S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XV.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XV

De productione mixtorum et sensibilium sive animalium.

On the production of (things) mixed and sensible or of the animals.

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 372-377.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 372-377.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

Dixit etiam Deus:  Producant aquae reptile etc.

 God also said:  Let the waters produce the reptile etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Supra egit Magister de productione rerum insensibilium,1 in hac parte agit de productione mixtorum et sensibilium, ut animalium.  Et quoniam ad animalium productionem facta est universitatis completio, et ad completionem sequitur ab opere cessatio; ideo ista pars habet tres partes.  In prima agit de sensibilium productione; in secunda vero de divinorum operum perfectione, ibi:  Omnibus autem his creatis atque dispositis etc.  In tertia agit de septimae diei requietione, ibi:  Iam de septimae diei requie aliquid loqui oportet etc.

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the production of insensible things,1 in this part he deals with the production of (things) mixed and sensible, such as the animals.  And since at the production of the animals the completion of the university (of things) was accomplished [facta est], and to the completion there follows (God’s) cessation from work; for that reason this part of his (text) has three parts.  In the first he deals with the production of sensible (things); but in the second with the perfection of Divine works, there (where he says):  Moreover, with all things having been created and arranged etc.  In the third he deals with the rest [requietione] of the Seventh Day, there (where he says):  It is necessary that we say [loqui] something of the rest of the Seventh Day etc..

Prima pars habet duas.  In prima determinat de productione animalium ex aquis; in secunda de productione animalium ex terra, ibi:  Sequitur:  Dixit Deus:  Producant terra etc.  In qua parte primo determinat veritatem, deinde solvit dubitationem.2  Similiter secunda pars, in qua determinat de operum divinorum consummatione, habet duas.  In prima ostendit, qualiter in productione hominis facta est et consummata distinctio rerum.  In secunda vero circa eandem distinctionem explicat diversas sententias catholicorum tractatorum, ibi:  In hac enim rerum distinctione catholici tractatores etc.  Similiter tertia pars habet duas.  In prima veritatem explicat; in secunda quaestionem movet et determinat, ibi:  Sed quaeritur, quomodo septimo die dicatur Deus etc.

The first part has two (parts).  In the first he determines concerning the production of animals out of the waters; in the second concerning the production of animals out of earth, there (where he says):  There follows:  God said:  “Let the earth etc.”.  In which part he first determines the truth, then he solves a doubt.2  Similarly the second part, in which he determines concerning the consummation of the Divine works, has two (parts).  In the first he shows, in what kind of manner the distinction of things was wrought and consummated in the production of man.  But in the second he explains the diverse sentences of catholic writers [tractatorum] about the same distinction, there (where he says):  For in this distinction of tings catholic writers etc..  Similarly the third part has two (parts).  In the first he explains the truth; in the second he moves and determines a question, there (where he says):  But there is asked, “In what manner is God said to have completed His work on the seventh day etc.”.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam huius partis incidit hic quaestio circa duo.

For an understanding of this part there falls here a questioning about two (things).

Et primo quaeritur, utrum sensibilia sive animalia facta sunt.

And first there is asked, whether sensibles or animals were made.

Secundo quaeritur, quo ordine facta sint.

Second there is asked, in what order they were made.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

About the first, three (questions) are asked.

Primo quaeritur, utrum sensibilia quantum ad animam sint producta ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo.

First there is asked, whether sensibles, as much as regards (their) soul, were produced out of something, and/or out of nothing.

Secundo quaeritur quantum ad corpora, utrum producta sint ex quatuor elementis, an ex uno.

Second there is asked, as much as regards (their) bodies, whether they were produced out of the four elements, or out of one.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in eorum compositione activa praedominentur passivis, an e contrario.

Third there is asked, whether in their composition active (things) were predominant to passive ones, or the other way around.

ARTICULUS I.

 

Utrum sensibilia sive animalia facta sint.

ARTICLE I

 

Whether sensible (creatures) or animals were made?

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum animae irrationalium sint productae ex aliquo.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether the souls of irrational (creatures) were produced out of something?

CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod sensibilium sive irrationalium animae productae sint ex aliquo:

ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is shown, that the souls of sensibles or irrationals were produced out of something:

1. Primo per textum Scripturae,3 quae dicit:  Producant aquae reptile animae viventis etc.; et paulo post:  Producat terra animam viventem.  Si enim quod creatur a solo Deo est, et terra cum aqua acceperit potestatem producendi reptile animae viventis, non videtur, quod animal secundum aliquod sui principium sit ex nihilo.

1. First through the text of the Scripture,3 which says:  Let the waters produce the creeping (thing) of a living soul etc.; and a little after (this):  Let the earth produce a living soul.  For if (that) which is created is from God alone, and the earth with the water accepted the power of producing the creeping (thing) of a living soul, it does not seem, that the animal, according to any principle of it, is out of nothing.

2. Item, per auctoritatem Philosophi in libro de Animalibus decimo sexto:4  « Solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco »; sed si animae brutorum productae fuissent ex nihilo, tunc essent a solo Deo et intrarent ab extrinseco.

2. Likewise, through the authority of the Philosopher in sixteenth book On Animals:4  « The intellect alone enters from without [ab extrinseco] »; but if the souls of brutes were produced out of nothing, then they would be from God alone and would enter from without.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia ex . . .

3. Likewise, this very (thing) seems by reason, because a thing / is produced . . .

1  Vat. simplicium et insensibilium.

2  Vat. dubitationes duas.  Unam, ibi:  Quaeri solet de venenosis.  Aliam, ibi:  De quibusdam etiam minutis.

3  Gen. 1, 20.  —  Seq. textus ibid. v. 24.  — Paulo inferius ex nonnullis codd. cum ed. 1 verbis cum aqua praemisimus et terra; pro quo aliqui falso et anima.  Lectio nostra respondet duos textibus s. Scripturae.

4  Secundum antiquam divisionem librorum de Animalibus.  Nunc est II. de Generat. animal. c. 3:  Restat igitur, ut mens sola extrinsecus accedat eaque sola divina sit.

1  The Vatican edition has of simple and insensible (things) [simplicium et insensibilium].

2  The Vatican edition reads:  two doubts.  One, there (where he says):  “There is customarily asked concerning venomous etc.”.  The other, there (where he says):  “Also, concerning certain minute etc.” [dubitationes duas.  Unam, ibi:  Quaeri solet de venenosis.  Aliam, ibi:  De quibusdam etiam minutis].

3  Gen. 1:20. —  The following text is ibid., v. 24.  —  A little below this out of not a few codices, together with edition 1, we have premised the words and the earth [et terra] to with the water [cum acqua]; in place of which some have falsely and the soul [et anima].  Our reading responds to the two texts of Scripture.

4   According to the ancient division of the books On Animals.  Now it is (reckoned as) On the Generation of Animals, Bk. II, ch. 3:  Therefore it remains, that the mind alone approaches extrinsically and that it alone is divine.

 

p. 373

 

eo res producitur, in quod resolvitur;1 sed non est aliquid, quod naturali resolutione resolvatur in nihil:  ergo animae brutorum animalium non sunt resolutae in nihil, quando aliqua animalia fuerunt corrupta:  ergo non productae fuerunt ex nihilo.

a thing / is produced out of that, into which it is resolved;1 but there is not anything, which is resolved into nothing by a natural resolution:  therefore the souls of brute animals are not resolved into nothing, when any (of these) animals have been corrupted:  therefore they were not produced out of nothing.

4. Item, ex eodem est anima istius bruti, quod nunc est, et primi bruti, per conformitatem; sed anima istius bruti generati per naturam non est ex nihilo, quia tunc a natura non posset produci, et sic sequeretur, quod natura non posset facere pediculum.  Quod cum non videatur probabile, et planum sit, sicut ex praecedentibus2 apparuit, quod natura non potest aliquid ex nihilo producere:  restat ergo, quod primae animae brutorum animalium non fuerunt ex nihilo productae.

4. Likewise, the soul of this brute, which now exists [est], and of the first brute is out of the same (thing) through conformity; but the soul of this brute generated through nature is not out of nothing, because then it could not be produced by nature, and thus it would follow, that nature could not made a louse [pediculum].  Which, since it does not seem probable, and (since) it is plain, just as has appeared out of the preceding,2 that nature cannot produce something out of nothing:  therefore it remains, that the first souls of brute animals were not produced out of nothing.

5. Item, anima rationalis, quia per creationem educitur in esse, est immortalis et incorruptibilis3 — eius enim productio non pendet ex corpore, sed ex principio effectivo — sed animae brutorum per naturam sunt corruptibiles:  ergo non sunt ex nihilo productae.

5. Likewise, the rational soul, because it is educed into ‘being’ through (an act of) creation, is immortal and incorruptible3 — for its production does not depend upon [pendet ex] the body, but upon an effective principle — but the souls of brutes are corruptible through nature:  therefore they were not produced out of nothing.

6. Item, opus ornatus praesupponit opus distinctionis, et opus distinctionis praesupponit opus creationis:  si igitur in distinctione corporum non fuit nova creatio, sed productio ex aliquo, multo fortius videtur, quod in ornatu.  Ergo si corpora animalium et animae ad ornatum spectant, videtur, quod non sint productae ex nihilo, sed ex aliquo.

6. Likewise, an ornate work presupposes a work of distinction, and a work of distinction presupposes a work of creation:  if, therefore, in the distinction of bodies there was not a new (act of) creation, but (rather an act of) production out of something, it seems much more strongly, that (there is a new act) in the ornamenting.  Therefore if the bodies and souls of animals pertain to the ornamenting (of the universe), it seems, that they were not produced out of nothing, but out of something.

CONTRA:  1. Si ex aliquo productae sunt sensibilium animae in primordio, quaero de illo, ex quo productae sunt, utrum illud productum sit ex aliquo, vel ex nihilo.  Et si ex aliquo, similiter quaeram de illo, et ita vel erit abire in infinitum, vel erit ponere, quod illud ex quo producta est anima sensibilis, ab initio productum fuerit ex nihilo.  Sed qua ratione illud productum fuit ex nihilo, eadem ratione et anima sensibilis:  ergo videtur etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. If the souls of sensible (creatures) were produced out of something in the first rise (of creation), I ask concerning that (something), out of which they were produced, whether that was produced out of something, and/or out of nothing.  And if (it was produced) out of something, similarly I will ask concerning that, and thus either there will be an infinite regress [abire in infinitum], and/or there will be a positing, that that out of which the sensible soul was produced, was produced from the start out of nothing.  But by the reckoning by which that was produced out of nothing, by the same reckoning also (was) the sensible soul (produced):  therefore it seems that etc..

2. Item, si animae illae productae sint de aliquo, illud aut erat spirituale quid, aut corporale.  Si corporale; contra:  ex corpore nunquam potest fieri spiritus, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram.4 Si spirituale; tunc quaeritur de illo:  aut vivebat, aut non vivebat, et quem usum habebat?  Et iterum, si spirituale; quare ex illo non poterat fieri anima rationalis?  Si igitur ad hoc non contingit rationabiliter respondere, sicut innuit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram,5 ad haec inconvenientia ducens, sequitur ex hoc, quod primae animae sensibilium ex nihilo sunt productae.

2. Likewise, if those souls were produced from something [de aliquo], that either was something spiritual [spirituale quid], or corporal.  If (it was) corporal; on the contrary:  a spirit can never be made out of a body, just as (St.) Augustine says On a Literal Exposition of Genesis.4  If (it was) spiritual; then there is asked concerning it:  either it was living [vivebat], or it was not living, and what use did it have?  And again, if (it was) spiritual; for what reason could a rational soul not be made out of it?  If, therefore, one does not happen to respond reasonably to this, just as (St.) Augustine hints at On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, leading (the argument) to these inconvenient (conclusions), it follows from this, that the first souls of sensible (creatures) were produced out of nothing.

3. Item, si fuissent productae ex aliquo, cum talis modus producendi competat virtuti naturali, videtur tunc, quod cum iam essent corpora supercaelestia agentia et moventia et ad mixtionem operantia, quod animalia virtute naturae possent producere:  ergo primaria opera non essent propria divinae potentiae, quod est inconveniens, cum ipse sit solus universi conditur6 et perfector.

3. Likewise, if they were produced out of something, since such a manner of producing suits natural virtue, it seems then, that since there were supercelestial bodies acting and moving and working for (their) mixing, that they could produce the animals by the virtue of (their) nature:  therefore the primary works were not proper to the Divine Power, which is unfitting, since He alone is the sole Founder6 and Perfecter of the universe.

4. Item, videmus, nunc quaedam animalia ignobilia per putrefactionem generari; quaero igitur, a quo educatur eorum anima; et videtur, quod non possit a natura, cum « natura sit vis insita rebus ex similibus similia procreans »;7 videtur etiam, quod non possit a virtute corporis caelestis, quia minus nobile non potest educere magis nobile:  « substantia autem spiritualis, ut dicit Augustinus, nobilior est omni corpore »:  ergo oportet, quod educatur a Creatore immediate.  Sed quod sic educitur habet educi ex nihilo:  ergo illorum animalium, quae per putrefactionem generantur, animae creantur:  ergo multo fortius animalium primo factorum.

4. Likewise, we see, that now certain ignoble creatures are generated through putrefaction; therefore I ask, “By what is their soul educed?; and it seems, that it cannot be by nature, since « nature is the force, engrafted into things, producing similars out of similars »;7 it also seems, that it cannot be by the virtue of a celestial body, because the less noble cannot educe the more noble:  « moreover the spiritual substance », as (St.) Augustine says, « is more noble than every body »:  therefore it is necessary [oportet], that it be educed immediately by the Creator.  But what is thus educed has to be educed out of nothing:  therefore the souls of those animals, which are generated through putrefaction, are created:  therefore much more strongly (are) the souls of the animals first made.

5. Item, nos videmus in animalibus annulosis, quod ad divisionem corporis remanet anima in partibus diversis;8 sed illa non potest esse anima prima, quia erat una sola, nec a natura producta, cum statim sit in qualibet parte, operatio autem naturae sit cum successione:  ergo videtur, quod illae partes animentur a Creatore, ergo multo fortius et sensibilia in primaria productione.

5. Likewise, we see in animals full of rings [animalibus annulosis], that after the division of the body there a soul remains in the diverse parts;8 but that cannot be the first soul, because there was only one, nor (can it have) been produced by nature, since it is immediately in every part, but the operation of nature is with a succession:  therefore it seems, that those parts are animated by the Creator, therefore much more strongly (are) sensible (creatures) also (animated by Him) in (their) first production.

6. Item, quando brutum generat brutum, aut transfundit animam, aut non.  Si transfundit; cum anima non sit divisibilis, dabit animam suam totam:  ergo in generatione morietur. Si non transfundit; cum cesset eius operatio in seminis decisione, necesse est ponere aliud agens, per quod anima educatur.  Hoc autem non potest esse femina, cum sit magis principium passivum quam activum, sicut vult Philosophus,9 nec aliud principium activum creatum:  ergo immediate producitur a Deo, et ita ex nihilo:  multo ergo fortius videtur, quod sic productae fuerint in primordio.

6. Likewise, when a brute generates a brute, either he transfuses (his) soul, or not.  If he transfuses (it); since the soul is not divisible, he will give his whole soul:  therefore he will die in (the act of) generation.  If he does not transfuse (his soul); since his operation ceases in the transmission [decisione] of the seed, it is necessary to posit another agent, through which the soul is educed.  But this cannot be the female [femina], since she is a passive principle more than an active one, just as the Philosopher9 (wants), nor (can it be) another active, created principle:  therefore it is produced immediately by God, and thus out of nothing:  therefore much more strongly does it seem, that (souls) were thus produced at the first rise (of these creatures).

1  Aristot., III. Phys. text. 45. (c. 5.):  Omne namque ex quo est, etiam resolvitur in hoc.

2  Dist. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seq.

3  Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 21. (c. 2.).

4  Libr. VII. c. 12. n. 19. et c. 20. n. 26. Cfr. ibid. c. 22. n. 33. seqq.

5  Libr. VII. c. 7. n. 10. seqq.

6  In cod. cc et ed. 1 additur et formator.

7  Vide tom. I. pag. 134, nota 10.  —  Verba Augustini, XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 16. n. 32:  Spiritus omnis omni est corpore sine dubitatione praestantior.  —  Cfr. de hoc arg. super pag. 198, nota 3. in fine.

8  Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 93. (c. 5.) et II. text. 20. (c. 2.).

9  Libr. I. de Generat. animal. c. 20. et II. c. 1.  —  Vat. post nec addit est, et paulo superius substituit genus pro agens.  Mox Vat. cum nonnullis codd. et ceteris edd. producuntur pro producitur.

1  Aristotle, Physics, Bk. III, text 45 (ch. 5):  For indeed everything out of which it is, is also resolved into this.

2  Distinction 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 f..

3  Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 21 (ch. 2).

4  Book VII, ch. 12, n. 19, and ch. 20, n. 6.  Cf. ibid., ch. 22, n. 33 ff..

5  Book VII, ch. 7, n. 10 ff..

6  In codex cc and edition 1 there is added and Former [et formator].

7  See Sent., Bk. I, d. 7, a. sole, q. 1, p. 134, footnote 10.  —  The words of (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. XII, ch. 16, n. 32:  Every spirit is without doubt more outstanding that every body. —  On this argument, cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, p. 198, footnote 3, at the end.

8  Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 93 (ch. 5), and Book II, text 20 (ch. 2).

9  On the Generation of Animals, Bk. I, ch. 20, and Bk. II, ch. 1.  —  The Vatican edition after nor [nec] adds is it [est], and a little above this it substitutes genus [genus] for agent [agent].  Then the Vatican edition, together with not a few codices and all the other editions, has they are produced [producuntur] for it is produced [producitur].

 

p. 374

 

CONCLUSIO.

 

Animae sensibiles in primordio productae sunt ex aliquo, non quidem materialiter, sed seminaliter, sicut nunc fiunt ex potentia materiae activa, quae ab agente excitatur.

CONCLUSION

 

Sensible souls were produced in the first rise (of things) out of something, not indeed materially, but seminally, just as they now come to be out of the active potency of matter, which is excited by an agent.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod circa productionem animarum animalium brutalium diversi diversa opinati sunt.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that about the production of the souls of brute-like animals [animalium brutalium] diverse (authors) have opined diverse (things).

Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod animae brutorum productae fuerunt ex nihilo, quia non ex aliquo materialiter nec ex aliquo seminaliter.  Non ex aliquo materialiter, quia sunt formae purae; non ex aliquo seminaliter, quia non habuerunt aliquid praeexistens.  Et ideo dicunt, in prima productione eas simpliciter fuisse creatas; sed deinceps in propagatione non dicunt eas creari, sed potius traduci, non per decisionem et separationem partis animae, sed per multiplicationem.  Sicut enim candela, ex quo accensa est, potest se multiplicare sine sui luminis diminutione, sic, immo multo fortius, dicunt substantiam spiritualem posse.

For certain (authors) wanted to say, that the souls of brutes were produced out of nothing, because (they are not) out of something materially nor out of something seminally.  (They are) not out of something materially, because they are pure forms; (they are) not out of something seminally, because they do not have something pre-existing.  And for that reason they say, that in (their) first production they were simply created; but afterwards in (their) propagation they do not say that they are created, but rather that they are handed down [traduci], not through a cutting-off [decisionem] and separation of part of the soul, but through a multiplication.  For just as a candle, on account of this that it is lit, can multiply itself without the diminution of its own light [luminis], so, nay much more strongly, they say that a spiritual substance can (multiply itself).

Secunda positio est huic directe opposita, quod animae brutorum productae sunt ex aliquo materialiter et seminaliter.  Materialiter, inquam, quia sunt hoc aliquid,1 cum quaelibet earum sit motor sufficiens, et ideo ex materia et forma dicunt eas constare; illam autem materiam dicunt esse spiritualem, inseparabiliter iunctam corporali naturae; unde sicut ex corporali natura producuntur corpora animalium, sic ex materia spirituali sibi annexa, ut dicunt, fit productio animarum.  Et sic fecit Deus a primordio, et sic etiam facit nunc natura.  Illa enim materia, cum praeexistat formae, seminarium est ipsius; et sic dicunt, animas illas produci, non tantum materialiter, sed etiam seminaliter, cum eis praeexistat spiritualis materia et habeat in se aliquam potentiam activam ad hoc, quod ex ea fiat anima, sicut et corporalis natura ad hoc, quod ex ea fiant corpora.

The second position is directly opposed to this, that the souls of brutes were produced out of something materially and seminally.  “Materially”, I say, because they are a ‘this something’ [hoc aliquid],1 since each of them is a sufficient mover, and for that reason they say that they are established out of matter and form; but they say that that matter is spiritual, inseparably joined to corporal nature; wherefore just as out of corporal nature the bodies of animals are produced, so out of the spiritual nature annexed to them, as they say, does the production of (their) souls come to be.  And thus God made (them) from the first rise (of creation), and thus too does nature now make (them).  For that matter, since it pre-exists the form, is its nursery [seminarium];* and thus they say, that those souls are produced, not only materially, but also seminally, since the spiritual nature pre-exists them and has in itself some active potency for this, that a soul comes to be out of it, just as corporal nature also (has a potency) for this, that bodies come to be out of it.

Tertia positio est, quod animae brutorum productae sunt ex aliquo materialiter, sed non seminaliter.  Materialiter, inquam, quia constant ex materia et forma; non autem seminaliter, quia materia illa non praeexistit formae tanquam semen ei quod ex ipso producendum est, sed cum illa concreatur et cum illa destruitur.  Et hi dicunt, quod omnes animas sensibiles non solum a primordio, sed etiam nunc esse a Creatore; nec tamen incorruptibiles, quia ipse Creator dat unicuique durationem, secundum quod competit eius naturae.

The third position is, that the souls of brutes were produced out of something materially, but not seminally.  “Materially”, I say, because they are established out of matter and form; but not seminally, because that matter does not pre-exist the form as seed (pre-exists) that which is to be produced out of it, but (rather because) it is co-created with it and destroyed with it.  And these say, that all sensible souls are not only from the Creator from the first rise (of things), but (are such) even now; but neither (are they) incorruptible, because the Creator Himself gives to each one a duration, according to which it suits its nature.

Sed quoniam omnes hae positiones aliquid dicunt improbabile — nam prima dicit, quod anima se ipsam multiplicat et transfudit, ita tamen, quod anima non habeat aliquid, ex quo fiat; et hoc est ponere, quod forma naturalis possit aliam formam consimilem ex nihilo producere, quod est improbabile et supra improbatum est distinctione septima.2  Secunda vero opinio ponit, aliquam materiam spiritualem animae praeexistere, ex qua educatur anima virtute naturae; et hoc satis male est intelligibile, quomodo sit aliqua spiritualis materia, quae non vivat nec usum habeat; quomodo etiam sit aliqua spiritualis materia, et ex illa anima rationalis fieri non valeat.  Et iterum, ubi est illa materia spiritualis? quia non videtur esse in se; si autem est cum materia corporali, tunc videtur, quod materia educatur de materia; quod nihil videtur esse dictum.  Similiter tertia positio ponit, quod materia animae sensibilis sibi concreetur et quod simul cum ea destruatur; hoc autem ponere est contrarium auctoritati Philosophi3 et rationi, materiam scilicet alicuius creaturae in nihil omnino cedere.  Si enim materia corporalis est ingenita et incorruptibilis, multo fortius videtur, quod spiritualis, quae dignior est et nobilior, secundum quod est sub tali esse.

But since all these position say something improbable — for the first says, that the soul multiplies and transfuses itself, yet thus, that the soul does not have something, out of which it comes to be; and this is to posit, that a natural form can produce another consimilar form out of nothing, which is improbable and has been disproved above in the Seventh Distinction.2  But the second opinion posits, that some spiritual matter pre-exists the soul, out of which the soul is educed by virtue of (the) nature; and it is scarcely [satis male] intelligible, in what manner some spiritual matter, which does not live nor has a use; also in what manner some matter is spiritual, and (in what manner) a rational soul does not prevail to be made out of it.  And again, where is that spiritual matter?, because it doest not seem to be in itself; but if it is with corporal matter, then it seems, that matter is educes from matter; wherefore nothing seems to have been said.  Similarly the third position, that the matter of a sensible soul is co-created with it and that it is destroyed together with it; but this is to posit (something) contrary to the authority of Philosopher3 and to reason, namely that the matter of any creature cedes entirely into nothing.  For if corporal matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, much more strongly does it seem, that spiritual (matter), which is more dignified and more noble, (is such) according to which it is under such a ‘being’.

Et ideo est quartus modus dicendi, quod animae, quae sunt pure sensibiles, productae sunt ex aliquo seminaliter, sed non materialiter.  Seminaliter, inquam, quia formae sunt generabiles et corruptibiles per naturam; et ideo, sicut aliae formae naturales non ex nihilo producuntur, sed est aliqua potentia activa in materia, ex qua fiunt tanquam ex seminario;4 sic etiam intelligendum est in animabus sensibilis, quae sunt formae tantum, cuiusmodi sunt in brutis animalibus.  Et ideo concedendum est, animas sensibiles sive animas brutorum esse ex aliquo, non inquam materialiter, sed seminaliter; quia, cum anima sensibilis sit forma, non habet materiam partem sui, sed solum fit ex potentia materiae activa, quae ab agente excitatur; et sic proficit, quousque fiat anima, sicut globus proficiendo fit rosa.

And for that reason there is a fourth manner of speaking (which says), that souls, which are purely sensible, have been produced out of something seminally, but not materially.  “Seminally”, I say, because forms are generable and corruptible through nature; and for that reason, just as other natural forms are not produced out of nothing, but there is some active potency in the matter, out of which they come to be as out of a nursery;4 so must it also be understood in the sensible souls, which are only forms, of which kind are (those) in brute animals.  And for that reason it must be conceded, that sensible souls or the souls of brutes are out of something, not, I say, materially, but seminally, because, since a sensible soul is a form, it does not have matter as part of itself, but comes to be solely out of the active potency of the matter, which is excited by the agent; and thus (this active potency) is of use [proficit], as long as a soul comes to be, just as a bud put to use [proficiendo] becomes a rose.

Aliter tamen nunc producuntur ex illo seminario, et aliter in primordio, quia nunc producuntur ex seminario praeexistente secundum sufficientem actualitatem; in primordio vero productae sunt simul cum illo seminario; vel si seminarium illud aliquo modo praeexistit5 ante diem quintum in quo facta est productio animalium, in die quinto est ad completam rationem eductum, ita quod data est virtus activa naturae, ut posset deinceps animalia quantum ad corpus et quantum ad animam propa- / -gare . . .

Yet now they are produced out of that nursery in one manner, and at the first rise (of creation) in another manner, because now they are produced from the pre-existing nursery according to a sufficient actuality; but at the first rise (of things) they were produced together with that nursery; and/or if that nursery pre-exists5 in some manner before the fifth day on which the production of animals came to be, it was educed on the fifth day according to (its) complete reckoning, such that an active virtue was given to the nature, so that it could propagate and multiply animals thereafter as much as regards (their) body and / as much . . .

1  Cfr. hic solutio ad 2. et supra pag. 109, nota 7. et pag. 197, nota 3. —  In sequentibus Vat. utitur ter verbis corporalis materiae pro corporalis naturae.

2  Parte II. a. 2. q. 2.  in corp.  Cfr. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.  —  Lineola supra posita indicat, incongruam esse constructionem.  Refertur antecedens ad hoc consequens:  Et idea est quartus.

3  Libr. I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.), ubi dicit, materiam esse « incorruptibilem et ingenitam . . . et si corrumpitur aliquid, in hoc [scil. materiam] abibit ultimum ».

4  Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. seq.  —  Aliquanto inferius plures codd. et proficit pro et sic proficit.

5  Ed. 1 praeexstitit.

1  Cf. here the solution to n. 2 and above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, p. 109, footnote 7, and d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, p. 197, footnote 3.  —  In the following the Vatican edition uses thrice the words corporal matter [corporalis materiae] for corporal nature [corporalis naturae].

2  Part II, a. 2, q. 2, in the body of the Question.  Cf. d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in the body of the Question.  —  The long hyphen placed above indicates, that the construction is incongruous.  The antecedent is referred to this consequent:  And for that reason there is a fourth.

3  Physics, Bk. I, text 82 (ch. 9), where he says, that matter is « incorruptible and unbegotten . . . and if anything is corrupted, it passes away into this (i. e. matter) last ».

4  Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, and below d. 18, a. 1, q. 2 f..  —  Somewhat below this several codices have and it is of use [et proficit] for and thus it is of use [et sic proficit].

5  Edition 1 has pre-existed [praeexstitit].

 

* [Trans. note:  i. e. a seedbed.]

 

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propa- / -gare et multiplicare.  —  Et quia quaedam sunt animalia maioris perfections et organizationis, quaedam vero minoris; ideo divina dispositio rectissime ordinavit, ut quaedam animalia producerentur ex suo principio sementivo1 secundum maiorem actualitatem, utpote sunt illa quae generantur per propagationem, ita quod simile ex simili, et ista sunt animalia perfectiora; quaedam vero secundum minorem, utpote illa quae generantur per putrefactionem; quia enim imperfectiora sunt, minori indigent adiutorio et virtute, ut producantur ad esse.

as much as regards (their) body and / as much as regards (their) soul.  —  And because certain animals are of a greater perfection and organization, but certain ones of a lesser (perfection and organization); for that reason the Divine disposition most rightly ordained, that certain animals would be produced out of their own seed-bearing principle [principio sementivo]1 according to a greater actuality, as for example are those which are generated through propagation, such that a similar (is produced) out of a similar, and these animals are more perfect; but certain ones according to a lesser (actuality), as for example those which are generated through putrefaction; for because they are more imperfect, they need less assistance and virtue, to be led forth to ‘being’ [ut producantur ad esse]

Haec autem positio rationabilior est et firmior, quia concordant in hoc tam Augustinus quam Philosophus.  Ait enim Augustinus ad Orosium2 sic:  «  Sicut semen cuiuslibet arboris habet quandam vim, ut, cum corruptum fuerit in terra, oriatur, et virgultum producatur, deinde ramis nihilominus constipata dilatetur et frondibus, deinde eisdem floribus decorata fructificet; ita est in corpore, ut ita dicam, quoddam seminarium, unde suo tempore, curante providentia Dei, aliqua genera animalium oriantur ».  Et hoc idem habetur super Genesim ad litteram, libro tertio,3 plane et diffuse.  —  Hoc etiam vult Philosophus in decimo sexto Animalium, ubi ostendit, quod vegetabilis et sensibilis prius sunt in semine in potentia, quam educantur in esse; et ibi videtur innuere, quod illud quod format membra, non est aliud quam ipsa anima; et illam animam vocat potentiam activam, intrinsecam ipsi semini, quae, cum corpus ex semine productum est et organizatum, ut possit ab eadem perfici, prodit in actum et efficitur perfectio corporis physici organici.  Aut certe illud quod format membra, potius est virtus animae patris et matris, ex cuius operatione in brutis animalibus educitur in esse anima prolis; secus autem est in hominibus, ut infra videbitur.4  Et hoc probat ibidem Philosophus ex multis coniecturis et argumentis, et ibidem dicit, quod res corporales plenae sunt virtute animae; et hoc multum concordat verbis Augustini,5 qui dicit:  « Terra praegnans est seminibus, non tantum respectu arborum, sed etiam respectu animalium ».  —  Hanc igitur positionem sustinendo dicendum est, animas sensibilium animalium in primordio non esse creatas ex nihilo, sicut rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt; habuerunt enim sementivum principium, ex quo productae sunt et nunc producuntur.

Moreover this position is more reasonable and more firm, because both (St.) Augustine and the Philosopher concord in this.  For (St.) Augustine speaks To Orosius2 thus:  « Just as the seed of any tree has a certain force, so that, when it has been corrupted in the earth, it rises, and a shoot is produced, then it stretches out pressed about with branches and leaves, then after having been decorated with the same flowers it bears fruit; so it there in a body, as I will thus call (it), a certain nursery, whence in its own time, with the care of God’s Providence, some genera of animals arise ».  And this same is had On  Literal Exposition of Genesis, in the third book,3 plainly and diffusely.  —  This also does the Philosopher want in the sixteenth (book) On Animals, where he shows, that the vegetable and sensible (soul) are in the seed in potency before they are educed into ‘being’; and there he seems to hint, that that which forms the members, is not other than the soul itself; and he calls that soul an active potency, intrinsic to the seed itself, which, when the body has been produced and organized out of the seed, to be able to be perfected by the same, comes forth into act and (thus) is effected the perfection of the physical, organic body.  Or certainly that which forms the members, is rather the virtue of the soul of the father and mother, out of whose operation in brute animals there is educed into ‘being’ the soul of the offspring; but it is otherwise in humans [hominibus], as will be seen below.4  And the Philosopher proves this in the same place out of many conjectures and arguments, and says in the same place, that corporal things are full of the virtue of the soul; and this concords very much with the words of (St.) Augustine,5 who says:  « The earth is pregnant with seeds, not only in respect of trees, but even in respect of animals ».  —  Therefore in sustaining this position this position it must be said, that the souls of sensible animals were not created out of nothing at the first rise (of creation), just as the reasons brought forward for this show; for they had a seed-bearing principle, out of which they were produced and are now produced.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod si animae sensibilium productae sunt ex aliquo, quod illud similiter productum est ex alio; dicendum, quod non oportet.  Seminalis enim ratio sive potentia activa ipsius materiae est ipsi materiae concreata, non ex aliquo producta; illa vero, quae ex illo semine oriuntur, proprie non  debent dici creari.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected first, that if the souls of sensible (creatures) were produced out of something, that that (something) similarly was produced out of something; it must be said, that it is not necessary [non oportet].  For the seminal reason or active potency of the matter itself was co-created with the matter itself, not produced out of something; but those, which arise out of that seed, ought not properly be said “to be created”.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quodsi est ex aliquo, quod illud est aut spirituale, aut corporale; dicendum, quod nec est materia spiritualis, nec est materia corporalis, sed est quadam potentia spiritualis, indita a Creatore materiae corporali et ei innitens et ab ea dependens.  Et propterea anima sensibilis in brutis generatur et corrumpitur per transmutationem corporalis naturae.  Et si tu obiicias, quod anima sensibilis est motor sufficiens, et ita est hoc aliquid et habet materiam et formam; dicendum, quod anima sensibilis non dicitur esse motor sufficiens, quia ipsa primo moveat corpus, quod perficit; sed quia corpus totum, quod habet,6 est hoc aliquid et virtue animae, quae est forma eius, movet partem, et movendo partem suam movet totum, sicut patet in gradientibus.  Et quod illud verum sit, apparet, quia si anima sensibilis, poneretur in corpore, quod non haberet partem mobilem nisi motu totius, sicut in lapide, nunquam illud moveret.

2. To that which is asked, that if it is out of something, that that (something) is either spiritual, or corporal; it must be said, that it is neither spiritual matter, nor is it corporal matter, but is a certain spiritual potency, endowed by the Creator to corporal matter and leaning upon it and depending from it.  And on this account the sensible soul in brutes is generated and corrupted through the transmutation of the corporal nature.  And if you object, that the sensible soul is a sufficient mover, and thus is a ‘this something’ [hoc aliquid] and has matter and form; it must be said, that a sensible soul is not said to be a “sufficient mover”, because it itself first moves the body, which it perfects; but because the whole body, which it has,6 is a ‘this something’ and by virtue of the soul, which is its form, it moves a part, and by moving a part moves the whole, just as is clear in (those) walking.  And it appears that this is true, because if a sensible soul would be placed in a body, which did not have a movable part, it would not move it except by the movement of the whole, just as in (the case of) a rock.

Vel aliter dici potest, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid sit motor sufficiens, non oportet, quod distet a mobili, ita quod sit substantia altera differens per . . .

And or it can be said in another manner, that for this, that something be a sufficient mover, it is not necessary [non oportet], that it be distant from the movable, thus that it be another substance differing through . . .

1  Plures codd. cum primis edd seminario; Vat. primo seminario.

2  Sive Quaest. 65. q. 37. (inter opera Augustini), ubi textus originalis substituit obrutum pro corruptum, subinde omittit eisdem; plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 substituunt creante, aliqui cum Vat. concurrente pro curante.  Cfr. V. de Gen ad lit. c. 23. n. 44.

3  Praesertim c. 14. n. 22.  —  Sententiam Philosophi vide loc. cit. sive, ut nunc dicitur, II. de Generat. animal. c. 3.

4  Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 3.  —  Aristot., loc. cit. c. 3. seqq.  —  Alius textus est ibid. libro III. c. 11:  Generantur autem in terra humoreque animalia et plantae, quoniam humor in terra, spiritus in humore, calor animalis in universo inest, ita ut quodam modo plena sint animae omnia.  —  Paulo ante Vat. dicitur inesse pro educitur in esse.

5  Libr. III. de Trin. c. 8. n. 13; et c. 9. n. 16, ubi hoc verbum quoad sensum clare exprimitur; sic ultimo cit. loc. ait:  Nam sicut matres gravidae sunt fetibus, sic ipse mundus gravidus est causis nascentium etc.

6  Plures codd. cum Vat. omittunt habet et omnes, exceptis F et T (a secund. manu) et ante virtute.  —  Pro intelligentia solutionis notentur haec ex. Gul. Mara, hic q. 1:  Dicendum, quod hoc aliquid dicitur multipliciter.  Aliquando idem est quod singulare quodcumque sive substantiae sive accidentis; et sic accipit Philosophus, ubi solvit paralogismos figurae dictionis:  « Homo et omne commune non hoc aliquid, sed quale quid significat ». (II. Elench. c. 3.).  Aliquando est idem quod habens esse distinctum.  Ita enim glossat Commentator super XII. Metaph. text. 14, ubi recitat distinctionem de ipso quid secundum Alexandrum, hoc aliquid i. e. habens esse distinctum in materia corporali; unde Commentator super III. de Anima, text. 4. dicit, quod intellectus non est hoc aliquid, i. e. neque virtus in corpore neque corpus.  Primo modo sequitur, si est motor sufficiens, quod sit hoc aliquid, quia omnes actiones sunt singularium.  Secundo modo et tertio non sequitur; unde Commentator super illud VIII. Phys. text. 30:  Et etiam quomodo est possibile:  Motor, inquit, debet esse distinctus a moto aut secundum definitionem et esse, sicut illa, quae moventur ab extrinseco, aut secundum definitionem tantum, sicut est dispositio in habentibus animas.  Anima enim, quae est motor in eis, distinguitur [a corpore, quod est motum] secundum definitionem, licet non distinguatur secundum esse etc.

1  Several codices, together with the first editions, have nursery principle [principio seminario]; the Vatican edition has first nursery [primo seminario] for seed-bearing principle [principio sementivo].

2  Or Sixty-Five Questions, q. 37, (reckoned among the works of St. Augustine), where the original text substitutes buried [obrutum] for corrupted [corruptum], then omits the same [eisdem]; several codices, together with editions 1, 2 and 3 substitute by God’s creating Providence [creante] for with the care of God’s Providence [curante].  Cf. On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. V, ch. 23, n. 44.

3  Especially in ch. 14, n. 22.  —  See the sentence of the Philosopher, loc. cit., or, as it is now called, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. II, ch. 3.

4  Distinction 18, a. 2, q. 3.  —  Aristotle, loc. cit., ch. 3 ff...  —  The other text is ibid., Bk. III, ch. 11:  Moreover there are generated in earth and humor animals and plants, since a humor is in the earth, a spirit in the humor, the heat of an animal in each and every (thing), such that in a certain manner all (things) are full of a soul.  —  A little before this the Vatican edition has out of whose operation the soul of the offspring is said to be in brute animals [dicitur inesse] for out of whose operation in brute animals there is educed into ‘being’ the soul of the offspring [educitur in esse].

5  On the Trinity, Bk. III, ch. 8, n. 13; and ch. 9, n. 16, where this verse is clearly expressed according to (its) sense; thus in the last passage cited he says:  For just as mothers are heavy with children, so the world itself is heavy with the causes of (things) born etc.

6  Several codices, together with the Vatican edition, omit it has [habet] and all, except F and T (by a second hand), have and [et] before by virtue [virtute].  —  For an understanding of the solution let these (words) be noted from Guillermo Mara, here in q. 1:  It must be said, that ‘this something’ [hoc aliquid] is said in a multiple manner. Sometimes it is the same as “a singular whatsoever” [singulare quodcumque] whether of a substance or an accident; and thus the Philosopher accepts (it), where he solves the formal fallacies [paralogismos] of the figure of speech:  « “Man” and “everything common” do not signify “this something”, but “something of the kind” [quale quid] ». (Lists of Sophistic Errors, Bk. II, ch. 3).  Sometimes it is the same as that which has a distinct ‘being’ [esse distinctum].  For thus does the Commentator gloss on Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 14, where he recites the distinction concerning the same “something” [quid] according to Alexander, “this something”, i. e. one having a distinct ‘being’ in corporal matter; wherefore the Commentator On the Soul, Bk. III, text 4, says, that the intellect is not a ‘this something’, i. e. (is) neither a virtue in the body nor the body.  In the first manner it follows, that, if it is a sufficient mover, it is a ‘this something’, because all actions are of singulars.  In the second and third manner it does not follow; wherefore the Commentator on that (passage) of Physics, Bk. VIII, text 30:  And also in what manner is it a possible,  says:  “A mover ought to be distinct form the moved either according to definition and ‘being’, just as those (things), which are moved by (something) extrinsic, or according to definition only, just as is the disposition in (those) having souls.  For the soul, which is a mover in them, is distinguished (from the body, which is moved) according to (its own) definition, though it is not distinguished according to (its own) ‘being’ etc..”

 

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materiam et formam; sed sufficit, quod illa sit forma in genere substantiae, carens extensione per se et per accidens.  Et haec forma sic est in una parte tota, quod tota est in alia; et ideo sic unitur isti parti, quam movet, quod etiam ab ea distat.  Et haec distantia sufficit ad hoc, quod possit movere eam, nec requiritur, quod habeat aliam materiam.  Et sic est in anima sensitiva in his animalibus, quae huic operationi habent organa apta.

matter and form; but it suffices, that it be a form in the genus of substance, lacking extension per se and per accidens.  And this form is thus in one part whole, as it is whole in another; and for that reason it is so united to this part, which it moves, that it is also distant from it.  And this distant suffices for this, that it can move it, nor is it required, that it have another matter.  And thus it is in the sensitive soul in these animals, which have organs apt for this work.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura possit eam educere; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia, antequam Dominus praeciperet aquis et diceret:  Producant aquae etc., aut seminarium illud animarum sensibilium producendarum non erat, aut si erat, non erat in tanta virtue, quod posset ad perfectionem venire; non enim potest quidquam creatura,1 nisi secundum statutum et praeceptum sibi datum a Creatore.  Unde cum prius esset unde fieri posset, post factum est divino imperio, ut esset unde fieret.

3. To that which is objected, that nature can educe it; it must be said, that (this) is false, because, before the Lord precepted the waters and said:  Let the waters produce etc., either that nursery to produce sensible souls was not, or if it was, it was not in so great a virtue, that it could arrive at perfection; for a creature1 cannot (do) anything, except according to the statute and precept given it by the Creator.  Wherefore, though (that) from which it could be made was first, it afterwards came to be by the Divine Command, that (that) from which it would be made was.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de animalibus, quae generantur per putrefactionem; dicendum, quod etsi sint varii modi solvendi, quia quidam dicunt, quod est a caeli motore, quidam, quod a Creatore;2 potest tamen secundum physicam positionem plane responderi, quod sicut humor fit semen per potentiam generativam, et postmodum fit corpus organicum in matrice, ita quod anima illa sensibilis, quae erat in potentia, educitur ad actum per virtutem agentis particularis et per adiutorium corporis caelestis; sic etiam in proposito intelligendum est, quod cum in terra ista esset seminarium illud, aliquo modo concurrentibus elementis, et adiuvante corpore caelesti, ut aggeneretur calor vivificus, fit quoddam semen, ita quod potentia illa activa, quae prius latebat, adiuta ex actione caelestis corporis, proficit et venit ad perfectionem et complementum, ita quod nec caelum nec motor caeli dat sibi formam ultimam, sed solum adiuvat et excitat, ut potentia illa proficiendo ad speciem completam perveniat.  Et per hunc modum intelligendum est etiam in aliis terrae nascentibus.

4. To that which is objected concerning the animals, which are generated through putrefaction; it must be said, that even if there are various manners of solving (this question), because certain (authors) say, that (such a generation) is from the mover of the heaven, certain ones, that (it is) from the Creator;2 yet it can be responded plainly according to the position of physics [positionem physicam], that just as a humor comes to be a seed through the generative power, and afterwards comes to be an organic body in the womb [matrice], such that that sensible soul, which was in potency, is educed to act through the virtue of the particular agent and thorough the help of a celestial body; so also must it be understood in the proposed, that though that nursery was in this earth (of ours), with the elements concurring in some manner, and with the help of a celestial body, to engender [aggeneretur] a vivifying heat, a certain seed comes to be, such that that active potency, which first laid hidden, helped out of the action of a celestial body, is put to use [proficit] and comes to perfection and (its) complement, such that neither the heaven nor the mover of the heaven gives it (its) ultimate form, but only helps and excites, so that that potency being put to use arrives at the complete species.  And through this manner it must be understood even in the other (creatures) born of the earth.

Et si tu obiicias, quod anima, quae est in potentia, non habet speciem nec actum completum a se, nec potest habere ab aliquo, quod non sit ita nobile, sicut ipsa, et nullum tale est corporale; dicendum, quod essentia3 talis speciei est in materia, sed in potentia; et illa essentia est ita determinata ad formam talis speciei producendam, quod non potest ex illa essentia sive ratione seminali alia educi, et cum in actum educta est, habet esse et habet tale esse.  Quod autem sit in actu, hoc habet ab extrinseco agente, quod erat ens in actu, et quantum ad hoc nobilius est ipsa, quae erat in potentia.  Quod autem sit talis speciei, hoc habet ab eo qui primo huius formae essentiam indidit materiae; alioquin nunquam natura ipsam ad esse produceret, nisi Deus ipsam materiae indidisset, sicut supra ostensum fuit distinctione octava.4  Et ideo non oportet, quod educens illam formam in actum sit nobilius illa forma educta.  Et huius exemplum in multis potest poni, sicut in mineralibus et in multis terrae nascentibus.

And if you object, that the soul, which is in potency, does not have a species nor a complete act by itself, nor can have from something, which is not as noble, as itself, and (that) nothing such is corporal; it must be said, that the essence of such a species is3 in matter, but in potency; and that essence is thus determined to produce the form of such a species, that it cannot be educed out of that essence or another seminal reason, and when it has been educed into act, it has a ‘being’ and has a ‘being’ such.  But that it is in act, this it has from an extrinsic agent, which was a being in act, and as much as regards this it is more noble than that, which was in potency.  But that it is of such a species, this it has from that which introduced [indidit] the essence of this form to the matter; otherwise the nature would never produce it to ‘being’, unless God had introduced it to the matter, just as was shown above in the Eight Distinction.4  And for that reason it is not necessary [non oportet], that the one educing that form into act be more noble than that educed form.  And an example of this can be posited in many (things), such as in minerals and in many (of the creatures) born of the earth.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo sequentia.  Nam quod obiicitur de divisione corporis annulosi, iam apertum est; quia enim corpus annulosum est modicae organizationis et quasi consimilis in partibus et in toto; ideo in qualibet sui parte est anima in proxima dispositione ad hoc quod sit actu; et ideo, facta divisione, virtute prioris formae et beneficio corporis caelestis, subito inducitur forma.

5. And through this the response to the two following (objections) is clear.  For what is objected concerning the division of a body full of rings [corporis annulosi], is already apparent [apertum]; for because a body full of rings is of a very small organization and (is) quasi consimilar in (its) parts and in (its) whole; for that reason in each part of it the soul is in a proximate disposition to this, that it be in act; and for that reason, with a division made, by the virtue of the prior form and the benefice of a celestial body, there is immediately induced a form.

Plures autem sunt alii modi dicendi circa hoc.  Quidam enim dicunt, quod anima multiplicatur, cum sit spiritualis, sicut punctus ad divisionem lineae, et species ad divisionem speculi; verumtamen in neutro horum intelligendum est, quod illud idem, quod fuit unum, fiat plura;5 et ideo praecedens via est magis plana.

But there are several other manners of speaking about this.  For certain (authors) say, that the (sensible) soul is multiplied, since it is spiritual, just as a point (is multiplied) at the division of a line, and (as one’s) appearance (is multiplied) at the division of a mirror; nevertheless in neither of these is it to be understood, that that very (same thing), which was one, comes to be several;5 and for that reason the preceding way is more plain.

6. Ad ultimam similiter patet responsio, quia,6 cum animal generetur ab animali per propagationem, etsi non decidatur anima ab anima, sicut corpus deciditur a corpore, quia non est anima divisibilis, ut corpus, deciduntur tamen cum ipso corpore spiritus et calores et virtus etiam animalis, quae adiuvat cum virtute matricis continentis, ut illa potentia activa, quae erat in humore seminario, ad actum completum perveniat.  Et ex hoc non sequitur, quod anima producat aliam animam ex nihilo, nec quod producat ex materia, nec etiam quod producat ex se ipsa.

6. To the last (objection) the response is similarly clear, because,6 since an animal is generated from an animal through propagation, even if a soul is not cut off from the soul, just as a body is cut off from the body, because the soul is not divisible, as a body, yet with the body itself there are cut off the spirit and virtue of the animal too, which help with the virtue of the containing womb [matricis], so that that active potency, which was in the humor of the nursery [humore seminario], arrives at a complete act.  And from this it does not follow, that the (sensible) soul produces another soul out of nothing, nor that it produces (it) out of matter, nor even that it produces (it) out of its very self.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Non agitur hic de anima sensitiva in homine, de qua infra (d. 31. a. 1. q. 1.) probatur, quod « sensibilis et rationalis in homine eiusdem sunt substantiae et ab eodem principio habent educi in esse, videlicet Creatore »; sed agitur de anima pure sensibili, scil. animalium.  Et quaestio praecise est de prima productione animalium, in Genesi narrata, licet etiam . . .

I. Here one does not deal with the sensitive soul in man, concerning which it is proven below (d. 31, a. 1, q. 1), that « the sensible and rational (soul) in man are of the same substance and have to be educed into ‘being’ by the same principle, namely the Creator »; but one deals with a purely sensible soul, namely (that) of the animals.  And the question concerns precisely the first production of animals, narrated in Genesis, though the question / concerning . . .

1  Cod. T natura.  Dein Vat. cum aliquibus codd. statum pro statutum.  —  Cfr. August., VI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15. n. 26. seqq., ex quo Magister, infra d. XVII. c. 3, plura allegat.

2  Cfr. supra pag. 198, nota 3.  —  Sententiam Aristotelis vide III. de Generat. animal. c. 11.  —  Paulo inferius plures codd. organizatum pro organicum.

3  Nonnulli codd. hic addunt non.  Subinde pauci codd. cum ed. 1 et illa potentia [ed. 1 addit essentialiter] pro et illa essentia.

4  Parte I. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.

5  Aristot., de Iuventute et senect., c. 1. ait:  Et multa quoque non insectorum divisa possunt vivere propter nutritivam.  Talem autem particulam actu quidem habent unam, virtute autem plures etc.  Idem dicitur I. de Anima, text. 93. seqq. (c. 5.) et II. text. 20. (c. 2.). —  Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 2, ubi diversae opiniones hac de re proponuntur, et August., de Quantit. animae, c. 31. n. 62. seqq.

6  Vat. quod, refragantibus multis codd. et ed. 1.

1  Codex T has nature [natura] for a creature [creatura].  Then the Vatican edition, together with some codices, has status [statum] for statute [statutum].  —  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VI, ch. 15, n. 25 ff., out of which (text) Master (Peter) alleges several (things), below in d. XVII, ch. 3.

2  Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, p. 198, footnote 3.  —  See the sentence of Aristotle in On the Generation of Animals, Bk. III, ch. 11.  —  A little below this several codices have organized [organizatum] for organic [organicum].

3  Not a few codices here add not [non].  Then a few codices, together wtih edition 1, have and that potency [et illa potentia], to which edition 1 adds essentially [essentialiter], for and that essence [et illa essentia].

4  In part II, a. 2, q. 1, in the body of the Question.

5  Aristotle, On Youth and Old Age, ch. 1, says:  And many divided (creatures) can live on account of the nutritive (power) of (those that have) not (been) cut into (pieces).  But they indeed have one such particle in act, but several in virtue etc.  The same is said in On the Soul, Bk. I, text 93 ff. (ch. 5), and Bk. II, text 20 (ch. 2).  —  Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 87, m. 2, a. 1, § 2, where diverse opinions on this matter are proposed, and (St.) Augustine, On the Quantity of the Soul, ch. 32, n. 62 ff..

6  The Vatican edition, breaking with many codices and edition 1, has that [quod] for because [quia]

 

p. 377

 

quaestio de propagatione posteriore animalium solvatur, ut patet ex verbis in corp.:  « Aliter tamen nunc producuntur ex illo seminario, et aliter in primordio ».  —  Inclinat autem S. Doctor in sententiam, quod seminarium illud non sit productum ante quintum diem, quin tamen excludat opinionem, quod aliquo imperfecto modo iam antea productum sit (ibid. et ad 3.).  Ex quo patet, quod illud seminarium non debeat confundi cum forma incompleta, sub qua creata fuit materia (cfr. supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 3.).

the question / concerning the later propagation of animals is also solved, as is clear from the words in the body (of the Question):  « Yet now they are produced out of that nursery in one manner, and at the first rise (of creatures) in another manner ».  —  Moreover the Seraphic Doctor inclines unto the sentence, that that nursery [seminarium] was not produced before the fifth day, yet he does not exclude the opinion, that in some imperfect manner it was already produced beforehand (ibid., and in reply to n. 3).  Out of which it is clear, that that nursery ought not be confounded with the incomplete form, under which matter was created (cf. above d. 12, a. 1, q. 3).

Fuerunt autem illa aetate qui putarent, nullam animam, nec in plantis, nec in animalibus, produci ex traduce (hoc negat etiam Scotus, II. Sent. d. 18. q. unica, n. 5.), sed semper creari ex nihilo.  Hanc sententiam, saltem quoad primordium, probabiliter sustineri posse, docet Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 1.), sed simul a sserit, sententiam S. Bonaventurae probabilem esse.  Attamen communiter posteriores Scholastici negant, eas proprie tunc creatas esse et nunc creari; quibus consentit S. Bonav. et etiam S. Thom., qui in Sum. (I. q. 71. a. unic.) docet, Deum ut principium activum de materia elementari animalia produxisse (cfr. ibid. q. 115. a. 2.).

Moreover there were in that age those who thought, that no soul, neither in plants, not in animals, is produced by a transduction [ex traduce] (this Bl. John Duns Scotus also denies, Sent., Bk. II, q. sole, n. 5), but that they are always created out of nothing.  That this sentence, at least in regard to the first rise (of creatures), can be sustained as probable, (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise teaches (here in q. 1, a. 1), but he asserts at the same time, that the sentence of St. Bonaventure is probable.  Nevertheless the latter Scholastics commonly deny, that they were properly created at that time and that they are now created; to which St. Bonaventure and even St. Thomas consent, the latter of which in (his) Summa. (I, q. 71, a. sole) teaches, that God as an active principle produced the animals from elementary matter (cf. ibid., q. 115, a. 2).

Quoad modum autem, quo animae sensibiles nunc per propagationem producantur, non consentiebant Scholastici.  S. Bonav. docet, quod ab agente producantur ex « aliqua potentia activa in materia, ex qua fiunt tanquam ex seminario ».  Haec sententia tota fundata est in doctrina eiusdem de rationibus seminalibus, de quibus cfr. infra d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. 3; d. 30. a. 3. q. 1, et supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1; d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.  —  S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 18. q. 2. a. 3; S. I. q. 118. a. 1; de Potent. q. 3. a. 11.). docet, quod « in actu generationis ex anima generantis derivatur quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae » (Sum. loc. cit.).  Scot. autem (II. Sent. d. 18. in utroque Scripto et de Rerum princip. q. 10. a. 3.) tenet, animas vegetabiles et sensitivas nec proprie creari ex nihilo, nec traduci a generante, sed a solo Deo educi de potentia materiae, quae materia alia non sit quam corpus, naturae viribus perfecte organizatum (cfr. Sum. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 118. a. 1.).

But in regard to the manner, in which sensible souls are now produced through propagation, the Scholastics did not agree.  St. Bonaventure teaches that they are produced by an agent out of « some active potency in the matter, out of which they come to be as out of a nursery ».  This whole sentence has been founded in the same’s doctrine concerning seminal reasons, concerning which, cf. below d. 18, a. 1, qq. 2 and 3; d. 30, a. 3, q. 1, and above in d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1; d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.  —  St. Thomas (Sent., Bk. II, d. 18, q. 2, a. 3; Summa, I, q. 118, a. 1; de Potentia, q. 3, a. 11) teaches, that « in the act of generation there is derived out of the soul of the one generating a certain active virtue regarding the very seed of the animal and/or plant » (Summa., loc. cit.).  But (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (Sent, Bk. II d. 18, in each version of his Commentaries and de Rerum principio, q. 10, a. 3) holds, that vegetable and sensitive souls are neither properly created out of nothing, nor are handed down by the one generating, but are educed by God alone from the potency of the matter, which matter is not other than the body, organized perfectly by the forces of nature (cfr. Summa Scoti, of Jerome of Montefortino, tome II, p. I, q. 118, a. 1.).

II. Explicite de hac quaestione tractant:  Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 1. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, qui alias opiniones impugnat et singulari modo loquendi utitur.  —  De opere quinti diei in genere cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 71. a unic.  —  Alii commentatores Lombardi rem tangunt infra d. 18, ubi disputant de rationibus seminalibus.

II. Explicitly treating of this question are:  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 60, m. 3, aa. 1 and 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 1, who impugns the other opinions and uses a singular manner of speaking.  —  On the fifth day in general cf. St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 71, a. sole. —  The other commentators on Lombard touch the matter below in d. 18, where they dispute concerning seminal reasons.

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