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S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis |
St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio |
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum |
Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences |
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Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis |
of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris |
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SECUNDI LIBRI |
BOOK TWO |
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVII. |
COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVII |
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DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI. |
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER |
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Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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Latin
text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
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DUB. I. |
DOUBT I |
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In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in littera: Creatoris voluntas necessitas est. Hoc enim necessario futurum est, quod vult et praescit. Quod si verum est, cum Deum velit omnia bona futura, nullum bonum futurum evenit contingenter: perit ergo libertas arbitrii. — Praeterea, falsum videtur dicere in hoc quod subiungit: Multa secundum inferiores causas futura sunt, sed in praescientia Dei futura non sunt; quod enim est futurum, erit; quod non est futurum in praescientia Dei, non erit: ergo simul idem erit et non erit. |
In this part are the questions about the text (of Master Peter), and first there is asked concerning that which (St. Augustine) says in the text: The Will of the Creator is the Necessity. For there is necessarily going to be, that which He wills and foreknows. Which if (this) is true, since God wills all good, future (things), no good future (thing) comes forth contingently: therefore free will is destroyed. — Besides, he seems to say (something) false in that which he subjoins: Many (things) are going to be [futura sunt] according to inferior causes, but are not going to be in the Foreknowledge of God; for what is going to be, will be; what is not going to be in the Foreknowledge of God, will not be: therefore the same at once will be and will not be. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod primum verbum intelligendum est de necessitate non consequentis, sed consequentiae,1 quia necessario ad velle Dei sequitur ipsum volitum esse vel futurum esse. Secundum autem verbum intelligendum est ita, quod per hoc participium futura significetur ordo effectus ad causas, non eventus, ut sit sensus: multa secundum inferiores causas futura sunt, id est, ordinata fieri, quae tamen secundum veritatem vel praescientiam non sunt futura, quia non evenient. |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that the first verse is to be understood of not of a necessity of consequent, but (of a necessity) of consequence,1 because there necessarily follows to God’s Willing that the willed itself is and/or is going to be. But the second verse is to be understood thus, that through this participle futura there is signified the order of an effect to (its) causes, not an event, so that the sense is: “many (things) are going to be according to inferior causes,” that is, “have been ordained to come to be, which, however, according to truth and/or foreknowledge are not going to be, because they will not come to pass.” |
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DUB. II. |
DOUBT II |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod homo extra paradisum est creatus, postmodum in paradiso est positus. Cum enim paradisus esset locus habitationis, debitus homini secundum statum innocentiae, et locus congruus habitationi sit congruus2 generationi et productioni; videtur, quod homo debuit produci in paradiso. — Item, cum tota terra tunc esset fructifera et aër tranquillus; videtur, quod tota erat congrua, ut inhabitaretur ab homine: ergo si homo extra paradisum productus est, videtur, quod extra paradisum ad habitandum debuit relinqui. — Item, si tota terra producta est propter hominem, ergo videtur, quod si homo stetisset, alia pars terrae a paradiso superflueret. — Propter hoc est hic quaestio, quid vocetur hic paradisus, in quo homo est positus. |
Likewise there is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says, that man was created outside of Paradise, (and) after a while was placed in paradise. For since paradise was the place of habitation, due man according to the state of innocence, and a fitting place [locus congruus] for habitation is a fitting one2 for generation and production; it seems, that man ought to have been produced in paradise. — Likewise, since the whole Earth was fruitful [fructifera] at that time and the air tranquil; it seems, that the whole was fitting, to be inhabited by man: therefore if man was produced outside of paradise, it seems, that he ought to have been left to dwell outside of paradise. — Likewise, if the whole Earth was produced for the sake of man, therefore it seems, that if man had stood, the part of Earth other than paradise would be superfluous. — On this account there is here the question, “What is called here the ‘paradise’, in which man was placed?” |
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RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut dicit Magister,3 tres fuerunt de paradiso sententiae. |
I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that just as Master (Peter)3 says, there were three sentences concerning “paradise”. |
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Quidam enim dixerunt, quod paradisus ille, in quo erat positus homo, erat locus corporalis, qui propter suam amoenitatem paradisus dicebatur, nec est alius paradisus nisi corporalis.4 |
For certain (authors) says, that that paradise, in which man had been placed, was a corporal place, which on account of its amenity [amoenitatem] was called “paradise”, and (that) there is no other paradise but the corporal one.4 |
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Alii vero attendentes, quod beatificatio hominis est in paradiso, quae consistit in Dei fruitiones, non in corporali amoenitate, dixerunt, hunc paradisum non esse locum corporalem, sed spiritualem; et omnia illa quae dicuntur de paradiso in Genesi, dicta esse metaphorice. Unde homo in sui formatione dicitur positus fuisse in paradiso, non quia fuerit localiter mutatus, sed quia in spirituali amoenitate et deliciis ex Dei amore et cognitione et fruitione est positus. In huius autem sententiae assertionem adducunt illud quod dicitur de latrone, Lucae vigesimo tertio:5 Hodie mecum eris in paradiso; . . . |
However others, attending (to this), that the beatification of man is in the paradise, which consists in the enjoyments of God, not in a corporal state of pleasure [corporali amoenitate], said, that this “paradise” is not a corporal place, but a spiritual one; and all those (things) which are said of “paradise” in Genesis, were said metaphorically. Wherefore man is said to have been placed “in paradise” at his formation, not because he was changed locally, but because he was placed in spiritual state of pleasure [spirituali amoenitate] and in delights on account of (his) love and cognition and fruition of God. Moreover for the assertion of this sentence they adduce that which is said of the (Good) Thief, in the twenty-third (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Luke:5 This day thou shalt be with Me in Paradise; . . . |
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1 Sive non absoluta, sed conditionata. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 38. a. 2. q. 1. seq. et d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. seq., ubi ea quae hic breviter tanguntur, diffuse explicantur. 2 In edd. 2, 3, 4, et Vat. desideratur habitationi sit congruus. 3 Hic c. 5. 4 Sub hoc respectu Isidor., XIV. Etymol. c. 3. n. 2. ait: Paradisus est locus in orientis partibus constitutus, cuius vocabulum ex Graeco in Latinum vertitur hortus. Porro Hebraice Eden dicitur, quod in nostra lingua deliciae interpretatur. Quod utrumque iunctum facit hortum deliciarum; est enim omni genere ligni et pomiferarum arborum consitus etc. 5 Vers. 43. — Seq. locus est Ezech. 28, 13. — Huius sententiae fuit Origines (IV. Periarch. n. 16.), reprehensus a S. Epiph. inter Epist. S. Hier. 51 (alias 60.). n. 5, et August., II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 9. n. 12. et XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 21. Cfr. Anastas. (Sinaita) II. Antiochen. († 599), VII. in Hexaëm., ubi praeter Origenem pro hac opinione citantur Philo, Papias, Irenaeus, Iustinus, Pantaenus Alexandrinus et Clemens Stromateus, et duo Gregorii Cappadoces, qui spiritualiter intellexisse dicuntur de Christi Ecclesia ea quae scripta sunt de paradiso. (Migne, Patr. Graec. tom. 89. col. 961.). Ibid. (col. 964.) etiam dicitur, quod quidam, sicut Dionysius, decreverunt, duos esse paradisos, « spiritualem et sensilem, terrestrem et caelestem, qui cernitur et qui intelligitur, sicut etiam est Christus caelestis simul et terrestris, congruenter typo duarum Ecclesiarum, terrenae, inquam, et caelestis civitatis » etc. |
1 Or a non-absolute (necessity), but a conditioned one. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 38, a. 2, q. 1 f., and d. 40, a. 2, q. 1 f., where those which are briefly touched upon here, are explained at length. 2 In editions 2, 3 and 4, and the Vatican edition, there is wanting for habitation is a fitting one [habitationi sit congruus]. 3 Here in chapter 5. 4 Under this respect (St.) Isidore (of Seville), Etymologies, Bk. XIV, ch. 3, n. 2 says: Paradise is a place constituted in the regions of the east, whose name is translated from the Greek into the Latin as hortus (i. e. garden). Finally, in Hebrew it is called “Eden” , which in our tongue is interpreted deliciae (i. e. delights). Wherefore each joined together makes a garden of delights [hortum deliciarum]; for it has been planted with every genus of tree and of fruit-bearing trees etc.. 5 Verse 43. — The following passage is Ezekiel 28:13. — Origen belonged to this sentence (Periarch, Bk. IV, n. 16), and was reproved by St. Epiphanius as mentioned in (St.) Jerome’s Epistle 51 (alias 60), n. 5, and (St.) Augustine, On Genesis against the Manichees, Bk. II, ch. 8, n. 12, and On the City of God, Bk. XIII, ch. 21. Cf. Anastasius II of Antioch (A. D. † 599), On the Hexaëmeron, Bk. VII, where for this opinion, in addition to Origen, there are cited Philo, (St.) Papias, (St.) Irenaeus, (St.) Justin (Martyr), (St.) Pantaenus the Alexandrine and Clemens Stromateus, and the two Cappadocian (Sts.) Gregory, who are said to have understood spiritually of Christ’s Church those (things) which were written of paradise. (Migne, Patrologia Graeca, tome 89, col. 961). Ibid., (co. 964) it is also said, that a certain (authors), such as Dionysius, decreed, that there are two paradises, « a spiritual one and a sensible one [sensilem], an earthly one and a heavenly one, which is discerned and is understood, just as Christ too is at once heavenly and earthly, (and is) fittingly the Type of the two Churches, the one of Earth, I say, and the Heavenly City » etc.. |
p. 427
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et illud quod dicitur de lucifero, Ezechielis vigesimo octavo: In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti. |
and that which is said of Lucifer, in the twenty-eighth (chapter) of Ezekiel: Thou wert in the delights of God’s Paradise. |
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Tertia est positio, quod est paradisum spiritualis, et est paradisus corporalis. Paradisus spiritualis dicit statum quietis et amoenitatem deliciarum spiritualium; et iste potest esse secundum duplicem statum, scilicet Ecclesiae triumphantis et Ecclesiae militantis. Unde paradisus spiritualis duplex est sive dupliciter dictus: unus est in Ecclesia militante, et alter in Ecclesia triumphante. Unde illa quae sunt dicta in Genesi de paradiso isto spirituali possunt exponi metaphorice. — Paradisus autem corporalis est locus deliciarum et amoenitatis; et hic est duplex similiter secundum duplicem statum, scilicet perfectum et imperfectum. Secundum statum perfectum paradisus est empyreum. Secundum statum imperfectum paradisus est locus quidam amoenus in partibus orientis, de quo dicit Damascenus:1 « Divinus paradisus est Dei manibus in Eden plantatus, gaudii et exultationis universae promptuarium ». |
The third is the position, that there is a spiritual paradise, and there is a corporal paradise. The spiritual “paradise” means the state of rest and pleasantness of spiritual delights; and this can be according to a twofold state, namely (that) of the Church Triumphant and (that) of the Church Militant. Whence the spiritual paradise is twofold or said in a twofold manner: the one is in the Church Militant, and the other in the Church Triumphant. Wherefore those (things) which were said in Genesis of that spiritual paradise can be expounded metaphorically. — But the corporal paradise is a place of delights and pleasantness; and this is similarly twofold according to a twofold state, namely the perfect and the imperfect. According to a perfect state the empyrean (Heaven) is Paradise. According to an imperfect state a certain pleasant place in the regions of the East [in partibus orientis], concerning which (St. John) Damascene1 says: « The divine paradise was planted by the Hands of God in Eden, as a place prompt [promptuarium] for each and every joy and exultation ». |
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In hoc autem loco decuit hominem poni, ut esset ei facilitas perveniendi ad patriam, et ut Deus homini ostenderet benevolentiam, cui locum amoenissimum ad inhabitandum praeparaverat, et sic amoenitas exterioris habitaculi corresponderet deliciis interioribus, quales habet anima, quae est templum Dei, et habebat anima primi hominis. — Extra autem hunc locum debuit homo produci, ut melius cognosceret Dei beneficium, dum se videret quasi aliunde adductum; et ut etiam per hoc ostenderet, quod homo non erat ibi factus ad aeternaliter habitandum, sed temporaliter peregrinandum. Et quia Deus praesciebat hominis casum, in paradiso voluit eum collocare, ut per eius eiectionem de loco voluptatis cognosceret sensibiliter, quanta bona spiritualia amisisset per culpam; cognosceret etiam nihilominus, quanta esset differentia inter eum qui Domino humiliter obedit, et eum qui ipsum superbe contemnit.2 |
Moreover it was fitting [decuit] that man be placed in this place, so that his might be an easy state [facilitas] to arrive at the Fatherland, and so that God might show man (His) Benevolence, for whom He had prepared a most pleasant place to dwell in, and thus (so that) the pleasantness of the exterior dwelling might correspond to the interior delights, which the soul, which is a temple of God, has, and (which) the soul of the first man had. — Moreover man should have been produced outside of this place, so that he might better know the benefice of God, when he sees himself draws as if from elsewhere; and so that He might also show through this, that man was not made to dwell there eternally, but to make pilgrimage (there) for a time [temporaliter peregrinandum]. And because God foreknew the downfall of man, He willed to place him completely in paradise, so that through his ejection from the place of pleasure he might sensibly cognize, how great (were) the spiritual gifts he had lost through (his) fault; (and) might also cognize, nevertheless, how great was the difference between him who humbly obeys the Lord, and him who proudly contemns Him.2 |
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Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Locus enim paradisi convenienter fuit factus propter hominem institutum; et alia terra convenienter fuit facta propter hominem, quem Deus praeviderat esse lapsurum; et quia simul etiam viderat hominem et peccatum, de ea terra sumsit eum, in quam erat postmodum rediturus. — Nec tamen, si homo stetisset, alia pars mundi superflueret, quia bestiis servientibus homini habitaculum praeberet, et habitaculum hominis sua inferioritate excellens ostenderet et sua magnitudine decoraret, sicut magna platea decorat palatium, et sicut aula3 decorat cameram. |
And through this the response to the objections is clear. For the place of paradise was conveniently made for the sake of man as instituted; and the other land [terra] was conveniently made for the sake of man, whom God had foreseen was going to fall [lapsurum]; and because He saw man and sin together He took him from that earth, unto which he was afterwards going to return. — Yet neither, if man had stood, would the other part of the world have been superfluous, because it proffered a dwelling for the beasts serving man, and it showed by its inferiority and decorated by its magnitude the excellent dwelling of man, just as a large piazza [magna platea] decorates a palace, and just as an entrance hall [aula] decorates a vaulted chamber [cameram].3 |
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DUB. III. |
DOUBT III |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Locum paradisi in alto situm, usque ad lunarem circulum pertingentem. Videtur hoc esse falsum: primo, quia inter lunarem circulum et aërem est sphaera ignis,4 quae non pateretur, hominem ibi posse vivere. — Item, aër in sua parte superiori est tantae subtilitatis, quod ibi non possunt aves vivere, sicut dicit Augustinus:5 ergo si paradisi locus esset adeo elevatus, non posset ibi vivere homo habens corpus animale. — Praeterea, si adeo esset ille locus elevatus, cum maxime appropinquaret soli: ergo esset calidissimus et intemperatissimus. Sequeretur etiam ex hoc, quod terra esset supra aquam et supra aërem. |
Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says: The place of paradise (is) sited on a high (place), stretching up to the orbit of the Moon. This seems to be false: first, because between the orbit of the Moon [lunarem circulum] and the air is the sphere of fire,4 which would not suffer, that man be able to live there. — Likewise, the air in its superior part is of so great a subtlety, that the birds cannot live there, just as (St.) Augustine5 says: therefore if the place of paradise were so elevated, man, having an animal body, could not live there. — Besides, if that place were so elevated, since it would approach the Sun in the greatest manner: therefore it would be most hot and most intemperate. There would also follow from this, that there would be land [terra] above water and above air. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod, sicut doctores6 dicunt, paradisi corporalis situs est valde eminens et altus et iuxta aequinoctialem in oriente, quodam modo vergens ad meridiem. Est autem tantae altitudinis, ut illuc non conscendant vapores in aëre elevati, sed sit ibi aër mundus et purus, idoneus statui perpetuitatis; et propter puritatem aëris ibi est contemperantia7 caloris, et quia secus aequinoctialem est, est ibi magna temperies temporis. — Quod ergo dicitur usque ad lunarem circulum pertingere, hoc non est dictum secundum situm, sed secundum quandam proprietatem, sive quia conformatur in raritate et luminositate et tranquillitate, . . . |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that, just as the doctors (of theology)3 say, the site of the corporal paradise is very lofty [valde eminens] and high and along [iuxta] the equinoctial (latitude) in the east, verging in a certain manner toward the meridian. Moreover it is of so great an altitude, that vapors elevated in the air do not ascend together [consendant] thither, but the air there is clean and pure, suitable for the state of perpetuity; and on account of the purity of the air there, there is a contemperance7 of the heat (of the Sun), and because it is along [secus] the equinoctial (latitude), there is a great tempering of the weather [temperies temporis] there. — Therefore, that it is said to stretch out even to the orbit of the Moon, this has not been said according to site, but according to a certain propriety, or because it is conformed (to the Moon) in rarity and luminosity and tranquility, . . . |
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1 Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 11, ubi etiam, relatis duabus primis opinionibus, ait: Mihi videtur, quod sicut homo sensibilis simul et intelligibilis conditus sit, sic etiam, quod huius sacratissimum templum sensibile simul et intelligibile et duplicem habens ostensionem etc. 2 Cfr. August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 11. n. 24. seqq. Ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 84. m. 1, sex rationes adducuntur, scil. eiectionis praevisio, excitatio gratitudinis, incitatio humiliationis, praemonstratio revocationis, congruentia resolutionis corporalis et minoratio afflictionis. Vide etiam Aegid. R., hic d. 18. q. 1. a. 1 dub. 6. lat. 3 Sive atrium. — Hoc dubium solvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 58. m. 1; B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 79; S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1; Richard. a Med., a. 2. q. 5; Aegid. R., hic d. 18. q. 1. a. 1. 4 Cfr. supra pag. 321, nota 4. 5 De Gen. ad lit. (imperfect. liber) c. 14. n. 44. et III. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 8. 6 Vide Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 11, Bedam et Strabum in Gen. 2, 8. 7 Ita cod. aa (a secunda manu); alii codd. et edd. incongrue esse contemperantiam. |
1 On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 11, where having related the two first opinions, he also says: It seems to me, that just as man was founded at once able to sense and able to understand, so also, that (He has founded) His Most Sacred Temple sensible and intelligible together and having a twofold manifestation [ostentionem] etc.. 2 Cf. (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, ch. 11, n. 24 ff.. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 84, m. 1, adduces six reasons (for this), namely, the prevision of (his) ejection, the excitation of (his) gratitude, the incitation of (his) humiliation, the foreshowing of (his) being called back, the congruence of the dissolution of (his) body and the lessening of (his) affliction. See also Giles the Roman, here in d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, 6th lateral doubt. 3 Or entrance room [atrium]. — Solving this doubt are Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 58, m. 1; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. II, tr. 13, q. 79; St. Thomas, here in q. 3, a. 2; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 1; Richard of Middleton, a. 2, q. 5; Giles the Roman, here in d. 18, q. 1, a. 1. 4 Cf. above d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, p. 321, footnote 4. 5 In his unfinished work, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, ch. 14, n. 44, and On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. III, ch. 6, n. 8. 6 See (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 11, (St.) Bede (the Venerable) and (Walafrid) Strabo on Gen 2:8. 7 Thus codex aa (by a second hand); the other codices and editions have incongruously there is a contemperance [esse contemperantiam] in indirect discourse. [Trans. note: A contemperance is a moderation wrought by the mixing of opposites.] |
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sive quia vapores, quibus dominatur luna, illuc non pertingunt. Et sic patet illud.1 |
or because the vapors, by which the Moon dominates, do not pertain there. And thus that (doubt) is clear.1 |
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DUB. IV. |
DOUBT IV |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In paradiso erant ligna diversi generis etc., propter quid duo2 ex illis lignis nominat, et non plura? — Item, cum lignum illud, de quo facta est prohibitio, non fuerit scientiae boni et mali nisi propter transgressionem Adae, non videtur, quod sic debuerit a sui principio nominari. — Item, cum lignum vitae illum effectum vivificandi non habuerit, videtur, quod aut frustra fuerit, aut ab illo effectu nominari non debuit. |
Likewise there is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says: In paradise there were trees of diverse genus etc., on account of what does he name two2 of those trees, and not more? — Likewise, since that tree, concerning which the prohibition was made, was not “of the Knowledge of Good and Evil” on account of the transgression of Adam, it does not seem, that it ought to have been named thus from its beginning. — Likewise, since the Tree of Life did not have that effect of vivifying, it seems, that either it was there in vain, or (that) it ought not have been named from that effect. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum est, quod universitas lignorum3 sub tribus differentiis comprehenditur, secundum quod ad triplicem utilitatem hominis poterant ordinari: aut ex parte corporis, aut ex parte animae, aut ex parte coniuncti. Si ex parte corporis; sic erant ligna fructifera, quae praebebant ei alimenta ad corporis sustentationem. Si ex parte animae; sic fuit lignum scientiae boni et mali, quod ordinabatur ad obedientiae hominis probationem. Si ex parte coniuncti; sic erat lignum vitae, quod faciebat ad humanae vitae perpetuationem. De his autem lignis duo tantum nominata sunt propter speciales4 effectus, propter quos et Dominus illa duo ligna collocavit in medio paradisi, et unum posuit iuxta alterum, ut ex uno conciperet homo affectum amoris, et ex alio affectum timoris — et quasi opposita iuxta se posita elucescerent5 — et faciendo abstinentiam ab uno mereretur habere refectionem sufficientem ex altero. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus de Civitate Dei,6 loquens de primis parentibus: « Status immortalitatis eis de ligno vitae, quod in medio paradisi cum arbore vetita simul erat, mirabilis Dei gratia monstrabatur; tamen et alios sumebant cibos praeter unam arborem, quae fuerat interdicta ». — Et sic patet, quare illa duo ligna specialiter nominantur. Unum autem, scilicet lignum vitae, nominatur ab effectu, non quem fecit, sed ad quem ordinabatur; aliud vero, scilicet lignum scientiae, ab eventu; et utrumque satis congruit, quia tam ille effectus quam ille eventus valde notabiles erant. Licet autem lignum vitae primum effectum non habuerit in actu, habuit tamen in habitu; nec tamen frustra fuit, quia, quamvis ex ipso primus homo non acceperit refectionem, eius tamen posteri recipiunt instructionem, dum per illud lignum intelligunt Christum.7 |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that the university of trees [universitas lignorum]3 are comprehended under three differences, according to which they could be ordained to the threefold utility of man: either on the part of the body, or on the part of the soul, or on the part of the conjoined. If on the part of the body, thus there were the fruit-bearing trees [ligna fructifera], which proffered him aliments [alimenta] for the sustenance of the body. If on the part of the soul; thus there was the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, which was ordained for the proof of man’s obedience. If on the part of the conjunct; thus there was the Tree of Life, which worked for the perpetuation of human life. But of these trees only two were named on account (their) special4 effects, on account of which the Lord also located those two together in the midst of paradise, and the one He placed alongside the other, to that from one man might conceive the affection of love, and from the other the affection of fear — and (so that) as opposites placed alongside themselves they might shine forth [elucescerent]5 — and (so that) by making abstinence from the one (man) might merit to have a sufficient refection out of the other. And this is what (St.) Augustine says On the City of God,6 speaking of (our) first parents: « Their state of immortality, a wonderful grace of God, was demonstrated from the Tree of Life, which was together in the midst of paradise with the forbidden tree; yet they also used to take [sumebat] other foods besides the one tree, which was interdicted ». — And thus it is clear, for what reason those two trees were named in particular. Moreover the one, namely the Tree of Life, is named from (its) effect, not (that) which it wrought, but (that) to which it was ordained; but the other, namely the Tree of Knowledge, from an outcome [eventu]; and each is sufficiently congruent, because both that effect and that outcome were very notable. But though the Tree of Life did not have (its) first effect in act, yet it had (it) in habit; yet neither was it in vain, because, though the first man did not accept refection from it, yet his posterity do receive instruction, so long as they understand Christ through that tree.7 |
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DUB. V. |
DOUBT V |
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Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: A ligno homo prohibitus est, quod malum non erat. Videtur enim, quod Deus inconvenienter fecerit; primum, quia, sicut prohibere malum est bonum, ita prohibere bonum est malum: ergo videtur, quod Deus fecerit male, dum prohibuit illius ligni usum. — Item, bene sciebat Deus, quod ipsi prohibitionem suam non servarent: ergo si sine illa prohibitione poterat esse salus, videtur, quod non fecerit aliud quam laqueum eis iniicere, dum prohibuit. — Item, si omnia facta sunt propter hominem, ergo lignum illud erat hominis; sed nulli debet subtrahi res propria absque culpa: ergo videtur, quod Deus iniuriatus fuerit homini et eum puniverit, prohibendo quod suum erat, in quo tamen nulla culpa praecesserat. |
Likewise there is asked concerning this which (St. Augustine) says: Man was prohibited from the tree, which was not evil. For it seems, that God made (it) unfittingly; first, because, just as it is good to prohibit evil, so it is evil to prohibit good: therefore it seems, that God acted badly [fecerit male], when He prohibited the use of that tree. — Likewise, God well knew, that they would not keep His prohibition: therefore if there could have been salvation without that prohibition, it seems, that He did nothing other than lay a trap for them, when He prohibited (it). — Likewise, if all (things) were made for the sake of man, therefore that tree was man’s; but one’s own property [res propria] ought be subtracted from no one without fault: therefore it seems, that God wronged [iniuriatus fuerit] man and punished him, by prohibiting what was his, yet in that which no fault had preceded. |
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RESPONDEO: Dicendum est, quod Deus homini illud lignum prohibuit propter obedientiae meritum acquirendum ex parte hominis, et propter ostendendum suae iurisdictionis dominium, quod habebat in hominem.8 Quia prohibuit propter obedientiae meritum; ut illud meritum esset purum et plenum, a tali re prohibuit, a qua non deberet cessari nisi solius obedientiae intuitu, et ideo a re bona. — Item, quia prohibuit ad ostendendum suae iurisdictionis dominium; ideo a tali re debuit prohibere, a qua homo non deberet manum retrahere nisi propter solius Dei imperium, et haec quidem fuit res bona. Et propter illud mandatum dicitur esse mandatum disciplinae, quia ad hoc homo non obligabatur ex se sive ex aliquo rationis naturalis dictamine, sed ex sola divina praeceptione; quamvis et alia possit reddi ratio, quod datum sit illud mandatum divinum, ut per hoc disceret, de quo Deo9 deberet esse subiectus, et quantum etiam differret inter eum qui Deo obedit, et eum qui contemnit eius imperium. — Nulla igitur ex hoc fiebat homini iniu- / -ria, . . . |
I RESPOND: It must be said, that God prohibited that tree to man for the sake of acquiring the merit of obedience on the part of man, and for the sake of showing the dominion of His jurisdiction, which He had over man [in hominem].8 Because He prohibited (it) for the sake of the merit of obedience; so that that merit would be pure and full, He prohibited (him) from such a thing, from which he ought not stop except for the consideration [intuitu] of obedience alone, and therefore (He prohibited him) from a good thing. — Likewise, because He prohibited (it) to show the dominion of His jurisdiction, for that reason He ought to have prohibited (him) from such a thing, from which man ought not withdraw (his) hand except on account of the command [imperium] of God alone, and this indeed was a good thing. And on account of that commandment [mandatum] (the prohibition) is said to be a mandate of discipline [mandatum disciplinae], because man was not obliged to this on his own account or on account of the dictate [dictamine] of any natural reason, but on account of the Divine Precepting alone; though another reason can also be given, that that Divine commandment was given, so that he might learn through that, concerning which he ought to be subject to God,9 and how much too is the difference between him who obeys God, and him who contemns His command. — Therefore from this no injury was done / to man, . . . |
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1 Idem dubium proponit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 84. m. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 4. et S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 79, ubi ad solutionem huius dubii eadem utitur distinctione, et dein addit: « Hoc tamen dico sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae; quia in quibusdam libris antiquissimis inveni, quod illius sententiae, quae attributur Bedae et Strabo, primus auctor fuit Thomas Apostolus, quod scilicet paradisus tantae altitudinis sit, quod usque ad lunarem globum ascendat ». Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2: Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. dub. 1. lat. 2 Nempe lignum vitae et lignum scientiae. 3 In cod. Y additur paradisi. Multi codd. cum edd. incongrue universalitas lignorum pro universitas lignorum, quod exhibent codd. C S T aa. 4 Plures codd. cum ed. 2 spirituales. 5 Nam secundum Aristot., I. Elench. c. 14. (c. 15) et II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 40. (c. 6.) opposita iusta se posita « minora et maiora apparent » et « sunt sensibiliora ». Cfr. tom. I. pag. 495, nota 1. 6 Libr. XIII. c. 20, ubi textus originalis mirabili Dei gratia praestabatur pro mirabilis Dei gratia monstrabatur (ministrabatur?). 7 Secundum August., XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 20; VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 8. seq. — De hoc dubio vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 58. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 5; Aegid. R., hic dub. 6. lit. 8 Cfr. de his Ambros., de Paradiso, c. 6. seqq.; August., VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 28. seqq; XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 12. seqq. — Edd. homine. 9 Vat. cui pro de quo Deo. |
1 The same doubt is proposed by Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 84, m. 2; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in q. 4 and in (his) Summa., p. II, tr. 13, q. 79, where for the solution of this doubt he also uses the same distinction, and then adds: « Yet this I say without prejudice for the better sentence; because in certain very ancient books I have found, that of that sentence, which is attributed to (St.) Bede and (Walafrid) Strabo, the first author was (St.) Thomas the Apostle, namely, that paradise is of so great an altitude, that it ascends even to the globe of the Moon ». (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 2; Giles the Roman, here in q. 1. a. 1, 1st lateral doubt. 2 Namely the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge. 3 In codex Y there is added of paradise [paradisi]. Many codices, together with the editions, have incongruously the universality of trees [universalitas lignorum] for the university of trees [universitas lignorum], which codices C S T and aa exhibit. 4 Several codices, together with edition 2, have spiritual [spirituales]. 5 For according to Aristotle, Lists of Sophistic Errors, Bk. I, ch. 14 (ch. 15), and On Heaven and the World¸ Bk. II, text 40 (ch. 6), opposites placed alongside one another « appear lesser and greater » and « are more sensible ». Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 28, a. sole, q. 1, p. 495, footnote 1 6 Book XIII, ch. 20, where the original text has The state of immortality, by the wonderful grace of God, was ensured [mirabili Dei gratia praestabatur] for The state of immortality, a wonderful grace of God, was demonstrated [mirabilis Dei gratia monstrabatur]. 7 According to (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. III, ch. 20; On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, ch. 4, n. 8 f.. — On this doubt see Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 58, m. 3; Bl. (now St.) Albertus, here in a. 5; Giles the Roman, here in the 6th lateral doubt. 8 Cf. on these, (St.) Ambrose, On Paradise, ch. 6 ff.; (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, ch. 13, n. 28 ff.; On the City of God, Bk. XIV, ch. 12 ff. — The edition have in man [homine] for over man [hominem]. 9 The Vatican edition has this, which God he ought to be subject to [cui Deo] for that, concernign which . . . to God [de quo Deo]. |
p. 429
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iniu- / ria, immo fiebat utilitas, dum praecipiebatur ad eius eruditionem et meriti amplificationem. Quodsi contrarium evenit, hoc fuit ex culpa sua, ex qua convertit sibi bonum in malum, sicut impiis et peccatoribus bona convertuntur in mala. Propter istius tamen eventus praevisionem non debuit Deus dimittere dare tale mandatum, quia ordo et decor, qui attenditur in operibus Dei secundum regulam divinae sapientiae, non debet intermitti propter incommodum alicuius specialis1 creaturae. Praeterea, ex illo malo inde sequente poterat Deus et sciebat multo maius bonum elicere. |
done / to man, nay there came to be a utility, since it was precepted for his erudition and the amplification of (his) merit. Wherefore if the contrary came about, this was on account of his own fault, out of which he converted the good for him into evil, just as for the impious and sinners goods are converted into evils. Yet on account of the prevision of this event God ought not have left off giving such a mandate, because the order and decor, which is attained in God’s works according to the rule of Divine Wisdom, ought not be omitted for the sake of the inconvenience [incommodum] of any particular1 creature. Besides, from that evil following thenceforth God was able and knew how to elicit a much greater good. |
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Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta, excepto primo, quia non est simile. Prohibere enim malum bonum est, quia non potest aliquis malum perpetrare sine culpa; sed prohibere bonum non est ita malum quia abstinere potest homo absque culpa; abstinere enim a bono commodi cadit in genere boni honesti.2 Alia satis patent per iam dicta. |
And through this the response to the objections is clear, except for the first, because it is not similar. For to prohibit an evil is good, because no one can perpetrate an evil without fault; but to prohibit a good is not thus evil because a man can abstain without fault; for to abstain from a good of convenience [a bono commodi] falls in the genus of the honest good [boni honesti].2 The other (objects) are sufficiently clear through (what has) already been said. |
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1 Vat. cum nonnullis codd. spiritualis. 2 Cfr. infra d. 20. dub. 7. |
1 The Vatican edition, together with not a few codices, has spiritual [spiritualis] for particular [specialis]. 2 Cf. below d. 20, Doubt 7. |
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