S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PARS II.

PART II

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

 

Quaestio VI.

ARTICLE SOLE

 

Question 6

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 232-235.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 232-235.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO VI.

 

Utrum daemones scrutari possint conscientiae nostrae.

QUESTION 6

 

Whether demons can scrutinize our conscience?

SEXTO ET ULTIMO quaeritur, utrum daemones possint scrutari secreta nostrae conscientiae.  Et quod sic, videtur.

SIXTH AND LAST there is asked, whether demons can scrutinize [scrutari] the secrets of our conscience.  And that (it is) so, seems:

1. Daemonum officium est accusare, secundum quod legitur Apocalypsis duodecimo:8  Proiectus est accusator fratrum etc.:  ergo si in iudicio argue- / -mur . . .

1. The office of the demons is to accuse, according to what is read in the twelfth (chapter of the Book) of the Apocalypse:8  Cast forth is the accuser of (our) brothers etc.:  therefore if at the Judgment we shall be convicted [arguemur] . . .

8  Vers. 10.

8  Verse 10.

 

p. 233

 

argue- / -mur de secretissimis cogitationibus, videtur, quod hae non lateant accusatorem nostrum.

from (our) most secrete thoughts, it seems, that these do not lie hidden from our accuser.

2. Item, peccatum est character bestiae, secundum quod insinuatur Apocalypsis decimo quarto.1  Sed unusquisque cognoscit proprium signaculum, ubicumque ponatur:  ergo diabolus cognoscit peccatum, ubicumque sit.  Sed nihil est in nobis secretius, quam sint peccata cogitationum et affectionum nostrarum:  ergo si haec diabolus potest videre, secreta conscientiarum nostrarum rimari potest.

2. Likewise, sin is the mark [character] of the beast, according to what is hinted at in the fourteenth (chapter of the Book) of the Apocalypse.1  But each one recognizes [cognoscit] his own mark [signaculum], wheresoever it be placed:  therefore a devil recognizes sin, wheresoever it be.  But nothing is more secrete in us, that are the sins of our thoughts and affections:  therefore if a devil can see these, he can probe [rimari] the secrets of our consciences.

3. Item, Augustinus duodecimo super Genesim ad litteram:2  « Mali angeli cogitationem noverunt, quia multa praedicunt, quae non praedicerent, si cogitationes non novissent ».

3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the twelfth (book) On a Litteral Exposition of Genesis2 (says):  « The evil angels know the thought (of men), because they have foretold many (things), which they would have not foretold, if they had not known (men’s) thoughts ».

4. Item, hoc videtur per rationem.  Notior est operatio quam potentia, et potentia quam substantia,3 quia per cognitionem operationis et potentiae pervenitur in cognitionem substantiae; sed substantiae animae non potest latere diabolum:  ergo nec eius operatio nec virtus:  ergo si cogitatio et affectio sunt actiones animae, ergo non possunt latere daemonem.

4. Likewise, this (same) seems through reason.  An operation is more known than a power, and a power than a substance,3 because through cognition of an operation and a power one arrives at cognition of a substance; but the substance of the soul cannot lie hidden to a devil:  therefore neither its operation nor virtue:  therefore if a thought and an affection are actions of the soul, therefore they cannot lie hidden to a demon.

5. Item, substantiae spirituales, sicut dicit Dionysius,4 per sui naturam sunt specula; sed sic est in speculo materiali, quod quando unum obiicitur alteri, non solum repraesentat ipsum, sed etiam omne quod relucet in ipso:  ergo si maioris communicationis sunt specula spiritualia, videtur, quod quando daemon intuetur et aspicit animam, non solum ipsam videat, sed omne quod est in ipsa.

5. Likewise, spiritual substances, just as (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite)4 says, are mirrors [specula] through their nature; but it is thus in a material mirror, that when one is placed before [obiicitur] another, not only does it represent it, but even everything which glitters in it:  therefore if spiritual mirrors are of a greater communication, it seems, that when a demon intuits and gazes upon the soul, he does not only see it, but everything which is in it.

6. Item, nihil potest oculus meus videre in me, quod non possit videre oculus alienus:  si ergo sic est in oculo corporali respectu rei visibilis corporalis, pari ratione similiter erit in oculo spirituali respectu cognoscibilis spiritualis.  Ergo si oculum meum spiritualem non latet secretum conscientiae meae, pari ratione nec oculos daemonum.

6. Likewise, my eye cannot see anything in me, which the eye of another cannot see:  if, therefore, it is thus in a corporal eye in respect of a visible, corporal thing, for an equal reason shall it be similarly in a spiritual eye in respect of a cognizable spiritual.  Therefore, if a secrete of my conscience does not lie hidden to my spiritual eye, for an equal reason neither to the eyes of the demons.

Ad oppositum:  1. Tertii Regum octavo:5  Tu solus nosti corda filiorum hominum:  non ergo daemon vel alius.

For the opposite (it is argued thus):  1. In the eighth (chapter) of the Third (Book) of Kings5 (there is written):  Thou alone knowest the hearts of the sons of men:  therefore a demon and/or another (does) not.

2. Item, Ieremiae decimo septimo:6  Ego Dominus, scrutans corda et renes:  ergo si Dominus hoc sibi attribuit tanquam proprium, videtur, quod non communicet diabolo.

2. Likewise, in seventeenth (chapter) of Jeremiah6 (there is written):  I, the Lord, (am) the One scrutinizing hearts and kidneys:  therefore, if the Lord attributes this to Himself as His own, it seem, that He does not communicate (it) to a devil.

3. Item, primae ad Corinthios secundo:7  Nemo scit quae sunt hominis, nisi spiritus hominis, qui est in illo; sed daemon nec est spiritus noster nec est in nobis:  ergo non novit secreta conscientiae nostrae.

3. Likewise, in the second (chapter of St. Paul’s) First (Letter) to the Corinthians (there is written):7  No one knows what belong to a man, except the spirit of the man, which is in him; but a demon is not our spirit nor is he in us:  therefore he does not know the secrets of our conscience.

4. Item, Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus:8  « Internas cogitationes nostras diabolum non videre, certum est ».

4. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas (says):8  « That the Devil does not see our internal thoughts, is certain ».

5. Item, ratione videtur:  quia si internas cogitationes cognosceret, cognosceret et virtutes, ergo beati Iob patientiam cognovisset; quod si cognovisset, non tentasset, cum nolit superari; sed tentavit:  ergo nec virtutem nec cogitationes eius cognovit.9

5. Likewise, it seems by reason: because if (a devil) cognizes internal thoughts, he would also cognize virtues, therefore he would have known [cognovisset] the patience of Job; wherefore if he had known, he would not have tempted (him), since he does not want to be conquered; but he did tempt (him):  therefore he cognized neither his virtue nor his thoughts.9

CONCLUSIO.

 

Nulla creatura potest nosse conscientiae humanae secreta nisi per signa, vel per coniecturam.

CONCLUSION

 

No creature can know the secrets of a human conscience except through signs, and/or through conjecture.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod sicut Deus voluntati rationalis creaturae dedit dominium sive arbitrium, cui nulla praesidet nisi divina potentia; sic eius cognitivae dedit conscientiae secretum, cuius secreta et profunda non penetrat nisi divina sapientia.  Et ideo dico, quod nulla creatura, nec humana nec angelica, potest conscientiae humanae nosse secreta, nisi per signa vel per coniecturas, vel nisi noverit Dei revelationes, aut hominis denuntiatione sive detectione.10  Et quoniam pauca sunt ita secreta, quin prodeant in opera exteriora, vel appareant per signa exteriora faciei, vel per signa cordis, quod diversimode movetur secundum diversitatem affectionum; hinc est, quod multae cogitationes et affectiones nostrae deprehendi possunt a malignis spiritibus, nisi arceantur Dei virtute.  Haec autem cognitio potius est coniecturae quam certae scientiae.11  —  Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, quod angelus malus secreta conscientiae nostrae perscrutari non potest.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that just as God gave to the will of the rational creature a dominion or judgment [arbitrium], to which nothing take precedence except the Divine Power; so He gave to his cognitive (faculty) the secret of (his) conscience, the secrets and depths of which non penetrates but the Divine Wisdom.  And for that reason I say, that no creature, neither human nor angelic, can know the secrets of a human conscience, except through signs and/or through conjectures, and/or unless he knows God’s revelations, either in the denunciation or the detection [detectione]10 of the man.  And since there are so few secrets, which do not go forth into exterior works, and/or (which do not) appear through the exterior signs of the face, and/or through the signs of the heart, which is moved in diverse manners according to the diversity of affections; hence it is, that many of our thoughts and affections can be detected [deprehendi] by malign spirits, if they are not constrained by God’s Virtue.  But this cognition is rather one of conjecture than of certain knowledge.11  —  And for that reason the reasons showing, that an evil angel cannot thoroughly scrutinize the secrets of our conscience, are to be conceded.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo in contrarium de accusatoris officio, dicendum, quod non solum ipse daemon erit accusator, immo etiam cor nostrum; unde etsi de exterioribus et visibilibus accusari possumus a diabolo, de occultis et secretis non.  Neutra tamen impunita relinquentur, quia non deerit accusator et testis.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected unto the contrary, concerning the office of accuser, it must be said, that no only will the demon himself be (our) accuser, nay even our own heart (shall be such); wherefore even if we can be accused by the Devil concerning exterior and visible (things), (we can) not concerning hidden and secret ones.  Yet neither shall (these) be left unpunished, because there will not be lacking an Accuser and Witness.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum est character diaboli; dicendum, quod peccatum tunc dicitur esse character, quando scribitur in fronte; hoc autem est, cum peccat sine rubore et publice, ut iam possit ei dici:  Frons mulieris meretricis facta est tibi, noluisti erubescere;12 et tunc absque . . .

2. To that which is objected, that sin is the mark [character] of the Devil; it must be said, that sin is then said to be a “mark”, when it is written on the forehead; but this is, when (someone) sins without shame and publicly, so that there then can be said to him:  The forehead of a woman harlot has become thine, thou art unwilling to be ashamed;12 and then without . . .

1  Vers. 9. et 11.

2  Cap. 17. n. 34. seq.  Cfr. ibid. c. 22. n. 48.

3  Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 11. (c. 1.) et II. text. 33. (c. 4.).

4  Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1.

5  Vers. 39:  Tu nosti solus cor omnium filiorum hominum.  Cfr. II. Paralip. 6, 30.

6  Vers. 10.

7  Vers. 11.

8  Cap. 48:  Internas animae cogitationes diabolum non videre, certi sumus.

9  Hoc argumentum insinuat August., XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 17. n. 34.

10  In Vat. desideratur sive detectione, pro quo plures codd. cum ed. 1 perperam sive directione.

11  Cod. I subiungit quia signa non semper sunt expressa et sunt fallibilia, quia plurium signa apta.  —  Cfr. August., II. Retract. c. 30.

12  Ier. 3, 3.  —  Paulo superius post peccat cod. V bene supplet aliquis.

1  Verses 9 and 11.

2  Chapter 17, n. 34 f..  Cf. ibid., ch. 22, n. 48.

3  Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 11 (ch. 1) and Bk. II, text 33 (ch. 4).

4  Cf. above d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. 4, p. 83, footnote 4.

5  Verse 39:  Thou alone knows the heart of all the sons of men.  Cf. 2 Paralip. 6:30.

6  Verse 10.

7  Verse 11.

8  Chapter 48:  That the Devil does not see the internal thoughts of the soul, we are certain.

9  St. Augustine hints at this argument On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. XII, ch. 17, n. .34.

10  In the Vatican edition there is wanting or the detection, in place of which several codices, together with edition 1, have faultily or direction [sive directione].

11  Codex I subjoins because signs are not always expressed and are fallible, because (they) are apt signs of several (things).  —  Cf. (St.) Augustine, Retractations, Bk. II, ch. 30.

12  Jer. 3:3.  —  A little above this codex V supplies rightly someone [aliquis] after when [peccat].

 

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dubio peccatum nostrum diabolo est cognitum, quia iam non est secretum, sed manifestum.

a doubt our sin is known to the  Devil, because it is then not secrete, but manifest.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, quod cogitationes noverunt, dicendum, quod loquitur de cognitione coniecturae, non certae scientiae.

3. To that which is objected concerning (St.) Augustine, that they know (men’s) thoughts; it must be said, that he is speaking of the cognition of conjecture, not of certain knowledge.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod notior est operatio quam substantia; dicendum, quod verum est de operatione extrinseca; de intrinseca autem non habet semper veritatem.  Multae enim res sunt nobis notae, quarum virtutes et operationes nos latent.  —  Vel dicendum, quod hoc locum habet in operatione naturali, non in operatione voluntaria.  Operatio enim naturalis, secundum quod naturalis est, ita se naturaliter nata est repraesentare nec se occultare potest, sicut nec substantia; immo per ipsam manifestatur substantia, dum plus habet de ratione actualitatis, ac per hoc manifestationis et lucis.  In operatione autem voluntaria secus est.  Nam cum substantia se naturaliter repraesentet, sicut naturaliter est, et se occultare non possit; operatio voluntaria, sicut voluntarie exit in esse, ita et voluntarie manifestatur, et ita occultari potest, immo non manifestatur, nisi homo velit.  Talia autem sunt quae latent in secreto nostrae conscientiae.  Ideo quamvis diabolus possit videre animam propria virtute, non tamen potest illam1 conspicere.

4. To that which is objected, that the operation is more known than the substance; it must be said, that it is true of an extrinsic operation; but of an intrinsic one it does not always have the truth.  For there are many things known to us, the virtues and operations of which lie hidden to us.  —  And/or it must be said, that this has a place in a natural operation, not in a voluntary operation.  For a natural operation, according to which it is natural, is thus bound to represent itself naturally nor can it hide itself, just as neither (can) a substance; nay the substance is manifested through it, so long as it has more of the reckoning of actuality, and through this (the reckoning) of being manifested and of light.  But in a voluntary operation it is otherwise.  For since a substance represents itself naturally, just as it is naturally, and (since) it cannot hide itself; a voluntary operation, just as it goes forth into being as in a voluntary manner, so also is it manifested in a voluntary manner, and thus it can be hidden, nay it is not manifested, unless a man will (it).  But such are those which lie hidden in the secrete of our conscience.  For this reason, though a devil can see the soul by his own virtue, yet he cannot completely gaze upon [conspicere] it.1

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod speculum repraesentat aliud speculum et quae sunt in eo contenta; dicendum, quod duplex est speculum, quoddam naturale, et quoddam voluntarium.  Speculum naturale, sicut naturaliter suscipit, ita et naturaliter reddit, et ita nihil occultat; ideo speculum sibi oppositum non solum ipsum, sed etiam omne quod lucet in eo, repraesentat.  Speculum autem voluntarium non est in actu manifestationis eorum quae in se continet, nisi cum hoc facit voluntas;2 et tale est speculum spirituale.  Ideo non est simile.

5. To that which is objected, that a mirror represents another mirror and what are contained in it; it must be said, that a “mirror” is twofold, a certain natural one, and a certain voluntary one.  A natural mirror, just as it naturally suscepts, so also does it naturally render, and thus it hides nothing; for that reason a mirror placed in front of itself not only represents itself, but even everything which shines in it.  But a voluntary mirror is not in the act of manifesting those (things) which are contained in it, except when the will causes this;2 and such is a spiritual mirror.  For that reason it is not similar.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de oculo corporali, per hanc ipsam rationem iam patet responsio.  Oculus enim unus corporalis videt quidquid videt alius, si obiectum sit utrique revelatum; si autem uni aperitur et alteri tegitur, unus potest videre quod non videt alius.  Quia ergo nullus se sibi nec vult nec potest velare, quia sibi semper praesens est; ideo oculum proprium, si quid in se est, non potest latere; alienum vero oculum potest subterfugere et se illi velare,3 quoniam non est ipsi praesens nec super eum potens:  et ideo omnem oculum spiritualem potest conscientiae nostra latere, excepto se et illo qui est supra se.  Et ideo dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram,4 quod « sicut substantiae corporales habent aliqua velamenta, quibus se alienis conspectibus occultat, sic in substantiis spiritualibus suo modo esse intelligendum est »; haec est verborum suorum sententia.

6. To that which is objected concerning a corporal eye, the response is already clear through this reckoning.  For one corporal eye sees whatever another sees, if the object is revealed to each; but if to one it lies open and to the other it is concealed [tegitur], one can see what another does not see.  Therefore because since none wills nor is able to veil himself from himself, because he is always present to himself; for that reason he cannot lie hidden to his own eye, if anything is in it; but he can escape the eye of another and veil3 himself to it, since it is not present to himself nor potent over him:  and for this reason our conscience can lie hidden to every spiritual eye, except itself and the One which is above it.  And for that reason (St.) Augustine says On a Literal Exposition of Genesis,4 that « just as corporal substances have some coverings [velamenta], which hide them from others looking upon (them) entirely, so in spiritual substances must it be understood in its own manner »; this is the thought [sententia] of this words.

Et si quaeras, quomodo possit hoc esse vel intelligi, cum substantia spiritualis sit simplex et uniformis per totum, et ita videtur, quod qui videt modicum, nihil latet, et cum uniformis sit, non potest esse ibi aliquid occultans et aliquid occultatum; dicendum, quod obstaculum illud non habet intelligi per interpositionem alicuius naturae opacae, sicut est in visu nostro corporeo, vel obscurae, vel minus clarae; sed ibi abscondere idem est quod manifestare nolle.  Et licet non sint ibi diversitates plicarum ex compositione diversarum naturarum, sunt tamen in anima gradus potentiarum et statuum, secundum quos quaedam dicuntur animae esse magis intima, utpote quae respiciunt potentias superiores et simpliciores sive puriores, secundum quas anima magis in se ipsa recolligitur, et ei quod summe unum est, unitur et simplificatur; et penes has maxime residet conscientiae secretum.

And if you ask, “In what manner can this be and/or be understood?”, since a spiritual substance is simple and uniform throughout, and thus it seems, that (to him) who sees a little bit [modicum], nothing lies hidden, and since it is uniform, there cannot be in it something hiding and something hidden; it must be said, that that obstacle does not have to be understood through the interposition of some opaque nature, just as is in our corporeal sight, and/or of an obscure, and/or less clear (nature); but there ‘to hide away’ is the same as ‘to not be willing to manifest’.  And though there are not diversities of folds [plicarum] out of the composition of diverse natures, yet there are in the soul grades of powers and states, according to which certain ones are said to be more intimate to the soul, as for example (those) which respect the superior and simple or purer powers, according to which (powers) the soul is more recollected in itself, and is united to and simplified before [simplificatur] That which is Most Highly One; and within these, most of all, does the secrete of the conscience reside.

Et sic patet solutio obiectorum; ex quibus etiam manifestantur omnia quae in littera dicuntur.  Hoc autem solum indiget explanatione, quod dicit Gennadius,5 quod daemones per energiam operationum etc., quid ibi appellet energiam.  Et dicendum, quod energia dicitur ab en, quod est in, et ergon, quod est labor, et mene, quod est defectus; unde energia quasi interior labor vel interior defectus.  Unde illi dicuntur energumeni, qui interius laborant per vexationem daemonis interius obsidentis et animam laborare facientis.  Et hoc est quod Gennadius intendit dicere.

And thus the solution of the objections is clear; out of which there are also manifested all which are said in the text.  But on account of what Gennadius says,5 that demons slip into minds through the energy of (their) operation etc., this alone needs an explanation: “What does he name “energy” [energiam] there?”  And it must be said, that energia is said from en-, which is “in”, and -ergon, which is “work”, and -mene, which is “defect”; wherefore energia (is) a quasi interior work and/or interior defect.  Wherefore they are said (to be) energumeni, who work interiorly through the vexation of a demon obsessing (them) interiorly and causing (their) soul to work.  And this is what Gennadius intends to say.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Secundum titulum quaestionis tantum de daemonibus agitur, sed in responsione negative resolvitur in genere respectu cuiusvis creaturae.  —  Conscientia hoc loco sumitur pro potentia intellectus et voluntatis (cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1.).  —  Quod autem de facto Angeli nesciant secreta cordium, in dubium vocatur a Durando (hic q. 5.), et cum eodem quoad « substantiam actionis in cogitatione » convenit Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 3. q. 13.), qui tamen quoad actus directionem in finem, sive bonum sive malum, nihil determinat.  Etiam Aegid. R. aliique his ex parte consentiunt.  —  Scot. (II. Sent. d. 9. q. 2. . . .

I. According to the title of the Question it deals only with demons, but in the Response it is resolved in the negative in general in respect of any creature.  —  “Conscience” here is taken for the power of the intellect and will (cf. below d. 39, a. 1, q. 1).  —  But that the Angels do not de facto know the secrets of hearts, is called into doubt by Durandus (here in q. 5), and Henry of Ghent agrees with him in regard to « the substance of action in thinking » (Quodlibetals, 3, q. 13), who, however, in regard to the direction of the act unto an end, whether good or evil, determines nothing.  Even Giles the Roman and others consent to these (authors) in part.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Sent., Bk. II; d. 9, q. 2, . . .

1  Scil. operationem voluntariam.  —  Vat. illa i. e. quae latent in secreto conscientiae.  In cod. aa additur quantum ad omnes suas potentias.

2  Cod. aa nisi consentiat voluntas.

3  Vat. revelare.  Mox nonnulli codd. ipse praesens, plures alii ipsa praesens pro ipsi praesens.

4  Libr. XII. c. 22. n. 48.  —  In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 sicut corporaliter substantiae corporales.

5  Vide lit. Magistri, c. 4.  Editores Maurini in editione Augustini ad marginem dicunt, quod mss. omittunt operationum post energiam.

6  Graece ενέργεια, quod derivatur ex his verbis εν i. e. in et έργον i. e. opus sive labor.  S. Bonav. ad explicationem verbi energumenus, cuius ultimae syllabae formam participii exprimunt, falsa etymologia illius aetatis usus, adiungit tertium, scil. μήνη i. e. luna, quae crescendo et decrescendo signum est defectus. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

1  Namely, a voluntary operation.  —  The Vatican edition has them [illa], i. e. those (things) which lie hidden in the secret of the conscience.  In codex aa there is added as much as regards all his powers [quantum ad omnes suas potentias].

2  Codex aa has unless the will consents [nisi consentiat voluntas].

3  The Vatican edition has reveal [revelare].  Next not a few codices have he himself is present [ipse praesens], several others have it itself is present [ipsa praesens] for it is present to him [ipsi praesens]. [Trans. note:  The sense here seems to be since it is not always present to him or ever potent over him.]

4  Book XII, ch. 22, n. 48.  —  In very many manuscripts and edition 1 there is read just as corporal substances have corporally [sicut corporaliter substantiae corporales].

5  See the text of Master (Peter), ch. 4.  The Editors Maurini in the edition of (St.) Augustine’s (works), write in the margin, that the manuscripts omit of (their) operations [operationum] after energy [energiam].  [Trans. note:  Note that there is had through (their) energetic operation [energicam operationem] in Lombard’s text.]

6  In Greek ενέργεια, which is derived from the words εω-, i. e. “in”, and έργον, that is work [opus] or work [labor].  St. Bonaventure to explain the word energumenus, whose final syllables express the form of the participle, uses a false etymology of his own age, and adjoins a third, namely, -μήνη, i. e. “moon”, which by waxing and waning is a sign of a defect [defectus]. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, in the body of the Question.

 

p. 235

 

n. 27. seqq.; Report. ibid. q. 2. n. 3-6; IV. Sent. d. 45. q. 4.) negat, Angelos de facto ista secreta cognoscere, sed dissentit quoad assignatam rationem et asserit, ista secreta speciali providentia Dei, concursum suum denegantis, subtrahi notitae spirituum, praesertim daemonum.  Hinc loquendo de possibili et praescidendo de negatione concursus generalis, idem putat, Angelos ea secreta per se posse cognoscere, dummodo sint praesentia, non futura.  —  Sed S. Thom. et communior sententia convenit cum S. Bonaventura tum in conclusionibus, tum in principali ratione.  —  Attentione dignae sunt solutiones ad 4. et 6.

n. 27 ff.; Reportatio, ibid., q. 2, nn. 3-6; Sent., Bk. IV, d. 45, q. 4) denies, that the Angels know de facto the secrets themselves, but he dissents in regard to the assigned reason and asserts, that these secrets are withdrawn from being know by spirits, especially by demons, by a special providence of God, denying His own concursus.  Hence speaking of the possible and prescinding from the denial of a  general concursus, the same thinks, that Angels can know those secrets per se, so long as they are present, not future.  —  But St. Thomas and the more common sentence agree with St. Bonaventure both in the conclusions, and in the principal reason.  —  The solutions to nn. 4 and 6 are also worthy of attention.

II. Praeter iam citatos:  S. Thom., S. p. I. q. 57. a. 4; de Malo, q. 16. a. 8; de Verit. q. 8. a. 13.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 10.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica. a. 6. quaestiunc. 5.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 2, q. 4.  —  Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 7. q. 2. a. 2.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.  —  Biel, II. Sent. d. 9. q. 2.

II. Besides (the authors) already cited:  St. Thomas, Summa., p. I, q. 57, a. 4; de Malo, q. 16, a. 8; de Veritate, q. 8, a. 13.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 10.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in the q. sole, a. 6, quaestiuncula 5.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 4.  —  Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. II, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 4.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. II, d. 9, q. 2.

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