S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 148-150.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 148-150.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum lucifer appetiverit Deo aequiparari.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether Lucifer desired to be God’s equal peer?

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, quid appetiit ipse lucifer.  Et quod appetiverit Deo parificari, ostenditur:

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, what did Lucifer himself desire.  And that he desired to be made God’s peer [Deo parificari], is shown:

1. Per textum Isaiae decimo* quarto,1 ubi describitur eius peccatum:  Ascendam in caelum, et ero similis Altissimo; sed non dixit de caelo empyreo, quia ibi erat:  ergo de caelo Trinitatis; sed in illo non est nisi aequalitas:  ergo etc.

1. Through the text of Isaiah, in the fourteenth* (chapter),1 where his sin is described:  I shall ascend unto Heaven, and I shall be similar to the Most High; but he did not speak of the empyrean Heaven, because he was (already) there:  therefore (he spoke) of the Heaven of the Trinity; but in That there is not but Equality:  ergo etc..

2. Item, super illud Psalmi:2  Quae non rapui, Glossa:  « Quia Adam et diabolus voluerunt rapere divinitatem, amiserunt felicitatem »; sed non voluerunt rapere divinitatem quantum ad identitatem:  ergo quantum ad aequalitatem.

2. Likewise, on that (verse) of the Psalm:2  That which I did not snatch away, the Gloss (says):  « Because Adam and the Devil wanted to snatch away divinity, they lost felicity »; but they did not want to snatch away divinity as much as regards (God’s) identity:  therefore as much as regards (God’s) equality.

3. Item, Bernardus de Gradibus humilitatis:3  « Haec iniquitas tua non ira momentanea, sed odio digna est sempiterno, quod tuo dilectissimo et altissimo Domino desideras semper aequari ».

3. Likewise, (St.) Bernard (says) On the Grades of Humility:3  « This, thy iniquity, that you desire always to be equal to [aequari] thy most beloved and Most High Lord, (was) not momentary wrath, but it is worthy of sempiternal hatred ».

4. Item, quod sit appetibile, videtur ratione, quia similitudo est appetibilis, ergo maior similitudo magis, et maxima similitudo maxime appetibilis; sed similitudo aequiparantiae est huiusmodi:  ergo videtur, quod valde facile fuit eam appetere, eo quod magna esset inclinatio.

4. Likewise, that it is desirable [appetibile], seems by reason, because a similitude (to God) is desirable, therefore a greater similitude (is) more (so), and the greatest similitude (is) most of all desirable; but a similitude of equiparancy is of this kind:  therefore it seems, that it was very easy that he desire this, by this, that the inclination (to it) was great.

5. Item, omne quod potest cogitari delectabile, potest appeti; sed diabolus potuit cogitare delectabile esse tale, qualis est Deus, quia summe delectabile est esse Deum:  ergo videtur rationabiliter, quod hoc potuerit appetere.

5. Likewise, everything which can be thought (to be) delectable, can be desired; but the Devil could have thought that to be such, as God is, (was) desirable, because to be God is most highly desirable:  therefore it seems reasonably, that he could have desired this.

6. Item, quod appetierit, videtur.  Diabolus superbus appetiit aliquid, quod vidit supra se, quia hoc est ratio superbiae; sed supra luciferum in statu illo nihil erat nisi Deus et eius celsitudo:  ergo appetiit divinam celsitudinem.

6. Likewise, it seems that he did desire (this).  The proud Devil desired something, which he saw above himself, because this is the reckoning of pride; but above Lucifer in that state there was naught but God and His Loftiness:  therefore he desired the Divine Loftiness.

7. Item, tantum excellens fuit superbia, quantum excellit invidiae et odii malitia; sed non tantum diabolus odit et invidet creaturis Dei, ut homini, immo etiam invidet ipsi Deo:  ergo non tantum creaturis praeesse, sed etiam Deo se voluit aequare.

7. Likewise, (his) pride was only as excellent, as he excelled in the malice of envy and hatred; but the Devil not only hates an envies God’s creatures, such as man, nay he even envies God Himself:  therefore he wanted not only to take precedence [praeesse] to creatures, but even that he equal [aequaare] to God.

8. Item, licitum est appetere similitudinem conformitatis:  si ergo diabolus illicitum appetiit, ultra hanc progressus est; sed ultra similitudinem conformitatis non est nisi similitudo aequalitatis:  ergo haec appetiit lucifer, ut videtur.

8. Likewise, it is licit to desire a similitude of conformity (with God):  if, therefore, the Devil desired (something) illicit, he went [progressus est] beyond this; but beyond the similitude of conformity there is naught but a similitude of equality:  therefore Lucifer desired this, as it seems.

CONTRA:  1. Primae ad Timotheum secundo:4  Adam non est seductus etc., Glossa:  « Non est credendum, quod vir spirituali mente praeditus appetierit esse sicut Deus ».  Si non est credendum de homine, cum adhuc sapientior esset illo Angelus, multo minus est credendum de eo.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. The Gloss on the second (chapter of St. Paul’s) First (Letter) to Timothy:4  Adam was not seduced etc., (reads):  « It must not be believed, that a man, not plundered of a spiritual mind, would desire to be as God (is) ».  If it must not be thought of a man, since an Angel was still wiser than he, much less is it to be believed of him (i. e. the Angel).

2. Item, Anselmus in libro de Casu diaboli:5  « Nihil appetiit, ad quod non pervenisset, si stetisset »; sed nunquam fuisset parificatus Deo:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury) in (his) book On the Downfall of the Devil (says):5  « He desired nothing, to which he would not have arrived, if he had stood (firm) »; but he never would have been made equal to God:  ergo etc..

3. Item, quod hoc non sit appetibile, videtur.  Divina immensitas non potest mente capi, ergo nul- / -lus . . .

3. Likewise, it seems that this is not desirable.  The Divine Immensity cannot be grasped by the mind, therefore no / one . . .

1  Vers. 13.  — De caelo Trinitatis cfr. supra d. 2. p. II. dub. 2.

2  Psalm. 68, 5.  —  Glossa sumta est ex August. enarratione in hunc Psalm. Serm. 1. n. 9.

3  Cap. 10. n. 33, ubi textus originalis qua tuo substituit pro quod tuo, et dein desideras tamen ac speras pro desideras semper; plures codd. desiderasti, Vat. desiderares pro desideras.

4  Vers. 14.  —  Glossa formata est ex August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 42. n. 58, ubi ponit quaestionem:  utrum Adam crediderit serpenti?

5  Haec sententia collecta videtur ex iis, quae libr. cit. c. 4. et 6. proponuntur.  Nam c. 4. dicitur:  « Voluit igitur aliquid, quod non habebat, nec tunc velle debebat; sicut Eva similis voluit esse diis, priusquam Deus hoc vellet . . . Nihil autem velle poterat nisi iustitiam, aut commodum . . . Iustitiam vero volendo peccare non potuit . . . Peccavit ergo volendo aliquod commodum, quod nec habebat nec tunc velle debuit [B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 1. allegat hunc textum, et hic interserit:  sed per meritum exspectare], quod tamen ad augmentum beatitudinis esse illi potuit . . . Cernis, ut puto, quia plus aliquid, quam acceperat, inordinate volendo, voluntatem suam extra iustitiam extendit ».  Cap. 6. legitur:  « Quid illud fuerit (quod mali angeli iniuste concupierunt), non video; sed quidquid fuerit, sufficit scire, quia fuit aliquid, ad quod crescere potuerunt; quod non acceperunt, quando creati sunt, ut ad aliud suo merito proficerent ».  Similis sententia occurrit supra d. III. c. 4, ubi Magister ex August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 23. n. 30. haec recitat verba:  Cecidit, non ab eo quod accepit, sed ab eo quod accepisset, si Deo subdi voluisset.

1  Verse 13.  —  On the Heaven of the Trinity, cf. above d. 2, p. II, dubium 2.

2  Psalm 68:5.  —  The gloss has been taken from (St.) Augustine, Enarrations, on this Psalm, sermon 1, n. 9.

3  Chapter 10, n. 33, where the original text substitutes by which [qua] for that [quod], and then reads you however desire and hope [desideras tamen ac speras] for you desire always [desideras semper], several codices have you desired [desiderasti], the Vatican edition has you would desire [desiderares] for you desire [desideras].

4  Verse 14.  —  The gloss has been formed from (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. XI, ch. 42, n. 58, where he posits the question:  “Whether Adam believed the serpent?”

5  This sentence seems to be gathered from those, which are proposed in the book cited, chs. 4 and 6.  For in ch. 4 there is said:  « Therefore he wanted something, which he did not have, nor ought he have willed (it) then; just as Eve wanted to be similar to the gods, before God willed this . . .But he could have willed nothing except justice, or (something) advantageous . . . But he could not have sinned by willing justice . . . Therefore he sinned by willing something advantageous, which he neither had nor ought to have willed at that time (St. Albertus Magus, Summa., p. II, tr. 5, q. 21, m. 1, cites this text, and inserts at this point:  but (ought) to have expected through merit), yet which for the augment of beatitude could have been his . . . Decide, as I think, because he extended his own will outside of justice, by willing inordinately something more than he had accepted ».  In chapter 6 there is read:  « What that was (which the evil angels unjustly desired completely), I do not see; but whatever it was, it is sufficient to know, that it was something, which they were able to grow up toward, which they had not accepted, when they were created, such as toward (something) else (to which) they would have progressed by their own merit ».  A similar sentence occurs above in d. III, ch. 4, where Master (Peter) quotes these words from (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, bk. XI, ch. 23, n. 30:  He fell down, not from that which he accepted, but from that which he would have accepted, if he had wanted to be subject to God.

* [Trans. nota:  Hic textus criticalis legivit perperam decimo, quarto pro decimo quarto.] 

* [Trans. note:  Here the text of the critical edition faultily placed the comma in the middle of the Latin for fourteenth [decimo, quarto], as can be seen from the context.]

p. 149

nul- / -lus potest cogitare aequalitatem ad Deum; sed nihil potest appeti, quod non potest intellectu capi:  ergo etc.

no / one can think of being equal [equality] to God; but nothing can be desired, which cannot be grasped by the intellect:  ergo etc..

4. Item, hoc probat Anselmus:1  « Si Deus non potest cogitari nisi ita solus, ut nihil ei simile possit cogitari:  quomodo potuit diabolus velle, quod non potuit cogitare »?

4. Likewise, (St.) Anselm proves this:1  « If God cannot be thought of except as one so alone, that nothing can be thought of similar to Him:  in what manner could the Devil will, what he could not think of »?

5. Item, quod diabolus hoc non appetierit, ostenditur, quia nihil appetiit, nisi ad quod se venire posse credidit — hoc patet, quia ipse dixit: Ponam sedem meam2 — sed nullus, nisi demens, posset unquam credere, quod creatura Creatori posset aequari:  ergo cum diabolus adhuc omnino stultus non esset, hoc nunquam appetiit.

5. Likewise, that the Devil did not desire this, is shown, because he desired nothing, except (that) to which he believed he could come — this is clear, because he himself said:  I shall place my throne2 — but no one, except the demented, could every believe, that a creature could be equal to the Creator:  therefore since the Devil was still not entirely a fool, he never desired this.

6. Item, diabolus diligebat se super omnia, ergo non volebat esse alius, quam ille qui erat; sed si esset par Deo, esset alius quam ille qui erat, quia esset Deus: ergo cum hoc non appeteret, non appetiit Deo omnino aequari.  Si tu dicas, quod bene appetitur antecedens sine consequente; verum est appetitu desiderativo, sed electivo nullus, nisi stultus, vult esse abbas deliberative, quin velit esse monachus.3

6. Likewise, the Devil loved himself above all (things), therefore he did not will to be other, than that which he was; but if he were God’s peer, he would be other than that which he was, because he would be God:  therefore since he did not desire this, he did not desire to be entirely equal to God.  If you say, that the antecedent is rightly desired without the consequent; it is true by a desiderative appetite [appetitu desiderativo], but no one by an elective (appetite), except a fool, wants to be an abbot in a deliberative manner, who does not want to be a monk.3

7. Item, omne peccatum est per conversionem ad bonum commutabile:4  ergo si diabolus appetiit parificari Deo, diabolus non peccavit; sed peccavit: ergo hoc non appetiit.

7. Likewise, every sin is through a conversion (from God) toward a commutable good:4  therefore if the Devil desired to be made God’s peer, the devil did not sin:  therefore he did not desire this.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Angelus malus appetiit quodam modo Dei similitudinem imitationis, quodam modo aequalitatis.

CONCLUSION

 

The evil Angel desired in a certain manner the similitude of God’s imitation, in a certain manner (the similitude of His) equality.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod duplex est similitudo Dei, scilicet aequiparantiae sive aequalitatis, et imitationis.5  Similitudo imitationis potest appeti ordinate et inordinate; ordinate, ut appetatur similitudo in his quae nostrae sunt aptitudinis et divinae acceptionis, cuiusmodi sunt perfectiones et decores virtutum; inordinate vero, ut homo appetat id quod non decet, vel quod Deo non placet, ut si appetat hominibus praeesse, vel se de adversariis vindicare.6  —  Similitudo aequalitatis nullo modo potest appeti ordinate, sed aliquo modo est appetibilis, aliquo modo non.  Nam omnimoda similitudo non est appetibilis, quia non potest cadere in cognitionem sive in intellectum, et ideo nec in appetitum; et si aliquis fingat, non appetit aequalitatem, sed suam fictionem.  Alio modo est similitudo aequalitatis in aliqua conditione, ut in dominio, praesidentia, scientia; et sic credo, quod potest appeti.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that God’s similitude is twofold, namely (that) of equiparancy or equality, and (that) of imitation.5  A similitude of imitation can be desired ordinately and inordinately; ordinately, so that a similitude in those (things) which belong to our aptitude and to the Divine Acceptance, are desired, of which kind are the perfections and ornaments of the virtues; but inordinately, so that a man desires that which is not decent, and/or which does not please God, such as if he desires to be before [praeesse] men, and/or to avenge himself on [de] (his) adversaries.6  —  A similitude of equality can in no manner be desired ordinately, but it is in some manner desirable, in some manner not.  For an omnimodal similitude is not desirable, because it cannot occur to [cadere in] the cognition or to the intellect, and for that reason neither to the appetite; and if anyone feigns (this), he does not desire an equality, but his own fiction.  In some manner there is a similitude of equality in some condition, such as in dominion, presidency, (and) knowledge; and in this manner I believe, that it can be desired.

Notandum est igitur, quod diabolus quodam modo appetiit similitudinem imitationis, quodam modo aequalitatis.  Et hoc apparet, si attendatur appetibile et modus appetendi.  Diabolus enim appetiit aliis praeesse, sua tamen auctoritate.  Quod appetiit praeesse, hoc fuit imitationis, et hoc quidem aliquando obtinuisset, si stetisset.  Quod autem propria auctoritate, ita quod sine meritis et sine datore et ita, quod nulli subesset; hoc est solius Dei, et hoc est aequiparantiae.  —  Et ita patet, quid appetiit; et patent multae auctoritates Sanctorum, quia Gregorius7 dicit, quod appetiit esse sui iuris, ita quod nulli subesset; Bernardus dicit, quod appetiit aequalitatem potentiae; Anselmus, quod appetiit praeesse sine meritis; et omnes verum dicunt, et diversae auctoritates circumloquuntur hoc quod est praeesse omnibus propria auctoritate.

It must be noted therefore, that the Devil desired in a certain manner the similitude of imitation, in a certain manner (that) of equality.  And this appears, if one attends to what he desired [appetible] and (his) manner of desiring [modus appetendi].  For the Devil desired to take precedence [praeesse] to others, yet one his own authority.  That he desired to take precedence, this belonged to imitation, and this indeed he would at some time have obtained, if he had stood (firm).  But that (he do so) on his own authority, such that (he have this) without merits and without a giver and thus, that the would be subject to no one; this belongs to God alone, and this is (the similitude) of equiparancy.  —  And thus is clear, what he desired; and the many authorities of the Saints are clear, because (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great)7 says, that he desired to be of his own right [sui iuris], such that he would be subject to none; (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux) says, that he desired the equality of power; (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury), that he desired to take precedence without merits, and all speak the truth, and the diverse authorities are speaking about [circumloquntur] that which it is to take precedence to all on ones’ own authority.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod appetiit divinam aequalitatem; concedendum est in aliquo; et sic currunt rationes ad illam partem inductae, quia bene potuit appeti, et maxime ab illo qui fuit superbissimus inter omnes, est appetita.

To that, therefore, which is objected, that he desired the Divine Equality; it must be conceded in some (manner); and thus runt the reasons brought forward for that side, because (this) well could have been desired, and it was desired most of all by him who was the most proud among all (the Angels).

Quod tamen obiicitur ultimo, non valet, quia quamvis licitum esset appetere similitudinem imitationis, non tamen omnem similitudinem, sicut ostensum est.

However, what is objected last, is not valid, because though it would be licit to desire a similitude of imitation, yet not every similitude, just as has been shown.

1. Ad illa quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, facile est respondere per iam dicta.  —  Quod enim obiicitur de Adam, non est simile, quia Adam gratiam habuit; et praeterea non habuit tantam occasionem efferendi se.

1. To those which are objected unto the contrary, it is easy to respond through (what has) already been said.  —  For what is objected concerning Adam, is not similar, because Adam had (sanctifying) grace; and besides he did not have so great an occasion of being puffed up [efferendi se].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, iam patet responsio, quia verum dicit quantum ad ipsum appetibile, non quantum ad circumstantiam, sub qua appetiit, scilicet quod propria auctoritate.

2. To that which is objected concerning (St.) Anselm, the response is already clear, because he speaks the truth as much as regards the thing desired itself [ipsum appetibile], not as much as regards the circumstance, under which he desired (it), namely, that (he desired to be such) on his own authority.

3. 4. Duae sequentes rationes, quae probant, quod non potest appeti, loquuntur de omnimoda assimilatione; quia si aliquis cogitet Deum in generali et cogitet ei similem, non cogitat Deum, sed fingit; et ideo non appetit esse similis Deo, sed fictioni suae.

3. 4. The two following reasons, which prove, that it cannot be desired, are speaking of omnimodal assimilation; because if someone thinks of God in general and thinks that he (is) similar to Him, he does not think of God, but feigns (doing so); and for that reason he does not desire to be similar to God, but to his own fiction.

1  De Casu diaboli, c. 4.

2  Isai. 14, 13.

3  Cfr. Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 2. et Damas., II. de Fide orthod. c. 22, qui praedictam appetitus distinctionem exprimunt vocabulis voluntas et electio, quarum prima potest esse impossibilium, altera autem non nisi possibilium.  —  Codd. X Y sed non electivo, nullus enim nisi pro sed electivo nullus, nisi.

4  Vide August., II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 53.

5  De quo vide August., I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 9.

6  Cfr. August., Enarrat., in Ps. 70, 19, Serm. 2. n. 6. seq.  —  Aliquanto superius plures codd. ut F K U X divinae acceptationis pro divinae acceptionis.  Mox post Similitudo in Vat. additur omnimoda.

7  Libr. XXXIV. Moral. c. 21. n. 40:  Leviathan vero iste eius (Dei) celsitudinis culmen aspiciens ius perversae libertatis appetiit, ut et praeesset ceteris et nulli subesset.  —  Verba Bernardi vide supra d. 4. a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. ad opp.  —  Anselm., de Casu diaboli, c. 4:  Etiamsi noluit omnino par esse Deo, sed aliquid minus Deo contra voluntatem Dei, hoc ipso voluit inordinate similis esse Deo, quia propria voluntate, quae nulli subdita fuit, voluit aliquid.  Solius enim Dei esse debet, sic voluntate propria velle aliquid, ut superiorem non sequatur voluntatem . . . Non solum autem voluit esse aequalis Deo, quia praesumsit habere propriam voluntatem, sed etiam maior voluit esse volendo, quod Deus illum velle nolebat, quoniam voluntatem suam supra voluntatem Dei posuit.  Cfr. etiam supra pag. 148, nota 5.

1  On the Downfall of the Devil, ch. 4.

2  Isaiah 14:13.

3  Cf. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. III, ch. 2, and (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 22, who express the aforesaid distinction of appetite with the terms “will” and “election”, the first of which can be of impossibles, but the other not but of possibles.  —  Codices X and Y have but not by an elective (appetite), for no one except [sed non electivo, nullus enim nisi] for but no one by an elective (appetite), except [sed electivo nullus, nisi].

4  See (St.) Augustine, On Free Will, Bk. II, ch. 19, n. 53.

5  Concerning which see (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, ch. 4, n. 9.

6  Cf. (St.) Augustine, Enarrations, on Psalm 79:19, sermon 2, n. 6 f..  —  Somewhat above this several codices, such as F K U and W have to the Divine Acceptance [divinae acceptationis] for to the Divine Acceptance [divinae acceptionis].  Next in the Vatican edition there is read An omnimodal similitude [Similitudo omnimoda] for A similitude [similitudo].

7  Morals on the Book of Job, Bk. XXXIV, ch. 21, n. 40:  However that Leviathan, looking upon the height of His (i.e. God’s) Loftiness, desired the right of perverse liberty, so that he might be both before all others and subject to none.  —  See the words of (St.) Bernard above in d. 4, a. 2, q. 2, in the 2nd opposed argument.  —  (St.) Anselm, On the Downfall of the Devil, ch. 4:  Even if he did not want entirely to be God’s peer, but (willed) something less than God against God’s will, by this very (thing) he willed inordinately to be similar to God, because by his own will, which was subject to no one, he willed something.  For it is owed to God alone, thus to will something by one’s own will, so that (the will) follows no superior will . . . But no only did he will to be God’s equal, because he presumed to have his own will, but he even willed to be greater by willing, what God was not willing that he will, since he placed his own will above God’s Will.

p. 150

5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non appetiit; dicendum, quod illae rationes probant, quod non appetiit omnem;1 et hoc verum est.

5. 6. To that which is objected, that he did not desire (this); it must be said, that those reason prove, that he did not desire every (similitude);1 and this is true.

7. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod non peccavit, si appetiit similitudinem; dicendum, quod ipse convertit se ad bonum incommutabile, ut esset proprium, et ita ut ad commutabile, ac per hoc inordinate.  Et inordinate ad Deum converti superbiendo est averti a Deo et converti ad se.  Et hoc patet, quia diabolus quod Dei erat appetebat sibi, et ita finaliter ad se convertebatur, non ad Deum.  Et sic patent omnia quaesita.

7. To that which is objected last, that he did not sin, if he desired (God’s) similitude; it must be said, that he himself turned himself completely to the Incommutable Good, so that it would be his own, and thus to a commutable (good), and through this (he acted) inordinately.  And to turn completely toward God inordinately, by being proud, is to turn away from God and to turn completely toward oneself.  And this is clear, because the Devil desired for himself what belonged to God, and thus turned completely toward himself as an end [finaliter], not toward God.  And thus all the (things) sought are clear.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Hic quaeritur de obiecto a lucifero inordinate desiderato.  Quod appetierit aliquo modo fieri aequalis Deo, inter theologos constat.  Conveniunt iidem etiam in distinctione, quam ex Alexandro Hal. sumsit S. Bonav., scil. inter similitudinem imitationis et aequalitatis (cfr. S. Thom., S. p. I. q. 63. a. 3.).  —  Petrus Lombardus cum aliis putat, daemonem simpliciter similitudinem aequalitatis appetivisse (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2.).  Communiter autem negatur, tum ipsum de facto hoc appetivisse, tum hoc possibile fuisse, si intelligitur de voluntate efficaciter et directe hoc volente.  Si autem hoc intelligitur de voluntate conditionata et inefficaci, Scotus censet, eum potuisse desiderare simpliciter deitatem; sed de facto inordinate appetivisse suam beatitudinem, quae inordinatio pluribus modis fieri potuerit; in quibus modis recensendis fere convenit cum S. Thoma.  —  Alex. Hal. vult, eundem indirecte aequalitatem cum Deo appetivisse, « quia appetiit aliquid, quo habito sequeretur, quod Deo erat aequalis, scilicet nulli subesse ».  —  Sed S. Thomas hanc sententiam non approbat (hic q. 1. a. 2.), cum Angelus nullo modo similitudinem aequalitatis potuerit desiderare.  Hinc docet, inordinatum eius desiderium aliquo modo circa ordinem supernaturalem versatum esse, ita dicens in Summa (loc. cit.):  « In hoc appetiit indebite esse similis Deo, quia appetiit ut finem ultimum beatitudinis, id, ad quod virtute suae naturae poterat pervenire, avertens suum appetitum a beatitudine supernaturali, quae est ex gratia Dei.  Vel si appetiit ut ultimum finem illam Dei similitudinem, quae datur ex gratia, voluit hoc habere per virtutem suae naturae, non ex divino auxilio secundum Dei dispositionem ».  —  Durand. (hic q. 1.) probabile putat, illud peccatum fuisse transgressionem alicuius praecepti positivi nobis ignoti.  —  S. Bonav. convenit fere cum Alexandro Hal., et restringit aequalitatem ad aliquas proprietates, « ut in dominio, praesidentia, scientia ».  Non autem satis apparet, utrum docuerit, daemonem voluntate conditionata et inefficaci etiam omnimodam aequalitatem potuisse desiderare, ut vult B. a Barberiis (Cursus theolog. t. II. disp. 9. q. 4.), qui hoc ex verbis (in corp. et ad 3. 4.):  « non appetit aequalitatem, sed suam fictionem », concludi posse putat.  Confirmatur hoc iis quae dicuntur infra d. 7. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 7.  Patet autem, quod voluntate inefficaci etiam ea quae cognita sunt ut impossibilia et mala, possint desiderari, quia « in malis ratio ordinationis non est ex parte ordinatorum, sed ex parte ordinantis » (S. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 2.).

I. Here there is asked concerning the object inordinately desired by Lucifer.  That he desired in some manner to be made equal to God, is established among theologians.  The same convene also in the distinction, which St. Bonaventure took from Alexander of Hales, namely, between a similitude of imitation and (one) of equality (cf. St. Thomas, Summa., p. I, q. 63, a. 3).  —  (Master) Peter Lombard, together with others, thinks, that the demon simple desired the similitude of equality (cf. St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2).  But commonly there is denied, both that he desired this in fact [de facto], and that this was possible, if it is understood of an efficacious will and one willing this directly.  But if this is understood of a conditioned and inefficacious will, (Bl. John Duns) Scotus judges, that he could have desired simply the Deity; but that in fact he desired inordinately his own beatitude, which inordination could have come to be in several manners; in reciting which manners he nearly convenes with St. Thomas.  —   Alexander of Hales wants, that the same desired indirectly equality with God, « because he desired something, namely to be subject to no one, with which had there would follow, that he was equal to God ».  —  But St. Thomas does not approve this sentence (here in q. 1, a. 2), since an Angel could in no manner desire the similitude of equality.  Hence he teaches, that his inordinate desire concerned [versatum esse circa] in some manner the supernatural order, thus saying in (his) Summa. (loc. cit.):  « In this he desired in an undue manner to be similar to God, because he desired as the last end of (his) beatitude, that, to which he could arrive by the virtue of his own nature, averting his appetite from supernatural beatitude, which is out of God’s grace.  And/or if he desired that similitude of God, which is given out of grace, as (his) last end, he wanted to have this through the virtue of his own nature, not out of the Divine Assistance according to God’s disposition ».  —  Durandus (here in q. 1) thinks that (it is) probable, that that sin was the transgression of some positive precept unknown to us.  —  St. Bonaventure convenes nearly with Alexander of Hales, and restricts the equality to some properties, « such as in dominion, presidency, (and) knowledge ».  Moreover it is not sufficiently apparent, whether he taught, that the demon could have even desired an omnimodal equality by a conditioned and inefficacious will, as B. a Barberii (Cursus theolog. tome II, disputation 9, q. 4) wants, who from these words (in the body of this Question, and in reply here to nn. 3 and 4):  « he desires not equality, but his own fiction », thinks that this can be concluded.  This is confirmed by those (things) which are said below in d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, in reply n. 7.  Moreover it is clear, that by an inefficacious will there can also be desired those which are cognized as impossible and evil, because « in evils the reckoning of (their) ordination is not on the part of the (things) ordered, but on the part of the one ordering (them) » (St. Bonaventure, Sent., Bk. I, d. 1, a. 1, q. 2).

II. Praeter laudatos:  Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 98. m. 3.  —  Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. tr. 5. q. 21. m. 1.  —  Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 6. q. 1. a. 3.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2.

II. Besides the (authors) mentioned:  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 98, m. 3.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each version (of his Commentary), here in q. 1.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 3; Summa., p. II. tr. 5, q. 21. m. 1.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. II, d. 6, q. 1, a. 3.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 2.

1  Subaudi:  similitudinem.  —  Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. omnino.

1  Understand:  similitude [similitudinem].  —  The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex has (this) entirely [omnino] for every (similitude) [omnem].

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