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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III |
PARS I. |
PART I |
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DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. |
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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DUB. I. |
DOUBT I |
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In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit, quod quatuor quidem Angelis videntur esse attributa. Primum, quia videtur sibi contradicere in enumeratione; enumerat enim sex, sicut patet,6 quae sunt: essentiae simplicitas, personalis discretio, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas et liberum arbitrium. — Item, videtur sibi contradicere in repetitione; dicit enim in sequenti capitulo, quod circa tria est consideratio, scilicet circa substantiam, formam et potestatem. — Quaeritur ergo de sufficientia illorum quatuor. Videtur enim quod multo plura debent attribui, scilicet incorruptibilitas, spiritualitas et huiusmodi ex parte essentiae, ex parte potentiarum etiam irascibilis et concupiscibilis; et ita competit eis ingenium, sicut memoria.7 — Item, videtur superfluitas, quia liberum arbitrium non discernitur a ratione et voluntate:8 ergo non deberet quarto loco connumerari. — Item, tertium attributum, quod est ratio, aut accipitur pro cognitiva tantum, aut pro cognitiva et motiva; si primo modo: ergo male dividitur in intelligentiam et voluntatem; si secundo modo: ergo superfluit liberum arbitrium. |
In this part are the doubts about (Master Peter’s) text, and first concerning this which he says, that there seems to be attributed to the Angels . . . four (things). First, because he seems to contradict himself in the enumeration; for he enumerates six, just as is clear,6 which (six) are: the simplicity of essence, the discretion of persons, memory, intelligence, will and free will. — Likewise, he seems to contradict himself in the repetition; for he says in the following Chapter, that there is a consideration about three, namely about substance, form and power. — Therefore, there is a question concerning the sufficiency of those four. For it seems that there ought to be attributed many more, namely incorruptibility, spirituality and (those perfections) of this kind on the part of the essence (of the Angels), (and) on the part of (their) powers also the irascible and concupiscible (powers); and thus there suits them a mental power [ingenium], such as memory.7 — Likewise, there seems (to be) a superfluity (in his words), because free will is not discerned by reason and will:8 therefore it ought not to be numbered with (them) in the fourth place. — Likewise, the third attribute, which is reason, either is accepted for the cognitive (power) only, or for the cognitive and motive (powers); if in the first manner: therefore it is badly divided into intelligence and will; if in the second manner: therefore it is superfluous (to enumerate) free will. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod illa attributa sunt convenientia Angelo per naturam suam et in sui creatione tanquam principalia, a quibus alia habent ortum. Et sumitur sufficientia sic: in Angelo enim est considerare esse et posse, sive substantiam et potentiam. Et circa substantiam duo, scilicet quo est, et penes hoc est substantiae simplicitas; vel ipsum quod est, et penes hoc est personalis discretio. Similiter circa posse est considerare ipsam potentiam, et penes hoc est tertium, scilicet ratio naturaliter insita. Est iterum considerare facultatem potentiae, et penes hoc est quartum attributum, scilicet liberum arbitrium. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that the attributes are those convening with an Angel through its own nature and in its own creation as principles, form which the others have (their) rise. And (their) sufficiency is taken in this manner: for in the Angel there is a considering of ‘being’ and ‘being able’, or of substance and power. And about substance (there is a considering) of two, namely (that) by which he is, and from within this the simplicity of (his) substance; and/or that which he is, and from within this there is (his) personal discretion. Similarly about (his) ‘being able’ there is a considering of power itself, and from within this is the third (attribute), namely the reason engrafted (in him) naturally. Again there is a considering of the faculty of (his) power, and from within this is the fourth attribute, namely, (his) free will. |
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Vel aliter: Angelus habet quadrupliciter considerari, scilicet in se, et sic essentiae simplicitas; ad alterum Angelum, et sic personalis discretio; ad Deum, et sic memoria, intelligentia et voluntas; in quibus consistit ratio imaginis; in comparatione ad ea quae subiecta sunt eorum regimini, et sic habet liberum arbitrium. |
And/or (it can be said) in another manner: An Angel has to be considered in a fourfold manner, namely in himself, and thus the simplicity of (his) essence; regarding another Angel, and thus (his) personal discretion; regarding God, and thus (his) memory, intelligence and will; in which consist the reckoning of the image (of God); (and) in comparison to those (acts) which are subject to the governance [regimini] of these (powers), and thus he has free will. |
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Vel aliter, et magis secundum consonantiam ad ea quae dicuuntur in littera:9 in Angelo est considerare substantiam, formam et potentiam. Substantia autem considerari potest dupliciter, sicut dictum est, et sic competit ei simplicitas et personalitas. / Formae . . . |
And/or in another manner, and rather according to a consonance with those (things) which are said in the text:9 in the Angel there is a considering of substance, form and power. Moreover substance can be considered in a twofold manner, just as has been said, and thus a simplicity and personality suit it. / Beauty . . . |
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6 Hic c. 1. 7 Respicitur ad illud ex libro de Spiritu et anima, c. 11: Ingenium investigat, ratio iudicat, memoria servat, intellectus separat, intelligentia comprehendit et ad meditationem sive contemplationem adducit. 8 Cfr. de hoc infra d. 25. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. seqq. 9 Hic c. 2. |
6 Here in ch. 1. 7 A reference to that (verse) from the book On Spirit and the Soul, ch. 11: Genius [ingenium] investigates, reason judges, memory conserves, intellect separates, intelligence comprehends and leads forward to meditation or contemplation. 8 On this (saying), cf. below d. 25, p. I, a. 1, q. 2 ff.. 9 Here in ch. 2. |
p.
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Formae attribuitur imaginis pulcritudo sive venustas. Potentiae attribuitur libertas. — Et sic patet, quomodo quatuor reducuntur ad tria. Patet etiam, quomodo tertium attributum in tria dividitur, in quibus consistit imago. Patet etiam, quomodo tertium attributum differt a quarto. Patet etiam sufficientia et responsio ad obiecta, quia hic enumerantur attributa principalia.1 |
Beauty or loveliness [venustas] is attributed to the form of an image. Liberty is attributed to power. — And thus it is clear, in what manner the four are reduced to three. It is also clear, in what manner the third attribute is divided into the three, in which consists the image (of God). It is also clear, in what manner the third attribute differs from the fourth. (Its) sufficiency and the response to objections is also clear, because here the principal attributes are enumerated.1 |
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DUB. II. |
DOUBT II |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Differentem essentiae tenuitatem habuisse intelligitur. Contra: simplicitas respicit essentiam sive substantiam, sicut dicit in littera;2 sed substantia non recipit magis et minus: ergo etc. — Item, simplex dicit privationem compositionis; sed privationes non recipiunt magis et minus:3 ergo etc. — Item, magis et minus si alicui imponitur, hoc est per impermixtionem cum suo opposito;4 sed simplex spiritus non est permixtus alicui compositioni, quae sit opposita simplicitati angelicae, et omnes habent easdem compositiones: ergo omnes sunt aequaliter simplices. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: A different refinement of essence. On the contrary: (an Angel’s) simplicity respects (his) essence or substance, just as he says in the text;2 but (his) substance does not receive a ‘more and less’: ergo etc.. — Likewise, the “simple” means a privation of composition; but privations do not receive a ‘more and less’:3 ergo etc.. — Likewise, a ‘more and less’, if it is imposed upon something, this is through a thorough unmixing [impermixtionem] with its opposite;4 but a simply spirit is not thoroughly mixed with some composition, which is opposed to the simplicity of an Angel, and all (the Angels) have the same compositions: therefore all are equally simple. |
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RESPONDEO: Ad hoc dicendum, quod in Angelis est gradus simplicitatis, et hoc manifestat gradus virtutis, quia unus Angelus est potentior altero; et quanto in spiritualibus aliquid est simplicius, tanto virtuosius.5 Hoc etiam manifestat approximatio ad Deum; si enim per naturam unus est Deo proximior altero et similior, ergo magis accedit ad divinam simplicitatem. Manifestat ulterius hoc ipsa cognitio, quia unus alterum purgat pellendo ignorantiam: ergo unus altero purior et simplicior. — Et ideo bene dicit Magister, quod est gradus in simplicitate essentiae. |
I RESPOND: To this it must be said, that in the Angels there is a grade of simplicity, and (their) grade of virtue manifests this, because one Angel is more powerful than the other; and as much as in spiritual (things) something is more simple, so much (is it) more virtuous.5 (Their) nearness [approximatio] to God also manifests this; for through nature one is nearer and more similar to God than the other, therefore he approaches [accedit] more towards the Divine Simplicity. Furthermore (their) cognition itself manifests this, because one purges the other by banishing [pellendo] (his) ignorance: therefore one (is) purer and more simple than the other. — And for this reason Master (Peter) says well, that there is a gradation [gradus] in the simplicity of (their) essence. |
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Quod ergo obiicitur, quod substantia non recipit magis et minus; responderi potest per interemptionem, quia una creatura veriori modo est ens quam alia. Et quod dicitur, substantiam non recipere magis et minus, hoc intelligendum est logice.6 — Vel dicendum, quod aliud est dicere essentiam, aliud simplicitatem essentiae; et simplicitas est proprietas essentiae. |
Therefore what is objected, that (their) substance does not receive a ‘more and less’; can be responded to through interemption, because one creature is a being in a true manner than another. And what is said, that a substance does not receive a ‘more and less’, this is must be understood logically.6 — And/or it must be said, that it is one (thing) to speak of essence, another (to speak of) a simplicity of essence, and ‘simplicity’ is a property of essence. |
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Quod obiicitur, quod dicit privationem; dicendum, quod etisi dicat privationem, non tamen pure privationem, quia aliquid ponit;7 et ideo potest recipere magis et minus. |
What is objected, that (“simplicity”) means a privation; it must be said, that even it it means a privation, yet not purely a privation, because it does posit something;7 and for that reason it can receive a ‘more and less’. |
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Quod obiicitur de permixtione, dicendum, quod illud non habet ubique veritatem, sed in his oppositis, quorum utrumque est aliqua natura; in aliis vero est per maiorem accessum ad suum summum. Unde major simplicitas est in Angelo non propter paucitatem compositionis, sed propter accessum maiorem ad summe simplex; hoc autem est propter maiorem nobilitatem formae, sicut ignis potest dici in corporalibus simplicior aëre.8 |
What is objected concerning a thorough mixing, it must be said, that that does not have truth everywhere, but (only) in those opposites, each of which is some nature; however in other (opposits) it is (true) through a greater approach [accessum] to their highest (degree). Wherefore there is a greater simplicity in an Angel not on account of the paucity of (his) composition, but on account of (his) greater approach to the most highly Simple; but this is on account of a greater nobility of form, just as fire can be said, in corporal (things), (to be) more simple than air.8 |
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DUB. III. |
DOUBT III |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In ipsa facultate arbitrii differentia animadvertenda est. Contra: Liberum arbitrium est liberum ab omni coactione, nec potest aliquo modo cogi: ergo in libertate arbitrii non potest esse gradus. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says: In the very faculty of judgment a difference is to be adverted to. On the contrary: Free will is free from every compulsion [coactione], nor can it in any manner be compelled [cogi]: therefore in the freedom of judgment there is no gradation [gradus]. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod libertas arbitrii dupliciter potest considerari: aut in quantum dicit facultatem et facilitatem ad exeundum in opus; et sic dicit positionem et consequenter rationem et voluntatem, et istae potentiae consequuntur substantiam; et secundum quod substantia simplicior, sic etiam potentiae excellentiores et facultas maior, et sic est ibi gradus; et hoc modo loquitur Magister. Alio modo accipitur privatione, ut dicatur libertas per privationem coactionis; et hoc modo est aequalitas, quia est privatio in termino;9 et sic opponit. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that “freedom of judgment” [libertas arbitrii] can be considered in a twofold manner: either inasmuch as it means a faculty and the facility to go forth unto a work; and thus it means a positing (of something) and consequently a reason and will (for acting), and these powers are consequent to a (rational) substance; and according to which the substance (is) more simple, so also (are these) powers more excellent and (this) faculty greater, and thus there is a gradation there; and in this manner Master (Peter) is speaking. In another manner it is accepted according to privation, to mean a liberty through a privation from compulsion; and in this manner there is an equality (among the Angels), because there is privation in the term;9 and thus he opposes (his argument). |
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DUB. IV. |
DOUBT IV |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod aequales sunt in hoc quod spiritus sunt et immortales sunt. Contra: Ideo sunt spiritus et immortales,10 . . . |
Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that they are equal in this, that they are spirits and are immortal. On the contrary: They are spirits and immortal10 for this reason, . . . |
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1 De hoc dubio vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 4. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 4-8; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 13-16; S. Thom., Richard. et Petr., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic p. I, dub. litt. 1. 2 Hic c. 2. — Minor exhibetur ab Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia. 3 Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.) dicit, quod sicut in nihilo nulla est diversitas, ita et in privatione non est diversitas. Et I. de Part. animal. c. 3. ait: Privationis, qua privatio est, nulla est differentia; non enim fieri potest, ut species eius sit, quod non est. 4 Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 5.): Et quae contrariis sunt impermixtiora; magis talia; ut albius quidem nigro impermixtius. — Vat. mixtionem, non pauci codd. immixtionem pro impermixtionem, quod habent codd. C R T V cc et ed. 1. 5 Cfr. liber de Causis, prop. 17, in qua de sequens ratio insinuatur. Tertia est Dionys. de Caelest. Hierarch. c. 3. 6 In cod. Q (a secunda manu) hoc intelligendum est, qui logice considerat essentiam rei, sed physice non est verum, qui considerat rem sub motu et varietate. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. ad 1. 7 Scil. modum unitatis nobilem. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2, et d. 24. a. 1. q. 1. 8 Vide I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 1. seq.; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 13. m. 3; S. Thom., Petr., Richard., hic circa lit; Aegid. R. hic p. I. dub. litt. 3. 9 Gilbert. Porretanus in libro Sex Principiorum, c. ult., cum agit de eo, quod est plus minusve suscipere, respectu eorum, quae non suscipiunt magis et minus, utitur his verbis: « Impositio [nominum ipsorum] in termino est, ultra quem transgredi impossibile est »; et rationem affert B. Albert. in comment. super hunc locum, scil. quia ille terminus indivisibilis est. — De hanc quaestionem resolvunt; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 29. m. 1. a. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 9; S. p. II. tract. 4. q. 16. m. 4; Aegid. R., hic p. I, dub. litt. 5. 10 Vat. falso spiritus mortales. |
1 Concerning this doubt, see Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 20, m. 4, a. 3; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in aa. 4-8; Summa., p. II, tract 4, qq. 13-16; St. Thomas, Richard (of Middleton) and (Bl.) Peter (of Tarentaise), here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in p. I, 1st doubt on the text. 2 Here in ch. 2. — The minor (of this argument) is exhibited by Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Substance”. 3 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. IV, text. 67 (ch. 8) says, that just as there is no diversity in nothing, so also there is not a diversity in a privation. And On the Parts of Animals, Bk. I, ch. 3 he says: Of the privation, by which there is privation, there is no difference; for it cannot come to be, that there be a species of that, which is not. 4 Aristotle, Topics, Bk. III, ch 4 (ch. 5): And what are more thoroughly unmixed with contraries; (are) more such; such as a whiter man (is) indeed more thoroughly unmixed with (the color) black. — The Vatican edition reads a mixing [mixtionem], and not a few codices intermingling [immixtionem], for a thorough unmixing [impermixtionem], which codices C R T V and cc, and edition 1, have. 5 Cf. Book of Causes, proposition 17, in which the following reason is hinted at. The third (reason) belongs to (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Celestial Hierarchies, ch. 3. 6 In codex Q (by a second hand) there read this one must understand, who considers the essence of a thing logically, but physically it is not true, (that one) who considers a thing under movement and variety, (must understand it thus) [hoc intelligendum est, qui logice considerat essentiam rei, sed physice non est verum, qui considerat rem sub motu et varietate]. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 17, p. II, q. 1, in reply to n. 1. 7 Namely a noble manner of unity. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q. 2, and d. 24, a. 1, q. 1. 8 See Sent., Bk. I, d. 17, p. II, q. 1 f.; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 9; Summa., p. II, tract 4, q. 13, m. 3; St. Thomas, (Bl.) Peter (of Tarentaise), Richard (of Middleton), here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in p. I, 3rd doubt on the text. 9 Gilbert of Porretain, in (his) book On the Six Principles, last chapter, where he deals with that, on account of which it is that one suscepts a ‘more or less’, in respect of those, which do not suscept a ‘more and less’, uses these words: « There is an imposition (of these names) in a term, beyond which it is impossible to transgress »; and Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) gives the reason, in (his) Commentary on this passage, namely, because that term is indivisible. — Solving this question are: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 29, m. 1, a. 3; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1; Summa., p. II, tract 4, q. 16, m. 4; Giles the Roman, here in p. I, 5th doubt on the text. 10 The Vatican edition has falsely mortal spirits [spiritus mortales] for spirits and immortal [spiritus et immortales]. |
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quia sunt simplices; sed non sunt aequaliter simplices: ergo etc. |
because they are simple; but they are not equally simple: ergo etc.. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod secundum quod spiritus privat corpulentiam, et immortales privat corruptionem — quia utrobique et respectu omnium Angelorum est privatio horum universalis — ideo dicit, ista esse aequalia; nihilominus tamen, si attendatur ad id quod positionis est ibi, sic posset esse gradus, sicut opponit. Magister accipit secundum sensum verborum magis consuetum, et secundum quod huiusmodi nomina consueverunt intelligi a nobis.1 |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that according to which “spirits” deprives (their suppposit) of corpulence, and “immortal” deprives (them) of corruption — because in each and in respect of all Angels there is a universal privation of these — for that reason he says, that these are equal; yet nevertheless, if one attends to that which belongs to that positing there, thus there could be a gradation, just as he opposes (his argument). Master (Peter) accepts (these terms) according to the more customary sense of words, and according to which names of this kind are accustomed to be understood by us.1 |
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1 Item dubium solvitur a B. Alberto, hic a. 11; Aegid. R., hic p. II. dub. litt. 6. |
1 The Same doubt is solved by Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 11; Giles the Roman, here in p. II, 6th Doubt on the text. |
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