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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVI |
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ARTICULUS I.
Quaestio II. |
ARTICLE I
Question 2 |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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QUAESTIO II.
Utrum homo sit imago Dei naturaliter. |
QUESTION 2
Whether man is an image of God naturally? |
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SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum homo sit imago Dei naturaliter. Et quod sic, videtur. |
SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether man is an image of God naturally. And it seems, that (this is) so. |
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1. Quod inest alicui a sua prima origine inest ei naturaliter; sed esse imaginem Dei convenit homini a sua prima conditione: ergo est ei naturale.3 |
1. What is in something from its first origin is in it naturally; but ‘to be an image of God’ befits [convenit] man from his first foundation: therefore it is natural to him.3 |
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2. Item, quod inest omnibus communiter et . . . |
2. Likewise, what is in all commonly and . . . |
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3 Vat. ergo inest ei naturaliter. |
3 The Vatican edition reads therefore it is in him naturally [ergo inest ei naturaliter]. |
p. 397
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inseparabiliter, inest naturaliter;1 sed esse imaginem convenit homini universaliter et inseparabiliter: ergo etc. |
inseparably, is in (them) naturally;1 but ‘to be an image’ befits man universally and inseparably: ergo etc.. |
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3. Item, quod convenit alicui secundum naturales eius proprietates convenit ei naturaliter; sed esse imaginem convenit homini secundum intrinsecas potentias et naturales: ergo convenit ei naturaliter. |
3. Likewise, what befits anything according to its natural properties befits it naturally; but ‘to be an image’ befits man according to (his) intrinsic and natural powers: therefore it befits him naturally. |
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4. Item, esse imaginem Dei non est homini accidens, sed potius substantiale, sicut esse vestigium nulli accidit creaturae:2 si ergo homo non est imago Dei naturalis, ergo non est res naturalis, sed artificialis. Si igitur hoc est plane falsum, scilicet quod homo sit artificialis: ergo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis. |
4. Likewise, ‘to be an image of God’ is not an accident to man, but rather (something) substantial (to him), just as ‘to be a vestige’ accedes to no creature:2 if, therefore, man is not a natural image of God, therefore it is not (some) thing natural, but artificial. If, therefore, this is plainly false, that is, that man is artificial: therefore he is not an artificial image, but a natural one. |
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5. Item, asinus artificialis non est asinus verus, ergo imago artificialis non est imago vera; sed homo est imago vera: ergo non est imago artificialis; et est artificialis vel naturalis: ergo etc. |
5. Likewise, an artificial donkey is not a true donkey, therefore an artificial image is not a true image; but man is a true image: therefore he is not an artificial image; and he is an artificial and/or natural (image): ergo etc.. |
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CONTRA: 1. Hilarius in libro de Synodo3 definiens naturalem imaginem dicit: « Imago est eius rei, ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens »; sed homo non est species indifferens ipsius Dei: ergo non est imago naturalis. |
ON THE CONTRARY: 1. (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers), On the Synod,3 defining a natural image, says: « An image is the undiffering appearance [species] of that thing, according to which it is imagined [imaginatur] »; but man is not an undiffering appearance of God: therefore he is not a natural image. |
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2. Item, Augustinus de Decem Chordis:4 « Sicut differt imago imperatoris in filio et in nummo, sic differt imago in Filio Dei et in homine »: si igitur imago in filio imperatoris est naturalis, in nummo est artificialis, videtur, quod solus Filius Dei est imago naturalis, homo vero solum artificialis. |
2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says) On the Ten Chords:4 « Just as the image of the emperor differs in (his) son and in a coin, so the image (of God) differs in the Son of God and in man »: if, therefore, the image in the son of the emperor is a natural one, (and) in the coin an artificial one, it seems, that the Son of God alone is a natural image, but man only an artificial one. |
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3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Sicut proprium est personae Filii esse filium, ita proprium est esse imaginem;5 sed sola persona Filii est filius naturalis, et non homo: ergo pari ratione sola persona Filii est imago naturalis, et non homo. |
3. Likewise, this very (thing) seems by reason. Just as it is proper to the Son to be a son, so it is proper (to Him) to be an image;5 but the Person of the Son alone is a natural son, and not man: therefore for an equal reason the Person of the Son alone is a natural image, and not man. |
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4. Item, quod est a voluntate non est a natura;6 sed productio hominis est a voluntate Dei: ergo non est a natura. Sed ab eo habet esse imaginem, a quo habet et produci: si igitur anima hominis non producitur Deo secundum naturam, sed secundum voluntatem, non erit imago Dei naturalis, sed voluntaria. |
4. Likewise, what is from will is not from nature;6 but the production of man is from God’s Will: therefore it is not from nature. But one has (his) ‘being an image’ from that, from which he has also (his) ‘being produced’: if, therefore, the soul of man is not produced by God according to nature, but according to will, it will not be a natural image of God, but a voluntary one. |
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5. Item, imago dicit imitationem et similitudinem: ergo si aliquid est imago alicuius naturalis, assimilatur cum eo in natura; sed homo cum Deo in natura assimilari non potest: ergo non potest esse eius imago naturalis. |
5. Likewise, an “image” means an imitation and a similitude: therefore, if anything is the natural image of something, it is assimilated to it in nature; but man cannot be assimilated with God in nature: therefore he cannot be a natural image of Him. |
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CONCLUSIO.
Homo est Dei imago nec artificialis nec connaturalis, sed naturalis. |
CONCLUSION
Man is neither the artificial nor connatural image of God, but the natural one. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod cum imago dicatur ab actu repraesentandi — nam imago refertur ad prototypum, ut dicit Damascenus7 — et repraesentatio dupliciter possit convenire alicui: vel per formam naturalem, vel per formam artificialem; quod duplex est imago, naturalis scilicet et artificialis. Et cum homo non repraesentet per formam artificialem, sed per suam formam naturalem et potentias ei naturaliter inditas; homo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that since “image” is said from an act of representing — for an image is referred to (is) prototype, as (St. John) Damascene7 says — and a representation can convene with something in a twofold manner: either through a natural form, and/or through an artificial form; that an image is twofold, namely a natural one and an artificial one. And since man does not represent through an artificial form, but through his own natural form and the powers naturally endowed to him, man is not an artificial image, but a natural one. |
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Differt autem dicere imaginem naturalem et connaturalem. Nam imago naturalis est, quae repraesentat per id quod habet a natura, sive cum illo quod repraesentat, conveniat in natura, sive non. Imago vero connaturalis dicitur, quae imitatur et refertur non solum per id quod habet a natura, sed per convenientiam in eadem natura. Ideo, etsi esse imaginem8 conveniat homini, esse tamen imaginem connaturalem non convenit homini, sed soli Filio Dei. |
But it differs to say that an image (is) a “natural” one and a “connatural” one. For a natural image is (that), which represents through that which it has by nature, whether it convenes in nature with that which it represents, nor not. But an image is said (to be) “connatural”, which imitates and is referred (to that which it represents) not only through that which it has by nature, but through a convening in the same nature. For that reason, even if it befits man to be an8 image, yet it does not befit man, but only the Son of God, to be a connatural image. |
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Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod homo non est imago artificialis, sed naturalis. |
Therefore, the reasons showing, that man is not an artificial image, but a natural one, are to be conceded. |
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1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod Hilarius definit imaginem connaturalem, non naturalem. |
1. To that, however, which is objected unto the contrary, it must be said, that (St.) Hilary is defining the connatural image, not the natural one. |
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2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Augustino, dicendum, quod non intendit ponere similitudinem quantum ad naturale et artificiale, sed quantum ad convenientiam et discrepantiam in natura. Sicut enim nummus cum imperatore in natura non convenit, sed filius eius convenit; sic in proposito intelligendum est. |
2. To that which is objected from (St.) Augustine, it must be said, that he does not intend to posit the similitude as much as regards the natural and the artificial, but as much as regards a convenience and discrepancy in nature. For just as a coin does not convene with the emperor in nature, but his son does convene; so must it be understood in the proposed. |
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3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sola persona Filii est filius naturalis; dicendum, quod non est simile. Aliter enim accipitur naturale, prout adiacet Filio, aliter, prout adiacet imagini; non enim differt dicere Filium naturalem et connaturalem, sicut differt in imagine. — Et ratio huius est ista: quia Filius dicit ut a quo, quantum est de suo principali intellectu; imago dicit ut ad quem. Ideo naturale, dictum de Filio, significat, quod egressus Filii sit per modum naturae, et ita quod cum Patre conveniat in natura; sed cum dicitur imago . . . |
3. To that which is objected, that the Person of the Son alone is a natural son; it must be said, that it is not similar. For “natural” is accepted in one manner, insofar as it modifies the Son [adjacet Filio], in another, insofar as it modifies “image”; for it does not differ to say that the Son (is) a “natural” one and a “connatural” one, just as it differs in regard to an image. — And the reason for this is this: because “the Son” means as a from whom, as much as concerns its principal understanding; “image” means as a to whom. For that reason “natural”, said of the Son, signifies, that the egress of the Son is through the manner of nature, and thus that He convenes with the Father in nature; but when “natural image” / is said . . . |
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1 Secundum Aristot., I. Perherm. c. 1. seq., naturale est idem apud omnes. Cfr. eius Problem. sect. 15. n. 3. 2 Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. ad 4. 3 Num. 13: Imago itaque est rei ad rem coaequandae imaginata et indiscreta similitudo. 4 Serm. IX. c. 8. n. 9. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 540, nota 3. 5 Sicut ostensum est I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 2. 6 Vide tom. I. pag. 56, nota 6. et pag. 127, nota 2. 7 Libr. IV. de Fide orthod. c. 16., adductis his Basili verbis: « imaginis honor ad exemplar transfertur », dicit: Exemplar porro est id cuius effigies exprimitur, ex quo forma derivatur (prwtouton de esti to eikonizomenon, ex ou to paragwgon ginetai). Cfr. tom. I. pag. 82, nota 10, ubi similia ex eiusdem Orationibus de imaginibus allata sunt. 8 In cod. F (Q a secunda manu) additur naturalem. |
1 According to Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 1 f., the natural is the same among all. Cf. his Problems, section 15, n. 3. 2 Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. I, q. 2, in reply to n. 4. 3 Number 13: And thus an image is of the thing (which is to be) co-equated to (the other) thing, the imagined and indiscrete similitude. 4 Sermon IX, ch. 8, n. 9. See (his) words above in Sent., Bk. I, d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, p. 540, footnote 3. 5 Just as has been shown above in Sent., Bk. I, d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 2. 6 See Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, a. sole, q. 4, p. 56, footnote 6, and d. 6, a. sole, q. 2, p. 127, footnote 2. 7 On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. IV, ch. 16, having adduced these words of (St.) Basil: « the honor of an image is transferred to (its) exemplar », he says: “Next an exemplar is that whose effigy is expressed, out of which a form is derived (prwtouton de esti to eikonizomenon, ex ou to paragwgon ginetai). Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, p. 82, footnote 10, where similar (words) are cites from the same’s Oration on Icons. 8 In codex F (Q by a second hand) there is had a natural [naturalem] for an. |
p. 398
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naturalis, significatur, quod illa repraesentatio est a naturali principio sive proprietate; et propter hoc non datur intelligi, quod sit inter imaginem et eum cuius est imago, convenientia naturae. |
“natural image” / is said, there is signified, that that representation is from a natural principle or property; and on this account there is not given to be understood, that there is a convening in nature between the image and that of which it is an image. |
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4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est a voluntate non est a natura; dicendum, quod verum est ex ea parte, ex qua est a voluntate; unde, cum creatura a Deo producitur voluntarie, non dicitur ab eo exire naturaliter, sed voluntarie; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod voluntarie repraesentet, immo est ibi accidens.1 Quamvis enim Deus voluntarie produxerit hominem, homo tamen habet operationes naturales, quia divina voluntas fabricavit et fecit ipsam naturam; non sic autem est de voluntate artificis creati, quia naturalem formam non potest producere. |
4. To that which is objected, “What is from will is not from nature”; it must be said, that (this) is true on that side, out of which there is a will; wherefore, since a creature is produced voluntarily by God, it is not said to go forth from Him naturally, but voluntarily; yet it does not follow from this, that it represents voluntarily, nay there is (a fallacy of) the accident there.1 For though God voluntarily produced man, nevertheless man has natural operations, because the Divine Will fabricated and made (his) nature; but it is not so concerning the will of an created craftsman, because he cannot produce a natural form. |
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5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago dicit similitudinem in natura; dicendum, quod haec determinatio naturaliter, addita alicui termino, qui quidem nec dicit habitudinem ut a quo, nec ut ad quem, ambiguam reddit locutionem, quia potest dicere habitudinem vel in ratione causae, vel in ratione formae.2 Unde haec est duplex: iste naturaliter assimilatur illi: vel ut intelligatur causaliter, quia assimilatur in eo quod habet a natura; vel ut intelligatur formaliter, quia assimilatur in ipsa natura. Primo modo accipiendo, haec est vera: homo naturaliter assimilatur Deo; secundo modo falsa; et primo modo sequitur ad hanc: homo naturaliter est imago Dei;* alio vero modo non.3 |
5. To that which is objected, that “image” means a ‘similitude in nature’; it must be said, that this determination “naturally” [naturaliter], added to any term, which indeed means neither a habitude as a from which, nor as a to which, renders the expression ambiguous, because it can mean a habitude either in the reckoning of a cause, and/or in the reckoning of a form.2 Wherefore this (proposition): “this one is naturally assimilated to that one”: is twofold (in its signification), so that it either is to be understood causally, because (this one) is assimilated (that one) in that which it has by nature; and/or so that it is to be understood formally, because (this one) is assimilated (to that one) in (its) very nature [in ipsa natura]. Accepting (“naturally”) in the first manner, this (proposition) is true: “man is naturally assimilated to God”; in the second manner (it is) false; and in the first manner (the proposition): “man is naturally an image of God”, follows after the former one;* but in the other manner (it does) not.3 |
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1 De fallacia accidentis cfr. tom. I. pag. 58, nota 5. 2 Codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 finis, quod explicari potest quia finis vel est extrinsecus, vel intrinsecus; posterior coniungitur cum ipsa rei forma. — Paulo superius Vat. sed ut ad quem pro nec ut ad quem. Subinde in multis codd. et ed. 1 deest causaliter et in paucis codd. etiam formaliter. 3 Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. |
1 On the fallacy of the accident, cf. Sent, Bk. I, d. 2, a. sole, q. 4, p. 58, footnote 5. 2 The codices, together with editions 1, 2, and 3, have (it is) the end [finis], which can be explained because an end either is extrinsic, and/or intrinsic; the latter is conjoined with the form itself of the thing. [Trans. note: Thus in the second manner “man is naturally an image of God” does not follow from this: “man is naturally assimilated to God”, because for man to be naturally assimilated to God in the formal sense, his very nature would have to be formally similar to God — which it is not — and thus that he would be naturally an image of God would have to be the intrinsic end or teleology of his form, whereupon that he would be assimilated to God naturally, would only be the consequent of his being a natural image.] — A little above this the Vatican edition has but as a to which [sed ut ad quem] for nor as a to which [nec ut ad quem]. Then in many codices and edition 1 there is lacking causally [causaliter] and in a few codices also formally [formaliter]. 3 See the Scholium to the preceding Question. |
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* [Trans. nota: Videtur perperam quod textus criticalis legivit : pro , hic, quod correxi secundum contextum alio vero etc.] |
* [Trans. note: Here the critical text apparently errs in placing a colon for a semicolon, which is corrected from the context, on account of the following conjunction.] |
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