S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM IV.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION IV

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE II

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 137-138.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 137-138.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum malis angelis revelari potuerit ipsorum damnatio.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether to the evil angels there could have been revealed their damnation?

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum malis angelis revelari potuit suus casus.  Et quod non videtur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether to the evil angels their own downfall could have been revealed.  And it seems that (it could) not.

1. Omnis certa cognitio futurae poenae et miseriae est poenalis; sed si Angelus certitudinaliter sciret, se peccaturum, cum certo iudicatorio1 cognosceret, peccatum esse puniendum, et peccatorem a Deo separatum esse miserum, haberet praecognitionem certam suae miseriae:  ergo poenam ante culpam haberet.  Sed hoc est contra ordinem divinae iustitiae:  ergo si Deus contra ordinem divinae iustitiae non potest facere, Deus non potuit revelare.

1. Every certain cognition of a future punishment and misery is a penal one; but if an Angel knew with certitude [certitudinaliter], that he was going to sin, since he would cognize with certain judgment [certo iudicatorio],1 that sin is to be punished, and that a sinner, separated from God, is miserable [miserum], he would have a certain foreknowledge of his own misery:  therefore he would have a punishment before the fault.  But this is contrary to the order of Divine Justice:  therefore if God cannot work against the order of Divine Justice, God could not reveal (this to him).

2. Item, omnis praecognitio certa de amissione alicuius boni cogit hominem desperare de illo; sed Deus neminem innocentem potest cogere ad desperationem, quia non potest cogere ad peccatum:  ergo non potuit Angelo revelare casum suum.

2. Likewise, every certain precognition of the loss of some good drives [cogit] a man to despair of it; but God drives no one to desperation, because He cannot drive (anyone) to sin:  therefore He could not reveal to an Angel his own downfall.

3. Item, fiat argumentum Anselmi in libro de Casu diaboli:2  « Si diabolus sciebat casum suum, aut volebat, aut non.  Si volebat:  ergo iam ceciderat, ergo non praesciebat, se casurum.  Si praesciebat et nolebat; sed quanto magis nolebat, tanto plus dolebat; et quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat; et quanto magis dolebat, tanto erat miserior:  ergo quanto iustior, tanto miserior.  Sed hoc omnino est inconveniens »:  ergo etc.

3. Likewise, let the argument of (St.) Anselm in the book On the Downfall of the Devil2 be made:  « If the Devil knew his own downfall, either he willed (it), or (he did) not.  If he willed (it):  therefore he had already fallen down, therefore he did not foreknow, that he was going to fall down.  If he foreknew (it) and did not will (it); but as much as he was more unwilling, so much more did he grieve; and as much as he was more unwilling, so much more was he the more just; and as much as he grieved more, so much was he more miserable:  therefore as much as (he was) more just, so much (was he) the more miserable.  But this is entirely unfitting »:  ergo etc..

4. Item, fiat argumentum Magistri:3  « Si praescierunt, aut ergo vitare potuerunt et voluerunt, et ita non ceciderunt; aut vitare voluerunt et non potuerunt, et ita fuerunt miseri; aut vitare potuerunt et noluerunt, et ita fuerunt stulti et maligni ».  Si ergo quodlibet istorum est impossibile, impossibile est, quod habuerunt praescientiam sui casus.

4. Likewise, let the argument of Master (Peter)3 be made:  « If they had foreknown, therefore, either they could have avoided (it) and wanted to, and thus did not fall down; or they wanted to avoid (it) and could not, and thus were miserable; or they could have avoided (it) and were unwilling to, and thus were foolish and disposed to evil [maligni] ».  Therefore, if any of these is impossible, it is impossible, that they had a foreknowledge of their own downfall.

SED CONTRA:  1. Dominus potuit praedicare Petro sine peccato suum casum, sicut dicitur Matthaei vigesimo sexto4 et in aliis Evangeliis:  ergo pari ratione potuit revelare lucifero.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. The Lord was able to foretell to (St.) Peter his downfall, just as is said in the twenty-sixth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Matthew4 and in the other Gospels:  therefore for an equal reason He could have revealed (this) to Lucifer.

2. Item, Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis5 tractans illud verbum Isaiae decimo quarto:  Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem:  « Puto per aquilonem reprobandos homines fuisse designatos; per sedem, potestatem in illos ».  Et in sequentibus dicit, quod « in praescientia Dei suum praevidit principatum », scilicet quod debebat praeesse malis; et ideo dixit:  Ponam sedem.  Ergo principatus sequebatur casum; et potuit praevidere principatum:  videtur similiter, quod potuit praevidere casum.

2. Likewise, (St.) Bernard On the Grades of Humility,5 treating of that verse in the fifteenth (chapter) of Isaiah:  I shall place my throne facing the North, (says):  « I think that through “the North” [aquilonem] there were designated the men to be reprobated; through “throne”, (the Devil’s) power over them ».  And in the following (passages) he says, that « in God’s Foreknowledge he foresaw his own principality », namely that he ought to have presided over the wicked; and for that reason he said:  I shall place (my) throne.  Therefore (his) principality followed (his) downfall; and he was able to see (his) principality:  it seems similarly, that he was able to foresee (his) down fall.

3. Item, videtur, quod rationes de poena non valeant, duplici ex causa.  Deus enim potest separare quae naturaliter sunt coniuncta, ut in igne calorem a luce, sicut dicit Basilius:6  ergo multo fortius cognitionem praedictam a poena.  Praeterea, quantumcumque aliquid sit punitivum, tamen non punit, nisi subiectum punibile sit — unde si anima Petri esset in inferno, non punieretur7 — ergo cum Angelus in statu illo esset innocens et nullo modo ad poenam dispositus, patet etc.

3. Likewise, it seems, that the reasons concerning punishment are not valid, on account of a twofold cause.  For God can separate what have been naturally conjoined, such as, in fire, the heat from the light, as (St.) Basil6 says:  therefore much more strongly (can He separate) the aforesaid cognition from punishment.  Moreover, howsoever much something be punitive, yet it does punish, unless the subject is able to be punished — wherefore if the soul of (St.) Peter were in Hell, it would not be punished7 — therefore since an Angel in that state would be innocent and in no manner disposed to punishment, it is clear that etc..

4. Item, videtur quod ratio de desperatione non valeat, quia sicut praecognitio damnationis est occasio desperationis, ita praecognitio gloriae est occasio praesumtionis; sed praesumtio non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare futuram glorificationem:  ergo pari ratione lapsum.8  Si tu dicas, quod non est simile, quia ex parte illa est occasio, hic est necessitas; contra:  desperare est actus voluntatis deliberativae et actus, qui est peccatum; sed nihil potest cogere voluntatem ad aliquid, maxime ad peccatum:  ergo etc.

4. Likewise, it seems, that the reason concerning desperation is not valid, because just as the precognition of (one’s) damnation is an occasion for (one’s) desperation, so the precognition of glory is the occasion of presumption; but presumption does not impede, that God is able to reveal (one’s) future glorification:  therefore for an equal reason (desperation does not impede, that God is able to reveal one’s) fall.8  If you say, that it is not similar, because on the part of the latter it is an occasion, here it is a necessity; on the contrary:  to despair is an act of a deliberative will and an act, which is a sin; but nothing can drive a will to something, most all to a sin:  ergo etc..

5. Item, praescientia Dei non ponit necessitatem,9 ergo nec praescientia diaboli:  ergo si sciret, quod posset aliter esse, ergo posset adhuc sperare:  non ergo cogeretur desperare.

5. Likewise, God’s Foreknowledge does not posit a necessity,9 therefore neither (does) the Devil’s foreknowledge:  therefore if he knew, that it could be otherwise, therefore he was still able to separate (himself from God):  therefore he would not be driven to despair.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Angelus malus certam sui casus praescientiam habere non potuit.

CONCLUSION

 

An evil angel could not have the certain foreknowledge of his own downfall.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod angelus certam praescientiam sui casus habere non potuit.  —  Cum enim hoc esset contingens, sciri certitudinaliter non potuit,10 nisi ab eo qui certitudinaliter omnia cognoscit, et tam necessaria quam contingentia, quia eius co- / -gnitio . . .

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that an (evil) angel could not have had the certain foreknowledge of his own downfall.  —  For since this would be contingent, it could not be known with certitude,10 except by him who cognizes all (things) with certitude, and (those) both necessary and contingent, because his cog- / -nitio . . .

1  Vat. iudicio.  —  Principia huius et seq. argumenti vide hic in lit. Magistri, ubi verba Augustini ex XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 22. afferuntur.

2  Cap. 21, pluribus interiectis et mutatis verbis.  Plures codd. cum Vat. circa medium textus et quanto dolebat magis, iustior erat pro quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat, quod habent codd. H K W Y bb cc et ed. 1.  Dein ex codd. M aa ante erat miserior supplevimus tanto.

3  In hac dist.  —  Vat. omittit primum membrum argumenti.

4  Vers. 34; Marc. 14, 30; Luc. 22, 34; Ioan. 13, 38.

5  Cap. 10. n. 36.  —  Isai. 14, 13, ubi Vulgata:  Sedebo in monte testamenti, in lateribus aquilonis.  S. Bernardus, loc. cit.:  Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem.  Multi codd. hic habent ab Aquilone, sed in solut. ad 2 ad aquilonem.  —  Conclusio argumenti, quam iuxta fidem maioris partis codd. et edd. 1, 2 exhibuimus, a codd. I W sic profertur:  Sed principatus sequebatur casum, ergo si potuit etc.; codd. Q U Ergo si principatus etc.  Vat.:  Ergo cum principatus . . . et si potuit etc.

6  Hexaëm. hom. 6. n. 3.  Cfr. tom. I. pag. 750, nota 7.

7  Cfr. infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 3.

8  Cod. cc, ed. 1 et Vat. ergo pari ratione desperatio non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare lapsum.  —  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.

9  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1.

10  Vat. scire certitudinaliter omnia non potuit.

1  The Vatican edition has a certain judgment [certo iudicio] for certain judgment [iudicatorio].  —  See the principles of this and the following argument here in the text of Master (Peter), where the words of (St.) Augustine from On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. XI, ch. 17, n. 22 are cited.

2  Chapter 21, with several (words) interjected and changed.  Several codices, together with the Vatican edition, about the middle of the text, have and as much as he grieved more, he was more just [et quanto dolebat magis, iustior erat] for as much as he was more unwilling, so much was he more just [quanto magis nolebat, tanto iustior erat], which codices H K W Y bb and cc and edition 1 have.  Then from codices M and aa were have supplied so much [tanto] before was he more miserable [erat miserior].

3  In this Distinction.  —  The Vatican edition omits the first member of this argument.

4  Verse 34; Mk. 14:30; Lk. 22:34; Jn. 13:38.

5  Chapter 10, n. 36.  —  Isaiah 14:13, where the Vulgate reads:  I shall sit on the mountain of the testament, on the sides of the North [Sedebo in monte testamenti, in lateribus aquilonis].  St. Bernard, loc. cit., reads:  I shall place my throne facing the North [Ponam sedem meam ad aquilonem].  Many codices have here by the North Wind [ab Aquilone] for facing the North [ad aquilonem], but in the solution to n. 2 have facing the North [ad aquilonem].  [Trans. note:  Here the North is capitalized because it is the proper name of a cardinal point on the compass.]  —  The conclusion of the argument, which we exhibit in accord with the testimony of the greater part of the codices and editions 1 and 2, is proffered thus by codices I and W:  But (his) principality followed (his) downfall, therefore if he was able etc. [Sed principatus sequebatur casum, ergo si potuit etc.]; codices Q and U have Therefore if (his) principality etc. [Ergo si principatus etc.].  The Vatican edition has:  Therefore when (his) principality . . . and if he was able etc. [Ergo cum principatus . . . et si potuit etc.].

6  On the Hexaëmeron, Homily 6, n. 3.  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 42, a. sole, q. 3, p. 750, footnote 7.

7  Cf. below d. 41, a. 2, q. 3.

8  Codex cc, edition 1 and the Vatican edition have explicitly therefore for an equal reason desperation does not impede, that God is able to reveal (one’s) fall [ergo pari ratione desperatio non impedit, quin Deus possit revelare lapsum].  —  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 40, a. 2, q. 2, in reply to n. 1.

9  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 38, a. 2. q. 1.

10  The Vatican edition has one could not know all (things) with certitude [scire certitudinaliter omnia non potuit].

p. 138

co- / -gnitio ex re non pendet; talis est Deus solus.1  Non ergo potuit praescire, nisi Domino revelante.  Deus autem sibi revelare non potuit, quia non debuit praedicere, quod potuit — sicut praedixit Petro — quod non voco revelare, sed certam interius illuminationem dare ad praecognoscendum suum lapsum, hoc voco revelationem.  Hanc autem dare Deus non potuit de potentia ordinata, quia talis praecognitio de necessitate habet annexam culpam, aut miseriam. Aut enim sibi placeret, quod laberetur, et ita esset impius; aut displiceret, et ita esset miser et dolorosus.  Utrumque est Deo impossibile et inordinatum, sive innocenti infligere poenam, sive innocentem, dum est innocens, habere culpam.  —  Et hoc probat ratio prima, et ratio Anselmi et Magistri.  Alia vero ratio de desperatione probat, quod non potuit Angelo revelari sua damnatio, quia impossibile est, certum de damnatione sperare.  Unde illa via bona est et concedenda.

cog- / -nitio does not depend upon the thing; (and) such is God alone.1  Therefore (an evil angel) could not foreknow (this), except with God revealing (it).  But God could not reveal (this) to him, because He ought not have foretold, what He was able (to foretell) — just as He foretold to (St.) Peter — which I do not call “a revealing”, but a “granting” of a certain interior illumination to precognize his own fall, this I call a “revelation”.  But God could not from (His) ordained power [potentia ordinata] give this, because such a precognition has of necessity a fault, or misery, annexed (to it).  For either it would please him, who would fall, and thus he would be impious; or it would displease (him), and thus he would be miserable and sorrowful.  Each is impossible for God and inordinate: whether that He inflict a punishment upon an innocent, or that an innocent, while he is innocent, have a fault.  —  And this the first reason proves, and (similarly) the reason of (St.) Anselm and Master (Peter).  But the other reason concerning desperation proves, that to an Angel there could not be revealed his own damnation, because it is impossible, that one certain of (his own) damnation hope.  Wherefore the former way is good and (is) to be conceded.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo, quod potuit ei Dominus revelare, sicut et Petro; solvitur, quia Petro non revelavit, sed praedixit; unde Petrus non intellexit simpliciter, sed sub conditione, vel etiam non bene advertit usque ad lapsum; sic credo, quod potuit praedicere Angelo.  —  Tamen aliqui dicunt, quod non est simile, quia lapsus Petri erat reparabilis, non sic lapsus Angeli.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that the Lord could have revealed (it) to him, just as (He did) to (St.) Peter; it is solved, because He did not reveal (this) to (St.) Peter, but foretold (it); wherefore (St.) Peter did not understand (it) simply, but under a condition, and/or even did not advert (to it) well until (his) fall; thus I believe, that He could have foretold (this) to an Angel.  —  Yet some say, that it is not similar, because the fall of Peter was reparable, not so the fall of an Angel.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praevidit suum dominium; quaere similiter non suum praecipitium? dicendum, quod de ipso Bernardus2 miratur et solvit, quod ita potuit esse, sicut de Joseph, qui vidit suum principatum et non praevidit suam venditionem.  Sed et diabolo potuit Dominus revelare dominium, et non praecipitium, quoniam dominium illud non de necessitate habet annexum praecipitium; potest enim aliquis bonus dominari malis.  —  Aliqui tamen voluerunt dicere, quod illud quod dictum est ad aquilonem, verbum est Prophetae.  Diabolus enim volebat praeesse* et aliis sedem dominationis3 suae praeponere; et Propheta praedicens quod eventurum sibi fuerat, dicit aquilonem, in hoc significans malos.

2. To that which is objected, that (the Devil) foresaw his own dominion; wherefore did he not similarly (foresee) his own downfall [praecipitium]? it must be said, that (St.) Bernard wonders over this and solves (it thus), that it could have been thus, as (it was) concerning (the Patriarch) Joseph, who saw his own principality and did not foresee his being sold (into slavery).  But God could also reveal to the Devil (his own) dominion, and not (his own) downfall [praecipitium], since that dominion does not have of necessity a downfall [praecipitium] annexed (to it); for someone good can dominate the wicked.  —  Yet some wanted to say, that that which has been said “facing the North” [ad aquilonem], is the word of the Prophet (Isaiah).  For the Devil wanted to preside over and to place the throne of his domination3 over the others; and the Prophet, foretelling what was going to come forth for him, says “the North”, signifying in this “the wicked”.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur contra rationem de poena, dicendum, quod ab ista cognitione separare poenam sive dolorem est auferre bonam voluntatem; quia qui praevidet, se facturum malum, et non dolet, hoc ipso est malus; et ita ista cognitio necessaria dispositione disponit animam vel ad poenam, vel ad culpam; nec Deus debet auferre et separare poenam, ut ex hoc redundet culpa.  Et sic patet illud.

3. To that which is objected against the reckoning concerning punishment, it must be said, that to separate punishment or sorrow from that cognition is to take away good will; because he who foresees, that he is going to do evil, and does not grieve, is by this very (fact) evil; and thus that cognition disposes the soul by a necessary disposition either to punishment, and/or to fault; nor ought God take away and separate the punishment, so that fault remain [redundet] on this account.  And thus that (objection) is clear.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de desperatione, dico, quod, supposito quod praevideret lapsum et impossibilitatem resurgendi, cogeretur desperare, quia haec cognitio non potest stare cum spe.  Unde si quis non credit aliam vitam, necessario desperat de futura vita, quia hoc4 necessario exigitur ad spem; sic qui certus est de damnatione desperat de salute.  Unde non est simile de occasione praesumtionis et praescientia Dei, quia illa non aufert quod est necessarium ad humilitatem et salutem; sed haec praecognitio certa necessario aufert certitudinem ad oppositum, et ita certitudinem spei.5

4. To that which is objected concerning desperation, I say, that, with (it) supposed that one has foreseen (his own) fall and (his) impossibility of rising back, he would be driven to despair, because this cognition cannot stand with hope.  Wherefore if one does not believe (there is) another life, he necessarily despairs of a future life, because this4 is necessarily required for hope; thus he who is certain of (his own) damnation despairs of (his own) salvation.  Wherefore it is not similar concerning an occasion of presumption and God’s Foreknowledge, because the former does not take away what is necessary for humility and salvation; but the latter, certain precognition necessarily takes away certitude for the opposite, and thus the certitude of hope.5

1  Vide I. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.  —  Paulo inferius Vat. quia praedicere quidem potuit pro quia non debuit praedicere, quod potuit, quae est lectio maioris partis codd. et edd. 2, 3; alii codd. ab hac lectione in tantum discedunt, quod substituunt praedicare quidem potuit pro praedicere, quod potuit.

2  Loc. cit. n. 36. seq.:  Sed miror, cum in praescientia Dei tuum praevideris principatum, cur non in eadem et praevidisti praecipitium?  Nam, si praevidisti, quae insania fuit, ut cum tanta miseria cuperes principari, ut malles misere praeesse, quam feliciter subesse? . . . Sed credibilius est, quod non praevidisti etc.  —  Paulo inferius Vat. Sic etiam pro Sed et.

3  Vat. damnationis; perperam.

4  Vat. haec et dein sicut pro sic.  Plures codd. cum Vat. aliquanto inferius quia illa non auferunt pro quia illa non aufert.

5  Vide Schol. ad quaestionem praeced.

1  See Sent., Bk. I, d. 38, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 39, a. 1, q. 2.  —  A little below this the Vatican edition has because was indeed able to foretell [quia praedicere quidem potuit] for because He ought not have foretold, what He could have (foretold) [quia non debuit praedicere, quod potuit], which is the reading of the greater part of the codices and of editions 2 and 3; the other codices depart from this reading inasmuch as they substitute indeed [quidem] for what [quod].

2  Loc. cit., n. 36 f.:  But I wonder, since you foresaw in God’s Foreknowledge your own principality, why you also did not see in the same (your) downfall [praecipitium]?  For, if you foresaw (this), what madness was (this), that when you desired to initiate so many miseries, that you prefer to preside in a wretched manner, than to happily be a subject? . . . But it is more believable, that you did not foresee (it) etc.  —  A little below this the Vatican edition has Thus . . . also [Sic etiam] for But . . . also [Sed].

3  The Vatican edition has faultily damnation [damnationis]. [Trans. note:  A little before this downfall [praecipitium] has the more precise meaning of falling head first in a downward direction.]

4  The Vatican edition has this (faith) [haec] for this (believing) [hoc] and then just as [sicut] for thus [sic].  Several codices, together with the Vatican edition, somewhat below this have those do not take away [illa non auferunt] for the former does not take away [illa non aufert].

5  See the Scholium to the preceding Question.

* [Trans. nota:  Hic textus criticalis perperam legivit praesse pro praeesse.]

 

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