S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVI

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio III.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 3

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 398-399.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 398-399.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO III.

 

Utrum esse imaginem conveniat homo proprie, ita quod nulli alii.

QUESTION 3

 

Whether ‘to be the image (of God)’ befits man properly, such that (it befits) no other?

TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum esse imaginem conveniat homini proprie, ita quod nulli alii.  Et quod sic, videtur.

THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether ‘to be the image (of God)’ befits [conveniat] man properly, such that (it befits) no other.  And it seems, that (it is) so.

1. In solius homini conditione dictum est:4  Faciamus hominem ad imaginem etc.; sed haec est nobilissima conditio, quae si daretur aliis, nullo modo deberet praetermitti:  ergo videtur, quod nulli alii quam homini esse ad imaginem suam Deus dederit.  Quod si praetermisit de aliis, et non de homine, tunc est quaestio:  quare Scriptura fecit?

1. At the foundation of man alone was it said:4  Let Us make man to Our image etc.; but this is the most noble condition, which if it were given to others, ought in no manner to be passed over:  therefore it seems, that God gave ‘to be (made) to His image’ to no other than to man.  Which if (Scripture) passed (this) over concerning others, and not concerning man, then the question is:  “For what reason did Scripture do (this)?”

2. Item, Augustinus in sermone de imagine:5  « Ad imaginem et similitudinem suam Deus illum creavit — loquitur de homine — quod nulli alii creaturae dedit ».

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in (his) Sermon “On the Image”,5 speaking of man, (says):  « To His image and similitude did God create him, which He gave to no other creature ».

3. Item, hoc videtur per rationem, quia « quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit »;6 sed imago dicit similitudinem expressissimam in genere creaturae:  ergo oportet, quod conveniat vel uni soli speciei, vel uni soli individuo.

3. Likewise, this seems through reason, because « what is said through a superabundance, convenes with one alone »;6 but “the image” means the most expressed similitude in the genus of creature:  therefore it is necessary [oportet], that it convene either with only one species, and/or with only one individual.

4. Item, eo ipso homo est imago Dei, quia immediate tendit in Deum;7 si ergo universum est ordinatum secundum omnem sui partem, impossibile est, quod aliquae creaturae diversarum specierum ordinentur in Deum ex aequo et immediate:  ergo vel homo et Angelus erunt eiusdem speciei, vel esse imaginem convenit soli homini.

4. Likewise, by this very (thing) man is the image of God, because he tends immediately unto God;7 if, therefore, the universe has been ordered according to its every part, it is impossible, that some creatures of diverse species are ordered unto God equally [ex aequo] and immediately:  therefore either man and Angel will be of the same species, and/or it convenes with man alone to be the image (of God).

5. Item, homo, eo ipso quod est imago Dei, est finis omnium aliorum;8 sed hoc non potest pluribus diversis specie convenire, et planum est, quod Angelo non convenit:  ergo videtur, quod esse imaginem conveniat soli homini.

5. Likewise, man, by this very (thing) that he is the image of God, is the end of all others;8 but this cannot convene with several, diverse in species, and it is plain, that it does not convene with the Angel:  therefore it seems, that ‘to be the image (of God)’ convenes with man alone.

6. Item, quia homo est imago Dei, fuit unibilis divinae naturae;9 hoc autem est eius proprium:  ergo proprium est homini esse Dei imaginem.

6. Likewise, because man is the image of God, he was able to be united to the Divine Nature;9 but this is proper to him:  therefore it is proper to man to be the image of God.

CONTRA:  1. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus10 dicit, quod « Angelus est imago Dei, manifestatio occulti luminis » etc.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) says On the Divine Names,10 that « The Angel is the image of God, the manifestation of the Hidden Light [occulti luminis] » etc..

2. Item, « Anima eo ipso est imago Dei, quo capax Dei est et particeps esse potest »;11 sed hoc competit Angelo, sicut animae:  ergo non soli homini competit esse imaginem.

2. Likewise, « The soul is an image of God by this very (thing), that it is able to grasp God and can be a participant (in Him) »;11 but this befits [competit] the Angel, just as (it does) the soul:  therefore it does not befit man alone to be an image (of God).

3. Item, ista est nobilissima omnium conditionum naturalium, videlicet esse imaginem:  ergo nobilissima omnium creaturarum huiusmodi proprietatis non debuit esse expers; si igitur creatura angelica est huiusmodi,12 patet etc.

3. Likewise, this is the most noble of all natural conditions, namely ‘to be the image (of God)’:  therefore the most noble of all creatures ought not have been destitute [expers] of a property of this kind; if, therefore, the angelic creature is of this kind,12 it is clear that etc..

4. Item, imago inest animae secundum superiorem partem, sicut in primo libro13 ostensum est; . . .

4. Likewise, the image (of God) is in the soul according to its superior part, just as has been shown in the First Book;13 . . .

4  Gen. 1, 26.

5  Serm. 43. (alias de Verbis Apostoli, serm. 27.) c. 2. n. 3. seq., ubi recenset dona, quae homo et aliae creaturae a Deo receperunt, ac dicit:  Sed tamen amplius, quid habemus?  Mentem, rationem, consilium, quod non habent bestiae, non habent volucres, non habent pisces:  in eo facti sumus ad imaginem Dei . . . Imaginem in nobis Dei deformare potuimus, reformare non possumus.  Habemus ergo, ut cuncta breviter retextamus, ipsum esse cum lignis et lapidibus, vivere cum arboribus, sentire cum bestiis, intelligere cum Angelis.  Cfr. Serm. 24. (alias 6. ex Sirmond.) n. 3, ubi, enumeratis ceteris creaturis, ait:  Nonne istorum omnium artifex Deus?  Sed hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam fecit.

6  Aristot., V. Topic. c. 3. (c. 5.).  Cfr. tom. I. pag. 542, nota 2.

7  Sicut supra q. 1. in corp. ostensum est.

8  Vide supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 1.  Cfr. etiam Ambros., Epist. 43. ad Honoratian. n. 13. seq.

9  Cfr. III. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

10  Cap. 4. § 22.  Cfr. supra d. 9. Praenotata, ubi haec definitio Angeli exponitur.

11  August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11.  —  Circa finem arg. multi codd. cum Vat. convenit esse pro competit esse.

12  De quo vide supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.

13  Dist. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

4  Gen. 1:26.

5  Sermon 43 (alias “On the Words of the Apostle”, Sermon 27), ch. 2, n. 3 f, where he lists the gifts, which man and other creatures have received from God, and says:  But yet more, what do we have?  A mind, reason, (and) counsel, which the beasts do not have, the birds do not have, the fishes do not have:  in this we were made to the image of God . . . An image of God in us we could deform, we cannot reform.  Therefore we have, to rephrase briefly all (which we have said), a very ‘being’ with logs and stones, a ‘living’ with trees, a ‘feeling’ with the beasts, an ‘understanding’ with the Angels.  Cfr. Sermon 24 (otherwise 6 in Sirmond’s edition), n. 3, where, having enumerated all the other creatures, he says:  Is not God the craftsman of all of these?  But man He made to His own image and similitude.

6  Aristotle, Topics, Bk. V, ch. 3 (ch. 5).  Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, p. 542, footnote 2.

7  Just as has been shown above in q. 1, in the body (of the Question).

8  See above d. 15, a. 2, q. 1.  Cf. also (St.) Ambrose, Epistle 43 “To Honoratia”, n. 13 f..

9  Cf. Sent., Bk. III, d. 2, a. 1, q. 1 f..

10  Chapter 4, § 22.  Cf. above d. 9, Prenotations, where this definition of an Angel is expounded.

11  (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, ch. 8, n. 11.  —  Near the end of the argument, many codices, together with the Vatican edition, have befits [convenit] for befits [competit].

12  Concerning which, see above d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2.

13  Distinction 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.

 

p. 399

 

sed in illa parte homo et Angelus habent convenientiam:  ergo videtur similiter, quod in dignitate imaginis conveniunt:  ergo esse imaginem non est proprium solius hominis.

but in that part man and the Angel have a convening:  therefore it seems similarly, that they convene in the dignity of the image:  therefore ‘to be an image (of God)’ is not proper to man alone.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Esse imaginem Dei proprie convenit homini respectu brutorum, non tamen respectu Angelorum, cum quibus hoc est ei commune.

CONCLUSION

 

‘To be an image of God’ befits man properly in respect of the brutes, yet not in respect of the Angels, with whom this is common to him.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod proprium dicitur dupliciter.  Est enim proprium simpliciter, et proprium alicui.1  Proprium simpliciter est quod convenit omni et soli;  proprium alicui est quod convenit omni contento sub illa specie, ita quod quibusdam aliis convenit, quibusdam vero minime; sicut esse bipedem proprie convenit homini respectu quadrupedem, non respectu volatilium.  —  Dicendum est igitur, quod sicut esse rationale vel intellectuale non est proprium homini simpliciter, quia convenit in hoc cum Angelo, sed est proprium respectu rerum corporalium; sic esse imaginem proprie convenit homini respectu brutorum, non tamen respectu Angelorum, immo communiter convenit hominibus et Angelis, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that the “proper” is said in a twofold manner.  For there is the “proper” simply, and the “proper” to something.1  The “proper” simply is that which convenes with every and (one) alone; the “proper” to something is that which convenes with every contained under that that species, such that it convenes with certain others, but with certain ones least of all; just as ‘to be a biped’ convenes properly to man in respect of the quadruped, not in respect of flying (things).  —  It must be said, therefore, that just as ‘to be rational and/or intellectual’ is not proper to man simply, because he convenes in this with the Angel, but it is proper (to him) in respect of corporal things; so ‘to be the image (of God)’ convenes with man properly in respect of the brutes, yet not in respect of the Angels, nay it convenes commonly with men and Angels, just as the reasons brought forward for this show.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod Scriptura non exprimit; dicendum, quod Scriptura non determinat conditionem Angeli expresse; ideo non est mirum, si non determinat eius modum nec dicit, eam ad imaginem esse factam.  Si autem quaeras, quare non determinat, hoc determinatum est supra, distinctione decima tertia.2

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected unto the contrary, that Scripture does not express (this); it must be said, that Scripture does not determine the foundation of the Angel expressly; for that reason it is not to be wondered at, if it does not determine his manner (of being) nor says, that it (i. e. the angel nature) was made to (God’s) image.  But if you ask, “For what reason does it not determine (this)?”, this has been determined above, in the Thirteenth Distinction.2

2. Ad illud Augustini dicendum, quod Augustinus non excludit creaturas spirituales, sed creaturas corporales et visibiles,3 quando dicit, quod nulli alii creaturae dedit.  Item, hoc dicit propter aliquam proprietatem repraesentationis, quam Deus dedit homini, non alii creaturae spirituali, vel corporali, non propter rationem imaginis principalem, quae consequitur omnem naturam rationalem.

2. To that (verse) of (St.) Augustine it must be said, that (St.) Augustine does not exclude spiritual creatures, but corporal and visible3 creatures, when he says, that He gave (this) to no other creature.  Likewise, he says this on account of some property of representation, which God gave to man, not to another spiritual and/or corporal creature, not on account of the principal reckoning of the image, which is consequent to every rational nature.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est similitudo expressissima; dicendum, quod superlativum dupliciter potest exponi:  uno modo per suum positivum cum valde adverbio, ut albissimum, id est valde album; et sic intelligitur, cum dicitur ad imaginem; et non oportet, ipsum Angelum superponi.  Aliquando superlativum intelligitur respective, et tunc dicit excessum respectu omnium, ad quae comparatur; et hoc modo non potest convenire pluribus; et sic non accipitur in proposito.4

3. To that which is objected, that (an image) is a most expressed similitude [similitudo expressissima]; it must be said, that the superlative can be expounded in a twofold manner:  in one manner through its positive (form) with the adverb very [valde], such as albissimum, that is, “very white” [valde album]; and thus it is understood, when it is said regarding the image (of God); and it is not necessary, that the Angel himself be superimposed [superponi].  Sometimes the superlative is understood respectively, and then it means an excess in respect of the all, to which it is compared; and in this manner it cannot convene with several; and it is not accepted in the proposed in this manner.4

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod eo ipso quo est imago, est finis; dicendum, quod ista non est tota ratio; immo, quia sic est imago in anima, quod ex parte corporis cum omnibus corporalibus habet quandam convenientiam; et ideo solus homo dicitur omnis creatura,5 et omnia propter ipsum quodam modo fieri, et ad ipsum etiam referri.

5. To that which is objected, that (man) is the image (of God) by the very (thing), by which he is the end (of all); it must be said, that this is the whole reason; nay, because the image (of God) is in (his) soul thus, that it has a certain convening with all corporals on the part of the body; and for that reason man alone is said (to be) “every creature”,5 and all, in a certain manner, (are said) “to be made” on account of him, and even “to be referred” to him.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de unione, dicendum, quod etsi ratio imaginis sit dispositio ad unionem, non tamen est dispositio sufficiens de se, nisi competat hoc personali proprietati et culpabili infirmitati; et hoc est reperire in homine, non in Angelo, sicut infra melius patebit in tertio.6  Ad praesens autem sufficiat, quod quidquid sit de unibilitate, imago tamen universaliter consequitur creaturam rationalem, ita quod omnis creatura rationalis est imago Dei veraciter et naturaliter.  Et ratio huius est expressio similitudinis quantum ad convenientiam ordinis, quae supra in principio quaestionis7 explanata fuit.

6. To that which is objected concerning union, it must be said, that even if the reckoning of an image is a disposition to union, yet it is not a disposition sufficient in itself, if this befits [nisi competat] a personal property and a culpable infirmity; and there is a finding of this in man, not in the Angel, just as will be more clear in the Third (Book).  But for the present let it suffice, that whatever concerns the ability to be united, yet the image is consequent to the rational creature universally, such that every rational creature is truly and naturally an image of God.  And the reason for this is the expression of the similitude as much as regards a convenience of order, which was explained above at the beginning of the questioning.7

1  Aristot., V. Topic. c. 1:  Assignatur autem proprium aut per se et semper, aut ad aliud . . . Est autem per se quidem proprium, quod ad omnia assignatur et ab omni separat . . . ad aliquod autem, quod non ab omni, sed ab aliquo statuto determinat.  —  Cod. B. et proprium secundum quid vel alicui.

2  Art. 1. q. 1. ad 2.

3  Aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 materiales.

4  Priscian., III. Grammat. c. 3:  Superlativum est, quod vel ad plures sui generis comparatum superponitur omnibus, vel per se prolatum, intellectum habet cum valde adverbio positivi, ut fortissimus fuit Graecorum Achilles, i. e. fortis super omnes Graecos; sin autem dicam:  fortissimus Hercules fuit, non adiiciens quorum, intelligo valde fortis.  Tale est apud Ciceronem pro Marco Marcello:  simillimum Deo iudicio, pro valde simile Deo.  —  Vat. supponi pro superponi.  —  Nota, quod S. Doctor ad 4. arg. non respondet; sed solutionis principia data sunt hic in fundam. 2. 4. et q. 1. et supra d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. et ad 2.

5  Gregor., in Evang. homil. 29. n. 2:  Sed omnis creaturae nomine signatur homo.

6  Dist. 2. a. 1. q. 2.

7  Quaest. 1.  —  Vide scholion ad 1. quaestionem.

1  Aristotle, Topics, Bk. V, ch. 1:  Moreover the “proper” is assigned either per se and always, or regarding something . . . Moreover the “proper” is indeed per se, which is assigned to all and separates from every . . . but (there is the “proper”) regarding something, which determines not from every, but from some arrangement [statuto].  —  Codex B reads and the “proper” secundum quid and/or to something [et proprium secundum quid vel alicui].

2  Article 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 2.

3  Some codices, together with edition 1, have material [materiales].

4  Priscian, Grammatical Institutions, Bk. III, ch. 3:  The superlative is, that which either having been compared to several of its own genus is superimposed upon all, and/or is mentioned by itself [per se prolatum], having (its) understanding with the adverb very for (something) positive, such as “Achilles was the strongest of the Greeks”, i. e. “strong among all Greeks”; but if I will say:  “Hercules is the strongest”, not adjoining a “than whom”, I understand (that he is) “very strong”.  Such is (its use) among Cicero for Marcus Marcellus:  in judgment most similar to God, for “very similar to God”.  —  The Vatican edition has supposed [supponi] for superimposed [superponi].  —  Note, that the Seraphic Doctor does not respond to the 4th argument; but the principles of (his) solution have been given here in fundaments 2 and 4, and in q. 1, and above in d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, in the body (of the Question) and in reply to n. 2.

5  (St.) Gregory (the Great), On the Gospel, Homily 29, n. 2:  But with the name of every creature is man marked.

6  Distinction 2, a. 1, q. 2.

7  Question 1.  —  See the Scholium to Question 1.

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