apart from every alteration of an absolute property.  For it is true to say, that the soul of (St.) Peter was for a longer time (in glory), than the soul of (St.) Francis,4 when he entered into glory, but it is not thus about God; for He has not endured longer today than the yesterday before.

 7. Quod obiicitur de exspectatione, dicendum, quod, sicut est successio non per novi acquisitionem, sed per prius dati continuationem, ita etiam est exspectatio non novi habendi, sed continuationis prius habiti, quod quia iam habent, et certi sunt se habituros, ideo potius dicitur tentio et comprehensio quam exspectatio.  Et sic patet illud.

7. What is objected concerning an expectation, it must be said, that just as there is a succession (there), not through the acquisition of (something) new, but through the continuation of (something) given beforehand, so also there is an expectation not of having (something) new, but (an expectation) of the continuation of (something) had beforehand, which because they already have (it), they are also certain that (they are) going to have it, (and) for that reason it is rather said (to be) a “holding” [tentio] and a “comprehension” than an “expectation”.  And thus that (objection) is clear.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Haec quaestio etiam sub his terminis proponitur:  utrum aevum sit mensura simplex sive indivisibilis.  S. Thom. in solutione eius cum communiore sententia contra S. Bonaventuram tenet, quod, sicut essentia et existentia Angeli simplex est et tota simul, sic etiam mensura ipsius excludat omnem successionem, nisi forte quatenus connotat coexistentiam ad tempus.  —  Sententia S. Bonaventurae duabus innititur distinctionibus.  1. Aliter sentiendum est de esse substantiali Angeli, aliter de duratione eius:  illud esse in instanti creationis accipit ut indivisibile et totum simul, non autem durationem eius, quae, quia creatura continuo dependet a Deo conservante, non est indivisibilis, sed habet aliquam suo modo successionem.  2. Duplex est successio:  propria, quae competit tempori secundum prius et posterius et habet variationem et renovationem, quia semper aliquid amittitur, et aliquid acquiritur; et impropria, quae competit aevo et non importat nisi durationis extensionem sine variatione vel innovatione.  Per creationem res proprie fit et acquirit initium existentiae et durationis; per conservationem vero non fit, sed continuatur in existentia et acquirit maiorem durationem, quin in esse eius fiat innovatio vel additio.  Unde aeviternum in instanti suae creationis totum suum esse substantiale habuit, sed non totam suam durationem, immo non nisi durationis initium.  —  Admissis his distinctionibus, quas contrariae sententiae fautores non approbant, facile intelligitur, in solo Deo idem esse essentiam, existentiam, durationem; in omnibus creaturis autem haec tria distinguenda esse.

I. This Question is also proposed under these terms:  “Whether the aevum is a simple or indivisible measure?”  St. Thomas in his solution holds with the more common sentence, against St. Bonaventure, that, just as the essence and existence of an Angel is simple and at once whole, so also its measure excludes all succession, except perhaps to the extent that it connotes a coexistence to time.  —  The sentence of St. Bonaventure is supported by two distinctions.  1. One must think in one manner of the ‘to be’ of the Angel’s substance, in another of its duration:  (the Angel) accepts that ‘to be’ in the instant of (his) creation as an indivisible and an at-once whole, but not its duration, which, because a creature depends continuously from God conserving (it), is not indivisible, but has some succession in its own manner.  2. Succession is twofold:  a proper (succession), which befits time, according to a before and after, and has a variation and a renovation, because something is always being lost, and something is acquired; and an improper (succession), which befits an aevum and does not convey but a duration of extension without a variation and/or an innovation.  Through creation a thing properly comes to be and acquires the start of (its) existence and duration; through conservation, however, it does not come to be, but is continued in existence and acquires a greater duration, which in its ‘to be’ becomes an innovation and/or addition.  Wherefore an eviternal in the instant of its creation had the whole ‘to be’ of its substance, but not the whole of its duration, nay naught but the start of (its) duration.  —  With these distinction admitted, which the supporters of the contrary sentence do not approve, it is easily understood, that in God alone essence, existence, (and) duration is the same; but in all creatures these three are to be distinguished.

II. Sententiam S. Thomae sequuntur inter antiquos Scholasticos Alex. Hal., Petr. a Tar., Henr. Gand., Durand., Dionys. Carth. aliique.  —  B. Albertus consentit S. Bonaventurae.  Richard. a Med., utriusque sententiae argg. ponit et solvit, magis tamen inclinat in sententiam S. Thomae.  Aegid. R. in re parum a S. Bonav. discedit.  Scotus vero (hic q. 1.) in utramque partem disputat et anceps haeret, tamen, testibus Lycheto pluribusque aliis Scotistis, magis inclinat in sententiam S. Bonaventurae.  Idem etiam de Rerum princip. q. 22. n. 8. ait:  « Vel forte habet (aevum) aliquam naturam successionis, scil. quae est esse et modus essendi et durandi illarum substantiarum ».  Nec inter recentiores desunt viri doctissimi, qui sententiam S. Bonaventurae praeferunt, vel valde probabilem censent, ut cl. P. Kleutgen S. I., Philosophie der Vorzeit tom. I. Abhandl. 4. c. 4. § 2, qui ut huius opinionis sequaces laudat Conimbricenses Phys. IV. c. 14. q. 2, et P. Silv. Maurum, Quaest. Philos. tom. II. q. 32.

II. The sentence of St. Thomas (on this matter) is followed among the ancient Scholastics by Alexander of Hales, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Henry of Ghent, Durandus, (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian and others.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) consents with St. Bonaventure.  Richard of Middleton, posits and solves arguments for the sentence of each, yet inclines more to the sentence of St. Thomas.  Giles the Roman departs little in the matter from St. Bonaventure.  But (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (here in q. 1) disputes for each side and adheres to both sides, yet, according to the testimony of Lychetus and many other Scotists, inclines more to the sentence of St. Bonaventure.  The same in (his) de Rerum principio., q. 22,n. 8, says:  « And/or perhaps (an aevum) has some nature of succession, namely, which is the ‘to be’ and the manner of being and enduring of those substances ».  Nor is there lacking among more recent (authors) the most learned men, who prefer the sentence of St. Bonaventure, and/or judge (it) probable, such as the Rev. Father P. Kleutgen, S. J., Philosophie der Vorzeit, tome I, Abhandl. 4, ch. 4, § 2, who praises the followers of this opinion, the Fathers of Coimbra, Physics., Bk. IV, ch. 14, q. 2, and Father Silvio Maruo, Quaestiones Philosophicae., tom. II, q. 32.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 3.  —  Scot., locc. citt.  —  S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 10. a. 5.  —  B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 2. a. 2. partic. 1.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3.  —  Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 13.  —  Durand., hic q. 3.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.  —  Biel, hic q. 1.

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, locc. citt..  —  St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 10, a. 5.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 2, a. 2, partic. 1.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 3.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 3.  —  Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals. 5, q. 13.  —  Durandus, here in q. 3.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 1.

1  Alluditur ad illam Boethii, V. de Consol. prosa 6, definitionem:  Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.  —  Vat. posse pro possessionem.

2  Aliis verbis:  In perpetuis non differt esse et posse i. e. potentia on distat ab actu sive non praecedit actum, sed simul sunt; non autem intelligitur ita, quod in substantiis spiritualibus, excepto Deo, non differant actus et potentia, immo vere differunt; sed potentia non praecedit actum sicut in istis inferioribus, quae motui et tempori subiiciuntur.  Dictio « tempus facit distare » est ex Aristotele.  Cfr. infra pag. 66, nota. 2.  —  Aliquanto superius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 3, 4 quod verum est de posse ad esse pro quod verum est de posse et esse.

3  Cod. cc et ed. 1 in aevo; cod aa hic.  Immediate ante Vat. existentium pro entium.  Paulo inferius post potest esse in cod. cc et ed. 1 suppletur duratio aevi.

4  Fide plurium codd. ut A K L O V Z bb adiecimus anima Francisci, quae verba etiam in ult. fundam. inveniuntur.  Paulo superius cod. aa Unde nunc pro Verum enim, qui dein post Petri bene adiungit in gloria.

1  An allusion to that definition of (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. 5, prose 6:  “Eternity is the whole and perfect possession at once of an interminable life.”  —  The Vatican edition has ‘being able’ [posse] for possession [possessionem].

2  In other words:  Among perpetual (beings) ‘being’ and ‘being able’ do not differ, i. e.  power is not distant from act, or does not precede act, but both are at once; however (this) is not understood thus, that in spiritual substances, excepting God, act and power do not differ, nay they truly differ; but power does not precede act as (it does) in these inferiors, which are subjected to movement and time.  The saying « time causes (something) to be distant [tempus facit distatre] » is from Aristotle.  Cf. below d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, p. 66, footnote 2.  —  Somewhat above this not a few codices, together with editions 1, 3 and 4 have of a ‘being able’ regarding a ‘to be’ [de posse ad esse] for concerning ‘being able’ and ‘being’ [de posse et esse].

3  Codex cc and edition 1 have in an aevum [in aevo] for now [nunc]; codex aa has instead here [hic].  Immediately before this the Vatican edition has existing [existentium] for existing [entium].  A little below this after And thus [potest esse] in codex cc and edition 1 there is supplied the duration of an aevum [duration aevi] for (such a property).

4  Trusting in several codices, such as A K L O V Z and bb, we have inserted the soul of (St.) Francis [anima Francisci], which words are also found in the last (argument) of the fundament.  A little above this codex aa has Wherefore there is now a saying [Unde nunc est dicere] in place of For it is true to say [Verum etiam est dicere], which (codex) next after of (St.) Peter adds well in glory [in gloria].

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