S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM V.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION V

ARTICULUS III.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE III

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 154-156.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 154-156.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS III.

 

De conversione bonorum Angelorum.

ARTICLE III

 

On the conversion of the good Angels.

Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur de conversione bonorum.  Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Consequently in the third place there is asked concerning the conversion of the good (Angels).  And about this two (questions) are asked.

Primo quaeritur de ipsa conversione in comparatione ad suum principium.

First there is the question concerning the conversion itself in comparison to its principle.

Secundo quaeritur de eadem in comparatione ad praemium.

Second there is the question concerning the same in comparison to the reward [praemium].

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum conversio bonorum Angelorum fuerit virtute naturae, vel auxilio gratiae.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether the conversion of the good Angels was by the virtue of nature, and/or by the help of grace?

QUAERITUR IGITUR primo, utrum conversio bonorum3 Angelorum ad Deum fuerit virtute naturae, vel auxilio gratiae.  Et quod virtute naturae, videtur:

THEREFORE THERE IS ASKED first, whether the conversion of the good3 Angels to God was by the virtue of nature, and/or by the help of grace [auxilio gratiae].  And that (it was) by the virtue of nature, it seems:

1. Primo auctoritate Magistri in littera:4  « Non indigebat Angelus gratia, per quam iustificaretur », ergo iustus erat etiam praeter gratiam; sed qui iustus est recte et ordinate convertitur ad fontem omnis iustitiae:  ergo videtur, quod hoc potuerint Angeli sine auxilio gratiae.

1. First on the authority of Master (Peter) in the text:4  « An Angel did not need the grace, through which he would be justified », therefore he was just even apart from [praeter] grace; but he who is just in an upright and ordinate manner is converted to the Fount of all justice:  therefore it seems, that the Angels were able (be) this without [sine] the help of grace.

2. Item, Philosophus in tertio de Anima:5  « Intellectus semper est rectus »; sed hoc non esset, nisi rectitudo esset ei connaturalis:  ergo Angeli intellectus vere et proprie de natura sua erat rectus.  Sed nullus est rectus, nisi is qui sursum est conversus et qui habet caput mentis erectum ad divina:  ergo videtur, quod hoc habuerit per naturam.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher (says) in the third (book) On the Soul:5  « The intellect is always upright »; but this would not be, unless rectitude were connatural to it:  therefore the intellect of an Angel was truly and properly upright from its own nature.  But no one is upright, except him who has turned completely upwards [sursum] and who had the head of his mind erect toward divine (things):  therefore it seems, that (an Angel) had this through nature.

3. Item, facilius potest quis illud ad quod naturaliter ordinatur, quam illud ad quod non ordinatur; sed Angelus erat ordinatus ad Deum magis quam ad aliud, et natura erat ordinata in ipso:  ergo cum sine aliquo adiutorio posset converti ad bonum commutabile et averti a Deo, multo fortius absque auxilio aliquo potest converti ad ipsum.

3. Likewise, one is more easily able (to do) that to which he is naturally ordered, than that to which he is not ordered; but an Angel was ordered to God more than to (something) else, and nature was ordered in him:  therefore since without any assistance [adiutorio] he could be converted to a commutable good and to be turned away from God, much more strongly can he be converted to Him apart from [absque] any help.

4. Item, naturale est alicui converti ad illud quod naturaliter magis diligit; sed Angelus naturali dilectione magis diligebat Deum quam aliquod creatum, ut in praecedentibus est habitum:6  ergo videtur, quod naturaliter converteretur ad ipsum.

4. Likewise, it is nature for anyone to be converted to that which he naturally loves [diligit] more; but an Angel by (his) natural dilection loved God more than any created (being), as has been had in the preceding:  therefore it seems, that he would be naturally converted to Him.

5. Item, simus in instanti conversionis et aversionis; nulla est differentia inter Angelos ante hoc instans; si ergo aliqua incipit esse differentia, hoc est7 aversione et conversione:  ergo prior est aversio et conversio quam gratiae infusio:  ergo conversio non potuit esse a gratia.

5. Likewise, let us stand [simus] in the instant of the conversion and aversion; there is no difference among the Angels before this instant; if, therefore, any difference begins to be, this is7 by the aversion and conversion:  therefore the aversion and conversion is prior to [prior quam] the infusion of grace:  therefore the conversion could not be from grace.

6. Item, si conversio fuisset a gratia et non a natura, ergo illis Angelis, qui nunquam habuerunt gratiam, sed sola naturalia, non esset imputandum, quod ad Deum non sunt conversi:  ergo nec diabolus esset culpandus nec puniendus, quod Domino non adhaesit.

6. Likewise, if (their) conversion were from grace and not from nature, therefore to those Angels, who never had grace, but natural (goods) alone, there would not be imputed, that they were not converted to God:  therefore the Devil would neither be faulted nor punished for not having adhered [quod non adhaesit] to the Lord

Ad oppositum arguitur primo auctoritate et postea demonstratione.8

For the opposite (side) one first argues by authority and afterwards by demonstration.8

1. Auctoritate sic.  Magister dicit in littera:9  « Conversio iustos fecit, sed aversio iniustos »; sed nihil facit iustum, nisi gratuitum;  ergo conversio fuit a gratia.  Si dicas, quod intelligit de iustitia naturali; hoc nihil est, quia illam habebant omnes Angeli a sua origine.

1. By authority thus.  Master (Peter) says in the text:9  « Conversion made (them) just, but aversion (made them) unjust »; but nothing makes one just, except a gratuitous (gift); therefore (their) conversion was from grace.  If you say, that he understands (“just” as said) of (their) natural justice; this is nothing, because all the Angels had that from their origin.

2. Item, conversio creaturae spiritualis ad Deum, ut dicit Augustinus,10 est dies, quia ibi est fulgor cognitionis et calor affectionis; sed per naturam lux praecedit diem; cum ergo Angelus non sit lux nisi . . .

2. Likewise, the conversion of the spiritual creature to God, as (St.) Augustine says,10 is a day, because in that there is the lightning brightness of a cognition and the warmth of an affection; but through nature light precedes the day; therefore since an Angel is not “light” except . . .

3  Ita codd. F K Y bb; multi alii cum Vat. beatorum.

4  Hic c. 4.

5  Text. 51. (c. 10.):  Intellectus igitur omnis rectus est.  —  Mox plures codd. cum ed. 1 angelicus intellectus pro Angeli intellectus.  In fine argum. cod. T a natura pro per naturam.  —  De definitione recti, quae mox affertur, cfr. S. Bernard., in Cant. Cant. serm. 24. n. 6. seq., ex quo iam supra pag. 124, nota 3. quaedam proposuimus.

6  Dist. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.

7  Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 haec est.

8  Ita cod. U, quae lectio confirmatur incongrua lectione ceterorum codd. et edd. 1, 2 qui, retenta voce primo, omittunt postea.  Vat. omittit primo et postea.

9  Hic c. 1.

10  Libr. IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 22. n. 39. seqq.; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 7.  —  De conclusione cfr. August., I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 32.

3  Thus codices F K Y and bb; many others, together with the Vatican edition, have of the blessed [beatorum].

4  Here in ch. 4.

5  Text 51 (ch. 10):  Therefore every intellect is upright [rectus].  —  Next several codices, together with edition 1, have the angelic intellect [angelicus intellectus] for the intellect of an Angel [Angeli intellectus].  At the end of the argument codex T has from (its) nature [a natura] for through nature [per naturam]. [Trans. note:  through nature here has the sense of according to its nature].  —  On the definition of the “upright”, which is next mentioned, cf. St. Bernard (of Clairvaux) On the Canticle of Canticles, sermon 24, n. 6 f., from which we propounded certain (things) already, above in d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, p. 124, footnote 3..

6  Distinction 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1.

7  Some codices, together with edition 1, have this (difference) is [haec est] for this (beginning of their being different) is [hoc est].

8  Thus codex Y, which reading is confirmed by the incongruous reading of all the other codices and of editions 1 and 2, which retaining the word first [primo], omit afterwards [postea].

9  Here in ch. 1

10  On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. IV, ch. 22, n. 39 ff.; On the City of God., Bk. XI, ch. 7.  —  On the conclusion, cf. (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. I, ch. 17, n. 32.

p. 155

per informationem gratiae, prius suscepit gratiam, quam converteretur ad bonitatem divinam.

through the information of grace [per informationem gratiae],* he suscepted grace before he was converted to the Divine Goodness.

3. Item, non est meritum sine gratia, sicut melius patet infra,1 quia non hominem propter opus, sed opus propter auctorem acceptat Deus; sed Angeli in sua conversione meruerunt, sicut alii in aversione demeruerunt:  ergo etc.

3. Likewise, (by demonstration thus:)  there is no merit without grace, just as will be more clear below,1 because  God does not accept the man on account of the work, but the work on account of (its) author; but the Angels in their conversion merited, just as the others in (their) aversion demerited:  ergo etc..

4. Item, si per sola naturalia fuisset conversio, cum ergo in naturalibus praecelleret lucifer, potius videtur, quod ipse esset conversus quam alii.  Si ergo non fuit conversus, non a virtute naturae fuit illa conversio, sed magis ab auxilio gratiae.

4. Likewise, if (their) conversion were through (their) natural (gifts) alone, therefore since Lucifer pre-excelled in natural (gifts), it seems rather, that he would have converted than the others.  If, therefore he did not convert, the former conversion was not by the virtue of nature, but more from the help of grace.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Conversio bonorum Angelorum non potuit esse sine gratia.

CONCLUSION

 

The conversion of the good Angels could not be without grace.

RESPONDEO:  Ad intelligentiam obiectorum praenotandum est, quod in conversione ad Deum attenditur rectitudo substantiae spiritualis quantum ad eius mentem, maxime ratione partis motivae;2 nec potest esse recta, nisi actu vel habitu sit ad Deum conversa.  Quemadmodum igitur duplex est rectitudo, sic duplex est conversio.  Est enim quaedam rectitudo naturae institutae, et penes hanc est iustitia originalis; et est rectitudo gratiae, et penes hanc est iustitia meritoria, quam acceptat iudex summus ad retributionem aeternam.  Et quia videt in ea pulcritudinem gratiae, merito eius3 animam traducit in sponsam, et opera eius sunt ipsi amabilia.  —  Sic intelligendum est, quod duplex est conversio, quaedam a naturali rectitudine, quaedam a rectitudine gratiae.  Primam potuerunt habere angeli absque gratia, sed secundam non sine gratia.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the objections it must be noted beforehand, that in a conversion to God there is attained the rectitude of a spiritual substance as much as regards its mind, most of all the reckoning of (its) motive part;2 nor can it be upright, except it be by an act and/or habit completely turned toward God [ad Deum conversa].  According to which manner, therefore, there is a twofold rectitude, there is thus a twofold conversion.  For there is a certain rectitude of instituted nature, and from within this there is original justice; and there is a rectitude of grace, and from within this there is meritorious justice, which the Most High Judge accepts for an eternal retribution.  And because He sees in this the beauty of grace, according to her merits3 He takes the soul as a spouse [traducit in sponsam], and her works are lovable to Him.  —  Thus it must be understood, that there is a twofold conversion, a certain one from natural rectitude, a certain one from the rectitude of grace.  The Angels could have the first apart from [absque] grace, but the second not without [sine] grace.

Quando igitur quaeritur, a quo principio fuerit illa conversio; dicendum est, quod4 illa conversio fuit meritoria et Deo placita; et ideo non potuit esse sine gratia.  Rursus, quia per illam conversionem obtinuerunt gratiam, oportet ponere, quod conversionem illam inchoaverit voluntas libera, sed consummaverit gratia; et ideo fuit ibi gratia subsequens, non praeveniens; gratia cooperans, non operans, ut dicit Magister in littera.5  —  Concedendum est ergo, quod illa Angelorum conversio, in qua confirmati sunt, non fuit sine gratiae auxilio.

When, therefore, there is asked, “From what principle was that conversion?”; it must be said, that4 that conversion was meritorious and pleasing to God; and for that reason it could not be without grace.  Again, because through that conversion they obtained grace, it is necessary [opportet] to posit, that free will undertook [inchoaverit] that conversion, but grace consummated (it); and for that reason there was a subsequent grace there, not a prevenient one; a cooperating grace, not an operating one, as Master (Peter) says in the text.5  —  It must be conceded, therefore, that that conversion of the Angels, in which they were confirmed, was not without the help of grace.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod non indigebat Angelus gratia iustificante; dicendum, quod iustificationis actus dupliciter intelligitur.  Est enim iustificare de non-iusto facere iustum.  Non-iustum autem dupliciter accipitur, scilicet privative et negative.  Privative idem est non-iustum, quod iniustum, et tunc iustificare idem est quod de impio facere pium; et hoc modo non fuit gratia in Angelis ad hunc effectum.  Alio modo dicitur non-iustum negative, et sic non tantum dicitur non-iustum quod habet impietatem, sed quod non habet iustitiam gratiae; et sic fuit in Angelis iustificatio per gratiam, et ab hac iustitia fuerunt opera eorum meritoria.6

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that an Angel did not need justifying grace; it must be said, that the act of justification is understood in a twofold manner.  For to justify is to make (someone) just from (one who was) non-just.  But “non-just” is accepted in a twofold manner, namely privatively and negatively.  Privatively ‘non-just’ is the same as ‘unjust’, and then to justify is the same as to make (someone) pius from (one who was) impious; and in this manner grace was not in the Angels for this effect.  In another manner “non-just” is said negatively, and in this manner the “non-just” is not only said (to be) that which has impiety, but (also) that which does not have the justice of grace; and in this manner there was in the Angels a justification through grace, and by this justice their works were meritorious.6

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus semper est rectus; iam patet responsio:  nam intelligit de rectitudine naturali.  Illud tamen verbum Philosophi debet intelligi, ut dicatur semper esse rectus respectu illorum ad quae movetur ut natura sive naturaliter; et sic nos dicimus in theologia synderesim semper rectam.7  Si autem intelligatur respectu eorum in quae movetur ut deliberans, falsum est; immo, circumscripto omni imaginabili et phantasmate, posset intellectus peccare sive praevaricari, sicut forte fecit angelicus.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect is always upright; the response is already clear:  for (the objection) understands (this) of (its) natural rectitude. Yet that verse of the Philosopher ought to be understood, as to say that it is always upright in respect of those to which it is moved as a nature or naturally; and in this manner we day in theology that the synderesis (is) always upright.  But if it be understood in respect of those in which it is moved as one deliberating, it is false; nay, excluding every imaginable and phantasm, an intellect could sin or prevaricate, just as perhaps the angelic (intellect) did.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod facilius potest quis in id ad quod ordinatur etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si illud sit intra8 terminos naturae; sed converti conversione perfecta et meritoria, hoc est supra naturam; sed deficere hoc est infra; ideo ratio illa non cogit.  —  Vel dic, quod illud est verum, quando genus operis, ad potentiam comparatum, est aequalis difficultatis, si in se consideretur; alias non habet veritatem, sicut patet in multis exemplis.9

3. To that which is objected, that one is more easily able unto that to which he is ordered; it must be said, that it is true, if that is within8 the boundaries [terminos] of nature; but to be converted by a perfect and meritorious conversion, this is above nature; but to fail this is within; for that reason that reckoning is not cogent.  —  And/or say, that it is true, when the genus of the work, compared to the power, is of equal difficulty, if it be considered in itself; otherwise it does not have truth, just as is clear in many examples.9

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de conversione, quod sequitur dilectionem; dicendum, quod uniformiter sumta conversione cum ipsa dilectione, non habet instantiam.  Sicut enim quaedam dilectio est a voluntate naturali, ut10 qua desideratur Deus ut beatificans; quaedam a voluntate electiva, qua quis optat Deo honorem et gloriam; quaedam a gratuita, qua in obsequium divinum captivatur ipsa voluntas tota:  sic et conversio per appetitum concupiscentiae est a natura; conversio per affectum amicitiae est a voluntate deliberativa sive electiva; conversio vero per obsequium obedientiae gratae est ab ipsa gratia.  Et sic patet illud.

4. To that which is objected concerning conversion, that it follows dilection; it must be said, that with conversion taken uniformly with dilection itself, (the objection) has no instance.  For just as a certain dilection is from the natural will, such as10 that by which God is desired as the One beatifying; a certain one from the elective will, by which one opts for God’s honor and glory; a certain one from a gratuitous (will), by which the whole will itself is captivated in the reverent service of God [obsequium divinum]:  so also the conversion (which occurs) through the appetite of concupiscence is from nature; the conversion through the affection of friendship is from the deliberative or elective will; but the conversion through the reverent service of a grateful obedience is from grace itself.  And thus that (objection) is clear.

1  Dist. 29. a. 1. q. 1. seq.  —  Vat. post Item bene addit demonstratione sic; certe supplendum.  Paulo inferius plures codd. pro propter auctorem substituunt propter hominem.  Circa finem argumenti cod. bb voci aversione praemittit sua.

2  Sive voluntatis.  —  De iis quae sequuntur, cfr. infra d. 29. a. 1. q. 1.

3  Plurimi codd. cuius, incongrue.

4  Codd. U Y, hic addito quia, paulo inferius ante ideo omittunt et, quod etiam in aliis non paucis codd. et ed. 1 deest.

5  Hic c. 3. et 4.

6  Eodem modo respondet Magister, hic c. 4.

7  De synderesi fusius infra d. 39. a. 2.

8  Multi codd. cum ed. 1 perperam infra, inter quos est cod. V, qui paulo inferius cum edd. 2, 3 pro infra substituit contra.

9  Sub quo respectu Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. ait:  « Nam facilius est quodlibet fecisse, quam bene fecisse; manifestum igitur, quoniam peccatum circa hoc plusculum, eo quod laboriosius ».  Et ibid. VII. c. 3. (c. 4.):  Facilius est corrumpere quam facere, et destruere quam construere.  Cfr. etiam Anselm., Dialog. de lib. arb. c. 3, ubi hoc ostendit de potentia videndi, ad quam plura requiruntur, quam ad non videndum.

10  Cod. cc et ed. 1 omittunt ut.

1  Distinction 29, a. 1, q. 1 f..  —  The Vatican edition after Likewise [Item] rightly adds by demonstration thus  [demonstratione sic], which must certainly be supplied.  A little below this several codices for on account of (its) author [propter auctorem] substitute on account of the man [propter hominem].  Near the end of the argument codex bb prefixes to the word aversion [aversione] the word their [sua].

2  Or of the will.  —  On those which follow, cf. below d. 29, a. 1, q. 1.

3  Very many codices have incongruously whose [cuius] for her [eius].

4  Codex U and Y, having added at this point because [quia], omit a little below this the and [et] before the and for that reason [ideo], which and is also lacking in not a few other codices and edition 1.

5  Here in chs. 3 and 4.

6  Master (Peter) responds in the same manner, here in ch. 4.

7  On synderesis, cf. more at length below in d. 39, a. 2.

8  Many codices, together with edition 1, have faultily below [infra] for within [intra], among which is codex V, which a little below this, together with editions 2 and 3, for below [infra] substitutes against (nature) [contra].

9  Under which respect Aristotle in Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 1, says:  « For it is easier to have made anything, than to have made (it) well; therefore (it is) manifest, that concerning the latter (a moral failure is) somewhat more a sin, by this that (it is) more laborious (to accomplish) ».  And ibid., Bk. VII, ch. 3 (ch. 4):  It is more easy to corrupt (something) than to make (it), and to destroy (something) than construct (it).  Cf. also (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury), Dialogue on Free Will, ch. 3, where he shows this concerning the power of seeing, for which more (things) are required, than for not seeing.

10  Codex cc and edition 1 omit such as [ut].

 

* [Here the Latin per informationem gratiae means more precisely through being formed into (a new state) by grace through the imposition of a new form (i. e. supernatural quality); this information is an action of transformation, not data or “information” in the modern sense of the English term; but not an act of transformation where the prior is necessary as the substance for the posterior, but in which there is imposed upon the prior an entire new quality, transcending the nature of the prior.]

p. 156

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in nullo differebant; dicendum, quod illud concludit, quod gratia non inchoaverit, sed non excludit, quin confirmaverit;1 et hoc est verum.

5. To that which is objected, that (the good and evil Angels) differed in nothing; it must be said, that that (argument) concludes, that grace did not begin [inchoaverit] (this difference), but it does not exclude, that it confirmed (it);1 and this is true.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non esset imputandum malis, si conversio esset a gratia; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia stare poterant et non averti, si volebant; et ideo aversio eis imputatur in culpam.2

6. To that which is objected, that (their lack of conversion) would not be imputed to the evil (Angels), if conversion were from grace; it must be said, that it is false, because they could have stood (firm) and not turned away, if they wanted (to); and for that reason (their) aversion is imputed to them as a fault.2

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Non defuerunt qui, male intelligentes aliqua huius quaestionis verba, non sint veriti traducere S. Bonaventuram et etiam S. Thomam tanquam Pelagianismo faventes.  Hinc ut sententia S. Doctoris recte intelligatur, haec observamus.

I. There have not been lacking those who, badly understanding some of the words of this Question, did not fear to betray St. Bonaventure and even St. Thomas as favoring Pelagianism.  Hence, so that the sentence of the Seraphic Doctor may be rightly understood, we makes these observations.

1. S. Bonav. cum sententia tunc communiore supponit, Angelos non simul cum creatione etiam gratiam sanctificantem accepisse (supra d. 4. a. 1. q. 2.); voluntatem autem eorum ab instanti creationis quoad appetitum naturalem ad Deum conversam fuisse, ita ut facile etiam per motum deliberativum et liberum Deo super omnia naturali dilectione adhaerere potuerint (hic ad 4, et supra d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1.).  Hinc sequitur, quod Angelus cum solo concursu Dei generali se convertere potuerit ad Deum ut auctorem naturae.  Attamen « non potuit mereri ex his quae acceperat » (supra d. 4. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6.), et quidem nec gratiam sanctificantem nec gloriam supernaturalem, immo proprie loquendo, nec* dispositionem quidem potuit acquirere sufficientem ad infusionem gratiae santificantis (infra d. 28. a. 2. q. 1.).

1. St. Bonaventure, together with the then more common sentence, supposes, that the Angels did not accept sanctifying grace at once also with (their) creation (above d. 4, a. 1, q. 2); but that their will from the instant of creation was completely turned toward God in regard to (its) natural appetite, such that through a deliberative and free movement they could also easily adhere to God above all (things) by a natural dilection (here in reply to n. 4, and above in d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1).  Hence it follows, that an Angel with only the general concursus of God could turn itself completely toward God as the Author of (his) nature.  But yet « he could not merit from those (natural goods) which he had accepted » (above d. 4. a. 1. q. 2, in reply to n. 6), and indeed he could acquire neither sanctifying grace nor supernatural glory, nay, properly speaking, neither* a sufficient disposition for the infusion of sanctifying grace (below d. 28, a. 2, q. 1).

2. Verba (in corp.):  « Ideo fuit ibi gratia subsequens, non praeveniens, gratia cooperans, non operans, ut dicit Magister in littera », quo sensu secundum modum loquendi illius aetatis accipienda sint, tangitur hic dub. 2, et diffusius explicatur infra d. 27. dub. 1. in fine.  Ex quo patet, quod ista divisio respicit gratiam santificantem secundum duplicem eius effectum (cfr. etiam infra d. 26. q. 6; d. 4. a. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et 6.).  Unde Richard. a Med. (I. Sent. d. 6. a. 2. q. 1.) secundum mentem Seraphici dicit:  « Quod conversio bonorum Angelorum per naturam fuit inchoata, et per gratiam gratum facientem promota et facta placita, et per gloriam consummata; et quamvis inter illa non fuerit ordo secundum prius et posterius in duratione, tamen inter illa fuit prius et posterius ordine naturae ».

2. In which sense the words (in the body of the Question):  « And for that reason there was a subsequent grace there, not a prevenient one; a cooperating grace, not an operating one, as Master (Peter) says in the text », are to be accepted according to the manner of speaking in that age, is touched upon here in Doubt 2, and is explained more at length below in d. 27, Doubt 1, at the end.  From which it is clear, that this division respects sanctifying grace according to its twofold effect (Cf. also below in d. 26, q. 6; and in d. 4, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to nn. 1 and 6).  Wherefore Richard of Middleton (Sent, Bk. I, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1) says, according to the mind of the Seraphic (Doctor):  « That the conversion of the good Angels was undertaken through nature, and promoted and made pleasing through the grace which makes one pleasing [per gratiam gratum facientem], and consummated through glory; and although among them there was no order according to a before and after in duration, yet there was among them a before and after according to the order of nature (i. e. in that grace is supernatural and thus prior in nature to the Angelic nature) ».

3. De dispositione proxima et congrua ad infusionem gratiae sanctificantis hic explicite nihil dicitur; unde applicanda sunt principia infra d. 28. a. 2. q. 1. proposita; et verba, quod « conversionem illam inchoaverit voluntas libera, sed consummaverit gratia » [sanctificans], non intelligenda sunt ita, ut excludatur auxilium supernaturale actuale, sed tantum habituale, si auctor loquatur de motu voluntatis, quatenus est proprie dispositio congrua ad susceptionem gratiae santificantis, et quatenus implicat conversionem ad Deum ut finem supernaturalem (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 62. a. 2.).  Vel dicendum esset, quod loquatur de motu voluntatis, non quatenus est dispositio sufficiens ad gratiam sanctificantem, sed de sola substantia actus, sive de conversione ad finem naturalem.  In hoc sensu plures antiqui intelligendi esse videntur, quando negant, gratiam gratis datam necessariam esse ad hanc conversionem.  Ita Petr a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 1.) dicit:  « Nec fuit necessaria gratia gratis data, vel gratum faciens ad eliciendam substantiam actus, sicut quidam dixerunt, cum natura sana esset et integra, nulli subiecta vitio vel culpae » (cfr. Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.).  In hoc etiam sensu, ni fallimur, explicari potest modus loquendi in Comment. S. Thomae (hic q. 2. a. 1.), qui differt ab eo quem adhibet in Summa (loc. cit.), quia in illo explicite negat, necessarium esse gratiam gratis datam, « a qua elicitur substantia actus, et quae liberum arbitrium inclinat ad volendum.  Sed istam gratiam ponere non videtur necessarium, nisi ipsa libertas arbitrii gratia dicatur, quae procul dubio nobis a Deo est ».  Deinde dicit:  « Ad eliciendum actum conversionis sufficit liberum arbitrium, quod se ad habendam gratiam per hunc actum praeparat et disponit; sed efficacia conversionis ad meritum non potest esse nisi per gratiam.  Unde unus et idem motus est conversionis liberi arbitrii, in quo gratia infunditur, qui est dispositio ad gratiam, secundum quod exit a libero arbitrio, et meritorius, secundum quod gratia informatur ».  Etiam B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 4. q. 18. m. 4.) ait:  « In actum meritorium non potuit Angelus ex solis naturalibus, sed indiguit gratia cooperante, quae stantibus est apposita ex merito congrui, non ex merito condigni.  Congruum enim fuit, ut illis qui ex solis naturalibus bonum aeternum elegerunt, apponeretur gratia, qua illud efficaciter obtinere possent ».  De quo textu observandum est, terminum meritum congrui ab antiquis Scholasticis saepe accipi in sensu largissimo, ut iam observavit P. Trigosus (cfr. d. 41. a. 1. q. 4.), et accuratius cl. Dr. Sheeben, in praeclaro opere:  Hanbuch de Kathl. Dogmatik. t. II. § 172. n. 964.

3. Of the proximate and congruous disposition for the infusion of sanctifying grace nothing is explicitly said here; whence the principles proposed below in d. 28, a. 2, q. 1 are to be applied; and the words, that « free will undertook [inchoaeverit]ͺ that conversion, but (sanctifying) grace consummated (it) », are not to be understood thus, as to exclude actual supernatural help, but only habitual (help), if the author is speaking of the movement of the will, to the extent that it is properly a congruous disposition to the susception of sanctifying grace, and to the extent that it implies a conversion to God as a supernatural end (cf. St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 62, a. 2).  And/or it would have to be said, that he is speaking of the movement of the will, not to the extent that it is a sufficient disposition for sanctifying grace, but of the substance alone of the act, or of (its) conversion to a natural end.  In this sense several ancient (Scholastics) seem to have been understood, when they deny, that the grace freely given [gratiam gratis datam] is necessary for this conversion.  Thus (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 2, q. 1) says:  « Nor was the grace freely given, and/or which makes one pleasing, necessary for eliciting the substance of the act, just as certain ones said, since (the Angelic) nature was sound and whole, subject to no vice and/or fault » (cf. Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 1).  In this sense too, unless we are mistaken, St. Thomas’ manner of speaking in his Commentary (here in q. 2, a. 1), which differ s from that which he employs in the Summa (loc. cit.) can be explained, because in the former he explicitly denies, that the grace freely given is necessary, « from which the substance of the act is elicited, and which inclines free will to will.  But it does not seem necessary to posit this grace, unless the liberty of judgment itself, which is far from doubt ours from God, be called a grace ».  Then he says:  « To elicit the act of conversion there suffices free will, which prepares and disposes itself to have grace through this act; but the efficacy of the conversion for merit cannot be except through (sanctifying) grace.  Wherefore one and the same movement belongs to the conversion of free will, in which (movement) grace is infused, which (movement) is a disposition for grace, according to which it goes forth from free will, and (which movement is) meritorious, according to which it is informed by grace ».  Even Bl. (now St.) Albertus Magus (Summa, p. II, tr. 4, q. 18, m. 4) says:  « An Angel was not able unto a meritorious act from natural (powers) alone, but needed cooperating grace, which is apportioned to (the Angels who) stood (firm) on account of the merit of the fitting [ex merito congrui], not on account of the merit of one completely worthy [ex merito condigni].  For it was fitting, that to those who elected the Eternal Good from (their) natural (goods) alone, there would be apportioned the grace, by which they could efficaciously obtain the former ».  Concerning which text it must be observed, that the term meritum congrui by the ancient Scholastics is often accepted in the broadest sense, as Father Trigosus (cf. d. 41, a. 1. q. 4) has already observed, and more accurately by the Rev. Dr. Sheeben, in his outstanding work:  Hanbuch de Kath. Dogmatik., t. II, § 172, n. 964.

II. Praeter laudatos:  Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. q. S. p. II. q. 19. m. 2.  —  Loci Scoti collecti ab Hier. de Montefortino t. II. q. 62. a. 2.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

II. Besides (those) mentioned:  Alexander of Hales, on this and the following question, Summa, p. II, q. 19, m. 2.  —  The passages from (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (have been) collected by Hieronymous de Montefortino, tome II, q. 62, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2.

1  Vat. consummarit.ͺ

2  Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5.

1  The Vatican edition has it will have confirmed (it) [consummarit read as consummaverit].

2  Cf. here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 5.

* [Trans. nota:  Hic perperam scholion originalis legivit ne pro nec.]

ͺ  [Trans. nota:  Hic fortasse nota originalis perperam consummarit pro consumaverit;  saltemve intelligendum ut formam contractam pro consuma(ve)rit.]

* [Trans. note:  Here the original text of the Scholium reads lest [ne] for neither [nec], fautily.]

ͺ [Trans. note:  Here the Quaracchi editors take pains to explain the sense of this phrase founded upon the Latin verb inchoaverit, which in the sense more common in 20th century Scholastic theology is understood as began, rather than undertook.  If understood as began, the problems they refer to and the solutions they propose are had; if understood as undertook the sense is obvious, being that proposed in their 2nd solution concerning the substance of the act.]

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