COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III
PARS II.	PART II
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE II Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 117-121. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 117-121. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
ARTICULUS II. De naturali cognitione Angeli.	ARTICLE II On an Angel’s natural cognition.
Circa secundum principale et⁶ circa Angeli naturalem cognitionem duo quaeruntur.	About the second principle (question) and⁶ about an Angel’s natural cognition two (things) are asked.
Primum est de cognitione ipsius creaturae.	The first concerns the cognition of the creature itself.
Secundum de cognitione creatricis essentiae.	The second concerns the cognition of the creating Essence.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum Angelus omnia creata, quae cognoscit, cognoscat per species innatas.	QUESTION 1 Whether all the things, which an Angel cognizes, he cognized through innate species?
QUAERITUR ERGO, utrum Angelus omnia creata, quae cognoscit, cognoscat per species innatas, an aliqua per species acquisitas. Et quod omnia creata cognoscat per species innatas:	THEREFORE THERE IS ASKED, whether all the created (things), which an Angel cognizes, he cognizes through innate species, or whether (he cognizes) some through acquired species. And that he cognizes all created (things) through innate species:
1. Videtur sacra Scriptura velle, Ezechielis vigesimo octavo:⁷ Tu plenus sapientia et perfectus decore — dicitur ad diabolum — sed non esset a sui origine plenus sapientia, nisi esset in eo plenitudo . . .	1. Sacred Scripture seems to want, in the twenty-eighth (chapter) of Ezekiel:⁷ Thou full of wisdom and perfect in ornament — is said regarding the Devil — but he would not from his origin be full of wisdom, unless there were in him a fullness . . .
⁶ Codd. aa bb id est. ⁷ Vers. 12.	⁶ Codices aa and bb have that is [id est] for and [et]. ⁷ Verse 12.

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specierum, per quas contingit res cognoscere: ergo cum plenitudo sufficiat unicuique, videtur, quod species innatae sufficiant Angelo ad omnia cognoscenda.	of species, through which he happens to cognize things: therefore since a fullness is sufficient for each one, it seems, that innate species are sufficient for an Angel to cognize all (things).
2. Item, per Augustinum, nono de Trinitate:¹ « Mens igitur ipsa sicut rerum corporearum notitiam per sensum corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam ». Et huius rationem aliam non assignat, nisi quia species incorporalium non potest fieri in sensus, et species acquiritur mediante sensu; sed Angelus nullum habet sensum — supponatur modo — ergo nullius notitiam acquirit suscipiendo speciem sive acquirendo speciem novam.	2. Likewise, through (St.) Augustine, in the ninth (book) On the Trinity:¹ « Therefore the mind itself, just as it gathers [colligit] knowledge [notitiam] of corporeal things through sensing, so of incorporeals through its very self ». And he does not assign a reason for this, except because the species of incorporeals cannot come to be in sensing, and (because) a species is acquired by means of sensing; but an Angel has no sense — let (this) be supposed for now — therefore he acquires the knowledge of nothing by suscepting a species or by acquiring a new species.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per auctoritatem libri de Causis:² « Omnis intelligentia est plena formis »; sed si species reciperet, non esset plena: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, this very (thing) seem through the authority of the Book of Causes:² « Every intelligence is full of forms »; but if it received a species, it would not be full: ergo etc..
4. Item, talis consuevit assignari differentia inter intellectum angelicum et humanum, quod humanus propter coniunctionem cum corpore est possibilis, angelicus vero est actualis; si ergo recipere non est nisi rei existentis in potentia, secundum quod huiusmodi:³ patet etc.	4. Likewise, such a difference is customarily assigned between the angelic and the human intellect, that the human on account of (its) conjunction with a body is possible, but the angelic is actual; if, therefore, ‘to receive’ belongs to naught but a thing existing in potency, according to which (it is) of this kind:³ it is clear that etc..
5. Item, quod ista differentia sit conveniens, videtur. Intellectus enim divinus est in omnimoda actualitate, ita quod omnino nihil potest recipere; intellectus vero humanus, quando creatur, est sicut tabula rasa,⁴ et ita in omnimoda possibilitate: ergo si inter haec extrema possibile est reperire medium possibile, scilicet in quo sit possibilitas actui coniuncta, et talem non est dare nisi angelicum, ergo etc.	5. Likewise, it seems that this difference of theirs is fitting [conveniens]. For the Divine Intellect is in an omnimodal actuality, such that it can receive entirely nothing; but the human intellect, when it is created, is as a tabula rasa,⁴ and thus in an omnimodal possibility: therefore if between these extremes it is possible to find a possible intermediary, namely in which there is a possibility conjoined to an act, and there is no granting of such (an intellect) except the angelic, ergo etc..
6. Item, triplex est esse rerum: habent enim res esse in Verbo, et in intellectu Angelico, et in mundo, secundum quod triplex esse dicit Augustinus⁵ illud esse dictum: Fiat, et fecit, et factum est. Sed esse rerum in intellectu angelico magis accedit ad esse rerum in Verbo, quam ad esse rerum in mundo: ergo cum in Verbo sint⁶ plenissime, in maiori plenitudine sunt in Angelo quam in mundo, vel in aeque magna. Sed Deus ab initio mundi indidit rebus rationes causales, secundum quas cetera fierent, et nihil diceretur novum, quia requievit Deus die septimo:⁷ ergo multo fortius videtur, quod Angelo impresserit similitudines et rationes, secundum quas posset cognoscere cetera facienda: ergo sine receptione nova.	6. Likewise, there is a threefold ‘being’ [esse] of things: for they have ‘being’ in the Word, and in the intellect of an Angel, and in the world, according to which threefold ‘being’ (St.) Augustine⁵ says that this (verse) has been said: Let it be, and He made (it), and it was done. But the ‘being’ of things in an angelic intellect accedes more to the ‘being’ of things in the Word, than to the ‘being’ of things in the world: therefore since (things)⁶ are in the Word in the fullest manner, they are in a greater plenitude in the Angel than in the world, and/or in an equally great (magnitude). But god from the start of the world endowed things with causal reasons [rationes causales], according to which all other (things) came to be, and nothing would be said (to be) “new”, because God rested on the Seventh Day:⁷ therefore much more strongly does it seem, that He impressed upon the Angel similitudes and reason, according to which he could cognize all the other (things) to be made: therefore without a new reception.
SED CONTRA: 1. Ad Ephesios tertio:⁸ Ut innotescat Principatibus et Potestatibus multiformis sapientia Dei; Glossa dicit ibi, « quod Angeli multa didicerunt ab Ecclesia »: ergo multorum species receperunt et acquisierunt.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. According to the third (chapter of St. Paul’s Letter) to the Ephesians:⁸ So that the manifold Wisdom of God may be made known to the Principalities and Powers; the Gloss says there, « that the Angels learned many (things) from the Church »: therefore they received and acquired the species of many (things).
2. Item, si per species innatas omnia cognoscit, ergo a natura sua omnia scit, ergo praesentia et futura, necessaria et contingentia, naturalia et voluntaria; quod manifeste falsum est et contra Scripturas.⁹	2. Likewise, if he cognizes all through innate species, therefore he knows [scit] all by his own nature, therefore (things) present and future, necessary and contingent, natural and voluntary; which is manifestly false and contrary to the Scriptures.⁹
3. Item, si omnia cognoscit per species innatas, habet penes se ipsum rationem cognoscendi omnia: ergo ita bene cognoscit absentia sicut praesentia, ita longinqua, sicut propinqua: ergo diabolus existens in inferno scit quidquid fit in mundo, et Angelus, qui est hic, quidquid fit in Anglia; quod manifeste falsum est et contra Scripturam, quae de multiplici missione Angelorum loquitur.¹⁰	3. Likewise, if he cognizes all through innate species, he has from within himself the reason for cognizing all: therefore he cognizes (things) absent as well as (things) present, (those) far off thus, as (those) near: therefore the Devil existing in Hell knows whatever is done in the world, and the Angel, who is here, whatever is done in England; which is manifestly false and contrary to the Scripture, which speaks of the multiple mission of the Angels.¹⁰
4. Item, si omnia cognoscit per species innatas, aut non cognoscit singularia, aut habet species omnium singularium. Primum est falsum et inconveniens, quod Angelus singularia non cognoscat, cum hominibus specialibus ministret et ad specialia et singularia ministeria dirigatur. Si autem habet species omnium singularium, ergo cum possint augeri in infinitum, habebit species infinitas; aut fiet aliquando aliquod singulare, quod non poterit cognoscere.¹¹ Si tu dicas, quod Angelus cognoscit singularia per species universalium; contra: in specie universalium non distinguuntur:¹² ergo non cognoscit distincte. Praeterea, species universalis non assimilatur cuilibet singulari assimilatione perfecta: ergo perfectius cognoscit homo quam Angelus. Si tu dicas, quod Angelus appropriat illas species applicando ad singularia; contra: omnem applicationem non fortuitam praecedit cognitio; si enim non cogno- / -scit . . .	4. Likewise, if he cognizes all through innate species, either he does not cognize singulars, or he has the species of all singulars. The first, that an Angel does not cognize singulars, is false and unfitting [inconveniens], since he ministers to particular men [hominibus specialibus] and is directed to particular [specialia] and singular ministries. But if he has the species of all singulars, therefore since (these) can be increased unto an infinite (degree), he will have infinite species; or at some time there will come to be some singular, which he cannot cognize.¹¹ If you say, that an Angel cognizes singulars through the species of universals; on the contrary: in the species of universals (singulars)¹² are not distinguished: therefore he does not cognize (them) distinctly. Moreover, the species of a universal is not assimilated with any singular by a perfect assimilation: therefore many cognizes more perfectly than an Angel (does). If you say, that an Angel appropriates those species by applying (the species of universals) to singulars; on the contrary: cognition precedes every non-fortuitous application; for if he does not / cognize . . .
¹ Cap. 3. n. 3. — Verba Augustini pro ratione addita sunt haec: Neque etiam, ut oculus corporis videt alios oculos et se non videt, ita mens novit alias mentes et ignorat semetipsam. Per oculos enim corporis corpora videmus, quia radios, qui per eos emicant et quidquid cernimus tangunt, refringere ac retorquere in ipso non possumus, nisi cum specula intuemur . . . Sed quoquo modo se habeat vis, qua per oculos cernimus; ipsam certe vim, sive sint radii sive aliud aliquid, oculis cernere non valemus, sed mente quaerimus etc. ² Prop. 10. — In minori post plena cod. M repetit formis. ³ Averroes, I. Phys. text. 69: Quidquid recipit aliquid non recipit ipsum, secundum quod est in actu, sed secundum quod est in potentia. ⁴ Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 14. (c. 4.). — Aliquanto inferius nonnulli codd. tale pro talem i. e. intellectum. ⁵ Libr. II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 8. n. 16-20; IV. c. 29. n. 46. et c. 31. n. 48. ⁶ Subaudi: res. — Ed. 1 fuerint. ⁷ Gen. 2, 2. — Cfr. infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2, ubi sententia Augustini de rationibus causalibus sive seminalibus exponitur. — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut C K L O Y cc et ed. 1 posset cogitare pro posset cognoscere. ⁸ Vers. 10. — Glossam vide apud Lyranum, loc. cit., ubi dicitur: « Qui [Angeli] multa secreta in his didicerunt ». S. Hieron. in explicatione huius versus ait: Idcirco idipsum sacramentum [incarnationis] et [Paulo] est revelatum, ut non solum gentibus, sed et Principatibus et Potestatibus per Ecclesiam manifesta fieret multiplex sapientia Dei. ⁹ Nam Scriptura cognitionem futurorum soli Deo esse proprium docet, ut patet ex Isai. 41, 23: Annuntiate, quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus, quia dii estis vos. ¹⁰ Cfr. supra pag. 79, nota 6. ¹¹ Vat. cogitare seu cognoscere; codd. et aliae edd. sunt inter se divisi; non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3 omittunt seu cognoscere, ceteri vero cum ed. 1 omittunt cogitare seu, quos sequimur. ¹² Supple cum codd. I T singularia, quod etiam cod. I post verba ergo non cognoscit repetit.	¹ Chapter 3, n. 3. — The words of (St.) Augustine for the added reason are these: Neither too, as the eye of the body sees other eyes and does not see itself, so the mind knows [novit] other minds and ignores its very self. For through the eyes of the body we see bodies, because the rays, which shine through them and touch whatever we discern, we cannot bend back and turn around upon it, unless we look with mirrors . . . But in whatever manner the force is held, by which we discern through (our) eyes; we certainly do not prevail to discern with (our) eyes the force itself, whether they be rays or something else, but we do seek with (our) mind etc.. ² Proposition 10. — In the minor (of the argument) after full [plena] codex M repeats of forms [formis]. ³ Averroës, Physics, Bk. I, text. 69: Whatever receives something does not receive it, according to which it is in act, but according to which it is in potency. ⁴ Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text. 14 (ch. 4). — Somewhat below this not a few codices have of such [tale] for of such (an intellect) [talem]. ⁵ On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. II, ch. 8, nn. 16-20; Bk. IV, ch. 29, n. 46, and ch. 31, n. 48. ⁶ Understand: things [res]. Edition 1 has when . . . were [fuerunt] for since . . . are [sint]. ⁷ Genesis 2:2. — Cf. below d. 18, a. 1, q. 2, where the sentence of (St.) Augustine on causal or seminal reasons is expounded. — A little below this several codices, such as C K L O T cc and edition 1, have he could think of [posset cogitare] for he could cognize [posset cognoscere]. ⁸ Verse 10. — See the Gloss in (Nicholas) of Lyra, loc. cit., where there is said: « Who (i. e. the Angels) learned many secrets among them ». St. Jerome in the explanation of this verse says: On which account the very sacrament (of the Incarnation) has also been revealed (to St. Paul), so that the manifold Wisdom of God would be made manifest, not only to the gentiles, but to both the Principalities and Powers, through the Church. ⁹ For Scripture teaches that the cognition of future (things) is proper to God alone, as is clear from Isaiah 41:23: Announce, (the things) which are going to come in the future, and we shall know, that you are gods [Annunitate, quae ventura sunt in futurum, et sciemus, quia diis estis vos]. ¹⁰ Cf. above d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, p. 79, footnote 6. ¹¹ The Vatican edition has think of or cognize [cogitare seu cognoscere]; the codices and other editions are divided among themselves; not a few codices, together with edition 2 and 3 omit or cognize [seu cognoscere], but all the others, together with edition 1, which we follow, omit think of or [cogitare seu]. ¹² Supply, together with codices I and T, singulars [singularia], which even codex I repeats after the words therefore he does not cognize [ergo non cognoscit].

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cogno- / -scit illum cui applicat, quomodo vult illi speciem applicare? Et iterum, quare magis illi singulari applicabit speciem hominis quam asini? Ergo ante applicationem cognoscit singulare. Praeterea, aut cognoscit post applicationem, aut non. Si non, ergo Angelus non potest tenere in memoria cognitionem alicuius singularis, quod manifeste falsum est; si sic: ergo remanet in memoria aliqua nova species, cum aliquid cognoscit,¹ quod prius non cognovit, et ita illa recipit aliquam speciem: ergo etc.	if he does not / cognize that to which he applies (them), in what manner does he will to apply the species to it? And again, for what reason will he apply the species of man to it rather than (that) of a donkey? Therefore before the application he cognizes the singular. Moreover, either he cognizes after the application, or (he does) not. If not, therefore an Angel cannot hold the cognition of any singular in (his) memory, which is manifestly false; if so: therefore there remains in (his) memory some new species, when he cognizes something,¹ which before he did not cognize, and thus that (memory) receives some species: ergo etc..
CONCLUSIO. Angelus omnia cognoscere potest per species concreatas universales, per quas cognoscit etiam singularia, sed non nisi dirigendo aspectum super cognoscibile et species ad invicem componendo.	CONCLUSION An Angel can cognize all through the co-created, universal species, through which he cognizes even singulars, but not but by directing (his) gaze upon the cognizable and by composing the species with one another.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod omnes qui aliquid intellexerunt, hoc posuerunt, quod Angelus cognoscit res creatas per species, nisi sit talis, quae essentialiter sit in Angelo. Cognoscere autem rem omnino per se ipsum, hoc est solius illius qui est actus purus et perfectissimus, et ideo idea et² causa omnium et efficiens et exemplaris se ipso, non alio quodam. Sed tamen in modo ponendi species diversificati sunt.	I RESPOND: It must be said, that all who understood something (of this matter), posited this, that an Angel cognizes created things through species, if (the created thing) is not such, as is essentially in the Angel. But to cognize a thing entirely through oneself, this belongs only to the One, who is a pure and perfect Act, and for that reason the Idea and² the Cause, both the efficient and exemplary, of all, by Himself, not by a certain other. But yet in the manner of positing the species they differed [diversificati sunt].
Aliqui enim posuerunt, quod Angelus omnia, quae novit per species, scit per species innatas; et huius positionis tradunt modum et causam. Modus enim hic est. Quamvis in Angelo sint innatae species in numero finito, scilicet rerum, quae sunt de prima constitutione mundi; tamen, sicut Deus in prima conditione indidit rationes causales et seminales rebus ad se multiplicandas, ita tradidit³ etiam speciebus, quas impressit angelico intellectui; et ita omnia possunt sine extrinseca receptione cognoscere. — Causam autem huius assignant, quia cum receptio fiat per quandam abstractionem et proportionem, ad quae concurrunt tanquam dispositiva organum et medium et virtutes inferiores, et hoc non sit in Angelo reperire; dicunt, quod nihil ab extra potest recipere. — Sed huius positionis modum facile non est intelligere, quia difficile est videre, qua ratione species possint multiplicari. Nam species unius rei non generat speciem omnino differentis rei, nec eadem species se multiplicat in anima secundum numerum, cum in una sit anima, sicut unius obiecti una est species in uno speculo indiviso.⁴ — Causam autem credo esse falsam, quia planum est, quod Angelus habet intellectum possibilem, cum non sit purus actus. Planum etiam est, quod habet agentem maioris virtutis, quamsi esset corpori alligatus. Si ergo alligatus potest abstrahere et possibili⁵ imprimere, quanto magis intellectus liber et separatus hoc potest?	For some posited, that all, which an Angel knows [novit] through species, he knows [scit] through innate species; and (those) of this position teach (that there is) a rule [modum] and cause (for this). For the rule [modus] is this. Though in an Angel there are innate species in a finite number, namely, of the things, which concern the first constitution of the world; yet, just as God in the first foundation endowed things with causal reasons to multiply them, so He also handed down [tradidit]³ (to them) the species, which He impressed upon the intellect of the Angels; and thus they can cognize all without an extrinsic reception. — Moreover they assign as the cause for this, that since the reception (of species) is made through a certain abstraction and proportion, to which there concur the organ (of sense) and the medium and the inferior virtues as dispositives, and there is no finding of this in the Angel; they say, that he can receive nothing ab extra. — But the rule [modum] for this position is not easy to understand, because it is difficult to see, by what reason species can be multiplied. For the species of one thing does not generate a species of an entirely different thing, nor does the same species multiply itself in the soul according to number, since it is in one soul, just as of one object there is one appearance [species] in one undivided mirror.⁴ — But I believe the cause (they assign) is false, because it is plain, that an Angel has a possible intellect, since he is not a pure act. It is also plain, that he has an agent (intellect) of greater virtue, that if he were bound to a body. Therefore, if (an agent intellect), bound (to a body), can abstract and impress the possible⁵ (intellect), how much more can an intellect, free and separated from this, (do so)?
Ideo est alia positio, quod Angelus quaedam cognoscit per species innatas, ut puta necessaria et naturalia, et quae fuerunt cum Angelo concreata; sed fortuita et voluntaria et futura contingentia intelligit per species acquisitas et receptas. Angelicus enim intellectus est possibilis respectu huiusmodi specierum; non tamen est tanta possibilitate possibilis, ut humanus, quia humanus est possibilis omnino propter nuditatem,⁶ et etiam possibilis propter coniunctionem cum phantasmatibus; angelicus vero neutro modo, sed possibilis est respectu praedictorum cognoscibilium. Cum enim non habeant causam certam,⁷ solus Deus, qui se ipso cognoscit, est in actu respectu talis cognitionis, et ille qui cognoscit in Deo, vel per revelationem factam a Deo; Angelus vero, qui indiget informatione speciei per naturam, est respectu talium in potentia, non in actu. — Sed haec positio videtur in se claudere duo opposita, scilicet quod Angelus habeat species universalium et suscipiat post species singularium. Species enim singularium eiusdem speciei non differunt nisi numero, et impossibile est, accidentia eiusdem speciei diversa numero esse in eodem subiecto:⁸ ergo nullus intellectus potest habere plures species hominis; sed si habet unam innatam, non potest aliam eiusdem speciei recipere, sicut nec duae albedines sunt in eodem corpore. Quod si dicas, duarum albedinum similitudines esse in eodem aëre et diversa lumina eiusdem naturae, ut dicit Dionysius,⁹ et facies duorum homi- / num . . .	For this reason there is another position, that an Angel cognizes certain (things) through innate species, such as (those) necessary and natural, and which were co-created with the Angel; but fortuitous and voluntary and future contingents he understands [intelligit] through acquired and received species. For the angelic intellect is possible in respect of species of this king; yet is not possible by such a great possibility, as the human one (is), because the human (intellect) is entirely possible on account of its nudity [nuditatem],⁶ and (is) also possible on account of (its) conjunction with phantasms; but the angelic (intellect is possible) in neither manner, but it is possible in respect of the aforesaid cognizables. For since they do not have a certain⁷ cause [causam certam], God alone, who cognizes by Himself, is in act in respect of such a cognition, and he who cognizes in God, and/or through a revelation made by God, (is similarly); but an Angel, who needs through nature the information of the species, is in respect of such in potency, not in act. — But this position seems to enclose in itself two opposites, namely that an Angel has the species of universals and suscepts afterwards the species of singulars. For the species of singulars of the same species do not differ except in number, and it is impossible, that the accidents of the same species be diverse in number in the same subject:⁸ therefore no intellect can have several species of a man; but if it has one innate (species of him), it cannot receive another of the same species; just as neither are there two whitenesses [albedines] in the same body. Wherefore if you say, that there are the similitudes of two whitnesses in the same air and diverse lights of the same nature (in the same air), as (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) says,⁹ and faces of two men . . .
¹ Plures codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue cognoscat, et paulo inferius multi codd. recepit pro recipit. ² Sola Vat. et ideo idem est. Aliquanto superius cod Z nisi sit res creata talis pro nisi sit talis. ³ Plures codd. ut I K U X Y aa bene indidit. Paulo ante aliqui codd. ad se multiplicandum pro ad se multiplicandas. ⁴ Cfr. August., XI. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. et c. 7. n. 11. seqq. ⁵ Plures codd. ut F H K T W bb in possibili; cod. cc et ed. 1 in possibilem. ⁶ Alluditur ad illud: Anima humana creata est sicut tabula rasa, sive, ut alii dicunt, nuda. Sub hoc respectu ait Averroes, III. de Anima, context. 4: Omne recipiens aliquid necesse est, ut sit denudatam a natura recepti. ⁷ In cod. I additur et determinatam. ⁸ Rationem adiungit cod. M quia accidens numeratur penes subiectum, in quo est, de quo vide supra pag. 106, nota 1, et tom. I. pag. 411, nota 6, pag. 665, nota 5. — Avicenna V. de Anima sive in libro sexto Naturalium, c. 5: Cum autem aliquam formam repraesentat sensus imaginationi, et imaginatio intellectui, et intellectus excipit ex illa intentionem, sed postea repraesentaverit ei aliam formam eiusdem speciei, quae non est alia nisi numero; iam non excipiet intellectus ex ea aliam formam, praeter quam acceperat, ullo modo, nisi secundum accidens, quod est illius [v. g. quod humanitas sit Socratis] proprium . . . Quod autem de hoc intelligitur, hoc est, quod prima forma humana, quae praecedit, ipsa prodest tantum animae ad cognoscendum formam humanam, secunda vero nihil prodest; intentio enim impressa animae est una, quae non est nisi imaginatio prima, et imaginatio secunda nihil operatur. ⁹ De Div. Nom. c. 2. § 4: Etenim videmus in domo, multis unitis lampadibus ad unum aliquod lumen, unita omnium omnia lumina et unam claritatem indiscretam relucentem, et non etiam quis, ut arbitror, poterit alicuius lampadis lumen ab aliis ex omnia lumina continenti aëre discernere etc.	¹ Several codices, together with edition 1, have incongruously since he cognizes something [cum aliquid cognoscat], and a little below this many codices have received [recepit] for receives [recipit]. ² The Vatican edition alone has and for that reason the Same is [et ideo idem est]. Somewhat above this codex Z has if the created thing is not such [nisi sit res creata talis] for if (the created thing) is not such [nisi sit talis]. ³ Several codices, such as I K U X Y and aa have well endowed (them) [indidit] for handed down (to them) [tradidit]. ⁴ Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XI, ch. 3, n. 6, and ch. 7, n. 11 ff.. ⁵ Several codices, such as F H K T W and bb, have (species) in the possible (intellect) [in possibili] for the possible (intellect) [possibili]; codex cc and edition 1 have (species) upon the possible (intellect) [in possibilem]. ⁶ An allusion to the saying: “The human soul has been created as a tabula rasa”, or as other say “a bare (tablet)” [nuda]. Under this respect Averroës says, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 4: It is necessary, that everything receiving something, be denuded of the nature of the one received. ⁷ In codex I there is added and determined [et determinatam]. ⁸ Codex M adjoins a reason: because an accident is numbered from within the subject, in which it is [quia accidens numeratur penes subiectum, in quo est], concerning which, see above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, p. 106, footnote 1, and Sent., Bk. I, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1, p. 411, footnote 6, and d. 37, p. II, Doubt IV, p. 665, footnote 5. — Avicenna, On the Soul, Bk. V, or Of Natural Things, Bk. VI, ch. 5: But when the sense represents to the imagination any form, and the imagination to the intellect, the intellect also catches [excipit] the intention from these, but afterwards (the imagination) will represent to it (i. e the intellect) another form of the same species, which is not other except in number; then the intellect will not catch from these another form, besides that which it accepted, in any manner, except according to the accident, which is proper to it (v. g. that humanity belongs to Socrates) . . . But what is understood from this, this is, that the first human form, which precedes, itself profits the soul only to cognize the human form, but the second profits nothing; for the intention impressed upon the soul is one, which is not but the first imagination, and the second imagination works nothing. ⁹ On the Divine Names, ch. 2, § 4: For indeed now we see in a house, with many lamps united for some, one light, that all the lights united from all (the lamps) and one undivided [indiscretam] brightness shining, and not even anyone, as I judge, could discern the light of any lamp from the others out of the air containing all the lights etc..

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homi- / num in eadem imagine; non est simile, quia idola et lumina in medio distinguuntur per suas origines, et diversae figurae possunt in genere figurae differre specie, aliter¹ sufficit species figurae cum numero, sicut possum tres species omnino similes configere. Et sic videtur dicta positio contraria implicare. — Amplius, si « species est totum esse formale individuorum », ut dicit Boethius,² nec est individuatio nisi ex coniunctione formae cum materia; si species existens in intellectu omnino abstrahit a materia, nullo modo in eodem intellectu est ponere diveras species sive formas solo numero differentes. Et sic redit idem quod prius, scilicet quod, si intellectu angelicus habet omnium universalium species innatas, nullam ulterius speciem recipit, sed sufficienter per illas omnia cognoscit.	in the same image; it is not similar, because images [idola] and lights in a medium are distinguished through their origins, and diverse figures can in the genus of figure differ in species, otherwise¹ the species of a figure with a number suffices, just as I can confect three species entirely similar. And thus the said position seems to imply contraries. — Furthermore, if « a species i the whole formal ‘being’ of individuals », as (St. Severinus) Boethius² says, neither is individuation but from the conjunction of the form with the matter; if a species existing in the intellect entirely abstracts from matter, in no manner is there in the same intellect the positing of diverse species or forms differing in number alone. And in this manner it renders the same (conclusion) as before, namely that, if the angelic intellect has the innate species of all universals, it receives no species beyond (this), but cognizes all (things) sufficiently through them.
Et ideo est tertia positio, quod Angelus omnia cognoscit per species innatas, non quia non possit recipere species; tunc enim si Deus crearet aliquid novum in specie, necesse esset Angelum ignorare; quod si falsum est, posset recipere. Et ideo haec non est ratio, sed hoc, quod Deus intellectum angelicum possibilem tot speciebus implevit, quod per illas poterat omnia cognoscere sine omni receptione nova. Et ideo dicitur intellectus angelicus esse in actu respectu rerum, non quia se ipso sit in actu, vel quia sit actus, sed per species factus est in actu.	And for that reason there is a third position, that an Angel cognizes all (things) through innate species, not because he cannot receive species; for then, if God created something new in species, it would be necessary that the Angel was ignorant of (it); which if (this) is false, he (then) could receive (a new species). And for that reason the reason is not this one, but this, (namely) that God filled the possible intellect of the Angel with so many species, that through them he could cognize all (things) without any [omni] new reception. And for that reason the angelic intellect is said to be “in act” in respect of things, not because it is by itself in act, and/or because it is an act, but (because) through species it comes to be in act.
Et modus et intellectus istius positionis est hic. Deus enim in Angelis concreavit species universales omnium fiendarum rerum, et per illas certum est, quod potest omnia universalia cognoscere; potest etiam et singularia, sed non nisi componat ad invicem, ut patet: si ego habeo penes me speciem figurae, speciem hominis, speciem coloris et temporis, et componam ad invicem; sine nova receptione speciei cognoscam individuum in propria natura. Sed quia talis compositio, nisi esset secundum certitudinem³ et correspondentiam ad ipsam rem, esset fictio et deceptio; ideo Angelus huiusmodi individua et singularia non cognoscit, nisi dirigat aspectum supra ipsum cognoscibile, et secundum illud quod est in re, ipse componat species in se; et tunc habet ita claram et certam cognitionem de re, sicut si speciem statim reciperet. — Et haec positio magis placet, quia concors est rationi et philosophiae et sacrae Scripturae. Et patet responsio ad omnia obiecta, si bene intelligatur.	And the rule [modus] and understanding of this position is this. For God in the Angels co-created the universal species of all the things to be made, and through them it is certain, that (an Angel) can cognize all universals; he can also (cognize) singulars, but not unless he composes (them) with each other [ad invicem], as is clear: if I have from within me the species of a figure, the species of a man, the species of a color and of time, and I compose (them) with each other; without the new reception of a species I will cognize the individual in his own nature. But because such a composition, unless it were according to (both) certitude³ and a correspondence with the thing itself, would be a fiction and a deception; for that reason an Angel does not cognize individuals and singulars of this kind, unless he directs (his) gaze [aspectum] upon the cognizable itself, and according to that which is in the thing, compose (its) species in himself; and then he has as clear and certain a cognition of the thing, as if he had received the species (of it) suddenly. — And this position is more pleasing, because it is concordant with reason and philosophy and Sacred Scripture. And the response to all the objections is clear, if one understands (this) well.
1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod Angeli didicerunt etc.; dicendum, quod haec positio bene ponit, Angelos multa discere, sed non propter hoc species novas recipere. Nec illud est incompossibile. Ego enim habeo speciem hominis et animalis, dum scio unam conclusionem de eis, sed per multiplicem conversionem et collationem poterit circa easdem res per easdem species nova cognitio generari secundum diversas operationes⁴ et habitudines, et ita aliquid addiscam, sed non novam speciem recipiam. Sic et Angeli multa didicerunt tum ex propria industria, tum ex revelatione, tum ex experientia.	1. For to that which is objected, that Angels learned etc.; it must be said, that this position posits well, that the Angels learn many (things), but not on account of this do they receive new species. For it that a co-impossible. For I have the species of a man and of an animal, so long as I know [scio] one conclusion concerning them, but through a multiple conversion and collation there can be generated about the same species through the same species a new cognition according to diverse operations⁴ and habitudes, and thus I learn something in addition [aliquid addiscam], but I will not receive a new species. Thus too the Angels learned many things both from their own industry, and from revelation, and from experience.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc cognosceret contingentia et absentia; dicendum, quod sicut tactum est, ad cognitionem harum rerum particularium, et maxime contingentium, non sufficit habere species innatas,⁵ nisi aspectus angelicus convertatur; et conversio requirit rei existentiam vel in se, vel in causa; requierit etiam praesentiam, eo quod virtus angelica est finita, ideo in approximatione aliqua proportionali est, cum se convertit ad rem extra. Et ita patet, quod non propter hoc cognoscit futura, vel etiam contingentia.	2. To that which is objected, that then (an Angel) would know (things) contingent and absent; it must be said, just as has been touched upon, that for the cognition of these particular things, and of contingents most of all, it does not suffice to have innate species,⁵ unless he gaze of the Angel is turned (upon them); and the turning (of his gaze) requires the existence of the thing either in itself, and/or in (its) cause; it also requires the presence (of the thing or cause), to this (extent) that the virtue of an Angel is finite, for that reason he is approximation (to the thing cognized) according to some proportional (distance), when he turns himself toward the thing outside of (himself). And thus it is clear, that on this account he does not cognize (things) future, and/or even contingent.
4.* Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut non cognoscit singularia, aut habet species infinitas; dico, quod cognoscit singularia per species universalium applicando et appropriando. Unde per appropriationem proprie et distincte cognoscit, nec oportet novas species recipi, nec oportet infinitas esse, quia singularia ad numerum finitum universalium reducuntur;⁶ sed finitae species infinitis modis componi possunt. Et ideo nunquam tot singularia cognoscit Angelus, quin adhuc possit cognoscere plura sine receptione speciei novae, non tamen sine directione aspectus supra rem. Ex qua directione non recipit speciem a cognoscibili, cum sit in actu per speciem, quam habet; sed dirigendo aspectum speciem appropriat et appropriando componit, et rem singularem sub sua proprietate cognoscit et percipit, quia tota cognitio est a forma, et forma haec « species est, quae est totum esse individuorum ».	4.* To that which is objected, that either (an Angel) does not cognize singulars, or he has infinite species; I say, that he cognizes singulars through the species of universals by applying and appropriating (them). Wherefore through an appropriation he properly and distinctly cognizes (them), nor is it necessary [oportet] that new species be received, nor it is necessary that there be infinite species, because singulars are reduced to a finite number of universals;⁶ but finite species can be composed in infinite manners. And for that reason an Angel never cognizes as many singulars, that he cannot still cognize more without the reception of a new species, yet (he does so) not without the direction of (his) gaze upon the thing. Our of which direction he does not receive a species from the cognizable, since (his intellect) is in act through the species, which he has; but by directing (his) gaze he appropriates the species and by appropriating (it) he composes (it), and he cognizes and perceives the singular thing under its own property, because (his) whole cognition is from the form, and this form « is a species, which is the whole ‘being’ of individuals ».
Ad illud quod obiicitur de applicatione, quod supponit⁷ cognitionem; dicendum, quod verum est, quod praesupponit cognitionem et relinquit cognitionem, sed tamen aliam praesupponit, aliam relinquit. Angelus enim sine conversione aliqua habet cognitionem loci, et cum convertit se supra locum, co- / -gnoscit . . .	To that which is objected concerning (the Angel’s) application (of species), that it supposes⁷ cognition; it must be said, that it is true, that it presupposes the cognition and leaves a cognition, but yet it presupposes one (cognition), it leaves another. For the Angel without any conversion (to the cognizable) has the cognition of the place, and when he turns himself upon the place, he cog- / -nizes . . .
¹ Scil., si non differunt specie. — Vat. cum ed. 4 praecedentia sic exhibet: quia cum idola [i. e. species sive similitudines rerum] et lumina in medio distinguantur per suas origines, diversae figurae possunt in genere figurae differre specie. Vel aliter etc. ² Libr. III. Comment. in Porphyr. Cfr. supra pag. 108, nota 6. — De principio individuationis vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ³ Vox certitudo ita sumitur in Avicenna, I. Metaph. c. 6: Unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem, qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem, qua est triangulus . . . et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 rectitudinem. Dein plures codd. et cognitionis naturam pro et correspondentiam. — Cfr. August., II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 37. et IX. de Civ. Dei. c. 21. seq., ubi etiam seq. solutio tangitur. ⁴ Plures codd. ut L bb cc et ed. 1 comparationes; cod. W compositiones. ⁵ Plures codd. non sufficit species innata. ⁶ Cfr. Aristot., III. Metaph. text. 12. (II. c. 4.) et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie. ⁷ Codd. K U praesupponit.	¹ Namely, if they do not differ in species. — The Vatican edition, together with edition 4, exhibits the preceding thus: because since images (i. e. the species and/or the similitudes of things) and lights in a medium are distinguished through their origins, diverse figures can in the genus of figure differ in species. And/or otherwise etc. [quia cum idola et lumina in medio distinguantur per suas origines, diversae figurae possunt in genere figurae differre specie. Vel aliter etc.]. ² Commentary on Porphyry., Bk. III. Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, p. 108, footnote 6. — On the principle of individuation, see above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. ³ The word “certitude” [certitudo] is taken thus in Avicenna, Metaphysics, Bk. I, ch. 6: For each thing has the certitude, by which it is that which it is, just as a triangle has a certitude, by which it is a triangle . . . and this is what we perchance name its ‘being’ [esse]. — Codex cc and edition 1 have rectitude [rectitudinem]. Then several codices have and the nature of the cognition [et cognitionis naturam] for and a correspondence [et correspondentiam]. — Cf. (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. II, ch. 17, n. 37, and On the City of God, Bk. IX, ch. 21 f., where the following solution is also touched upon. ⁴ Several codices, such as L bb and cc, and edition 1, have comparisons [comparationes]; codex W has compositions [compositiones]. ⁵ Several codices have an innate species does not suffice [non sufficit species innata] for it does not suffice to have innate species [non sufficit habere species innatas]. ⁶ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics., Bk. III, text. 12 (Bk. II, ch. 4), and Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. “On Species”. ⁷ Codices K and U have it presupposes [praesupponit].
* [Trans. nota: In fine tomi istius legitur sic: Errata, pag. 120. col. II. 3 ponatur numerus 4, et inferius deleatur numerus 4. Quod factum est.]	* [Trans. note: According to the corrigenda at the end of Vol. II, this number is changed to 4 from 3, and the 4 at the beginning of the next paragraph is deleted.]

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co- / -gnoscit omnes res, quae sunt in loco, applicando species universales ad singularia et componendo; et illae species sub tali applicatione et compositione remanent in angelico intellectu, et ita relinquunt cognitionem novam sine receptione speciei.¹ — Ponatur etiam, quod nullam haberet cognitionem, sed solum speciem universalis in intellectu suo; adhuc poterit applicare et appropriare non causaliter, sed certitudinaliter. Quod patet sic. Homo enim, cum nascitur, non habet cognitionem nec speciem singularium, nec communem nec propriam; sola tamen directione aspectus super res cognoscit omnia visibilia et recipit simul cognitionem certam et speciem, quia denudatus erat a forma recepti.² Quodsi haberet species, multo melius posset, dirigendo aspectum ad res mundanas, eas cognoscere, non suscipiendo species, cum iam habeat, sed ex directione, et applicare et appropriare et componere et distincte nosse.³	he cog- / -nizes all the things, which are in the place, by applying universal species to singulars and by composing (them); and those species under such an application and composition remain in the angelic intellect, and thus they leave a new cognition without the reception of a species.¹ — Let one also posit, that (an Angel) had no cognition, but only the species of a universal in his intellect; he could still apply and appropriate (the species), not casually, but certitudinally. Which is clear thus. For a man, when he is born, does not have cognition nor the species of singulars, neither common nor proper; yet by the direction alone of (his) gaze upon things he cognizes all visibles and receives a certain [certam] cognition and species together, because (his intellect) was bare [denudatus] of the form of the received.² Wherefore if he had species, he could cognize them much better, by directing (his) gaze to mundane things, not by suscepting species, since he already would have (them), but from the direction (of his gaze), (he could)³ both apply and appropriate and compose (them) and distinctly know [nosse] (mundane things).
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Verba omnia creata in titulo quaestionis restringenda sunt ad omnia creata extra ipsum Angelum. Nam Angelus cognoscit rem, « quae essentialiter » est in ipso (in corp., in princip.), i. e. se ipsum, et etiam Deum (hic q. 2. ad 4.) non per tales species, sed potius per suam essentiam. — Supponitur tanquam doctrina communis, res ab Angelo extra ipsum cognosci per species. Attamen non defuerunt qui hoc negaverint. Nam Durandus (hic q. 6.) cum pluribus Nominalibus voluit, ab eisdem haec intelligi « non per aliud repraesentativum quam per ipsammet praesentiam rerum in se vel in suis causis, vel utroque modo ». Alii cum Antissiodorensi putaverunt, omnia ab eis intelligi per eorum essentiam, analogo modo ut in Deo est. — Pro confirmanda communi sententia, quod species intelligibiles tam in homine quam in Angelis ad intelligendum vel omnia vel saltem multa requirantur, serviunt quae a Seraphico dicuntur (I. Sent. d. 35. q. 1.) de similitudine, ut est ratio cognoscendi etiam in Deo (aliter tamen ac in nobis); item (ibid. d. 3. p. I. q. 1.) de quatuor requisitis ad cognitionem; item (Itiner. mentis in Deum, c. 2.) de modo, quo mundus sensibilis intrat in animam per similitudines; et praecipue (Hexaem. Serm. 11. a med.) de generatione speciei ab obiecto, ubi admirabili doctrina declaratur, quod « omnis creatura clamat generationem aeternam, et hanc exprimunt et repraesentant duodecim generationes ».	I. The words “all created (things)” in the title of the Question must be restricted to all created (things) outside of the Angel himself. For an Angel cognizes the thing, « which essentially » is in himself (in the body of the Question, at the beginning), i. e. himself, and also God (here in q. 2, in reply to n. 4) not through such species, but rather through his own essence. — There is supposed (here) as the common doctrine, that things outside of the Angel are cognized by him through species. Nevertheless there were not lacking those who denied this. For Durandus (here in q. 6), together with several Nominalists, wanted, that these were understood by the same « not through a representative other than the very presence itself of things in them and/or in their causes, and/or in each manner ». Others with (William) of Auxerre thought, that all (things) are understood by them through their essence, in an analogous manner as is in God. — For a confirmation of the common sentence, that intelligible species both in man and in Angels are required to understand either all and/or at least many (things), there serve those which are said by the Seraphic Doctor (Sent, Bk. I, d. 35, q. 1) concerning a similitude, that it is the reason for cognizing even in God (yet in a manner other than in us); likewise (ibid., d. 3, p. I, q. 1) concerning the four requisites for cognition; likewise (Itinerarium mentis in Deum, ch. 2) concerning the manner, in which the sensible world enters into the soul through similitudes; and chiefly (Hexaëmeron., Sermon 11, in the middle) concerning the generation of a species from an object, where there is declared by an admirable doctrine, that « every creature proclaims the Eternal Generation (of the Son), and the twelve generations express and represent this ».
II. Principalis controversia est de difficillimo problemate, quomodo ab Angelis cognoscantur singularia extra ipsos. Petr. a Tar. quinque de hoc opiniones recenset, nihil determinans. S. Thom. reprobat plures opiniones et etiam eam, quam ponit S. Bonav.; ipse autem tenet, singularia ab Angelo cognosci per species universales ipsi connaturales, quae etiam inferiora singularia distincte repraesentent. Scot. autem, cui fere concordat Richard. a Med., singularia haec ab ipso cognosci per species a rebus acquisitas, non tamen a phantasmatibus abstractas. S. Bonav., media via incedens, hic docet, Angelum ad hoc non indigere novarum specierum acquirendarum; tamen species universales concreatas non sufficere, ut singularia cognoscantur, « nisi Angelus dirigat aspectum supra ipsum cognoscibile, et secundum illud quod est in re, ipse componat species in se ». — Addit tamen idem, quod Angelus, licet non indigeat novarum specierum, « tamen possit recipere species ».	II. The principal controversy concerns a most difficult problem, (namely), in what manner singulars are cognized by the Angels ad extra. (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise cites five opinions concerning this, determining nothing. St. Thomas reproves several opinions and even that one, which St. Bonaventure posits; but he holds, that singulars are cognized by an Angel through universal species, connatural to him, which also represent inferior singulars distinctly. But (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, with whom Richard of Middleton nearly agrees, (teaches) that these singulars are cognized by him through species acquired from things, yet not through abstracted phantasms. St. Bonaventure, taking a middle path, teaches here, that an Angel for this does not have a need of acquiring new species; yet co-created, universal species do not suffice, for the cognizing of singulars, « unless the Angel directs (his) gaze upon the cognizable itself, and according to that which is in the thing, composes (its) species in himself ». — Yet he adds the same, that an Angel, though he does not have need of new species, « yet he can receive species ».
III. Secunda controversia, quae cum prima intime est connexa, haec est, utrum in Angelo sit suo modo intellectus agens et possibilis, de qua distinctione vide infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 4. — S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. II. c. 96.) docet: « In substantiis separatis non est intellectus agens et possibilis, nisi forte aequivoce (cfr. S. I. q. 54. a. 4.). Ratio est, quia secundum ipsum nullo modo Angelus accipit cognitionem a sensibilibus. Haec ratio negatur tum a Scoto, qui vult, de facto esse illam receptionem, tum a S. Bonav., qui eam receptionem aestimat esse possibilem. Hinc uterque cum Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 22. m. 3, B. Alberto (S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 3. a. 1. part. 1.), Petro a Tar., aliisque multis contendit, Angelum habere suo modo intellectum agentem et possibilem, « cum non sit actus purus » (hic in corp.). Hanc potentialitatem Seraphicus intelligit tum in ordine ad actum intellectionis, tum in ordine ad species potentiae angelicae ab origine divinitus concreatas, tum in ordine ad novas species, quas possit vel naturaliter vel a Deo imprimente acquirere. — Quod autem intellectus aliquo modo sit in potentia quoad haec tria, non est alienum, ni fallimur, a sententia S. Thomae, licet aliqui eius expositores putent, species illas in eo sensu esse connaturales, quod ab ipsa Angeli natura ut principio activo quasi proprietates fluant. Alii autem S. Thomae discipuli (cfr. Gotti, de Deo Creatore, tr. 9. q. 4. § 6.) probabilius esse putant, istas species potius esse divinitus impressas iuxta indigentiam et inclinationem naturae angelicae.	III. The second controversy, which is intimately connected with the first, is this, whether in an Angel there is, in his own manner, an agent and possible intellect, concerning which distinction see below d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 4. — St. Thomas (Summa contra Gentiles., p. II, ch. 96) teaches: « In separated substances there is not an agent and possible intellect, except perhaps equivocally (cf. Summa., I, q. 54, a. 4). The reason is, that according to him an Angel in no manner accepts a cognition from sensibles. This reason is denied by (Bl.) Scotus, who wants, that there is this reception de facto, and by St. Bonaventure, who judges that this reception is possible. Hence each, together with Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 22, m. 3, Bl. (now St.) Albertus Magnus (Summa, p. II. tr. 4, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, part 1), (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, and many others contend, that an Angel has in his own manner an agent and possible intellect, « since he is not a pure act » (here in the body of the Question). This potentiality the Seraphic (Doctor) understands both in the order regarding an act of intellection, and in the order regarding the species of angelic power divinely co-created (with him) from (his) origin, and in the order regarding new species, which he can acquire either naturally and/or by God impressing (them). — Moreover that (his) intellect is in some manner in potency in regard to these three, is not alien, unless we are mistaken, from the sentence of St. Thomas, though some of his expositors think, that those species are connatural in this sense, that they flow from the very nature of the Angel as quasi properties of an active principle. Moreover some of St. Thomas’s disciples (cf. Gotti, de Deo Creatore, tr. 9, q. 4, § 6) think that it is more probable, that those species are rather divinely impressed in accord with the indigence and inclination of the Angel’s nature.
IV. Tertia controversia est circa doctrinam S. Thomae (hic q. 3. a. 2; S. I. q. 55. a. 3.), quod Angeli natura superiores intelligant per universaliores et pauciores species. Scot. (hic q. 10. n. 6. seqq.) hoc negat. Sententiae negativae favent plura a S. Bonav. incidenter dicta hic et praecipue I. Sent. d. 35. q. 4. in corp. et ad. 2. — Notatu dignum est quod in solut. ad 4. in fine de humano intellectu docetur, scil. hominem a nativitate non habere cognitionem nec speciem singularium, nec communem nec propriam (cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. II. q. 4. Schol.).	IV. The third controversy is about the doctrine of St. Thomas (here in q. 3, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 55, a. 3), that the Angels superior in nature understand through more universal and fewer species. (Bl.) Scotus (here in q. 10, n. 6 ff.) denies this. Several (of the things) said by St. Bonaventure incidentally here and chiefly in Sent., Bk. I, d. 35, q. 4, in the body of the Question, and in reply to n. 2, favor the negative sentence. — Worthy of note is what is taught in the solution to n. 4, at the end, concerning the human intellect, namely, that a man does not have from (his) nativity either a common or a proper cognition and/or species of singulars, (cf. Sent., Bk. I, p. II, q. 4, Scholium).
V. De cognitione Angelorum quoad praesentia, praeterita et futura contingentia cfr. infra d. 7. p. II. a. 1. q. 1-3; quoad secreta cordium d. 8. p. II. q. 6; quoad fidei mysteria III. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.	V. On the cognition of the Angels in regard to present, past and future contingents, cf. below d. 7, p. II, a. 1, qq. 1-3; in regard to the secrets of hearts, d. 8, p. II, q. 6; in regard to the mysteries of the Faith, Sent., Bk. III, d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.
De hac et connexis quaestionibus: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 24. m. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. 10. 11, et d. 9. q. 2; Report., hic q. 2. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. 3; S. I. q. 55. a. 1. 2. 3, et q. 56. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 96-100; de Verit. m. 3. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 6. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 5. q. 14. — Durand., hic q. 5. 6. 7. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. 2.	On this and connected questions: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 24, m. 2 and 3. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in qq. 10 and 11, and in d. 9, q. 2; Reportatio., here in qq. 2 and 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 3, aa. 1, 2 and 3; Summa., I, q. 55, aa. 1, 2 and 3, and q. 56, aa. 1 and 2; Summa contra Gentiles., Bk. II, chs. 96-100; de Veritate., m. 3, aa. 1 and 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 4, aa. 1 and 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 6, qq. 1 and 2. — Giles the Roman, here in p. II, q. 2, aa. 1 and 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals., 5, q. 14. — Durandus, here in qq. 5, 6 and 7. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 5. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 2.
¹ Codd. V cc et ed. 1 distinctius novae speciei. ² Cfr. supra pag. 119, nota 6. ³ Cod. aa supplet posset, quod codd. Q bb (a secunda manu) interserunt post et applicare.	¹ Codices V and cc and edition 1 have more distinctly of a new species [novae speciei]. ² Cf. above p. 119, footnote 6. ³ Codex aa supplies he could [posset], which codices Q and bb (by a second hand) insert after et applicare.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III