COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III
PARS I.	PART I
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio III.	ARTICLE I Question 3
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 99-102 Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 99-102. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO III. Utrum materia corporalium et incorporalium sit una numero.	QUESTION 3 Whether the matter of corporal and non-corporal (things) is one in number?
TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum materia spiritualium et corporalium sit una secundum numerum, aut secundum unitatem aliam. Et quod sit una numero, videtur sic:	THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether the matter of spiritual and corporal (things) is one according to number, or according to another unity. And that it is one in number, seems in this manner:
1. Omne illud quod ita est unum, quod non recipit distinctionem, est unum numero;¹ materia per essentiam suam ita est unum, quod omnino nullam habet distictionem secundum suam essentiam, quia omnis distinctio est a forma: ergo necesse est, materiam in omnibus esse unam numero.	1. Every that which is thus one [unum], that it does not receive a distinction, is one in number;¹ matter through its essence is thus one [unum], that it has entirely no distinction according to its essence, because every distinction is from form: therefore it is necessary, that matter is one in number [unam numero] in all (things).
2. Item, « omne quod est unum, est unum vel genere, vel specie, vel numero »;² sed materia non est eadem in spiritualibus et corporalibus unitate generis, vel speciei, cum illa sit solum a forma: ergo a divisione materia est una numero.	2. Likewise, « everything which is one [unum], is one either in genus, and/or in species, and/or in number »;² but matter is not the same in spiritual and corporal (things) according to a unity of genus, and/or of species, since that is only from form: therefore a divisione matter is one in number.
3. Item, status perfectus non potest esse nisi in uno,³ ergo sicut est status in genere efficientis et finis, ita in genere materiae; sed in genere efficientis primi et finis ultimi sic est status, quod unum solum est primum efficiens per essentiam, ad quod omnia reducuntur: ergo videtur similiter, cum ex parte resolutionis sit status in essentia materiae, quod illa sit una numero.	3. Likewise, a perfect standing still cannot be but in one,³ therefore just as there is a standing still in the genus of an efficient (cause) and of a final (cause), so in the genus of matter; but in the genus of a first efficient (principle) and of a last final (principle) there is thus a standing still, that One alone is the First Efficient (Principle) through essence, to which all are a led back: therefore it seems similarly, since there is a standing still in the essence of matter on the part of an explanation [resolutionis], that it (i. e. matter) is one in number.
4. Item, cum dicitur: materia lapidis est materia, et materia Angeli est materia, aut dicitur univoce, aut aequivoce, aut idem predicatur de se. Sed non aequivoce, quia tunc Angelus et lapis aequivoce dicerentur substantiae; non univoce, quia univocatio est solum in formis et in his quae dicunt formam:⁴ ergo oportet, quod idem praedicetur de se: ergo si materia lapidis et materia Angeli non sunt plures materiae, sed unica, restat, quod materia est in spiritualibus et corporalibus numero una.	4. Likewise, when there is said: “the matter of a stone is matter and the matter of an Angel is matter”, either (this) is said univocally, or equivocally, or the same is predicated of itself. But (it is) not (said) equivocally, because then an Angel and a stone would be said (to be) “substances” equivocally; not univocally, because univocation is only in forms and in those which mean a form:⁴ therefore it is necessary [oportet], that the same be predicated of itself: therefore if the matter of a stone and the matter of an Angel are not several matters, but unique, it remains, that matter in spiritual and corporal (things) is in number one.
5. Item, intelligamus materiam sive spiritualium, sive corporalium per abstractionem ab omnibus formis; intelligitur materia ut simplex, intelligitur materia ut unica, nullo modo multiplicata nec distincta; sed formae supervenientes non mutant essentiam materiae, sed solum esse: ergo si prius erat quantum ad essentiam unica numero, ergo nunc, cum habet formas.	5. Likewise, let us understand matter, whether of spiritual or of corporal (things), through abstraction from all forms; matter is (then) understood as simple, matter is (then) understood as unique, in no manner multiplied nor distinguished; but supervening forms do not change the essence of matter, but only the ‘to be’ (of matter): therefore if beforehand it was unique in number as much as regards essence, therefore now (it is likewise), when it has forms.
6. Item, intelligamus per impossibile, quod Deus de uno lapide faceret Angelum; tunc mutaretur forma et esse materiale, sed essentia esset salva: ergo materia, cum sit una per essentiam, etiam in hac transmutatione est illius mutationis subiectum; sed illa mutatio est una numero: ergo materia per essentiam manet una numero. Arguitur ergo sic: si in illo Angelo sic producto et lapide praeexistente est materia una numero, et tantum distat ille Angelus a natura corporali, quantum alius Angelus: ergo videtur, quod in aliis Angelis et in aliis rebus corporalibus sit materia una numero.⁵	6. Likewise, let us understand though the impossible, that God made an Angel from one stone; then a form and a material ‘to be’ would be changed, but the essence (of matter) would have been saved: therefore matter, since it is one through essence, is also in this transmutation the subject of that mutation; but that mutation is one in number: therefore matter through essence remains one in number. Therefore it is argued thus: ‘if in that Angel thus produced, and in the pre-existing stone, matter is one in number, and that Angel is as much distant form a corporal nature, as another Angel: therefore it seems, that in the other Angels and in other corporal things matter is one in number’.⁵
CONTRA: 1. Unum numero respicit esse individuum sive individuatum;⁶ sed materia in corporalibus et spiritualibus non est una unitate inidivuali: ergo nec una est secundum numerum. Maior patet; minor probatur per hoc, quod « quaecumque sunt eadem numero alicui individuo, inter se sunt una numero »; sed Angelus a sua materia non differt numero, nec lapis a sua: ergo si materia lapidis et Angeli est una numero, ergo lapis et Angelus sunt unum numero; quod falsum est.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. ‘One in number’ [unum numero] respects an individual or individuated ‘to be’;⁶ but matter in corporal and spiritual (things) is not one according to the unity of an individual [una unitate individuali]: therefore it is neither one according to number [una secundum numerum]. The major is clear; the minor is proven through this, that « whatsoever are the same in number with any individual, are among themselves one in number [una numero] »; but an Angel by his matter does not differ in number, nor (does) the stone by its own: therefore if the matter of a stone and of an Angel is one in number [una numero], therefore a stone and an Angel are one in number [unum numero]; which is false.
2. Item, unum et multum sunt differentiae entis, et entis in actu;⁷ sed materia est omnino ens in potentia: ergo si dividentia non conveniunt nisi eis, quibus convenit divisum: ergo nullo modo potest dici materia per essentiam una numero.	2. Likewise, “one” and “many” are differences of being, and of a being in act;⁷ but matter is entirely a being in potency: therefore if (those) being divided do not convene except with those, with which the one divided convenes: therefore in no manner can matter through essence be said (to be) “one in number” [una numero].
3. Item, si de auro uno fiant diversa vasa . . .	3. Likewise, if from one lump of gold [de uno auro] there are made diverse vessels . . .
¹ Sub hoc respectu ait Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.) et VII. c. 1: « Maxime autem indubitanter quod unum est numero idem ab omnibus videtur dici ». Rationem minori additam VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.) ita exprimit: h gar entelecia cwrizei i. e. actus namque separat. — In ipsa minori cod. cc et ed. 1 ita est una pro ita est unum. ² Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.) — Verba ergo a divisione (Vat. addit sufficienti), quae in fine argumenti habentur, significant modum argumentandi, de quo tom. I. pag. 420, nota 5. ³ Cfr. Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1; VIII. Phys. text. 48. (c. 6.); II. Metaph. text. 5. et XII. text. 56.(I. brev. c. 2. et XI. c. 10.). — Cod. O nisi in uno numero: unde sicut etc. Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 est principium efficiens pro est primum efficiens. ⁴ Aristot., de Praedicam. in princ. et c. de Substantia. — Post de se in cod. cc et ed. 1 additur ipso. ⁵ Vat. omittit in hac prop. verba in aliis Angelis et. Aliquanto superius cod. F illius transmutationis subiectum pro illius mutationis subiectum. ⁶ Nam ait Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 14. (II. c. 4.): Numero unum dicere aut singulare nihil differt. — Probationem minoris insinuat Aristot., VII. Topic. c. 1. et I. Phys. text. 17. (c. 2.). ⁷ Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 16. (II. c. 4.): Omnia vero entia aut unum aut plura, quorum unumquodque unum est. — Paulo inferius voci divisum cod. U praemittit esse.	¹ Under this respet Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 6 (ch. 5), and Bk. VII, ch. 1, says: « But most of all it seems that there is said by all that ‘one’ is ‘a same in number’ [idem numero] ». He expresses the added reckoning of the minor in Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 49 (Bk. VI, ch. 13) thus: h gar entelecia cwrizei, i. e. “for indeed, an act separates.” — In the minor itself codex cc and edition read is thus one [ita est una] for is thus one (being) [ita est unum]. ² Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 6 (ch. 5) and Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 12 (Bk. IV, ch. 6). — The words had at the end of the argument: therefore a divisione [ergo a divisione], to which the Vatican adds sufficienti, signify a manner of arguing, concerning which see Sent., Bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, p. 420, footnote 5. ³ Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VII, ch. 1; Physics, Bk. VIII, text 48 (ch. 6); Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 5 and Bk. XII, text 56 (shorter version, Bk. I, ch. 2, and Bk. XI, ch. 10). — Codex O reads but in one number: wherefore just as etc. [nisi in uno numero: unde sicut etc]. A little below this not a few codices, together with edition 1, has efficient principle [principium efficiens] for first efficient (principle) [primum efficiens]. ⁴ Aristotle, On the Predicaments, at the beginning and in the ch. “On Substance”. — After predicated of [predicetur de] codex cc and edition 1 read its very self [se ipso] for itself [ipso]. ⁵ The Vatican edition omits in this proposition the words in the other Angels and [et aliis Angelis et]. Somewhat above this codex F has of the subject of that transmutation [illius transmutationis subiectum] for of the subject of that mutation [illius mutationis subiectum]. ⁶ For Aristotle says in Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 14 (Bk. II, ch. 4): To say “one in number” or “singular (in number)” differs in nothing. — Aristotle hints at the proof of the minor in Topics, Bk. VII, ch. 1, and Physics, Bk. I, text 17 (ch. 2). ⁷ Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. III, text 16 (Bk. II, ch. 4): But all beings (are) either one [unum] or many, each one of which is one [unum]. — A little below this codex U reads with which it convenes to have been divided [quibus convenit esse divisum].

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postquam facta sunt, iam illud aurum desinit esse unum propter distinctionem superinductam: cum ergo de materia fiant creaturae genere et specie differentes, videtur ergo, quod materia numeretur in illis: ergo etc.	after they are made, that gold already ceases to be one [unum] on account of the distinction induced upon it [distinctionem superinductam]: therefore since from matter there come to be creatures differing in genus and species, therefore it seems, that matter is numbered in them: ergo etc..
4. Item, opposita non sunt compossibilia circa idem numero¹ — hoc planum est, quia mutuo se expellunt — sed oppositae formae sunt circa materiam, ut est in diversis: ergo impossibile est, materiam esse unam numero.	4. Likewise, opposites are not co-possibles about the same in number¹ — this is plain, because they mutually expel themselves — but opposed forms are about the same matter, as it is in diverse (supposits): therefore it is impossible, that matter is one in number.
5. Item, impossibile est, idem numero esse ens et non-ens, quia inter ens et non-ens summa est distantia; sed Angelus secundum suam formam et materiam est in actu; anima antichristi nec est secundum materiam nec secundum formam, immo creanda est secundum suum totum:² ergo impossibile est, quod Angeli et animae sit eadem materia, vel alterius creaturae diversae.	5. Likewise, it is impossible, that the same in number be a being and a non-being, because between a being and a non-being there is a most high distance; but an Angel according to its form and matter is in act; the soul of the Antichrist exists [est] neither according to matter nor according to form, nay is to be created according to the whole (‘being’):² therefore it is impossible, that of an Angel and of a soul, and/or of another diverse creature, there be the same matter.
6. Item, creatio non solum terminatur ad esse, sed etiam ad essentiam: ergo ubi sunt diversae creationes, necesse est, diversos esse terminos per essentiam; sed creatio animae Petri et animae antichristi est alia et alia, et utrobique producitur essentia materiae: ergo necesse est, materiam hic et ibi aliam esse per essentiam: ergo impossibile est, esse numero unam.	6. Likewise, an (act of) creation is not only terminated ad a ‘to be’, but also at an essence: therefore where there are diverse (acts of) creation, it is necessary, that the termini be diverse through essence; but the creation of the soul of (St.) Peter is one (action) and of the soul of the Antichrist (is) another, and in each there is produced the essence of matter: therefore it is necessary, that the matter here and that there be through essence: therefore it is impossible, that it be in number one [numero unum].
7. Item, esse simpliciter unum in pluribus, hoc est proprietas Dei, sive esse unum in omnibus,³ ergo non competit alii, vel si competit alii, minime competit ei quod maxime distat a Deo; sed materia maxime distat a Deo, cum sit prope nihil: ergo nullo modo videtur ipsi convenire, quod ipsa sit una numero in omnibus, vel etiam in pluribus.	7. Likewise, ‘to be simply one in several’, or ‘to be one in all’, this is a property of God,³ therefore it does not suit another, and/or if it does suit another, it suits least of all that, which is most of all distant from God; but matter most of all is distant from God, since it is near nothing: therefore in no manner does it seem that it befits it, that it be one in number in all (things), and/or even in several (things).
CONCLUSIO. Materia rerum spiritualium et corporalium, cum non habeat unitatem nec universalitatis nec individuationis, secundum essentiam dici potest una numero per homogeneitatem.	CONCLUSION The matter of spiritual and corporal things, though it does not have a unity, neither of universality nor of individuation, can be said according to essence (to be) “one in number” through homogeneity.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod positio philosophorum et physicorum virorum haec fuit et est, quod materia in quibuscumque est, per essentiam est una et una numero. — Et rationem huius assignant, quia materia, hoc ipsum quod est, est ens omnino in potentia; et ideo oportet, quod in quibuscumque est, quod sit per essentiam numero una.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that the position of the men (who are) philosophers and of physicists was and is, that matter in whatsoever (things) it is, is through essence one [una] and one in number [una numero]. — And they assign a reason for this, because matter, that very (something) which is, is a being entirely in potency; and for that reason it is necessary [oportet], that in whatsoever (things) it is, that it be through essence one in number.
Haec autem ratio bona est, quod melius patet, si pertractetur. Quia enim materia omnino est ens in potentia, ideo per sui essentiam nullum habet actum, nullam formam, ergo nullam distinctionem; si nullam distinctionem habet et non est nihil, oportet ergo, quod sit una sine multitudine, et ita numero una. — Amplius, quia ens omnino in potentia, ideo nec genus nec species esse potest, quae dicunt⁴ aliquo modo actum; et ideo non potest esse communis eis, quibus est communis, unitate universalitatis vel univocationis: ergo nec genere nec specie est una, et tamen nihilominus est una, et ita est una numero. — Rursus, quia est ens omnino in potentia, ideo de se est infinita et ad formas infinitas; sed Deus, quia infinitus est, ubique unus⁵ est sua infinitate, quae venit ex actualitatis summae perfectione: sic et materia, quia infinita, in omnibus materiatis est una propter infinitatem eius, quae venit ex summae possibilitatis imperfectione. — Postremo, quia materia est ens in potentia, unitas eius non potest esse unitas individuationis, sive per continuitatem, sicut mons est unus, sive per actualem simplicitatem, sicut Angelus est unus; sed si habet unitatem, unitatem homogeneitatis habet. Haec autem unitas simul manet in diversis, sicut patet: si de eodem auro fiant multa vasa, illa sunt de eodem auro per homogeneitatem; sed aurum, quod est in uno, differt ab auro, quod est in alio adeo, ut non sint⁶ unum per continuitatem. Si igitur materia non est una actuali simplicitate, ut Angelus, nec continuitate, ut mons vel auri frustrum, sed sola homogeneitate; et haec non tollitur per adventum formarum: ita est materia una sub omnibus formis, sicut omnibus formis abstractis. Sed abstractis omnibus formis, nulla est distinctio in materia, immo intelligitur ut simpliciter una. Nunc⁷ igitur materia est in omnibus materiatis numero una, quia est ens omnino in potentia; et haec est recta ratio et causa.	Moreover this reckoning is a good one, as [quod] is clear in a better manner, if it be treated thoroughly. For because matter is entirely a being in potency, for that reason through its essence it has no act, no form, therefore no distinction; if it has no distinction and is not nothing, therefore it is necessary [oportet], that it be one without multitude, and thus one in number [numero una]. — Furthermore, because (it is) a being entirely in potency, for that reason it can be neither a genus nor a species, which mean⁴ in some manner an act; and for that reason it cannot be common to those, to which it is common, by a unity of universality and/or of univocation: therefore nether is it in genus nor in species one, and yet it is nevertheless one, and thus is one in number. — Again, because it is a being entirely in potency, for that reason of itself it is infinite and regards infinite forms; but God, because He is infinite, is everywhere One⁵ by His own Infinity, which comes out of the perfection of (His) Most High Actuality: thus matter too, because (it is) infinite, is in all materiated (beings) [in omnibus materiatis] one on account of its infinity, which comes out of the imperfection of (its) most high possibility. — Lastly, because matter is a being in potency, its unity cannot be a unity of individuation, or through a continuity, just as a mountain is one, or through an actual simplicity, just as an Angel is one; but if it has a unity, it has a unity of homogeneity. Moreover this unity remains together in diverse (supposits), as is clear: if from the same lump of gold there come to be many vessels, they are of the same lump of gold through a homogeneity; but the gold, which is one, differs from the gold, which is in the other to such an extent, that they are⁶ not one [unum] through continuity. If, therefore, matter is not one according to an actual simplicity, as an Angel (is), nor according to a continuity, as a mountain and/or a lump of gold [auri frustrum], but only according to a homogeneity; and this is not taken away through the advent of forms: thus there is one matter under all forms, just as (there is) with all forms removed. But with all forms removed, there is no distinction in matter, nay it is understood as simply one [una]. Therefore, now⁷ matter is one in number in all materiated things, because it is a being entirely in potency; and this is a right reckoning and claim [causa].
Ex his pro magna parte patent obiecta, quoniam ex praedictis colligi potest, qualis est illa unitas, qua materia dicitur una. Non enim est unitas actualis, cuiusmodi est unitas Corisci in foro et theatro,⁸ et cuiusmodi est unitas Dei; sed illa est . . .	From these (considerations) the objections are for the most part clear, since from the aforesaid it can be gathered, of what kind is that unity, by which matter is said (to be) “one” [una]. For it is not the unity of an act [unitas actualis], of which kind is the unity of Coriscus in the forum and theatre,⁸ and of which kind is the unity of God; but the former (i. e. the unity of matter) is . . .
¹ Aristot., de Predicam. c. de Oppositis, et II. Periherm. c. 4. (c. 14.): Simul autem non contingit eidem inesse contraria. ² Supple cum cod. I esse. ³ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 1. et d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ⁴ Vat. hic incipit novam propositionem et substituit Quia dicit pro quae dicunt. Eadem Vat. paulo superius, mutata interpunctione, omittit verba si nullam distinctionem. Dein post Amplius quia codd. Y aa adiicunt est. ⁵ Fide cod. cc et ed. 1 supplevimus unus, quod etiam contextus requirit. Multi codd. cum ed. 1. paulo inferius, mutata interpunctione et adiecto est, ita legunt: sic et materia quia infinita (cod. T quae infinite) in omnibus mteriatis est, est una etc., quae lectio cum prima parte huius prop. non convenit. ⁶ Vat. cum pluribus mss. sit. ⁷ Cod. L Tunc. ⁸ Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 104. (c. 11.) ad demonstrandum quod nunc temporis re ipsa sit idem et ratione tantum alterum, adducit sophisma illud, quod « Sophistae accipiunt, diversum Coriscum in Lyceo esse et Coriscum in foro; et hoc igitur ex eo, quia alibi et alibi est, diversum est ». Quae verba S. Thomas (lect. 18.) ita exponit: Et hoc modo [scil. ratione alterum] sophistae utuntur altero, cum dicunt, Coriscum alterum esse in theatro et in foro; sic arguentes secundum sophisma accidentis: esse in foro est aliud ab eo quod est in theatro; sed Coriscus est nunc in foro, nunc in theatro: ergo est alius a se.	¹ Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Opposites”, and On Interpretation, Bk. II, ch. 4 (ch. 14): Moreover it does not happen that contraries are in the same together. ² Supply together with codex I ‘being’ [esse]. ³ Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q. 1, in reply to n. 1, and d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. ⁴ The Vatican edition begins there a new proposition and substitutes Because it means [Quia dicit] for which mean [quae dicunt]. The same Vatican edition, a little above this, having changed the inter-punctuation, omits the words if it . . . no distinction [si nullam distinctionem] and reads therefore it has no distinction [ergo nullam distinctionem habet] for therefore no distinction; if it has no distinction [ergo nullam distinctionem; si nullam distinctionem habet]. Then after Furthermore, because [Amplius, quia] codices Y and aa add it is [est]. ⁵ Trusting in codex cc and in edition 1, we have supplied One [unus], which even the context requires. Many codices, together with edition 1, a little below this, having changed the inter-punctuation and added is [est] read thus: thus matter too, because it is infinite (codex T reads which is) in all materiated (things), is one etc. [sic et materia quia infinita (cod. T quae infinite) in omnibus mteriatis est, est una], which reading does not convene with the first part of this proposition. ⁶ The Vatican edition, together with several manuscripts, has it is [sit] for they are [sint]. ⁷ Codex T has then [Tunc] for now [Nunc]. ⁸ Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text 104 (ch. 11) to demonstrate that the now of time is the same according to the thing itself and another only according to a reckoning, adduces the sophism that « the Sophists accept, that the acrobat in the Lyceum (i. e. the gymnasium of Aristotle at Athens, so named because it stood near a grove sacred to Apollo Lyceius) and the acrobat in the forum is diverse; and this, therefore, from this, because he is here and there, he is diverse ». Which words St. Thomas expounds thus (lect. 18): And in this manner (i. e. the other reckoning) the Sophists use “other” [altero], when they say, that Coriscus is different [alterum] in the theatre and in the forum; thus arguing according to a sophism of accident: ‘ to be in the forum is other than that which it is (to be) in the theatre; but Coriscus is now in the forum, now in the theatre: therefore he is other than himself.’ [Trans. note: Coriscus of Scepsis, was an acquaintance of both Plato and Aristotle, and is mentioned by the latter in Physics, Bk. IV, and Metaphysics, Bks. V-VII.]

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unitas magis possibilitatis et potest dici homogeneitatis, quae adeo ampla est, ut sustineat receptionem maioris multitudinis diversitatis formarum superadiectarum quam unitas formae alicuius universalis, etiam generis generalissimi;¹ et hoc est propter summam possibilitatem. Unde dicitur una numero, quia est una sine numero, quemadmodum ovis, carens signo respectu ovium habentium signum, dicitur esse signata; per hunc modum intelligi potest materia numero una.²	a unity of a greater possibility and can be said (to be a “unity) of homogeneity”, which is ample to such an extent, that it sustains the reception of a greater multitude of diversity of superadded forms than the unity of any universal form, even of the most general genus; and this is on account of (its) most high possibility. Wherefore it is said (to be) “one in number”, because it is one without number, according to which standard of measure a sheep, lacking a brand [signum] in respect of the sheep having a brand, is said to have been “marked out” [signata]; through this standard of measure matter can be understood (to be) one in number.²
1. Quod ergo obiicitur: unum numero respicit individuum; dicendum, quod verum est, prout unum numero dicit accidens, vel prout consequitur esse actuale;³ non autem est verum, prout respicit essentiam, quoniam hoc modo se extendit ad unitatem maioris capacitatis, quam sit unitas individualis; et de illa non sequitur, quod quae sunt eadem uni etc., sicut non sequitur, quod homo et asinus uniuntur in animali, ergo sunt unum inter se.	1. What, therefore, is objected: “(to be) ‘one in number’ respects an individual”; it must be said, that (this) is true, insofar as “one in number” means an accident, and/or insofar is it is consequent to an actual ‘to be’;³ but it is not true, insofar as it respects an essence, since in this manner it extends itself to the unity of a greater capacity, than is the unity of an individual, and from that it does not follow, that what are the same to one etc., just as it does not follow, that (since) a man and a donkey are united in ‘animal’, (that) therefore they are one [unum] among themselves.
2. Quod obiicitur, quod unum numero est differentia entis in actu; dicendum, quod verum est de uno, quod dicit unitatem completam. Unitas enim et veritas et bonitas proprie et complete sunt in creatura completa; nihilominus tamen, sicut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione,⁴ incomplete reperiuntur in materia. Sicut ergo materia incompleta est de se, ita unitatem secundum se habet incompletam, possibilem tamen, quantum ad esse, compleri per formam, cuius adventu constituitur individuum numero unum unitate actuali et completa, ex cuius etiam adventu fit distinctio, et surgit in rebus multitudo.	2. What is objected, that “one in number” [unum numero] is a difference of a being in act; it must be said, that it is true of the “one” [uno], which means a complete unity. For unity and truth and goodness are properly and completely in a complete creature; yet nevertheless, just as (St.) Augustine says On the True Religion,⁴ they are found incompletely in matter. Therefore just as matter is incomplete of itself, so according to itself it has an incomplete unity, yet a possible one, as much as regards a ‘to be’, to be completed through a form, at whose advent there is constituted an individual, one in number according to an actual and complete unity, out of which advent too there comes to be a distinction, and there rises up in things a multitude.
3. Quod obicitur de auro, non est simile, quia aurum habet unitatem continuitatis et individuationis, quae opponitur numerationi et discontinuitati; et hoc est, quia aurum, etsi sit materia scyphi, est ens in actu; non sic materia prima respectu materiatorum, ut ostensum est prius.⁵	3. What is objected concerning gold, is not similar, because gold has a unity of continuity and of individuation, which is opposed to being numbered [numerationi] and to discontinuity; and this is, because gold, even if it is the matter of a goblet [scyphi], it is a being in act; not thus (is) prime matter in respect of materiated (beings), as has been shown before.⁵
4. 5. 6. Quod obiicitur, quod opposita non possunt se compati circa unum, et quod idem non potest esse simul ens et non-ens, et diversis mutationibus introduci in esse; ad haec tria unica est responsio, scilicet quod illud est verum de eo quod est ita unum, quod eius unitas repugnat multitudini, sicut est unum individuum; sed de eo quod est ita unum, quod multitudini non repugnat, immo propter suam possibilitatem admittit omnem diversitatem, non habet veritatem; immo simul et semel habet opposita, simul etiam et semel potest esse in re, et potest esse in potentia agentis, et diversis productionibus produci, sicut diversis formis informari. Et hoc patet, quia forma humanitatis una est unitate universalitatis; ideo simul verum est, quod est homo, qui generatur, et est homo, qui generandus est, et est homo albus, et est homo niger, et in omnibus his est forma univeralis una. — Quod si dicas, quod non est simile, quia humanitas non est una numero, ut materia; dico, quod quamvis non sit una numero, sed specie, tamen unitas materiae, quae est unias homogeneitatis, maioris amplitudinis est quam humanitas ipsa, et maiorem diversitatem admittit. Et ideo nulla est oppositio, nulla omnino contradictio ex comparatione oppositorum ad unitatem materiae per essentiam, sed solum ex comparatione oppositorum ad unitatem materiae secundum esse. Unde sicut, si duo scyphi facti sunt de auro conformi, potest unus destrui, altero remanente, vel unus produci, altero in esse producto; sic intelligendum est in proposito.	4. 5. 6. What is objected, that opposites cannot suffer to be together [se compati] about one (thing), and that the same cannot be at once a being and a non-being, and be introduced into ‘being’ by diverse mutations; to these three there is a unique response, namely, that that is true of that which is thus one [unum], that its unity is repugnant to a multitude, just as is one individual; but concerning that which is thus one [unum], that it is not repugnant to a multitude, nay on account of its own possibility it admits every diversity, it does not have truth; nay it has opposites at one and the same time [simul et semel], it also can be at one and the same time in a thing, and can be in the power of an agent, and be produced in diverse productions, just as (it can) be informed by diverse forms. And this is clear, because the form of humanity is one by a unity of universality; for that reason it is true at once, that man is he, who is generated, and man is he, who is to be generated, and man is white, and man is black, and in all these there is one universal form. — Wherefore if you say, that it is not similar, because humanity is not one in number, as matter (is); I say, that though it is not one in number, but (is) in species, yet the unity of matter, which is a unity of homogeneity, is of a greater amplitude than humanity itself, and admits a greater diversity. And for that reason there is no opposition, entirely no contradiction out of a comparison of opposites regarding the unity of matter through essence, but only out of a comparison of opposites regarding the unity of matter according to a ’to be’. Wherefore just as, if two goblets have been made from a conform lump of gold [de auro conformi], one can be destroyed, with the other remaining, and/or one be produced, with the other having been produced into ‘being’; so must it be understood in the proposed.
Si quis enim vult unitatem materiae intelligere, oportet ab unitae individuali animum abstrahere et super actum imaginationis conscendere et omnino ens in potentia per privationem cogitare; et sic poterit aliqualiter capere. Quamdiu enim materia ut moles extensa cogitatur, ad unitatem essentiae consideratam⁶ nullo modo pertingitur.	For if anyone wants to understand the unity of matter, he is bound [oportet] to withdraw (his) spirit from (a consideration of) the unity of an individual and rise upon [super . . . conscendere] an act of imagination and think entirely of a being in potency through privation; and thus he will be able in some matter to grasp (it). For as long as matter is thought of as an extended mass, one in no manner attains to having considered [ad . . . consideratam . . . pertingitur]⁶ the unity of (its) essence.
7. Quod ultimo obiicitur satis planum est. Sicut enim Deus est infinitus, et materia infinita, alio tamen modo infinitatis, quae potius est per recessum quam per accessum; unde non competit formae, sed materiae: sic intelligendum est de illa unitate. Deus enim est unus in pluribus, ita quod perfectissimus et omnino actus, et hoc est eius solius; sed materia est una in omnibus, et hoc quia per suam essentiam non potest esse distincta; non sic est de forma. Et sic patent omnia.	7. What is objected last is sufficiently plain. For just as God is infinite, and matter infinite, yet in another manner of infinity, which is rather through a recess (from perfection) that through an access (to it); wherefore it dos not suit a form, but (does suit) matter: thus must it be understood of that unity. For God is one in Several (Persons), thus that (He is) most perfect and entirely an Act, and this belongs to Him alone; but matter is one in all (created things), and this because through its essence it cannot be distinct; not so is it concerning form. And thus all (the objections) are clear.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
In fine huius quaestionis codd. F M addunt haec quae sequuntur, quorum prima pars etiam in cod. K legitur. Licet incertum sit, utrum hoc additamentum a S. Bonventura, an potius ab aliquo ipsius discipulo scriptum est, tamen illud non penitus omittendum, sed hoc loco ponendum esse censuimus. Sequitur cod. F, in multis tamen ope duorum aliorum codd. correctum, adiectis intra unicinos paucis lectionibus variantibus ex cod. M.	At the end of this Question codices F and M add these (paragraphs) which follow, the first part of which is also read in codex K. Though it is uncertain, whether this addition was written by St. Bonaventure, or rather by one of his disciples,* yet we have judged that it is not entirely to be omitted, but rather to be placed in this position. The version of codex F follows, yet in many (places) corrected with the help of the other two codices, with a few variant readings from codex M placed within square brackets (in italics).
¹ Porphyr., de Predicab. c. de Specie: Substantia, cum suprema sit, eo quod nihil supra eam sit, genus est generalissimum. ² In cod. I additur: Unde Augustinus, XII. Confes. c. 6. dicit, quod materia ignorando cognoscitur, scil. per privationem omnis formae; est ergo una numero ratione suae possibilis infinitatis, defectibilitatis. ³ Sub quo respectu individuum a Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, definitur: cuius collectio proprietatum nunquam in alio eadem erit. Cfr. etiam Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 11. ⁴ Cap. 32. n. 60: « Nam quis non admonitus videat, neque ullam speciem neque ullum omnino esse corpus, quod non habeat unitatis qualecumque vestigium »? Ad pleniorem intelligentiam cfr. supra pag. 17, nota 4. ⁵ In corp. quaest. ⁶ Codd. W aa considerandam, codd. P Q consideratione, Vat. omittit consideratam. Paulo superius nonnulli codd. ascendere pro conscendere.	¹ Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. “On Species”: A substance, since it is supreme, by this that nothing is above it, is the most general genus. ² In codex I there is added: Wherefore (St.) Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XII, ch. 6, says, that matter by being ignored is cognized, that is, through the privation of every form; it is, therefore, one in number by reason of its possible infinity, (and) defectibility. ³ Under this respect an “individual” is defined by Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. “On Species”: the collection of whose properties will never be in another. Cf. also (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. III, ch. 11. ⁴ Chapter 32, n. 60: « For who, un-admonished, sees, that there is neither any species nor entirely any body, which does not have some kind of vestige of unity »? For a fuller understanding (of this), cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 17, footnote 4. ⁵ In the body of the Question. ⁶ Codices W and aa read to consider the unity of (its) essence [ad unitatem essentiae considerandam], codices P and Q by consideration to the unity of (its) essence [ad unitatem essentiae consideratione], the Vatican edition has to the unity of (its) essence [ad unitatem essentiae], instead of to consider the unity of (its) essence [ad unitatem essentae consideratam].
	* [Trans. note: It appears more probable that this addition was written by a disciple of St. Bonaventure, for this reason, that its author seemingly fails to comprehend the fundamental distinction of matter made by the Seraphic Doctor, namely that matter is a being entirely in potency, and that therefore when one speaks of its unity according to essence, one prescinds from the necessity of distinguishing whether this be according to its essence simply, or according to its bare and absolute essence, because the essence of a being in pure potency has no existence nor distinction, and is an essence equivocally, that is, not in the real order but in the notional or logical order. Likewise, the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor leaves one un-preoccupied with the diverse manners of speaking regarding the being of material and spiritual matter, since such a distinction is posterior to an act of existence, a hence pertains only to materiated things; whereas St. Bonaventure’s position is rather that prime matter is only capable of materiality (corporalility) in virtue of a form which is bound to be in a nature with extended dimensions, according to a here and there. And thus the author of this addition shows that he has not well considered nor understood the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor. That he uses ista at the end of the first paragraph also evidences that the position of the Seraphic Doctor is not his own, and the context of his preoccupation signifies the proximity in his own mind of the contrary thesis regarding the matter of spiritual things, without the certainty of the truth of the Seraphic Doctor’s position, all of which point away from the Seraphic Doctor being its author, and presuppose in addition that its author did not have personal access to him, when he wrote this addition.]

p. 102

« Haec autem dicta sunt de unitate materiae spiritualium et corporalium secundum essentiam ipsius nudam et absolutam; quoniam secundum esse diversificari habet in diversis non tantum secundum esse accidentale, sed etiam secundum esse substantiale. Unde in diversis secundum substantiam diversificatur substantialiter, sicut patebit in sequenti articulo questionis. Licet autem non contingat in natura reperire essentiam materiae ab omnibus formis et dispositionibus denudatam, contingit tamen vere intelligere et aliquid ei vere attribuere, sicut Augustinus in duodecimo Confessionum¹ docet satis aperte, et in libro de Vera Religione dicit, quod est quasi medium inter aliquod et nihil, et Philosophus in primo libro de Generatoine dicit, quod est ita simplex sicut punctus. Quemadmodum igitur rerum corporearum compositarum et extensarum contingit vere intelligere materiam esse per essentiam simplicem, et hoc per privationem omnis compositionis et extensionis, quamvis secundum esse naturae impossibile sit, rerum corporearum materiam ab extensione separari, ut in pluribus locis dicit Augustinus, maxime in libro de Immortalitate animae,² et super Genesism ad litteram: sic rerum diversarum et distinctarum et numeratarum vere contingit intelligere materiam per suam essentiam indistinctam et non numeratam, et ita quoddammodo numero unam per privationem omnis numerationis et distinctionis, ut praedictum est. Et hoc expresse dicit Commentator super primum Metaphysicae in illo capitulo: Quoniam autem in fundamento [text. 17.], ubi assignat differentiam inter unitatem generis et materiae; id ipsum expressissime dicit super duodecimum [text. 14], ubi etiam dat modum, qualiter hoc possit intelligi, quod diversorum sit materia numero una, ostendens, quod hoc potius privative dicitur quam positive. Hoc ipsum dicit auctor Fonis vitae in prima parte sui libri et expresse probat in quarto [decimo], quod corporalium et spiritualium [corporalibus et spiritualibus] est materia per essentiam una. Et hoc probat per hoc, quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et per hoc, quod si spiritualia et corporalia non haberent materiam per essentiam unam, impossibile esse, quod aliquid esset eis univocum, quia diversitas radicum prohibet convenientiam in ramis. Aliorum autem auctoriates causa brevitatis omitto. — Et propter haec et his simila dictum fuit a principio, hunc modum dicendi esse philosophicum, quamvis nihil prohibeat, ipsum esse catholicum et theologicum, dum tamen recte intelligatur. In nullo enim modus iste dicendi repugnat dignitati substantiae spiritualis, nec distantiae inter ipsam et corporalem, nec creationi spirituum. Non enim propter hoc oportet ponere, spiritus fieri de materia praeiacente, quia materia, induta forma corporali, non potest illa exspoliari; nec Deus facit contra ea [illa] quae stabilivit [statuit] a principio, et ideo [ita], cum creatur substantia spiritualis, necesse est, cum ea suam materiam concreari. Et quemadmodum creatio spirituum [cod. M omittit spirituum] non tollit eis [ei] convenientiam essentialem in unitate formae specificae, sic etiam non tolit unitatem materiae per essentiam nudam et absolutam, quoniam, sicut dictum fuit, maioris amplitudinis est haec unitas quam unitas generis vel speciei; et praeterea nunquam creatur nec creata fuit materia sine aliqua forma, sub qua habet diversificari, sicut dictum fuit supra. Si quis igitur essentiam materiae nudae potest intelligere, videbit, quod satis probabiliter potest dici una numero privative. Et haec sufficiant de ista positione ».	« Moreover these (things) have been said of the unity of the matter of spiritual and corporal (things) according to the bare and absolute essence of the same; since according to (its) ‘being’ it has (its) ‘being diversified’ in diverse (beings) not only according to an accidental ‘to be’, but also according to (its) substantial ‘to be’. Wherefore in (beings) diverse according to substance (matter) is diversified substantially, just as will be clear in the following Article of the question (i. e. of the Distinction). But though one does not happen in nature to find the essence of matter denuded of all forms and dispositions, yet one does happened to understand (it) truly and to truly attribute something to it, just as (St.) Augustine teaches in the twelfth (book) of (his) Confession¹ in a sufficiently open manner, and in (his) book On the True Religion he says, that (matter) is a quasi medium between something and nothing, and the Philosopher in the first book On Generation says, that it is thus simple, just as a point (is). Therefore according to this standard of measure of composite and extended corporeal things one happens to truly understand that matter exists [esse] through a simple essence, and this through the privation of every composition and extension, though according to the ‘to be’ of (its) nature it is impossible, that the matter of corporeal things be separated from extension, as (St.) Augustine says in several passages, most of all in (his) book On the Imortality of the Soul,² and On a Literal Exposition of Genesis: thus of diverse and distinct and numbered things one truly happens to understand the matter through its own indistinct and not-numbered essence, and thus in a certain manner that (it is) one in number through the privation of every numeration and distinction, as has been said before. And this the Commentator on the First (Book) of Metaphysics says expressly in that chapter: Moreover since in the fundament [text 17], where he assigns a difference between the unity of a genus and (the unity) of matter; the very same (thing) does he say in the most express manner on the twelfth (book) [text 14], where he even gives a standard of measure, in which manner it can be understood, that of diverse (beings) the matter be one in number, showing, that this is rather said privatively than positively. This very (thing) does the author of The Fount of Life say in the first part of his book and he expressly proves in the fourth [in the tenth], that of corporal and spiritual (things) [Trans.note: in codex M the same is said with a dative of possession] the matter is one through essence. And this he proves through this, that every diversity is from form, and through this, that if spiritual and corporal (beings) did not have a matter though essence one, it is impossible, that something would be univocal to them, because a diversity of roots [radicum] prohibits a convening in branches [in ramis]. Moreover, I omit the citation of others for the sake of brevity. — And on account of these and (those) similar to them it had been said at the beginning, that this manner of speaking is philosophical, though nothing prohibits, that it be Catholic and theological, so long as it is rightly understood. For in nothing is this manner of speaking repugnant to the dignity of a spiritual substance, nor to the distance between it and a corporal (substance), nor to the creation of spirits. For not on account of this is it necessary [oportet] to posit, that a spirit is made from pre-existent [praeiacente] matter, because matter, having been endowed with a corporal form, cannot be despoiled of it; nor does God work against that [Trans. note: in codex M the same is said with illa rather than ea] which he established [Trans. note: in codex M the same is said with statuit rather than stabilivit] from the beginning, and for that reason [thus], when a spiritual substance is created, it is necessary, that with it its matter be co-created. And according to the matter in which the creation of spirits [Trans. note: codex M omits of spirits] does not take from them [from it or him] a convening of essence in the unity of a specific form, thus it also does not take away a unity of matter through (its) bare and absolute essence, since, just as had been said, this unity is of a greater amplitude than the unity of genus and/or of species, and besides matter is never created nor had been created without some form, under which it has (its) ‘being diversified’, just as had been said above. Therefore, if anyone can understand the essence of bare matter, he will see, that it can be said in a sufficiently probable manner (to be) “one in number” privatively. And these (considerations) suffice concerning that position of his ».
« Est autem et alius hic dicendi modus, quod spiritualium et corporalium non est materia per essentiam una, quantumcumque intelligatur denudari a formis et dispositionibus superadditis, immo adhuc essentialiter distinguuntur se ipsis. Sicut enim prima rerum genera se ipsis distinguuntur, et essentia formae se ipsa distinguitur ab essentia materiae, et essentia materiae a Deo propter simplicitatem; sic essentia materiae se ipsa distinguitur ab essentia materiae. Et secundum hanc positionem, si Deus per infinitatem suae potentiae de corpore faceret spiritum, nihil maneret commune, sed totum transiret in totum. — Et si obiiciatur contra hanc positionem, quod omnis diversitas est a forma, et quod solus actus dividit, et consimilia; breviter secundum hanc positionem respondetur, quod illud verum est de distinctione et diversitate completa. Sicut enim essentia materiae, omni forma abstracta, est incompleta respectu actus essendi, sic etiam respectu distinctionis. Et per hoc possunt quasi omnes rationes ad oppositum determinari, sicut patet pertractanti. Et ideo non oportet in hoc diutius immorari. — Utraque igitur harum positionum in hoc concordat, quod spiritualium et corporalium est materia una unitate analogiae. Sed utrum istud sufficiat dicere ad sustinendam unitatem generis — cum substantiarum et accidentium sint principia eadem per analogiam, sicut vult Philosophus,³ nec tamen habeant unum genus commune — utrum etiam oporteat procedere ad unitatem essentiae et ad indistinctionem; diu consideranti et bene intelligenti difficile est videre. Et ideo sanius est uni istarum positionum cum formidine partis alterius adhaerere, quam in alteram omnino praecipitare sententiam; maxime cum magistri et probati clerici utrumque dicant ».	« Moreover there is also another manner of speaking, (which says) that of spiritual and corporal (things) there is not one matter through essence, howsoever much it be understood to be denuded from superadded forms and dispositions, nay (these two kinds of matter) are still distinguished essentially by themselves. For just as the first genera of things are distinguished by themselves, and the essence of a form is distinguished by itself from the essence of matter, and the essence of matter from God on account of (His) Simplicity; so the essence of matter (in things spiritual) is distinguished by itself from the essence of matter (in things corporal). And according to this position, if God through the infinity of His own Power would make a spirit from a body, nothing common would remain, but the whole would pass over into the whole. — And if there be objected against this position, that every diversity is from form, and that an act alone divides, and completely similar (arguments); it will be briefly responded according to this position, that that is true concerning a complete distinction and diversity. For just as the essence of matter, abstracted from every form, is incomplete in respect of the act of being, so also in respect of distinction. And through this almost all the reason for the opposite can be determined, just as is clear to the one treating of (them) thoroughly. And for that reason it is not necessary [non oportet] to dwell upon this any longer. — Therefore each of these positions is concordant in this, that of spiritual and corporal (things) there is one matter according to the unity of analogy. But whether this is sufficient to say to sustain a unity of genus — since of substances and accidents there are the same principles through analogy, just as the Philosopher wants,³ nor, however, do they have one common genus — (or) whether it is even necessary [oporteat] to proceed to a unity and indistinction of essence; it is difficult to see, for the one considering for a long time and understanding well (this matter). And for that reason it is saner to adhere to one of these positions with fear of the other side (being true), than to precipitate entirely into one of the two sentences; most of all since masters (of theology) and proven clergy support each (side) ».
Auctores vide in Schol. ad praeced. quaest.	See the authors in the Scholium to the preceding Question.
¹ Cap. 3. seqq. Deinde c. 18. n. 35. seq. — Text. 27. (c. 5.). ² Cap. 8. n. 13. — VII. c. 12. n. 18. — Hucusque cod. K. ³ Libr. XII. Metaph. text. 19. seqq. (XI. c. 4.).	¹ Chapter 3 ff.. Then ch. 18, n. 35 f.. — Text 27 (ch. 5). ² Chapter 8, n. 13. — Bk. VII, ch. 12, n. 18. — Thus far codex K. ³ Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 19 ff. (Bk. XI, ch. 4.).

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III