COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE I Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 413-416. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 413-416. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Utrum anima Adae fuerit producta ex materia.	QUESTION 2 Whether the soul of Adam was produced out of matter?
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum anima Adae producta fuerit ex materia. Et quod non, videtur:	SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the soul of Adam was produced out of matter. And that (it was) not, seems:
1. Primo per philosophum,² qui dicit, quod « forma est compositioni contingens in simplici essentia consistens ». Si igitur anima rationalis vere forma est, ergo simplex est: ergo non componitur ex materia et forma.	1. First through the philosopher,² who says, that « the form is the one contingent to the composition, consisting in a simple essence ». If, therefore, the rational soul is truly a form, therefore it is simple: therefore it is not composed out of matter and form.
2. Item, Philosophus in principio tertii de Anima³ dicit, quod « intellectus est impermixtus et impassibilis »; sed omne quod habet materiam, habet potentiam passivam: ergo substantia intellectiva non habet materiam.	2. Likewise, the Philosopher at the beginning of the third (book) On the Soul³ says, that « the intellect is thoroughly unmixed and impassible »; but everything which has matter, has a passive potency: therefore an intellective substance does not have matter.
3. Item, Magister in littera:⁴ « Substantiam animae, in qua viveret, creavit Deus non de materia aliqua corporali, vel spirituali, sed de nihilo ».	3. Likewise, Master (Peter says) in the text:⁴ « The substance of the soul, in which it would live, God created not from any corporal, and/or spiritual, matter, but from nothing ».
4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Substantia intellectiva nihil cognoscit, nisi abstrahatur a materia;⁵ sed in actu cognoscendi fit assimilatio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile, et e converso: ergo si ad hoc, quod intelligatur, necesse est, quod abstrahatur a materia, ad hoc, quod aliqua substantia intelligat, necesse est, quod sit per naturam a materia separata. Sed anima Adae fuit huiusmodi: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, this very (thing) seems by reason. An intellective substance cognizes nothing, unless it is abstracted from matter;⁵ but in the act of cognizing there comes to be an assimilation of the one cognizing to the cognizable, and vice versa: therefore if for this, that it be understood, it is necessary, that it be abstracted from matter, for this, that any substance understand, it is necessary, that it be through nature separated from matter. But the soul of Adam was of this kind: ergo etc..
5. Item, quanto forma nobilior, tanto simplicior;⁶ sed anima inter omnes formas est nobilissima: ergo simplicissima. Sed aliae formae non componuntur ex materia et forma: ergo multo fortius nec rationalis anima.	5. Likewise, as much as a form (is) more noble, so much (is it) more simple;⁶ but the soul, among all forms, is the most noble one: therefore (it is) the most simple one. But other forms are not composed out of matter and form: therefore much more strongly neither (is) the rational soul.
6. Item, omne quod habet materiam et formam ut partes constitutivas, est hoc aliquid et est completum;⁷ nihil autem, quod est hoc aliquid et completum in se, venit ad constitutionem tertii; sed anima rationalis venit ad constitutionem tertii, ita quod ex anima et corpore fit unum per essentiam: ergo anima non est hoc aliquid: ergo vel est materia, vel forma pura; non materia: ergo forma.	6. Likewise, everything which has matter and form as constitutive parts, is a this something [hoc aliquid] and is complete;⁷ but nothing, which is a this something and complete in itself, comes to the constitution of a third; but the rational soul comes to the constitution of a third, such that out of soul and body there comes to be one (being) through essence: therefore the soul is not a this something: therefore either it is matter, and/or pure form; (it is) not matter: therefore (it is) form.
SED CONTRA: 1. In tertio de Anima⁸ dicit Philosophus, quod « sicut in omni natura est materia et efficiens, sic in anima est intellectus, quo est omnia fieri, et intellectus, quo est omnia facere ». Si igitur potentia passiva est a materia, et haec est in anima, patet etc.	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In the third (book) On the Soul⁸ the Philosopher says, that « just as in every nature there is matter and an efficient (cause), so in the soul there is an intellect, by which there is a coming to be of all (things), and an intellect, by which there is a making of all (things) ». If, therefore, passive potency is from matter, and this (potency) is in the soul, it is clear that etc..
2. Item, in nono⁹ Primae Philosophiae dicit Philosophus, quod « sicut materia est subiectum formarum substantialium, sic compositum est subiectum accidentis »; sed anima rationalis est subiectum scientiarum et virtutum, etiam secundum se considerata: ergo composita est ex materia et forma.	2. Likewise, in the ninth⁹ (book of his) The First Philosophy the Philosopher says, that « just as matter is the subject of substantial forms, so the composite is the subject of the accident »; but the rational soul is the subject of sciences and virtues, even considered according to itself: therefore it has been composed out of matter and form.
3. Item, Philosophus in octavo¹⁰ Metaphysicae: « Operans et generans non facit aliud nisi propter materiam »: ergo si Deus facit animam, quae est . . .	3. Likewise, the Philosopher in the eighth¹⁰ (book of his) Metaphysics (says): « The one operating and generating does not make another except on account of matter »: therefore if God makes the soul, which is . . .
² Intellige cum Vat. auctorem Sex Principiorum (c. 1.), scilicet Gilbertum Porretanum. ³ Text. 3. seq. (c. 4.). — Non pauci codd. cum Vat. de Animalibus; perperam. ⁴ Hic c. 2. ⁵ Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 9. seqq. et text. 37. seqq. (c. 4. et 8.). De minori vide eiusdem VI. Ethic. c. 1. ⁶ Cfr. liber de Causis, prop. 10. et. 17. ⁷ Vide supra pag. 109, nota 7. et pag. 197, nota 3. — De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.). ⁸ Text. 17. seq. (c. 5.). ⁹ Text. 12. (VIII. c. 7.). Verba non sunt ipsius Aristotelis, sed exhibent summam longioris expositionis. ¹⁰ Text. 11. seq. (VII. c. 4.); sententialiter; clarius VII. text. 28, quem iam supra pag. 109, nota 5. allegavimus. — Plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2 nihil facit pro non facit.	² Understand together with the Vatican edition the author of The Six Principles (ch. 1), namely Gilbert of Porretain [auctorem Sex Principiorum (c. 1.), scilicet Gilbertum Porretanum.]. ³ Text 3 f. (ch. 4). — Not a few codices, together with the Vatican edition, have On Animals [de Animalibus], faultily. ⁴ Here in ch. 2. ⁵ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 9 ff. and text 37 ff. (chs. 4 and 8). On the minor (of the argument) see the same’s, Ethics, Bk. VI, ch. 1. ⁶ Cf. The Book of Causes, propositions 10 and 17. ⁷ See above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, p. 109, footnote 7, and d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, p. 197, footnote 3. — On the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 49 (Bk. VI, ch. 13). ⁸ Text 17 f. (ch. 5.). ⁹ Text 12 (Bk. VIII, ch. 7). The words are not of Aristotle himself, but they exhibit a summary of (his) longer exposition. ¹⁰ Text 11 f. (Bk. VII, ch. 4) according to the sense; more clearly in Bk. VII, text 28, which we have already cited above in d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, p. 109, footnote 5. — Several codices, together with editions 1 and 2, have makes nothing other [nihil facit aliud] for does not make another [non facit aliud].

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aliud quam ipse, necesse est, quod materia vel sit in Deo, vel sit in anima; sed non est in Deo, ergo est in anima.	other than Himself, it is necessary, that there be matter in God, and/or that it be in the soul; but it is not in God, therefore it is in the soul.
4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Omne creatum, cui debetur propria operatio, habet haec duo diversa, scilicet quod agit et quo agit;¹ sed animae secundum se consideratae debetur propria operatio: ergo videtur, quod non solum sit forma, quia, si pure forma esset, tunc ageret se ipsa: ergo habet aliquid de materia.	4. Likewise, this very (thing) seems by reason. Everything created, to which there belongs its own operation, has these two diverse (things), namely what it does [quod agit] and that whereby it does [quo agit];¹ but to the soul, considered according to itself, there belongs its own operation: therefore it seems, that it is not only a form, because, if it were a pure form, then it would act by itself: therefore it has something of matter.
5. Item, omne illud quod secundum sui mutationem est susceptibile contrariorum, est hoc aliquid et substantia per se existens in genere,² et omne tale compositum est ex materia et forma; sed anima secundum sui mutationem est susceptiva gaudii et tristitiae: ergo anima rationalis composita est ex materia et forma.	5. Likewise, every that which is susceptible of contraries according to its own mutation, is a this something [hoc aliquid] and a substance existing through itself in (its) genus [substantia per se existens in genere];² and every such has been composed out of matter and form; but the soul according to its own mutation is susceptive of joy and sadness: therefore the rational soul has been composed out of matter and form.
6. Item, anima rationalis non solummodo vitam praebet corpori, sed etiam vivit; aut igitur est sua vita, aut non. Si sic: ergo non differt in ea vivens, et quo vivit. Et iterum, si est sua vita, non vivit per participationem, sed per essentiam; quae duo sunt contra Boethium³ et Augustinum: ergo ponere est in anima, secundum se considerata, aliquid quod det vitam, et aliquid quod recipiat. Et si hoc, ergo est composita ex materia et forma. — Et ad hoc possunt adduci rationes, quae adductae sunt supra⁴ ad ostendendum, Angelum esse compositum ex materia et forma.	6. Likewise, the rational soul does not only proffer life to the body, but it also lives; therefore either it is its own life, or (it is) not. If so: therefore the one living in it, and (that) by which it lives, does not differ. And again, if it is its own life, it does not live through a participation, but through (its) essence, which two (assertions) are contrary to (Sts. Severinus) Boethius³ and Augustine: therefore there is a positing in the soul, considered in itself, a something which gives life, and a something which receives (it). And if this (is so), therefore it has been composed out of matter and form. — And for this there can be adduced the reasons, which were adduced above⁴ to show, that the Angel has been composed out of matter and form.
CONCLUSIO. Anima rationalis, non autem brutalis, habet materiam, quae vocatur spiritualis.	CONCLUSION The rational soul, has the matter, which is called spiritual, (the soul) of beasts, however, (does) not.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa opinati sunt.	I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that about this diverse (authors) have opined diverse (things).
Quidam enim dixerunt, nullam animam, nec rationalem nec brutalem, habere materiam, quia spiritus sunt simplices; animam tamen rationalem dixerunt habere compositionem ex quo est et quod est, quia ipsa est hoc aliquid et nata est per se et in se subsistere. — Sed cum planum sit, animam rationalem posse pati et agere et mutari ab una proprietate in aliam et in se ipsa subsistere; non videtur, quod illud sufficiat dicere, quod in ea sit tantum compositio ex quo est et quod est, nisi addatur esse in ea compositio materiae et formae.	For certain (authors) have said, that no soul, neither the rational not (that) of the brutes, has matter, because they are simple spirits; yet they said that the rational soul does have a composition out of (that) by which it is [quod est] and (that) which it is [quo est], because it is a this something [hoc aliquid] and is bound to subsist through itself and in itself. — But since it is plain, that the rational soul can suffer and act and be changed from one property into another and (can) subsist in its very self; it does not seem, that it suffices to say this, that there is in it only a composition out of (that) by which it is and (that) which it is, unless there be added that there is in it a composition of matter and form.
Ideo fuerunt et alii, qui dixerunt, non solum animam rationalem, sed etiam brutalem ex materia et forma compositam esse, cum utraque sit motor corporis sufficiens. — Sed quia anima brutalis propriam⁵ operationem non habet nec est nata per se subsistere, non videtur, quod habeat materiam intra se.	For that reason there were also others, who said, that not only the rational soul, but even (the soul) of brutes has been composed out of matter and form, since each is a sufficient mover of the body. — But because the soul of brutes does not have its own⁵ operation and is not bound to subsist through itself, it does not seem, that it has matter within itself.
Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, tenens medium inter utrumque, scilicet quod anima rationalis, cum sit hoc aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri,⁶ quod habet . . .	And for that reason there is a third manner of speaking, holding the middle (ground) between each, namely, that the rational soul, since it is a this something and (is) bound through itself to subsist and act and suffer, to move and be moved,⁶ that it has . . .
¹ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. fundam 3. et d. 8. p. II. q. 2, ubi haec ex Boethio formata propositio explicatur. ² Aristot., de Predicam. c. de Substantia. — Pro seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 12. (I. brevior, c. 2.) et XII. text. 10. (XI. c. 2.), ubi dicit, quod in omni eo quod movetur sive mutatur, materia inveniatur. — August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 9. inquirens, utrum anima ex materia spirituali producta sit, ait: Si enim quiddam incommutabile esset anima, nullo modo eius quasi materiam quaerere deberemus; nunc autem mutabilitas eius satis indicat, eam interim vitiis atque fallaciis deformem reddi, formari autem virtutibus veritatisque doctrina, sed in sua iam natura, qua est anima, sicut etiam caro in sua natura, qua iam caro est, et salute decoratur et morbis vulneribusque foedatur etc. ³ De Trin. c. 2: « Reliqua [praeter Deum] enim non sunt id quod sunt; unumquodque enim habet esse suum ex his, ex quibus est, id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae, sed non hoc, vel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corporeque, corpus et anima est, non vel corpus, vel anima ». In libro de Hebdomadibus docet, quod creaturae non sint suum esse, sed participent esse. In libro autem de Unitate et uno dicit, quod tam Angelus quam anima sint aliquod « unum coniunctione materiae et formae ». Similiter August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 4. n. 6. docet, quod creaturae sint bonae « participando bonum et habendo ». In Ioan. tract. 19. n. 13, exponens illa verba: Vitam dedit Filio, ut habeat eam in semetipso, per oppositionem ad vitam animae dicit de Filio Dei: « Dedit ei, ut Filius esset, genuit, ut vita esset, hoc est Dedit ei habere vitam in semetipso, ut esset vita non egens vita, ne participando intelligatur habere vitam. Si enim participando haberet vitam, posset et amittendo esse sine vita ». Libr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 36. comparatur vita animae cum Dei vita: « Vita Deus est, vita et anima est, similis, sed dispar; similis, quod vita, quod se ipsa vivens . . . dispar, quoniam ille creator est, et ista creatura. Nisi enim ab illo creata esset, non esset; et nisi ab illo vivificata non viveret . . .Vita anima est, vivens quidem, sed non aliunde quam se ipsa; et ob hoc non tam vivens, quam vita est » etc. Haec verba, quae sumta sunt ex Bernard., in Cant. serm. 81. n. 3. seq., intelligit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 1. a. 2. § 2. in eodem sensu ac S. Bonav., scil. « anima vivit se ipsa i. e. aliquo sibi intrinseco, utpote formali principio »; et explicat exemplo sumto ab animali: « Animal enim dicitur se ipso moveri i. e. ab aliquo principio sibi intrinseco, eo modo quo dicitur anima vivere se ». ⁴ Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ⁵ Intellige propriam per se ipsam sive independentem a corpore, quia omnis operatio animae sensitivae est coniuncti. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 12. seqq. (c. 1.). — Ex hac ratione deducitur sequens, scil. quod anima brutalis non est nata per se subsistere. — Paulo inferius in codd. O R S habetur per se et intra se pro intra se. ⁶ Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 5.	¹ Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, 3rd argument of the fundament, and d. 8, p. II, q. 2, where this proposition, formed from (the words of St.) Boethius, is explained. ² Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. “On Substance”. — For the following proposition, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 12 (in the shorter version, Bk. I, ch. 2), and Bk. XII, text 10 (Bk. XI, ch. 2), where he says, that in every that which is moved or changed, matter is found. — (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VII, ch. 6, n. 9, inquiring, whether the soul has been produced out of spiritual matter, says: For if the soul were a certain incommutable something, we would in no manner be obliged to seek as if for its matter; but its mutability now sufficiently indicates, that it is sometimes rendered deformed by vices and fallacies, but formed by virtues and the doctrine of truth, but now in its own nature, by which it is the soul, just as also the flesh in its own nature, by which it is now the flesh, is also decorated by health and disfigures by deadly diseases and wounds etc. ³ On the Trinity, ch. 2: « For the rest (i. e. besides God) are not that which they are; for each one has its own ‘to be’ out of those, out of which it is, that is out of its own parts, and is this and also this, that is its own conjoined parts, but not this, and/or this singularly, so that since an earthly man is established out of soul and body, he is the soul and body, nor either the body, and/or the soul ». In the book On the Seven Categories of Aristotle he teaches, that creatures are not their own ‘to be’, but participate in a ‘to be’. Moreover in the book On Unity and the One he says, that both the Angel and the soul are some « one (being) by the conjunction of matter and form ». Similarly, (St.) Augustine, On the Customs of the Manichees, Bk. II, ch. 4, n. 6, teaches, that creatures are good « by participating in and having the good ». On the Gospel of St. John, tract 19, n. 13, expounding these words: He gave life to the Son, so that He might have it in Himself, he says of the Son of God, through an opposition to the life of the soul: « He gave to Him, so that He might be the Son, He begot (Him), so that He might be Life, that is He gave him to have life in Himself, so that He might be the Life not needing life, lest by participating (in it) He be understood to have life. For it by participating (in it) He had life, He could also by losing (it) be without life ». In the book On Spirit and the Soul, (numbered among the works of St. Augustine), ch. 36, the life of the soul is compared with the life of God: « God is Life, the soul is also life, similar, but disparate; similar, because (they are both) the life, which (is) living by itself . . . disparate, since the Former is the Creator, and the latter a creature. For if it had not been created by Him, it would not be; and if it (had) not been vivified by Him it would not live . . . The soul is life, indeed living, but not from another than itself; and because of this not as living, as Life is » etc. These words, which have been taken from (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux), On the Canticle of Canticles, sermon 81, n. 3 f., Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 87, m. 1, a. 2, § 2, understands in the same sense as St. Bonaventure, namely, « the soul lives by its very self, i. e., by something intrinsic to itself, such as by a formal principle »; and he explains (this) by an example taken from the animal: « For an animal is said “to move by itself”, i. e. by some principle intrinsic to itself, in that manner in which the soul is said “to live by itself” ». ⁴ Distinction 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. ⁵ Understand “its own” as “through its very self” or “independent from the body”, because every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the conjunct. Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 12 ff. (ch. 1.). — From this reason there is deduced the following, namely, that the soul of a brute is not bound to subsist through itself. — A little below this in codices O R and S there is had through itself and within itself [per se et intra se] for within itself [intra se]. ⁶ Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 89, footnote 5.

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intra se fundamentum suae existentiae et principium materiale, a quo habet existere, et formale, a quo habet esse. De brutali autem non oportet illud dicere, cum ipsa fundetur in corpore. Cum igitur principium, a quo est fixa existentia creaturae in se, sit principium materiale; concedendum est, animam humanam materiam habere. Illa autem materia sublevata est supra esse extensionis, et supra esse privationis et corruptionis, et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis. — Et propterea illi qui locuti sunt de materiali principio quantum ad esse extensionis, et prout habet esse sub privatione, dixerunt, animam rationalem non habere materiam, non intendentes de materia in sua generalitate, sed prout ad eam stat resolutio physica, sicut dictum est de simplicitate Angeli.¹ — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.	within itself the fundament of its own existence and a material principle, from which it has (its) existing, and a formal (principle), from which it has its ‘to be’. But it is not necessary [non oportet] to say this of the (soul) of brutes, since (theirs) is founded in the body. Therefore, since the principle, by which the existence of a creature in itself is fixed, is the material principle; it must be conceded, that the human soul has matter. But that matter has been raised above the ‘being’ of extension, and above the ‘being’ of privation and corruption, and for that reason is said (to be) a spiritual matter. — And on this account those who spoke of a material principle as much as regards the ‘being’ of extension, and insofar as it has a ‘to be’ under privation, said, that the rational soul does not have matter, not understanding (this) of matter in its generality, but insofar as the definition of (its) nature consists in this [prout ad eam stat resolutio physica], just as has been said concerning the simplicity of the Angel.¹ — Wherefore the reasons showing this are to be conceded.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis forma est simplex; dicendum, quod auctor ille, definiens formam, loquitur de forma illa, quae est forma tantum non de ea, quae est forma et hoc aliquid; unde vel definit ibi formam accidentalem, vel definit formam universalem.²	1. To that which is objected, that every form is simple; it must be said, that that author, defining form, speaks of that form, which is only a form, not of that, which is a form and a this something; wherefore either he defines the accidental form there, and/or he defines the universal form.²
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus est impassibilis et impermixtus; dicendum, quod Philosophus removet ab intellectu materiam, secundum quod consideratur sub privatione et sub potentia ad transmutationem secundum esse, non removet materiam universaliter, immo ponit, cum dicit, quod in intellectu est natura, qua est facere, et qua est fieri.	2. To that which is objected, that the intellect is impassible and thoroughly unmixed; it must be said, that the Philosopher removes matter from the intellect, according to which it is considered under a privation and under a potency for transmutation according to (its) ‘to be’, he does not remove matter universally, nay he posits (it), when he says, that in the intellect there is a nature, by which there is a making, and by which there is a becoming.
3. Ad illud quod dicit Magister in littera, dicendum, quod Magister non vult dicere, quod anima non habeat materiam, sed quod non habeat materiam praeiacentem; huius autem ratio habebitur infra,³ scilicet, quare anima non est producta nec producitur ex praeiacenti materia.	3. To that which Master (Peter) says in the text, it must be said, that Master (Peter) does not want to say, that the soul does not have matter, but that it does not have pre-existing matter [materiam paeiacentem]; moreover the reason for this will be had below,³ namely, for what reason the soul has not been produced nor is produced out of pre-existing matter.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantia intellectiva nihil cognoscit, nisi quod abstrahitur a materia; dicendum, quod hoc non facit propter hoc, quod ipsa sit omnino immaterialis, sed propter hoc, quod res non potest ei uniri secundum veritatem. Ideo oportet, quod uniatur secundum similitudinem, quam anima abstrahit a re.⁴ — Alia est etiam ratio, quia intellectus per similitudinem, per quam intelligit, debet fieri in actu intelligendi; illud autem, quod facit, rem esse in actu, species est et forma. Ideo anima non cognoscit rem, nisi speciem eius et formam sibi imprimat; et hoc non potest esse, nisi illa abstrahatur a materia.⁵ Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod anima careat materia; res enim abstracta a materia propria bene potest fieri in re alia, quae suam habet propriam materiam et formam, sicut similitudo coloris in speculo.	4. To that which is objected, that an intellective substance cognizes nothing, except what is abstracted from matter; it must be said, that it does not do this on account of this, that it is entirely immaterial, but on account of this, that the thing cannot be united to it according to truth. For that reason it is necessary [oportet], that it be united according to the similitude, which the soul abstracts from the thing.⁴ — There is also another reason, because the intellect through the similitude, through which it understands, ought to come to be in an act of understanding; but that, which causes (it) to be the thing in act, is the species and the form. For that reason the soul does not cognize the thing, unless it impresses its species and form upon itself; and this cannot be, unless the latter is abstracted from the matter.⁵ Nor does it follow from this, that the soul lacks matter; for the thing abstracted from its own mater can well come to be in another thing, which has its own proper matter and form, just as the similitude of a color (comes to be) in a mirror.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto forma nobilior, tanto simplicior est; dicendum, quod istud habet locum in his quae sunt purae formae; anima autem non tantum est forma, immo etiam est hoc aliquid; et ideo, si comparetur forma animae ad alias formas, absque dubio simplicior erit quam aliae formae. Ipsa autem anima, cum sit rationalis, cum sit per se existens, aliquam compositionem habet, quam aliae formae non sunt natae per se habere, dum non sunt natae per se existere; nihilominus tamen ipsa anima simplicior aliis formis dici potest. — Est enim multiplex genus simplicitatis, secundum quod et multiplex est genus compositionis et partium. Sunt enim partes substantiales et sunt partes quantitativae, et compositio ex partibus substantialibus et compositio ex partibus quantitativis.⁶ Et sic simplex dicitur dupliciter: aut quod caret partibus constitutivis, aut quod caret partibus quantitativis. Quamvis igitur anima non sit aliis formis simplicior quantum ad partes constitutivas, quia tales partes habere spectat ad complementum et perfectionem; hoc enim facit, rem esse per se; simplicior tamen est quantum ad privationem partium quantitativarum. Ipsa enim nec habet extensionem per se nec habet extensionem per accidens, nec quantum ad substantiam nec quantum ad proprium actum. Aliae autem formae per accidens possunt habere extensionem et partibilitatem, vel secundum id quod sunt, vel secundum id quod operantur. Et ideo quantum ad hoc anima, et maxime rationalis, est forma nobilior.	5. To that which is objected, that as much as a form (is) more noble, so much is it more simple; it must be said, that this (saying) has a place among those which are pure forms; but the soul is not only a form, nay it is also a this something; and for that reason, if the form of the soul be compared to other forms, without a doubt it will be more simple than the other forms. But the soul itself, since it is rational, since it is one existing through itself [per se existens], has some composition, which the other forms are not bound to have through themselves, so long as they are not bound to exist through themselves; yet nevertheless the soul itself can be said to be more simple than other forms. — For the genus of simplicity is manifold, according to which the genus of composition and of parts is also manifold. For there are substantial parts and there are quantitative parts, and (there is) a composition out of substantial parts and a composition out of quantitative parts.⁶ And thus the “simple” is said in a twofold manner: either (it is) that which lacks constitutive parts, or that which lacks quantitative parts. Therefore, although the soul is not more simple than other forms as much as regards constitutive parts, because the having of such parts pertains to (its) complement and perfection; for this (having) causes, that a thing is through itself; yet it is more simple as much as regards the privation of quantitative parts. For it itself neither has an extension through itself nor does it have an extension through an accident, neither as much as regards (its) substance, nor as much as regards its own act. But other forms can have an extension and an ability to have parts [partibilitatem] through an accident, either according to that which they are, and/or according to that which they work. And for that reason, as much as regards this, the soul, and most of all the rational one, is a more noble form.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod compositum ex materia et forma est ens completum, et ita non venit⁷ ad constitutionem tertii; dicendum, quod hoc non est verum generaliter, sed tunc, quando materia terminat omnem appetitum formae, et forma omnem appetitum materiae; tunc⁸ non est appetitus ad aliquid extra, et ita nec possibilitas ad composi- / -tionem, . . .	6. To that which is objected, that (something) composed out of matter and form is a complete being, and thus does not come⁷ to the composition of a third; it must be said, that this is not true generally, but (is) then, when the matter terminates every appetite for form, and the form every appetite for matter; then⁸ there is not appetite for anything outside, and thus neither a possibility for the composi- / -tion,
¹ Supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, ubi etiam plura praecedentium explicantur. — Vat. resolutio philosophica pro resolutio physica. ² Cod. T formalem substantialem universalem, scil. « secundum essentiam abstractam », ut dicit Bonav., I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. In cod. A additur universalis est species, genus, vel intelligitur de particulari, sicut est anima bruti. ³ Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius post primum materiam cod. A subiungit concreatam, vel coexistentem. ⁴ De hac ratione cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. seq. (c. 8.). — Paulo superius in multis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desideratur Ideo [pro quo cod. V ponit unde], et paulo inferius falso legitur quam intelligit pro per quam intelligit. ⁵ Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 28. seqq. (c. 7.). ⁶ Vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. et I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. — Vat. omittit et compositio ex partibus substantialibus. ⁷ Ita plures codd. ut F W aa, alii codd. cum edd. convenit. ⁸ In cod. cc et ed. 1 bene additur autem. Circa finem solutionis Vat. cum nonnullis codd. corporalem materiam pro corporalem naturam, refragante etiam ed. 1, et dein plures codd. cum ed. 1 sustinendam animam pro suscipiendam animam.	¹ Above in d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, where even several of the preceding (propositions) are explained. — The Vatican edition has (its) philosophical definition [resolutio philosophica] for the definition of (its) nature [rsolutio physica]. ² Codex T has the formal substantial universal [formalem substantialem univesalem], that is « according to (its) abstracted essence », as (St.) Bonaventure says, Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, in reply to n. 1. In codex A there is added the universal (form) is the species, genus, and/or is understood of the particular, just as the soul of a brute (is) [universalis est species, genus, vel intelligitur de particulari, sicut est anima bruti]. ³ Distinction 18, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above this after the first have [materiam], codex A subjoins co-created, and/or coexistent, [concreatam, vel coexsitentem]. ⁴ On this reason, cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 38 f. (ch. 8). — A little above this in many codices and editions 1 and 2 there is wanting For that reason [Ideo], in place of which codex V puts Wherefore [unde], and a little below this there is falsely read which it understands [quam intelligit] for through which it understands [per quam intelligit]. ⁵ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 28 ff. (ch. 7.). ⁶ See above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q. 2. — The Vatican edition omits a composition out of substantial parts and [et compositio ex partibus substantialibus]. ⁷ Thus several codices, such as F W and aa, the other codices, with the editions, have come together [convenit]. ⁸ In codex cc and edition 1 there is well added but [autem] (before this in the English). Near the end of the solution the Vatican edition, together with not a few codices, has corporal matter [corporalem materiam] for corporal nature [corporalem naturam], breaking even with edition 1, and then several codices, together with edition 1, have to sustain a soul [sustinendam animam] for to suscept a soul [suscipiendam animam].

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composi- / -tionem, quae praeexigit in componentibus appetitum et inclinationem. Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam; sicut corpus organicum ex materia et forma compositum est, et tamen habet appetitum ad suscipiendum animam.	the composi- / -tion, which requires in the components beforehand an appetite and inclination. But though the rational soul has a composition out of matter and form, yet it has an appetite to perfect corporal nature; just as the organic body has been composed out of matter and form, and yet has an appetite to suscept a soul.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Quaestio haec non intelligitur in eo sensu, quod anima producta sit de materia praeiacente, sive quae tempore praecesserit productionem animae, sed in eo sensu, quod producta anima constet ex materia et forma tanquam principiis constituentibus. Aliud enim est, aliquid habere materiam in qua fiat, ut est in omnibus formis corporalibus; aliud, ex qua fiat ut ex aliquo praeiacente, sicut est in generabilibus et corruptibilibus; aliud, ex qua sit, quod olim supponebatur quoad corpora incorruptibilia, et a nonnullis quoad spirituales substantias creatas (cfr. Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2.). Eadem igitur quaestio hic de anima humana ponitur, quae supra (d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3.) quoad Angelos discussa est; eadem etiam principia a S. Doctore adhibentur ad eandem conclusionem ponendam, eademque est auctorum dissensio, quae ibi in scholio ad q. 1. est notata.	I. This Question is not understood in the sense, that the soul has been produced from pre-existing matter [materia praeiacente], or which in time preceded the production of the soul, but in the sense, that the soul produced is established out of matter and form as constituent principles. For it is one (thing), that something has matter in which it comes to be, such as it is in all corporal forms; another, out of which it comes to be as out of something pre-existing, just as is in generable and corruptible (things); another, out of which it is, which was at one time supposed in regard to incorruptible bodies, and by not a few in regard to created spiritual substances (cf. Bl. Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 2). Therefore there is posed here the same question concerning the human soul, which has been discussed above (d. 3, p. I, a. 1, qq. 1, 2, and 3) in regard to the Angels; the same principles are also employed by the Seraphic Doctor to posit the same conclusion; and there is the same dissension among the authors, which was noted in the Scholium there on q. 1.
S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) dicit: « Mihi non videtur, in anima vel in aliqua spirituali substantia aliquomodo esse materiam, sed ipsas esse simplices formas et naturas, quamvis quidam aliter dicant. Et praeter alias rationes, quibus hoc de Angelis impossibile videtur . . . etiam quadam speciali ratione materia a ratione animae secluditur. Cum enim anima sit forma corporis, oportet, quod vel secundum totam essentiam suam sit corporis forma, vel secundum partem essentiae suae. Si secundum essentiam suam totam, impossibile est, quod pars essentiae sit materiae . . . Si autem secundum partem substantiae suae est forma corporis, per quam est in actu, et non secundum alteram, quae est materia eius, sequuntur duo inconvenientia » etc. In fine addit: « Nec tamen negamus, animam rationalem quendam modum compositionis habere, scil. ex esse et quod est . . . Qui tamen compositionis modus in aliis formis non invenitur, quia non possunt esse subsistentes quasi in esse suo, sed sunt per esse compositi. Et in hoc anima deficit a simplicitate divina ». Praenotatum argumentum grave repetitur Sum. I. q. 75. a. 5. in corp. (cf. S. c. Gent. II. c. 50.). — Eandem obiectionem, quod scil. compositum ex materia et forma non possit esse alterius compositi forma, S. Bonav., hic ad 6, solvere nititur; similiter Richard. (qui utramque opinionem probabilem aestimat), hic a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. sic ad eam respondet: « Dico, quod hoc esset verum, si materia esset unigenea. Sed materia animae non est unigenea cum materia ipsius corporis, sed est actualior quam forma incompleta in corpore humano, praecedens ordine naturae animae intellectivae infusionem ». Et ibid. ad 3. ex hoc, quod materia non est unigenea, concludit: « Unde potest esse pars perfectionis illius ». — Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 61. m. 1.) ad principalem quaest. respondet: « Anima humana dicitur composita ex forma et materia intellectuali; nullatenus autem sic habet materiam et formam, sicut dicuntur corpora habere materiam et forma, sive sint caelestia sive inferiora. Materiae enim corporalis terminus est magnitudo; spiritualis autem materiae (magnitudo) non est terminus ». — Iam in praedicto scholio notavimus ipsius S. Thomae verbis, quod ex sententia S. Bonaventurae, Alexandri et Scoti minime sequatur praeiudicium contra immortalitatem animae; item verbis Petri a Tar. (loc. cit.), quod haec opinio, quae nunc est obsoleta, tunc esset celebris et a multis probata.	St. Thomas (here in q. 1, a. 2) says: « It does not seem to me, that in the soul and/or in any spiritual substance there is matter in any manner, but that these are simple forms and natures, even though certain (authors) say otherwise. And besides the other reason, by which this seems impossible concerning the Angels . . . matter is excluded also by a certain special reason from the reckoning of the soul. For since the soul is the form of the body, it is necessary [oportet], that either it be the form of the body according to its whole essence, and/or according to part of its essence. If according to its whole essence, it is impossible, that part of (its) essence belong to matter . . . But if it is the form of the body according to the part of its substance, through which it is in act, and not according to the other (part), which is its matter, two unfitting (things) follow » etc.. At the end he adds: « Yet we also do not deny, that the rational soul has a certain manner of composition, namely out of a ‘to be’ and a what it is . . . Which manner of composition, however, is not found in other forms, because they cannot be subsistent as if in their own ‘to be’, but are through the ‘to be’ of the composite. And in this the soul fails from the Divine Simplicity ». The aforementioned argument is repeated emphatically [grave] in (his) Summa., I, q. 75, a. 5, in the body of the Question (cf. Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 50). — The same objection, namely, that (something) composed out of matter and form cannot be the form of another composite, St. Bonaventure, here in reply to n. 6, strives to solve; similarly Richard of Middleton (who judges each opinion probable), here in a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 2, responds to it thus: « I say, that this would be true, if matter were of one kind [unigenea]. But the matter of the soul is not of one kind with the matter of the body itself, but is more actual than the incomplete form in the human body, preceding according to the order of nature the infusion of the intellective soul ». And ibid., in reply to n. 3, from this, that matter is not of one kind, he concludes: « Wherefore it can be part of its perfection ». — Alexander of Hales (Summa., p. II, q. 61, m. 1) responds to the principle Question: « The human soul is said (to be) composed out of intellectual form and matter; but to no extent does it have thus matter and form, as bodies are said to have matter and form, or as celestials or inferior (beings are said to have such). For the terminus of corporal form is a magnitude; but of spiritual matter (magnitude) is not the terminus ». — Already in the aforesaid Scholium we have noted with the words of St. Thomas, that from the sentence of St. Bonaventure, Alexander and (Bl.) Scotus, there follows least of all a prejudice against the immortality of the soul; similarly with the words of (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (loc. cit.), that this opinion, which is now obsolete, was at that time celebrated and approved by many.
II. Praeter auctores citatos: Scotus, de Anima, q. 15; de Rerum princip. q. 7. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Alios vide in scholio supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.	II. Besides those cited: (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, de Anima, q. 15; de Rerum principio, q. 7, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 3. — See the others in the Scholium above in d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII