COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 16, a. 2, q. 3: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVI
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio III.	ARTICLE II Question 3
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 404.-406. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 404-406. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO III. Utrum imago principalius sit in cognitiva quam affectiva.	QUESTION 3 Whether the image (of God) is more principally in the cognitive (part) than the affective one?
TERTIO QUAERITUR, utrum imago principalius sit in cognitiva quam in motiva sive affectiva. Et quod principalius sit in cognitiva, videtur:	THIRD THERE IS ASKED, whether the image (of God) is more principally in the cognitive (part of the soul) more than in the motive or affective (part). And it seems, that it is more principally in the cognitive:
1. Per illud quod dicit Augustinus:⁴ « Imago est in potentia cognoscendi, et similitudo in potentia diligendi »; sed hoc non est dictum, quod omnino sit in potentia cognoscendi: ergo dictum est, quia principalius est ibi.	1. Through that which (St.) Augustine says:⁴ « The image (of God) is in the power of cognizing [potentia cognoscendi], and the similitude in the power of loving [potentia diligendi] »; but this has not been said, because it is entirely in the power of cognizing: therefore it has been said, because it is there more principally.
2. Item, imago primo et principaliter convenit ipsi Verbo aeterno:⁵ ergo ei principaliter magis convenit quod illi Verbo aeterno respondet; hoc autem est ipsa intelligentia, quae est in ipsa potentia cognitiva: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, the image (of God) convenes first and principally with the Eternal Word Himself:⁵ therefore there convenes with it more principally that which responds to that Eternal Word; but this is the intelligence itself, which is in the cognitive power: ergo etc..
3. Item, imago consistit in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate; sed duae istarum potentiarum, scilicet memoria et intelligentia, tenent se ex parte cognitivae: ergo et imago plus se tenet ex parte cognitivae quam affectivae.	3. Likewise, the image (of God) consists in the memory, intelligence and will; but two of these powers, namely the memory and intelligence, hold themselves on the part of the cognitive (power): therefore the image too holds itself more on the part of the cognitive than of the affective.
4. Item, imago dicit quandam configurationem et distinctionem;⁶ sed affectivae est unire, et cognitivae distinguere: ergo imago principalius residet penes cognitivam quam penes affectivam.	4. Likewise, an “image” means a certain configuration and distinction;⁶ but it belongs to the affective (power) to unite, and to the cognitive to distinguish: therefore the image (of God) resides more principally within [penes] the cognitive (power) than within the affective.
CONTRA: 1. Imago reformationis respondet imagini creationis; sed imago reformationis, quae quidem est gratia, principalius est in affectiva quam in cognitiva:⁷ ergo et imago creationis.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The image (belonging to the act) of reformation responds to the image (belonging to the act) of creation, but the image (belonging to the act) of reformation, which indeed is according to grace, is more principally in the affective than in the cognitive (power):⁷ therefore also the image (belonging to the act) of creation.
2. Item, in eo principaliter consistit res, in quo consistit eius complementum; sed imago completur in voluntate, et voluntas se tenet ex parte affectivae: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, a thing consists principally in that, in which its complement consists; but the image (of God) is completed in the will, and the will holds itself on the part of the affective (power): ergo etc..
3. Item, imago est nobilissimum in anima, ergo consistit penes id quod est in anima nobilissimum; sed liberum arbitrium sive voluntas est nobilissimum, quod sit in anima:⁸ ergo principaliter consistit imago penes arbitrii libertatem sive voluntatem; hoc autem principaliter respicit affectivam: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, the image (of God) is the most noble (thing) in the soul, therefore it consists from within [penes] that which is the most noble (thing) in the soul; but free will [liberum arbitrium] or the will is the most noble (thing), which is in the soul:⁸ therefore the image (of God) consists principally within [penes] the liberty of judgment [arbitrii libertatem] or the will; but this respects principally the affective (power): ergo etc..
4. Item, similitudo est in plus, quam sit imago; non enim quaelibet similitudo est imago, sed similitudo expressa in quadam configuratione et imitatione: ergo ubicumque est imago, principaliter est et similitudo. Sed similitudo non est principaliter penes cognitionem, sed penes affectionem, cum similitudo sit in gratuitis, quae maxime respiciunt potentiam affectivam: ergo pari ratione imago.	4. Likewise, the similitude (of God) is in more, than the image (of God) is; for not every similitude is an image, but (only) the similitude expressed in a certain configuration and imitation: therefore wheresoever there is the image (of God), there is principally also the similitude. But the similitude is not principally within the cognition, but within the affection, since the similitude (of God) is in gratuitous (gifts), which respect most of all the affective (part): therefore for an equal reason the image (of God also).
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, quae sit differentia inter imaginem et similitudinem. Cum enim in plus sit similitudo quam imago, sicut ostendit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum,⁹ et superius non debeat connumerari suo inferiori, videtur, quod male dicitur homo factus ad imaginem et similitudinem.	In accord with this there is asked, “What is the difference between the image (of God) and the similitude (of God)?”. For since the similitude is in more than the image (is), just as (St.) Augustine shows in the book Of Eighty-Three Questions,⁹ and (since) a superior ought not be numbered with its inferior, it seems, that man is said badly (to have) been made to the image and similitude (of God).
Item, cum duae sint potentiae ex parte affectionis, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscilibis,¹⁰ sicut duae ex parte cognitionis, scilicet memoria et intelligentia; quaestio est, quare in ratione imaginis potius accipiuntur duae potentiae ex parte cognitivae, et una ex parte affectivae. Videtur enim, quod potius deberet esse e converso, cum tres virtutes theologicae, quae reformant imaginem animae, sic in ea ponantur, ut duae sint ex parte affectivae, scilicet spes et caritas, quarum una est in irascibili et altera in concupiscibili, et una ex parte cognitivae, scilicet fides, quae communiter ponitur in rationali.¹¹	Likewise, since there are two powers on the part of the affection, namely the irascible and the concupiscible,¹⁰ just as there (there) are two on the part of the cognition, namely memory and will; the question is, “For what reason are two powers rather accepted in the reckoning of the image on the part of the cognitive, and one on the part of the affective. For it seems, that it ought rather to have been the other way around, since the three theological virtues, which reform the image of the soul, are so placed in it, that two are on the part of the affective, namely hope and charity, one of which is in the irascible and the other in the concupiscible; and one on the part of the cognitive, namely faith, which is commonly placed in the rational.¹¹
⁴ Libr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 10. Cfr. ibid. c. 39. et hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. ⁵ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 31. p. II. q. 2. — De seqq. cfr. ibid. d. 27. p. II. q. 3. ⁶ Vide infra pag. 405, nota 2. ⁷ Cfr. infra d. 26. q. 5. seq. ⁸ Vide supra pag. 115, nota 6, et infra d. 25. p. I. q. 6. ubi etiam ostenditur, quod liberum arbitrium principalius respicit affectivam potentiam. ⁹ Quaest. 74, ubi dicit: « Imago et aequalitas et similitudo distinguenda sunt », et deinde hanc explicat propositionem: Quia ubi imago, continuo similitudo, non continuo aequalitas; ubi aequalitas, continuo similitudo, non continuo imago; ubi similitudo, non continuo imago, non continuo aequalitas. ¹⁰ Vide tom. I. pag. 197. nota 6. et infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. ¹¹ Cfr. III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 2. q. 5.	⁴ In the book (numbered among the works of St. Augustine), On Spirit and the Soul, ch. 10. Cf. ibid., ch. 39, and here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 3. ⁵ Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 31, p. II, q. 2. — On the following, cf. ibid., d. 27, p. II, q. 3. ⁶ See footnote five on the next page. ⁷ Cf. below d. 26, q. 5 f.. ⁸ See above d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, footnote 6, and below d. 25, p. I, q. 6, where there is also shown, that free will more principally respects the affective power. ⁹ Question 74, where he says: « “Image” and “equality” and “similitude” are to be distinguished », and then explains this proposition: “Because where there is an “image”, (there is) immediately a “similitude”, not immediately an “equality”; where (there is an) “equality”, (there is) immediately a “similitude”, not immediately an “image”; where (there is) a “similitude”, (there is) not immediately an “image”, not immediately an “equality”. ¹⁰ See Sent., Bk. I, d. 10, a. 1, q. 2, p. 197, footnote 6, and below in d. 24, p. I, q. 2. ¹¹ Cf. Sent., Bk. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2; d. 26, a. 2, q. 5.

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CONCLUSIO. Ratio imaginis non est magis in viro quam in muliere quoad primum esse, sed tantum quoad accidentalem proprietatem.	CONCLUSION The reckoning of (God’s) image is not more in the man than in the woman in regard to (its) prime ‘being’, but only in regard to an accidental property.
RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod de prima nominis impositione differt imago et similitudo. Imago enim nominat conformitatem in quantitate, similitudo vero convenientiam in qualitate. Imago enim nominat quandam configurationem, et ita importat figuram, quae est quantitas in qualitate, vel qualitas in quantitate; similitudo vero dicitur rerum differentium eadem qualitas.¹	I RESPOND: It must be said, that from the first imposition of the name an “image” and a “similitude” differs. For an “image” names a conformity in quantity, but a “similitude” a convening in quality. For an “image” names a certain configuration, and thus conveys the figure, which is the quantity in a quality, and/or the quality in a quantity; but the same quality of different things is said (to be) a “similitude”.¹
Ex hac autem primaria differentia triplex consuevit assignari modus distinguendi inter imaginem et similitudinem, cum dicitur:² Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem. — Primus est, quem dicit Hugo, quod « similitudo respicit naturam, et imago respicit formam »; quia similitudo dicit convenientiam in distinctione figurali, ad modum cuiusdam trianguli, in quo sunt tres termini et tres lineae; quia tres sunt potentiae, quarum quaelibet habitudinem habet ad quamlibet, et similiter tres personae; et potentia vel persona tenet rationem termini; habitudo vero vel emanatio rationem lineae.	Moreover from this primary different there is accustomed to be assigned a threefold manner of distinguishing between the image and similitude, when there is said:² Let Us make man to (Our) image and similitude. — The first is (that), which Hugo says, that « a similitude looks back to a nature, and an image looks back to a form »; because a “similitude” means a convening in the distinction of a figure [in distinctione figurali], after the manner of a certain triangle, in which there are three termini and three lines; because there are three powers, each of which has a habitude to any other [ad quamlibet], and similarly three Persons; and power and/or Person have the reckoning of the terminus; but habitude and/or emanation the reckoning of a line.
Secundus modus distinguendi est, quod imago est in naturalibus, et similitudo in gratuitis, qui similiter habet ortum ex illa prima differentia. Quia enim imago dicit configurationem; et illa attenditur ex parte naturalium potentiarum animae, scilicet memoriae, intelligentiae et voluntatis: hinc est, quod imago est in naturalibus. Quia vero similitudo dicit convenientiam, quae ortum habet a qualitate; et qualitas, in qua anima similatur Deo, haec est gratia: ideo similitudo dicitur in gratuitis esse.	The second manner of distinguishing is, that the image (of God) is in natural (things), and the similitude (of God) in gratuitous (gifts), which (manner) similarly has (its) rise out of that first difference. For because “image” means a configuration; and (because) that is attained on the part of the natural powers of the soul, namely (on the part) of the memory, intelligence and will: hence it is, that the image is in natural (things). But because “similitude” means a convening, which has (is) rise from a quality; and this quality, in which the soul is likened to God, is grace: for that reason the similitude is said to be in gratuitous (gifts).
Tertius modus distinguendi est, quod imago est in potentia cognoscendi, et similitudo in potentia diligendi; et iste modus similiter habet ortum ex differentia prima. Quia enim imago consistit in convenientia secundum configurationem; et configuratio attenditur in origine, habitudine et potentiarum distinctione; et haec origo et habitudo principaliter residet ex parte cognitivae: ideo imago principalius ponitur in cognitiva. Similitudo vero dicit convenientiam in qualitate; et quia qualitas, in qua principaliter assimilatur anima Deo, est in voluntate sive in affectione: hinc est, quod similitudo ponitur principaliter in potentia affectiva.	The third manner of distinguishing is, that the image (of God) is in the power of cognizing, and the similitude in the power of loving [diligendi]; and this manner similarly has (its) rise from the first difference. For because the image consists in a convening according to a configuration; and a configuration is attained in the origin, habitude and distinction of the powers; and this origin and habitude reside principally on the side of the cognitive: for that reason the image (of God) is more principally placed in the cognitive. But “similitude” means a convening in quality; and because the quality, in which the soul principally is assimilated to God, is in the will or in the affection: hence it is, that the similitude (of God) is posited principally in the affective power.
Et inde est, quod in imagine creationis duae sunt potentiae ex parte cognitivae, scilicet memoria et intelligentia, et una ex parte affectivae, scilicet voluntas. Econtra vero in imagine recreationis, quae quidem consistit in gratia, duae virtues sunt ex parte affectivae, scilicet spes et caritas, et una ex parte cognitivae, scilicet fides. Imago enim principaliter respicit originem et habitudinem; habitudo autem et origo attenditur inter memoriam et intelligentiam per modum parentis et prolis, et inter haec duo et voluntatem secundum modum derivationis sive processionis.³ Inter irascibilem vero et concupiscibilem nec est talis ordo nec origo, cum motus irascibilis possit esse sine concupiscibili, et e converso; motus autem voluntatis non potest esse sine motu intelligentiae praevio, nec actus similiter intelligentiae sine actu memoriae, in his dico, quae sunt de ratione imaginis. Ideo in assignatione imaginis duo sumuntur membra ex parte cognitivae, et unum ex parte affectivae. Hoc enim exigit ordo et origo et distinctio, et propterea imago principalius est in cognitiva quam in affectiva. — Similitudo vero principalius consistit in unione animae ad Deum, quae quidem est per gratiam. Et quoniam unio et gratia principaliter respiciunt affectivam; hinc est, quod in imagine recreationis, quae quidem est in gratuitis, duae sunt virtutes, quae respiciunt affectivam, scilicet spes et caritas, penes duas vires, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem; una vero, quae respicit cognitivam, scilicet fides, quae respicit rationalem, quamvis et spes, reformans irascibilem, per consequens reformet memoriam, cum conveniant in actu, qui est tenere.⁴	And hence it is, that in the image (belonging to the act) of creation there are two powers on the part of the cognitive, namely the memory and intelligence, and one on the part of the affective, namely the will. But contrariwise in the image (belonging to the act) of recreation, which indeed consists in grace, there are two virtues on the part of the affective, namely hope and charity, and one on the part of the cognitive, namely faith. For the image (of God in the powers of the soul) principally respects the origin and habitude (of the powers); but the habitude and origin among the memory and intelligence is attained through the manner of a parent and offspring, and among these two and the will according to the manner of a derivation or procession.³ However among the irascible and concupiscible there is neither such an order nor an origin, since there can be a movement of the irascible without (a movement) of the concupiscible, and vice versa; but there cannot be a movement of the will without a previous movement of the intelligence, nor similarly an act of intelligence without an act of memory, among those (powers), I say, which concern the reckoning of the image. For that reason in the assignation of the image two members are taken on the part of the cognitive, and one on the part of the affective. For the order and origin and distinction (of the powers) requires this, and on this account the image (of God) is more principally in the cognitive (part) than in the affective (part). — But the similitude (of God) consists more principally in the union of the soul with God [ad Deum], which indeed is through grace. And since the union and grace principally respect the affective (part); hence it is, that in the image (belonging to the act) of recreation, which is indeed in gratuitous (gifts), there are two virtues, which respect the affective (part), namely hope and charity, within two powers, namely the irascible and concupiscible; but one, which respects the cognitive (part), namely faith, which respects the rational (part), though hope too, reforming the irascible (part), per consequens reforms the memory, since they convene in the act, which is to hold (in intention).⁴
Secundum hoc igitur planum est respondere ad quaestionem et ad obiecta. Concedendum enim est de plano, quod imago principaliter respicit cognitivam; concedendae sunt etiam rationes, quae hoc probant.	According to this, therefore, it is easy [planum] to respond to the Question and to the objections. For it must be conceded plainly [de plano], that the image (of God) principally respects the cognitive (part of the soul); the reasons too, which prove this, are to be conceded.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de imagine reformationis; dicendum, quod non valet, quia imago reformationis potius est similitudo quaedam, quam sit imago. Si enim proprie esset imago, esset capax Dei et esset immortalis;⁵ nunc autem non est sic. Et ideo, quia imago recreationis potius est similitudo quam imago, magis principaliter respicit potentiam affectivam quam cognitivam, quamvis reformet tam cognitivam quam affectivam.	1. To that, however, which is objected concerning the image (belonging to the act) of reformation; it must be said, that it is not valid, because the image (belonging to the act) of reformation is rather a certain similitude, than an image. For if it were properly an image, it would be able to grasp God and would be immortal;⁵ but not it is not so. And for that reason, because the image (belonging to the act) of recreation is rather a similitude than an image, it respects more principally the affective power than the cognitive one, even though it reforms both the cognitive and affective (part).
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod complementum imaginis⁶ est in voluntate; dicendum, quod etsi voluntas ultima sit in imagine, non tamen se habet . . .	2. To that which is objected, that the complement of the image⁶ is in the will; it must be said, that even if the ultimate will is in the image, yet it does not hold itself . . .
¹ Nam ut dicit Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quantitate: Proprium est qualitatis secundum eam simile vel dissimile dici. Cfr. etiam V. Metaph. text. 16. et 20. (IV. c. 9. et 15.). ² Gen. 1, 26. — Verba Hugonis habentur I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 2: Imago pertinet ad figuram, similitudo ad naturam. ³ Cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 12. n. 17. seq. — Plures codd. cum Vat. donationis pro derivationis. ⁴ Ut iam dictum est I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. et plenius dicetur III. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 2; d. 26. a. 2. q. 5. ⁵ Duplex haec proprietas requiritur, ut aliquid sit imago Dei, sicut ostendit August., XIV. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6. et c. 8. n. 11. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 informet pro reformet. ⁶ Vat. magis.	¹ For as Aristotle says, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Quantity”: It is proper to a quality to be said (to be) “similar” and/or “dissimilar” according to the same. Cf. also (his) Metaphysics, Bk. V, texts 16 and 20 (Bk. IV, chs. 9 and 15). ² Gen. 1:26. — The words of Hugo are had in (his) On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. VI, ch. 2: An image pertains to a figure, a similitude to a nature. ³ Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity¸ Bk. XI, ch. 12, n. 17 f.. — Several codices, together with the Vatican edit ion, have donation [donationis] for derivation [derivationis]. ⁴ As has already been said in Sent., Bk. I, d, 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 4, and as will be said more fully in Sent., Bk. III, d. 23, a. 1, q. 2; d. 26, a. 2, q. 5. ⁵ This twofold property is required for something be an image of God, just as (St.) Augustine shows, On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, ch. 3, n. 6, and ch. 8, n. 11. — A little below this codex cc and edition 1 have informs [informet] for reforms [reformet]. ⁶ The Vatican edition has is more [magis est] for of the image is [imaginis est].

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per modum complementi in ratione imaginis. Imago enim dicit ordinem et originem in potentiis, sicut est in personis; et quemadmodum tertia persona non ponitur aliarum completiva nec alias complere, sed potius ab eis recipere; sic voluntas, prout est pars imaginis, potius consideratur in ratione egredientis quam in ratione complentis. Et quia prima ratio originis est per modum naturae, quae quidem consistit in ortu intelligentiae ex memoria; hinc est, quod imago principalius respicit cognitivam quam affectivam.	in the reckoning of the image through the manner of a complement. For the “image” means an order and origin among the powers, just as there is among the (Divine) Persons; and according to the manner in which the third Person is not posited as completive of the Others nor to complete the Others, but rather to receive from Them; so the will, insofar as it is part of the image, is rather considered in the reckoning of one stepping forth than in the reckoning of a complement. And because the first reckoning of origin is through the manner of nature, which indeed consists in the rise of the intelligence out of the memory; hence it is, that the image (of God in the soul9 respects more principally the cognitive (part) than the affective.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imago consistit penes nobilissimum in anima; dicendum, quod nobilius¹ in anima dupliciter potest accipi: vel secundum distinctionem potentiarum, scilicet affectivae et cognitivae, vel secundum conditionem statuum, scilicet superioris portionis et inferioris. Cum ergo dicitur, quod imago consistat penes nobilissimum, hoc intelligitur quantum ad statum in superiori parte, non quantum ad potentias, quia imago complectitur tam affectivam quam cognitivam, cum utraque nata sit immediate ferri in Deum.	3. To that which is objected, that the image (of God) consists within the most noble (thing) in the soul; it must be said, that “the more noble” [nobilius]¹ in the soul can be accepted in a twofold manner: either according to the distinction of powers, namely of the affective and cognitive, and/or according to the condition of states, namely of the superior and inferior portion. Therefore when there is said, that the “image” consists within the most noble (thing), this is understood as much as regards the status in the superior part, not as much as regards the powers, because the image comprises both the affective and cognitive (power), since each is bound to be immediately borne into God.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est in plus quam imago; dicendum, quod similitudo, si accipiatur in sua generalitate, in plus est; si vero accipiatur proprie, sicut accipitur in proposito, non est in plus, immo distinguitur ab imagine, ita quod, etsi utraque² tam affectivam quam cognitivam respicit, imago tamen principalius respicit cognitivam, et similitudo affectivam; et ratio iam dicta est. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad illa duo, quae quaerebantur.	4. To that which is objected, that the similitude is in more than the image (is); it must be said, that the “similitude”, if it be accepted in its generality, is in more; but if it be accepted properly, just as it is accepted in the proposed, it is not in more, nay it is distinguished from the image, such that, even if each² respects both the affective and the cognitive, yet the image more principally respects the cognitive, and the similitude the affective; and the reason (for this) has already been said. — And through this the response to those two, which were asked, is clear.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. In hac quaestione speciali praesupponitur distinctio inter imaginem creationis, quae pertinet ad ordinem naturae et proprie dicitur imago, et imaginem recreationis (reformationis), quae est ordinis supernaturalis et communiter vocatur similitudo in sensu proprio. Licet enim similitudo per se aliquid communis significet quam imago, atque in ipsa ratione imagnis includatur; tamen in sensu speciali et proprio adhibetur ad quandam altiorem imaginis perfectionem significandam, quae animae per gratiam sanctificantem tribuitur (hic ad 4, et cfr. S. Thom., locis citt.). — De triplici gradu expressionis per modum vestigii, imaginis et similitudinis S. Doctor egregie loquitur Breviloq. p. II. c. 12; de similitudine aequiparantiae et imitationis supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 2; de similitudine secundum proprietatem generis et extra genus I. Sent. d. 35. q. 2. ad 2; de similitudine proportionis et proportionalitatis IV. Sent. d. 1. p. I. dub. 3.	I. In this special Question there is presupposed the distinction between the image belonging to the act of creation [imaginem creationis], which pertains to the order of nature and is properly said (to be) the “image (of God)”, and the image belonging to the act of recreation (reformation) [imaginem recreationis seu reformationis], which belongs to the supernatural order and is commonly called the similitude (of God) in the proper sense. For though the “similitude” signifies through itself something common as the image, and is also included in the very reckoning of the image; yet in a special and proper sense it is employed regarding a certain higher perfection of the image to signify, those (things) which are granted to the soul through sanctifying grace (here in the reply to n. 4, and cf. St. Thomas, locis citt.). — Of the threefold grade of expression through the manner of vestige, image and similitude the Seraphic Doctors speaks in an outstanding manner in (his) Breviloquium, p. II, ch. 12; of the similitude according to a propriety of genus and outside of the genus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 35, q. 2, in reply to n. 2; of the similitude of proportion and proportionality, Sent., Bk. IV, d. 1, p. I, Doubt 3.
II. Alii auctores hoc loco plerumque tantum quaerunt, quomodo differant imago et similitudo, praeter Alexandrum Hal. et Aegid R., qui etiam de hac speciali quaestione tractant.	II. Other authors in this place very often only asked, in what manner image and similitude differ, except Alexander of Hales and Giles the Roman, who treat of this in a special question.
Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. a. 4. et § 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 4; S. I. q. 93. a. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. et q. 1. a. 3. — Alios auctores vide in scholio ad a. 1. q. 1.	Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, a. 4, and § 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, here in the q. sole, a. 4; Summa, I, q. 93, q. 9. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 5. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in the q. sole, a. 6. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 3. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 3, and q. 1, a. 3. — See the other authors in the Scholium to a. 1, q. 1.
¹ Vat. cum ed. 1 et uno alteroque cod. nobilissimum. Eadem Vat. paulo inferius cognitionem, cod. W considerationem pro conditionem, de quo cfr. infra d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ² Plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 utramque, non recte.	¹ The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, has “the most noble” [nobilissimum]. The same Vatican edition a little below this has the cognition [cognitionem], codex W the consideration [considerationem] for the condition [conditionem], concerning which cf. below d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 2. ² Several codices, together with editions 1, 2, 3 and 4, have it respects each [utramque] for each respects [utraque].

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVI