COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III
PARS I.	PART I
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE II Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 105-108 Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 105-108. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Utrum personalis proprietas in Angelis sit substantialis, vel accidentalis.	QUESTION 2 Whether the personal property in the Angels is a substantial one, and/or an accidental one?
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum personalis proprietas sit in Angelis accidentalis, vel substantialis. Et quod accidentalis, videtur sic.	SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the personal property in the Angels is an accidental one, and/or a substantial one. And that (it is) an accidental one, seems in this manner:
1. Boethius¹ dicit, quod « omne principium manat de genere accidentium, non solum proprium individui, sed etiam speciei »; sed individuum magis approximat accidentibus quam species: ergo multo fortius proprietas individualis de genere accidentium est. Sed discretio personalis est proprietas individualis: ergo etc.	1. (St. Severinus) Boethius¹ says, that « every principle flows [manat] from the genus of accidents, not only (what is) proper to the individual, but even to the species »; but an individual is near [approximat] more to accidents than a species (is): therefore much more strongly is the property of an individual from the genus of accidents. But a personal discretion is the property of an individual: ergo etc..
2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore² ait; « quod in divinis est personalis discretio per originem, in Angelis per qualitatem, in hominibus utroque modo »: si ergo tam qualitas quam origo dicit proprietatem accidentalem in creaturis, patet etc.	2. Likewise, Richard of Saint Victor says, « that among the Divine (Persons) personal discretion is through origin, among the Angels through quality, among men in each manner »: if, therefore, both a quality and an origin means an accidental property in creatures, it is clear that etc..
3. Item, Porphyrius³ dicit, « quod individuum constat ex proprietatibus, quarum collectionem impossibile est in altero reperire »; sed tales sunt proprietates accidentales: ergo individuatio est per accidentia. Sed per eadem est personalis discretio, per quae est individuatio: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, Porphyry³ says, « that an individual is established out of properties, the collection of which is impossible to find in another »; but such are accidental properties: therefore individuation is through accidents. But personal discretion is through the same (accidents), through which individuation is: ergo etc..
4. Item, humana natura in Christo non habuit personalitatem nec discretionem personalem; sed constat, quod habuit quae sunt essentialia substantiae rationali: ergo personalis discretio non est substantialis sive essentialis nec homini nec Angelo.	4. Likewise, the human nature in Christ did not have a personality nor a personal discretion; but it is established, that it did have what are essential. for a rational substance: therefore personal discretion is not substantial or essential, neither to a man nor to an Angel.
5. Item, circumscriptis omnibus accidentibus, res non cadit in sensu, sed solum in intellectu; sed « universale, dum intelligitur, singulare, dum sentitur »:⁴ ergo circumscriptis accidentibus, circumscribitur individuatio, ergo et personalis discretio, et sic idem quod prius.	5. Likewise, excluding all accidents, a thing does not occur to the senses [cadat in sensu] but only to an intellect; but « a universal (is such), while it is understood, a singular (is such), while it is sensed »:⁴ therefore excluding accidents, individuation is excluded, therefore also personal discretion, and thus (there is) the same (conclusion) as before.
6. Item, discretio personalis est discretio secundum numerum; sed circumscripta quantitate, non est intelligere numerum:⁵ ergo nec discretionem personalem. Sed substantiale intelligitur, circumscripto accidentali: ergo si discretio personalis non potest intelligi, accidentibus circumscriptis, ergo non est substantialis Angelo, sed potius accidentalis.	6. Likewise, a personal discretion is a discretion according to number; but excluding quantity, there is no understanding of number:⁵ therefore neither of a personal discretion. But the substantial is understood, excluding the accidental: therefore if a personal discretion cannot be understood, excluding accidents, therefore it is not substantial to the Angel, but rather accidental.
CONTRA: 1. Arguitur primo per textum. Magister⁶ enim dicit, quod « prima consideratio est de substantia », et sub prima consideratione comprehendit personalem discretionem: ergo videtur, quod personalis discretio est Angelo substantialis.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. There is first the argument through the text (of Master Peter). For Master (Peter)⁶ says, that « the first consideration concerns (their) substance », and under the first consideration he comprehends (their) personal discretion: therefore it seems, that the personal discretion is substantial to the Angel.
2. Item, « persona non est aliud quam individua substantia rationalis naturae »;⁷ sed individua substantia, in quantum huiusmodi, est in genere substantiae non per reductionem, sed directe, secundum rectam lineam: ergo, in quantum huiusmodi, est in genere substantiae: ergo personalitas non est in genere accidentis, quia in eodem genere est album, in quantum album, et albedo: ergo in eodem genere personalitas et persona.	2. Likewise, « a person is not other than an individual substance of rational nature »;⁷ but an individual substance, inasmuch as (it is) of this kind, is in the genus of substance, not through a reduction, but directly, according to a straight line: therefore, inasmuch as (it is) of this kind, it is in the genus of substance: therefore personality (i. e. the quality or state of being a person) is not in the genus of accident, because white, inasmuch as (it is) white, and whiteness, is in the same genus: therefore personality and person (are) in the same genus.
3. Item, « nullum accidens est nisi in substantia individua »:⁸ ergo omne accidens consequitur individuitatem essentiae, et tam in rationali quam in irrationali hoc habet veritatem: ergo prius per naturam est aliquid individuum substantiae rationalis, quam habeat accidens: ergo per prius persona: ergo et discretio in personalitate.	3. Likewise, « there is no accident except in an individual substance »:⁸ therefore every accident is consequent to the individuality of an essence, and both in rational and in irrational (being) this has truth: therefore something individual of a rational substance is prior through nature, to that (substance) which has the accident: therefore through (a consideration of what is) prior a person (is also): therefore a discretion in personality (is) also.
4. Item, quae differunt personalitate⁹ differunt in suis principiis substantialibus, sicut patet in Petro et Paulo; et quae sic differunt substantialiter discernuntur: ergo discretio personalis dicit differentiam substantialem: ergo non est proprietas accidentalis.	4. Likewise, what differ in personality,⁹ differ in their substantial principles, just as is clear in Peter and Paul, and what thus differ are discreted [discernuntur] substantially: therefore a personal discretion means a substantial difference: therefore it is not an accidental property.
5. Item, non est maior discretio in accidentibus quam inter opposita; sed opposita non faciunt discretionem personalem, quia unus homo prius est albus, postea niger, prius puer, postea senex; et tamen idem individuum est et una persona:¹⁰ ergo etc.	5. Likewise, a discretion among accidents is not greater than among opposites; but opposites do not cause a personal discretion, because one man is first white, afterwards black, first a boy, afterwards an old man; and yet is the same individual and one person:¹⁰ ergo etc..
6. Item, accidentia diversa, cum sunt in uno . . .	6. Likewise, diverse accidents, when they are in one . . .
¹ Comment. in Porphyr. (a se ipso translat.) libr. III. de Specie circa finem; libr. IV. c de Proprio; libr. V. de Communit. et differentiis speciei et proprii. ² Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 15. ³ De Predicab. c. de Specie. ⁴ In cod. T in marg. additur Boethius in Commentario super Praedicamenta (! Praedicabilia Porphyrii), ubi in fine libr. I. ait: Ita quoque generibus et speciebus, id est singularitati et universalitati, unum quidem subiectum est, sed alio modo universale est, cum cogitatur, alio singulare, cum sentitur in rebus his, in quibus habet esse suum. — Codd. aa cc et ed. 1 post universale subiungunt est. ⁵ Nam secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c de Quantitate, numerus est discreta quantitas; et secundum Damasc., III. de Fide orthod. c. 5, numerus significat quantitatem dumtaxat earum rerum, quae in numerum cadunt. ⁶ Hic c. 2. ⁷ Boeth., de Duabus Naturis et una persona, c. 3. — De prop. seq. cfr. supra pag. 48, nota 1. ⁸ Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, in cuius expositione Boeth. ait: « Principaliter vero individuae substantiae dictae sunt, quod omne accidens prius in individua, post vero in secundas substantias venit. Nam quoniam Aristarchus grammaticus est, homo vero est Aristarchus, est homo grammaticus: ita prius omne accidens in individuum venit, secundo vero loco etiam in species generaque sustantiarum accidens illud venire putabitur ». Aristoteles ibidem hanc rationem addit: Color in corpore est; ergo et in quodam corpore; nam si non in aliquo esset singulorum, nec omnino in corpore. — Paulo inferius cod. L substantiae rationali, quam habet pro substantiae rationalis, quam habeat. ⁹ Codd. I bb in personalitate. ¹⁰ Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: Substantia vero, cum unum et idem numero sit, susceptiva contrariorum est, ut quidam homo, cum unus et idem sit, aliquando quidem albus, aliquando fit niger etc. A Porphyrio, de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, haec discretio vocatur alteritas.	¹ Commentary on Porphyry (translated by himself), Bk. III, “On Species”, near the end; Bk. IV, ch. “On the Proper”; Bk. V, “On the Commonality and differences of a Species and the Proper”. ² On the Trinity, Bk. IV, ch. 15. ³ On the Predicables, ch. “On Species”. ⁴ In codex T there is added in the margin: Boethius in (his) Commentary on the Predicaments (sic: it is rather, on the Predicables of Porphyry), where at the end of Book I he says: Thus too, for genera and species, that is for a singularity and universality, one indeed is the subject, but a universal is in one manner, when it is thought of, a singular in another, when it is sensed in those things, in which it has one ‘to be’. — Codices aa and cc and edition 1 after universal [universale] subjoin is [est]. ⁵ For according to Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Quantity”, a number is a discrete quantity; and according to (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. III, ch. 5, a number signifies a quantity so long as (it is) of those things, which fall to number. ⁶ Here in ch. 2. ⁷ (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, ch. 3. — On the following proposition, cf. above d. 1, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, p. 48, footnote 1. ⁸ Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Substance”, in the exposition of which (St. Severinus) Boethius says: « However, principally they are said (to be) “individual substances”, because every accident comes first unto individuals, but afterwards to second substances. For since Aristarchus is a grammarian, but a man is Aristarchus, a man is a grammarian: thus first every accident comes unto an individual, but that accident will also be thought to come in the second place unto species and genera ». In the same place Aristotle adds this reckoning: Color is in body; therefore also in a certain body; for if it would not be in anyone of the singulars, neither (would it be) in body. — A little below this codex L reads to a rational substance [substantiae rationali] for of a rational substance [substantiae rationalis]. ⁹ Codices I and bb have in personality [in personalitate] for in personality [personalitate]. ¹⁰ Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Substance”: But a substance, since it is one and the same in number, is susceptive of contraries, such as a certain man, since he is one and the same, sometimes (is) indeed white, sometimes becomes black etc.. [Trans. note: Aristotle is referring here to the characteristic of Mediterranean peoples to obtain in the summertime a very dark tan while working outside under the sun, and to lose this during the winter.] By Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. “On Difference” this discretion is called “otherness” [alteritas].

p. 106

supposito, sunt unum numero, ut grammaticum et musicum;¹ sed hoc non esset, si diversitas secundum numerum vel secundum discretionem personalem veniret ab accidentibus: ergo etc.	supposit, are one in number, such as (in the case of the man who is both) a grammarian and a musician;¹ but this would not be, if a diversity according to number and/or according to a personal discretion came from accidents: ergo etc..
CONCLUSIO. Personalis proprietas non causatur ab accidentibus, sed ab actuali coniunctione principiorum, et in se est aliquid substantiale; quod autem ad hoc consequitur, hoc est aliquo modo in genere accidentium.	CONCLUSION A personal property is not caused by accidents, but by the actual conjunction of the principles (of the thing), and in itself it is something substantial; but that which is consequent to this, is in some manner in the genus of accidents.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum, quod circa hoc est triplex modus dicendi.	I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that about this there is a threefold manner of speaking.
Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod personalis discretio est accidentalis proprietas, quia dicunt,² quod est in genere accidentis, et quod etiam causatur ab accidentibus, sicut discretio numeralis. Sed in hoc differentia est, quia discretio numeralis causatur a diversitate proprietatum, in quibus communicat creatura rationalis et irrationalis; sed discretio personalis a proprietatibus, quae insunt proprie rationali creaturae. — Sed illud improbatur in opponendo per multas rationes. Nec potest habere veritatem, quod distinctio individualis sit ab accidentibus, cum individua differant secundum substantiam, non solum secundum accidens; et similiter de discretione personali intelligendum est.	For indeed certain (authors) wanted to say, that a personal discretion is an accidental property, because they say,² that it is in the genus of accident, and that it is also caused by accidents, just as a numeral discretion (is). But in this there is a difference, because a numeral discretion is caused by a diversity of properties, in which the rational and irrational creature communicate; but a personal discretion by properties, which are properly in a rational creature. — But that is disproved through the many reasons of the Contrary [in opponendo]. Nor can it have truth, that an individual distinction is from accidents, since individuals differ according to substance, not only according to accident; and similarly must it be understood concerning a personal discretion.
Et ideo alius modus est dicendi, quod discretio personalis dicit proprietatem accidentalem, quae tamen non causatur ab accidentibus, sed a substantia³ sive principiis substantialibus; sicut unitas, quae est principium numeri, est in genere accidentis, tamen immediate habet ortum a substantia. — Sed cum persona dicat idem quod suppositum rationalis naturae, ut est in genere substantiae; non videtur probabile, quod personalis discretio dicat proprietatem accidentalem solum.	And for that reason there is another manner of speaking, (which says) that a “personal discretion” means an accidental property, which, however, is not caused by accidents, but by substance³ or substantial principles; just as a unity, which is the principle of number, is in the genus of accident, yet has (its) rise immediately from substance. — But since “person” means the same as “a supposit of rational nature”, such as is in the genus of substance; it does not seem probable, that a “personal discretion” means only an accidental property.
Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, quod discretio personalis, etsi videatur dicere accidens, quia dicit per modum accidentis, tamen principaliter dicit quid substantiale; et si aliquo modo importat accidens, hoc est consequenter; illud tamen immediate habet ortum a principiis substantialibus. — Et hoc patet sic. Discretio personalis addit supra discretionem individualem; discretio autem individualis duo dicit, scilicet individuationem et consequenter distinctionem. Individuatio autem est ex principiorum indivisione⁴ et appropriatione; ipsa enim rei principia, dum coniunguntur, invicem se appropriant et faciunt individuum. Sed ad hoc consequitur esse discretum sive esse distinctum ab alio, et surgit ex hoc numerus, et ita accidentalis proprietas,⁵ consequens ad substantiam. — Et sic individualis discretio dicit aliquid accidentale, et aliquid substantiale; personalis autem addit supra hanc dignitatem personalitatis. Dignitas autem illa duo dicit, scilicet nobilitatem rationalis naturae, quae est, quod natura rationalis tenet principatum inter naturas creatas; unde non est ordinabilis ad perfectiorem formam. Et haec nobilitas, etsi per modum qualitatis habeat intelligi, tamen essentialis est naturae rationali. — Dicit etiam illa nobilitas actualem eminentiam, ita quod in supposito nulla sit alia natura ita principalis, ut natura rationalis, ut quasi sit per se sonans.⁶ Et ideo, quia hoc deficit ei in Christo, natura rationalis creata non facit personalitatem, et hoc est accidentale. — Dicendum igitur, quod quemadmodum individualis discretio est ex existentia formae naturalis in materia, sic personalis discretio ex existentia naturae nobilis et supereminentis in supposito. Et ideo, quamvis utrobique importetur quid substantiale, et similiter accidentale consequens — hoc dico in creatura — non tamen importatur accidentale, quod causetur vel ortum habeat ab accidente, sed potius consequitur formam in materia, vel naturam in supposito.	And for that reason there is a third manner of speaking, (which says), that a “personal discretion”, even if it may seem to mean an accident, because it speaks through the manner of an accident, yet it principally means something [quid] substantial; and if it in any manner conveys an accident, this is in a consequent manner; yet the former does have (its) rise immediately from substantial principles. — And this is clear in this manner. A personal discretion adds upon an individual discretion; but an “individual discretion” means two (things), namely an individuation and consequently a distinction. Moreover individuation is out of the indivision and appropriation of principles;⁴ for the very principles of a thing, while they are conjoined, appropriate on another and cause the individual. But there is consequent to this a discrete ‘to be’ or a ‘to be’ distinct from another; and there rises up from this a number, and thus an accidental property,⁵ consequent to the substance. — And thus an “individual discretion” means something [aliquid] accidental, and something substantial; but a “personal (discretion)” adds upon this the dignity of personality. Moreover this dignity means two (things), namely the nobility of a rational nature, which is, because a rational nature holds a principality among created natures; wherefore it is not ordainable to a more perfect form. And this nobility, even if it has (its) ‘being understood’ through the manner of a quality, yet is essential to a rational nature. — That nobility also means an actual eminence, such that in a supposit there is no other nature so principal, as a rational nature, so that is it, as it were [quasi], “one sounding through itself” [per se sonans].⁶ And for that reason, because this is lacking it in Christ, the created rational nature does not cause a personality, and this (lack of causality) is accidental. — Therefore it must be said, that according to the measure which individual discretion is out of the existence of a natural form in matter, so a personal discretion (is) out of the existence of a noble and supereminent nature in a supposit. And for that reason, though in each there is conveyed something substantial [quid substantiale], and similarly a consequent accidental — this I say in a creature — yet there is not conveyed the accidental, which is caused and/or has (its) rise from an accident, but rather (conveys the accidental which) is consequent to the form in matter, and/or to the nature in the supposit.
Ex his patet veritas problematis et dissolutio obiectionum pro parte. Si enim quaeratur, utrum personalis discretio sit proprietas substantialis, vel accidentalis; si substantialis proprietas dicatur, quia immediate sequitur substantiam; sic dicendum est, esse substantiale. Si substantiale dicatur, quia non exit genus substantiae; dicendum, quod quodammmodo sic, et quodammodo non. Similiter si dicatur accidentalis proprietas, quia causatur ab accidentibus; sic dicendum simpliciter, quod non; si vero accidentalis, quia est in genere accidentis; sic potest dici, quod quodammodo sic, quodammodo non, secundum distinctionem primo factam.	From these (considerations) the truth of the problem and the dissolution of the objections on (their) side is clear. For if it be asked, whether a personal discretion is a substantial property, and/or an accidental one; if it be said (to be) a “substantial property”, because it immediately follows the substance; in this manner it must be said, to be “substantial”. If it be said (to be) “substantial”, because it does not go forth from the genus of substance; it must be said, that in a certain manner yes (this is true), and in a certain manner no (it is not). Similarly if it be said (to be) an “accidental property”, because it is caused by accidents; it thus must be said simply, that (this is) not (true); however, if it (be said to be) “accidental”, because it is in the genus of accident; in this manner it can be said, that in a certain manner yes (it is true), in a certain manner no (it is not), according to the distinction first made.
Quod ergo obiicitur, quod personalis discretio pertinet ad substantiam, et non causatur ab accidentibus; hoc totum concedendum est.	What, therefore, is objected, that a personal discretion pertains to substance, and is not caused by accidents; this whole must be conceded.
1. Quod obiicitur in oppositum, quod proprium omne manat de genere accidentium; dicendum, quod Boethius loquitur de propria passione, et hanc . . .	1. What is objected unto the opposite, that everything proper flows from the genus of accidents; it must be said, that (St. Severinus) Boethius speaks of a proper passion, and says / that this . . .
¹ Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5. ): Tertium vero [aliquid idem dicitur], quando ab accidente, ut sedens vel musicum Socrati; omnia enim haec unum numero volunt significare. Cfr. V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 9.). ² Multi codd. dubiae sunt lectionis; legi siquidem potest dicunt vel dicit, quod etiam edd. 2, 3 ponunt. ³ In cod. T additur sive substantiis. ⁴ Cod. U subiungit quae sunt materia et forma, cod. M coniunctione. Sola Vat. bis substituit invidisio pro individuatio. ⁵ Vat. hic interserit dicit. ⁶ Haec etymologia nominis personae invenitur in Boeth., de Duabus Naturis et una persona, c. 3. Cfr. tom. I. p. 405, nota 11. Plura de re, quae hic proponitur, vide I. Sent. d. 34. per totam, et III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. seqq. ac d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. seq. — Paulo superius cod. Y specialem eminentiam pro actualem eminentiam. Aliquanto inferius Vat. bis omittit particulam ex voci existentia praefixam.	¹ Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 6 (ch. 5.): However the third (i. e. something is said to be the same), when (it differs) by an accident, such as (Socrates) sitting, and/or the musician, (is the same) as Socrates; all these (expressions) want to signify one in number. Cf. Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 16 (Bk. IV, ch. 9). ² Many codices have a dubious reading; which indeed can be read they say [dicunt] and/or it means [dicit], which editions 2 and 3 also have. ³ In codex T there is added or substances [sive substantiis]. ⁴ Codex U subjoins which are matter and form [quae sunt material et forma], codex M reads out of the indivision, conjunction [indivision coniunctione] for out of the indivision [indivisione]. Only the Vatican edition twice substitutes indivision [indivisio] for the (prior two) individuation’s [individuationem and individuation respectively]. ⁵ The Vatican edition here inserts means that (something is) [dicit]. ⁶ This etymology of the name of “person” [persona] is found in (St. Severinus) Boethius’, On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ, ch. 3. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1, p. 405, footnote 11. For more on this matter, which is proposed here, see Sent., Bk. I, d. 34 throughout, and Bk. III, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2 ff.; d. 10, a. 1, q. 2 f.. — A little above this codex Y has special eminence [specialem eminentiam] for actual eminence [actualem eminentiam]. Somewhat below this the Vatican edition twice omits out of [ex] prefixed before the words existence [existentia].

p. 107

dicit manare de genere accidentium, non quia non causetur ex principiis subiecti, sed quia, etsi ex ipsis causetur, formaliter tamen est in genere accidentium.¹ Dupliciter ergo deficit illa ratio. Primo, quia peccat in intellectu huius nominis proprium. Est enim proprietas quantum ad rem, et est proprietas quantum ad modum; et Boethius intelligit de eo quod realiter est propria passio, non de eo quod est proprietas quantum ad modum. Proprietas autem individualis aut proprietas personalis, etsi videatur dicere proprietatem consequentem esse, sicut accidens, realiter tamen non dicit nisi appropriationem principiorum per indivisionem; hoc dico quantum ad proprietatem individualem. Similiter proprietas personalis non dicit ultra hoc nisi dignitatem sive nobilitatem naturae rationalis, quae nobilitas non est ei accidentalis, immo simpliciter et omnino essentialis.	says / that this flows from the genus of accidents, not because it is not caused out of the principles of the subject, but because, even if it be caused out of them, yet it is formally in the genus of accidents.¹ Therefore that reckoning is deficient in a twofold manner. First, because it sins in the understanding of this name “proper” [proprium]. For there is a property as much as regards the thing, and there is a property as much as regards a standard of measure; and (St. Severinus) Boethius understands (it) of that which is really a proper passion, non of that which is a property as much as regards a standard of measure. Moreover an individual property or a personal property, even if it seems to mean a property consequent to the ‘to be’ (of the thing), just as an accident (is), yet really it means naught but the appropriation of the principles (of the thing) through indivision; I say this as much as regards an individual property. Similarly a personal property does not mean more than [ultra] this, but the dignity or nobility of a rational nature, which nobility is not accidental to it, nay (is) simply and entirely essential (to it).
Peccat etiam praedicta ratio in malo intellectu praedicati, quia proprium dicitur manare de genere accidentium, non quia manat ab accidentibus, sed quia manat a substantia, existens de genere accidentium; sic in proposito. Unde sicut unitas, quae est principium numeri, ortum habet a principiis substantiae, accidentaliter ad ipsam relatis, non autem a principio altero, quod sit in genere accidentis; sic intelligi potest de discretione personali, secundum id quod in ea accidentale est, utpote comparatio ad alteram personam, respectu cuius habet distingui et numerari; et eminentia dignitatis in supposito respectu alterius naturae, quam non habuit humana natura in Christo.	The aforesaid reckoning also sins in a bad understanding of the predicate, because “the proper” is said “to flow” from the genus of accidents, not because it flows from accidents, but because it flows from the substance, existing from the genus of accidents; thus in the proposed. Wherefore just as the unity, which is the principle of number, has (its) rise from the principles of the substance, accidentally related to it, but not from another principle, which is in the genus of accident, so it can be understood concerning a personal discretion, according to that which is accidental in it, for example the comparison to another person, in respect of whom it has it that is is distinguished and numbered; and the eminence of the dignity in the supposit in respect of another nature, which the human nature in Christ did not have.
2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod discretio personalis est per qualitatem; dicendum, quod intelligitur de qualitate, quae est in genere qualitatis quantum ad modum, non autem quantum ad rem. His enim duobus² distinguuntur praedicamenta vel quantum ad essentiam, vel quantum ad modum; et aliquid est in genere substantiae, quod nihilominus habet modum accidentis; unde etiam consuevit distingui qualitas duplex, scilicet substantialis et accidentalis.³ — Vel dicendum, quod Richardus loquitur de distinctione personali quantum ad nostram cognitionem; et quia cognitio nostra est per accidentales qualitates, dixit, personas creatas distingui qualitate. — Et per hunc modum intelligitur verbum Porphyrii, qui dicit, individuum constare ex collectione proprietatum; loquitur enim secundum rationem et cognitionem, non secundum rem; et sic patet tertium.	2. 3. What is objected, that a personal discretion is through a quality; it must be said, that (this) is understood of the quality, which is in the genus of quality as much as regards a standard of measure, but not as much as regards a thing. For in these two (manners)² predicaments are distinguished either as much as regards essence, and/or as much as regards a standard of measure; and something is in the genus of substance, which nevertheless has the manner of an accident; wherefore even a twofold quality was accustomed to be distinguished, namely the substantial and the accidental.³ — And/or it must be said, that Richard (of St. Victor) speaks of personal distinction as much as regards our cognition; and because our cognition is through accidental qualities, he said, that created persons are distinguished according to quality. — And through this standard of measure the verse of Porphyry is understood, who says, that an individual is established out of a collection of properties; for he is speaking according to a reckoning and (according to our) cognition; not according to the thing; and thus the third (objection) is clear.
4. Quod obiicitur, quod in Christo humana natura non habuit personalitatem; dicendum, quod hoc est ratione illius eminentiae, quae consequitur ad nobilitatem; et illa supereminentia dicit quandam dignitatem accidentalem, sicut prius ostensum est, quae amitti potest non solum per deperditionem, sed etiam per dignioris superinductionem, sicut alibi melius dicetur.⁴	4. What is objected, that in Christ the human nature did not have personality; it must be said, that this is according to the reckoning of that eminence, which is consequent to the (Divine) Nobility; and that Supereminence means a certain accidental dignity, just as has been shown before, which (accidental dignity) can not only be lost through a destruction [deperditionem], but also through the superinduction of (something) more worthy, just as will be said in a better manner elsewhere.⁴
5. Quod obiicitur de sensu et intellectu, dicendum, quod etsi sensus solummodo sit singularium, intellectus tamen potest esse non solum universalium, sed etiam singularium; unde non est intelligenda illa differentia cum praecisione. Et hoc patet, quia solus intellectus comprehendit intrinseca principia Petri et Platonis; et circumscriptis omnibus accidentibus, dicit, eos esse discretos et distinctos.⁵	5. What is objected concerning sense and intellect, it must be said, that even if sensing is only of singulars, yet understanding can be not only of universals, but even of singulars; wherefore that difference is not to be understood with precision. And this is clear, because an intellect alone comprehends the intrinsic principles of (St.) Peter and Plato; and excluding all accidents, it says, that they are discrete and distinct (men).⁵
6. Quod obiicitur de numero, dicendum, quod sicut unitatem substantialem consequitur unitas accidentalis inseparabiliter, quae non est principium indivisionis,⁶ sed consequens ad illam; sic diversitatem substantialem consequitur numerus inseparabiliter; tamen secundum rem et naturam distinctio illa est a substantiali principio, non accidentali. Et sic patet totum.	6. What is objected concerning number, it must be said, that just as an accidental unity, which is not the principle of indivision,⁶ but which (is) consequent to it, is inseparably consequent to substantial unity; so number is inseparably consequent to substantial diversity; yet according to thing and nature that distinction is from a substantial principle, not an accidental one. And thus the whole is clear.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. In hanc quaestionem incidit problema de principio individuationis in substantiis sive corporalibus sive spiritualibus, quod famosum est magis infinitis disputationibus quam evidenti solutione, cum recte dicat Phil. de Ss. Trinitate in sua celebri Summa philosophica, p. II. q. 5. in princ.: « In hac re quot capita, tot sensus ».	I. To this Question falls the problem concerning the principle of individuation in substances, whether corporal or spiritual, which is a famous more on account of endless disputations than an evident solution, since as Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, in his celebrated Summa philosophica, p. II, q. 5 at the beginning, says: « In this matter, as many (are the things) grasped, so many (are) the thoughts ».
1. Scotus (hic q. 1-5.) quoad substantias corporales quinque enumerat opiniones, quas distinctis quaestionibus, nititur evertere, et sunt haec: 1. Substantia naturalis ex ipsa sua natura est individua vel singularis; quae est sententia Nominalium. — 2. Individuatio fit non per aliquod positivum, sed per duplicem negationem; ita Henr. Gand., Quodl. 2. q. 8. — 3. Individuatio fit per actualem existentiam, ita Durand. (hic q. 2.), qui dicit: « Natura communis et individuum solum differunt ut concepta et existens ». — 4. Ipsa fit per quantitatem in materia; quae opinio attribuitur Aegidio R. — 5. Ipsa fit per materiam, ut vult S. Thomas. — Tandem Scotus (q. 6.), dissentiens a SS. Thoma et Bonav., ponit, quod substantia materialis est individua per entitatem quandam essentiae specificae superadditam et ex parte rei formaliter ab ipsa distinctam, quae est differentia individualis, a nonnullis vocata haecceitas, per quam simili modo constituitur individuum, sicut natura specifica per differentiam specificam. Eadem principia Scotus applicat ad individua in spiritualibus creaturis.	1. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (here in qq. 1-5), in regard to corporal substances, enumerates five opinions, which in distinct questions he strives to overturn, and these are (as follows): 1. “The substance of a nature out of its very own nature is individual and/or singular”; which is the sentence of the Nominalists. — 2. “Individuation comes to be not through something positive, but through a twofold negation”; thus Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals, 2, q. 8. — 3. “Individuation comes to be through actual existence”, thus Durandus (here in q. 2), who says: « The common nature and the individual differ only as one conceived and one existing ». — 4. “It (i. e. individuation) comes to be through the quantity in the matter”; which opinion is attributed to Giles the Roman. — 5. “It (i. e. individuation) comes to be through matter,” as St. Thomas wants. — Finally, (Bl.) Scotus (q. 6), dissenting from Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure, posits, that a material substance is individual through a certain entity superadded to the essence of the species and distinguished formally on the part of the thing from it, which is an “individual difference”, called by not a few the haecceitas (i. e. “thisness”) (of the real thing), through which the individual is constituted in a similar manner, just as the nature of a species (is) through a specific difference. (Bl.) Scotus applies the same principles to individuals in spiritual creatures.
2. Quoad sententiam S. Thomae discipuli eius conveniunt in hoc, quod secundum ipsum formae substantiales individuantur per materiam, ita ut materia individua sit radix individuationis formae, et quod formaliter individuantur per ordinem intrinse- / -cum . . .	2. In regard to the sentence of St. Thomas, his disciples convene in this, that according to him substantial forms are individuated through matter, such that individual matter is the root of the individuation of form, and that they are formally individuated through (their) intrinsic / and essential order . . .
¹ Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, etsi ex ipsis formatur causaliter, tamen est etc., quae etiam in fine solutionis post non habuit addit nec habet. ² Supple cum codd. K Y modis. Dein cod. cc et ed. 1 substituunt praedicata pro praedicamenta. ³ Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 19 (IV. c. 14.). ⁴ Libr. III. Sent. d. 5. a. 2. q. 2 seqq. et d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. seq. ⁵ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2. ⁶ Vat. individuationis.	¹ The Vatican edition, contradicting the manuscripts and edition 1, reads even if it is formed out of them causally, yet it is in the [etsi ex ipsis formatur causaliter, tamen ex etc.] for even if it be caused out of them, yet it is formally in the [etsi ex ipsis causetur, formaliter tamen ex etc..], which (edition) also at the end of the solution after did not have [non habuit] adds nor does have [nec habet]. ² Supply together with codices K and Y manners [modis]. Then codex cc and edition 1 substitute predicated (terms) [praedicata] for predicaments [praedicamenta]. ³ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text. 19 (Bk. IV, ch. 14.). ⁴ Sent., Bk. III, d. 5. a, 2. q. 2 ff., and d. 10. a. 1. q. 2. f.. ⁵ Cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 39, a. 1. q. 2, in reply to n. 2. ⁶ The Vatican edition has individuation [individuationis].

p. 108

intrinse- / -cum et essentialem ad materiam individuam; item, quod substantiae materialis completae primum principium individuationis sit materia prima signata quantitate. Sed quomodo hoc fiat, non eodem modo ab omnibus explicatur. — Quoad puros spiritus, cum secundum Angelicum non sint plures in una specie, iam non requiritur aliud principium individuationis; unde ipse dicit (hic q. 1. a. 2.): « Incommunicabilitas [personalitas] est in homine ex hoc, quod ipsius natura receptibilis in materiae fundamento per materiam determinatur; sed in Angelo in se determinata est ex hoc, quod in aliquo sicut forma determinabilis recipi non potest; et ex hoc ipso satis incommunicabilis est, et non per determinationem recipientis » (cfr. S. I. q. 50. a. 4.). Idem de Angelis sentit Aegid. R. (hic p. I. q. 2. a. 1.).	through (their) intrinsic / and essential order to individual matter; likewise, that the first principle of the individuation of a complete, material substance is prime matter signed with a quantity. But in what manner this comes to be, is not explained in the same manner by all (of his disciples). — In regard to pure spirits, since, according to the Angelic (Doctor), there are not more (than one) in (any) one species, there is presently required no other principle of individuation; wherefore he himself says (here in q. 1, a. 2): « Incommunicability is in man out of this, that his nature, receivable in a fundament of matter, is determined through matter; but in an Angel it has been determined in itself out of this, that it cannot be received in something as a determinable form; and out of this very (thing) it is sufficiently incommunicable, and (is not such) through the determination of a recipient » (cf. Summa, I, q. 50, a. 4). Giles the Roman (here in p. I, a. 2, q. 1) thinks the same concerning the Angels.
II. S. Bonav. (hic q. 3. in corp. et ad 1. 2.) non approbat opinionem Scoti, quod ultra formam speciei specialissimae sit forma individualis superaddita. In hoc praeter S. Thomam consentiunt etiam Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3.), Richard. a Med. (hic a. 4. q. 1.) et Durand. (loc. cit.). — Deinde S. Bonav., quippe qui etiam in spiritualibus creaturis ponat materiam, sed non extensam, hic docet, individuationem in omnibus creaturis consurgere ex duplicis principii coniunctione, qua unum sibi appropriat alterum, ut clare explicat in quaest. 3. in corp. — Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.), aliorum referens opiniones, nihil determinat.	II. St. Bonaventure (here in q. 3 in the body of the Question, and in reply to nn. 1 and 2) does not approve of the opinion of (Bl.) Scotus, that beond the form of the most particular species there is a superadded individual form. In this, besides St. Thomas, there agree Alexander of Hales (Summa., p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3), Richard of Middleton (here in a. 4, q. 1) and Durandus (loc. cit.). — Then St. Bonaventure, who indeed posits matter in spiritual creatures, but not extended (matter), teaches here, that individuation in all creatures rises together out of the conjunction of two principles, by which (conjunction) the one appropriates the other to itself, as he clearly explains in Question 3, in the body of the Question. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 2, a. 1), mentioning the opinions of others, determines nothing (himself).
III. Quod autem principium individuationis non sit in genere accidentis, sed substantiae, communiter docetur. Nihilominus S. Bonav. etiam sententiae primo loco relatae aliquid veri inesse fatetur, quatenus id quod individuationem consequitur, scil. distinctio ab aliis et numerus, sit accidentalis proprietas; quod magis explicatur in solut. ad 1. De ratione unitatis et numeri cfr. I. Sent. d. 24. a. 1. q. 1, Scholion.	III. Moreover that the principle of individuation is not in the genus of accident, but of substance, is commonly taught. Nevertheless St. Bonaventure says there is something of truth in the sentence related in the first position, to the extent that that which is consequent to individuation, namely the distinction from others and number, is an accidental property; which is explained further in the solution to n. 1. On the reason for unity and number, cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, in the Scholium.
IV. Discretionem personalem in homine distinctam esse a discretione individuali, constat, quia humana Christi natura est quidem individua, non autem est persona humana, unde (hic in corp.) dicitur: « Discretio personalis addit super discretionem individualem ». De hoc plura iam dicta sunt I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 3; d. 25, a. 1. q. 1, a. 2, q. 1. 2. et d. 34. q. 1, quae hic confirmantur et mira claritate et profunditate magis explicantur.	IV. That in man personal discretion is distinct from individual discretion, is established, because Christ’s Human Nature is indeed an individual one, but it is not a human person, wherefore (here in the body of the Question) there is said: « A personal discretion adds upon an individual discretion ». On this several (things) have already been said in Sent, Bk. I, d. 23, a. 1, q. 3; d. 25, a. 1, q. 1, and a. 2, qq. 1 and 2, and in d. 34, a. 1, which are here confirmed and explained further with a wonderful clarity and profundity.
V. De seq. quaest. 3. commentatores Magistri explicite non tractant, praeter B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 15. m. 2. et Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2, qui tantum aliqua ex S. Bonav. transcribit); plurimi autem iam ideo de hoc non agunt, quia non admittunt principium materiale in Angelis. — Etiam de hac q. 2. pauci tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 15. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1.	V. Of the following third Question, besides Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. II. tr. 4, q. 15, m. 2, and (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian (here in q. 2, who only transcribes some (passages) out of St. Bonaventure), commentators on Master (Peter’s text), do not explicitly treat; but very many do not deal with it for this reason, because they do not admit of a material principle in the Angels. — Few also treat of this second Question: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. II, tr. 4, q. 15, m. 1. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 4, q. 1.

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup, all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2007, 2008 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III