S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVI

Qualiter Deus produxerit hominem ad suam imaginem.

In what kind of manner did God produce man to His image?

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 393-396.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 393-396.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

His excursis, quae supra de hominis creatione etc.

 Having run through those (considerations), which we prefaced above concerning the creation of man etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Terminatis duabus primis partibus, in quibus Magister determinavit de conditione creaturae spiritualis et corporalis divisim, hic sequitur tertia pars, in qua determinat de productione creaturae compositae ex utraque, scilicet de homine.  Dividitur autem pars ista in partes duas.  In prima namque determinat de homine quantum ad ipsius productionem; secundo, quantum ad permanentiam et durationem, infra distinctione decima nona:  Solent plura quaeri de statu primi1 hominis.  Prima pars habet duas.  In prima agit de productione hominis in comparatione ad principium effectivum. In secunda vero parte in comparatione ad principia constitutiva, infra distinctione decima septima:  Hic de origine animae plura quaeri solent.

Having finished the first two parts, in which Master (Peter) determined concerning the foundation of the spiritual and corporal creature separately [divisim], here follows the third part, in which he determines concerning the production of the creature composed out of each, that is of man.  Moreover this part of his (work) is divided into two parts.  For indeed, in the first (part) he determines concerning man as much as regards his production; second, as much as regards (his) permanence and duration, below in the Nineteenth Distinction (which begins):  Several (questions) are customarily asked concerning the state of the first1 man.  The first part has two (parts).  In the first he deals with the production of man in comparison to (its) effective principle.  But in the second part in comparison to (its) constitutive principles, below in the Seventeenth Distinction (which beings):  Here several (questions) are customarily asked concerning the origin of the soul.

Prima pars spectat ad praesentem distinctionem et dividitur in partes duas.  In prima parte Magister veritatem narrat, scilicet qualiter Deus produxerit hominem ad suam imaginem, in qua similitudinem habet ad suum principium efficiens.  In secunda vero parte veritatem explanat, ibi:  Filius vero proprie imago dicitur.

The first part pertains to the present Distinction and is divided into two parts.  In the first part Master (Peter) narrates the truth, that is in what kind of manner [qualiter] God produced man to His image, in which (image) he has a similitude to his own Efficient Principle.  But in the second part he explains the truth, there (where he says):  However the Son is properly said (to be) the “image” of the Father etc..

Prima pars habet tres particulas.  In prima continuat Magister dicta dicendis.  In secunda vero auctoritatem sacrae Scripturae inducit, in qua ostenditur, per quem modum homo productus ad suum effectivum principium comparetur, ibi:  In Genesi legitur:  Faciamus etc.  In tertia parte subdit illius auctoritatis expositionem, ibi:  Imago autem et similitudo in hoc loco etc.

The first part has three subparts [particulas].  In the first the Master (Peter) continues by saying what has been said [dicta dicendis].  But in the second he brings forward the authority of Sacred Scripture, in which there is shown, through which manner the man produced is compared to his Effective Principle, there (where he says):  In Genesis there is read:  Let Us make etc..  In the third part he subjoins an exposition of that authority, there (where he says):  Moreover in this passage “image” and “similitude” etc..

Similiter secunda pars principalis habet tres partes.  In prima enim ponit explanationem inductae auctoritatis secundum aliorum opinionem.  In secunda parte secundum opinionem propriam, ibi:  Verumtamen haec distinctio etc.  In tertia vero ex veritate explanata concludit quandam conclusionem corollariam, ibi:  Quocirca homo et imago dicitur et ad imaginem etc.  Et sic summa totius partis huius consistit in hoc, scilicet ostendendo, quod homo factus est ad Dei imaginem et similitudinem.

Similarly, the second principal part has three parts.  For in the first (Master Peter) puts an explanation of the authority brought forward according to the opinion of others.  In the second parts according to his own opinion, there (where he says):  Nevertheless, this distinction etc..  But in the third he concludes from the explained truth a certain corollary conclusion, there (where he says):  Wherefore man is said (to be) both an “image” and “(made) to the image (of God)” etc..  And thus the sum of this whole part consists in this, that is in showing, that man has been made to the image and similitude of God.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

Ad intelligentiam huius partis circa duo incidit hic quaestio.

For an understanding of this part there falls here a questioning about two (things).

Primo quaeritur, qualiter homo sit imago secundum considerationem absolutam.

First there is asked, in what kind of manner is man an image according to an absolute consideration.

Secundo, qualiter sit imago secundum considerationem relatam.2

Second, in what kind of manner is he an image according to a related2 consideration.

Circa primum quaeruntur tria.

About the first, three (questions) are asked.

Primo quaeritur, utrum sit imago Dei vere.

First there is asked, whether he is truly an image of God.

Secundo, utrum sit imago Dei naturaliter.

Second, whether he is naturally an image of God.

Tertio, utrum sit imago Dei proprie.

Third, whether he is properly an image of God.

ARTICULUS I.

 

Qualiter homo sit imago secundum considerationem absolutam.

ARTICLE I

 

In what kind of manner is man an image according to an absolute consideration?

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum homo sit vere imago Dei.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether man is truly an image of God?

CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod homo sit imago Dei vere.

ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is shown, that man is truly the image of God.

1. Genesis primo:3  Faciamus hominem ad imaginem etc.; hoc non est nisi verbum Trinitatis:  ergo etc.

1. According to the first (chapter) of Genesis:3  Let Us make man to Our image etc., this is not but the word of the Trinity:  ergo etc..

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo:4  Deus de terra creavit hominem, et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum; si igitur homo factus est secundum imaginem Dei, homo est imago Dei.

2. Likewise, according to the seventeenth (chapter) of Ecclesiasticus:4  God created man from the earth, and according to His own image did He make him; if, therefore, man was made according to the image of God, man is an image of God.

3. Item, quod est maxime natum uniri alteri maxime natum est ei configurari et conformari — amor enim, quia unit, transformare dicitur amantem in amatum, sicut dicit Hugo5 — sed creatura rationalis, ut homo, maxime nata est uniri Deo et in ipsum . . .

3. Likewise, what is bound most of all to be united to the other is bound most of all to be configured and conformed to it — for love [amor], because it unites, is said “to transform the one loving into the one loved”, just as Hugo (of St. Victor)5 says — but a rational creature, such as man, is bound most of all to be united to God and to tend / unto Him . . .

1  Ita codd. et edd.; textus Magistri melius primo.

2  Codd. W aa relativam.

3  Vers. 26.

4  Vers. 1.

5  De Arrha animae:  Qui per affectum coniungeris, in ipsius similitudinem ipsa quodammodo dilectionis societate transformaris.

1  Thus the codices and editions; the text of Master (Peter) has better in the first state of man [in statu primo hominis].

2  Codices W and aa have relative [relativam].

3  Verse 26.

4  Verse 1.

5  On the Earnest Money of the Soul:  You who are conjoined through affection, are transformed in a certain manner by the very society of dilection into His similitude.

 

p. 394

 

tendere per amore:  ergo maxime natus est ei configurari et assimilari.  Si igitur imago dicit similitudinem expressam, patet etc.

to tend / unto Him through love:  therefore he is bound most of all to be configured and assimilated to Him.  If, therefore, “image” means an expressed similitude [similitudinem expressam], it is clear that etc..

4. Item, quod vere repraesentat aliquid secundum eius nobilem actum et secundum distinctionem et ordinem, vere est eius imago; sed homo vere repraesentat Deum secundum eius nobilissimum actum, qui est intelligere — non solum enim repraesentat Deum, in quantum est ens et vivens, sed etiam in quantum est intelligens — et iterum, repraesentat distinctionem et ordinem, qui est in personis, quantum ad memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem:1 ergo homo vere est Dei imago.

4. Likewise, what truly represents something according to its noble act and according to (its) distinction and order, is truly its image; but man truly represents God according to his most noble act, which is ‘to understand’ [intelligere] — for he not only represents God, inasmuch as he is a being and living, but even inasmuch as he is intelligent [intelligens] — and again, he represents the distinction and order, which is among the (Divine) Persons, as much as regards (his) memory, intelligence and will:1  therefore he truly is an image of God.

CONTRA:  1. Nihil est illud ad quod fit, quia nihil fit ad se ipsum; sed homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, sicut dicitur Genesis primo:2  ergo homo non est imago.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. Nothing is that to which [ad quod] it is made, because nothing is made according to its very self [ad se ipsum]; but man has been made to the image of God,2 just as is said in the first (chapter) of Genesis:  therefore man is not an image.

2. Item, ubicumque est imago, ibi est similitudo; ubicumque est similitudo, ibi est identitas aliqua; ubicumque autem est identitas, ibi est convenientia in aliquo tertio:3  si igitur Deus et creatura in aliquo tertio non conveniunt, creatura non potest esse similitudo Dei, et ita nec imago.

2. Likewise, wheresoever there is an image, there is a similitude; wheresoever there is a similitude, there is some identity; but wheresoever there is an identity, there is a convening [convenientia] in some third:3  if, therefore, God and creature do not convene in some third (thing), a creature cannot be the similitude of God, and thus neither (His) image.

3. Item, non quaecumque similitudo est imago, sed similitudo expressa; sed nulla est similitudo expressa alicuius, quae plus est disconveniens quam conveniens:  cum ergo omnis creatura plus sit Deo dissimilis quam consimilis, sicut dicit Augustinus decimo quinto4 de Trinitate, ergo nulla potest esse expressa Dei similitudo:  ergo nulla potest esse imago.

3. Likewise, not (every) similitude whatsoever is an image, but (only) an expressed similitude; but there is no expressed similitude of anything, which is more dis-convening [disconveniens] than convening:  therefore since every creature is more dissimilar to God than consimilar, just as (St.) Augustine says in the fifteenth (book) On the Trinity,4 therefore none can be an expressed similitude of God:  therefore non can be (His) image.

4. Item, ubicumque est imago, ibi est configuratio, imago enim attenditur in figura;5 sed divina essentia nullo modo est figurabilis:  ergo nullo modo est per aliquam imaginem repraesentabilis:  ergo nulla creatura est imago Dei.

4. Likewise, wheresoever there is an image, there is a configuration, for an image is attained in a figure;5 but the Divine Essence is in no manner figurable:  therefore It is in no manner representable through any image:  therefore no creature is an image of God.

5. Item, differt imago a vestigio, quia vestigium repraesentat secundum partem, imago autem secundum totum;6 sed nullum finitum potest repraesentare infinitum secundum totum:  cum igitur Deus sit infinitus, et quaelibet creatura finita, nulla creatura potest esse imago Dei.

5. Likewise, an image differs from a vestige, because a vestige represents according to a part, but an image according to the whole;6 but no finite can represent an infinite according to a whole:  therefore, since God is infinite, and every [quaelibet] creature finite, no creature can be an image of God.

6. Item, quaelibet creatura distat a Deo in infinitum; Deus enim quamlibet7 in infinitum excellit:  ergo si infinita distantia non est maior, una creatura non distat magis quam alia; similiter nec una magis approprinquat quam alia:  ergo vel omnis creatura est imago, vel nulla.  Sed non omnis est imago:  ergo nulla.

6. Likewise, every [quaelibet] creature is distant from God unto an infinite (degree); for God excels every (creature)7 unto an infinite (degree):  therefore if the infinite distance (of one creature to God) is not greater (than that of another creature to God), one creature is not more distant than another; similarly neither does one approach (God) more than another:  therefore either every [omnis] creature is an image (of God), and/or none (is).  But not every (creature) is an image:  therefore none (is).

CONCLUSIO.

 

Homo est vere imago Dei, quia est eius expressa similitudo.

CONCLUSION

 

Man is truly an image of God, because he is His expressed similitude.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod imago dicit expressam similitudinem.  Necesse est autem, omnem creaturam quoquo modo8 assimilari Deo; necesse est etiam, aliquam ad complementum universi expresse assimilari Deo:  et ideo omnis creatura habet rationem vestigii, sed aliqua habet rationem imaginis, illa videlicet, quae assimilatur expresse.  Haec autem est rationalis creatura, ut homo; et ideo concedendum est, quod homo est imago Dei, quia est eius expressa similitudo.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that an image means an expressed similitude.  Moreover it is necessary, that every creature be assimilated to God in some manner [quoquo modo];8 it is also necessary, that some (creature) be assimilated to God expressly for the complement of the universe:  and for that reason every creature has the reckoning of a vestige, but some (creature) has the reckoning of an image, that, namely, which is assimilated expressly.  But this is a rational creature, such as man; and for that reason it must be conceded, that man is an image of God, because he is His expressed similitude.

Ad quod intelligendum notandum est, quod quaedam est similitudo per convenientiam omnimodam in natura, et sic una persona in Trinitate est alteri similis; quaedam per participationem alicuius naturae universalis, sicut homo et asinus assimilantur in animali; quaedam vero secundum proportionalitatem,9 sicut nauta et auriga conveniunt secundum comparationem ad illa quae regunt; quaedam est similitudo per convenientiam ordinis, sicut exemplatum assimilatur exemplari.  —  Primis duobus modis nulla creatura potest Deo assimilari, secundis duobus modis omnis creatura assimilantur; sed illa quae assimilatur magis de longinquo, habet rationem vestigii; illa vero quae de proximo, habet rationem imaginis; talis autem est creatura rationalis, utpote homo.

To understand which it must be noted, that there is a certain similitude through a omnimodal convening in nature [convenientiam omnimodam in natura], and thus one Person in the Trinity is similar to the Other; a certain one (which is) through a participation in some universal nature [participationem alicuius naturae universalis], just as a man and a donkey are assimilated in the animal; but a certain one according to a proportionality,9 just as a pilot [nauta] and charioteer [auriga] convene according to a comparison to those which they rule; there is a certain similitude through a convening of order [convenientiam ordinis], just as an copy [exemplatum] is assimilated to an exemplar.  —  In the first two manners no creature can be assimilated to God, in the second two manners every creature is assimilated; but those which are assimilated more from afar [de longinquo], have the reckoning of a vestige; however those which (are assimilated) from nearby [de proximo], have the reckoning of an image; but such is the rational creature, that is, man.

Et hoc patet sic.  Primo de convenientia ordinis.  Deus enim universa propter semetipsum operatus est,10 ita quod, cum sit summa potestas et maiestas, fecit omnia ad sui laudem; cum sit summa lux, fecit omnia ad sui manifestationem; cum sit summa bonitas, fecit omnia ad sui communicationem.  Non est autem perfecta laus, nisi adsit qui approbet; nec est perfecta manifestatio, nisi adsit qui intelligat; nec perfecta communicatio bonorum, nisi adsit qui eis uti valeat.  Et quoniam laudem approbare, veritatem scire, dona in usum assumere non est nisi solummodo rationalis creaturae; ideo non habent ipsae creaturae irrationales immediate ad Deum ordinari, sed mediante creatura rationali.  Ipsa autem creatura rationalis, quia de se nata est et laudare et nosse et res alias in facultatem voluntatis assumere, nata est ordinari in Deum immediate.11 . . .

And this is clear in this manner.  First concerning the convening of order.  For God has wrought each and every (thing) for His very own sake,10 such that, since He is the Most High Power and Majesty, He made all for His praise; since He is the Most High Light [lux], He made all for His manifestation; since He is the Most High Goodness, He made all for His communication.  Moreover there is no perfect praise, unless there is at hand one to approve (it); nor is there a perfect manifestation, unless there is at hand one to understand [intelligat] (it); nor a perfect communication of goods, unless there is at hand one who prevails to use them.  And since to approve praise, to understand [scire] truth, to put gifts to use [dona in usum assumere] belongs not but only to a rational creature; for that reason irrational creatures themselves do not have to be ordered to God immediately, but mediately by a rational creature.  Moreover the rational creature itself, because it is bound of itself both to praise and to know [nosse] and to assume other things into the faculty of (its) will, is bound to be ordered to God immediately.11 . . .

1  Sicut explanatum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. per totum.  —  Vat. et originem, quae pro et ordinem, qui.

2  Vers. 26.

3  Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 2. ait:  « Imago id est, cuius generatio per imitationem est ». Et V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. 9.) similitudo definitur rerum diversarum qualitas eadem; identitas autem unitas quaedam plurium in essentia.

4  Cap. 11. n. 20. seqq., ubi et similitudo et dissimilitudo, quae est inter Verbum increatum et verbum creatum, inter imaginem increatam et creatam ostenditur.  Cfr. lit. Magistri, I. Sent. d. III. c. 3.  —  De maiori cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 71.

5  Hugo a S. Vict., I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 2:  Imago pertinet ad figuram.  Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem.  —  Minorem exhibet Damasc., IV. de Fide orthod. c. 16.  Cfr. etiam eiusdem Orationes de imaginibus, ubi et haec sententia, sicut et plura alia huc spectantia occurrunt.

6  De quo vide I. Sent. d. 3. p. I, q. 2. ad 4.

7  Aliqui codd. hic repetunt creaturam.  Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. Deus enim quolibet finitum excellit in infinitum.

8  Codd. I Q quodam modo; bene.  Dein multi codd. cum ed. 2 autem pro etiam; incongrue.

9  Plures codd. cum ed. 1 proportionem.

10  Prov. 16, 4.

11  Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 44. n. 82.

1  Just as has been explained in Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, throughout.  —  The Vatican edition has and origin, which [et originem, quae] for and order, which [et ordinem, qui].

2  Verse 26.

3  Aristotle in Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 2 says:  « An image is that, the generation of which is through imitation ».  And in Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 16 (Bk. IV, ch. 9) a “similitude” is defined as the same quality of diverse things; but an “identity” as a certain unity of several (things) in essence.

4  Chapter 11, n. 20 ff., where both the similitude and dissimilitude, which is between the uncreated Word and the created word, and between the uncreated Image and created (image), is shown.  Cf. the text of Master (Peter), Sent., Bk. I, d. III, ch. 3.  —  On the major (of the argument), cf. (St.) Augustine, Eighty-three Questions, q. 71.

5  Hugo of St. Victor, On the Sacraments¸ Bk. I, p. VI, ch. 2:  An image pertains to a figure.  Cf. here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3, near the end.  —  (St. John) Damascene exhibits the minor (of the argument), On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. IV, ch. 16.  Cf. also the same’s, Orations on Icons, where this sentence, just as several others pertaining to this, also occurs.

6  Concerning which see Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 2, in reply to n. 4.

7  Some codices repeat here creature [creaturam].  The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, has For God excels any finite unto an infinite (degree) [Deus enim quolibet finitum excellit in infinitum].

8  Codices I and Q have in a certain manner [quodam modo]; well.  Then many codices, together with edition 2, have however [autem] for also [etiam], incongruously.

9  Several codices, together with edition 1, have a proportion [proportionem].

10  Prov. 16:4.

11  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the True Religion, ch. 44, n. 82.

 

p. 395

 

Et quoniam quanto aliquid immediatius ordinatur ad aliquid, tanto magis convenit cum eo convenientia ordinis; et anima rationalis et quaelibet rationalis creatura, eo quod « capax Dei est et particeps esse potest »,1 immediate ordinatur in ipsum; maxime convenit cum eo convenientia ordinis.  Et quia, quanto maior est convenientia, tanto expressior est similitudo; hinc est, quod quantum ad hoc genus similitudo rationalis creatura est similitudo expressa, et ideo imago est.  —  Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus de Trinitate decimo quarto,2 quod « eo est anima imago Dei, quo capax eius est et particeps esse potest ». Quia enim ei immediate ordinatur, ideo capax eius est, vel e converso; et quia capax est, nata est ei configurari; et propter hoc fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini.3  Et ideo quantum ad similitudinem, quae attenditur ad convenientiam ordinis, perfecte dicitur imago Dei, quia in hoc ei assimilatur expresse.

And since as much as anything is ordered more immediately to something, so much does it convene more with it by a convenience of order [convenientia ordinis], and (since) the rational soul and whatever rational creature, by this that « it is able to grasp God [capax Dei] and can be a participant (in Him) »,1 is immediately ordered unto Him; it convenes most of all with Him by a convenience of order.  And because, as much as the convening is greater, so much is the similitude more expressed; hence it is, that as much as regards this genus the rational creature is an expressed similitude, and for that reason is an image.  —  And this is what (St.) Augustine says in the fourteenth (chapter) On the Trinity,2 that « the soul is an image of God by that, by which it is able to grasp Him and can be a participant (in Him) ».  For because it is  ordered immediately to Him, for that reason it is able to grasp Him, and/or vice versa; and because it is able to grasp (Him), it is bound to be configured to Him; and on account of this it bears in itself from its origin the light [lumen] of the Divine Countenance.3  And for that reason as much as regards the similitude, which is attained according to a convening of order, it is said (to be) perfectly the “image of God”, because in this it is assimilated to Him expressly.

Similiter in similitudine, quae attenditur in convenientia proportionalis vel proportionis, expresse assimilatur Deo creatura rationalis, et ideo secundum eam recte dicitur imago.  Quod patet sic.  Convenientia enim proportionis attenditur secundum similiter se habere.  Similiter autem se habere, hoc potest esse dupliciter:  vel in comparatione ad extrinseca, vel in comparatione ad intrinseca.  Tunc autem est similitudo expressa, quando non tantum est similis modus se habendi in comparatione ad extrinseca, sed in comparatione ad intrinseca.  Contingit autem comparare divinam essentiam ad creaturam; contingit etiam comparare personam ad personam.  Omnis autem creatura aliquam comparationem habet, secundum quam aliquo modo conformatur Deo, secundum quod est causa creaturae, sicut est comparatio illa, quae est ad effectum productum.  Sicut enim Deus producit suum effectum, sic et agens creatum, licet non omnino.  Creatura vero rationalis non solum sic convenit, sed etiam quantum ad intrinsecarum suarum potentiarum originem, ordinem et distinctionem, in quibus assimilatur illi distinctioni et ordini,4 quae est in divinis personis intrinseca divinae naturae.  —  Et in hoc ostendit Augustinus in libro de Trinitate,5 hominem esse imaginem Dei; et hoc explanatum fuit in primo libro, ubi ostensum est, quod in anima rationali est unitas essentiae cum trinitate potentiarum ad invicem ordinatarum et quasi consimili modo se habentium, sicut se habent personae in divinis.  Et ideo est ibi expressa similitudo proportionis; et propter hoc rationalis creatura, quae est homo, est imago Dei.

Similarly, in the similitude, which is attained in a proportional convening and/or a (convenience) of proportion, the rational creature is expressly assimilated to God, and for that reason it is rightly said according to this (to be) an “image”.  Which is clear in this manner.  For a convenience of proportion is attained according to a ‘holding of themselves in a similar manner’.  Moreover ‘to hold themselves in a similar manner’, this can be in a twofold manner:  either in comparison to extrinsic (things), and/or in comparison to intrinsic (things).  Moreover there is then an expressed similitude, when there is not only a similar manner of holding oneself in comparison to extrinsic (things), but (also) in comparison to intrinsic (things).  Moreover one happens to compare the Divine Essence to a creature; one also happens to compare a (Divine) Person to a Person.  Moreover every creature has some comparison, according to which it is conformed to God in some manner, according to which He is the Cause of the creature, just as is that comparison, which is to a produced effect.  For just as God produces His own effect, so also a created agent (produces its own effect), though not entirely.  But the rational creation not only convenes in this manner, but also as much as regards the origin, order and distinction of its intrinsic powers, in which it is assimilated to that distinction and order,4 which among the Divine Persons is intrinsic to the Divine Nature.  —  And in this (St.) Augustine shows in the book On the Trinity,5 that man is an image of God, and this was explained in the First Book, where it was shown, that in the rational soul there is a unity of essence with a trinity of powers ordered to one another and quasi consimilar in the manner of holding themselves, just as the (Divine) Persons hold themselves among the divine.  And for that reason there is an expressed similitude of proportion there; and on this account the rational creature, which is man, is an image of God.

His visis, patet responsio ad quaestionem propositam et etiam ad obiecta.  Concedendum est enim, quod homo vere est imago Dei, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

With these seen, the response to the proposed Question and even to the objections is clear.  For it must be conceded, that man is truly an image of God, just as the reasons brought forward for this show.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod homo est ad imaginem:  ergo etc.; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia, cum dicitur factus ad imaginem, imago accipitur abstractive; cum dicitur imago Dei, imago accipitur concretive, quia est imagine Dei insignitus; sicut tabula, in qua depicta est imago, et imago potest dici et ad imaginem.6  Sic et in proposito.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that man is (made) according to the image (of God):  ergo etc.; it must be said, that it does not follow, because, when he is said (to be) “made to the image (of God)”, “image” is accepted abstractively; when he is said (to be) an “image of God”, “image” is accepted concretively, because he has been marked [insignitus] by the image of God; just as a painting [tabula], in which there is depicted an image, and an image can also be said (to be) “(made) to an image”.6  Thus (is it) also in the proposed.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est aliqua identitas Dei ad creaturam, ergo nec similitudo; dicendum, quod similitudo, quae est in imagine, non attenditur per identitatem, aut eiusdem naturae participationem, sed per convenientiam in ordine et proportione;7 quae similitudo non exigit communicantiam in tertio, quia in convenientia ordinis unum est similitudo alterius; in convenientia proportionis non est similitudo in uno, sed in duabus comparationibus.

2. To that which is objected, that there is no identity of God to a creature, therefore neither a similitude; it must be said, that the similitude, which is in an image, is not attained through an identity, or (through) a participation in the same nature, but through a convening in order and proportion;7 which similitude does not require a communicating [communicantiam] in a third, because in the convenience of order the one is the similitude of the other; in the convening of proportion there is not a similitude in one (thing), but in two comparisons.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago est similitudo expressa; iam patet responsio, quia, si magna sit8 dissimilitudo in proprietatibus absolutis, multum tamen magna est similitudo in immediatione ordinis et comparatione proportionis, ex quibus et in quibus duobus expressio similitudinis consistit, quae imaginem facit.

3. To that which is objected, that an image is an expressed similitude; the response is already clear, because, if there is a great8 dissimilitude in absolute properties, yet there is a very great similitude in the immediacy of order [immediatione ordinis] and the comparison of proportion, out of which and in which two the expression of a similitude consists, which causes the image.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de configuratione; dicendum, quod imago corporalis exigit configurationem corporalem, imago vero spiritualis configuratione et effigie spirituali contenta est.  Haec autem consistit non in quantitate molis, sed in quantitate virtutis, scilicet in potentiis, ita quod, sicut figura triangularis habet tres terminos et tres lineas, sic etiam in imagine spirituali potentiae sint ad modum terminorum, et egressio unius ab altera quantum ad actum se habeat ad modum lineae coniungentis.

4. To that which is objected concerning configuration; it must be said, that a corporal image requires a corporal confirmation, but a spiritual image is content with a spiritual configuration and effigy.  Moreover this consists not in a quantity of mass, but in a quantity of virtue, that is in the powers, such that, just as a triangular figure has three termini and three lines, so also in a spiritual image the powers are after the manner of termini, and the egress of one from the other as much as regards (its) act holds it after the manner of a conjoining line.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago repraesentat secundum totum; dicendum, quod illud est verum de illa imagine, quae habet omnimodam perfectionem; et sic solus Filius Dei est imago Patris.9  De alia non est verum, quod repraesentat secundum totum simpliciter, repraesentat autem quantum ad aliquam totalitatem.  Quia enim « rationalis creatura et intellectus quodam modo est omnia »,10 et . . .

5. To that which is objected, that an image represents according to the whole; it must be said, that that is true concerning that image, which has an omnimodal perfection; and thus the Son of God alone is “the image” of the Father.9  Concerning the other (image) it is not true, that it represents according to the whole simply, but it does represent as much as regards some totality.  For because « the rational creature and the intellect is in a certain manner all (things) »,10 and . . .

1  August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.

2  Cap. 8. n. 11.  —  Paulo superius post similitudo expressa non pauci codd. addunt et imago.

3  Alluditur ad illud Ps. 4, 7:  Signatum est super nos etc.

4  Cod. T (a manu suppari) bene addit et origini.

5  Praesertim libr. IX. X. XIV. et XV.  Cfr. lit. Magistri, I. Sent. d. III. c. 2. et. ibid. Comment. p. II. per totum.

6  Cfr. August., XV. de Trin. c. 22. n. 43. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. in fine et Comment. infra dub. 2.

7  Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. proportionem.

8  Vat. etsi magna est.

9  Cfr. I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et dub. 4.

10  Aristot. III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.):  « Anima entia quodam modo est omnia ».  Ibid. text. 14. (c. 4.):  Potentia quodam modo est intelligibilia intellectus, sed actu nullum antequam intelligat.  Oportet autem sic, ut in tabula, in qua nihil est scriptum actu etc.

1  (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, ch. 8, n. 11.

2  Chapter 8, n. 11.  —  A little above this after expressed similitude not a few codices add and image [et imago].

3  An allusion to Ps. 4:7:  The light of Thy Countenance is marked upon us [Signatum est supernos lumen vultus tui].

4  Codex T (by an unequal hand) adds well and origin [et origini].

5  Especially in Bks. IX, X, XIV, and XV.  Cf. the text of Master (Peter), Sent., Bk. I, d. III, ch. 2, and (St. Bonaventure’s) Commentary, p. II, throughout.

6  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XV, ch. 22, n. 43, and here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3, at the end and (St. Bonaventure’s) Commentary, below in Doubt 2.

7  The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, has through a convening in order and (through) a proportion [proportionem].

8  The Vatican edition has even if there is a great [etsi magna est].

9  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 f., and Doubt 4.

10  Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 37 (ch. 8):  « The soul is in a certain manner all beings ».  Ibid., text 14 (ch. 4):  In power it is in a certain manner the understanding of intelligibles, but in act (it is) nothing before it understands.  Moreover it is necessary [oportet] thus, that on the tablet, upon which nothing has been written in act, etc. (all are bound to be written ...).

 

p. 396

 

omnia sunt nata ibi scribi, et imprimi omnium similitudines et depingi; ideo, sicut totum universum repraesentat Deum in quandam totalitate sensibili, sic creatura rationalis eum repraesentat in quadam totalitate spirituali; quaelibet autem alia creatura irrationalis repraesentat eum solum in parte, quia secundum se tantum, cum non sit nata alia in se spiritualiter continere, ita quod nihil sit, quod non sit nata cognoscere.  Hoc dico propter animam sensibilem, quae, si1 cognoscat aliqua, non tamen nata est cognoscere omnia.

all (things) are bound to be written there, and the similitudes of all (are bound) to be impressed and depicted; for that reason, just as the whole universe represents God in a certain sensible totality, so the rational creature represents Him in a certain spiritual totality; but any [quaelibet] other irrational creature represents Him only in part, because (it does so) according to itself only, since it is not bound to contain others in itself spiritually, such that there be nothing, which it is not bound to cognize.  I say this on account of the sensible soul, which, if1 it cognizes some (things), yet it is not bound to cognize all (things).

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaelibet creatura distat in infinitum; dicendum, quod verum est de illa distantia, quae opponitur participationi et adaequationi.  Cum enim Deus sit infinitus, nihil potest ei adaequari; cum sit simplex, non potest aliquam naturam tertiam cum aliqua creatura participare.  Et penes has similitudines nullo modo attenditur ratio imaginis in homine, sed penes aliam duplicem, scilicet ordinis et consimilis habitudinis, secundum quam rationalis creatura non distat in infinitum a Creatore, sed valde approprinquat ei, sicut ostensum est supra.2

6. To that which is objected, that every [quaelibet] creature is distant (from God) unto an infinite (degree); it must be said, that (this) is true of that distance, which is opposed to participation and to adequation.  For since God is infinite, nothing can be adequated to Him; since He is simple, He cannot participate in a third nature with any creature.  And from within these similitudes there is attained in man in no manner the reckoning of an image, but (there is) from within the other two, namely order and a consimilar habitude, according to which the rational creature is not distant from the Creator unto an infinite (degree), but approaches very near to Him, just as has been shown above.2

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. In tota hac distinctione, quae est magni momenti, disputatur de imagine creata, de qua iam plura dicta sunt I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2, a. 2. q. 1. 2. et dub. 4; sed de differentia inter vestigium et imaginem ibid. p. I, q. 2. ad 4.  De imagine increata actum est I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. 2. et dub. 4. 5, ubi in scholio ad q. 1. de ipsa ratione imaginis nonnulla notata sunt.  —  De ratione imaginis et similitudinis etiam cfr. infra a. 2. q. 3. in initio corp.  De imagine in specie S. Doctor (I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.) dicit:  « Imago attenditur secundum expressam conformitatem ad imaginatum », sive (hic in corp.):  « Imago consistit in convenientia secundum configurationem, et configuratio attenditur in origine, habitudine et potentiarum distinctione ».  Ut haec definitio intelligatur, notandum est, quod hoc termino expressa duplex insinuatur relatio, quam imago habet ad prototypum.  Prima relatio est, quod imago sit ex alio expressa per aliquem modum productionis, saltem secundum rationem causae exemplaris.  Unde dicit S. Doctor (I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1.):  « Sicut exemplar secundum proprietatem vocabuli dicit expressionem per modum activi — unde exemplar dicitur ad cuius imitationem fit aliquid — sic e contrario imago per modum passivi; et dicitur imago quod alterum exprimit et imitatur ».  Unde ob defectum huius conditionis ovum non dicitur imago ovi, licet ei sit simillimum (S. Thom. S. I. q. 93. a. 1.).  Secunda relatio est relatio ipsius similitudinis inter imaginem et prototypum, et non similitudinis cuiuslibet, sed expressae i. e. « quae sit similitudo expressa in quadam configurationem et imitatione » (infra a. 2. q. 3. arg. 4.ad oppos.), sive per convenientiam in aliqua proprietate distinctiva et insigni.  Diximus:  distinctiva; « si enim similitudo sit secundum genus tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter hoc dicetur, aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius » (S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 2.).  Multo magis hoc valet de proprietatibus transcendentibus unitatis, bonitatis, veritatis, in quibus conditionibus generalibus omnis creatura similis est Deo secundum rationem vestigii.  Diximus:  in proprietate insigni, quia, ut bene observat Petr. a Tar., (hic q. unica, a. 2.), similitudo in pede non dicitur proprie imago, sed in facie.  —  Cum autem illa convenientia in aliqua proprietate pluribus modus esse possit, plures etiam species imaginis distinguuntur.  « Imago accipitur dupliciter, secundum quod duplex est expressio, scilicet vel in naturae unitate, vel in naturae diversitate:  in naturae communitate sive unitate, sicut filius imperatoris dicitur imago patris; in naturae diversitate, sicut imago imperatoris est in nummo » (I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1).  Unitas autem naturae accipi potest vel ut unitas numerosa (identitas), qualis est inter divinas personas, vel ut unitas specifica, qualis est inter patrem humanum eiusque filium.  —  His suppositis, facile intelligitur distinctio in seq. quaest. inter imaginem connaturalem, naturalem et artificialem.  Aliter enim filius est imago naturalis sui patris, nempe in unitate specifica naturae, aliter imago naturalis Dei, nempe « in diversitate naturae » (loc. cit.); tamen est Dei imago per suam formam naturalem, quae convenientiam habet cum suo exemplari divino tum in intellectualitate naturae, tum in origine, habitudine et distinctione suarum potentiarum, quibus adumbratur personarum divinarum trinitas.  Haec autem secunda convenientia praecipue a Seraphico urgetur hic et infra a. 2. q. 1.  —  De imagine corporali et spirituali cfr. hic ad 4. et I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

I. This entire Distinction, which is of great moment, contains the disputation concerning the created image, concerning which several (things) have already been said Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2; a. 2, qq. 1 and 2, and Doubt 4; but on the difference between a vestige and image, ibid., p. I, q. 2, in reply to n. 4.  The uncreated Image has been dealt with Sent., Bk. I, d. 31, p. II, a. 1, qq. 1 and 2, and Doubts 4 and 5, where in the Scholium for Q. 1 not a few (things) were noted concerning the reckoning itself of the image.  —  On the reckoning of image and similitude cf. also below a. 2, q. 3, at the beginning of the body of the Question.  On the image in particular the Seraphic Doctor (Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2) says:  « An image is attained according to an expressed conformity to the (thing) imaged », or (here in the body of the Question):  « The image consists in a convening according to a configuration, and a configuration is attained in the origin, habitude and distinction of the powers ».  To understand this definition, it must be noted, that by this term “expressed” [expressa] there is insinuated a twofold relation, which the image hast to (its) prototype.  The first relation is, that the image be expressed out of another through some manner of production, at least according to the reckoning of an exemplar cause.  Wherefore the Seraphic Doctor (Sent, Bk. I, d. 31, p. II, a. 1. q. 1) says:  « Just as an “exemplar” according to the propriety of the term means an expression through the manner of (something) active — whence an exemplar is said according to the imitation of which something is made — so the other way around an “image” (is said) through the manner of (something) passive; and that which expresses and imitates the other is said (to be its) “image” ».  Wherefore because of the lack of this condition an egg is not said (to be) the “image” of an egg, though it is very similar to it (St. Thomas, Summa.., I, q. 93, a. 1).  The second relation is the relation of similitude itself between the image and the prototype, and not of any similitude, but of an expressed one, i. e. « which is a similitude expressed in a certain configuration and imitation » (below in a. 2, q. 3, in the 4th opposed argument), or through a convening in some distinctive and outstanding [insigni] property.  We have said:  “distinctive”, « for if a similitude is according to genus only, and/or according to some common accident, it will not on this account be said, to be something according to the image of the other » (St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 2).  Much more is this valid concerning the transcendent proprieties of unity, goodness, (and) truth, in which general conditions every creature is similar to God according to the reckoning of a vestige.  We have said:  “in an outstanding property”, because, as (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise rightly observes, (here in the q. sole, a. 2), a similitude in foot is not said properly (to be) an “image”, but (a similitude) in face (is).  —  Moreover, since that convening in some property can be in several manners, several species of image are also distinguished.  « “Image” is accepted in a twofold manner, according to which an expression is twofold, namely either in the unity of a nature, just as the son of the emperor is said (to be) the “image of (his) father”; (and) in the diversity of nature, just as the image of the emperor is on a coin » (Sent., Bk. I, d. 31, p. II, a. 1. q. 1).  Moreover a “unity of nature” can be accepted either as a numerous unity (i. e. an identity), of which kind is (the unity) among the Divine Persons, and/or as a specific unity, of which kind is (the unity) among a human father and his son.  —  With these (things) supposed, the distinction in the following Question between a connatural, a natural and an artificial image is easily understood.  For in one manner a sin is the natural image of his own father, namely in a specific unity of nature, in another manner (he is) the natural image of God, namely « in a diversity of nature » (loc. cit.); yet he is an image of God through his own natural form, which has a convening with his Divine Exemplar both in an intellectuality of nature, and in the origin, habitude and distinction of his powers, by which there is sketched [adumbratur] the Trinity of the Divine Persons.  Moreover this second convening is chiefly urged by the Seraphic (Doctor) here and below in a. 2, q. 1.  —  On the corporal and spiritual image, cf. here in reply to n. 4, and Sent, Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1. q. 1, in reply to n. 2.

II. Alii commentatores plerumque de hac materia diffuse, sed sub aliis titulis, disputant I. Sent. d. 3, imprimis Dionys. Carth., ubi plura in seqq. quaestionibus tractata inveniuntur.  —  Alex. Hal., de hac et pluribus seqq. qq. inquirit S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 1-7. et etiam q. 55. m. 4.  —  Item Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica et I. Sent. d. 3. q. 2.

II. The other Commentators, most of all (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, dispute very much concerning this matter at length, but under other titles, in Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, where several (of the things) treated of in the following Questions are found.  —  Alexander of Hales, on this and several of the following questions, inquires in Summa, p. II, q. 62, m. 5, aa. 1-7, and also in q. 55, m. 4.  —  Likewise (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each edition of his Commentary, here in the q. sole and Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, q. 2.

Hanc et seq. quaestionem alii (exceptis Petr. a Tar. et Aegid. R.) una quaestione absolvunt:  S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 1; S. I. q. 93. a. 1.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 1; (de hac et seqq. qq.) S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 71.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 1. 7.  —  Richard. a Med., II. Sent. hic q. 2.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lat. 2.  —  Durand., I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. q. 1.  —  Biel, I. Sent. d. 3. q. 10.

The others solve this and the following Question in one question (except Bl. Peter of Tarentaise and Giles the Roman):  St. Thomas, here in the q. sole, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 93, a. 1.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1; (on this and the following qq.) Summa, p. II, tr. 12, q. 71.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in the q. sole, aa. 1 and 7.  —  Richard of Middleton, Sent., Bk. II; here in q. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 1, and in the 2nd lateral doubt.  —  Durandus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, q. 1.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, Sent, Bk. I, d. 3, q. 10.

III. De 3. huius articuli quaestione sub aliis titulis tractant:  S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 2; S. I. q. 93. a. 2.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 2.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 3.  —  Aegid. R, hic q. 1, a. 2.

III. The others treat of the 3rd question of this Article under other titles:  St. Thomas, here in the q. sole, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 93, a. 2.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 2.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in the q. sole, a. 3.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 2.

1  Intellige etsi, quod etiam Vat. ponit.

2  Hic in corp. quaest.

1  Understand:  even if [etsi], which even the Vatican edition has.  [Trans. note:  Cf. the Rationale for the Translation of Peculiar Latin Terms, in the Introduction to this English translation, regarding cognoscere, to understand this divergence of readings.]

2  Here in the body of the Question.

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