COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III
PARS I. Quales creati sint Angeli quoad naturalia attributa.	PART I How were the Angels created in regard to their natural attributes?
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE I Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 88-94 Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 88-94. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Ecce ostensum est etc.	Behold it has been shown etc..
DIVISIO TEXTUS.	DIVISION OF THE TEXT
Supra egit Magister, quando et ubi creati sunt Angeli. In hac parte ostendit, quales facti sunt. Et quoniam qualitas Angeli potest attendi aut quantum ad naturales habilitates sive qualitates respicientes dispositionem naturae, aut meritum, aut premium; ideo hac pars tres habet. In prima determinat de primis, scilicet de attributis. In secunda de habitibus malitiae et bonitate, ibi: Illud quodque investigatione etc. In tertia de habitibus beatitudinis et miseriae, infra distinctione quarta: Post haec videndum, utrum perfectos etc.	Above Master (Peter) dealt with (the questions), “When and where the Angels were created?” In this part he shows, how [quales] were they made. And since the quality of an Angel can be attained either as much as regards natural abilities or qualities respecting the disposition of (his) nature, or (his) merit, or reward; for that reason this part has three (parts). In the first he determines concerning the first, namely, concerning (their) attributes. In the second concerning the habits of wickedness and goodness, there (where he says): That also seems to be worthy of investigation etc.. In the third concerning the habits of beatitude and misery, below in the Fourth Distinction (where he says): After these it must be seen, whether God created the Angels perfect etc..
Prima pars habet tres. In prima enumerat et distinguit illa attributa. In secunda ostendit, quomodo recipiunt magis et minus, ibi: Hic considerandum est, utrum etc. In tertia ostendit in aliquibus aliis aequalitatem, ibi: Et sicut in praedictis Angeli differebant etc.	The first part has three (parts). In the first he enumerates and distinguishes those attributes. In the second he shows, in what manner they receive more or less (of God’s Goodness), there (where he says): Here one must consider, whether etc.. In the third he shows an equality in some other (goods), there (where he says): And just as in the aforesaid the Angels differed etc..
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.	TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ad intelligentiam huius partis duo quaeruntur secundum duo attributa, quia de aliis habebitur infra.	For an understanding of this part two (questions) are asked according to two (of) the attributes, because (what) concerns the others will be had below.
Et primo quaeritur de simplicitate essentiae.	And first there is the question of the simplicity of (their) essence.
Secundo vero de discretione personali.	But second of (their) personal distinction.
Et circa primum quaeruntur tria.	And about the first three (questions) are asked.
Primo quaeritur, utrum Angelus sit simplex, an compositus ex materia et forma.	First there is asked, whether an Angel is simple, or composed out of matter and form.
Secundo, dato quod sic, quaeritur, utrum eadem sit materia in spiritualibus et corporalibus per essentiam.	Second, granted that (the latter is) so, there is asked, whether matter is the same among (things) spiritual and corporal through (its) essence.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum sit una numero, aut secundum identitatem aliam.	Third there is asked, whether (matter) is one in number, or (one) according to another identity.

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ARTICULUS I. De simplicitate essentiae in Angelis.	ARTICLE I On the simplicity of the essence in the Angels.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum Angeli sint compositi ex materia et forma.	QUESTION 1 Whether the Angels were composed out of matter and form?
QUAERITUR ERGO primo, utrum in Angelo sit compositio ex diversis naturis, scilicet ex materia et forma. Et quod sic, ostenditur:	THEREFORE THERE IS ASKED first, whether in an Angel there is a composition out of diverse natures, namely out of matter and form. And that (it is) so, is shown:
1. Per rationem mutationis. Nullum mutabile est simplex; sed Angelus de natura sua est mutabilis et mutatur:¹ ergo habet compositionem. Sed ulterius, quod ex materia: cuicumque inest mutatio, inest principium mutabilitatis: sed principium mutabilitatis est materia: ergo etc. Prima manifesta est; secunda patet per Augustinum duodecimo Confessionum:² « Omne mutabile insinuat quandam informitatem, qua forma capitur, vel mutatur, vel vertitur ». Et Boethius in secundo capitulo libri de Trinitate: « Nihil, quod est mere forma, accidentibus potest subiici ». Et ibidem expresse dicit, quod « forma non suscipit accidentia, quia haec non suscipit, nisi materia subiecta ». Si tu dicas mihi, quod mutabilitas venit rebus, quia sunt ex nihilo, sicut in pluribus locis vult Augustinus;³ sed constat, quod mutabilitas non est pura privatio, immo dicit aliquam positionem: ergo non habet causam ipsam puram privationem. Necesse est ergo, quod habeat causam dicentem positionem; sed non positionem omnimodam, cum etiam dicat privationem: ergo aliquid, quod non est omnino aliquid, nec omnino nihil, sed quod est medium inter aliquid et nihil; hoc autem dicit Augustinus⁴ materiam: ergo etc.	1. Through the reason for change. Nothing mutable [mutabile] is simple; but an Angel from his own nature is mutable and is changed [mutatur]:¹ therefore he has a composition. But furthermore, that (an Angel is created) out of matter: in whatsoever there is a change, there is a principle of mutability: but the principle of mutability is matter: ergo etc.. The first is manifest; the second is clear through (St.) Augustine in the twelfth (book) of the Confessions:² « Everything mutable insinuates a certain formlessness, according to which a form is grasped, and/or changed, and/or altered [vertitur] ». And (St. Severinus) Boethius in the second chapter of (his) book On the Trinity (says): « Nothing, which is merely a form, can be subjected to accidents ». And in the same place he expressly says, that « a form does not undertake [suscipit] accidents, because it does not undertak these, except according to (its) subjected matter ». If you say to me, that mutability comes to things, because they are out of nothing, just as (St.) Augustine³ wants in several passages; but it is established, that mutability is not a pure privation, nay it means the positing of something [aliquam positionem]: therefore it does not have as (its) cause a pure privation. Therefore it is necessary, that it have a cause meaning a positing (of something); but not an omnimodal positing, since (its cause) also means a privation: therefore something, which is not entirely something, nor entirely nothing, but which is a medium between something and nothing; but this (St.) Augustine⁴ calls [dicit] “matter”: ergo etc..
2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per rationem actionis et passionis: quia nihil idem et secundum idem agit et patitur; sed Angelus idem agit et patitur: ergo habet aliud et aliud principium, secundum quod agit, et secundum quod patitur. Sed principium, secundum quod agit, est forma, principium vero, secundum quod patitur, non potest esse nisi materia:⁵ ergo etc. Maior per se manifesta est; minor similiter patet; nam Angeli est recipere illuminationes et dare: ergo etc. Si forte des instantiam, quod medium per eandem naturam recipit lumen et dat, ut patet in aëre; nulla est instantia, quia medium non habet rationem activi nec cooperativi. Et rursus, haec instantia non potest fieri in vera actione et passione: Angelus enim agit et patitur; dum enim agit quod non debet, patitur quod debet; dum agit culpam, patitur poenam, ut nullo modo sit dedecus peccati sine decore iustitiae,⁶ et haec est passio proprie.	2. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown through the reason for an action and passion: because nothing the same and according to the same acts and suffers; but the same Angel acts and suffers: therefore he has one and another principle, according to which he acts, and according to which he suffers. But the principle, according to which he acts, is (his) form, but the principle according to which he suffers, cannot be but matter:⁵ ergo etc.. The major is manifest through itself; the minor is similarly clear, for to an Angel it belongs to receive and give illuminations: ergo etc.. If perchance you grant the instance (i. e. the contrary example), that a medium receives and gives light [lumen] through the same nature, as is clear in the air; there is no instance, because a medium does not have the reckoning of an active (principle), nor of a cooperative one. And again, this instance cannot come to be in a true action and passion: for an Angel acts and suffers; for while he does what he ought not, he suffers what he ought; while he commits [agit] a fault, he suffers a punishment, so that in no manner is the disgrace [dedecus] of sin without the ornament [decore] of justice,⁶ and this (punishment) is properly a passion.
3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem individuationis. In Angelis enim est distinctio hypostasum, non per originem. Fiat ergo talis ratio: omnis distinctio secundum numerum venit a principio intrinseco et substantiali, quia, omnibis accidentibus circumscriptis, differentia numero sunt diversa; sed non venit a forma: ergo venit a principio materiali: ergo etc. Maior per se manifesta est; minor patet per Philosophum, qui dicit de Caelo et mundo:⁷ « Cum dico caelum, dico formam; cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam ». Et idem in pluribus locis dicit, quod « omnino materia numerabiliter se habet ». Si tu dicas, quod materia vocatur ipsa hypostasis, sive ipsum quod est; ego quaero a te de hypostasi: aut addit aliquid supra essentiam et formam, aut nihil. Si nihil addit, ergo non contrahit: ergo sicut ipsum universale est natum semper . . .	3. Likewise, this seems through the reason for individuation. For among the Angels there is a distinction of hypostases, not (a distinction) through origin. Therefore let there be such a reckoning: ‘every distinction according to number comes from an intrinsic and substantial principle, because, prescinding from all accidents, (those) differing in number are diverse; but (this) does not come from form: therefore it comes from a material principle’: ergo etc.. The major is manifest through itself; the minor is clear through the Philosopher, who says On Heaven and the World:⁷ « When I say “heaven”, I am mean a form; when I say “this heaven”, I am mean matter ». And the same in several passages says, that « matter holds itself entirely in a numerable manner ». If you say, that matter is itself called a “hypostasis”, or that which is; I ask of you concerning a hypostasis: either it adds something upon the essence and form, or nothing. If it adds nothing, therefore it does not contract (them): therefore just as a universal is itself bound to always . . .
¹ August., VI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8: Nihil enim simplex mutabile est, omnis autem creatura mutabilis. — Paulo inferius post materia codd. N Q addunt videtur. Dein aliqui codd. ut H I U vv bis mutationis pro mutabilitatis. — Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 12. (I. brev. c. 2.) ait: Sed etiam materiam necesse est in eo quod movetur, intelligere. ² Cap. 19. n. 28: « Et verum est, quod omne mutabile insinuat notitiae nostrae quandam informitatem, qua formam capit, vel qua mutatur et vertitur ». Aliqui codd. cum textu originali qua formam capit pro qua forma capitur. — Verba Boethii sunt: Formae vero subiectae esse non possunt. Nam quod ceterae formae [praeter Deum] subiectae accidentibus sint, ut humanitas, non ita accidentia suscipit eo quod ipsa est, sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est. Dum enim materia subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accidens, ipsa hoc suscipere videtur humanitas. Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum nec vero inesse materiae. ³ De Natura boni, c. 1. n. 1; II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54; XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 8; Epist. 118. ad Dioscorum, c. 3. n. 15. ⁴ Libr. XII. Confess. c. 3. n. 3: « Nonne tu Domine docuisti me, quod priusquam istam informem materiam formares atque distingueres, non erat aliquid, non color, non figura, non corpus, non spiritus? Non tamen omnino nihil, erat quaedam informitas sine ulla specie ». Et ibid. c. 6. n. 6. fatetur, se materiae conceptum tunc acquisivisse, quando ipsam cogitabat ut « quiddam inter formatum et nihil, nec formatum nec nihil, informe propre nihil ». ⁵ Aristot. II. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 53. (c. 9.): Materiae enim est pati et moveri; movere autem et facere alterius potentiae (scil. formae). ⁶ Cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 26. ⁷ Libr. I. text. 92. (c. 9.): Alterum igitur est hoc caelum et caelum simpliciter; et hoc quidem ut species et forma, illud autem ut cum materia mixtum. Cfr. ibid. text. 95. — Sequens textus habetur. I. Phys. text. 66. (c. 7.): O ariqmoV ulh i. e. numerus vero materia. Cfr. etiam ibid. VII. text. 28. et 41. (VI. c. 8. et. 11.), VIII. text. 10 (VII. c. 3.), XII. text. 27. (XI. c. 5.), ubi dicitur, quod materia sit principium numericae diversitatis.	¹ (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. Vi, ch. 6, n. 8: For nothing simple is mutable, but every creature (is) mutable. — A little below this after matter [materia] codices N and Q add it seems [videtur]. Then some codices, such as H I U and vv twice have of change [mutationis] for of mutability [mutabilitatis]. — Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. II, text. 12 (in the shorter version, Bk. I, ch. 2) says: But it is necessary to understand matter too in that, which it is moved. ² Chapter 19, n. 28: « And it is true, that everything mutable insinuates to our knowledge a certain formlessness, according to which it grasps a form, and/or by which it is change and altered ». Some codices, together with the original text, have according to which it grasps a form [qua formam capit] for according to which a form is grasped [qua forma capitur]. — The words of (St. Severinus) Boethius are (these): But forms cannot be subjected. For because all other forms (except God) have been subjected to accidents, such as humanity (is), (a form) does not thus suscept accidents by this that it is itself, but by this that matter has been subjected to it. For so long as the matter subjected to humanity suscepts any accident, humanity itself seems to suscept this. But a form, which is without matter, will not be able to be subjected to nor, on the other hand, be in mater. ³ On the Nature of the Good, ch. 1, n. 1; On Free Will, Bk. II, ch. 20, n. 54; On the City of God, Bk. XII, ch. 8; Epistle 118 “To Dioscorus”, ch. 3, n. 15. ⁴ Confessions, Bk. XI, ch. 3, n. 3: « Have Thou, Lord, not taught me, that before you formed and distinguished this formless matter, there was not anything, not color, nor figure, not body, not spirit? Yet not entirely nothing, (for) there was a certain formlessness without any species ». And ibid., ch. 6, n. 6 he says, that he acquired the concept of matter then, when he thought of it as « a certain (something) between (something) formed and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, in a formless manner near nothing ». ⁵ Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, text 53 (ch. 9): For it belongs to matter to suffer and to be moved; but to move and to make to the other power (that is, to form). ⁶ Cf. (St.) Augustine, On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 19, n. 26. ⁷ Book I, text 92 (ch. 9): Therefore this heaven and heaven simply is otherwise [alterum], and the latter, indeed, (is) as a species and form, but the former as mixed with matter. Cf. ibid., text 95. — The following text is had in Physics, Bk. I, text. 66 (ch. 7): O ariqmoV ulh, i. e. a number (is) according to matter. Cf. also ibid., Bk. VII, texts 28 and 41 (Bk. VI, chs. 8 and 11); Bk. VIII, text 10 (Bk. VII, ch. 3); Bk. XII, text 27 (Bk. XI, ch. 5), where it is said that matter is the principles of numerical diversity.

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esse et ubique,¹ sic ipsa hypostasis, sicut patet in divinis, quia persona non addit supra esentiam, sed est ubique et immensa, sicut essentia. Ergo cum hypostasis Angeli sit finita et arctata et limitata, et ita hic et nunc, necessario oportet, quod ultra formam addat aliquid arctans substantiale sibi; hoc autem non potest esse nisi materia.	be and (be) everywhere,¹ so a hypostasis itself, just as is clear among the Divine (Persons), because a Person does not add upon the Essence, but is everywhere and immense, just as the Essence (is). Therefore since the hypostasis of an Angel is finite and constrained and limited, and (is) thus here and now, it must necessarily be [necessario oportet], that beyond the form something be added to it as a constraining substantial; but this cannot be but matter.
4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per naturam essentialis compositionis. Angelus enim definitur, et ita participat naturam generis et differentiae: naturam, in qua convenit cum aliis, et naturam, in qua differt.² Ergo cum necesse sit, totam veritatem definitionis realiter inveniri in quolibet Angelo, necesse est in eo ponere naturarum diversitatem. Sed impossibile est, plures naturas concurrere ad constitutionem tertii, quin altera habeat rationem possibilis, altera rationem actualis; quia ex duobus entibus in potentia nihil fit, similiter nec ex duobus entibus in actu:³ ergo necesse est etc. Si tu feras mihi instantiam in albedine et in aliis formis, quae habent definiri et habent genera et differentias, nec tamen materiam partem sui; instantia omnino nulla est, quia secus est in naturis accidentium, quae habent ortum ex substantia et eius principiis, et de naturis sive differentiis substantiae, quae non habent ortum ex alio genere. Unde necessario sequitur, vel quod albedo habeat diversas naturas in se, vel⁴ natura speciei et generis primi et subalterni causenter a diversis naturis repertis in subiecto; quodsi ita non potest poni in Angelo, primum ponendum est.	4. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown through the nature of essential composition. For an Angel is defined, and thus he participates in the nature of a genus and a difference: in a nature, in which he convenes with others, and in a nature, in which he differs.² Therefore since it is necessary, that the whole truth of a definition really be found in any Angel, it is necessary to posit in him a diversity of natures. But it is impossible, that several natures concur for the constitution of a third (being), one of which does not have the reckoning of a possible, the other of which (does not have) the reckoning of an actual, because from two beings in potency nothing comes to be, similarly neither from two beings in act:³ therefore it is necessary etc.. If you bring to me to the instance in whiteness and in other forms, which have a definition [habet definiri] and have genera and differences, yet do not have matter as a part of themselves, there is entirely no instance, because it is otherwise in the natures of accidents, which have (their) rise from a substance and its principles, and concerning the natures or differences of a substance, which do not have (their) rise out of another genus. Wherefore it necessarily follows, that either whiteness has diverse natures in itself, and/or⁴ (that) the nature of the species and of the prime and subaltern genus are caused by diverse natures found in the subject; which if (this) cannot be posited in an Angel, the first must be posited.
SED CONTRA: 1. Boethius in fine libri de Duabus Naturis et una persona Christi:⁵ « Omnis natura incorporeae substantiae nullo materiae fundamento innititur; nullum vero corpus est, cui materia non sit subiecta ». — Et iterum: « Cum alia res fundamento materiae innitatur, ut corpus, alia vero omnino subiecto materiae non egeat, ut incorporeum; nullo modo fieri potest, ut corpus in incorporalem speciem permutetur ». Ex hac auctoritate expresse habetur, quod Angelus non habet materiam.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St. Severinus) Boethius at the end of (his) book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ (says):⁵ « Every nature of an incorporeal substance is supported by no fundament of matter; but there is no body, to which matter has not been subjected ». — And again (he says): « Since some things are supported by the fundament of matter, such as a body, but others need entirely no subject of matter, such as an incorporeal [incorporeum] (being); it can in no manner come to be, that a body be thoroughly changed into an incorporal species ». From this authority there is expressly had, that an Angel does not have matter.
2. Item, Philosophus de Anima⁶ dicit, quod « neque corpus est, neque forma in corpore est, neque mixtum cum materia omnino »; et hoc dicit esse verum de intellectu; sed Angelus est huiusmodi: ergo non habet materiam.	2. Likewise, the Philosopher says On the Soul,⁶ that « neither is it a body, nor is it a form in a body, nor (is it) entirely mixed with matter »; and this he says is true of the intellect; but an Angel is of this kind: therefore he does not have matter.
3. Item, ostenditur ratione. Universum est perfectissimum secundum ordinem naturarum, ita quod perfectius non potest cogitari rationabiliter; sed cogitari potest rationabiliter⁷ aliqua substantia spiritualis et immaterialis: ergo illa est in universo: ergo etc. Maior patet per hoc, quod Deus fecit omnia valde bona;⁸ patet etiam per Damascenum capitulo vigesimo nono: « Omnia quae per Dei providentiam fiunt, deductionem convenientem suscipiunt, et ut non est melius, facta sunt ». Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio: « Potest esse aliquid in rerum natura, quod tua ratione non cogitas; non esse autem, quod vera ratione cogitas, non potest ». Minor patet, quia rationabiliter cogitatur substantia Deo similis per spiritualitatem et immaterialitatem; et hoc videtur: cum enim sit aliqua natura, quae secundum substantiam et esse est actus materiae, ut formae materiales et corporales; alia, quae secundum actum essendi, non secundum essentiam, ut anima rationalis; erit igitur tertia, quae secundum actum et essentiam erit separata.	3. Likewise, it is shown by reason. The universe is the most perfect (being) according to the order of natures, such that a more perfect one cannot reasonably be thought of; but some spiritual and immaterial substance can be reasonably⁷ thought of: therefore that is in the universe: ergo etc.. The major is clear through this, that God made all (things) very good;⁸ it is also clear through (St. John) Damascene in the twenty-ninth chapter: « All which come to be through God’s Providence, undertake a fitting act of being lead forth [deductionem convenientem suscipiunt] (into being), and, as there is no better (universe), have been made (accordingly) ». (St.) Augustine (says) On Free Will: « Something can be in the nature of things, which you do not think of with your reason; but that which you think of by a true reckoning, cannot not be ». The minor is clear, because one reasonably thinks of a substance similar to God through spirituality and immateriality; and this is seen: for since there is some nature, which according to substance and a ‘to be’ is the act of matter, such as material and corporal forms; (and since there is) another, which (is) according to the act of being, not according to essence, such as a rational soul; there will be a third, which will have been separated (from matter) according to act and essence.
4. Item, videtur per deductionem ad inconveniens. Inconveniens enim est, quod aliqua natura creata sit nobilior Angelo; sed omnis causa nobilior est suo effectu:⁹ ergo Angelus non habet aliam causam, quam increatam. Sed illa non potest esse causa materialis nec formalis: ergo Angelus non habet nec materiam nec formam aliam, sed essentialiter est forma.	4. Likewise, it seems through a deduction to the unfitting. For it is unfitting, that some created nature be more noble than an Angel; but every cause is more noble that its own effect:⁹ therefore an Angel does not have a cause other that an uncreated one. But That cannot be the material nor the formal cause (of the Angel): therefore an Angel has neither matter nor any form, but is essentially a form.
CONCLUSIO. Si materia large sumitur extendendo nomen ad omne potentiale constitutivum, ipsa substantia Angeli composita est ex materia et forma.	CONCLUSION If “matter” is taken broadly, by extending the name to every constitutive potential, the very substance of an Angel is composed “out of matter and form”.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod certum est, Angelum non habere essentiam simplicem per privationem omnis compositionis; certum enim est, quod Angelus compositus est compositione multiplici. Po- / -test . . .	I RESPOND: It must be said, that it is certain, that an Angel does not have an essence simple through the privation of every composition; for it is certain, that an Angel is composed by a multiple composition. For . . .
¹ Aristot., I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 31). — Paulo inferius post essentiam supplevimus ex cod. cc et ed. 1 sed, pro quod codd. F K quia habent, cod. T quae. ² Cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.). — Cod. O naturam generis, in qua convenit cum aliis, et naturam differentiae, in qua differt ab aliis. ³ Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.). — Paulo superius nonnulli codd. ut A K rationem potentialis pro rationem possibilis. ⁴ Supple cum Vat. quod. ⁵ Cap. 6. In hoc textu fere omnes codd. (excepto cod. I) cuius materia pro cui materia, quod concordat cum originali. In altero textu, qui invenitur ibidem, Vat. spiritum pro speciem. ⁶ Libr. III. text. 6. (c. 4.): « Unde neque rationabile est, ipsum mixtum esse cum corpore. Qualis enim quidam utique fieret, calidus aut frigidus? Et ei instrumentum (organum) aliquod esset sicut sensitivo; nunc autem nullum est ». Averroes ibid.: « neque corpus neque virtus in corpore ». ⁷ Sola Vat. omittit sed cogitari potest rationabiliter. Cod. cc et ed. 1 post sed subiungunt in universo. Codd. W bb nam perfectius pro ita quod perfectius. ⁸ Gen. 1, 31: Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. — Verba Damasceni, II. de Fide orthod. c. 29: « Providentia est voluntas Dei, per quam res omnes convenienti ratione reguntur . . . atque ita, ut meliori modo prorsus existere non possint (oi hn panta ta onta thn prosjoron diexagwghn lambanei . . . kai wV ouc eni creittw genesqai) ». Ultimam partem Vat. sola sic exhibet: et ut est melius, facta sunt; sensus quidem idem est, sed sententia Damasceni non ita fideliter quoad verba redditur, sicuti in textu nostro. — Textus August. est loc. cit. libro III. c. 5. n. 13. ⁹ Cfr. Dionys. de Div. Nom. c. 2. § 8. et c. 9. § 6; August., 83 Qq. q. 2.	¹ Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 24 (ch. 31). — A little below this after essence [essentiam], we have supplied from codex cc and edition 1 but [sed], in place of which codices F and K have because He [quia], and codex T which [quae]. ² Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text. 43 (Bk. VI, ch. 12). — Codex O reads in the nature of a genus, in which he convenes with others, and in the nature of a difference, in which he differs from others [naturam generis, in qua convenit cum aliis, et naturam differentiae, in qua differt ab aliis]. ³ Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 49 (Bk. VI, ch. 13). — A little above this not a few codices, such as A and K, have the reckoning of a potential [rationem potentialis] for reckoning of a possible [rationem possibilis]. ⁴ Supply together with the Vatican edition that [quod]. ⁵ Chapter 6. In this text nearly all the codices, except codex I, have the matter of which [cuius materia] for to which matter [cui materia], which concords with the original. In the other of the two texts, which is found ibid., the Vatican edition has spirit [spiritum] for species [speciem]. ⁶ Book III, text 6 (ch. 4): « Wherefore neither is it reasonable, that it has been mixed with a body. For indeed, what does it become, hot or cold? And something is its instrument, such as the sensitive; but now nothing is ». Averroës (says) on the same: « (it is) neither a body nor the virtue in the body ». ⁷ The Vatican edition alone omits but . . . can be reasonably thought of [sed cogitari potest rationabiliter]. Codex cc and edition 1 after but [sed] have in the universe [in universo]. Codices W and bb have for a more perfect one [nam perfectius] for such that a more perfect one [ita quod perfectius]. ⁸ Gen. 1:31: And God saw all which He had made, and they were truly good. — The words of (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 29 (are): « Providence is God’s Will, through which all things are ruled according to a fitting reason . . . and thus, that, in a word, they cannot exist in a better manner (oi hn panta ta onta thn prosjoron diexagwghn lambanei . . . kai wV ouc eni creittw genesqai) ». The last part the Vatican edition alone exhibits thus: and as is better, have been made [et ut est melius, facta sunt]; the sense, indeed is the same, but the thought of (St. John) Damascene is not so faithful rendered in regard to his words, as in our text. — The text of (St.) Augustine is loc. cit., Bk. III, ch. 5, n. 13. ⁹ Cf. (St.) Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, § 8, and ch. 9, § 6; (St.) Augustine, Eight-Three Questions, q. 2.

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Po- / -test enim considerari in comparatione ad suum principium; et sic in tantum est compositus, in quantum habet ad ipsum¹ dependentiam. Simplicissimum enim absolutissimum est, et omne dependens hoc ipso cadit in aliquam compositionem. — Habet secundo considerari in comparatione ad suum effectum; et sic habet componi² ex substantia et potentia. — Habet nihilominus considerari ut ens in genere; et sic secundum metaphysicum componitur ex actu et potentia, secundum logicum vero ex genere et differentia. — Item, habet considerari ut ens in se; et sic quantum ad esse actuale est in ipso compositio entis et esse, quantum ad esse essentiale, ex quo est et quod est, quantum ad esse individuale sive personale, sic quod est et quis est.³ — Cum ergo angelica essentia dicitur simplex, hoc non est per privationem harum compositionum.	he can be considered in comparison to his Principle; and thus inasmuch as he has been composed, insomuch does he have a dependence regarding It [ipsum].¹ For the most simple is the most absolute, and every dependent by this very (thing) falls into some composition. — He also has to be considered [habet considerari] in comparison to his effect, and thus he has a ‘being composed’² out of substance and potency. — Nevertheless, he has to be considered as a being in a genus [ens in genere]; and thus according to the metaphysician he is composed out of act and potency, but according to logician out of genus and difference. — Likewise, he has to be considered as a being in himself [ens in se]; and thus as much as regards actual ‘being’ [esse actuale] there is in him a composition of a being and of a ‘to be’ [entis et esse], as much as regards essential ‘being’, (he is composed) out of that by which he is and that which he is [quo est et quod est], as much as regards individual ‘being’ or personal (‘being’), thus (there is a composition of) what he is and who he is [quod est et quis est].³ — Therefore though the angelic essence is said (to be) “simple”, this is not through the privation of these compositions.
Sed hoc certum est, aliquas compositiones a substantia Angeli removeri, utpote compositionem ex partibus quantitativis, compositionem ex partibus heterogeneis et compositionem ex natura corporali et spirituali, qualis est in homine.	But this is certain, that some compositions are removed from the substance of an Angel, as for example a composition out of quantitative parts, a composition out of hetereogenus parts, and the composition out of corporal and spiritual nature, of the kind which is in man.
Sed de compositione materiae et formae sive materialis et formalis, de hac dubium est. Et voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod talis removetur ab Angelo, et sunt in eo compositiones prius dictae. — Sed, sicut ostensum est supra,⁴ cum in Angelo sit ratio mutabilitatis non tantum ad non-esse, sed secundum diversas proprietates, sit iterum ratio passibilitatis, sit iterum ratio individuationis et limitationis, postremo ratio essentialis compositionis secundum propriam naturam: non video causam nec rationem, quomodo defendi potest, quin substantia Angeli sit composita ex diversis naturis, et essentia omnis creaturae per se entis; et si⁵ composita est ex diversis naturis, illae duae naturae se habent per modum actualis et possibilis, et ita materiae et formae. Et ideo illa positio videtur verior esse, scilicet quod in Angelo sit compositio ex materia et forma.	But concerning the composition of matter and form or of the material and the formal (principle), concerning this there is a doubt. And some wanted to say, that such is removed from an Angel, and there are in him the prior, said [prius dictae] compositions. — But, just as has been shown above,⁴ since in an Angel there is a reckoning of mutability not only regarding ‘not-being’, but (also) according to diverse properties, (since) there is again a reckoning of passibility (i. e. the ability to receive an action), and again a reckoning of individuation and of limitation; lastly a reckoning of essential composition according to his own nature: I do not see the cause nor the reason, in what manner it can be defended, that the substance of an Angel, and the essence of every creature being through itself, has not been composed out of diverse natures; and if⁵ (its substance) has been composed out of diverse natures, those two natures hold themselves through the manner of an actual and a possible, and thus (in the manner of) matter and form. And for that reason that position seems to be more true, namely, that in an Angel there is a composition out of matter and form.
1. 2. Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritate Boethii,⁶ dicendum, quod loquitur de materia appropriate, scilicet ratione potentiae passivae, « quae est principium patiendi et transmutandi ab alio ». Et hoc patet, quia ipse vult probare, quod corporalia non convertuntur in spiritualia, nec e converso. Similiter Philosophus vult dicere, quod anima denudata sit a ratione materiae, secundum quam est causa permixtionis et corruptionis. Et ideo non loquuntur generaliter de materia, sed appropriate; alioquin ipse Boethius contradiceret sibi in principio de Trinitate,⁷ ubi dicit, quod nihil subiicitur accidentibus nisi per materiam; et ibidem, quod solus Deus est immaterialis.	1. 2. What, therefore, is objected unto the contrary concerning the authority of (St. Severinus) Boethius,⁶ it must be said, that he is speaking of matter in an appropriated manner [appropriate], namely according to the reckoning of the passive power, « which is the principle of suffering and of being transmuted by another ». And this is clear, because he himself wants to prove, that corporal (things) are not converted into spiritual ones, nor vice versa. Similarly the Philosopher wants to say, that the soul has been denuded from the reckoning of matter, according to which (matter) there is (in the soul) a cause of thorough mixing and corruption. And for that reason they are not speaking generally of matter, but in an appropriated manner; otherwise (St.) Boethius himself would contradict himself at the beginning of (his book) On the Trinity,⁷ where he says, that nothing is subjected to accidents except through matter; and in the same place (he says), that God alone is immaterial.
3. Quod obicitur, quod creatura simplex rationabiliter potest cogitari etc.; dicendum, quod consideratis proprietatibus creaturae, quia creatura eo ipso quod creatura non est actus purus, oportet quod habeat possibilitatem; quia mutabilis est, oportet quod habeat fundamentum; quia limitata et in genere, oportet quod compositionem habeat: unde non potest rationabiliter cogitari quod non potest esse nec fieri.⁸ Et si obiicias mihi, quod Deus potest facere, quod forma accidentalis sit sine materia, ut in Sacramento altaris; dicendum, quod nunquam facit, quin semper sit nata esse in materia, et ad illam, quantum est de sui natura, habet inclinationem. Si ergo Deus res condidit, secundum quod competit naturis ipsarum, patet, quod nunquam debuit facere, formam stare sine materia in conditione rerum, quamvis in miraculis faciat contra naturam et supra naturam. « In conditione enim rerum non quaerimus, quid Deus possit, sed quid congruat naturae ipsius creaturae », sicut dicit Augustinus.⁹	3. What is objected, that a simple creature can reasonably be thought of etc.; it must be said, that having considered the properties of a creature, because a creature by this very (thing), that (it is) a creature, is not a pure act, it is necessary [oportet] that it have (some) possibility; because it is mutable, it is necessary that it have a fundament; because (it is) limited and in a genus, it is necessary that it have a composition: wherefore what cannot be nor be made cannot be reasonably thought of.⁸ And if you object to me, that God can cause, that an accidental form be without matter, as in the Sacrament of the Altar; it must be said, that He never causes, that what is not always bound to be in matter have even an inclination to it, as much as concerns its own nature. Therefore, if God founded things, according to which it suits their natures, it is clear, that He ought never cause, that a form stand without matter in the foundation of things, even though in miracles He works against nature and above nature. « For in the foundation of things we do not seek, what God can (do), but what is congruent to the nature of the creature itself », just as (St.) Augustine says.⁹
4. Quod obiicitur, quod causa nobilior est effectu;¹⁰ verum est de efficiente et finali, quae proprie tenent rationem causae; sed de materiali et formali, quae sunt principia ordinata ad compositionem, non habet veritatem simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid.	4. What is objected, that a cause is more noble than (its) effect;¹⁰ is true concerning an efficient and final (cause), which properly have the reckoning of a cause; but of a material and formal (cause), which are the principles ordered to composition, it does not have truth simply, but only secundum quid.
¹ Codd. U aa ab ipso. Paulo inferius post hoc ipso in cod. A additur quod dependet, et dein post compositionem in Vat. quia differt quo est et quid est. ² Codd. F N bb compositionem. ³ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. ⁴ Hic in fundamentis. ⁵ Vat., mutata interpunctione, per se entis sic composita. Paulo post codd. P Q potentialis pro possibilis. ⁶ In fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 de auctoritatibus Boethii et Augustini [cod. Y philosphi et Augustini] dicendum [plures codd. dico, alii dicunt] quod loquuntur de etc. Sed inter obiectiones superius positas nulla ex Augustino invenitur: ergo vel ipsa excidit, vel lectio codd. non est recta; ideoque nihil mutavimus. Ipse August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5. n. 8. seqq. in resolvenda quaestione, utrum anima humana sit a Deo ex nihilo creata, an ex praeiacente materia educta, c. 12. n. 19. dicit: « Omne quippe corpus in omne corpus posse mutari, non defuerunt qui assererunt. Corpus autem aliquod sive terrenum sive caeleste converti in animam fierique naturam incorpoream, nec quemquam sensisse scio, nec fides hoc habet ». Idem repetit ibid. c. 20. n. 26. Quia S. Bonav. in seqq. ad hanc sententiam recurrit, lectio sic formari posset: Quod ergo obiicitur in contrarium de auctoritatibus Boethii et Philosophi, secundum Augustinum dicendum, quod loquuntur de materia . . .. Et hoc patet, quia ille [ita cod. K pro ipse] vult etc. — Definitio potentiae passivae sumta est ex Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 2. (VIII. c. 1.). ⁷ Cap. 2. Vide supra pag. 89, nota 2. Ibid. ait: Sed divina substantia sine materia forma est, atque ideo unum est et id quod est. Reliqua enim non sunt id quod sunt etc. — Paulo superius non pauci codd. secundum quam est ratio pro secundum quam est causa. Circa finem solutionis post ibidem codd. H cc et ed. 1 bene supplent dicit. ⁸ Nempe creatura simplex. ⁹ Libr. II.de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 2: Nunc enim, quemadmodum Deus instituerit naturas rerum, secundum Scripturas eius nos convenit quaerere, non quid in eis vel ex eis ad miraculum potentiae suae velit operari. ¹⁰ Cod. aa suo effectu.	¹ Codices U and aa have from it [ab ipso]. A little below this after by this very (thing) [hoc ipso] there is added in codex A that it depends [quod dependet], and then after composition [compositionem] there is read in the Vatican edition because that by which it is and what it is differ [quia differt quo est et quid est]. ² Codices F N and bb read a composition [compositionem] for a ‘being composed’ [componi]. ³ Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q. 2. ⁴ Here in the arguments of the fundament (i. e. the reasons in the first part, in favor of the conclusion). ⁵ The Vatican edition, having changed the inter-punctuation, reads and the essence of some creature, being through itself, has not been thus composed etc. [Trans. note: In each reading the proposition is subordinate to the quin of the prior proposition, which requires a negative sense and the same verb, thus rendering omnis as some rather than every.] A little after this codices P and Q have potential [potentialis] for possible [possibilis]. ⁶ In nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 there is read concerning the authorities of (Sts.) Boethius and Augustine — codex Y reads of the philosopher and (St.) Augustine [philosophi et Augustini] — it must be said — several codices read I say [dico], others they say [dicunt] — that they are speaking of etc. [de auctoritatibus Boethiis et Augustini dicendum quod loquuntur de etc.]. But among the objections posited above none is found from (St.) Augustine: therefore either it fell from the text, and/or the reading of the codices is not right; and for that reason we have changed nothing. (St.) Augustine himself, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VII, ch. 5, n. 8 ff, in resolving the question, whether the human soul has been created by God out of nothing, or whether it has been drawn forth from pre-existing [praeiacente] matter, ch. 12, n. 19, says: « Indeed, there were not lacking those who asserted, that every body can be changed into every body. But that some body, whether earthly or heavenly, is converted into the soul and becomes an incorporeal nature, I neither know anyone who has thought (this), nor does the Faith hold this ». He repeats the same ibid, ch. 20, n. 26. Because St. Bonaventure in the following recurs to this sentence, the reading could be formed thus: What, therefore, is objected unto the contrary concerning the authorities of (St. Severinus) Boethius and the Philosopher, it must be said according to (St.) Augustine, that they are speaking of matter etc.. And this is clear, because codex K reads the former (i.e. the former of two, and thus there must be more than one) wants [ille vult] for he himself wants [ipse]. — The definition of a passive power has been taken form Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. XI, text 2 (Bk. VIII, ch. 1). ⁷ Chapter 2. See above p. 89, footnote 2. Ibid., he says: But the Divine Substance is a form without matter, and for that reason It is one [unum] and That which It is. For the rest are not that which they are etc. — A little above this not a few codices have a reckoning of [ratio] for a cause of [causa]. Near the end of the solution after in the same place [ibidem] codices H and cc and edition 1 supply well he says [dicit]. ⁸ Namely a simple creature [Trans. note: Here the Quaracchi editors understand, the proposition to read wherefore a simple creature cannot be reasonably thought of, because it cannot be nor be made]. ⁹ On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. II, ch. 1, n. 2: For now it is fitting that we seek according to His Scriptures, that standard of measure according to which God instituted the natures of things, not what He wanted to work in them and/or out of them according to a miracle of His Power. ¹⁰ Codex aa reads its effect [suo effectu].

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SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Doctrina catholica docet « unitatem substantialem humanae naturae, quae duabus constat substantiis partialibus, corpore nempe et anima rationli » (Litterae de mandato Pii Papae IX. scriptae 5 Iunii 1877 a. Wlad. Czacki), et quidem ita, ut « substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac per se humani coporis sit forma » (Concil. Viennens.). Insuper communis doctrina Scholasticorum tunc tenebet, omnia entia corporalia completa, tam viventia quam non viventia, intrinsece constitui ex materia et forma tanquam ex partibus essentialibus. Quoad autem substantias spirituales creatas S. Bonav. cum multis aliis suae aetatis doctoribus docet, etiam in his esse similem ex materia et forma compositionem. Hoc asserit quoad Angelos in tribus huius articuli quaest., et quoad animam humanam infra d. 17. a. 1. q. 2. — Qui imbuti sunt tantum recentioris philosophiae placitis, hi cum vocabulo materiae plerumque connectunt conceptum substantiae completae corporalis et inertis; unde non parum tali doctrina offenduntur, quasi faveat materialismo. Hinc pro intelligendo vero S. Doctoris sententia 1. praelibenda videntur aliqua capita communis doctrinae de unione sive compositione substantiali materiam inter et formam; 2. proponamus, quid S. Bonav. sentiat de ipsa ratione materiae; 3. quoad quaestionem, de qua agitur, videamus, in quibus ipse cum sententia nunc communi conveniat, in quibus dissentiat.	I. Catholic doctrine teaches « that the substantial unity of human nature, which is established by two partial substances, namely the body and rational soul » (Pope Pius IX’s Letters of Mandate written June 5, 1877 A.D. to Wlad. Czacki), and indeed thus, that « the substance of the rational or intellective soul is truly and through itself the form of the human body » (Council of Vienne). Moreover the common doctrine of the Scholastics held at that time, that all corporal, complete beings, both living and non-living, are intrinsically constituted out of matter and form as out of essential parts. But in regard to created, spiritual substances St. Bonaventure, with many other doctors of his age, teaches, that even in those there is a similar composition out of matter and form. This he asserts in regard to the Angels in the three Questions of this Article, and in regard to the human soul, below in d. 17, a. 1, q. 2. — Those who have been imbued with only the positions of more recent philosophy, very frequently connect with this term “matter” the concept of a complete corporal and inert substance; wherefore they are not a little offended by such a doctrine, as if it favores materialism. Hence for understanding the true sentence of the Seraphic Doctor, 1st. it seems necessary to review some points of the common doctrine concerning the substantial union or composition of matter and form; 2nd. to propose, what St. Bonaventure thinks of the very reckoning of matter; 3rd. to see, in regard to the question, which he deals with, in what he himself convenes with the now common sentence, (and) in what he disagrees.
II. Communis doctrina Scholasticorum haec capita tenet.	II. The common doctrine of the Scholastics holds these points:
1. Materia et forma sunt duo elementa realia et principia substantialia, ex quorum unione resultat tertium aliquod, quod est unum compositum substantiale, a duobus suis principiis constituentibus distinctum, atque una completa substantia. In hoc composito remanent duo principia constitutiva, ut entitates reales et substantiales, sed incompletae in genere substantiae et ordinatae ad unum totum, quia constituunt unum ens, ex utroque elemento coalescens. Unio igitur substantialis omnino differt ab unione accidentali. Ut unio sit substantialis, duo requiruntur, scil. primo duo elementa substantialia, quae ut partes substantiales intrant in totum compositum; secundo talis modus unionis, ut inde resultet una completa substantia. — Non est igitur unio substantialis, sed accidentalis, quando duae completae substantiae ita connectuntur, ut etiam in coniunctione maneant intrinsice duae completae substantiae; neque etiam, quando aliquod accidens, quantumcumque necessarium, suo subiecto unitur. Cum enim accidentia non constituant instrisecus substantiam, sed essentiae quasi extrinsecus insint, nunquam ex ista unione resultat aliquod tertium substantiale, sed non nisi eiusdem substantiae perfectio accidentalis (cfr. infra d. 26. q. 3, praesertim ad 4, et III. Sent. d. 36. q. 6. ad 3.).	1. Matter and form are two real elements (i. e. “element” in the philosophical, not the chemical, sense) and substantial principles, out of the union of which there results a third something, which is (both) one substantial composite, distinct from its two constituent principles, and one complete substance. In this composite there remain the two constitutive principles, as real and substantial entities, but incomplete in the genus of substance and ordered to one whole, because they constitute one being, coalesced out of each element. Therefore a substantial union differs entirely from an accidental union. That there be a substantial union, two (things) are required, namely first two substantial elements, which enter into the whole composite as substantial parts; second such a manner of union, that from it there results one complete substance. — There is not, therefore, a substantial union, but an accidental one, when two complete substances are thus connected, that even in the conjunction they remain intrinsically two complete substances; nor even, when some accident, howsoever necessary, is united to its subject. For since accidents do not constitute intrinsically a substance, but are quasi extrinsically in the essence, there never results from their union some, substantial third, but rather (there is from such a union) naught but the accidental perfection of the same substance (cf. below d. 26, q. 3, chiefly in reply to n. 4, and Sent., Bk. III, d. 36, q. 6, in reply to n. 3).
2. Porro hic modus unionis substantialis requirit, ut alterum istorum principiorum constituentium sit aliquid indeterminatum, at determinabile, vel receptivum sive passivum (potentia), alterum vero sit determinas sive perficiens, vel actuans (actus). Unde dicitur hic fundam. 4: « Impossibile est, plures naturas concurrere ad constitutionem tertii, quin altera habeat rationem possibilis, altera rationem actualis; quia ex duobus entibus in potentia nihil fit, similiter nec ex duobus entibus in actu etc. (cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. dub. 6.).	2. Next this manner of substantial union requires, that one of the two of its constituent principles be something indeterminate, but determinable, and/or receptive or passive (potency), but the other of the two be determining or perfecting, and/or actuating (act). Whence there is said here in the 4th argument of the fundament: « It is impossible, that several natures concur for the constitution of a third (being), the one of which does not have the reckoning of a possible, the other of which (does not have) the reckoning of an actual; because out of two beings in potency nothing comes to be, similarly neither out of two beings in act etc. (cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II; Doubt 6).
3. Materia per essentiam est quaedam entitas realis, sed passiva. « Communiter materia prima nominatur quod est in genere substantaie ut potentia quaedam intellecta praeter omnem speciem et formam, et etiam praeter privationem, quae tamen est susceptiva et formarum et privationum » (S. Thom., de Spiritual. Creatur. a. 1.). Materia non existit nec potest existere, saltem naturaliter, nisi sub forma; quia « secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam » (idem, S. I. q. 75. a. 6, et Scot., de Rerum princip. q. 7. a. 1. n. 2.). Materia igitur in se non nisi mente concipitur: « secundum sui essentiam est informis per possibilitatem omnimodam, et dum sic consideratur, ipsa formarum capacitas sive possibilitas est sibi pro forma » (infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1 ad 1.). « Formationem habet aliunde, sed informitatem et possibilitatem habet ex propria natura; non tamen potest esse prior duratione. Nunquam enim informitas est nisi per aliquam formam, nec possibilitas nisi per aliquem actum ». « Materia a forma dependet et ad ipsam habet necessariam ordinationem » (ibid. ad 1. et 2; cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. ad 4.; d. 30. q. 3; d. 26. q. 1. ad 6.). — Hinc patet, quod materia non est nihil, et tamen non est ens completum et ens actu, cum « ens in potentia simpliciter inter non-ens et ens-actu sit medium » (infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. ad 6.).	3. Matter through essence is a certain real, but passive, entity. « Commonly “prime matter” names that which is in the genus of substance as a certain potency understood in addition to [praeter] every species and form, and also in addition to privation, yet which is susceptive of forms and privations » (St. Thomas, de Spiritual. Creatur., a. 1). Matter does not exist nor can it exist, at least naturally, except under a form; because « according to this it acquires a ‘to be’ in act, on which account it acquires a form » (St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 75, a. 6, and Bl. John Duns Scotus, de Rerum princip., q. 7, a. 1, n. 2). Matter, therefore, in itself is not but conceived by the mind: « according to its own essence it is formless through an omnimodal possibility, and so long as it is considered thus, the very capacity or possibility of forms is its own in virtue of form » (below in d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, in the body of the Question; cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 1). « It has its formation from elsewhere, but it has (its) formlessness and possibility out of its own nature; yet it cannot be prior according to duration. For there is never a formlessness but through some form, nor a possibility except through some act ». « Matter depends from form and has a necessary ordination to it » (ibid., in reply to nn. 1 and 2; cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, in reply to n. 4; d. 30, q. 3; d. 26, q. 1, in reply to n. 6). — Hence it is clear, that matter is not nothing, and yet it is not a complete being nor [et] a being in act, since « a being in potency is simply a medium between a non-being [non ens] and a being-in-act [ens-actu] » (below, d. 12, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 6).
4. Forma substantialis (entelechia, perfectio) est alterum « principium constitutivum, quae [forma] complet in essendo » (III. Sent. d. 36. q. 6. a. 3.). Ipsa « est parts rei, per quam est actu » (Ioan. a Rupella, I. de Anima, c. 13.), et « principium essendi substantialiter ei, cuius est forma, principium autem dico non effectum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur ens ». (S. Thom., S. c. Gent. III. c. 68.).	4. The substantial form (entelechia, perfection) is the other « constitutive principle, which the form completes in being » (Sent., Bk. III, d. 36, q. 6, a. 3). It « is the part of the thing, through which (the thing) is in act » (John of Rupella, On the Soul, Bk. I, ch. 13), and « the principle of the substantial being [essendi substantialiter] of that, of which it is the form, but I say “the principle” not the “effect”, but the “formal (principle)”, by which something is and is denominated as a “being” » (St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, ch. 68).
III. Attamen in conceptu ipso materiae, si magis determinatur, notabiliter dissentiunt S. Bonaventura et S. Thomas.	III. But yet in the very concept of matter, if it is to be more determined, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas disagree.
1. Secundum S. Thom. materia essentialiter est principium rerum corporalium tantum. Unde tritam illam Aristotelis, VII. Metaph. text. 8 (VI. c. 3.), definitionem, quod sit nec quid nec quantum nec aliquid aliud quippiam dicatur, quibus ens determinatur (mhte ti mhte poson allo mhqen legetai etc.) intelligit in sensu, quod materia sine forma careat natura corporali specifica, sicut caret actu existendi; radicaliter tamen est ens corporale sive materialie. Nam « materia et forma dividunt substantiam materialem (S. c. Gent. II. c. 54. circa finem). Sed S. Bonav., eandem definitionem accipiens in toto rigore, dicit (hic q. 2, ad 3.): « Materia in se considerata nec est spiritualis, nec corporalis [cfr. infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3. ad 5.]; et ideo capacitas consequens essentiam materiae indifferenter se habet ad formam, sive spiritualem sive corporalem. Sed quia materia nunquam spoliatur ab omni esse, et quae semel est sub esse corporali nunquam exuitur, et similiter illa, quae est sub esse spirituali: hinc est, quod materia consequens esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus est alia et alia ».	1. According to St. Thomas matter is essentially the principle of corporal things only. Whence that trite definition of Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 8 (Bk. VI, ch. 3), that (matter) is neither something nor a quantum nor even said (to be) anything else, by which (whatevers) a being is determined (mhte ti mhte poson allo mhqen legetai etc.), he understand in the sense, that matter without form lacks a specific corporal nature, just as it lacks the act of existing; yet radically it is a corporal or material being. For « matter and form divide material substance (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II. ch. 54, near the end). But St. Bonaventure, accepting the same definition it all its rigor, says (here in q. 2, in reply to n. 3): « Matter considered in itself is neither spiritual, nor corporal (cf. below d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, in reply to n. 5); and for that reason the capacity consequent to the essence of matter holds itself indifferently to a form, whether a spiritual or a corporal one. But because matter is never despoiled from all ‘being’, and what is once under a corporal ‘being’ is never laid aside [exuitur], and similarly that, which is under a spiritual ‘being’: hence it is, that the matter consequent to the ‘to be’ in spiritual and corporal (things) is different [alia et alia] ».
2. Hinc S. Bonav. sub uno nomine materiae comprehendit plures res physice differentes, sive considerat materiam essentialiter unam in tribus praecipue statibus. Nam distinguit (hic q. 2. 3. passim, et d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. in fine) materiam secundum essentiam sive secundum se et metaphysice consideratam, et eandem, quatenus est applicata formis. Applicata formis est vel spiritualis vel corporalis, quae ultima iterum alia est in corporibus corruptibilibus, alia in caelestibus incorruptibilibus.	2. Hence St. Bonaventure, under the one name of “matter”, comprehends several different things physically, or considers matter essentially one in three states chiefly. For he distinguishes (here in qq. 2 and 3 passim, and in d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, at the end) matter according to essence or according to itself and metaphysically considered, and the same, to the extent that it is applied to forms. Applied to forms it is either spiritual and/or material, the latter of which is again in corruptible bodies, the former in incorruptible heavenly (bodies).
3. Materia secundum essentiam sive metaphysice considerata, quae a Scoto vocatur vel metaphysice vel primo prima (de Rerum princip. q. 1. a. 1. n. 3, et q. 7. a. 2, n. 26; q. 8. a. 3. n. 20), ita describitur a S. Bonaventura: « Per sui essentiam nullum habet actum, nullam formam, ergo nullam distinctionem » (hic q. 3. in corp.); « materia, abstracta omni forma, simplex est, non tamen habet actualem simplicitatem, ut punctus, sed simplex, quia caret actuali extensione, habet tamen possibilitatem ad illam; et cum natura formae corporalis illi materiae datur, tunc reducitur ad actum » (q. 2. ad 4.); « de se est infinita et ad formas infinitas . . . quae infinitas venit ex summae possibilitatis imperfectione » (q. 3. in corp.); « quia ens omnino in potentia, ideo nec genus nec species esse potest, quae dicunt aliquo modo actum; et ideo non potest esse communis eis, quibus est communis, unitate universalitatis vel univocationis » (ibidem); « sed si habet unitatem, unitatem homogeneitatis habet . . . quae adeo ampla est, ut sustineat receptionem maioris multitudinis diversitatis formarum superadiectarum, quam unitas formae alicuius universalis, etiam generis generalissimi; et hoc est propter summam possibilitatem » (ibid.). De . . .	3. Matter according to essence or metaphysically considered, which is called by (Bl. John Duns) Scotus either “(matter) metaphysically (considered)” [metaphysice] and/or “the first prime (matter)” [primo prima] (de Rerum principio, q. 1, a. 1, n. 3, and q. 7, a. 2, n. 26; q. 8, a. 3, n. 20), is described by St. Bonaventure thus: « Through its essence it has no act, no form, therefore no distinction » (here in q. 3, in the body of the Question); « matter, abstracted from every form, is simple, yet it does not have an actual simplicity, as a point (does), but (is) simple, because it lacks an actual extension, yet has a possibility for it; and when the nature of a corporal form is given to that matter, then it is reduced to act » (q. 2, in reply to n. 4); « of itself it is infinite and regards infinite forms . . . which infinity comes from the imperfection of (its) most high possibility » (q. 3, in the body of the Question); « because (it is) a being entirely in potency, for that reason it can be neither a genus nor a species, which mean in some manner an act; and for that reason it cannot be common to those, to which it is common, by the unity of universality and/or univocation » (ibid.); « but if it has a unity, it has a unity of homogeneity . . . which is so ample, that it sustains the reception of a greater multitude of a diversity of the above said forms, than the unity of any universal form (does), even of the most general kind; and this is on account of (its) most high possibility » (ibid.). Of . . .

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essentia eius valet, quod S. Doctor de unitate ipsius dicit, scil. ut aliquo modo capiatur, oportet « super actum imaginationis conscendere et omnino ens in potentia per privationem cogitare; et sic poterit aliqualiter capere. Quamdiu enim materia ut moles extensa cogitatur, ad unitatem essentiae consideratam nullo modo pertingitur » (ibid. ad 4. 5. 6.).	its essence, what the Seraphic Doctor says of its unity, is valid, namely, that it be in some manner grasped, that it is necessary « one embark upon an act of imagination and think entirely of a being in potency through privation; and thus one will be able to grasp (it) in some manner. For however so long matter be thought of as an extended mass, one will attain in no manner to the considered unity of (its) essence » (ibid, in reply to nn. 4, 5 and 6).
4. Materia applicata formis spiritualibus « sublevata est super esse extensionis et super esse privationis et corruptoinis; et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis » (infra d. 17. q. 2. in corp.). In his materia est tantum « fulcimentum variationis » « ad receptionem influentiae et habituum, et perditionem » (hic q. 2. in corp.). — Si autem « suscipit formam corporalem, quae non est nata esse in materia nisi cum extensione, quamvis ipsa in se sit simplici essentia consistens », tunc possibilitas ad extensionem « reducitur ad actum » (q. 2. ad 4.). — Hinc « proprie est materia in corporalibus et corruptibilibus, minus proprie in corporibus incorruptibilibus, minime in spiritualibus » (q. 2. in corp.).	4. Matter applied to spiritual forms « has been raised above the ‘being’ of extension and above the ‘being’ of privation and of corruption, and for that reason is said (to be) “spiritual matter” (below in d. 127, q. 2, in the body of the Question). In these (beings) matter is only « the support of variation » « according to the reception of an influence and of habits, and a loss (thereof) » (here in q. 2, in the body of the Question). — But if « it suscepts a corporal form, which is not bound to be in matter except with an extension, though in itself it is one consisting according to a simple essence », then (its) possibility for extension « is reduced to act » (q. 2, in reply to n. 4). — Hence « properly there is matter in corporal and corruptible (things), less properly in incorruptible bodies, least (properly) in spiritual (things) » (q. 2, in the body of the Question).
IV. Cum dicti doctores in ipsa ratione materiae determinanda dissentiant, fieri nequit, quominus etiam in aliis questionibus, in quibus de materia agitur, diversimode vel sentiant, vel saltem loquuntur. Sed hae differentiae pertinent ad res philosophicas, praesertim metaphysicas, ut interdum infra observabimus. Sub aspectu autem proprie theologico sunt exigui momenti, etiam in hac quaestione de Angelorum compositione. Quod ut pateat, videamus, in quibus conveniant oppositae sententiae, et in quibus dissentiant.	IV. Since the said doctors disagree in determining the very reckoning of matter, it is impossible, even no less in the other questions, in which matter is dealt with, that they do not think, and/or at least speak in a diverse manner. But these differences pertain to the matters of philosophy, especially metaphysics, as we shall now and then observe below. But under a properly theological aspect they are of small moment, even in this question concerning the composition of the Angels. To clarify this (statement), let us see, in what (their) opposed sentences convene, and in what the disagree.
1. Conveniunt in his: a) Angeli sunt incorporei, quia nec habent corpora coniuncta, ut anima humana, nec in se ipsis materiam corporalem et extensam. b) Ipsi sunt naturaliter incorruptibiles et immortales (cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4. 5. 6.). c) Creati sunt ex nihilo, nullatenus ex materia praeiacente (infra d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. fundam. 5. et ad 5.). d) Item, quoad substantiam sunt simplices, quantum decet creaturam (Breviloq. p. II. c. 6.). Non tamen sunt absolute simplices et actus puri, sed plures habent compositiones. In eis est enim compositio accidentalis « ex substantia et potentia » et actione, quia in nulla creatura actio et potentia operativa est idem quod eius essentia, ut probat S. Thom., S. I. q. 54. a. 3. et 1. (cfr. ibid. q. 3. a. 4.). Item in ordine substantiali inest ipsis compositio metaphysica inter essentiam et existentiam (cfr. supra Schol. ad d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.). De his duabus compositionibus non est dubium; nec etiam, quod debeat removeri a substantia angelica « compositio ex partibus quantitativas et compositio ex partibus heterogeneis et compositio ex natura corporali et spirituali, qualis est in homine » (hic in corp.).	1. They agree in these: a) Angels are incorporeal, because they neither have conjoined bodies, as the human soul (does), nor corporal and extended matter in their very selves. b) They themselves are naturally incorruptible and immortal (cf. Sent., Bk. I, p. I, a. 2. q. 2, in reply to nn. 4, 5, and 6). c) They have been created out of nothing, (and) to no extent out of preexisting matter [ex material praeiacente] (below in d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, 5th argument of the fundament, and in reply to n. 5). d) Likewise, in regard to (their) substance they are simple, as much as befits a creature (Breviloquium, p. II, ch. 6). Yet they are not absolutely simple nor pure acts, but have several compositions. For in them there is an accidental composition « out of substance and potency » and action, because in no creature is action and operative power the same as its essence, as St. Thomas proves, in Summa., I, q. 54, aa. 3 and 1 (cf. ibid., q. 3, a. 4). Likewise in the substantial order there is in them a metaphysical composition between essence and existence (cf. the Scholium above in d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1). Of these two compositions there is no doubt; nor even, that there ought to be removed from the angelic substance « a composition out of quantitative parts and a composition out of heterogeneous parts and a composition out of corporal and spiritual nature, of the kind which is in man » (here in the body of the Question).
2. Attamen dissentiunt a) in numero earum compositionum, quae ad metaphysicam et logicam spectant, imprimis quoad compositionem, quae spectat ad esse individuale sive personale, vel inter quod est et quis est, ut infra a. 2. q. 2. constabit. Durandus etiam non admittit compositionem logicalem ex genere et differentia hic notatam, quam cum Scoto Aegidius R bene explicat et sustinet. — Notandum est insuper, quod secundum S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 52. 53.), compositio ex substantia et esse, quae spectat ad esse actuale, eadem est atque ea « quae a quibusdam dicitur ex quod est et esse, vel ex eo quod est et quo est ». Attamen S. Bonav. distinguit inter utramque, et illam secundam refert ad esse essentiale. Sciendum est igitur, hanc Boethii distinctionem (cfr. Schol. ad I. Sent. d. 8. p. II q. 2.) in duplici sensu accipi, ut testatur Richard. a Med. (Sent. d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.) his verbis: « Quod est ipsius animae est essentia concreta cum proprietatibus naturalibus, et quo est est sua essentia absolute considerata. Vel potest dici seucndum alios, quod suum quod est est sua essentia ut per se existens, et suum quo est est suum esse ». Quid significent ista secundum primam acceptionem, clarius explicatur a Ioan. a Rupella (I. de Anima, c. 13.): « Essentia, qua creatura est, non dicit nisi respectu eius quod essentiale est creaturae; quod est vero respicit essentiale et accidentale, ut patet in Angelo et anima, quia dicitur de eo quod est anima, quod est rationalis; et hoc est essentiale ei; et quod est iusta, quod est accidentaliter ». Quando Seraphicus in corp. loquitur de distinctione quoad esse essentiale, ita intelligendus esse videtur.	2. Nevertheless they disagree a) in the number of those compositions, which pertain to (their) metaphysical (nature) and logical (nature), first of all in regard to the composition, which pertains to individual or personal ‘being’, and/or between what one is and who one is, as will be established below in a. 2, q. 2. Durandus also does not admit a logical composition out of genus and difference noted here, which he explains and sustains well with (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (and) Giles the Roman. — It must be noted besides, that according to St. Thomas (Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, chs. 52 and 53), the composition out of substance and a ‘to be’, which pertains to actual ‘being’, is the same as that « which by certain (authors) is said (to be) out of that which one is and a ‘to be’, and/or out of that which is and that by which it is ». Nevertheless St. Bonaventure distinguishes between each, and refers the second one to essential ‘being’ [esse essentiale]. It must be understood, therefore, that this distinction of (St. Severinus) Boethius (cf. Scholium on Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q. 2) is accepted in a twofold sense, as Richard of Middleton testifies (Sent., II, d. 17, a. 1. q. 1, in reply to n. 1) in these words: « What it is belongs to the soul itself according to an essence concreted with natural properties, and that by which it is is its own essence, absolutely considered. And/or it can be said according to others, that its ‘what it is’ is its own essence as existing through itself, and its ‘that by which it is’ is its own ‘to be’ ». What these (words) of his signify according to the first acceptation, is more clearly explained by John of Rupella (On the Soul, Bk. I, ch. 13): « The “essence, by which” a creature is, he says not but in respect of that which is essential to a creature; but “that which it is” respects the essential and accidental, as is clear in the Angel and the soul, because there is said of “that which is” a soul, that it is “rational”; and this is essential to it; and that it is just, what it is accidentally ». When the Seraphic (Doctor) speaks in the body of the Question concerning a distinction in regard to essential ‘being’ [esse essentiale], seems thus to be understood.
b) Sed principalis differentia in eo consistit, quod praeter dictas compositiones ipsa essentia Angeli secundum S. Doctorem composita est ex principio materiali et formali, quam sententiam Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2.) post longiorem discursum sic exprimit: « Ergo in (Angeli) essentia est una res, per quam ipse se movet, et alia res, per quam ipse movetur; et primam rem dicimus formam, secundam dicimus materiam ». — Non defuerunt (ut Marcus a Baudunio, Paradisus theol. t. I. q. 44. a. 2.), qui verba S. Doctoris explicare voluerint in sensu pure metaphysico, ita ut nihil dicant nisi distinctionem inter essentiam et esse, et omnino idem cum eo quod S. Thom. (de Spiritual. Creaturis) docet: « In substantia spirituali est compositio potentiae et actus, et per consequens formae et materiae . . . Sed tamen hoc non est proprie dictum secundum communem usum nominum ». — Haec autem expositio manifeste falsa est, quia clarissimis sententiis, quae in hac quaestione et infra d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. occurunt, violentiam facit. Eliditur etiam haec opinio ipsa controversia, per saecula inter tot auctores de hac compositione ex materia et forma protracta. Nunquam enim dubium exortum est de admittenda aliqua distinctione inter essentiam et existentiam, sive inter quod est et quo est. — Notandum etiam, S. Bonaventuram doctrinam hic traditam usque ad finem suae vitae tenuisse, cum in ultimo suo opere (Hexaëm. Serm. II, aliquanto ante finem) inter alia doceat, omnem substantiam creatam distingui « reali distinctione principiorum, quorum unum activum, alterum passivum », et (ibid. Serm. IV. circa med.): « Necesse est enim, cum in omni creatura potentia activa coniuncta sit potentiae passivae, quod illae duae potentiae fundentur super diversa principia rei ». Deinde (paulo inferius) concludit: « Minus est periculosum dicere, quod Angelus sit compositus, etiamsi verum non sit, quam quod sit simplex: quia hoc ego attribuo Angelo, nolens ei attribuere quod ad Deum solum aetimo pertinere, et hoc propter reverentiam Dei. Sed secundum veritatem sic videtur, quia dicit Boethius: Forma simplex subiectum esse non potest: ergo Angelo nihil accideret tunc nec laetitia nec tristitia ».	b) But the principal difference consists in this, that besides the aforesaid compositions the very essence of the Angel, according to the Seraphic Doctor, has been composed out of a material and formal principle, which sentence Richard of Middleton (here in a. 1, q. 2), after a longer discourse, expresses thus: « Therefore in the essence (of an Angel) there is one thing, through which he himself moves himself, and another thing, through which he himself is moved; and the first thing we say (is) the “form”, the second we say (is) the “matter” ». — There were not lacking those (such as Marcus a Baudunius, Paradisus theol., tome I, q. 44, a. 2), who wanted to explain the words of St. Bonaventure in a purely metaphysical sense, so that they mean nothing but a distinction between essence and ’to be’, and are entirely the same as what St. Thomas teaches (de Spiritual. Creaturis): « In a spiritual substance there is a composition of potency and act, and per consequens of form and matter . . . But yet this is not properly said according to the common usage of names ». — Moreover this exposition is manifestly false, because it does violence to the clearest of sentences, which occur in this Question and below in d. 27, a. 1, q. 2. This opinion also erases the controversy itself, drawn out throughout the ages among all the authors (writing) on this composition of matter and form. For there has never arisen a doubt concerning admitting some distinction between essence and existence, or between what on is and that by which it is. — It also must be noted, that Saint Bonaventure held the doctrine handed down here even unto the end of his life, since in his last work (Hexaëmeron., Sermon II, somewhat near the end) he teaches, among other (things), that every created substance is distinguished « by a real distinction of principles, one of which (is) active, the other passive », and (ibid., Sermon IV, near the middle): « For it is necessary, since there is in every creature an active power conjoined to a passive power, that those two powers be founded upon the diverse principles of the thing ». Then, a little below this, he concludes: « It is less dangerous to say, that an Angel has been composed, even if it is not true, than that he is simple: because this I attribute to an Angel, not wanting to attribute to him what, I estimate, pertains to God alone, and this (I do) for the sake of reverence to God. But according to the truth it seems thus, because (St.) Boethius says: “A simple form cannot be a subject”: therefore (if an Angel be “simple” simply speaking), then to an Angel nothing accedes, neither gladness nor sadness ».
V. Verumtamen haec sententia a S. Bonaventura nec primo inventa nec ab ipso solo vel a paucis propugnata est, sed illa aetate a multis et magnis doctoribus tenebatur; unde Petr. a Tar. (II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 2.) de hac controversia dicit: « Duplex est celebris opinio ». Defensores eius credebant, eam certissime esse sententiam S. Augustini, praecipue propter locum luculentum ex libro de Mirabilibus s. Scripturae (hic q. 2. fundam. 1.). Sed nunc constat, hunc librum esse spurium. Attamen S. Augustinus in libris de Gen. ad lit. pluries loquitur de materia spirituali, et in sensu, qui praedictae sententiae favet, ut V. c. 5. n. 13; VII. c. 5. n. 7, c. 6. n. 9; et ibid. post logiorem inquisitionem c. 17. n. 39. dicitur: « Quid nisi de spirituali materia anima facta congruentius creditur »? — Eandem sententiam cum iisdem distinctionibus circa materiam fere omnes magistri Franciscani (excepto Ioanne a Rupella) usque ad saec. 16. docuerunt, inter quos nominamus Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 2. § 1, et q. 61. m. 1; richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. et a. 2. q. 1, et d. 17. a. 1. q. 1, cum plurimis aliis antiquis discipulis S. Bonaventurae, ut testantur opera inedita Matthaei ab Aquasparta, Gulielmi de Mara (Marra), Petri Ioan. Olivi, Alexandri ab Alexandria. Sed praecipue nominandus est Scotus, qui id quod de Anima q. 15. breviter dicit, in suis quaestionibus disputatis, a Waddingo sub tituolo de Rerum principiis primum editis, q. 7. 8. late tractat et (q. 7. a. 2.) duodecim conclusionibus proponit. In

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III