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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM III. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION III |
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PARS II. |
PART II |
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ARTICULUS III.
Quaestio I. |
ARTICLE III
Question 1 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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ARTICULUS III.
De naturali Angelorum dilectione. |
ARTICLE III
On the Angel’s natural dilection. |
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Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur de naturali Angelorum dilectione, et de ipsa duo quaeruntur. |
Consequently in the third place there is the question concerning the natural dilection of the Angels, and concerning this two (questions) are asked. |
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Primo de dilectione, qua diligebant. |
First concerning the dilection, by which they loved [diligebat]. |
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Secundo de dilectione, qua unus Angelus diligebat alterum. |
Second concerning the dilection, by which one Angel loved the other. |
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QUAESTIO I.
Utrum Angeli naturali dilectione dilexerint Deum propter ipsum et super omnia. |
QUESTION 1
Whether the Angels by natural dilection loved God for His own sake and above all (things)? |
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QUAERITUR ERGO primo de modo naturalis dilectionis ad Deum. Et est quaestio, utrum Angeli naturali dilectione dilexerint Deum propter se et super omnia. Et quod non, videtur: |
THEREFORE THERE IS ASKED first concerning the manner of (their) natural dilection for God. And the question is, whether the Angels by natural dilection loved [dilexerint] God for His own sake [propter se] and above all (things) [super omnia]. And that (they did) not, seems: |
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1. Quia Bernardus3 dicit, quod « natura est curva »: ergo ad se ipsam reflectitur, ergo magis diligit se quam alia, et alia propter se: ergo etc. |
1. Because (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux)3 says, that « nature is crooked [curva] »: therefore it is bend back [reflectitur] toward itself, therefore it loves itself more than others, and others for its own sake: ergo etc.. |
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2. Item, qui diligit aliquid supra se elevatur supra se. « Amor enim iungit amantem cum amato ».4 Si ergo magis diligit quod est supra se quam se, ergo supra se elevatur; sed nihil per se elevatur supra se: ergo necesse est, quod talis amor aliud principium habeat quam naturam. |
2. Likewise, he who loves [diligit] something above himself is elevated above himself. « For love [Amor] joins the one loving with the one loved ».4 If, therefore, one loves that which is above himself more than himself, therefore he is elevated above himself, but nothing is elevated above itself through itself: therefore it is necessary, that such a love [amor] have a principle other than (one’s own) nature. |
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3. Item, actus dilectionis est nobilissimus inter omnes actus animae, et motus iste, scilicet diligere propter se et supra omnia, est motus, quo nullus potest cogitare nobilior:5 ergo si natura potest in hunc sine gratia, multo fortius et in quemlibet alium, et ita nulla est opportunitas gratiae naturae institutae. Et iterum, si nobilissimus est, Deo est placitus et acceptus: ergo dignus remuneratione: ergo gratia non est necessaria ad merendum. |
3. Likewise, the act of dilection is the most noble (act) among all the acts of the soul, and that movement of its, namely ‘to love (God) for His own sake and above all (things)’, is the movement, than which no other can be thought more noble:5 therefore if nature is able unto this (act) without grace, much more strongly also unto any other (act), and thus instituted nature has no opportunity for grace. And again, if it is the most noble (act), it is pleasing to and accepted by God: therefore (it is) worthy of remuneration: therefore grace is not necessary for meriting. |
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4. Item, naturalis dilectio diligit quod diligit per modum desiderii sive concupiscentiae; sed omnis concupiscentia naturalis supponit aliquam indigentiam; sed quandocumque aliquis diligit aliquid propter suam indigentiam, magis diligit illud in quo est indigentia, quam illud quod supplet — ut . . . |
4. Likewise, natural dilection loves what it loves through the manner of a desire or concupiscence; but every natural concupiscence supposes some indigence; but whensoever anyone loves something on account of his own indigence, he loves more that in which there is the indigence, than that which supplies (for it) — as . . . |
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3 Nota P. Nicolai in ed. librorum Sent. S. Thomae, hic q. 4, hanc sententiam Bernardi colligi ex ipsius libro de Diligendo Deo, c. 8, eamque verbis expressis in operibus S. Bernardi non occurrere. — Sed in Sermonibus eius in Cant. Cant., Serm. 24. n. 6. seqq. et 80. n. 3. seqq., ubi agit de rectitudine, quam Deus animae primi hominis in creatione contulit, et quam homo perdidit, animam vocat curvam, quae quaerit et sapit illa, quae sunt super terram, et non illa, quae sunt sursum. Cfr. etiam Epist., 11, ubi n. 5. de propria voluntate ait: « Grave utique et importabile iugum super omnes filios Adam, heu, inclinans et incurvans cervices nostras »; et n. 8. primum gradum amoris in eo ponit, quod homo diligit se ipsum propter se. Caro quippe est et nihil sapere valet praeter se. 4 Hugo de S. Vict., de Arrha animae. Cfr. Dionys. de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 12. et 15. 5 Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 in hac prop. bis ponunt modus pro motus, sed, si standum est auctoritate codd., non recte, ut colligitur ex solutione huius obiectionis, in qua omnes codd. legunt motus. |
3 Father Nicholas’ note in the edition of St. Thomas’ Commentary on the Sentences (of Master Peter Lombard), here in q. 4, (says) that this sentence from (St.) Bernard is gathered from his book On Loving God, ch. 8, and that it does not occur expressly in the works of St. Bernard. — But in his Sermons on the Canticle of Canticles, Sermon 24, n. 6 ff. and 80, n. 3 ff, where he deals with the rectitude, which God conferred to the soul of the first man in creation, and which man lost, (St. Bernard) calls the soul “crooked” [curva], which seeks and tastes those (things), which are upon the Earth, and not those, which are above. Cf. also (his) 11th Epistle, where in n. 5 he says of his own will: « Indeed a heavy and unbearable yoke upon all the sons of Adam, alas ! inclining and bending down [incurvans] our necks »; and in n. 8 he posits the first grade of love in this, that man loves himself for his own sake. Indeed he is flesh and he is able to taste nothing besides himself. 4 Hugh of St. Victor, On the Earnest Money of the Soul. Cf. (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 12 and 15. 5 Many codices, together with edition 1 and 2, in this proposition have twice measure [modus] for movement [motus], but, not rightly, if one is to stand upon the authority of the codices, as is gathered from the solution of this objection, in which all the codices read movement [motus]. |
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cum appeto vestimentum propter indigentiam corporis et similiter cibum, magis diligo corpus quam vestimentum vel cibum — ergo si Angelus naturaliter diligit Deum propter suam indigentiam, ergo magis diligit se quam Deum. |
when I desire [appeto] clothing on account of the indigence of (my) body and similarly food, I love (my) body more than the clothing and/or food — therefore if an Angel naturally loves God on account of his own indigence, therefore he loves himself more than God. |
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CONTRA: 1. Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum:1 « Tales Deus creavit Angelos, ut ipsum prae se diligerent, cuius opere se tales creatos esse cognovissent ». |
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Augustine (says) On the Faith to Peter:1 « God created the Angels such, that they would love Him before themselves, by Whose work they recognized [cognovissent] that they were created such ». |
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2. Item, ratione videtur, quia affectus angelicus amabat bonum naturali dilectione; aut ergo quia bonum, aut quia bonum sibi. Si quia bonum, cum Deus esset summe bonus, magis ergo ipsum Deum quam aliquid aliud diligebat. Si quia bonum sibi; sed Deus adhuc melius erat ei quam aliquid aliud, quia bonus, immo optimus est affectui quaerenti illum:2 ergo quocumque modo videtur, quod ipsum propter se et super omnia diligebat. |
2. Likewise, it seems by reason, because the Angel’s affection loved the good [bonum] by natural dilection; therefore either because (it was) the good, or because (it was) good for itself. If because (it was) the good, since God was most highly good, therefore it loved God Himself more than something else. If because (it was) good for itself; but God was still better for it than something else, because (He is) Good, nay is the Best for the affection seeking Him:2 therefore in whatsoever manner (the Angel’s affectoin loved), it seems, that it loved Him for His own sake and above all (things). |
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3. Item, gustus sanus, non errans in iudicio, id magis desiderat et magis amat, quod est magis delectabile; sed Deus est maxime delectabilis: ergo cum Angelus a sua conditione hoc nosset et affectum sanum haberet, ergo in eo propter se et super omnia delectabatur. Sed illud magis diligit, in quo magis3 et propter se delectatur: ergo etc. |
3. Likewise, a healthy (sense of) taste, not erring in judgment, desires more and loves more that, which is more delectable; but God is delectable most of all: therefore since an Angel from his foundation knew this and had a healthy (sense of) taste, therefore he delighted [delectabatur] in Him for His own sake and above all (things). But one loves that more, in which one is delighted more3 and for its own sake: ergo etc.. |
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4. Item, hoc mandatum de diligendo Deum propter se et super omnia erat scriptum in corde Angeli, ergo conscientia dictabat ei, quod ad hoc tenebatur: ergo si non sic diligebat, contra conscientiam faciebat, ergo peccabat: ergo ante peccatum Deum super omnia diligebat. Si tu dicas, quod conscientia non obligabat eum nisi pro tempore gratiae, quia ante non poterat; contra: affectus Angeli ante peccatum non repugnabat intellectui,4 alioquin ante peccatum erat bellum; sed intellectus dicit, nihil esse diligendum super omnia nisi Deum: ergo cum oporteret, Angelum aliquid diligere super omnia, necesse erat,5 quod aut diligeret Deum propter se et super omnia, aut faceretur contra conscientiam, et ita peccaret. |
4. Likewise, this command [mandatum] concerning loving God for His own sake and above all (things) had been written in the Angel’s heart, therefore (his) conscience dictated to him, that he was bound to this: therefore if he did not love in this manner, he worked against (his) conscience, therefore he sinned: therefore before sinning he loved God above all (things). If you say, that (his) conscience did not oblige him except for the time of grace, because beforehand it could not (oblige him); on the contrary: the Angel’s affection before sinning was not repugnant to (his) intellect,4 otherwise before sinning there was a war (between them); but the intellect says, that nothing is to be loved above all (things) except God: therefore since it was necessary [oporteret], that the Angel love something above all (things); it was necessary [necesse erat],5 that either he love God for His own sake and above all (things), or that he work against (his own) conscience, and thus that he sin. |
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5. Item, Angelus diligebat Deum, aut ergo fruens, aut utens. Si fruens: ergo propter se et super omnia; si utens: ergo cum « summa perversio sit uti fruendis »,6 erat perversus, et affectus erat in eo inordinatus, cum faceret de via terminum, et e converso; patet ergo etc. |
5. Likewise, the Angel loved God, therefore either as one enjoying (Him), or as one using (Him). If as one enjoying (Him): therefore for His own sake and above all (things); if as one using (Him): therefore since « the highest perversion is to use (the things what are) to be enjoyed »,6 he was perverse, and the affection in him was inordinate, when he make an end of a means [de via], and vice versa: therefore it is clear that etc.. |
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CONCLUSIO.
Tum Angelus quam homo tempore naturae institutae habiles erant ad diligendum Deum propter ipsum et super omnia. |
CONCLUSION
Both Angel and man in the time of instituted nature were able to love God for His own sake and above all (things). |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod absque dubio tempore naturae institutae tam homo quam Angelus habilis erat ad diligendum Deum propter se et super omnia. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that without a doubt, in the time of instituted nature, both man and Angel was able [habilis erat] to love God for His own sake and above all (things). |
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Et hoc patet: impossibile enim erat, eum aliter esse rectum.7 Rectitudo enim mentis consistit radicaliter in amore. Amor autem rectus esse non potest, si aliquid diligat supra Deum vel aeque, vel aliquid diligat propter se, et Deum propter aliud. Si ergo Deus fecit hominem et Angelum rectum,8 patet, quod unicuique dedit habilitatem ad amandum se, Deum, super omnia et propter se. |
And this is clear: for it was impossible, that he be upright [rectum] in another manner.7 For the rectitude of the mind consists radically in love [amore]. But one cannot be upright, if he loves anything above God and/or equally, and/or (if) he loves anything for his own sake, and God for the sake of (something) else. If, therefore, God made man and Angel upright,8 it is clear, that He gave to each one the ability to love [habilitatem ad amandum] Him, God, above all (things) and for His own sake. |
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Patet enim hoc planius, si attendamus, quid est diligere propter se, et super omnia. — Contingit enim, aliquid diligi dilectione concupiscentiae, sicut aliquis amat vinum, vel amicitiae, sicut aliquis amat socium.9 — Propter se vero aliquid diligere amore concupiscentiae est non alterius gratia, sed ibi sistere, sicut ebriosus diligit vinum propter se. Propter aliud, est alterius gratia, sicut sobrius diligit potum propter salutem. — Similiter in amore amicitiae propter se diligere est non alterius gratia velle alteri bonum, sicut dicit Philosophus,10 quod « diligimus amicos propter se, etsi nihil omnino boni debeat nobis ab ipsis esse ». Propter aliud vero est alterius gratia, sicut aliquis diligit hominem propter commodum suum, sicut dicit idem,11 quod « inimicos nostros volumus esse iustos, ut nihil nobis noceant ». — Diligere vero aliquid super . . . |
For this is more plainly clear, if we attend to what it is “to love (something) for its own sake”, and “(to love something) above all (things)”. — For it happens, that something is loved with the dilection of concupiscence, just as someone loves [amat] wine, and/or (with the dilection) of friendship, just as someone loves [amat] a companion [socium].9 — But ‘to love something for its own sake’ [Propter se] with the love [amore] of concupiscence is not ‘(to love) for the sake of another’ [non alterius gratia], but to stand still therein, just as a drunkard loves [diligit] wine for its own sake. “(To love) for the sake of (something) else” [Propter aliud] is “(to love) for the sake of another” [alterius gratia], just as a sober (man) loves drink for the sake of health. — Similarly in the love of friendship [amore amicitiae] ‘to love (a friend) for his own sake’ is not ‘to will the good to one for the sake of another’, just as the Philosopher10 says, that « we love friends for their own sake, even if entirely nothing of the good ought to be ours from them ». However ‘(to love someone) for the sake of (something) else’ is ‘(to love him) for the sake of another’, just as someone loves a man for the sake of his own advantage [commodum], just as the same says,11 that « we want our enemies to be just, so that they do no harm to us ». — However ‘(to love) someone above . . . |
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1 Cap. 3. n. 31. 2 Alluditur ad Thren. 3, 25: Bonus est Dominus sperantibus in eum, animae quaerenti illum. — Cod. L posteriorem partem argumenti sic exhibet: Si quia bonum: ergo magis bonum magis dilexit, et maximum maxime, et ita Deum summe dilexit. Si quia bonum sibi; sed Deus est magis bonus ipsi Angelo quam ipse sibi: ergo etc. Minor patet; quia Angelus per hoc quod in se habet, ablato eo, quod a Deo habet, statim in nihilum cederet. — Aristot., VII. Ethic. c. 12: Bonum dupliciter: alterum enim absolute, alterum alicui bonum. 3 Vat. addit incongrue est. Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 hoc indigeret pro hoc nosset, et dein supra se pro super omnia. 4 Cod. L: affectus Angeli et intellectus aequales erant ante peccatum; quia natura eius adhuc sana ante peccatum non repugnabat intellectui. Idem cod. circa initium argumenti post in corde Angeli prosequitur expressius quam in corde hominis, conscientia quoque dictabat etc. 5 Multi codd. et (i. e. etiam) necesse erat. 6 August., 83 Qq. q. 20: Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui. Et rursus omnis ordinatio, quae virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti. Cfr. etiam I. Sent. d. 1. lit. Magistri. 7 Cod. M verbis esse rectum praemittit mente. 8 Eccle. 7, 30. 9 Vat. hic perperam non habet secundum disiunctionis membrum, sed ponit vel amicum sive socium, referens haec verba ad praecedentia; quae lectio orta esse videtur ex falsa abbreviatione vocis amicitiae, quae in nonnullis codd. habetur, quorum etiam non pauci omittunt aliquis. Mox post diligere, fide codd. F Q et contextu exigente, supplevimus amore concupiscentiae. Dein post Propter aliud codd. F N P V repetunt diligere. 10 Libr. III. Topic. c. 1. Cfr. etiam VIII. Ethic. c. 2. seqq., ubi, propositis definitione et speciebus amicitiae, concludit, quod amicitiae, in quibus amatur amicus propter utilitatem vel delectationem et non propter se, non sunt amicitiae per se, sed per accidens. 11 Libr. III. Topic. c. 1. |
1 Chapter 3, n. 31. 2 An allusion to Lamentations 3:25: Good is the Lord to (those) hoping in Him, to the soul seeking Him [Bonus est Dominus sperantibus in eum, animae quaerenti illum]. — Codex L exhibits the second part of the argument thus: If because (its was) good: therefore it loved the greater good more, and the greatest most greatly, and thus it loves God most highly. If because (it was) good for itself; but God is more good for the Angel himself than he himself for himself: ergo etc. The minor is clear; because an Angel through that which he has in himself, having taken away that, which he has from God, would immediately cede into nothing [Si quia bonum: ergo magis bonum magis dilexit, et maximum maxime, et ita Deum summe dilexit. Si quia bonum sibi; sed Deus est magis bonus ipsi Angelo quam ipse sibi: ergo etc. Minor patet; quia Angelus per hoc quod in se habet, albato eo, quod a Deo habet, statim in nihilum cederet]. — Aristotle, Ethics., Bk. VII, ch. 12: The good (is) in a twofold manner: for the one (is good) absolutely, the other (is) good for something. 3 The Vatican edition reads incongruously in which there is more and one is delighted for its own sake [in quo magis est et propter se delectatur]. A little above this codex cc and edition 1 have needed this [hoc indigeret] for knew this [hoc nosset], and then have above himself [supra se] for above all (things) [supra omnia]. 4 Codex L reads: the Angel’s affection and intellect were equal before sinning; because his nature, still healthy before sinning, was not repugnant to (his) intellect [affectus Angeli et intellectus aequales erant ante peccatum; quia natura eius adhuc sana ante peccatum non repugnabat intellectui]. Likewise the codex, near the beginning of the argument, after in the Angel’s heart [in corde Angeli], proceeds thus: more expressly than in man’s heart, (and his) conscience also dictated etc. [expressius quam in corde hominis, conscientia quoque dictabat etc.]. 5 Many codices have it was also necessary [et (i. e. etiam) necesse erat]. 6 (St.) Augustine, Eighty-Three Questions, Q. 20: And so every human perversion is that which is also called a “vice”, ‘to use (the things which are) to be enjoyed and to enjoy (the things which are) to be used’. Cf. Master (Peter’s) First Book of Sentences, d. 1. 7 Codex M to the words he be upright [esse rectum] prefixes the words in mind [mente]. 8 Ecclesiastes 7:30. 9 The Vatican edition, here, faultily does not have the second member of the disjunction, but has and/or a friend or companion [vel amicum sive socium], referring these words to the preceding; which reading seems to have arisen from the false abbreviation of the word of friendship [amicitiae], which is had in not a few codices, not a few of which also omit someone [aliquis]. Next after for his own sake [diligere], trusting in codices F and Q and as required by the context, we have supplied with the love of concupiscence [amore concupiscentiae]. Then in the next proposition codices F N P V explicitly repeat To love [diligere] before for the sake of (something) else [est]. 10 (Aristotle), Topics, Bk. III, ch. 1. Cf. also Ethics, Bk. VIII, ch. 2 ff., where having proposed the definition and species of friendship, he concludes, that friendships, in which the friend is loved for the sake of (his) usefulness and/or delight and not for his own sake, are not friendships per se, but per accidens. 11 Topics, Bk. III, ch. 1. |
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omnia amore amicitiae est nullo commodo vel incommodo velle ipsum offendere nec amicitiam solvere; similiter diligere1 dilectione concupiscentiae est nullo commodo vel incommodo velle illud perdere. |
all (things)’ by the love of friendship is ‘to will to offend him in nothing, advantageous and/or inadvantageous [incommodo], nor to dissolve friendship (with him)’; similarly ‘to love1 (something above all things) with the dilection of concupiscence’ is ‘to will to loose it for nothing advantageous and/or inadvantageous’. |
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Quoniam igitur affectus Angeli Deum habere cupiebat propter se, quia summe bonum et summe reficiens, non alterius boni gratia, et Deo volebat bonum propter se, multo magis quam amicus amico; similiter nullo commodo vel incommodo volebat Deum offendere vel perdere, ut manifestum est et patet intuenti: dico, quod Deum diligebat propter se et super omnia. |
Therefore, since the Angel’s affection desired [cupiebat] to have God for His own sake, because (He is) most highly good and most highly refecting, not for the sake of another good, and willed good to God for His own sake, much more than a friend (does) for a friend; similarly (because) he willed to offend God in nothing advantageous and/or inadvantageous nor [vel] to loose (Him for anything advantageous and/or inadvantageous), as has been manifested and is clear to the one looking into (it): I say, that he loved God for His own sake and above all (things). |
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1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motus naturae curvus est; dicendum, quod aut Bernardus intelligit de natura, qua communicamus cum brutis; aut si de rationali, intelligit prout lapsa est; aut hoc vocat curvitatem, quod appetit sibi. Sed esto, quod Deum appetat sibi, non tamen aliquid magis diligit sibi quam Deum, et ita nihilominus propter se et super omnia. |
1. To that which is objected, that the movement of nature is crooked; it must be said, that either (St.) Bernard understands (this) of the nature, by which we communicate with brutes; or if of rational (nature), he understands (this) insofar as (nature) is fallen; or he calls this, that one desires (something) for himself, “crookedness” [curvitatem]. But let it be, that one desires God for himself, yet he does not choose [diligit] something for himself more than God, and thus, nevertheless, (he loves Him) for His own sake and above all (things). |
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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod elevatur supra se; dicendum, quod elevari supra se est dupliciter: aut supra suum posse, et hoc est impossibile, nisi adiuvetur natura; aut supra suum esse, et hoc est possibile et naturale. Unde bene concedo, quod homo naturaliter natus est elevari supra se, contemplando et amando. |
2. To that which is objected, that one is elevated above himself; it must be said, that ‘to be elevated above oneself’ is in a twofold manner: either above one’s own ‘being able’, and this is impossible, unless nature be assisted; or above one’s own ‘being’, and this is possible and natural. Wherefore I well concede, that man has been born to be naturally elevated above himself, by contemplating and by loving [amando]. |
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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motus iste videtur nobilissimus et difficillimus et Deo gratissimus: dicendum, quod motus iste aliter est gratiae, aliter est naturae institutae. Naturae institutae est ex quadam habilitate et rectitudine respectu boni; gratiae vero est, quia captivatur affectus in obsequium Christi, sicut intellectus per fidem.2 Tunc autem captivatur intellectus in obsequium Christi, quando contra illud quod ratio sua dictat, assentit primae veritati; sic et affectus, quando id ad quod diligendum naturaliter inclinatur, amore Christi paratus est odire; vel e conversio, quando id ad cuius odium naturaliter inclinatur, paratus est amare. Et talis est affectus, qui contemnit vitam et honores est omne desiderabile, et amat odientes se et laedentes propter Deum; et hic est solus affectus, qui Deo famulatur, et quem Deus acceptat3 et remunerat; et hic non est a natura, sed solum a gratia. |
3. To that which is objected, that that movement seems (to be) the most noble and the most difficult and the most pleasing [gratissimus] to God: it must be said, that that movement belongs in one manner to grace, (and) belongs in another manner to instituted nature. It belongs to instituted nature out of a certain ability and rectitude in respect of the good; but it belongs to grace, because the affection is captivated in reverent obedience [obsequium] to Christ, just as the intellect (is) through faith.2 Moreover the intellect is then captivated in reverent obedience to Christ, when it assents to the First Truth against that which its own reason dictates; thus also the affection, when it is prepared by love [amore] to hate that which it is naturally inclined to love [ad diligendum]; and/or conversely, when it is prepared to love [amare], that which it is naturally inclined to hate [ad odium]. And such is the affection, which contemns life and honors and everything desirable, and loves (those) hating and wounding it, for God’s sake; and this alone is the affection, which serves God familiarly, and which God accepts3 and remunerates; and this is not from nature, but only from grace. |
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Aliter etiam differt hic motus ab illo, quia ille a cognitione naturali, scilicet qui est dilectionis naturalis, alius est a cognitione fidei. Et differt haec cognitio ab illa, quia cognitio naturalis congoscit Deum summe bonum propter diffusionem sive communicationem bonitatis in effectibus creatis; sed fides dictat Deum summe bonum per communicationem bonitatis in divinis personis. Et utraque cognitio dicit Deum summe bonum et summe diligendum; sed multo nobilius fides sive cognitio gratuita. Per hunc modum utraque dilectio Deum diligit summe, sed magis et nobilius dilectio gratuita. |
This movement also differs in another manner from the former, because the former (is) from natural cognition, namely (is) that which belongs to natural dilection, the other is from the cognition of faith. And the latter cognition differs from the former, because natural cognition cognizes God as the One most highly good on account of the diffusion or communication of (His) Goodness in (His) created effects; but faith dictates (that one love) God as the One most highly good through the communication of (His) Goodness in the Divine Persons. And each cognition says that God (is) the One most highly good and the One most highly to be loved; but faith or gratuitous cognition (does so) much more nobly. Through this standard of measure each dilection loves God most highly, but gratuitous dilection (loves Him) more and more nobly. |
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Alia differentia consuevit dari, quod dilectione naturali diligit Deum animus sive affectus rectus, quia bonus4 sibi; et ideo summe diligit, quia summe bonum sibi; et omne bonum, quod est et quod habet, pendet ex ipso et nihil esset nisi per ipsum: ideo plus Deum diligit quam etiam se ipsum. Sed dilectione gratuita diligit quis Deum, quia bonus; et quia summe bonus, diligit summe; et quia non est bonus ipse homo, nisi in quantum est ad Deum, non diligit se nisi propter Deum; et hoc dico dilectione gratuita. |
Another difference is customarily given, that an upright spirit or affection loves God by a natural dilection, because (he is) good4 to himself; and for that reason he loves (Him) most highly, because (He is) the One most highly good to himself; and everything good, which he is and which he has, depends from Him and would be nothing except through Him: for that reason he loves God more than even his very self. But one loves God by gratuitous dilection, because (He is) good; and because (He is) most highly good, one loves (Him) most highly; and because a man himself is not good, except inasmuch as he is according to God [ad Deum], he does not love himself except for God’s sake, and this I say according to gratuitous dilection. |
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Et sic triplex est differentia: prima est a parte modi diligendi; secunda a parte cognitionis disponentis sive principii; tertia est a parte motivi. Omnes autem sunt rationabiles, sed primae magis innitendum. |
And thus there is a threefold difference (among loves): the first is on the part of the manner of loving [modus diligendi]; the second on the part of the disposing cognition or principle; the third is on the part of the motive. Moreover all are reasonable, but one must strive more for the first [primae magis innitendum]. |
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4. Ad ultimum solvendum est per interemptionem,5 quia natura rationalis, de qua nunc loquimur, non tantum amat ratione indigentiae, sed etiam ratione convenientiae et complacentiae; et ideo magis illud quod natum est summe delectare et summe placere. |
4. Regarding the last (objection) it must be solved through interemption,5 because rational nature, of which we are now speaking, not only loves [amat] by reason of indigence, but also by reason of convenience and complacency; and for that reason (it loves) more that which is bound to delight (it) most highly and to pleased (it) most highly. |
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SCHOLION. |
SCHOLIUM |
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I. Vocabulum naturali in titulo quaestionis intelligitur, quatenus distinguitur a gratuito i. e. supernaturali. In alio sensu naturale distinguitur ab actu deliberativo et libero; sic « amor naturalis respicit ipsam inclinationem naturae, quae est ad unum determinata » (III. Sent. d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1; cfr. infra d. 5. a. 3. q. 1. ad 4, d. 6. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.). De amore naturali in utroque sensu haec quaestio a posterioribus theologis tractata est. — Praeter ea quae in corp. de amore concupiscentiae et benevolentiae (amicitiae), de diligere propter se et propter aliud dicuntur, cfr. de his I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. a. 1. q. 2; III. Sent. d. 27. a. 2. q. 2. ad 2, d. 26. a. 2. q. 3. ad 3, d. 29. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. |
I. The term for the “natural” in the title of this Question is understood, to the extent that it is distinguished from “gratuitous”, i. e. from the supernatural. In the other sense the “natural” is distinguished from a deliberative and free act; thus « natural love respects the very inclination of nature, which has been determined to one (object) » (Sent., Bk. III, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 4; cf. below d. 5, a. 3, q. 1, in reply to n. 4, d. 6, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to n. 3; and d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 3). Concerning “natural” love, this Question was treated by later theologians in each sense. — Besides those which are said in the body of the Question concerning the love of concupiscence and benevolence (friendship), concerning ‘loving (something) for its own sake’ and ‘for the sake of (something) else’, concerning these, cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 17, p. I, a. 1, q. 2; Sent, Bk. III, d. 27, a. 2, q. 2, in reply to n. 2; d. 26, a. 2, q. 3, in reply to n. 3; and d. 29, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to n. 4. |
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II. Quaestio solvitur a Seraphico affirmative quoad amorem tum concupiscentiae tum benevolentiae. Consentiunt S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Aegid R., et etiam Scotus (cfr. H. de Montefortino, Sum. Scoti, t. III. p. II. q. 26. a. 3, et t. II. p. I, q. 60. a. 5.), licet (III. Sent. d. 27. q. unica) arguat contra argumentum principale S. Thomae, unde a nonnullis pro opposita sententia citatur. — Alii autem affirmative respondent quoad amorem concupiscentiae, negative quoad amorem benevolentiae. Ita, teste Dionysio Carth., Gulielm. Antissiodorensis, quem sequuntur Alex. Hal., B. Albert. aliique, qui putant, quod amare Deum propter ipsum et super omnia sit caritas supernaturalis. — De differentia autem caritatis sive amoris gratuiti . . . |
II. The Question is solved by the Seraphic (Doctor) in the affirmative in regard to both the love of concupiscence and of benevolence. St. Thomas, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Middleton, Giles the Roman, and even (Bl. John Duns) Scotus agree (cf. H. de Montefortino, Summa Scoti, tome III; p. II, q. 26, a. 3, and tome II. p. I, q. 60, a. 5), though (in Sent, Bk. III, d. 27, q. sole) he argues against the principal argument of St. Thomas, wherefore he is cited by not a few (as being) for the opposite sentence. — Others, however, respond affirmatively in regard to the love of concupiscence, negatively in regard to the love of benevolence. This, on the testimony of (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, William of Auxerre, whom Alexander of Hales, Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus) and others follow, who think, that ‘to love God for His own sake and above all (things)’ is supernatural charity. — But concerning the difference of charity or of gratuitous love . . . |
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1 Intellige cum cod. cc et ed. 1 super omnia diligere. Non pauci codd. omittunt diligere, quorum plures paulo superius ponunt in nullo commodo pro nullo commodo. 2 Epist. II. Cor. 10, 5: Et in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. 3 De acceptatione cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. et 2; de merito d. 27. a. 2. 4 Cod. F bonum, qui et paulo inferius ponit ab ipso pro ex ipso. 5 Cfr. tom. I. pag. 87, nota 4. |
1 Understand, together with codex cc and edition 1, above all things [super omnia]. Not a few codices omit to love (something) [diligere], several of which have a little above this have explicitly in nothing [in nullo] for in nothing [nullo]. 2 2 Cor. 10:5: And bringing into captivity every intellect in reverent obedience to Christ [Et in captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi]. 3 On (God’s) acceptance, cf. below d. 29, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2; on merit, d. 27, a. 2. 4 Codex F has (He is) good to himself [bonum sibi], which (codex) also a little below this has depends from [pendet ab] for depends from [pendet ex]. 5 Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, p. 87, footnote 4. |
p. 126
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a naturali amore bene loquitur Seraphicus in solut. ad 3; quam doctrinam Petr. a Tar. iisdem fere verbis in compendium redegit. |
from natural love, the Seraphic (Doctor) speaks well in the solution to n. 3; which doctrine (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise reduces [redegit] into a compendium with nearly the same words. |
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III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 30. m. 1. a. 2. § 2. — Scot., loc. cit. et Report., III. Sent. d. 27. n. 11-13. — S. Thom., hic q. 4; S. I. q. 60. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 18; S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 14. m. 4. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 7. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 3. a. 1. dub. lat. 2. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 4. q. 11. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 7. |
III. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 30, m. 1, a. 2, § 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, loc. cit. and Reportatio., Sent., Bk. III, d. 27, nn. 11-13. — St. Thomas, here in q. 4; Summa., I, q. 60, a. 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 18; Summa., p. II, tr. 4, q. 14, m. 4, a. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 5, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 7, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in p. II, q. 3, a. 1, lateral doubt 2. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibetals., 4, q. 11. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian., on this and the following q., here in q. 7. |
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