COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V
Quales facti sint Angeli aversione et conversione.	What the Angels became by their aversion and conversion.
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE I Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 144-148. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 144-148. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Post haec consideratio etc.	After these (things, their) consideration leads us forward etc.
DIVISIO TEXTUS.	DIVISION OF THE TEXT
Supra ostendit Magister, quales facti sunt Angeli in sua prima conditione. Hic secundo intendit agere, quales facit sunt aversione et conversione. Dividitur autem haec pars in tres. In prima agit de aversione et conversione. In secunda de confirmatione et obstinatione, infra distinctione septima: Supra dictum est, quod Angeli etc. In tertia de ordinum distinctione, infra distinctione nona: Post praedicta superest cognoscere.	Above Master (Peter) shows, what the Angels became in their first foundation. Here he intends second to deal with, what they became by (their) aversion and conversion. Moreover this part is divided into three (parts). In the first he deals with (their) aversion and conversion. In the second with (their) confirmation and obstinacy [obstinatio], below in the Seventh Distinction (where he says): Above it has been said, that the Angels etc. In the third with the distinction of (their) orders, below in the Ninth Distinction (where he says): After the aforesaid it remains that one recognize [cognoscere].
Prima pars habet duas. In prima agit de conversione et aversione. In secunda de ruina, quae consecuta est malorum aversionem, et hoc infra distinctione sexta: Praeterea sciri oportet etc.	The first part has two (parts). In the first (Master Peter) deals with the conversion and aversion (of the Angels). In the second with the ruin, which was consequent to the aversion of the evil (Angels), and this below in the Sixth Distinction (where he says). Moreover it is necessary that one know etc.
Prima pars habet tres. In prima ostendit, quid sit averti et converti. In secunda ostendit, a quo sit, ibi: Habebant enim omnes etc. In tertia quaedam dubia circa conversionem movet et solvit, ibi: Si autem quaeritur, utrum post creationem. Et illa tertia pars habet tres partes secundum tres dubitationes, quas determinat et explanat. Primo enim determinat, utrum bonis gratia sit collata ad hoc, ut efficaciter converterentur. Secundo vero, utrum malis sit sua aversio imputanda, cum gratiam non habuerint, ibi: Ideoque quibusdam videtur etc. In tertia vero determinat, utrum conversio fuerit meritoria confirmationis, ibi: Hic quaeri solet, utrum in ipsa confirmatione etc. — Et sic tria tanguntur in universo, scilicet aversio luciferi, aversio¹ aliorum minorum et conversio bonorum.	The first part has three (parts). In the first he shows, what it is to turn away and to be converted. In the second he shows, by whom it is, there (where he says). For they all had etc. In the third he moves and solves certain doubts about the conversion (of the good Angels), there (where he says): But if it is asked, “Whether after (their) creation” etc.. And that third part has three parts according to the three doubts, which he determines and explains. For first he determines, whether grace was conferred upon the good for this, that they might be efficaciously converted. But second, whether to the evil (angels) their own aversion is to be imputed, since they did not have grace, there (where he says): And for that reason it seems to certain ones etc. However, in the third he determines, whether the conversion (of the good) was meritorious of (their) confirmation, there (where he says): Here there is customarily asked, whether in (their) very confirmation etc. — And in this manner the three are touched upon all together [in universo], namely the aversion of Lucifer, the aversion¹ of the other lesser (angels) and the conversion of the good.
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.	TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua quaeritur, quales facit sint Angeli per aversionem et conversionem, tria quaeruntur.	For an understanding of this part, in which there is asked, “What did the Angels become through (their) aversion and conversion?”, three (questions) are asked.
Primo enim quaeritur, de aversione luciferi, qui fuit caput totius malitiae.²	For first there is asked, concerning Lucifer’s turning away [aversio], he who was the head of the whole wickedness [totius malitiae].²
Secundo quaeritur de aversione minorum Angelorum.	Second there is asked concerning the aversion of the lesser Angels.
Tertio de conversione bonorum.	Third concerning the conversion of the good (Angels).
Quantum ad primum duo quaeruntur.	As much as regards the first two (things) are asked.
Primum est, utrum peccaverit peccato superbiae.	The first is, whether (Lucifer) sinned by the sin of pride.
Secundum est, quid fuerit eius appetibile.	The second is, what was it that he desired [eius appetibile].
¹ Vat. conversio; falso. ² Cod. cc et ed. 1 mali.	¹ The Vatican edition has falsely conversion [conversio]. ² Codex cc and edition 1 have evil [mali] for wickedness [malitiae].

p. 145

ARTICULUS I. De aversione luciferi.	ARTICLE I On Lucifer’s turning away.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum lucifer peccaverit peccato superbiae.	QUESTION 1 Whether Lucifer sinned by the sin of pride?
QUOD AUTEM peccaverit peccato superbiae, videtur sic.	THEREFORE THAT he sinned by the sin of pride, seems in this manner:
1. Super illud Lucae decimo:¹ Videbam satanam etc., Glossa: « Qui singulariter elatus erat, ut in eius casu ceteri de elatione timerent ».	1. On that (verse) in the tenth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Luke:¹ I saw Satan (fall like lightning from Heaven), the Gloss (says): « He who had been singularly elated, so that at his downfall all the others might be afraid of being elated [elatione] ».
2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo:² Initium omnis peccati superbia; sed primum inter omnia peccata fuit peccatum diaboli: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, in the tenth (chapter)² of Ecclesiasticus (there is written): The start of every sin: pride; but the first among all sins was the sin of the Devil: ergo etc..
3. Item, Augustinus undecimo super Genesim ad litteram: « Factus continuo se a luce veritatis ad litteram:³ « Factus continuo se a luce veritatis avertit, superbia tumidus et propriae potestatis delectatione corruptus ».	3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says) in the eleventh (book) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis:³ « Immediately having been made, he turned himself away from the Light of Truth, swollen with pride and corrupted by delectation in his own power ».
4. Item, Isidorus de Summo Bono, libro primo, capitulo decimo:⁴ « Mox ut factus est, in superbiam erupit et praecipitatus de caelo est ».	4. Likewise, (St.) Isidore (of Seville) On the Most High Good, (says) in the First Book, tenth chapter:⁴ « As soon as he was made, he erupted into pride and fell headlong down [praecipitatus] from Heaven ».
5. Item, ratione videtur, quia non contingit peccare nisi tripliciter, videlicet aut ex concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia vitae.⁵ Sed primum peccatum non potuit esse carnis concupiscentia, nec potuit esse appetitus divitiarum, quia spiritus istis non indiget: ergo necesse est, quod fuerit superbia vitae.	5. Likewise, it seems by reason, because one does not happen to sin except in a threefold manner, namely either out of the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, or the pride of life.⁵ But the first sin could not be by the concupiscence of the flesh, nor could it belong to an appetite for riches, because a spirit does not need those (things): therefore it is necessary, that it was by the pride of life.
6. Item, peccatorum spiritualium non sunt nisi quatuor genera praeter avaritiam, quae tenet quasi medium inter carnalia et spiritualia, scilicet superbia, ira, accidia, invidia; sed in omnibus tribus generibus est odium: ergo cum omne odium causetur ab amore, odium inordinatum causatur ab amore inordinato:⁶ ergo ante ista tria genera oportet aliquod peccatum spirituale praecedere in diabolo. Sed hoc non potuit esse nisi superbia: ergo etc.	6. Likewise, of spiritual sin there are not but four genera besides — the avarice, which holds a quasi middle ground [medium] between carnal and spiritual (sins) — namely, pride, wrath [ira], sloth [accidia], (and) envy; but in all three genera there is hatred (of the good): therefore since every hatred is caused by a love [amore], an inordinate hatred is caused by an inordinate love:⁶ therefore before those three genera it is necessary [oportet] that in the Devil some spiritual sin precede. But this could not be but pride: ergo etc..
7. Item, nunquam pervertitur affectus, nisi prius pervertitur iudicium; nunquam pervertitur iudicium in his quae sunt de necessitate salutis, nisi aliqua excaecatio sit in ratione: ergo excaecatio rationis praecedit omne appetitum. Sed excaecatio non potest esse, quin praecesserit peccatum; et non potuit praecedere peccatum appetitus: ergo praecessit peccatum praesumtionis; sed hoc est peccatum superbiae: ergo etc.	7. Likewise, the affection is never perverted, unless the judgment is first perverted; the judgment is never perverted in those (things) which of necessity belong to salvation, unless there be some thorough blindness [excaecatio] in the reason: therefore the thorough blinding of the reason [excaecatio rationis] precedes every appetite (for evil). But there cannot be a thorough blinding, which does not precede the sin; and the appetite (for evil) could not precede the sin: therefore the sin of presumption preceded; but this is the sin of pride: ergo etc..
CONTRA: 1. Quod fuerit primum peccatum omissio, videtur, quia, si ipse deliberasset, utrum illud esset appetendum, nunquam peccasset, nec aliter vitare poterat: ergo tenebatur deliberare; et ante omisit deliberare, quam illud appeteret: ergo ante omisit, quam superbiret. Si forte dicas, quod per intellectum deiformem poterat sine deliberatione videre, quid faciendum; contra: ad hoc, quod ipse hoc inspiceret, oportuit ipsum considerare circumstantias appetiti et consequentia, et ista sunt multa; sed simplex virtutis finitae, quod cognoscit multa per multa, impossibile est simul multa cognoscere, cum se totaliter convertat ad cognitum:⁷ ergo necesse habuit deliberare. Praeterea, hoc non solvit, quia quidquid esset, tenebatur vitare peccatum, tenebatur reprimere cogitationem suam, ne procederet ad consensum, et hoc, antequam consentiret: ergo ante omisit: ergo etc.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. That (his) first sin was an omission, seems, because, if he himself had deliberated, whether that (sin) was to be desired, he never would have sinned, nor could he otherwise avoid (it): therefore he was bound to deliberate; and he omitted to deliberate before he desired that (sin): therefore he omitted (to deliberate) before he was proud. If perchance you say, that through (his) deiform intellect he could see without deliberation, what (is) to be done; on the contrary: for this, that he himself would see it, it was necessary [oportuit] that he consider the circumstances and consequences of the (thing) desired, and these are many; but (something) simple of a finite virtue, which cognizes many (things) through many (acts), it is impossible that it cognize many together, since it converts itself totally toward the cognized:⁷ therefore it was necessary for him [necesse habuit] to deliberate. Moreover, this does not solve (the matter), because whatever it was, he was bound to avoid sin, he was bound to repress his own thought, lest it proceed to consenting, and this, before he consented: therefore he omitted (something) beforehand: ergo etc..
2. Item, videtur, quod peccato ingratitudinis. Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis:⁸ « Quia gratuitae bonitati Dei, a qua conditus es, ingratus existis, iustitiam, quam expertus non es, non metuis; ideo audacter culpam committis »: ergo ante fuit ingratus, quam committeret culpam illam superbiae.	2. Likewise, it seems, that (he sinned) by a sin of ingratitude. (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux says) On the Grades of Humility:⁸ « Because you stand forth as one ungrateful for the gratuitous Goodness of God, by which you were founded, you did not fear the justice, which you had not experienced; for that reason you audaciously commit a fault »: therefore he was ungrateful before he committed that fault of pride.
3. Item, ratione videtur, quia tenetur quis gratias agere de beneficiis, quando illa considerat; sed diabolus consideravit beneficia Dei, cum respexit⁹ suam pulcritudinem et excellentiam, et non egit gratias, immo oppositum fecit, quia voluit sibi attribuere quod Dei erat: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, it seems by reason, because one is bound to give thanks for benefactions [beneficiis], when one considers them; but the Devil considered the benefactions of God, when he looked back upon⁹ his own beauty and excellence, and he did not give thanks, nay he did [fecit] the opposite, because he wanted to attribute to himself what belonged to God: ergo etc..
4. Item, videtur, quod peccato infidelitatis, quia Anselmus de Peccato diaboli et Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis¹⁰ dicunt, quod diabolus non credidit, se esse puniendum, sive credidit, se non debere puniri; sed qui credit, peccatum a Deo impunitum relinqui, est infidelis; ergo diabolus, antequam peccaret appetendo, peccavit per infidelitatem.	4. Likewise, it seems, that (the Devil sinned) by a sin of infidelity, because (St.) Anselm On the Sin of the Devil and (St.) Bernard On the Grades of Humility¹⁰ say, that the Devil did not believe, that he was to be punished, or believed, that he ought not be punished; but he who believes, that God will leave sin unpunished, is an infidel [infidelis]; therefore the Devil, before he sinned by desiring, sinned through infidelity.
5. Item, ratione videtur: diabolus nunquam appetivisset, nisi credidisset, sibi esse bonum vel . . .	5. Likewise, it seems by reason: the Devil never would have desired (to be equal to God), unless he had believed, that (this) is good and/or . . .
¹ Vers. 18. — Glossa sumta est ex Gregor., XXIII. Moral. c. 6. n. 13: Ipse quippe singulariter elatus dixerat: Supra astra caeli . . . (Isai. 14, 13), et mire Dominus, ut in discipulorum cordibus elationem premeret, mox iudicium ruinae retulit, quod ipse magister elationis accepit, ut in auctore superbiae discerent, quid de elationis vitio formidarent. ² Vers. 15. ³ Cap. 23. n. 30. ⁴ Num. 7. ⁵ Epist. I. Ioan. 2, 16. ⁶ Cfr. August. XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 6. seq. — Cod. I causetur pro causatur. ⁷ Cfr. supra pag. 67, nota 8. et pag. 79, nota 2. — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 quia cognoscit pro quod cognoscit. ⁸ Cap. 10. n. 33, ubi agit de lucifero ipsumque his verbis alloquitur. ⁹ Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 respexerit. ¹⁰ Anselm., de Casu diab. c. 23; Bernard. loc. cit., c. 10. n. 33 et 36.	¹ Verse 18. — The Gloss has been taken from (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great), Morals, ch. 6, n. 13: He himself, indeed singularly elated, had said: Above the starts of Heaven . . . (Isaiah 14:13), and the Lord in a wonderful manner, to repress elation in the hearts of (His) disciples, mentioned next the judgment of ruin, which that master of elation accepted, so that they might learn in the author of pride, what to dread concerning the vice of elation. ² Verse 15. ³ Chapter 23, n. 30. ⁴ Number 7. ⁵ 1 John 2:16. ⁶ Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. XIV, ch. 6 f.. — Codex I reads in the subjunctive (and since) an inordinate love is caused etc. [causetur]. ⁷ Cf. above d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 33, p. 67, footnote 8, and d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, p. 79, footnote 2. — A little above this codex cc and edition 1 has because it cognizes [quia cognoscit] for which cognizes [quod cognoscit]. ⁸ Chapter 10, n. 33, where he deals with Lucifer and speaks to him in these words. ⁹ Not a few codices, together with edition 1, read in the subjunctive since he [respexerit] for when he [respexit]. ¹⁰ (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury), On the Downfall of the Devil, ch. 23; (St.) Bernard, loc. cit., ch. 10, nn. 33 and 36.

p. 146

possibile; sed omnis qui credit, creaturam posse aequari ipsi Creatori, est infidelis: ergo diabolus, antequam superbiret, infidelis fuit.	possible for him; but everyone who believes, that a creature can be equated [aequari] with the Creator Himself, is an infidel: therefore the Devil, before he was proud, was unfaithful [infidelis].
6. Item, videtur, quod peccatum curiositatis fuerit primum. Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis, capitulo decimo:¹ « Per curiositatem a veritate cecidit, quia quod prius spectavit curiose, affectavit illicite et speravit praesumtuose ».	6. Likewise, it seem, that the sin of curiosity was the first (sin). (St.) Bernard (says) On the Grades of Humility, in the tenth (chapter):¹ « Through curiosity he fell from the truth, because what he first looked at curiously, he strove after [affectavit] illicitly and hoped for presumptuously ».
7. Item, hoc videtur ratione: quia curiositatis vitium est diligenter respicere, quod non licet appetere, secundum illud: « Non licet intueri quod non licet concupisci »;² sed diabolus diligenter aspexit quod supra se erat, quando dixit: In caelum ascendam: ergo manifestum etc.	7. Likewise, this seems by reason: because ‘to look back diligently upon that which it is not licit to desire [appetere]’ is the vice of curiosity, according to that (verse): « It is not licit to look upon that which it is not licit to desire completely [concupisci] »;² but the Devil diligently looked at That which was above him, when he said: I shall ascend unto Heaven: therefore it is manifest that etc..
8. Item, quod invidia fuerit, videtur. Augustinus de Sancta Virginitate,³ loquens de superbia et invidia: « His duobus diabolus diabolus est »; sed in primo peccato factus est diabolus: ergo fuit simul invidia ut superbia: ergo qua ratione superbia primum, et invidia.	8. Likewise, it seems, that it was envy. (St.) Augustine On Holy Virginity,³ speaking of pride and envy (says): « By these two the Devil is a devil »; but in the first sin he became a devil: therefore (his first sin) was at once envy as (it is) pride: therefore according to that reckoning by which pride (was) the first (sin), envy (is) also.
9. Item, ratione Magistri⁴ videtur: « Sicut converti est caritate adhaerere, ita ab oppositis averti est odio habere vel invidere »: cum ergo primo peccato diabolus fuerit aversus, invidia fuit eius primum peccatum.	8. Likewise, it seems by the reckoning of Master (Peter):⁴ « Just as to convert is to adhere by charity, so to turn away ab oppositis is to hold in hatred and/or to envy »: therefore since by the first sin the Devil had turned away, his first sin was envy.
CONCLUSIO. Primum Angeli peccatum fuit superbia; quod initiatum est in praesumtione, consummatum in ambitione, confirmatum in invidiae et odii aversione.	CONCLUSION The first sin of the Angel was pride; which started in presumption, (was) consummated in ambition, (and was) confirmed in the aversion of envy and hatred.
RESPONDEO: Ad hoc notandum, quod aliqui voluerunt dicere ad praedictas rationes et auctoritates, quod diabolus simul tempore peccavit pluribus generibus peccatorum; naturaliter tamen et principaliter prae aliis peccatis fuit peccatum superbiae. Et sic respondent unica et brevi responsione ad omnia obiecta, quod verum concludunt. — Sed haec responsio nec verum dicit, nec solvit. Non dicit verum, quia, cum affectus diaboli simplex ait, sicut et intellectus, et intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere vel plures cogitationes habere, similiter nec affectus simul et in eodem instanti plura peccata committere, maxime quae spectant omnino ad diversas actiones, sicut infidelitas, superbia et invidia. Praeterea, esto quod vera esset,⁵ non solvit, quia praedictae rationes non tantum probant, quod praedicta peccata concomitentur superbiam, sed quod antecedant.	I RESPOND: Regarding this it must be noted, that some wanted to say regarding the aforesaid reasons and authorities, that together in time the Devil sinned according to several genera of sins; yet naturally and principally before other sins was the sin of pride. And in this manner they respond with a unique and brief response to all the objections, that they conclude (are) true. — But this response neither speaks the truth, nor solves (the matter). It does not speak the truth, because, since the affection of the Devil is simple, just as even (his) intellect, and (his) intellect cannot understand at once several (things) and/or have several thoughts, similarly neither does (his) affection at once and in the same instant commit several sins, most of all those which pertain entirely to diverse actions, just as infidelity, pride and envy (do). Moreover, let it be that (this response)⁵ would be true, it (still) does not solve (the matter), because the aforesaid reasons do not only prove, that the aforesaid sins were concomitant with pride, but that they antecede (the sin of pride).
Et ideo aliter est dicendum, quod est loqui de peccato quantum ad triplicem statum, scilicet quantum ad inchoationem, consummationem et confirmationem. Peccatum diaboli initiatum est in praesumtione, statim enim, ut suam vidit pulcritudinem, praesumsit; consummatum est in ambitione, quia praesumens de se appetiit quod omnino supra se fuit et ad quod pervenire non potuit; sed confirmatum est invidiae et odii aversione, quia ex quo obtinere non potuit quod appetiit, ideo invidere coepit et affectu odii contrarire. Et in hoc firmatus est, quia hoc⁶ omnino ipsum a Deo separavit et perfectum obstaculum posuit, sicut perfecta caritas perfecte Deo iungit.	And for that reason it must be said in another manner, that there is a speaking of “sin” as much as regards (its) threefold state, namely as much as regards (its) being undertaken [inchoationem], (its) being consummated [consummationem] and (its) being confirmed [confirmationem]. The sin of the Devil was initiated in presumption, for as soon, as he saw his own beauty, he presumed; it was consummated in ambition, because presuming of himself he desired what was entirely above himself and to which he could not arrive; but it was confirmed in the aversion of envy and hatred, because out of this (that) he could not obtain what he desired, for that reason he began to envy and to go against (God) by the affection of hatred. And in this he was made firm [firmatus est], because by this (hatred)⁶ he entirely separated himself from God and placed a perfect obstacle (between himself and God), just as (contrariwise) perfect charity joins (one) perfectly to God.
Concedendae ergo sunt rationes primae, quod superbia fuerit primum peccatum; nam superbia praesumtionis et tumoris primum fuit generatione, superbia ambitionis primum fuit consummatione.	Therefore there are to be conceded the first reasons, that pride was the first sin; for the pride of presumption and of being puffed up [tumoris] was the first according to generation, the pride of ambition was the first according to consummation.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de omissione, notandum, quod omissio nec fuit nec potuit esse principale peccatum sive primum, quia dimissio boni venit ex timore male humiliante, et omnis talis timor venit ex amore male inflammante.⁷ Unde nullus dimittit aliquid facere quod debet, nisi aliquid amet, quod non debet; sicut aliquis omittit ire ad matutinum, quia amat somnum et quietem in lectulo. — Hac eadem ratione non potuit primum⁸ esse ingratitudo, nec etiam invidia. — Dicendum est igitur, quod non quaecumque dimissio inducit peccatum omissionis. Contingit enim omittere circumstantiam, et tunc non est peccatum omissionis, sed negligentia quaedam. Contingit omittere actum, et hoc dupliciter: vel generaliter, vel specialiter; generaliter, secundum quod comprehendit praeceptum affirmativum et negativum; specialiter⁹ contra affirmativum, sicut transgressio contra negativum. Unde non omittit qui non vitat fornicationem, sed qui non honorat parentes. Et secundum quod est actus specialis, potest esse actus principalis, vel non principalis. Et non est omissio peccatum principale, nisi pro actu principali, sicut patet de eo qui te- / -netur . . .	1. To that which is objected concerning omission, it must be noted, that omission neither was nor could be (his) principal or first sin, because the letting go [dimissio] of the good comes out of a badly humbling fear [timore male humiliante], and every such fear comes out of an badly inflaming love [amore male inflammante].⁷ Wherefore no one leaves off [dimittit] doing something which he ought to, unless he loves something, which he ought not; just as one omits going to (the liturgy of) Matins [ad matutinum],* because he loves sleep and rest in bed. — For this same reason ingratitude could not be (his) first (sin),⁸ nor even envy. — Therefore it must be said, that not any leaving off [dismissio] whatsoever induces the sin of omission. For one happens to omit (the consideration of) a circumstance, and then there is not the sin of omission, but a certain negligence. One happens to omit a (due) act, and this in a twofold manner: either generally, and/or in particular; generally, according to that which comprehends an affirmative and negative precept; in particular⁹ against an affirmative (precept), just as a transgression (is committed) against a negative (precept). Wherefore he who does not forbid fornication does not omit (a due act); but he who does not honor (his) parents (does). And according to which an act is particular, it can be a principal, and/or non principal, act. And an omission is not a principle sin, except on behalf of a principal act, just as is clear concerning him who is / bound . . .
¹ Num. 38; in qua sententia textus originalis, verbis transpositis: quia prius spectavit curiose, quod affectavit illicite, speravit praesumtione. ² Gregor., XXI. Moral. c. 2. n. 4. — Sequens textus est Isai. 14, 13. ³ Cap. 31. n. 31: Quibus duobus malis, hoc est superbia et invidentia, diabolus est. — Paulo inferius Vat. cum pluribus mss. et superbia, cod. cc et ed. 1 cum superbia pro ut superbia. ⁴ Hic c. 1. ⁵ Subaudi: haec responsio. — Nonnulli codd. quod ita esset. ⁶ Scil. odium. — Vat. firmatum est, quia haec. ⁷ August., Enarrat. in Ps. 79, n. 3: Succensa igni et effosa etc. Omnia peccata duae res faciunt in homine, cupiditas et timor . . . Ad omne recte factum amor et timor ducit, ad omne peccatum amore et timor ducit . . . Quae sunt peccata succensa igni et effossa? Quid fecerat amor malus? Tanquam ignem succenderat. Quid fecerat timor malus? Tanquam effoderat. Amor quippe inflammat, timor humiliat. — In hac prop. sicut et aliquanto inferius nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 omissio pro dimissio. ⁸ Supple cum Vat. peccatum. ⁹ Cod. U specialiter vero ita est omissio. Cod. cc et ed. 1 specialiter contra affirmativum. Sic enim omissio est contra praeceptum affirmativum, sicut etc. Non pauci codd. cum Vat. incongrue apprehendit pro comprehendit.	¹ Number 38; in which sentence the original text, with transposed words reads: because first looked at curiously, what he strove after illicitly, (and) hoped for with presumption [quia prius spectavit curiose, quod affectavit illicite, speravit praesumtione]. ² (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great), Morals on the Book of Job, Bk. XXI, ch. 2, n. 4. — The following text is Isaiah 14:13. ³ Chapter 31, n. 31: By which two evils, that is pride and envying [invidentia], he is a devil. — A little below this the Vatican edition, together with several manuscripts, has and pride [et superbia] for as (it is) pride [ut superbia]. ⁴ Here in ch. 1. ⁵ Understand: this response [haec responsio]. Not a few codices have that it would be thus [quod ita esset]. ⁶ That is, by this hatred. — The Vatican edition reads (his sin) was made firm, because this (affection) [firmatum est, quia haec]. ⁷ (St.) Augustine, Enarrations., Ps. 79, n. 3 (on v. 17): (Things) enkindled by fire and gutting etc.. Two things, cupidity and fear, cause all the sins in man . . . Love and fear lead to everything rightly done, love and fear lead to every sin . . .What are the sins enkindled and gutted by fire? What had evil love wrought? It enkindled as fire. What had evil fear wrought? As one gutting. Love indeed inflames, fear humbles. — In this proposition, just as also somewhat below it, not a few codices, together with edition 1, have omission [omissio] for letting go and leaving off [dismissio]. ⁸ Supply together with the Vatican edition sin [peccatum]. ⁹ Codex U has but in particular thus it is an omission [specialiter vero ita est omissio] for in particular [specialiter]. Codex cc and edition 1 have in particular against an affirmative (precept). For thus an omission is against an affirmative precept, just as etc. [specialiter contra affirmativum. Sic enim omissio est contra praeceptum affirmativum, sicut etc.]. Not a few codices, together with the Vatican edition, have incongruously apprehends [apprehendit] for comprehends [comprehendit].
	* [Trans. note: Matins is the hour of the Divine Office which is recited by monks and friars shortly after Midnight, and which in the 13th Century was obligatory for the clerics of the Monastery.]

p. 147

te- / -netur ire ad matutinas, tenetur se inducere et surgere de lecto, et sic de aliis; et quamvis sint multi actus, una est omissio. Ad hoc autem, quod sit peccatum aliquod censendum esse peccatum omissionis, oportet, quod sit omissio actus, non circumstantiae; affirmativi,¹ non negativi; principalis, non annexi. — Sic autem patet, quod non est in proposito, quia diabolus actum principalem aliquem, ad quem teneretur, non dimisit, sed id appetiit, quod non debuit. Et sic patet breviter de omissione.	is / bound to go to Matins [ad matutinas], (that) he is bound to induce himself and to rise from bed, and thus concerning other (acts); and though there are many acts (consequent to the omission of the principal act), there is one omission. But regarding this, that some sin be judged to be a sin of omission, it is necessary [oportet], that the omission be of an act, not of a circumstance; of an affirmative (precept),¹ not of a negative one; of a principal (act), not of one annexed. — Moreover in this manner it is clear, that (this) is not in the proposed, because the Devil did not leave of some principal act, to which he was bound, but he did desire that which he ought not have. And thus briefly it is clear concerning omission.
2. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ingratitudine, dicendum, quod ingratitudo potest dici dupliciter, scilicet negative, vel privative.² Negative, quando quis non est gratus Deo, ut debet, et sic est circumstantia omnium peccatorum. Privative, quando non tantum non est gratus, immo contrarie movetur, ut puta quando cogitat de beneficio, ut est beneficium, et parvipendit beneficium vel benefactorem; et sic est speciale peccatum. Sic autem non peccavit diabolus, quia non cogitavit de beneficiis Dei, in quantum erant Dei, sed in quantum erant bona propria, et ideo elatus est.	2. 3. To that which is objected concerning ingratitude, it must be said, that “ingratitude” can be said in a twofold manner, namely negatively, and/or privatively.² Negatively, when one has not been grateful to God, as he ought, and in this manner it is the circumstance of all sins. Privatively, when one not only has not been grateful, nay is moved contrarily, as for example when he thinks of the benefaction, as it is a benefaction, and thinks little [parvipendit] of the benefaction and/or benefactor; and in this manner it is a special sin. But in this manner the Devil did not sin, because he did not think of God’s benefactions, inasmuch as they belongs to God, but inasmuch as they were his own goods, and for that reason he was elated.
4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infidelitate, dicendum, quod nec peccatum infidelitatis nec curiositatis fuit primum, quia oculus sanus et clarus ipsius intellectus non pervertitur in iudicando vel inquirendo, nisi prius aliqua elatione inquinetur.³	4. 5. To that which is objected concerning infidelity, it must be said, that neither the sin of infidelity nor (that) of curiosity was first, because the healthy and clear eye of the intellect itself is not perverted in judging and/or inquiring, unless it be befouled [inquinetur]³ first by some elation.
Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non credidit etc.; dicendum, quod ad infidelitatis peccatum duo concurrunt. Oportet enim, quod sit consensus rationis cum iudicio universali. Si enim aliquis cogitat, quod fornicari est sibi bonum; vel cogitat in universali, quod est bonum, et non consentit iudicio rationis,⁴ non est infidelis, ut patet. Et de diabolo dico, quod non consensit iudicio rationis, sed aestimavit sibi bonum.	To that, therefore, which is objected, that (the Devil) did not believe etc.; it must be said, that for the sin of fidelity two things concur. For it is necessary [oportet], that there be the consent to a reckoning with a universal judgment. For if anyone thinks, that it is good for him to fornicate; and/or thinks in the universal (sense), that it is good, and does not consent to the judgment of reason,⁴ he is not unfaithful, as is clear. And of the Devil I say, that he did not consent to the judgment of reason, but esteemed (it) good for him.
6. 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de curiositate, dicendum, quod duo faciunt considerationem dici curiosam, scilicet curae attentio et utilitatis privatio.⁵ Unde si diabolus ex omnibus quae respexit, suum bonum elicuisset, referendo illa in gloriam Dei; illa consideratio nec esset culpanda nec curiosa dicenda. Quod ergo fuit curiosa, ex hoc fuit, quod non suum⁶ bonum inde elicuit, sed malum ambitionis et praesumtionis incurrit; et ita fuit primo ratio peccati in praesumtione et in consideratione. Et sic patet, quod quamvis in diabolo fuerit curiositas, non fuit culpa antecedens praesumtionem, nec alia, sed conditio illi annexa.	6. 7. To that which is objected concerning curiosity, it must be said, that two (things) cause a consideration to be said (to be) “curious”, that is the attention of the care and the privation of (its) utility.⁵ Wherefore if the Devil out of all (the things) which he looked back upon, had elicited his own good, by referring them unto God’s glory; that consideration would neither have been faulted as nor said (to be) “curious”. Therefore that it was curious, was from this, that from it he did not elicit his own⁶ good, but incurred the evil of ambition and presumption; and thus the reckoning of sin was first in the presumption and in the consideration. And thus it is clear, that although in the Devil there was curiosity, it was not a fault antecedent to the presumption, nor to other (faults), but a condition annexed to the former.
8. 9. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de invidia, patet responsio per verbum Augustini, quod non fuit primum peccatum. Nam Augustinus dicit, quod est proles superbiae, in libro de Virginitate,⁷ et ita eam consequitur, etsi non in eodem instanti, tamen in eodem tempore sine morae intermissione. Unde in huius prolis generatione confirmata est superbia, et diabolus dictus est diabolus, quia deorsum fluxit⁸ et ex hoc in malitia sua firmatus fuit. Et ideo Magister describens perfectam aversionem, qualis est in diabolo, non qualis est in hominibus peccatoribus, dicit, quod « averti est odio habere vel invidere ». Diabolus enim superbus non valens conscendere, sed compulsus descendere, odit Deum iustum et invidet excellentiae eius.	8. 9. To that which is objected last concerning envy, the response is clear through the word of (St.) Augustine, that it was not (his) first sin. For (St.) Augustine says, that (envy) is the offspring of pride, in the book On Virginity,⁷ and thus it is consequent to it, even if (it is) not in the same instant, yet in the same time without the intermission of a delay. Wherefore in the generation of this offspring (his) pride was confirmed, and the Devil is said (to be) a “devil”, because he rushed downward [deorsum fluxit]⁸ and on this account he was made firm in his wickedness. And for that reason Master (Peter), describing the perfect aversion, of the kind which is in the Devil, not of the kind which is in men as sinners, says, that « ‘to turn away’ is ‘to hold in hatred’ and/or ‘to envy’ ». For the proud Devil, not prevailing to completely ascend, but compelled to descend, hates the Just God and envies His Excellence.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Fide constat, aliquos Angelos peccasse; theologi in hoc etiam consentiunt, quod nulla creatura ex natura sua esse possit omnino impeccabilis in ordine ad finem tum naturalem tum supernaturalem. Respectu autem finis et legis naturalis S. Thom. (S. q. 63. a. 1. ad 3; de Malo, q. 16. a. 3, et a. 5. ad 10.) censet, Angelos directe et immediate non contra hunc finem et legem, sed tantum contra finem et legum supernaturalem potuisse peccare. S. Bonav. autem, Scot. aliique multi omnem creaturam peccabilem esse sine restrictione dicunt (cfr. infra d. 24. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.).	I. It is established by the Faith, that some Angels sinned; (catholic) theologians also consent in this, that no creature out of its own nature can be entirely impeccable in the order regarding both (its) natural and the supernatural end. Moreover in respect of (its) natural end and law St. Thomas (Summa., q. 63, a. 1, in reply to n. 3; de Malo, q. 16, a. 3, and a. 4, in reply to n. 19) judges, that the Angels directly and immediately could not have sinned against this end and law, but only against (their) supernatural end and law. But St. Bonaventure, (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, and many others say that every creature is peccable (i.e. able to commit a sin) without restriction.
II. Primum peccatum luciferi in superbia ponendum esse, communiter tenetur. Quod etiam Alex. Hal. docet, sed addit: « Et radix eius avaritia vel cupiditas », scil in sensu largiore. Scotus autem putat, illud non esse superbiam proprie dictam, quam intelligit esse appetitum immoderatum excellentiae per respectum ad alios; sed potius reducendam esse ad quandam luxuriam spiritualem. Porro doctores in hoc convenire videntur, quod initium huius peccati non consistat in appetendo aliquod bonum non habitum, sed in amando inordinate bonum, quod Angelus habuit; sive quod ipse peccare incepit ab inordinato amore non cuiuscumque, sed sui ipsius. Et cum inordinatus amor recurvetur in se ipsum, hinc ille sibi complacuit, et motus complacentia excellentiae in se ipso consideratae, prorupit in appetitum inordinatum alicuius obiecti, vel per se ipsi non concessi, vel saltem inordinato modo desiderati. Sed de hoc progressu in peccando, et praecipue de . . .	II. That Lucifer’s first sin is to be posited in pride, is commonly held. Which even Alexander of Hales teaches, but adding: « And its rood (was) avarice and/or cupidity », namely in the broader sense. But (Bl. John Duns) Scotus thinks, that it was not “pride” properly said, which he understands to be the immoderate appetite for excellence through a looking back to others; but rather is to be lead back to a certain spiritual lust [luxuriam spiritualem]. Furthermore the doctors (of theology) seem to convene in this, that the start of his sin does not consist in desiring some good not had, but in loving the good, which the Angel had, inordinately; or that he started to sin from an inordinate love not for anything whatsoever, but for himself. And since inordinate love curves back upon itself, hence he was completely pleased with himself, and moved by the complacency of the excellence considered in himself, he burst forth in an inordinate appetite for some object, either not conceded to him through itself, and/or at least desired in an inordinate manner. But concerning this progression in sinning, and chiefly concerning . . .
¹ Cod. cc et ed. 1 praecepti affirmativi. ² Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 contrarie, quod non convenit subnexis. Eadem distinctio insinuatur hoc modo: materialiter et formaliter. ³ Vat. inclinetur. ⁴ Plurimi codd. cum primis edd. iudicium rationis; perperam, ut claret ex contextu. — Cfr. Aristot., de Motu animalium, c. 4. (c. 7.), ubi electionem et appetitum exponit per modum syllogismi, qui habet tres propositiones. ⁵ Eadmerus († 1121), de S. Anselmi similitudinibus (inter opera Anselmi), c. 26. definit curiositatem ita: Curiositas est studium perscrutandi ea quae scire nulla est utilitas. — Quoad primam curiositatis notam, scil, quod sit curae attentio, codd. inter se dissentiunt; plures enim cum edd. 1, 2 pro attentio substituunt accusatio, nonnulli accuratio, aliqui actio; melius codd. N P Q W applicatio et cod. I accumulatio. ⁶ In pluribus mss. et ed. 1 desideratur suum. ⁷ Cap. 31. n. 31: Hanc (superbiam) sequitur invidentia, tanquam filia pedissequa; eam quippe superbia continuo parit, nec unquam est sine tali prole atque comite. Cfr. XI. de gen. ad lit. c. 14. n. 18. — Cod. cc et ed. 1 filia superbiae pro proles superbiae. ⁸ Isidor., VIII. Etymolog. c. 11. n. 18: Diabolus Hebraice dicitur deorsum fluens, quia quietus in caeli culmine stare contempsit, sed superbiae pondere deorsum corruens cecidit; Graece vero diabolus criminator vocatur etc.	¹ Codex cc and edition 1 have of an affirmative precept [praecepti affirmativi]. ² Many codices, together with editions 1 and 2, have contrarily [contrarie], which does not convene with the subjoined. The same distinction is given in this manner: materially and formally. ³ The Vatican edition reads it be inclined [inclinetur]. ⁴ Very many codices, together with the first editions, have and the judgment of reason does not consent [non consentit iudium rationis], faultily, as is clear from the context. — Cf. Aristotle, On the Movements of Animals, ch. 4 (ch. 7), where he explains choice and desire through the manner of a syllogism, which has three propositions. ⁵ Eadmer († 1121 A.D.), On the Similitudes of St. Anselm, (among the works of St. Anselm), ch. 26, defines curiosity thus: Curiosity is the study of thoroughly scrutinizing those, which there is no usefulness to know. — In regard to the first mark of curiosity, namely, that is the attention of the care (given to the object of curiosity), the codices disagree among themselves; for several, together with editions 1 and 2, for attention [attentio] have accusation [accusatio], not a few have carefulness [accuratio], some action [actio]; better are the readings of codices N P Q and W application [applicatio] and of codex I accumulation [accumulatio]. ⁶ In several manuscripts and edition 1 there is wanting his own [suum]. ⁷ Chapter 31, n. 31: Envying follows this (pride), as a daughter and attendant [pedissequa]; indeed pride immediately gives birth to her, nor is she ever without such an offspring and follower [comite]. ⁸ (St.) Isidore (of Seville), Etymologies, Bk. VIII, ch. 11, n. 18: “Devil” [diabolus] in Hebrew means a “one flowing downward” [deorsum fluens], because at rest in the height of Heaven he contemned staying (there), but falling downward by the weight of pride he fell down; but in Greek a “devil” is called an “accuser” [criminator] etc..

p. 148

obiecto ab ipso appetito (de quo agitur seq. quaest.), diversae sunt sententiae, vel saltem modi loquendi. Hunc progressum in peccando S. Bonav. egregie hic et clarius in Breviloquio (p. II. c. 7.) adumbrat, ubi dicit: « Lucifer, suae pulcritudinis et altitudinis consideratione excitatus ad se diligendum et suum privatum bonum, praesumit de altitudine habita et ambivit excellentiam propriam, non tamen obtentam; ac per hoc praesumendo constituit se sibi principium summum, in se ipso gloriando; et ambiendo constituit se sibi summum bonum, in se ipso quiescendo ». Et his verbis, ni fallimur, apparet, verba (in corp.) in praesumtione sensu largiore accipienda esse pro actu, quo voluit esse bonus et magnus secundum se et non per aliud; totam autem sententiam Seraphici congruere cum iis quae de peccato Adami dicit S. Augustinus (XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 13. n. 1.): « Quid est autem superbia nisi perversae celsitudinis appetitus? Perversa enim celsitudo est, deserto eo cui debet animus inhaerere principio, sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, dum sibi nimis placet. Sibi vero ita placet, cum ab illo bono incommutabili deficit, quod ei magis placere debuit, quam ipse sibi ». Cfr. etiam infra a. 2. q. 1.

the object of the appetite itself (concerning which the following Question deals), there are diverse sentences, and/or at least manners of speaking. This progression in sinning St. Bonaventure sketches in an outstanding manner here and more clearly in the Breviloquium (p. II, ch. 7), where he says: « Lucifer, excited by the consideration of his own beauty and height to love himself and his own private good, presumed from the height (he) had and sought for [ambivit] his own, yet not obtained, excellence; and through this, by presuming, he constituted himself his own most high principle, glorying in himself; and by seeking [ambiendo] consituted himself his own most high good, resting in himself ». And with these words, unless we are mistaken, it appears, that the words (in the body of the present Question) “in presumption” are to be accepted in the broader sense for the act, by which he willed to be good and great according to himself and not through another; but that the entire sentence of the Seraphic (Doctor) is congruent with those (things) which St. Augustine says of the sin of Adam (On the City of God, Bk. XIV, ch. 13, n. 1): « Moreover what is pride except the appetite for a perverse loftiness? For it is a perverse loftiness, having deserted that Principle to which (one’s) spirit ought to cleave, to in a certain manner become and be one’s own principle. This is wrought, so long as one is exceedingly pleasing to oneself. But one pleases oneself thus, when one fails from that Incommutable Good, which ought to have pleased one more, than one (does) oneself ». Cf. also below in a. 2, q. 1.

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 2. — Scotus, in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 6. q. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. I. q. 63. a. 2; S. c. Gent. III. c. 109. 110. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Durand. de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. II. Sent. d. 6. q. unica.

III. Alexander of Hales., Summa., p. II, q. 98, m. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each version, Sent., Bk. II, d. 6, q. 2. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3; Summa. , I, q. 63, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. III, chs. 109 and 110. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 2; Summa., p. II, tr. 5, q. 21, m. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 3. — Durandus, on this and the following q. here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following question, here in q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following question, Sent., Bk. II, d. 6, q. sole.

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup, all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2007, 2008 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo. The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V