COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 15, a. 2, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XV.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XV
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE II Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 382-384. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 382-384. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
ARTICULUS II. De ordine, quo animalia sunt producta.	ARTICLE II On the order, in which the animals were produced.
Consequenter quaeritur, quo ordine animalia sint producta. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.	Consequently there is asked, in what order animals were produced. And about this three (questions) are asked.
Primo quaeritur de ordine productionis ex parte finis.	First there is asked concerning the order of (their) production on the part of (their) end.
Secundo vero ex parte temporis.	But second on the part of time.
Tertio vero de ordine¹ productionis et quietis.	But third of the order¹ of (their) production and (God’s) rest.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum omnia sensibilia facta sint propter hominem.	QUESTION 1 Whether all sensible (creatures) were made for man’s sake?
CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum omnia sensibilia facta sint propter hominem. Et quod sic, videtur:	ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is asked, whether all sensible (creatures) were made for man’s sake [propter hominem]. And that (it is) so, seems:
1. Primo per Scripturam, Genesis primo:² Dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli etc. Et post, Genesis nono: Omnes pisces maris manui vestrae traditi sunt, et omne quod movetur et vivit: ergo omnia ad utilitatem hominis facta sunt.	1. First through Scripture, in the first (chapter) of Genesis:² Dominate the fishes of the sea and the flying (creatures) of heaven etc. And afterwards, in the ninth (chapter) of Genesis (there is said): All the fishes of the sea have been handed over into your hand, and everything which moves and lives: therefore all (creatures) have been made for man’s utility.
2. Item, Apostolus primae ad Corinthios tertio:³ Omnia vestra sunt, hoc dicit viris iustis: ergo proper viros iustos omnia quaecumque facta sunt, sunt producta: ergo et animalia sensibilia.	2. Likewise, the Apostle in the third (chapter) of (his) First (Letter) to the Corinthians (says):³ All (things) are yours, this he says to just men: therefore all (things), whatsoever (things) have been made, have been produced for the sake of just men: therefore also the sensible animals.
3. Item, Philosophus:⁴ « Homo est finis quodam modo omnium eorum quae sunt »: ergo et sensibilium.	3. Likewise, the Philosopher (says):⁴ « Man is the end in a certain manner of all those which are »: therefore also of sensible (creatures).
4. Item, omnia bonum exoptant, non quodcumque, sed summum, sicut vult Dionysius⁵ et Philosophus; sed inter creaturas inferiores solus homo natus est immediate ad Deum pertingere: ergo aliae creaturae ordinantur in finem mediante homine. Sed quod in finem ordinatur mediante alio, est propter illud: ergo omnia sensibilia facta sunt propter hominem.	4. Likewise, all (things) long for [exoptant] the good, not any (good) whatsoever, but the Most High (Good), just (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite)⁵ wants and the Philosopher (too); but among inferior creatures man alone has been born to attain [pertingere] immediately to God: therefore the other creatures are ordered unto the End by means of man. But what is ordered unto an end by means of another, is for that sake of that: therefore all sensible (things) have been made for the sake of man.
SED CONTRA: 1. Tantae dignitatis est esse rerum finem, sicut esse principium; sed sensibilium animalium solus Deus fuit principium, ita quod non homo: ergo eorundem finis est non homo, sed Deus.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. To be the End of things is of as great a dignity, as (it is) to be (their) Beginning [principium]; but of sensible animals God alone was the Beginning, such that man (was) not: therefore the end of the same is not man, but God.
2. Item, quaedam sunt animalia, quae non valent homini nisi ad esum, quaedam, quae non valent nisi ad vestimentum; sed homo, si stetisset his non indiguisset: ergo huiusmodi animalia aut facta essent frustra, aut non sunt facta propter hominem. Si tu dicas, quod Deus ea fecit, quia praevidit, hominem esse lapsurum;⁶ tunc videtur, quod in voluntate hominis et peccato consisteret, utrum illa animalia frustra facta essent; quod falsum est.	2. Likewise, there are certain animals, which do not avail for man except for eating, certain ones, which not do avail except for clothing; but man, if he had stood would not have needed the latter: therefore animals of this kind either were made in vain [frustra], or were not made for the sake of man. If you say, that God made them, because He foresaw, that man was going to lapse;⁶ then it seems, that it was established [consisteret] in man’s will and sin, that those animals were made in vain; which is false.
3. Item, si animalia facta sunt propter hominem, ergo nulla debent esse facta contra hominem: sed bestiae sunt nocivae: ergo non debuerunt fieri in primaria rerum conditione, aut certe frustra factae sunt. Si tu dicas, quod bestiae non possent nocere, si homo non peccasset;⁷ tunc videtur, quod post peccatum hominis sit nova potentia eis tradita.	3. Likewise, if animals were made for the sake of man, therefore none ought to have been made against man: but beasts are harmful: therefore they ought not have been made in the first foundation of things, or certainly they were made in vain. If you say, that beasts were not able to harm, if man had not sinned;⁷ then it seems, that after the sin of man a new power was handed over to them.
4. Item, si animalia facta sunt propter habitationem hominis decorandam, cum in statu innocentiae non deberet habitatio foedari, videtur, quod non debuerunt corruptibilia animalia fieri, quae suis corruptionibus et exhalationibus inficerent aërem. Si tu dicas, quod non corrumperentur; hoc est contra Augustinum super Genesim ad litteram libro tertio,⁸ qui dicit, tunc facta esse animalia viventia de rapina. Ait enim sic: « Quaedam refectionem corporis sui ex aliorum corporibus quaerunt », ubi loquitur de bestiis.	4. Likewise, if animals were made for the sake of decorating man’s dwelling [habitationem], since (his) dwelling ought not have been defiled [foedari] in the state of innocence, it seems, that corruptible animals ought not have been made, which infect the air with their corruptions and exhalations. If you say, that they would not be corrupted; this is against (St.) Augustine in the third book On a Literal Exposition of Genesis,⁸ who says, that at that time were made the animals living from robbery [rapina]. For he says thus: « Certain (animals) seek refection for their body out of the bodies of another (animals) », where he is speaking of the beasts.
5. Item, quidquid sit de hoc, sive moriantur sive non moriantur, videtur, quod animalia, quae alia devorant, hominis habitationem dehonestent, cum ea destruant, quae ad ipsius faciunt decorem et ornatum.	5. Likewise, whatever concerns this (question), whether they die or do not die, it seems, that the animals, which devour others, dishonor man’s dwelling, since they destroy those (things), which work toward its decoration and ornament.
CONCLUSIO. Omnia sensibilia facta sunt propter hominem, aliter tamen in statu innocentiae, aliter in statu naturae lapsae.	CONCLUSION All sensible (creatures) were made for man’s sake, yet in one manner in the state of innocence, in another in the state of fallen nature.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod finis, ad quem res ordinantur, duplex est. Quidam enim est finis principalis et ultimus, quidam vero est finis sub fine. Si primo modo loquamur de fine, sic omnium creaturarum tam rationalium quam irrationalium finis est Deus, quia omnia propter semetipsum creavit Altissimus;⁹ omnia enim fecit ad laudem suae bonitatis. Si autem . . .	I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that the end, to which things are ordered, is twofold. For there is a certain principal and ultimate End, but there is a certain end under the End. If we speak in the first manner of an “end”, thus of all creatures, both rational and irrational, God is the End, because the Most High⁹ has created all for the sake of Himself; for He made all (things) to praise His own Goodness. But if . . .
¹ Vat. ex parte pro de ordine. ² Vers. 28. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. v. 2. seq. ³ Vers. 22. ⁴ Libr. II. Phys. text. 24. (c. 2.). ⁵ De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 10. — Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. Cfr. etiam Boeth., III. de Consolat. prosa 2. et 10 seq. ⁶ Sicut dicit Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 10. — Paulo inferius plures codd. cum Vat. et potestate pro et peccato. ⁷ Secundum August., III. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15. n. 24. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. — Cod. aa potuissent pro possent. Aliquanto superius Vat. sed multae bestiae homini pro sed bestiae. ⁸ Cap. 16. n. 25. ⁹ Prov. 16, 4: Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. I. c. 4. et ibid. Comment. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. — Paolo inferius Vat. sensibilia alia pro sensibilia animalia.	¹ The Vatican edition on the part [ex parte] for of the order [de ordiine]. ² Verse 28. — The following text is loc. cit., v. 2 f.. ³ Verse 22. ⁴ (Aristotle), Physics, Bk. II, text 24 (ch. 2). ⁵ On the Divine Names, ch. 4, § 10. — Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1. Cf. also (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prose 2 and 10 f.. ⁶ Just as (St. John) Damascene says, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 10. — A little below this several codices, together with the Vatican edition, have and power [et potestate] for and sin [et peccato]. ⁷ According to (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis¸ Bk. III, ch. 15, n. 24. Cf. here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3. — Codex aa has would not have been able [non potuissent] for were not able [possent]. Somewhat above this the Vatican edition has but many beasts are harmful to man [sed multae bestiae homini etc.] for but many beasts are harmful [sed bestiae etc.]. ⁸ Chapter 16, n. 25. ⁹ Prov. 16:4: Each and every (thing) for Himself has the Lord worked. Cf. above the text of Master (Peter), d. I, ch. 4, and ibid., (St. Bonaventure’s) Commentary, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. — A little below this (on the next page) the Vatican edition reads all other sensibles [omnia sensibilia alia] for all sensible animals [omnia sensibilia animalia].

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loquamur de fine non principali, qui est finis quodam modo et finis sub fine; sic omnia sensibilia animalia facta sunt propter hominem.	we speak of the non-principal “end”, which is an end in a certain manner and an end under the End; thus all sensible animals have been made for the sake of man.
Et hoc insinuat Philosophus, cum dicit: « Sumus finis nos quodam modo omnium eorum quae sunt ». Insinuat etiam Scriptura multo excellentius, cum dicit:¹ Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit piscibus maris etc. Quia enim homo rationis capax est, ideo habet libertatem arbitrii et natus est piscibus dominari; quia vero per similitudinem natus est in Deum immediate tendere, ideo omnes creaturae irrationales ad ipsum ordinantur, ut mediante ipso in finem ultimum perducantur. — Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, animalia propter hominem facta esse.	And the Philosopher insinuates this, when he says: « We are in a certain manner the end of all those which are ». Scripture also insinuates (this) much more excellently, when (God) says:¹ Let us make man to Our image and similitude, and let him preside over the fishes of the sea etc.. For because man is capable of reason, for that reason he has liberty of judgment [libertatem arbitrii] and is bound to dominate the fishes; but because he is bound to tend immediately unto God through (being His) similitude, for that reason all irrational creatures are ordered to him, so that by means of him they may be thoroughly led unto their last End. — And thus the reasons showing, that the animals have been made for the sake of man, are to be conceded.
Ad dissolutionem autem rationum, quae inducuntur in contrarium, notandum est, quod aliter ordinantur animalia ad hominem secundum statum innocentiae, aliter secundum statum naturae lapsae. — Secundum statum innocentiae ordinantur ad hominem secundum rationem quadruplicem. Prima ratio est ad manifestandum eius imperium, quod manifestarent, dum ei per omnia obedirent. Secundo, ad decorandum hominis habitaculum; perpulcrum enim erat, habitationem hominis animalium multiplicatione, non solum arborum decorari. Tertio, ad excitandum² hominis sensum, ut in ipsorum animalium naturis diversis videret homo multiformitatem sapientiae Conditoris. Quarto, ad movendum eius affectum, ut, dum homo videret, animalia secundum rectitudinem suae naturae currere et amare illud ad quod naturaliter facta sunt, ex hoc excitaretur ad amandum Deum. — Et propter has rationes non solummodo fecit Deus iumenta, sed etiam bestias et pecora; omnia enim faciunt ad hominis utilitatem secundum rationes praedictas.	But to dissolve the reason, which are brought forward unto the contrary, it must be noted, that animals are ordered to man according to the state of innocence in one manner, according to the state of lapsed nature in another. — According to the state of innocence they are ordered to man according to a fourfold reason. The first reason is to manifest his empire, which they manifest, so long as they obey him through all (things). Second, to decorate man’s dwelling [habitationem]; for it was very beautiful, that man’s dwelling was decorated not only by the multiplication of the trees, but of the animals. third, to excite² the sense of man, so that man might see in the diverse natures of the animals themselves the multiformity of the Wisdom of (their) Founder. Fourth, to move his affection, so that, when man saw, that the animals run according to the rectitude of their nature and love that for which they have been naturally made, he might be excited from this to love God. — An on account of all these reasons God not only made the livestock [iumenta], but also the beasts and flocks [pecora]; for all work to the utility of man according to the aforesaid reasons.
Secundum statum naturae lapsae ordinantur ista animalia ad utilitatem hominis; sed aliter bestiae, et aliter iumenta et pecora. Iumenta enim et pecora ordinantur ad relevandam hominis indigentiam quantum ad cibum et quantum ad vestimentum³ et quantum ad obsequium, sicut sunt equi et asini etc., et quantum ad solatium, sicut sunt quaedam aves et catuli et similia: et sic facta sunt propter hominem ratione quadruplici. — Similiter bestiae sive animalia noxia ordinantur ad hominem secundum quadruplicem rationem et utilitatem, quam ponit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram libro tertio.⁴ Dicit enim, quod « aut poenaliter laedunt, aut salubriter exercent, aut utiliter probant, aut ignoranter docent ».	These animals are ordered according to the state of lapsed nature to the utility of man; but the beasts in one manner, and the livestock and flocks in another. For livestock and flocks are ordered to relieve the indigence of man as much as regards food and as much as regards clothing³ and as much as regards service [obsequium], just as are the horses and donkeys etc., and as much as regards solace, just as are certain birds and young animals and the like: and thus they have been made for the sake of man according to a fourfold reason. — Similarly the beasts or noxious animals are ordered to man according to the fourfold reason and utility, which (St.) Augustine posits in the third book⁴ On a Literal Exposition of Genesis. For he says, that « they either wound penally, or exercise salubriously, or prove usefully, or teach unknowingly ».
Et sic patet, quod tam bestiae quam reptilia et iumenta facta sunt propter hominem, sive in statu innocentiae, sive in statu naturae lapsae. Planum est etiam per hoc illud quod obiicitur in contrarium.	And thus it is clear, that both the beasts and the creeping (things) and the livestock have been made for the sake of man, whether in the state of innocence, or in the state of lapsed nature. Through this, there is also plain that which is objected unto the contrary.
1. Ad illud enim quod obiicitur, quod esse finem esse magnae dignitatis; dicendum, quod verum est de fine principali, qui est finis carens fine; non autem est verum de fine, qui est finis quoddam modo.	1. For to that which is objected, that ‘to be an end’ belongs to a great dignity; it must be said, that (this) is true of a principal end, which is an end lacking an end; but it is not true of the end, which is an end in a certain manner.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de animalibus non valentibus nisi⁵ ad esum et vestimentum, responderi potest, quod illa fecit Deus, quia praevidit hominem lapsurum; esto tamen, quod non laberetur, non tamen essent frustra; haberent enim praeter relevationem indigentiae quadruplicem utilitatem, sicut determinatum est supra.	2. To that which is objected concerning the animals not availing but⁵ for eating and clothing, it can be responded, that God made these, because He foresaw that man (was) going to lapse; yet let it be, that he did not lapse, they would not, however, be in vain; for they would have beside the relief of indigence a fourfold utility, just as has been determined above.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de bestiis, quae sunt contra hominem; dicendum, quod homine stante, nulla animalia ipsum offenderent, sed omnia sibi mansueta essent, sicut aliquando divino imperio ferae crudelissimae Sanctis Dei mansuetae factae sunt, ut leones Danieli.⁶ Quod autem noceant vel offendant, hoc est propter peccatum hominis, non propter novam potentiam eis datam, sed propter dignitatis praesidentiam ab homine amissam. Unde sicut oculus sanus a sole non laeditur, sed cum efficitur lippus, statim offenditur, non propter mutationem factam in sole, sed in oculo; sic in proposito intelligi potest.	3. To that which is objected concerning the beasts which are against man; it must be said, that with man standing, no animals would offend him, but all would be meek to him, just as sometimes by the Divine Command the most cruel wild animal [ferae crudelissimae] have become meek to God’s Saints, such as the lions (did) to Daniel.⁶ But that they harm and/or offend, this is on account of the sin of man, not on account of a new power given to them, but on account of the presidency of dignity lost by man. Wherefore just as a healthy eye is not wounded by the Sun, but when it becomes bleary-eyed [lippus], it is immediately offended, not on account of a change made in the Sun, but in the eye; so can it be understood in the proposed.
4. 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homine stante, non debuerunt fieri animalia mortalia; dicendum, quod sicut animalia sua vita habitationem hominis decorant et ornant, sic etiam morte sua ex successione faciunt ad universi decorationem. Et sicut animalia se invicem iuvantia sunt ratio sapientiae excogitandae,⁷ sic etiam animalia sese offendentia et de carnibus aliorum animalium nutrimentum sumentia; quia illa corruptio aërem hominis non inficeret, qui eius odoratum offenderet, sed potius quadam successione et ordine, dum animalia sibi succederent, universum decorarent, tanquam pulcherrimum carmen, in quo syllaba succedit syllabae.⁸ — Similiter, dum bestia aliud animal edendo occideret, in hominis habitatione discordiam non faceret, sed potius occasionem eruditionis homini praeberet. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus tertio super Genesim ad litteram: « Nimirum aliae . . .	4. 5. To that which is objected, that with man standing, there ought not have been made deadly animals [animalia mortalia]; it must be said, that just as animals by their life decorate and ornament the dwelling of man, so also out of their succession in death they work to the decoration of the universe. And just as animals helping one another are a reason for thinking of wisdom,⁷ so also animals offending themselves and taking nourishment from the pieces of flesh [de carnibus] of other animals (are reasons for thinking of wisdom); because that corruption would not infect the air of man, which would offend his smell, but rather by a certain succession and order, when animals succeeded one another [sibi], they would decorate the universe, just as a most beautiful song (does), in which (one) syllable succeeds (another) syllable.⁸ — Similarly, when a beast slays another animal by eating (it), it does not cause discord in man’s dwelling, but rather proffers to man an occasion of erudition. And this is what (St.) Augustine says in the third (book) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis: « Of course some . . .
¹ Gen. 1, 26. — Cfr. August., 83. Qq. q. 13. et 30; et Serm. 43. (alias de Verbis Apostoli, 27.). c. 2. n. 3. seq. ² Cod. C excolendum, cod. T exercendum. Paulo inferius cod. I excitandum, Vat. moderandum pro movendum. ³ Aliqui codd. vestitum. — Cfr. de his Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 10. ⁴ Cap. 17. n. 26. ⁵ Fide codd. Q U et exigente ipsa obiectione supplevimus nisi. Vat. vestitum pro vestimentum. ⁶ Dan. 6, 22. ⁷ Respicere videtur ad Eccli. 16, 25.* ⁸ Cfr. tom. I. pag. 786, nota 7. et pag. 832, nota 4, ubi opera Augustini allegantur, in quibus haec habetur sententia. — Paulo superius Vat. quod eius pro qui eius. ⁹ Cap. 16. n. 25, in quibus verbis textus originalis post mutantur subiungit: Quod etsi stultos latet, sublucet proficientibus clarumque perfectis est. Cfr. I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 16. n. 25. seq.	¹ Gen. 1:26. — Cf. (St.) Augustine, Eight-Three Questions, Qq. 13 and 30; and (his) Sermon 43 (alias On the Words of the Apostle, 27), ch. 2, n. 3 f.. ² Codex C has cultivate [excolendum], codex T exercise [exercendum]. A little below this codex I has excite [excitandum], the Vatican edition moderate [moderandum] for move [movendum]. ³ Some codices have (the supine) clothing [vestitum] for the noun clothing [vestimentum]. — On these (reasons), cf. (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 10. ⁴ Chapter 17, n. 26. ⁵ Trusting in codices Q and U and as required by the objection itself, we have supplied but [nisi]. The Vatican edition has (the supine) clothing [vestitum] for (the noun) clothing [vestimentum]. ⁶ Dan. 6:22. ⁷ Seems to respect Ecclesiasticus 16, 25.* ⁸ Cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 44, a. 1, q. 3, p. 786, footnote 7, and d. 46, a. sole, q. 6, p. 832, footnote 4, where the works of (St.) Augustine are cited, in which this sentence is had. — A little above this the Vatican edition reads because that corruption, because it would offend his smell, would not infect man’s air [quod eius] for because that corruption would not infect the air of man, which would offend his smell [qui eius]. ⁹ Chapter 16, n. 25, in which words the original text, after hidden to their own genus [mutantur] subjoins: Wherefore even if it lies hidden to the foolish, it gleams faintly for the proficient and is clear to the perfect. Cf. On Genesis against the Manichee, ch. 16, n. 25 f..
* [Trans. nota: Nota originaliter perperam legivit 5 pro 25.]

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bestiae cibi sunt aliarum; nec recte possumus dicere, quod non essent aliae, quibus aliae vescerentur; habent enim omnia, quamdiu sunt, mensuras, numeros et ordines suos, quae cuncta merito considerata laudantur, nec sine occulta pro suo genere moderatione pulcritudinis temporalis, ex alio in aliud transeundo, mutantur; et certe omnibus talibus inferioris creaturae motibus praebentur homini salubres admonitiones ». Deinde planius exemplificat. — Ex his patet responsio ad obiecta.	beasts are foods for others; nor can we rightly say, that some, on which the others feed, would not be, for all, as long as they are, have their own measures, numbers and orders, all of which, considered according to (their) merit, are worthy of praise, nor are they changed by passing from one into the other without a moderation of temporal beauty, hidden to their own genus [pro suo genere]; and certainly by all such movements of an inferior creature there are proffered to man salubrious admonitions ». After which he gives more plain examples. — From these (considerations) the response to the objections is clear.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. De fine eiusque distinctionibus vide supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. Principia hoc loco explicata communiter approbantur et magni momenti sunt pro ethica christiana (cfr. infra d. 16. a. 2. q. 1.).	I. On ‘end’ and its distinctions, see above d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. The principles explicated in this passage are commonly approved and are of great moment for Christian ethics (cf. below d. 16, a. 2, q. 1.).
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 17. m. 3. — S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. a. 3; S. c. Gent. III. c. 22. 97. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 11. q. 63. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic II. Sent. d. 1. a. 5. q. 3. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 1. p. II. q. 1. a. 4. — Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 1. q. 8. — Biel, hic q. unica in fine.	II. (On this Question:) Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 17, m. 3. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. II, d. 1, q. 2, a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles., Bk. III, chs. 22 and 97. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. II, tr. 11, q. 63, m. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here in Sent., Bk. II, d. 1, a. 5, q. 3. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. II, d. 1, p. II, q. 1, a. 4. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, Sent., Bk. II, d. 1, q. 8. — (Gabriel) Biel, hic in the q. sole at the end.
III. De seq. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 55. m. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. q. 71. 72. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 11. q. 63. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.	III. On the following Question: Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 55, m. 5. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 2; Summa., I, qq. 71 and 72. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. II, tr. 11, q. 63, m. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 4, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, aa. 1 and 2. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 3.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XV.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XV