S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS II.
De habitibus per naturam Angelis superadditis.

PART II
On the habits superadded to the Angels through nature.

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 112-114.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 112-114.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Illud quoque investigatione dignum videtur etc.

That also seems to be worthy of investigation etc..

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Supra egit Magister de naturalibus attributis ipsis Angelis.  In hac parte agit de habitibus superadditis, et hoc per naturam.  Dividitur autem haec pars in tres.  In prima agit de naturali bonitate.  In secunda de naturali cognitione, ibi:  Hic quaeri solet, quam sapientiam.  In tertia de naturali dilectione, ibi:  Solet etiam quaeri etc.

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the natural (goods) attributed to the Angels themselves.  In this part he deals with (their) superadded habits, and this through nature.  Moreover this part is divided into three (parts).  In the first he deals with the natural goodness (of the Angels).  In the second with (their) natural cognition, there (where he says):  Here there is customarily asked, “Which wisdom . . .”.  In the third with (their) natural love [dilectionem], there (where he says):  There is also customarily asked etc..

Prima pars habet tres.  In prima opinionem falsam ponit cum confirmatione sua.  In secunda vero ponit opinionem veram, similiter cum sua confirmatione, ibi:  Aliis autem videtur etc.  In tertia opinionem falsam exterminat et rationes eius et auctoritates explanat, ibi:  Ideoque Augustinus exterminans etc.  Et sic in grosso2 tria determinat:  primo, quales creati sunt Angeli quantum ad bonitatem et malitiam; secundo, quantum ad cognitionem; tertio, quantum ad dilectionem.

The first part has three (parts).  In the first he posits a false opinion with its own confirmation.  But in the second he posits the true opinion, similarly with its own confirmation, there (where he says):  But to others it seems etc..  In the third he puts an end to [exterminat] the false opinion and its reasons and explains (its) authorities, there (where he says):  And for that reason (St.) Augustine, putting an end to etc..  And thus he determines the three at once [in grosso]:2  first, how the Angels were created as much as regards (their) goodness and malice; second, as much as regards (their) cognition; third, as much as regards (their) love [dilectionem].

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam huius partis circa tria incidit hic quaestio secundum tria, quae Magister determinat.

For an understanding of this part concerning (these) three, there a question occurs here according to the three, which Master (Peter) determines (in the text):

Et primo de qualitate, quam Angelus habuit in sua creatione.

And first concerning the quality, which the Angel had in his creation.

Secundo quaeritur de naturali sua cognitione.

Second, there is the question concerning his natural cognition.

Tertio vero de naturali dilectione.

But third concerning (his) natural dilection.

Et circa primum quaeruntur duo.

And about the first two (questions) are asked.

Primo, utrum Deus fecerit ipsum malum.

First, whether God made him evil.

Secundo, dato quod non, utrum in primo instanti suae creationis ex propria voluntate fuerit malus.

Second, granted that (He did) not, (there is asked) whether in the first instant of his creation he was evil out of his own will.

ARTICULUS I.

 

De qualitate, quam Angelus habuit in sua creatione.

ARTICLE I

 

On the quality, which the Angel had in his creation.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum Deus malum condiderit Angelum.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether God established an evil Angel?

QUOD AUTEM Deus fecerit ipsum malum, videtur:

MOREOVER THAT God made him evil, seems:

1. Per auctoritates, quas adducit Magister in littera.  Videtur etiam per rationes, quia oppositio mali ad bonum decorat universum, et confert saluti et gloriae Beatorum.  Cum igitur Deus posset in omnem decorem et in omne quod utile est saluti electorum et iterum ipsum facere sit conveniens; videtur, quod Deus non tantum fecerit Angelos bonos, sed etiam malos et caput malorum, scilicet ipsum luciferum.  Et hoc est quod videtur dici Ecclesiastici trigesimo tertio:4  « Contra malum bonum, et contra mortem vita, et contra virum iustum peccator:  et sic intuere in omnia opera Altissimi ».

1. Through the authorities, which Master (Peter) adduces in the text.  It also seems through the reasons, because the opposition of evil to the good decorates the universe, and promotes [confert] the salvation and glory of the Blessed.  Therefore since God was able unto every ornament and unto everything which is useful for the salvation of the Elect and again (since) it is fitting [conveniens] that He make (him such):  it seems, that God not only made the good Angels, but also the evil ones and the head of the evil ones, namely Lucifer himself.  And this is what seems to be said in the thirty-third (chapter) of Ecclesiasticus:4  « Against evil, good, and against death, life, and against the just man, the sinner:  and thus look upon all the works of the Most High ».

2. Item, hoc videtur ex ordine.  Inter naturam, quae est apta nata habere iustitiam et habet, et . . .

2. Likewise, this seems from the order (of the universe).  Between the nature, which has been born apt to have justice and has (it), and . . .

2  Cod. aa in summa; Vat. in universo.

3  Hic c. 4.

4  Vers. 15.  —  Hoc argumentum insinuatur ab Augustino, XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 17; Enchirid. c. 10. seq.; III. de Lib. Arb. c. 9. n. 24. seqq.

2  Codex aa reads summarily [in summa]; the Vatican has all at once [in universo].

3  Here in ch. 4.

4  Verse 15.  —  This argument is hinted at by (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. XI, ch. 17; Enchiridion, ch. 10 f; On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 9, n. 24 ff..

p. 113

inter naturam, quae non est apta nata habere nec habet, cadit media illa natura, quae est apta nata habere et non habet iustitiam; sed Deus potest facere extrema et congruit eum facere:  ergo pari ratione potest et congruit ei facere mediam:  ergo naturam, quae est apta nata habere iustitiam, et non habentem congruit Deum facere.  Sed talis est natura mala, scilicet creatura rationalis mala:  ergo etc.

between the nature, which has been born apt to have (it) and does not (have it), there falls that intermediary nature, which has been born apt to have justice and does not have (it); but God can make the extremes and it is fitting [congruit] that He make (them):  therefore for an equal reason He can, and it is fitting that He, make the intermediary:  therefore it was fitting that God make the nature, which has been born apt to have justice, and (yet is born as) one not having (it).  But such is the evil nature, namely the evil, rational creature:  ergo etc..

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur a simili.  Sicut natura rationalis est mala, quae non habet iustitiam, ad quam est nata, ita creatura irrationalis1— unde canis, cum sit natus ad latrandum, si non habet latratum, est malus — ergo cum Deus possit creaturas facere deficientes operationibus, ad quas natae sunt, ut puta canem non latrantem et oculum caecum, pari ratione potest facere voluntatem carentem iustitia.  Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia creatura rationalis immediate ordinatur ad Deum, non sic rationalis;2 obiicitur tunc ulterius, quod intellectus noster immediate ordinatur in Deum.  Sed Deus potest facere intellectum carentem scientia, ad quam est sive quam debet habere, scilicet ignorantem; sicut dicit Augustinus in tertio libro de Libero Arbitrio,3 quod si Deus talem condidisset hominem ante peccatum, qualis nunc est, nemo posset ex hoc accusare.

3. Likewise, this very (thing) seems from a simile.  Just as the rational nature, which does not have the justice, for which it has been born, is evil, so the irrational creature (if it does not have the operation, for which it has born)1 — wherefore the flesh, since it has been born to bark [ad latrandum], if it does not have a bark [latratum], is evil — therefore since God could make creatures deficient in the operation, for which they were born, as for example the dog which does not bark [canem non latrantem] and the blind eye, for an equal reason He can make a will lacking justice.  If you say, that it is not similar, because the rational creature is immediate ordered to God, not so the irrational;2 it is then objected further, that our intellect is immediately ordered unto God.  But God can make an intellect lacking the knowledge, for which it is or which it ought to have, namely, an ignorant (intellect); just as (St.) Augustine says in the third book On Free Will,3 that if God had established [condidisset] man such before (original) sin, as he is now, no one could accuse (Him) on this account.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur a minori.  Plus dependet materia a forma perfectiva et magis est imperfecta in genere creaturarum sive entium, quam faciat4 rationalis natura a iustitia — sed hoc manifestum est, quia materia sine forma est ens omnino imcompletum — sed creatura rationalis sine iustitia habet quodam modo esse completum.  Cum igitur Deus fecerit materiam informem, ad minus sine distinctione formarum, sicut dicunt multi Sancti:5  ergo pari ratione potuit facere Angelum sine iustitia, quam debebat habere.  Sed Anselmus dicit, « quod malum nihil aliud est quam privatio boni, ubi debet esse »:  ergo videtur etc.

4. Likewise, this very (thing) seems from the lesser.  Matter depends more from perfective form and is more imperfect in the genus of creatures or of beings, than rational nature does [faciat]4 from justice — but this is manifest, because matter without form is an entirely incomplete being — but the rational creature without justice has in a certain manner a complete ‘being’.  Therefore since God made matter formless, according to a lesser [degree] without the distinction of forms, just as many Saints say:5  therefore for an equal reason He could make an Angel without the justice, which he ought to have had.  But (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury) says, « that evil is nothing other than the privation of a good, where it ought to be »:  therefore it seems that etc..

CONTRA:  1. Genesis primo:6  Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant vale bona:  ergo, cum valde bona supponant bonum, cuncta quae Deus fecit, erant bona:  ergo nihil malum.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. In the first (chapter)6 of Genesis (there is written):  God saw all which He had made, and they were very good:  therefore, since the “very good” suppose the good, all which God made, were good:  therefore nothing (was) evil.

2. Item, Dionysius:7  « Optimi est optima adducere »:  ergo si Deus est optimus, non potest ergo producere malum, ita quod faciat malitiam in eo.  Et eodem libro de Divinis Nominibus dicit, « quod sicut a calido non egreditur nisi calidum, ita nec a summo bono nisi bonum ».

2. Likewise, (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite says):7  « It belongs to the best to bring forth [adducere] the best »:  therefore if God is the Best, He cannot, therefore, produce (someone) evil, such that He work malice in him.  And in the same book On the Divine Names he says, « that just as from (something) hot there does not step forth but (something) hot, so also from the Most High Good naught but (something) good ».

3. Item, omne quod Deus indidit unicuique rei a sua conditione, est ei naturale:  ergo si Deus fecisset Angelum malum, esset ei malitia naturalis.  Sed pro naturalibus nemo est vituperandus, nemo puniendus:8  ergo nec vituperandus nec puniendus esset diabolus.

3. Likewise, everything with which God endowed each thing from its foundation, is natural to it:  therefore if God had made an Angel evil, malice would be natural to him.  But for natural (attributes) no one is to be blamed, no one punished:8  therefore neither would the Devil have to be blamed nor punished.

4. Item, si aliquod factum vitium facit aliquem dignum poena, magis facit actorem dignum quam alium:9  si ergo diabolus ob suam malitiam dignus est poena, si Deus eum fecisset malum, magis esset Deus dignus poena quam diabolus; sed hoc est absurdissimum:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, if any crime [vitium], done, makes someone worthy of punishment, it makes the doer (of the evil deed) more worthy (of punishment) than the other9 (who suffers the injustice):  therefore if the Devil, because of his malice, is worthy of punishment, if God had made him evil, God would be more worthy of punishment than the Devil (is); but this is most absurd:  ergo etc..

CONCLUSIO.

 

Falsum est et impossibile, Deum fecisse Angelum originaliter malum.

CONCLUSION

 

Its is false and impossible, that God made an Angel originally evil.

RESPONDEO:  Ponere, quod diabolus a Deo habuit originaliter sibi innatam malitiam voluntatis, non tantum falsum est, immo haereticum; et est falsum,10 quod in se habet evidentiam suae falsitatis, si quis advertat.

I RESPOND:  To posit, that the Devil had originally from God a malice of will, innate to himself, is not only false, nay (it is) heretical; and it is false,10 because it has in itself the evidence of its own falsehood, if one adverts (to it).

Nam opus Dei, eo ipso quod opus Dei est, necesse est, ipsum esse laudabile, ordinabile, acceptabile, perfectum vel perfectibile.

For a work of God, by this very (thing) that it is a work of God, it is necessary, that it be praiseworthy [laudabile], ordainable, acceptable, perfect and/or perfectible.

Nihil enim facit Deus quod non deceat suam maiestatem.  Si ergo magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis,11 et in tantum laudabilis, quod non tantum in se, sed etiam in nullo opere potest vituperari iuste, immo in omnibus digne laudari:  impossibile est, quod faciat opus vituperabile, quantum est de ipso auctore. Sed malum, eo ipso quod malum culpae, dignum est vituperio:  ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura ab ipso habeat istam conditionem.  Et rursus, non tantum malum dignum est vituperio, immo12 est quodam modo in Dei vituperium.  Si ergo Deus faceret creaturam malam, ipse faceret sibi vituperium et contumeliam.

For God makes nothing which does not befit [non deceat] His Majesty.  Therefore if (He is) a great Lord and exceedingly worthy of praise [laudabilis],11 and praiseworthy unto such a degree [in tantum], that not only in Himself, but even in no work (of His) can He be justly blamed, nay in all (He can) be worthily praised [digne laudari]:  it is impossible, that He make a blameworthy [vituperabile] work, as much as concerns Him as (its) Author.  But evil, by this very (thing) that evil (belongs) to a fault, is worthy of blame:  therefore it is impossible, that any creature have from Him this condition.  And again, not only is evil worthy of blame [dignum vituperio], nay12 it is, in a certain manner, an offense to God [in Dei vituperium].  Therefore, if God made an evil creature, He would work offense and contumely against Himself.

1  Supple cum codd. A cc et ed 1 si non habet operationem, ad quam [cod. A si non habet ad quod] nata est.

2  Cfr. infra d. 15. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 16. a. 1. q. 1.

3  Cap. 9. n. 25. et c. 20. n. 56. seqq.  —  In fine argumenti cod. W supplet Deum, pro quo codd. U Y exhibent eum.

4  Cod. aa sit.  —  Vocem faciat interpretare dependeat.

5  Vide infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2.  —  Verba Anselmi, de Casu diaboli, c. 11, sunt:  Malum non est aliud quam non bonum aut absentia boni, ubi debet et expedit esse bonum.

6  Vers. 31.

7  De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 19.  Iuxta versionem Scoti Erigenae:  « Neque enim igni frigere, neque optimi non optima adducere »; iuxta aliam versionem [in operibus S. Thomae]:  « Neque enim ignis est infrigidare, neque boni non bona producere ».  Quibus verbis contineri videtur etiam textus, qui mox allegatur, de quo et cfr. ibid. § 21, ubi dicitur:  Etenim neque in igne frigus, neque ille vitiatur eo et malum bono existente.

8  Cod. P adiungit secundo Ethicorum, c. 5, ubi ostendit Aristot., virtutem non esse affectus neque potentias naturales, quia his neque laudamur neque vituperamur.  III. Ethic. c. 5. ait:  Qui enim natura deformes sunt, eos reprehendit nemo.  Cfr. II. Eudem. c. 7. (c. 6.):  Vituperantur autem laudanturque non quae a necessitate vel natura vel fortuna insunt, sed quorum ipsi causa sumus.

9  Sub quo respectu Aristot, V. Ethic. c. 11. dicit, quod deterius sit iniustitiam facere quam iniustitiam accipere.  —  Codd. aa bb auctorem pro actorem.  Ultimam prop. argumenti sed hoc est absurdissimum:  ergo etc. fide codd. E F I K P Q U Y X bb adiuximus.

10  Cod. aa tale falsum, Vat. et ita est falsum.

11  Psalm. 47, 2.

12  Fide codd. K U bb substituimus est pro etiam; codd. E cc et ed. 1 immo etiam quodammodo redundat [codd. I Y aa est] in etc.

1  Supply, together with codices A and cc and edition 1, if it does not have the operation, for which (codex A reads: if it does not have (that) for which) it has been born [si non habet operationem, ad quam (si non habet ad quod) nata est].

2  Cf. below d. 15, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 16, a. 1, q. 1.

3  Chapter 9, n. 25, and ch. 20, n. 56 ff..  —  At the end of the argument codex W supplies God [Deum] for Him, in place of which codices U and Y exhibit Him [eum].

4  Codex aa has is [sit].  —  Understand the word faciat as depend [dependeat].

5  See below d. 12, a. 1, q. 2.  —  The words of (St.) Anselm, On the Downfall of the Devil, ch. 11, are:  Evil is not other than the not-good or the absence of the good, where there ought and there is expedient that there be the good.

6  Verse 31.

7  On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 19.  According to the version of Scotus Erigena:  « For neither (does it belong) to fire to be cold [frigere], nor to the best not to bring forth the best »; according to the other version (in the works of St. Thomas):  « For neither does it belong to fire to freeze [infrigidare], nor to the good not to produce good (things) ».  Among which words there seems also to be contained the text, which next follows, concerning which cf. also ibid. § 21, where there is said:  And indeed neither (is) one cold in fire, nor is the latter weakened by this or (is) evil (weakened) by the existing good.

8  Codex P adjoins according to Ethics [secundum Ethicorum], ch. 5, where Aristotle shows, that virtue is not the affection nor the natural powers, because for these we are neither praised nor blamed.  In Ethics, Bk. III, ch. 5 he says:  For those which are deformed by nature, these no one reprehends.  Cf. Eudemian Ethics, Bk. II, ch. 7 (ch. 6):  Moreover blamed and praised are not those, which are in (a thing) by necessity and/or nature and/or fortune, but we ourselves for those of which we are the cause.

9  Under this respect Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. V, ch. 11 says, that it is worse to do injustice, than to accept injustice.  —  Codices aa and bb read the author [auctorem] for the doer [actorem].  The last proposition of the argument, but this is most absurd:  ergo etc., we have added, trusting in codices E F I K P Q U Y X and bb.

10  Codex aa has (and) such (is) false [tale falsum], the Vatican has and it is so false [et ita est falsum].

11  Psalm 47:2.

12  Trusting in codices K U and bb, we have substituted it is [est] for also [etiam]; codices E and cc and edition 1 have nay it is also in a certain manner redounds unto God’s offense [immo etiam quodammodo redundat in Dei vituperium], codices I Y and aa have the same, substituting as an offense to God [est in Dei vituperium] for  redounds unto God’s offense [redundat in etc.].

p. 114

Necesse est etiam1 esse ordinabile, quia nihil facit, nisi quod deceat suam sapientiam; sed nihil quod Deus facit, est ordinabile in poena, quia tunc Deus destrueret opera sua, et ita se praevaricatorem constitueret.  « Deus enim illius rei est ultor, cuius non est auctor ».2  Ergo si Deus facit creaturam malam malitia culpae, erit ergo ordinabilis; et non in poena:  ergo malum culpae maneret inultum sive impunitum, salvo ordine universi.  Sed hoc est impossibile per se, quia tunc malum esset bonum per se, si aliter esset ordinatum:  ergo si Deus faceret creaturam malam, creatura non esset mala.

It is also1 necessary that (a work of God) be ordainable, because He makes nothing, except what befits His Wisdom; but nothing which God makes, is ordainable in regard to punishment, because then God would destroy His own works, and thus establish that He (is) a prevaricator.  « For God is the avenger of that thing, of which He is not the Author ».2  Therefore, if God made an creature evil according to the wickedness of fault, therefore it will be ordainable; and not in regard to punishment:  therefore the evil of fault would remain unavenged or unpunished, with the order of the universe conserved.   But this is impossible through itself, because then (something) evil would be good through itself, if it were not otherwise ordained:  therefore if God would make a creature evil, the creature would not be evil.

Necesse est etiam, quod sit acceptabile.  Nihil enim facit Deus, nisi quod vult; sed omne quod Deus vult, iusta et bona3 voluntate vult:  ergo cum omne quod iusta et aequa voluntas approbat, sit omnibus acceptabile, si Deus faceret malum, malum esset omnibus acceptabile: ergo acceptare malum esset bonum, pari ratione et facere:  ergo malum esset bonum.

It is also necessary, that it be acceptable.  For God makes nothing, except what He wills; but everything which God wills, He wills by a just and good3 will:  therefore since everything which a just and equitable [aequa] will approves, is acceptable to all, if God would make (something) evil, evil would be acceptable to all:  therefore ‘to accept evil’ would be good, and for an equal reason ‘to work (evil)’:  therefore evil would be good.

Necesse est etiam, quod omne quod Deus facit, sit perfectum vel perfectibile, cum Dei perfecta sint opera.4  Ergo omne quod est in opere Dei a Deo, vel est de perfectione, vel inclinat ad perfectionem.  Si ergo malitia est a Deo in creatura rationali, ergo vel est de perfectione Angeli, vel disponit ad perfectionem; sed nihil tale deordinat:  ergo malum non deordinaret, et si non deordinaret, non noceret:  ergo malum esset aliquid et non noceret.

It is also necessary, that everything which God makes, be perfect and/or perfectible, since God’s works are perfect.4  Therefore everything which is from God in a work of God, either concerns (its) perfection, and/or inclines (it) to perfection.  If, therefore, in a rational creature there is a wickedness from God, therefore either it concerns the perfection of the Angel, and/or disposes (him) to perfection; but nothing such (i. e. which disposes to perfection) causes disorder [deordinat]:  therefore (something) evil would not cause disorder, and if it would not cause disorder, it would not harm:  therefore evil would be something and it would not harm

Cum igitur hic sint quatuor incompossibilia manifesta, manifestum est, quod falsum est et impossibile, Deum fecisse Angelum originaliter malum.  Et venit ista impossibilitas ex summa perfectione et nobilitate5 operantis et vilitate mali culpae:  privat enim illas quatuor conditiones nobiles, quas necesse est esse in omni divino opere, non quia Deus teneatur operi illas dare, sed quia non decet eius voluntatem aliter operari vel facere.

Therefore since here there are four manifest, co-impossible [incompossibilia] (consequences), it is manifest, that it is false and impossible, that God made an Angel originally evil.  And this impossibility comes from the Most High Perfection and Nobility5 of the One working and (from) the vileness of the evil of fault:  for it deprives those four noble conditions, which are necessary to be in every divine work, not because God is bound to grant them to a work, but because it is not fitting that His Will work and/or make (something) otherwise.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod facit ad decorem; dico, quod est mali productio, et producti ordinatio.  Productio mali foedat et turpat, quantum est de se, sed ordinatio decorat.  Et quoniam Deus non potest foedare, sed decorare; ideo non potuit producere, sed ordinare secundum antithesim.  Et secundum hoc intelligit Ecclesiasticus:  Contra bonum malum, non quia Deus fecerit, sed quia quod in suis operibus factum invenit ordinavit.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that (evil) works for the ornament (of the universe); I say, that there is the production of evil, and the ordination of the (evil) produced.  The production of evil defiles [foedat] and befouls [turpat], as much as concerns itself, but the ordination (of the evil produced) ornaments.  And since God cannot defile, but (can) ornament; for that reason He could not produce (something evil), but (He could) ordain (it) according to an antithesis.  And according to this Ecclesiasticus understands:  Against the good, evil, not because God made (evil), but because He ordained (the evil) which He found done among His works (i. e. by His creatures).

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de natura, quae nata est habere iustitiam etc.; dicendum, quod cum dico naturam privatam iustitia, duo dico, scilicet quod natura est, et quod privata.  In quantum natura, tenet medium et sequitur argumentum; in quantum vero privata, non tenet medium, immo locum infimum, immo ipsa privatio nullum,6 quantum est de se, quia nihil est.  Et ideo non valet, quod eam privatam fecerit.  Et si tu obiicias, quod maior privatio est non habere nec actum nec aptitudinem, quam habere aptitudinem et non actum; dicendum, quod maior est privatio, si accipiatur large privatio;7 sed tamen ista est deiformis, illa non.  Unde cum dico:  lignum non videt, dico negationem, sed non deformitatem; cum dico:  homo non videt, dico utrumque.  Et sic patet illud.

2. To that which is objected concerning the nature, which is born to have justice etc.; it must be said, that when I say “a nature deprived of justice”, I say two (things), namely that there is a nature, and that (it has been) deprived.  Inasmuch as (it is) a nature, it holds an intermediary (position) and the argument follows; but inasmuch as (it has been) deprived, it does not hold an intermediary (position), nay (it holds) the lowest place, nay a privation itself (has) no (place),6 as much as concerns itself, because it is nothing.  And for that reason (the argument) is not valid, that He made it deprived.  and if you object, that not having neither an act nor an aptitude is a greater privation, than having an aptitude and not an act; it must be said, that it is a greater privation, if “privation” be accepted broadly;7 but yet the latter is deiform, the former is not.  Wherefore when I say:  “a log does not see”, I mean a negation, but not a deformity; when I say:  “a man does not see”, I mean each.  And thus that (objection) is clear.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur a simili in aliis naturis, et a minori in ipsa materia; dico, quod non est ibi locus a simili in ipsa materia; si bene consideretur.  Malum enim culpae aliter importat deordinationem sive privationem ordinis quam malum naturae vel poenae, quia, sicut dictum est distinctione quadragesima septima primi libri,8 malum culpae dicit deordinationem sive privationem ordinis principalis, qui scilicet est imaginis ad Deum immediate; malum vero naturae vel poenae deordinationem ordinis non principalis, sed particularis.  Et hinc est, quod Deus, salva condecentia suae bonitatis et sapientiae, potest facere rem malam malitia poenae, vel defectu naturae,9 non sic privatam ordine iustitiae ex ea parte, qua procedit ab ipsa dispositione divinae sapientiae.  Unde non sequitur:  potest Deus facere hominem caecum:  ergo potest facere iniquum.

3. 4. To that which is object from the simile in other natures, and from the lesser in matter itself; I say, that there is no point from a simile in matter itself; if it be considered well.  For the evil of fault conveys a deordination or privation of order in a manner other than the evil of nature and/or of punishment, because, just as has been said in the Forty-Seventh Distinction of the First Book,8 the “evil of fault” means a deordination or privation of the principal order, which, namely, belongs to the image regarding God immediately; but the “evil of nature” and/or “of punishment” (means) a deordination not of the principle, but of a particular, order.  And hence it is, that God, preserving the co-fittingness [condecentia] of His Goodness and Wisdom, can make a thing evil by the wickedness of punishment, and/or by a defect of nature,9 not so deprived of the order of justice on that part, by which it proceeds from the very disposition of the Divine Wisdom.  Wherefore it does not follow:  ‘God can make a man blind:  therefore He can make (him) iniquitous’.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Quod Angelus in primo instanti fuerit malus, dupliciter potest intelligi:  vel quod a Deo creatus fuerit malus, vel quod bonus creatus ipse in primo instanti se fecerit malum.  De quaestione in primo sensu hic agitur, de altera in seq. quest.  Haec prima militat contra pestiferos Manichaeos et contra omnes, qui malum culpae eodem modo, sicut malum poenae, Deo auctori attribuere non erubescunt.  De hoc dicit Concil. Later. cap. Firmiter:  « Diabolus et alii daemones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, sed ipsi per se facti sunt mali ».  De manichaeis cfr. supra d. 1. p. I, a. 2, q. 1.

I. That an Angel was evil in the first instant (of his existence), can be understood in a twofold manner:  either that he was created evil by God, and/or that having been created good, he made himself evil in the first moment (of his existence).  One deals with the question in the first sense here, with the other in the following Question.  This first (Question) militates against the pestiferous Manichees and against all, who do not blush to attribute the evil of fault to God as Author, in the same manner that the evil of punishment (is).  On this the (Fourth) Lateran Council say, in the chapter “Firmiter”:  « The Devil and the other demons were indeed created good by God, but they themselves were made evil through themselves ».  On the Manichees, cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 1. a. 3.  —  Scoti loci collecti a Montefortino in Sum. t. II. p. I. q. 63. a. 4.  —  S. Thom., S. I. q. 63. a. 4; S. c. Gent. III. c. 107; de Malo, q. 16. a. 2.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 13; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. a. 1.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 8. q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 1. a. 1.  —  Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 4.  —  Biel, de hac et seq. q. II. Sent. d. 4. q. unica circa finem.

II. Alexander of Hales., Summa., p. II, q. 98, m. 1, a. 3.  —  The passages from (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, have been collected by Montefortino in his Summa., tome II, p. I, q. 63, a. 4.  —  St. Thom as, Summa., I, q. 63, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles., Bk. III, c. 107; de Malo., q. 16, a. 2.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 13; Summa., p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, a. 1.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 8, q. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, here in p. II, q. 1, a. 1.  —  Durandus, on this and the following q., here in q. 4.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following q., below in d. 4, q. sole, near the end.

1  Supple cum cod. Q opus Dei, et dein post quia nihil facit cum cod. W Deus.

2  Fulgent., I. ad Monimum, c. 49.

3  Cod. W aequa; Vat. paulo inferius bona pro aequa.

4  Deut. 32, 4.

5  Fere omnes codd. voluntate; perperam et contra cod. cc cum ed. 1.

6  Subaudi cum codd. F (Q T a secunda manu) locum tenet; Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et primis edd. supplet habet medium, sed minus congrue.

7  Scil. prout idem est ac negatio.

8  Quaest. 3. 4.  —  Paulo superius Vat. magis importat pro aliter importat, quae etiam circa initium solutionis ponit in prima materia pro in ipsa materia.  Eadem Vat. paulo inferius quae scilicet pro qui scilicet.

9  Plures codd. cum ed. 1 vel defectum naturae.

1  Supply, together with codex Q, a work of God [opus Dei], and then after because [quia nihil facit], with codex W God [Deus].

2  (St.) Fulgentius (of Ruspe), To Monimus, Bk. I, ch. 49.

3  Codex W has equitable [aequa]; the Vatican edition a little below this has good [bona] for equitable [aequa].

4  Deut 32:4.

5  Nearly all the codices have Will [voluntate], faultily and contrary to codex cc, together with edition 1.

6  Understand with codices F (Q and T by a second hand) has . . . place [locum tenet]; the Vatican edition, together with not a few codices and first editions, reads by supplying has no intermediary (place) [nullum habet medium], but less congruously.

7  Namely insofar as it is the same as a negation.

8  In Questions 3 and 4.  —  A little above this the Vatican edition has more [magis] for in a manner other [aliter], which (edition) also near the beginning of the solution has in prime matter [in prima materia] for in matter itself [in ipsa materia].  The same Vatican edition, a little below this, has which (deordination or privation), namely [quae scilicet] for which (order), namely [qui scilicet].

9  Several codices, together with edition 1, have and/or defect of nature [vel defectum naturae].

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