S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III

PARS II.

PART II

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE II

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 122-124.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 122-124.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum Angelus per cognitionem naturalem divinam essentiam cognoverit in se ipsa sine medio et creaturae adminiculo.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether an Angel through natural cognition cognized the Divine Essence in Itself without the medium and support of a creature?

SECUNDO QUAERITUR circa hoc de naturali cognitione Angeli respectu creatricis essentiae.  Et est quaestio, utrum Angelus per cognitionem naturalem divinam esentiam cognoverit in se ipsa sine omni medio et creaturae adminiculo.  Et quod sic, videtur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, about this, concerning the natural cognition of an Angel in respect of the creating Essence [creatricis essentiae].  And the question is, whether an Angel through natural cognition cognized the Divine Essence in Itself without any medium and support of a creature.  And it seems, that (it is) so.

1. « Angelus per naturam habet deiformem intellectum », sicut vult Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus;1 sed intellectus humanus, quando factus est deiformis, cognoscere potest Deum in luce sua — non enim efficitur deiformis nisi per gloriam — ergo et hoc poterat Angelus per naturam.

1. « An Angel through (its) nature has a deiform intellect », as (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) wants in (his) book On the Divine Names;1 but the human intellect, when it has been made deiform, can cognize God in His own light — for it is not made deiform except through (the light of) glory — therefore an Angel could also (do this) through nature.

2. Item, « Angelus per naturam est speculum clarum ipsius supremi lumini »;2 sed illud lumen semper, quantum est de se, et naturaliter supersplendet speculo intellectuali.  Si ergo speculum mundum, obiectum soli, claritatem suscipit per naturam, ergo et Angelus claritatem illius supernae lucis:  ergo cum possit oculum ad illam supernam lucem, nullo obsistente, dirigere, sed et dirigendo cognoscere, ergo videtur, quod naturali cognitione ipsam divinam lucem in se ipsa cognoscat.  Si dicas, quod acies intellectus angelici retunderetur propter improportionabilitatem luminis; contra:  semper manet improportionabilitas, quidquid detur Angelo:  ergo nunquam videret.

2. Likewise, « an Angel through nature is a clear mirror of the Supreme Light [supremi lumini] Itself »;2 but that Light always, as much as concerns itself, and naturally shines over [supersplendet] the mirror of the intellect.  Therefore if a clean mirror, held up to the sun, suscepts (its) clarity through (its) nature, therefore an Angel too (suscepts) the clarity of that Supernal Light [supernae lucis]:  therefore since the eye can direct (itself) to that supernal light, without anything obstructing (it), but by directing (itself) also cognize (it), therefore it seems, that by natural cognition (an Angel) cognizes the Divine Light Itself in Itself.  If you say, that the insight [intellectus] of the angelic intellect would be beaten back [retunderetur] on account of (its) improportionability to the Light [luminis]; on the contrary:  an improportionability always remains, whatever (help) be given to the Angel:  therefore he would never see (the Light).

3. Item, quae sunt essentialiter et praesentialiter in potentia cognoscente cognoscuntur per sui praesentiam et essentiam, sicut dicit Augustinus de Trinitate3 et super Genesis ad litteram, quod « anima se ipsam et habitus suos per essentiam et praesentiam cognoscit ».  Si ergo Deus praesentissimus erat intellectui angelico, et hoc per naturam:  ergo naturaliter ipsam divinam essentiam in se ipsa cognoscebat.

3. Likewise, what are essentially and by means of  (their) presence [praesentialiter] in the cognizing power, are cognized through its presence and essence, just as (St.) Augustine says On the Trinity3 and On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, that « the soul cognizes itself and its habits through (its) essence and presence ».  If, therefore, God was most present to the intellect of an Angel, and this through (its) nature:  therefore he naturally cognized the Divine Essence in Itself.

4. Item, omne illud quod est ens cognoscibile per se, aut cognoscitur per sui essentiam, aut per speciem.  Si ergo Angelus cognoscebat Deum naturaliter, ut dicit Magister in littera,4 aut per speciem, aute in sua essentia; sed non per speciem; ergo etc.  Quod autem non per speciem, videtur.  Species enim est maioris simplicitatis et abstractionis et puritatis, quam illud cuius est species; sed nihil Deo simplicius:  ergo Deus speciem non habet:  ergo non poterat Angelus Deum nosse per speciem:  et noverat per speciem vel essentiam:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, every that, which is a cognizable being through itself, either is cognized through its essence, or through (its) species.  If, therefore, an Angel cognized God naturally, as Master (Peter) says in the text,4 either (he did so) through a species, or in His own Essence; but not through a species:  ergo etc..  Moreover, it seems that (he did not do such) through a species.  For a species is of a greater simplicity and abstraction and purity, that that of which it is a species; but nothing is more simple than God:  therefore God does not have a species:  therefore an Angel could not know [nosse] God through a species:  and he did know (Him) through a species and/or (His) Essence:  ergo etc..

5. Item, Angelus per naturalem cognitionem Deum cognoscebat, aut ergo sub velatione, aut facie revelata.  Non sub velatione, quia velamen non est nisi propter culpam vel propter molem carnis coniunctam; sed in Angelo nulla erat macula culpae,5 nulla moles carnis coniuncta nec phantasmatum obsistentia:  ergo sua naturali cognitione summam essentiam in sua luce videbat.

5. Likewise, an Angel through natural cognition cognized God, therefore either under a veiling [velatione], or with face revealed.  Not under a veiling, because a veil [velamen] is not but on account of fault and/or on account of a conjoined mass of flesh; but in an Angel there was no stain of fault,5 no conjoined mass of flesh nor obstruction [obsistentia]:  therefore by natural cognition he saw the Most High Essence in His own Light.

6. Item, si Angelus cognoscebat Deum, aut ergo per medium, aut sine medio.  Si sine medio, ergo videbat Deum in se ipso.  Si per medium, ergo inter mentem Angeli et Deum aliquid erat medium; quod est contra Augustinum6 et contra rationem.  Nam illud medium aut esset magis proportionabile Deo quam mens Angeli, aut minus.  Si magis, ergo aliqua creatura superior Angelo; si minus, ergo potius impediebat cognitionem, quam adiuvaret.  Restat igitur, quod Angelus per cognitionem naturalem cognoscebat divinam essentiam in se ipsa.

6. Likewise, if an Angel cognized God, therefore (he did so) either through a medium, or without a medium.  If without a medium, therefore he saw God in Himself.  If through a medium, therefore between the mind of the Angel and God something was a medium; which is contrary to (St.) Augustine6 and against reason.  For that medium either would be more proportional to God than the mind of an Angel, or less.  If more, therefore some creature (is) superior to an Angel; if less, therefore it impeded rather (his) cognition, than help (it).  Therefore it remains, that an Angel through natural cognition cognized the Divine Essence in Itself.

CONTRA:  1. Ioannis decimo septimo:7  Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te Deum, ergo in visione Dei est beatitudo summa:  si ergo hoc habebat Angelus per naturam, ergo per naturam erat beatus.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. In the seventeenth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) John (there is written):7  This is eternal life, that they might know [cognoscant] Thee, God, therefore in the vision of God there is a most high beatitude:  therefore, if an Angel had this through nature, therefore through nature he was blessed.

2. Item, adhuc naturalia salva sunt in Angelis malis, maxime quae spectant ad intellectum:8  si ergo per naturam poterant divinam lucem conspicere in se, ergo et nunc possunt:  ergo non sunt in tenebris damnationis, quod aperte falsum est.

2. Likewise, the natural (goods of the Angel) are still conserved in the evil Angels, most of all (those) which pertain to the intellect:8  if, therefore, they could through nature gaze upon [conspicere] the Divine Light in themselves, therefore they can also (do so) now:  therefore they are not among the shadows of damnation, which is openly false.

3. Item, proximior est Deo anima habens gratiam, quam sit Angelus habens sola naturalia; sed anima exuta cum gratia non potest aspicere lucem summam, nisi adiuvetur per gloriam, sicut patet de his qui sunt in purgatorio, et fuerunt in limbo:  ergo videtur, quod nec Angelis per naturam.

3. Likewise, the soul having grace is closer to God, than is the Angel having only natural (goods); but the soul having laid (the body) aside cannot with grace look upon the Most High Light, unless it be helped through (the light of) glory, just as is clear concerning those, who are in Purgatory, and (those who) were in the Limbo (of the Patriarchs):  therefore it seems, that neither (can) the Angels through nature.


1  Cap. 7. § 2. et c. 4. § 2. 22; c. 5. § 8.  —  Paulo superius multi codd. cum ed. 1 perperam in se ipso pro in se ipsa.  Idem in seqq. pluries recurrit.

2  Secundum Dionysium.  Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1.

3  Libr. X. c. 3. n. 5. seq., c. 8. n. 11. seqq. et c. 10. n. 16; XIII. c. 1. n. 3; XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 31. n. 59.  Cfr. tom. I. pag. 68, nota 8. et pag. 302, Scholion, ubi etiam ex Augustino citati inveniuntur textus, qui maiorem seq. argumenti concernunt.  —  Paulo superius multi codd. cum ed. 1 falso potentialiter pro praesentialiter et absentiam pro essentiam.

4  Hic c. 5.  —  Dein codd. T aa per suam essentiam pro in sua essentia.

5  Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt culpae, cod. W substituunt culpa pro macula culpae.

6  Cfr. supra pag. 45, nota 5, qui textus, licet respiciant mentem humanam, tamen etiam de mente angelica valent.  Idem colligi potest ex XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 1. n. 2, ubi asseritur, quod Deus nihil melius instituit quam spiritus angelicos.

7  Vers. 3.

8  Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 23:  Sed [daemones] non omnino expertes boni, secundum quod et sunt et vivunt et intelligunt, et omnino est quidam in eis concupiscentiae motus . . . Et datas eis angelicas donationes nunquam ipsas commotas fuisse dicimus, sed sunt et integri et clarissimi.  —  Sola Vat. omittit malis.


1  Chapter 7, § 2 and ch. 4, § 2 and 22, ch. 5, § 8.  —  A little above this many codices, together with edition 1, has faultily in himself [in se ipso] for in Itself [in se ipsa].  The same (error) recurs very often in the following (sentences).

2  According to (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite).  Cf. above d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 4, p. 83, footnote 1.

3  Book X, ch. 3, n. 5 f.; ch. 8, n. 11 ff., and ch. 10, n. 16; Bk. XIII, ch. 1, n. 3; On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. XII, ch. 31, n. 59.  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, a. sole, q. 1, p. 68, footnote 8, and d. 17, p. I, a. sole, q. 4, Scholium, where the texts cited from (St.) Augustine are also found, which concern the major of the following argument.  —  A little above this many codices, together with edition 1, have falsely potentially [potentialiter] for by means of (their) presence [praesentialiter] and absence [absentia] for essence [essentiam].

4  Here in ch. 5.  —  Then codices T and aa have through his own essence [per suam essentiam] for in His own Essence [in sua essentia].

5  Very many codices, together with edition 1, omit of fault [culpae], codex W substitutes fault [culpa] for stain of fault [macula culpae].

6  Cf. above d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, p. 45, footnote 5, which texts, though they refer to the human mind, yet are also valid concerning the angelic mind.  The same can be gathered from On the City of God, Bk. XXII, ch. 1, n. 2, where there is asserted, that God instituted nothing better than the angelic spirits.

7  Verse 3.

8  (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 23:  But (the demons are) not entirely expert in the good [expertes boni], according to which they both are and live and understand, and there is entirely in them a certain movement of concupiscence . . . And we say that there were given to them angelic donations, (which) never (have) been taken away (from them), but they are both whole and very clear.  —  The Vatican edition alone omits evil [malis].


p. 123

4. Item, lux divinae essentiae est supra omnem intellectum creatum, quantumcumque ille intellectus sit excellens in naturalibus:  ergo nunquam intellectus creatus in illam intuendam ascendet virtute sua, nisi Deus condescendat per gratiam:  ergo impossibile est, quod Angelus naturali cognitione cognoscat divinam esentiam in se ipsa.1

4. Likewise, the Light of the Divine Essence is above every created intellect, howsoever much that intellect is excelling in natural (goods):  therefore a created intellect never ascends unto intuiting It by its own virtue, unless God condescends through grace:  therefore it is impossible, that an Angel by natural cognition cognize the Divine Essence in Itself.1

5. Item, multo plus est Deus supra intellectum angelicum, quam sit Angelus supra intellectum humanum; sed homo non potest nosse Angelum, nisi Angelus condescendat ei:  ergo nec Angelus ipsam divinam lucem in se ipsa.

5. Likewise, God is much more above the intellect of an Angel, than an Angel is above the intellect of a man; but a man cannot know [nosse] an Angel, unless the Angel condescends to him:  therefore neither (can) an Angel (know) the Divine Light Itself in Itself.

6. Item, impossibile est, quod aliquis oculus perveniat ad cognitionem luminis solaris nisi per immissionem radiorum solis, quantumcumque habeat alia lumina:  ergo impossibile est, quod aliquis ad contuitum supernae lucis perveniat per illuminationem aliquam naturalem, vel acquisitam, nisi Deus suae luminositatis radium immittat;2 sed immissio haec non est nisi per gratiam:  ergo impossible est, quod aliqua creatura, quantumcumque nobilis, divinam lucem in se ipsa per naturam cognoscat.

6. Likewise, it is impossible, that any eye arrive at the cognition of the light of the Sun [luminis solaris] except through the immission [immisionem]* of the Sun’s rays, howsoever much it has other lights:  therefore it is impossible, that someone arrive at the contuition of the Supernal Light through any natural, and/or acquired, illumination, unless God immits a ray of His Luminosity;2 but this immission is not but through grace:  therefore it is impossible, that some creature, howsoever noble, cognize the Divine Light [divinam lucem] in Itself through (its own) nature.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Angelus naturali cognitione divinam essentiam in se ipsa videre non poterat.

CONCLUSION

 

An Angel could not by a natural cognition see the Divine Essence in Itself.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod Angelus naturali cognitione divinam essentiam videre non poterat in essentia3 sive claritate sua.  Et hoc patet, quia haec cognitio est primum praemium, quo habito, mens creata quiescit tanquam beata et perfecta; hoc autem praemium nemo obtinet nisi gratuita Dei influentia.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that an Angel by natural cognition could not see the Divine Essence in Its essence3 or clarity.  And this is clear, because this cognition is the first reward, with which had, the created mind rests as one blessed and perfected; but this reward no one obtains except by the gratuitous influence of God.

Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, sane dici potest, quod divina lux propter sui eminentiam est inaccessibilis viribus omnis naturae creatae; et ideo per quandam benignitatis condescensionem facit se cognosci, ita quod in illa cognitione cognoscens multo plus agatur, quam agat.  Illa autem condescensio bonitatis quid gratuitum dicit; sed constat, quod non dicit divinae essentiae humiliationem, quia non potest minorari, sed dicit alicuius radii gratuitam immissionem, per quam anima clare cognoscit, cum est immisio in abundantia, sicut erit in gloria.  Et ita Angelus divinam essentiam non potest per naturam cognoscere in se ipsa, sicut ostendunt rationes inductae, et sicut colligitur a Dionysio in principio mysticae Theologiae.4

But if the reason for this be asked, it can be sanely said, that the Divine Light on account of Its Eminence is inaccessible to the forces [viribus] of every created nature; and for that reason through a certain condescension of benignity It makes itself cognized, such that in that cognition the one cognizing is acted upon [agatur] much more, that acts.  But that condescension of goodness means something gratuitous; but it is established, that it does not mean the humiliation of the Divine Essence, because It cannot be lessened, but (rather) it means the gratuitous launching of some ray, through which the soul clearly cognizes (It), when there is a launching in abundance, just as there will be in glory.  And thus an Angel cannot through nature cognize the Divine Essence in Itself, just as the reasons brought forward shown, as just as is gathered from (St.) Dionysius at the beginning of (his) mystical Theology.4

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod est deiformis per naturam; dicendum, quod hoc non dicitur, quia habeat deiformitatem, quam habet intellectus gloriosus per assimilationem, quae est in statu perfecto, sed deiformis dicitur, quia sine susceptione specierum, per id quod habet in se, actu cognoscit.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that (the intellect of an Angel) is deiform through nature; it must be said, that this is not said, because it has the deiformity, which a glorified [gloriosus] intellect has through the assimilation, which is in the perfect state, but it is said (to be) “deiform”, because without the susception of species, through that which it has in itself, it cognizes by an act.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est speculum clarum; dicendum, quod Deus refulget in omni creatura tanquam causa in effectu suo, et ex omnibus potest cognosci, et maxime in creatura, quae ipsius Dei est insignita imagine.  Sed illa refulgentia luminis, per quam videtur Deus facie ad faciem,5 non est naturae, sed condescensionis et gratiae.  Nec est simile de luce corporali, quae naturaliter influit lumen in haec inferiora; non sic debet intelligi de luce aeterna.

2. To that which is objected, that that (an Angel) is a clear mirror; it must be said, that God glitters [refulget] in every creature as a cause in its own effect, and He can be cognized out of all (of them), and most of all in the creature, which has been marked [insignita] with the Image of God Himself.  But that refulgence of the light [luminis], through which (refulgence) God is seen face to face,5 does not belong to nature, but to (His) condescension and grace.  Nor is it similar concerning corporal light [luce corporali], which naturally inflows a light [lumen] upon these inferiors; not so ought it be understood concerning the Eternal Light [luce aeterna].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus praesentialiter est in anima etc.; dicendum, quod esse praesentialiter hoc est dupliciter:  vel ut principium conservans et continens, vel ut obiectum immutans et movens.  Primo modo est Deus praesens Angelo, et lux caeco;6 secundo modo non.  Et ideo non est simile de anima et eius habitibus, quoniam praesentes sunt animae utroque modo.  Et ratio huius est, quoniam haec cognoscibilia non superexcedunt cognoscentis potentiam et naturam.

3. To that which is objected, that God by means of (His) presence [praesentialiter] is in the soul etc.; it must be said, that ‘to be by means of a presence’ [esse essentialiter], this is in a twofold manner:  either as a conserving and containing principle, and/or as changing [immutans] and moving object.  In the first manner God is present to an Angel, and light to a blind (man);6 in the second manner (they are not).  And for that reason it is not similar concerning the soul and its habits, since they are present to the soul in each manner.  And the reason for this is, that these cognizables do not superexceed the power and nature of the one cognizing (them).

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut per speciem, aut per essentiam etc.; dicendum, quod adhuc est tertius modus cognoscendi, scilicet per effectus.  Cognoscitur autem Deus per effectus visibiles et per substantias spirituales et per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod « est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo, quia in inferiori natura », sicut dicit Augustinus in nono de Trinitate, et habitum est in primo.7  Et ita respondetur illi rationi, quod procedit ex divisione insufficienti.

4. To that which is objected, that (a cognizable being is) either (cognized) through a species, or through (its) essence etc.; it must be said, that there is yet a third manner of (its) being cognized, namely through an effect.  Moreover God is cognized through (His) visible effects and through spiritual substances and through the influence of a light connatural to the cognizing power, which (light) « is a certain similitude of God, not abstracted, but infused, inferior to God, because (it is) in an inferior nature », just as (St.) Augustine says in the ninth (book) On the Trinity, and (as) is had in the first (book).7  And thus one responds to that reckoning, which proceeds from the insufficient division (of the manners in which a cognizable being is cognized).

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de velatione, dicendum, quod non posse pertingere ad alicuius cognitionem, hoc est dupliciter:  vel propter cordis obscuritatem, vel protper cognoscibilis profunditatem.  Si primo modo, sic dicitur impediri velatione; si secundo modo, sic impeditur non propter interpositionem velaminis, sed propter sublimitatem cognoscibilis.  Primo modo impeditur homo peccator, secundo modo Angelus.  Unde nec videbat sub vela- / -amine aenigmatis, . . .

5. To that which is objected about veiling, it must be said, that ‘to not be able to attain to the cognition of something’, this is in a twofold manner:  either on account of the obscurity of the heart, and/or on account of the profundity of the cognizable.  If in the first manner, thus one is said “to be impeded by being veiled [velatione] ”; if in the second manner, thus one is impeded not on account of the interposing of a veil, but on account of the sublimity of the cognizable.  In the first manner man, the sinner, is impeded, in the second manner the Angel.  Wherefore neither did he see (God) under the / veil of an enigma, . . .


1  Fide codd. A H M N Q X Z aa bb cc et ed. 1 supplevimus in se ipsa.

2  Cfr. Liber de Spiritu et anima (inter opera August.), c. 12.  —  Paulo superius nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 et Vat. ad cognitionem pro ad contuitum.

3  Cod. F in se ipsa.  Aliquanto inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 propter sui excellentiam pro propter sui eminentiam.

4  Cap. 1. § 3, ubi docet, quod Dei neque dictio neque intellgentia sit, quia cunctis creatis superessentialiter eminet et penitus est incognoscibilis.

5  Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12.

6  August., in Ioan. tract. 1. n. 19:  Quomodo homo positus in sole caecus, praesens est illi sol, sed ipse soli absens est; sic omnis stultus, omnis iniquus, omnis impius caecus est corde etc.  —  Cod. aa ut lux caeco.

7  Dist. 3. p. I. q. 1. ad 5, ubi verba Augustini, loc. cit. c. 11. n. 16. allegantur, et q. 2. ad 4, ubi triplex gradus ascensus in Deum recensetur.  —  Paulo superius codd. L O potentiae cognoscere pro potentiae cognoscenti.


1  Trusting in codices A H M N Q X Z aa bb and cc and edition 1, we have supplied in Itself [in se ipsa].

2  Cf. the book (among the works of St. Augustine, On the Spirit and the Soul, ch. 12.  —  A little above this not a few codices, together with edition 1 and the Vatican edition, have at the cognition [ad cognitionem] for at the contuition [contuitum].

3  Codex F has in Itself or (in) Its clarity [in se ipsa sive claritate sua].  Somewhat below this codex cc and edition 1 have on account of Its Excellence [propter sui excellentiam] for on account of Its Eminence [propter sui eminentiam].

4  Chapter 1, § 3, where he teaches, that there is not saying nor understanding of God, because He stands out from [eminet] all other created things super-essentially and is thoroughly uncognizable.

5  1 Cor. 13:12.

6  (St.) Augustine, On the Gospel of St. John., tract 1, n. 19:  In the manner that a blind man, placed in the sun, is present to the Sun, but is himself absent from the sun; so every foolish (man), every iniquitous (man), every impious (man) is blind at heart etc..  —  Codex aa has as light (is) to a blind (man) [ut luc caeco].

7  Distinction 3, p I, q. 1, in reply to n. 5, where the words of (St.) Augustine, loc. cit., ch. 11, n. 16, are cited, and in q. 2, in reply to n. 4, where the three steps of ascension unto God is mentioned.  —  A little above this codices L and O have to the power to cognize [potentia cognoscere] for to the cognizing power [potentiae cognoscenti].

 

* [Trans. note:  Immission differs from emission in that the latter speaks only of the diffusion from the luminous object, whereas the former speaks of the projection of that illumination upon another object; though archaic the English cognates immit, immission etc. retain thus the same sense of the Latin verb immittere in all its forms.]


p. 124

vela- / -amine aenigmatis, nec tamen facie ad faciem, quia medium est inter utrumque, videlicet Deum videre in speculo absque aenigmate.1

the / veil of an enigma, nor, however, face to face, because there is a medium between each, namely ‘to see God in a mirror without an enimga’.1

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aut cognoscebat Deum per medium, aut sine medio; dicendum, quod per medium, scilicet per effectum; non quia illud medium magis esset proportionale Deo, sed quia magis erat proportionale intellectui angelico; unde naturaliter videbatur per speculum et per vestigium, quamvis non per aenigma.  Nec illud est contra Augustinum, quia, sicut infra melius patebit,2 Augustinus vult, quod inter mentem et Deum non cadit medium in ratione causae efficientis, vel influentis, cadit tamen medium manuductionis, quod tamen non habet rationem medii proprie, quia magis subservit potentiae cognoscenti, quam praesit.

6. To that which is objected, that either (an Angel) cognized God through a medium, or without a medium; it must be said, that (he did so) through a medium, that is through (His) effect; not because that medium was more proportional to God, but because it was more proportional to the angelic intellect; wherefore he naturally saw through a mirror and through a vestige, though not through an enigma.  Nor is that contrary to (St.) Augustine, because, just as will be more clear below,2 (St.) Augustine wants, that between the mind and God there does not fall a medium in the reckoning of an efficient, and/or of an influencing, cause; yet there does fall a medium of being lead by the hand [manuductionis], which, however, does not have the reckoning of a medium properly, because it is rather subservient to the power of the one cognizing, than standing before [praesit] (it).

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Conclusio et principia hic clare exposita conveniunt cum iis quae dicuntur infra (d. 23. a. 2. q. 3.) de modo, quo Adam in statu innocentiae Deum cognovit, et quae in genere de cognoscibilitate Dei dicta sunt (I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1. 2.).  Vide Schol. ibid. ad q. 1, in quo (in III.) etiam breviter insinuatum est, quomodo intelligantur verba S. Doctoris, hic ad 4: « per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti ».  Late de hac doctrina agitur in opusculo a nobis edito:  de Humanae Cognitionis ratione anecdota quaedam etc. Ad Claras Aquas 1883.

I. The conclusion and the principles clearly expounded here convene with those (things) which are said below (in d. 23, a. 2, q. 3.) concerning the manner, in which Adam in the state of innocence cognized God, and those which have been said in general concerning the cognizability of God (Sent, Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, qq. 1 and 2).  See the Scholium ibid., on Q. 1, in which (under n. III) there is also briefly touched upon, in what manner the words of the Seraphic Doctor, here in reply to n. 4, are understood:  « through the influence of a light connatural to the cognizing power ».  This doctrine is dealt with at length in the opuscle edited by us: de Humanae Cognitionis ratione anecdota quaedam etc., Ad Claras Aquas 1883.

II. Consentiunt quoad conclusionem:  Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 23. m. 3, et q. 24. m. 1.  —  Scot., hic q. 9; Report. hic q. 4; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. et 11.  —  S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 23. q. 2. a. 1; IV. Sent. d. 49. q. 2. a. 6; S. I. q. 56. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 49; de Verit. q. 8. a. 5.  —  B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. a. 2. partic. 2. et quaest. incid.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 4. a. 1. q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. a. 1.  —  Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 9.  —  Durand., I. Sent. Prolog. q. 3.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6.  —  Biel, hic q. 2. circa finem.

II. Those consenting in regard to the conclusion (are):  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 23, m. 3, and q. 24, m . 1.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 9; Reportatio., here in q. 4; Sent., Bk. IV, d. 49, qq. 2 and 11.  —  St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. II, d. 23, q. 2, a. 1; Sent., Bk. IV, d. 49, q. 2, a. 6; Summa. , I, q. 56, a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles., Bk. III, ch. 49; de Veritate., q. 8, a. 5.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. II, tr. 4, q. 14, a. 2, partic. 2. and the incidental q..  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 4, a. 1, quaestiuncula 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. II, d. 4, a. 1, q. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. I, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.  —  Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetas., 4, q. 9.  —  Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, Prologue, q. 3.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 6.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 2, near the end.


1  Alluditur ad illud I. Cor. 13, 12:  Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem.  Cfr. infra d. 23. a. 2. q. 3, et I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3.  —  Aliquanto superius codd. K cc et ed. 1 propter subtilitatem cognoscibilis pro propter sublimitatem cognoscibilis.

2  Dist. 10. a. 2. q. 1. seq.  Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 3. ad 1.  —  Post non cadit medium in multis codd. additur id est, in Vat. scilicet.


1  An allusion to that (verse) of 1 Cor. 13:12:  We see know through a mirror in an enigma, but then (we shall see) face to face [Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem].  Cf. also d. 23, a. 2. q, 3, and Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 3.  —  Somewhat above this (on the previous page) codices K and cc and edition 1 have on account of the subtlety of the cognizable [propter subtilitatem cognoscibilis] for on account of the sublimity of the cognizable [propter sublimitatem cognoscibilis].

2  Distinction 10, a. 2, q. 1 f..  Cf. also Sent ., Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 3, in reply to n. 1.  —  After there does not fall a medium [non cadit medium] in many codices there is added that is [id est], in the Vatican edition namely [scilicet].


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