S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS II.

PART II

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 115-117.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 115-117.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum Angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus propria voluntate.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether an Angel was in the first instant of his creation evil by his own will?

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum Angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuerit malus actu propriae voluntatis.  Et quod sic videtur:

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether an Angel in the first moment of his creation was evil by an act of his own will.  And it seems that (it is) so:

1. Auctoritate canonicae Ioannis tertio:1  Diabolus ab initio peccavit; sed nihil est ante initium duratione:  ergo nulla creatura praecessit duratione angelicum peccatum.

1. By the authority of the canonical (Letter of St.) John, in the third (chapter):1  The Devil sinned from the start; but nothing is before a start according to duration:  therefore no creature preceded the sin of the Angels in duration.

2. Item, Augustinus undecimo super Genesim ad litteram:2  « Non frustra putari potest, in initio temporis diabolum superbia cecidisse, nec fuisse ullum antea tempus, quo cum Angelis sanctis pacatus vixerit et beatus, sed in ipso primordio creaturae a suo Creatore apostatasse ».  Si tu dicas mihi, quod hoc non dicit secundum suam opinionem, et bene, quia ibidem, ubi Augustinus ponit istam opinionem, alias etiam ponit, quas non tenet; obiicitur, quod hoc dixerit secundum suam opinionem, quia ipsius opinio fuit, quod omnia simul essent condita, et per lucem intelligit angelicam creaturam formatam, per tenebras intelligit aversam a Deo:3  ergo si simul lux facta est et a tenebris divisa, simul cum rerum prima conditione fuit peccatum Angeli; et ita videtur, quod nulla fuit omnino ibi mora.

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the eleventh (chapter) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis (says):2  « Not in vain can it be thought, that at the start of time the Devil fell [cecidisse], nor that there was any time beforehand, in which he lived in peace with the holy Angels and (was) blessed, but (rather) he apostatized from His Creator at the very first rise of Creation [creaturae] ».  If you say to me, that he does not say this according to his own opinion, and well, because in the same place, where (St.) Augustine posits this opinion, he also posits others, which he does not hold; it is (then) objected, that he said this according to his own opinion, because it was his opinion, that all (things) had been founded together, and he understands through (the word) “light” the formed, angelic creature, (and) he understands through (the word) “shadows” (the same creature) turned away from God:3  therefore if light was at once made and divided from the shadows, the sin of the Angel was together with the first foundation of things; and thus it seems, that there was entirely no delay there.

3. Item, ratione videtur:  aliqua creatura corporalis est, quae simul et in eodem instanti est et operatur, sicut lux statim cum est, lucet; et Augustinus4 dicit, « quod lux et splendor sunt coaeva, et si esset lux aeterna, splendor esset aeternus »:  ergo cum spiritualis natura sit magis vel aeque actualis, ut corporalis:  ergo potest esse, quod in primo instanti cum est, sit in suo actu.  Sed actus eius est velle:  ergo statim cum est, potest velle, ita quod esse non praecedit velle tempore sive duratione, sed solum natura; sed qua ratione velle potest bonum, eadem ratione malum:  ergo cum volens malum sit malus, in primo instanti potuit esse malus.  Si tu dicas, quod5 potest habere operationem coaevam naturalem, sed non liberum arbitrium; contra:  « liberum arbitrium est sub Deo potentissimum », sicut dicit Bernardus,6 et nihil habet retardans in Angelo nec ligans, sed statim cum est, perfectum est et potest operationem illam habere.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason:  there is some corporal creature, which at once and in the same instant is and works, just as light as immediately when it is, it shines [lucet]; and (St.) Augustine4 says, « that light and (its) splendor are coeval,* and if light were eternal, (its) splendor would be eternal »:  therefore since a spiritual nature is more and/or equally actual, as a corporal (nature):  therefore it can be, that what (is) in the first instant when it is, is in its act.  But the act of this (Angel) is ‘to will’:  therefore immediately when he is, he can will, such that (his) ‘to be’ does not precede (his) ‘to will’ in time or in duration, but only in nature; but by the reckoning by which he can will the good, by the same reckoning (he can will) the evil:  therefore since one willing evil is evil, he could be evil in the first instant.  If you say, that (an Angel)5 can have a coeval operation of nature, but not (a coeval) free will:  on the contrary:  « free will is the most potent (power) under God », just as (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux)6 says, and it has nothing retarding nor binding (it) in an Angel, but immediately when it is, it is perfect and can have that operation (i. e. a coeval operation).

4. Item, si oculus crearetur cum actualitate virtutis visivae et impressione speciei, simul esset et videret.  Cum ergo Angelus a sui prima conditione habuerit intellectum agentem et species rerum innatas, ut post patebit:7  ergo simul fuit et intellexit, pari ratione et simul fuit et voluit.  Si tu dicas, quod intelligere et velle fiunt in diversis instantibus; contra:  intelligere Angeli est simplex et in instanti potest esse, similiter et velle; sed nihil prohibet, duo indivisibilia esse simul:  ergo nihil prohibet, quod intelligere et velle, cum sint indivisibilia, saltem ratione indivisibilis simul sint, sicut ultima duarum linearum continguarum simul sunt.8

4. Likewise, if an eye were created with the actuality of the virtue of sight [virtutis visivae] and the impression of a species, it would at once be and see.  Therefore, since an Angel had from its first foundation an agent intellect and innate species of things, as will be clear afterwards:7  therefore he at once was and understood, and for an equal reason at once was and willed.  If you say, that (his) ‘understanding’ and ‘willing’ came to be in diverse instants; on the contrary:  an Angel’s ‘understanding’ is simple and can be in an instant, and similarly also (his) ‘willing’; but nothing prohibits, that two indivisibles be together:  therefore nothing prohibits, that (his) ‘understanding’ and ‘willing’, though they are indivisible, be at least according to the reckoning of an indivisible together, just as the ends [ultima] of two contiguous lines are together.8

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per simile.  Quia anima rationalis simul tempore conditur et vitiatur, nec est ibi aliqua oppositio:  ergo similiter videtur, quod in Angelo esse potuerit, quod simul fieret et vitiaretur, non tamen a Deo, sicut nec originale peccatum est a Deo. Aut si non est simile, ego quaero rationem:  quare anima haec duo potest habere simul, et non Angelus?  Si dicas mihi, quod ab actu alieno inficitur anima, scilicet a corpore, sed Angelus a se; hoc nihil est, quia ita cito Angelus fuit cognitus a se, sicut ab alio:  ergo pari ratione ita infici potuit ab actu proprio, sicut ab alieno.

5. Likewise, this very (thing) is shown through a simile.  Because (on account of Original Sin) a rational soul is at once founded and vitiated, nor is there any opposition in this:  therefore it seems similarly, that in an Angel it could be, that he was once made and vitiated, yet not by God, just as neither is Original Sin from God.  Or if it is not similar, I ask the reason:  “For what reason can this soul have two at once, and the Angel (can)not?”  If you say to me, that the soul is infected by the act of another, namely by the body, but the Angel by himself; this is nothing, because the Angel is cognized as swiftly by himself, as by another:  therefore for an equal reason he could be as (swiftly) infected by his own act, as by that of another.

SED CONTRA:  1. Ezechielis vigesimo octavo:9 . . .

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. In the twenty-eight (chapter) of Ezekiel (there is written):9 . . .

1  Epist. I. 3, 8: Quoniam ab initio diabolus peccat.  —  In minori Vat. durationis pro duratione.

2  Cap. 16. n. 21, in quibus verbis textus originalis ab initio pro in initio et sed ab ipso pro sed in ipso.

3  De quo vide I. Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 32. seqq; IV. c. 22. n. 39. seqq. et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 19. seq.  Cfr. infra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 13. a. 1. q. 1.

4  Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 1:  Sicut splendor, qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur, coaevus est illi, et esset coaeternus, si esset ignis aeternus.  Cfr. etiam II. contra Maxim. Arian. c. 14. n. 6. et Tract. 20. in Ioan. n. 8.  —  Paulo inferius plurimi codd. minus congrue ergo si pro ergo cum, quorum non pauci dein verbis sit in suo actu praefigunt ita.

5  Supple:  Angelus; non cum cod. Q (a secunda manu) lux, nec cum cod. A sol.

6  Haec sententia, quae etiam ab aliis Scholasticis allegatur, collecta est ex iis, quae S. Bernardus in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio docet de libertate a necessitate, quae competit libero arbitrio.  Haec enim, qua sumus « nobilis Deo creatura » et « praestamus ceteris animantibus » (c. 3. n. 7. ), « aeque et indifferenter Deo universaeque tam malae, quam bonae rationali convenit creaturae », ac « manet tam integra pro suo modo in creatura, quam in Creatore, sed in illo potentior » (c. 4. n. 9.).  In hac libertate arbitrii « potissimum aeternae et incommutabilis Divinitatis substantiva quaedam imago impressa videtur », ratione cuius « liberum arbitrium sui omnino defectum seu diminutionem non patitur neque augmentum » (c. 9. n. 28.).  Ob hanc tandem libertatem creatura rationalis « sui iuris est » (c. 11. n. 36.), et voluntas a nullo potest cogi (c. 12. n. 39.).  S. August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 7. n. 9. animarum rationalium liberum arbitrium vocat potentissimum.  —  Mox cod. F sed nihil pro et nihil, ac dein codd. L Q operationem suam pro operationem illam.

7  Hic a. 2. q. 1.  —  Paulo inferius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 fuit (codd. P Q sint) in diversis instantibus pro fiunt in diversis instantibus.

8  Cfr. Aristot., V. Phys. text. 21. seqq. (c. 3.) et VI. text. 1. seq.  —  Paulo superius codd. F Q et ed. 1 ratione indivisibilitatis pro ratione indivisibilis.

9  Vers. 12. seq.:  Plenus sapientia et perfectus decore.  In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti.

1  1 Jn. 3:8:  Since the Devil sins from the start [Quoniam ab initio diabolus peccat].  —  In the minor (of the argument) the Vatican edition has of a duration [durationis] for according to duration [duratione].

2  Chapter 16, n. 21, in which words the original text has from the start [ab initio] for at the start [in initio] and from the very [ab ipso] for at the very [in ipso].

3  Concerning which, see A Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. I, ch. 17, n. 32 ff.; Bk. IV, ch. 22, n. 39 ff., and On the City of God, Bk. XI, ch. 19 f..  Cf. below d. 12, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 13, a. 1. q. 1.

4  On the Trinity, Bk. VI, ch. 1:  Just as the splendor, which is begotten and diffused by fire, is coeval with it, and would be coeternal, if the fire was eternal.  Cf. also Against Maximus the Arian, Bk. II, ch. 14, n. 6, and On the Gospel of St. JohnΈ tract 20, n. 8.  —  A little below this very many codices have less congruously therefore if [ergo si] for therefore since [ergo cum], not a few of which (codices) then read that in the first instant when it is, that it be in its act [quod in primo instanti cum est, ita sit in suo actu] for that what (is) in the first instant when it is, is in its act [quod in primo instanti cum est, sit in suo actu].

5  Supply:  an Angel [Angelus]; not as codex Q (by a second hand) has light [lux], nor as codex A the Sun [sol].

6  This sentence, which is cited also by other Scholastics, has been collected from those, which St. Bernard teaches in the book On Grace and Free Will concerning the liberty from necessity, which befits free will.  For this (power of free will), by which we are « God’s noble creature » and « take precedence to all other living (things) » (ch. 3, n. 7), « equally and indifferently convenes with God’s creature, and each and every rational one, both evil, and good », and « remains so whole in virtue of its own manner in the creature, as in God, but in the former (is) more potent » (ch. 4, n. 9).  In this liberty of judgment « a certain impressed, substantive image of the Eternal and Incommutable Divinity seems (to be) the most potent (force) », by reason of which « free will suffers entirely neither its own defect or diminution nor augment » (ch. 9, n. 28).  Finally, on account of this liberty « it is » a rational creature « of its own right » (ch. 11, n. 36), and (its) will can be compelled by nothing (ch. 12, n. 39).  St. Augustine, On the Customs of the Manichees, Bk. II, ch. 7, n. 9, call the free will of rational souls the most potent (force).  —  Next codex F has but [sed] for and [et], and then codices L and Q have its own operation [operationem suam] for that operation [operationem illam].

7  Here in a. 2, q. 1.  —  A little below this not a few codices, together with editions 1, 2, and 3 have was (codices P and Q have are) in diverse instants [fuit (sint) in diversis instantibus] for come to be in diverse instants [fiunt in diversis instantibus].

8  Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, text. 21 ff (ch. 3) and Bk. VI, text 1 f..  —  A little above this codices F and Q and edition 1 have according to the reckoning of indivisibility [ratione indivisibilitatis] for according to the reckoning of the indivisible [ratione indivisibilis].

9  Verse 12 f.:  Full of wisdom and full of ornament.  In the delights of God’s Paradise wert thou [Plenus sapientia et pefectus decore.  In deliiciis paradisi Dei fuisti].

 

* [Trans. note:  What is coeval is co-extensive in duration.]

p. 116

In deliciis paradisi fuisti, plenus sapientia et perfectus decore, ergo etc.:  ergo cum hoc intelligatur de diabolo, sicut exponunt Glossae, fuit ergo aliquando sine peccato.

He was among the delights of Paradise, full of wisdom and perfected in ornament, ergo etc.:  therefore since this is understood of the Devil, just as the Glosses expound (it), he was, therefore, at some time without sin.

2. Item, hoc dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei, capitulo decimo quinto:  « In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti, omni lapide pretioso ornatus es; ubi aliquando intelligitur fuisse sine peccato ».

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine says this in the eleventh (book) On the City of God, in the fifteenth chapter:  « Among the delights of God’s Paradise were you, (and) with every precious stone were you ornamented; where at some time he is understood to have been without sin ».

3. Item, ratione videtur:  omne peccatum actuale exit in esse per actum deliberationis; sed ubi deliberatio, ibi collatio et successio de necessitate:  ergo si peccatum sequitur deliberationem Angeli, peccatum sequitur Angelum non tantum natura, verum etiam duratione.  Si tu dicas, quod Angelus propter intellectum deiformem deliberat in instanti, et simul videt et deliberat; ostendo, quod1 non potest esse.  Angelus enim ad hoc, quod appeteret, necessario tria praecognovit:  et appetibile, et cui appetebat, et rationem moventem — aliqua enim ratio fuit, quae excitavit — sed ista sunt diversa, et impossibile est per naturam, aliquam potentiam simplicem simul et semel ad plura converti; propter quod etiam dicit Philosophus,2 « quod intelligimus unum solum »:  ergo si non simul, successive ergo cognovit.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason:  every actual sin goes forth into ‘being’ through an act of deliberation; but where (there is) deliberation, there (is) collation and succession of necessity:  therefore if sin is subsequent to [sequitur] an Angel’s deliberation, sin is subsequent to the Angel not only according to nature, but also according to duration.  If you say, that an Angel on account of (his) deiform intellect deliberates in an instant, and at once sees and deliberates; I show, that1 (this) cannot be.  For an Angel for this, so that he would desire [appeteret], necessarily precognized three (things):  both the appetible, and that for which he desired (it), and the reason moving (him to desire) — for there is some reason, which excited (him to act) — but these (three) are diverse, and it is impossible through nature, that any simple power be at once and the same moment converted to several (objects); on account of which the Philosopher also says,2 « that we understand only one (thing) »:  therefore if (he did) not (cognize these three) together, therefore he cognized (them) successively.

4. Item, Angelus, quando conditus est, aut factus est cum sua operatione actuali, aut absque operatione actuali.  Si absque operatione actuale:  ergo post tempus peccavit necessario.  Si cum sua operatione;3 sed non decuit Deum concreare alicui rei nisi operationem suae naturae convenientem:  cum ergo actio deformis potius sit naturae disconveniens, patet etc.

4. Likewise, an Angel, when he was founded, either was made with his own actual operation, or apart from actual operation.  If apart from actual operation:  therefore he sinned necessarily after a time.  If with his own3 operation; but it was not fitting [decuit] that God co-create for any thing but an operation convening with its nature:  therefore since a deformed action is rather discordant [disconveniens] with nature, it is clear that etc..

5. Item, haec duo sunt vera per se, quod nullus in illo instanti, quo peccat, potest vitare peccatum; et nullus peccat actuali peccato in eo quod vitare non potest; sed si Angelus peccavit in illo instanti, non potuit4 in illo vitare, nec in aliquo, quod esset ante illud, nec post:  ergo non potuit vitare.  Sed si non potuit vitare, non peccavit:  ergo si peccavit in primo instanti, non peccavit.

5. Likewise, these two are true through themselves:  that no one in that instant, in which he sins, can avoid sin; and (that) no one sins by an actual sin in that which he cannot avoid; but if an Angel sinned in that instant, he could not avoid (sinning)4 in that (instant), nor in any (other instant), which was before that one, nor afterwards:  therefore he could not avoid (sinning).  But if he could avoid (sinning), he did not sin:  therefore if he sinned in the first instant, he did not sin.

6. Item, malum est corruptivum boni; sed nihil corrumpitur nisi quod est vel fuit:  ergo in Angelo aliquid fuit, quod amisit per peccatum.  Tunc ergo quaero, utrum in primo instanti peccaverit, an non.  Si non, tunc habeo propositum; si sic, ergo peccavit subito.  Sed cum in subita mutatione simul sit fieri et factum esse, simul erit corrumpti et corruptum esse, et ita non esse:  ergo bonum in primo instanti non est.  Sed non corrumperetur, nisi fuerit:  ergo in eodem instanti fuit et non fuit, et ita contradictorie opposita sunt simul vera.  Sed hoc est impossibile, et propter hoc vult Philosophus,5 « quod inter mutationes contrarias de necessitate sit quies media »:  ergo inter illius boni productionem et ademptionem fuit quies media, et ita morula.  Si tu dicas — sicut dicitur de anima rationali, quia similiter potest ibi obiici — quod6 non adimit bonum, quod infuit, sed quod infuisset, si non peccasset; nunquam enim fuit iustus et bonus, sed fuisset, si non peccasset; contra hoc est Augustinus de Correptione et gratia:7  « Ille in veritate non stetit, dictum est de diabolo, quia ibi fuit, sed non permansit »:  ergo illa responsio nihil valet hic.

6. Likewise, evil is corruptive of the good; but nothing is corrupted except what is and/or was:  therefore in the Angel there was something, which he lost through sin.  Therefore, then I ask, “Whether in the first instant he sinned, or not?”  If not, then I have the proposed; if so, therefore he sinned immediately [subito].  But since in a sudden change [in subita mutatione] there is at once a ‘being done’ and a ‘having been done’, there will (also) be at once a ‘being corrupted’ and a ‘having been corrupted’, and thus a ‘not being’ [non esse]:  therefore the good is not in the first instant.  But (an Angel) would not be corrupted, if he were not:  therefore in the same instant he was and was not, and thus contradictorily opposed (propositions) are true together.  But this is impossible, and on this account the Philosopher5 wants, « that between contrary changes there be of necessity an intermediary rest »:  therefore between the production (of the Angel) and the taking away [ademptionem] (of this something) there was an intermediary rest, and thus a little delay [morula].  If you say — just as is said of a rational soul, because it can similarly be objected there — that (his evil deed)6 did not take away [adimit] the good, which was in (him), but which would have been in (him), if he had not sinned; for he never was just and good, but he would have been, if he had not sinned:  against this is (St.) Augustine On Correction and Grace (wherein he says):7  « That one did not stand in the Truth, was said of the Devil, because he was in it, but he did not remain (in it) »:  therefore that response is worthy nothing here.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Morula fuit inter creationem Angeli et lapsum eius.

CONCLUSION

 

There was a little delay between the creation of the Angel and his fall.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod antiqua positio fuit aliquorum, quod simul tempore fuit diabolus et peccavit, nec unquam fuit nisi malus; et videtur Augustinus illam approbare super Genesim ad litteram;8 et ideo aliqui moderni eam tenuerunt.  —  Sed quoniam, sicut expresse dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei,9 praedicta positio accedit ad primam, quae est haeretica, et ita quasi haeresim sapit; communis opinio magistrorum Parisiensium est, quod duratione conditio Angeli praecessit lapsum; et de communi consilio magistrorum positio opposita excommunicata est ab episcopo Parisiensi.10

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the ancient position of some was, that the Devil was and sinned together in time, and (that) he was never (anything) but evil; and it seems that (St.) Augustine approves of that (opinion) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis;8 and for that reason some modern (authors) hold it.  —  But since, as (St.) Augustine expressly says in the eleventh (book) On the City of God,9 the aforesaid position approaches to the first, which is heretical, and thus smells [sapit] as if of heresy; the common opinion of the masters of Paris is, that according to the duration (of his existence) the foundation of the Angel preceded (his) fall; and from the common counsel of the masters the opposite position was excommunicated by the Bishop of Paris.10

Ideo tanquam magis veram et catholicam, et magis probabilem et communem opinionem dico illam esse tenendam, quod morula fuit inter creationem et lapsum, licet parvula.  Propter quam Sancti et expositores et ipsa Scriptura loquitur de malitia diaboli, quasi semper fuisset in ea, quia illud modicum quasi pro nihilo reputatur.11

For that reason I say that that (position) is to be held as more true and catholic, and (as) the more probable and common opinion, that there was a little delay [morula] between the creation and the fall (of the Devil), though a tiny one.  On account of which (opinion) the Saints and (their) expositors and Scripture itself speaks of the malice of the Devil, as if he had always been in it, because that small measure (of time) is reputed almost as nothing [quasi pro nihilo].11

1  Codd. P aa quod hoc.

2  In cod. P bene (a secunda manu) additur secundo Topicorum, c. 4. (c. 10.).   Cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 2.

3  Cod. cc et ed. 1 addunt actuali, qui etiam paulo inferius cum nonnullis aliis mss. pro concreare substituunt creare, codd. T U dare.

4  Cod. V hic peccatum non potuit, et paulo inferius post ergo non potuit interserit peccatum.  Vat. circa initium argumenti post quod nullus in illo addit primo.  —  Cfr. de hoc arg. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 1. et 18, et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 15.

5  Libr. VIII. Phys. text. 62. et 71. (c. 7. et 8.). Cfr. V. Phys. text. 12. (c. 2.) et XI. Metaph. c. 11. (X. c. 12.).  —  Plures codd. cum ed. 1 cadit (cod. K cadat) quies pro sit quies.  Dein post productionem in cod. Y additur et corruptionem.

6  Subaudi: malum.

7  Cap. 6. n. 10.  —  Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. illa ratio pro illa responsio.

8  Libr. XI. c. 19. seqq.  Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.

9  Cap. 15:  Et illud, quod ab initio diabolus peccat, non ab initio, ex quo creatus est, peccare putandus est, sed ab initio peccati, quod ab ipsius superbia coeperit esse peccatum.  —  De prima positione, « quae est haeretica », cfr. quaest. praeced.

10  Vide Scholion.

11  Aristot., II. Rhetor. c. 3. (c. 2.):  Quae vero nihil aut admodum parva sunt, pro nihilo habenda esse putamus.  —  Paulo superius cod. Q propter quod pro propter quam.

1  Codices P and aa have that this [quod hoc].

2  In codex P (by a second hand) there is added well in the second (book) of Topics [secundo Topicorum], ch. 4 (ch. 10).  Cf. above d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, p. 79, footnote 2.

3  Codex cc and edition 1 add actual [actuali], which (codex and edition) also a little below this, together with not a few other manuscripts, substitute create [creare] for co-create [concreare]; codices T and U have give to [dare] for co-create for [concreare].

4  Codex V here has sinning [peccatum], and a little below this after therefore he could not avoid [ergo non potuit] it inserts sinning [peccatum].  The Vatican edition near the beginning of the argument, after that no one in that [quod nullus in illo] adds first [primo].  —  Cf. on this argument, (St.) Augustine, On Free Will, Bk. III, chs. 1 and 18, and Bk. XI, On the City of God, ch. 15.

5  Physics, Bk. VIII, texts 62 and 71 (chs. 7 and 8).  Cf. Physics, Bk. V, text 12 (ch. 2) and Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 11 (Bk. X, ch. 12).  —  Several codices, together with edition 1, have there falls [cadit], codex K there fall [cadat] for there be [sit].  Then after production [productionem] in codex Y there is added and corruption [et corruptionem].

6  Understand:  (his) evil (deed) [malum].

7  Chapter 6, n. 10.  —  A little below this not a few codices have reckoning [ratio] for response [responsio].

8  Book XI, ch. 19 ff..  Cf. the text of Master (Peter) here, in ch. 4.

9  Chapter 15:  And he must be thought to sin that, which the Devil sins from the start, not from the start, in which he was created, but from the start of the sin, which began to be a sin from his pride.  —  On the first position, « which is heretical », cf. the preceding Question.

10  See the Scholium.

11  Aristotle, Rhetoric, Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 2):  But those which are nothing or quite small, we think are to be regarded as nothing.  —  A little before this codex Q has On which account [Proper quod].

p. 117

1. Ex hoc patet responsio ad primum, quia, ut dicit Augustinus,1 sensus est:  diabolus ab initio peccat, id est statim post initium.

1. From this the response to the first (objection) is clear, because, as (St.) Augustine1 says, the sense is:  the Devil sins from the start, that is immediately after the start (of his existence).

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, dico, quod dicit secundum alienam opinionem; quod patet, quia contrarium dicit undecimo de Civitate Dei.2  —  Et quod obiicitur, quod ipse posuit omnia simul facta; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad esse naturale, sed non quantum ad bene esse.  Unde posuit, quod lux corporalis simul esset et divisa esset a tenebris, similiter, quod non est ordo materialium dierum; sed bene posuit ordinem spiritualium dierum secundum septemplicem conversionem intellectus angelici supra res.3

2. To that which is objected from (St.) Augustine, I say, that he speaks according to another’s opinion; which is clear, because he says the contrary in the eleventh (book) On the City of God.2  —  And what is objected, that he himself posited that all (things were) made together; it must be said, that (that) is true regarding (their) ‘natural being’ [esse naturale], but not as regards (their) ‘well being’ [bene esse].  Wherefore he posited, that corporal light was and was at once divided from the shadows, similarly, that there is not an order of material days; but he posited well the order of spiritual days according to the sevenfold conversion of the angelic intellect upon things.3

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod statim fuit in actu; dicendum, quod quidam hoc negant in omni creatura; quia tamen Augustinus videtur dicere contrarium in luce et splendore, concedamus etiam in Angelo.  Sed tamen non fuit statim4 in actu electionis, quia illum antecedit deliberatio et praecognitio plurium; quia, sicut dictum est in opponendo,5 non possunt esse simul, non ob repugnantiam actuum vel simplicitatum, sed propter simplicitatem intellectus angelici, quia una conversione totus capitur intellectus ab uno obiecto, ita quod incompossibilis est in illo instanti conversio ad aliud obiectum.

3. To that which is objected, that (an Angel) was immediately in act; it must be said, that certain (authors) deny this in every creature; yet because (St.) Augustine seems to say the contrary in regard to light and splendor, let us concede (this) also in regard to an Angel.  But yet (this ‘being in act’) was not immediately (in the Angel)4 in regard to an act of choosing [actu electionis], because the deliberation and precognition of several (things) antecedes that (act); because, just as has been said in the Contrary [in opponendo],5 (these acts) cannot be together, not on account of the repugnancy of the acts and/or of simplicities, but on account of the simplicity of the angelic intellect, because (its) whole intellect by one conversion is grasped by one object, such that a conversion to another object in that instant is co-impossible.

4. 5. Et sic patet responsio ad duo sequentia.  —  Ad illud autem quod obiicitur de peccato animae, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia peccatum in anima non fit per actualem deliberationem, sed fit per unionem ad carnem infectam; et quoniam unio est in instanti, deliberatio et collatio non:  ideo non est simile hinc et inde.

4. 5. And thus the response to the two following (objections) is clear.  —  Moreover to that which is objected concerning the sin of the soul, it must be said, that it is not similar, because (original sin) does not come to be in the soul through an actual deliberation, but comes to be through (its) union to infected flesh; and sine (that) union is in a instant, deliberation and collation (do) not (occur):  for that reason it is not similar in the latter and in the former.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Quoad hanc quaestionem inquiri potest 1. de facto, 2. de possibili, 3. de ratione huius possibilitatis sive potius impossibilitatis.

I. In regard to this Question there can be an inquiry 1. concerning the fact, 2. concerning the possibility [de possibilii], 3. concerning the reason for this possibility or rather for the impossibility.

1. Loquendo de facto, communiter tenebatur sententia negativa, cum a. 1240 a Parisiensibus condemnata esset propositio, « quod malus angelus in primo instanti suae creationis fuit malus et nunquam nisi malus » (Collect. iudicior. t. I. pag. 186, et infra d. 23. in fine.).

I. Speaking of the fact (i. e. the creation of an evil angel), the negative sentence was commonly held, since there was condemned in A. D. 1240, by the (masters) of Paris, the proposition, « that an evil angel was in the first instant of his creation evil and never but evil » (Collectio iudiciorum. tome I, p. 186, and below in d. 23, at the end).

2. Si quaeritur de possibili, Scot. (II. Sent. d. 5. q. 2; Report. II. Sent. d. 4. q. unica) cum aliis censet, Angelos in primo instanti potuisse non solum mereri, se etiam contrahere malum sive culpae sive poenae.  —  Sed S. Bonav. omnino hoc negat quoad culpam, et etiam, praescindendo a Christo (de quo nihil determinare vult), negat, Angelum in primo instanti potuisse mereri (III. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.), quia, ut multi dicant, « in omni creatura esse praecedit operari » (ibid. in corp.).  —  S. Thom. cum Aegid. R. distinguit et docet, Angelos in primo instanti mereri quidem potuisse, omnesque de facto meritos esse (S. I. q. 63. a. 5. ad 4.), sed non potuisse peccare.

2. If one ask concerning the possibility [de possibili], (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Sent., Bk. II, d. 5, q. 2; Reportatio, Sent. Bk. II, d. 4, q. sole) judges with others, that the Angels in the first instant (of their existence) could have not only merited, but also contracted the evil both of fault or of punishment.  —  But St. Bonaventure entirely denies this in regard to fault, and also, prescinding from Christ (concerning whom he wishes to determine nothing), denies, than an Angel in the first instant could have merited (Sent., Bk. III, d. 18, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 4), because, as many say, « in every creature ‘being’ precedes ‘operating’ » (ibid., in the body of the Question).  —  St. Thomas, together with Giles the Roman, distinguishes and teaches, that the Angels in the first instant could have indeed merited, and de facto all were worthy (Summa., I, q. 63, a. 5, in reply to n. 4), but they could not have sinned.

3. Quoad rationem probantem hanc impossibilitatem, et quoad numerum instantium, qui requiratur ad peccatum Angelorum, doctores valde dissentiebant.  Praecipue controvertebatur de hoc, utrum creaturae produci possint in actuali operatione.  —  Alex. Hal., licet S. p. II. q. 98. m. 11. dubius esse videatur, tamen ubi ex professo de hac re tractat (ibid. q. 29. m. 1. a. 7. ad 1.), asserit, quod « nec in caelo nec in Angelo nec in aliqua creatura contingit illud, quod in eodem instanti, in quo primo est, habeat actum aliquem.  In omni enim alio a primo prius est potentia quam actus, non solum natura, sed etiam duratione ».  —  Hanc rationem S. Bonav. hoc loco (ad 3.) propter auctoritatem S. Augustini aliquo modo restringit, cum quoad lucem et actus naturales Angeli rem relinquat ambiguam.  Quoad deliberatos autem Angeli actus, qui sunt in genere morum (cfr. infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 1.), negativum responsionem omnino tenet.  Assentiunt ipsi B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. et etiam Richard. a Med., qui tamen sententiam S. Thomae ut probabilem admittit.  —  Attamen S. Thom. (cui concordat Aegid. R., reiectis sex aliis opinionibus) illam rationem non approbat (in Sum. loc. cit.) aliamque ibi et in Comment. (hic q. 2.) affert, contra quam hac vice Dionys. Carth. arguit.  Omnes autem illas rationes Scotus evertere nititur, ut suam affirmativam responsionem ad secundum quaesitum sustineat.

3. In regard to the reason proving this impossibility, and in regard to the number of instants (of existence), which may be required for the sin of the Angels, the doctors (of theology) greatly disagree.  There was chiefly a controversy concerning this, whether creatures could be produced in actual operation.  —  Alexander of Hales, though he seems to be in doubt in (his) Summa., p. II, q. 98, m. 11, yet where he treats of this matter ex professo (ibid., q. 29, m. 1, a. 7, in reply to n. 1), he asserts, that « neither in a heaven nor in an Angel nor in any creature does it happen, that in the same instant, in which it first is, it has any act.  For in every other (being) from the First (Being) power is prior to act, not only according to nature, but also according to duration ».  —  This reason St. Bonaventure restricts in some manner in this Question (in reply to n. 3) on account of the authority of St. Augustine, since in regard to light and the natural acts of an Angel he leaves the matter ambiguous.  But in regard to the deliberated acts of an Angel, which are in the genus of morals (cf. below d. 41, a. 1, q. 1), he holds an entirely negative response.  Assenting to this are Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, and even Richard of Middleton, who, however, admits the sentence of St. Thomas as probable.  —  However St. Thomas (with whom Giles the Roman agrees, having rejected the other six opinions) does not approve of this reason (Summa., loc. cit.) and mentions another there and in his Commentary (here in q. 2), against which (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian argues this time.  But all these reasons (Bl. John Duns) Scotus strives to overturn, so as to sustain his own affirmative response to the second question.

II. Praeter laudatos supra et in Schol. praeced.:  B. Albert., hic a. 14; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. a. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., q. 3. a. 2.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 8, q. 2.  —  Henr. a Gand., Quodl. 8. q. 10.

II. Besides those mention above and in the preceding Scholium.:  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 14; Summa., p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, q. 3, a. 2.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 8, q. 2.  —  Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals. 8, q. 10.

1  Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 30, de quo vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. circa finem, et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 15.  —  Vat. cum aliquibus mss. et ed. 1 peccavit pro peccat.

2  Cap. 15.  Vide supra pag. 116, nota 9.

3  Libr. IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22. n. 39. seqq.  Cfr. infra d. 13. a. 1. q. 1.

4  Supplent codd. Z cc et ed. 1 in Angelo, sed melius subaudiretur Angelus, vel lege cum codd. A I in Angelo actus electionis.  Dein post plurium codd. I L U substituunt quae pro quia.

5   Fundam. 3.  —  Mox Vat. perperam vel simplicitatem pro vel simplicitatum i. e. indivisibilium.  Dein plures codd. ut T W aa bb et ed. 1 qui pro quia.

1  On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. XI, ch. 23, n. 30, concerning which see here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 4, near the end, and On the City of God, Bk. XI,. ch. 15.  —  The Vatican edition, together with some manuscripts and edition 1, has sinned [peccavit] for sins [peccat].

2  Chapter 15.  See the previous page, here, footnote 9.

3  On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. IV, ch. 22, n. 39 ff..  Cf. below d. 13, a. 1, q. 1.

4  Supply, together with codices Z and cc and edition 1, in the Angel [in Angelo], but it would be better to understand Angel [Angelus] for (this ‘being in act’), and/or to read with codices A and I an act of election was not immediately in the Angel [in Angelus actus elections].  Then after of the many [plurium] codices I L and U substitute which [quae] for because [quia].

5   In the 3rd argument of the fundament.  —  Next the Vatican edition has faultily and/or the simplicity of the acts [vel simplicitatem] for of the acts and/or of simplicities [vel simplicitatum], i. e. of indivisibles.  Then several codices, such as T W aa and bb, and edition 1 have which [qui] for because (its) [quia].

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