S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS I.

PART I

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quaestio III.

ARTICLE II

 

Question 3

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 108-110
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 108-110.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum discretio personalis sit a parte principii formalis, vel materialis.

QUESTION 3

 

Whether a personal discretion is on the part of a formal principle, and/or a material principle?

TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum discretio personalis sit a parte principii formalis, vel materialis.  Et quod a parte principii formalis:

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether a personal discretion is on the part of a formal principle, and/or a material one.  And that (it is) on the part of a formal principle:

1. Richardus1 dicit, « quod tam in Angelis quam in hominibus est discretio personalis per qualitatem »; sed qualitas aut est forma, aut tenet se ex parte formae:  ergo etc.

1. Richard (of St. Victor)1 says, « that both in the Angels and in men personal discretion is through a quality »; but a quality either is a form, or holds itself on the part of a form:  ergo etc..

2. Item, si aliquid inest aliquibus et est in eis commune per analogiam, necesse est, quod insit per aliquid analogice repertum in eis.2  Personalis autem discretio est in divinis et in Angelis analogice; sed in divinis nullo modo est a materia, quia Deus est pura forma:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, if anything is in some and there is in them (something) common through analogy, it is necessary, that it be in it through something found analogically in them.2  But a personal discretion is among the Divine (Persons) and among the Angels analogically; but among the Divine (Persons) it is in no manner from matter, because God is pure form:  ergo etc..

3. Item, personalis discretio in creatura dicit maximam nobilitatem; sed quod magis nobile est maxime elongatur a materia et maxime accedit ad formam:  ergo etc.

3. Likewise, a personal discretion in a creature means the greatest nobility; but what is more noble is elongated most of all from matter and accedes most of all to form:  ergo etc..

4. Item, personalis discretio dicit maximam actualitatem3 in creatura, quia quod tale est nullo modo est ad alterum possibile; omne autem tale consequitur formam, non materiam:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, a personal discretion means the greatest actuality3 in a creature, because what is such is in no manner possible for another; but everything such is consequent to form, not to matter:  ergo etc..

5. Item, nihil quod est unum in omnibus, est principium discretionis; materia, quantum est de se, unica est:4  ergo nullo modo est principium discretionis:  ergo nec discretionis personalis.

5. Likewise, nothing which is one in all, is the principle of a discretion; matter, as much as concerns itself, is unique:4  therefore in no manner is it the principle of a discretion:  therefore neither of a personal discretion.

6. Item, « definitio, ut vult Philosophus,5 est aggregati »:  ergo cum definitur homo, non forma tantum, sed compositum ex materia et forma definitur:  ergo si homo in communi claudit in se materiam, et natura rationalis similiter; si persona addit aliquid super naturam, cum non possit addere materiam, oportet, quod addat aliquid formale.

6. Likewise, as the Philosopher5 wants, « a definition is of an aggregate »:  therefore when ‘man’ is defined, he is defined not only according to a form, but as composed out of matter and form:  therefore if ‘man’ in common encloses in himself a matter, and ‘rational nature’ similarly; if ‘person’ adds something upon ‘nature’, since it cannot add matter, it is necessary [oportet], that it add something formal.

CONTRA:  1. Boethius:6  « Species est totum esse individuorum »; sed esse est a forma:  ergo individuum supra speciem non addit formam, ergo nec persona supra naturam.  Si ergo aliquid addit, aut materiam, aut accidentia; sed per accidentia non potest esse discretio personalis vel individualis:  ergo necesse est, quod per materiam.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. (St. Severinus) Boethius (says):6  « A species is the whole ‘being’ of  (its) individuals »; but ‘being’ is from form:  therefore an ‘individual’ does not add a form upon the species, therefore neither (does) ‘person’ upon the nature.  If, therefore, it adds something, either (it adds) matter, or accidents; but through accidents there cannot be a personal and/or individual discretion:  therefore it is necessary, that (it add something) through matter.

2. Item, si persona adderet aliquam formam supra naturam, ergo sicut species est definibilis, quia addit differentiam et formam supra genus, ita . . .

2. Likewise, if ‘person’ added some form upon ‘nature’, therefore just as a species is definable, because it adds a difference and form upon the genus, so . . .

1  Libr. IV. de Trin. c. 14.  Cfr. supra pag. 104, nota 5.  Minorem insinuat Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 5. (X. c. 6.):  Substantia vero secundum quale, hoc enim determinatae naturae, quantum verum indeterminatae est  —  Paulo superius post formalis codd. U aa supplent videtur.

2  Vide supra pag. 26, nota 5.  Minor iam probata est I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 2.

3  Ita codd. F U Y; alii codd. auctoritatem, Vat. auctoritatem et actualitatem.  Verbum auctoritas, quod minus placet, intelligendum esset, ut sit proprietas ad nobilitatem pertinens (I. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1; d. 25. a. 1. q. 2.), vel principalitas (ibid. d. 9. dub. 11.).

4  Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 2.

5  Libr. VIII. Metaph. text. 9. (VII. c. 3.) dicit, substantiae compositae dari definitionem, non tamen eorum, ex quibus primo componitur, cum sint simplicia, « siquidem aliquid de aliquo significat ratio definitiva; et oportet hoc quidem ut materiam, illud vero ut formam esse ».  Quae verba Averroes ita exponit:  « Impossibile enim est, ut formae ultimae in definitionibus habeant definitionem; quoniam formae ultimae sunt simplices, et definitiones sunt compositorum; definitiones enim rerum sunt ex materiis et formis » etc.  Idem dicit ibid. text. 6. et VII. Metaph. text. 40. seqq. (VI. c. 11.).  — Paulo inferius post non forma tantum codd. F K adiungunt vel materia tantum.  Dein aliqui codd. ut F aa et naturam pro et natura.

6  Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. agens de Specie ait:  Homo vero Socratis atque Ciceronis tota substantia est. —  Quod forma det esse, docet Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 60 (VI. c. 17.), et Boeth., de Unitate et Uno.

1  On the Trinity, Bk. IV, ch. 14.  Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, p. 104, footnote 5.  Aristotle hints at the minor (of the argument), in Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 5 (Bk. X, ch. 6):  However the substance according to which kind (it is), this indeed (is) of a determinate nature, but how much is of an indeterminate (nature).  —  A little above this after And [formalis] codices U and aa supply it seems [videtur].

2  See above d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, p. 26, footnote 5.  The minor has already been proven in Sent., Bk. I, d. 25, a. 2, q. 2.

3  Thus codices F U and Y; the other codices have authorship [auctoritatem], the Vatican edition has authorship and actuality [auctoritatem et actualitatem].  The term authorship [auctoritas], which is less pleasant, would have to be understood, as the property pertaining to nobility (Sent., Bk. I, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1; d. 25, a. 1, q. 2), and/or as the quality of being a principle [principalitas] (ibid., d. 9, Doubt 11).

4  Cf. above a. 1, q. 2.

5  (Aristotle), Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, text 9 (Bk. VII, ch. 3) says, a definition is given for a composite substance, but not for those, out of which it is first composed, since those are simple, « if indeed the definitive reckoning signifies anything concerning something; and it is necessary, indeed, that the latter be as the matter, but the former as the form ».  Which words Averroës expounds thus:  « For it is impossible, that ultimate forms have in definitions (their own) definition; since ultimate forms are simple, and definitions are of composites; for the definitions of things are out of matters and forms » etc.  He says the same ibid., text 5, and Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 40 ff. (Bk. VI, ch. 11).  —  A little below this after not only according to a form [non forma tantum] codices F and K adjoin and/or only according to matter [vel materia tantum].  Then some codices, such as F and aa, have (in the sense of another object of the verb) and the nature of a rational (being) similarly [et naturam rationalis similiter].

6  Commentary on Porphyr, Bk. III, dealing with species says:  But the man, Socrates, and Cicero, is a whole substance.  —  That form gives ‘being’, is taught by Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 60 (Bk. VI, ch. 17), and (St.) Boethius, On Unity and the One.

p. 109

etiam individuum esset definibile; quod falsum est.1

also an individual would be definable; which is false.1

3. Item, si individuum sive persona addit formam individuantem supra speciem specialissimam, quaero, utrum Conditor2 possit facere aliam formam per omnia illi consimilem.  Constat, quod sic, quia nulla est forma accidentalis, cuius similem non possumus cogitare:  ergo similiter in substantiali.  Sed si faciat similem, illa est communis pluribus; sed nihil tale est individuum:  ergo impossibile est, discretionem personalem esse a principio formali superaddito speciei.

3. Likewise, if ‘individual’ or ‘person’ adds an individuating form upon the most particular species [speciem specialissimam], I ask, whether the Founder2 can make some form consimilar to that one through all (things).  It is established, that He can [quod sic], because there no accidental form, the similar to which we cannot think of:  therefore similarly in a substantial (form).  But if He makes a similar, that (similar) is common to several; but nothing such is an individual:  therefore it is impossible, that a personal discretion be from a formal principle superadded to the species.

4. Item, ab eodem est discretio personalis, a quo est distinctio secundum numerum; sed illa est a materia, sicut dicit Philosophus in prima Philosophia:3  « Omnia materia numerabiliter se habet »:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, personal discretion is from the same, from which is distinction according to number; but the latter is from matter, just as the Philosopher says in the first Philosophy:3  « All (things) hold themselves in a numerable manner according to matter »:  ergo etc..

5. Item, ab eodem est personalis discretio, a quo est esse hoc, sive hic et nunc; sed hoc est materia, quia in libro de Caelo et mundo4 dicitur, « quod differt dicere caelum et hoc caelum, quia cum dico caelum, dico formam; cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam »:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, personal discretion is from the same, from which is ‘to be this’, or ‘(to be) here and now’; but this is from matter, because in the book On Heaven and the World4 there is said, « that to say “heaven” and “this heaven” differs, because when I say “heaven”, I mean a form; when I say “this heaven”, I mean matter »:  ergo etc..

6. Item, in creaturis, in quibus est personalis discretio per originem, non est ob aliud, nisi quia generans generat aliud; sed, ut dicit Philosophus,5 « generans non generat aliud nisi propter materiam »:  ergo in rebus creatis est personalis discretio per materiam.

6. Likewise, in the creatures, in which there is a personal discretion through origin, (this) is not because of (anything) else, except that the one generating generates another; but, as the Philosopher5 says, « the one generating does not generate another except on account of matter »:  therefore in created things personal discretion is through matter.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Quatenus personalis discretio dicit singularitatem, ipsa, sicut individuatio, consurgit ex coniunctione duplicis principii; quatenus dicit dignitatem, sequitur principaliter rationem formae.

CONCLUSION

 

To the extent that a personal discretion means a singularity, it, just as individuation, rises forth together out of the conjunction of the twofold principle (of the thing); to the extent that it means a dignity, it follows principally the reckoning of (its) form.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod haec eadem est quaestio de individuatione, quae nunc movetur de personali discretione; et de ipsa fuit contentio inter philosophicos viros.6

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that this is the same Question concerning individuation, which is now moved concerning personal discretion; and concerning it there was a contention between philosophical men.6

Quidam enim innitentes verbo Philosophi dixerunt, quod individuatio venit a materia, quia individuum supra speciem non addit nisi materiam.  Et hoc ponebant, quia dixerunt, universalia solum dicere formas; et tunc primo tangitur materia, quando pervenitur ad hoc aliquid.7

For certain (men), leaning upon the word of the Philosopher, said, that individuation comes from matter, because ‘individual’ does not add but matter upon the species.  And this they posited, because they said, that universals only mean forms; and (that) ‘matter’ is then touched upon first, when one comes to ‘this something’.7

Aliis vero aliter visum est, scilicet quod individuatio esset a forma, et dixerunt, quod ultra formam speciei specialissimae est forma individualis.  Et quod movit hos ponere illud fuit, quod intellexerunt, ordinem in formis secundum generationem et naturam esse per eundem modum, per quem ordinantur in genere, ita quod forma generis generalissimi primo advenit materiae; et sic descendendo usque ad speciem.  Et adhuc forma illa non constituit individuum, quia non est omnino in actu, sed ultra hanc formam individualis subsequitur, quae est omnino in actu, sicut materia fuit omnino in potentia.8

On the other hand it was seen by others otherwise, namely, that individuation is from form, and they said, that beyond the form of the most particular species there is the form of the individual.  And what moved them to posit this was, that they understood, that the order among forms according to generation and nature is through the same standard of measure, through which they are ordered in the genus, such that the form of the most general genus comes first to matter; and thus by descending even to the species.  And yet that form does not constitute the individual, because it is not entirely in act, but beyond this form there follows after (the form) of the individual, which is entirely in act, just as matter was entirely in potency.8

Quaelibet istarum positionum aliquid habet, quod homini non9 multum intelligenti rationabiliter videri poterit improbabile.  Quomodo enim materia, quae omnibus est communis, erit principale principium et causa distinctionis, valde difficile est videre.  Rursus, quomodo forma sit tota et praecipua causa numeralis distinctionis, valde difficile est capere, cum omnis forma creata, quantum est de sui natura, nata sit habere aliam similem, sicut et ipse Philosophus10 dicit etiam in sole et luna esse.  Vel quomodo dicimus, duos ignes differre formaliter, vel etiam alia, quae plurificantur et numero distinguuntur ex sola divisione continui, ubi nullius est novae formae inductio?

Any of these positions of theirs has something, which could seem reasonably improbable to a man (who is) not9 very intelligent.  For in what manner matter, which is common to all (creatures), will be the principal principle and cause of a distinction, is very difficult to see.  Again, in what manner a form is the whole and chief cause of numeral distinction, is very difficult to grasp, since every created form, as much as concerns its own nature, is born to have another similar (to itself), just as the Philosopher10 also says is (the case) in the Sun and the Moon.  And/or in what manner do we say, that two fires differ formally, and/or (that) even other (things), which are plurified and distinguished in number out of the division of a continuum alone (differ), where there is the induction of no new form?

Ideo est tertia positio satis planior, quod individuatio consurgit ex actuali coniunctione materiae cum forma, ex qua coniunctione unum sibi appropriat alterum; sicut patet, cum impressio vel expressio fit multorum sigillorum in cera, quae prius erat una, nec sigilla plurificari possunt sine cera, nec cera numeratur, nisi quia fiunt in ea diversa sigilla.

For this reason there is a third position, sufficiently plainer, that individuation rises up together out of the actual conjunction of matter with form, out of which conjunction one appropriates the other to itself; just as it clear, when an impression and/or expression is made of many seals in wax, which (wax) before was one, nor can seals be plurified without wax, nor is wax numbered, except because diverse seals are made in it.

Si tamen quaeras, a quo veniat principaliter; dicendum, quod individuum est hoc aliquid.  Quod sit hoc, principalius habet a materia, ratione cuius forma habet positionem in loco et tempore.11  Quod . . .

However, if you ask, “From what does (individuation) principally come?”; it must be said, that an individual is this something.  That it is this, it has more principally from the matter, by reason of which the form has a position in place and time.11  That . . .

1  Ut ostendit Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 35-44. (VI. c. 10. seq.).

2  Plures codd. conditio, aliqui cogitatio, Vat. additio; perperam et contra maiorem partem mss. et ed. 1.

3  Libr. XIV. c. 8. (XIII. c. 5.).  Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 7.

4  Libr. I. text. 92. et 95. (c. 9.).

5  Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.), ubi impugnat formas Platonicas hac ratione, quod nihil prosint ad generationes, et dicit:  Sed generans sufficiens est, ut faciat et causa sit formae in materia; tota vero iam talis forma in his carnibus et ossibus, Callias et Socrates; et diversa quidem propter materiam [versio Arabico-latina:  aliud propter materiam] etc.

6  Cod. aa philosophos nostros; ed. 1 physicos viros.  Dein plures codd. cum ed. 1 verbis pro verbo.

7  Aristot., de Praedicam. c de Substantia:  Omnis autem substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare.  In primis [singularibus] igitur substantiis indubitabile et verum est, quod hoc aliquid significant.  Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur.  In secundis vero substantiis [generibus, speciebus] videtur quidem similiter . . . non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significant; neque enim unum est quod subiectum est, quemadmodum prima substantia, sed de multis homo dicitur et animal.

8  Hanc opinionem proponit Averroes, Comment. super I. Metaph. text. 17.

9  Vat., contradicentibus mss. et tribus priorbus edd., homini multum intelligenti, omissis particula non.  —  Verba in textu nostro S. Doctori a sua humilitate inspirata sunt.  —  Aliquanto inferius codd. I bb post quae omnibus addunt creaturis.

10  Libr. VII. Metaph. text. 55. (VI. c. 15.).  Cfr. etiam I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 92. (c. 9.).

11  Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I, a. 1. q. 2. in corp.  De iis quae sequuntur, vide hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp.

1  As Aristotle shows in Metaphysics, Bk. VII, texts 35-44 (Bk. VI, ch. 10 f.).

2  Faultily and contrary to the greater part of the manuscripts and edition 1, several codices read a condition [conditio], some a thought [cogitatio], the Vatican edition an addition [additio] for the Founder [Conditor].

3  Book XIV, ch. 8 (Bk. XIII, ch. 5).  Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 89, footnote 7.

4  Book I, texts 92 and 95 (ch. 9).

5  Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 28 (Bk. VI, ch. 8), where he impugns Platonic forms with this reason, that the profit nothing for generations, and says:  “But the one generating is sufficient, to make and be the cause of the form in the matter; but in these muscles [carnibus] and bones, (which are) Callias and Socrates, (there is) already such a whole form; and (this form is) indeed diverse on account of matter (in the Arabic-Latin version: indeed other on account of matter) etc..

6  Codex aa has our philosophers [philosophos nostros]; edition 1 men (who are) physicists [physicos viros].  Then several codices, together with edition 1, have the words [verbis] for the word [verbo].

7  Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Substance”:  Moreover every substance seems to signify this something.  Therefore, among the first substances (i. e. in singulars) it is indubitable and true, that they signify this something.  But in second substances (i. e. genera and species) indeed it seems similarly . . . yet it is not true, but they rather signify something of this kind; for neither is there one which has been subjected, according to which manner a first substance (is subjected), but of many is there said “man” and “animal”.

8  This opinion is proposed by Averroës, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk. I, text 17.

9  The Vatican edition, contradicting the manuscripts and the three prior editions, has to a man (who is) very intelligent [homini multum intelligenti], omitting the not [non].  —  The words of the Seraphic Doctor in our text were inspired by his humility.  —  Somewhat below this codices I and bb add creatures [creaturis] after which is common to all [quae omnibus].

10  Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text. 55 (Bk. VI, ch. 15). Cf. also On Heaven and the World, Bk. I, text 92, (ch. 9).

11  Cf. above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, in the body of the Question.  Concerning those which follow, see here in a. 1, q. 2, in the body of the Question.

p. 110

sit aliquid, habet a forma.  Individuum enim habet esse, habet etiam existere.  Existere1 dat materia formae, sed essendi actum dat forma materiae.  —  Individuatio igitur in creaturis consurgit ex duplici principio.

it is something, it has from form.  For an individual has to be, it also has to stand forth [existere].  Matter gives an ‘existing’1 to form, but form gives the act of being to matter.  —  Therefore individuation in creatures rises up together out of a twofold principle.

Personalis autem discretio dicit singularitatem et dignitatem.  In quantum dicit singularitatem, hoc dicit ex ipsa coniunctione principiorum, ex quibus resultat ipsum quod est.  Sed dignitatem dicit principaliter ratione formae; et sic patet, unde sit personalis discretio originaliter, in creaturis loquendo, sive in hominibus, sive in Angelis.

Moreover a personal discretion means a singularity and a nobility.  Inasmuch as it means a singularity, it means this out of the very conjunction of principles, out of which there results the very (thing) which is.  But it means a dignity principally by reason of the form; and thus it is clear, wherefore according to origin [originaliter] there is a personal discretion in creatures, whether speaking in regard to men, or to Angels.

Quae ergo obiiciuntur ad primam partem, procedunt ratione nobilitatis et dignitatis, prout tamen est in ipso supposito, sive quod est, cuius distinctio venit in divinis ex origine, in creaturis ex principiis originalibus, sicut in primo libro2 fuit ostensum.

Therefore, (the reasons) which are objected for the first side, proceed according to a reckoning of nobility and dignity, yet insofar as it is in the supposit itself, or ‘that which is’, the distinction of which comes in the Divine (Persons) from (Their) origin, (and) in creatures from (their) original principles, just as had been shown in the First Book.2

Si autem quaeratur:  quid est illud commune, secundum quod inest? dicendum, quod proprietas dignitatis incommunicabiliter existens in hypostasi; aliter tamen reperitur hic, aliter ibi.3  Omnes rationes sequentes procedunt via praedicta.

But if there be asked:  “What is that common (something), according to which there is (a distinction) among (these persons)?”, it must be said, that (it is) the property of dignity existing incommunicably in the hypostasis; yet it is found in one manner here, in another manner There.3  All the following reasons proceed according to the aforesaid way.

1. 2. 3. Quod obiicitur ad oppositum, quod non possit esse a forma, sed a materia; dicendum, quod rationes illae probant, ut patet, quod non totaliter est a forma, quia forma nulla est individua, nisi propter coniunctionem sui cum materia.  Et universalia similiter, quia dicunt formas,4 non concernunt materiam nisi ratione suorum individuorum, pro quibus supponunt, quando definiuntur vel subiiciuntur.  Unde illae rationes concedendae sunt, quod individuum non addit aliam formam, quae sit individualis de se.

1. 2. 3. What is objected for the opposite, that (individuation) cannot be from form, but (is) from matter; it must be said, that those reasons prove, as is clear, that it is not totally from form, because no form is an individual, except on account of its conjunction with matter.  And universals similarly, because4 they mean forms, do not concern matter except by reason of their own individuals, on behalf of which they suppose, when they are defined and/or subjected.  Wherefore those reasons are to be conceded, that ‘individual’ does not add another form, which is of itself individual.

4. 5. 6. Quod obiicitur, quod individuatio est a materia; dicendum, quod per illas auctoritates non datur intelligi, quod materia sit principium individuationis, nisi sicut causa sine qua non, non autem sicut tota causa.  Nec tamen ita potest attribui materiae personalis discretio, sicut individuatio, propter hoc quod dicit dignitatem, quae principalius respicit formam, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem.5

4. 5. 6. What is objected, that individuation is from matter; it must be said, that through those authorities one is not given to understand, that matter is the principle of individuation, except as a sine qua non cause, but not as the whole cause.  Yet neither can personal discretion be attributed to matter, just as (neither can) individuation, on account of this that it means a dignity, which more principally respects form, just as the reasons for the first side show.5

1  In alio sensu ac recentiores s. Doctor intelligit terminum existere; cfr. p. 96, nota 5.

2  Dist. 34. q. 1, cfr. Schol. ad q. 2.  —  Paulo supra nonnulli codd. sive qui est pro sive quod est.

3  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 1. et etiam q. 2, ex qua insuper patet, quomodo intelligenda sint verba:  quid sit illud commune, secundum quod inest, scil. proprietas personalis.  Nam v. g. Petrus et Paulus nomen personae habent commune.

4  Fere omnes codd. in hac prop. omittunt coniunctionem quia, pro qua cod. cc et ed. 1 substituunt quae ac hic addunt particulam et; cod. bb verbo substituit prout; cod. F hic adiicit quae, cod. Q ponit nec pro non, cod. I non tamen, cod. A non autem.

5  Vide Schol. ad praeced. quaest.

1  The Seraphic Doctor (here) understands existere in a sense other than more recent (authors, namely as ‘standing forth’); cf. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, 2, p. 96 (just above the footnote in the text and in the note itself).

2  Distinction 34, q. 1, cf. Scholium on q. 2.  —  A little above this not a few codices have or ‘Who it is’ [sive qui est] for or ‘that which it is’ [sive quod est].

3  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 25, a. 2, q. 1, and also q. 2, from which it is, moreover, clear, in what manner there are to be understood the words:  “What is that common (something), according to which (individuation) is in (a person)?”  Answer:  a personal property.  For, v. g., Peter and Paul have the common name of “person”.

4  Nearly all the codices omit in this proposition the conjunction because they [quia], in place of which codex cc and edition 1 substitute which [quae] and add after forms [formas] the particle and [et]; codex bb substitutes for the verb insofar as [prout]; codex F after forms [formas] adjoins which [quae], codex Q has neither do they [nec], codex I yet they do not [non tamen], codex A but they do not [non autem], for they do not [non].

5  See the Scholium to the preceding Question.

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