COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE I Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 434-438. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 434-438. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Utrum mulier formata fuerit de costa viri secundum rationem seminalem.	QUESTION 2 Whether the woman was formed from the rib of the man according to a seminal reason?
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum mulier formata sit de costa viri secundum rationem seminalem. Et quod sic, videtur:	SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the woman was formed from the rib of the man according to a seminal reason. And that (it is) so, seems:
1. Primo per textum:³ Consummavit Deus die sexto omne opus suum. Si ergo formatio mulieris fuit post diem sextum, sicut Scriptura innuit, ergo aliquo modo in illis operibus sex dierum mulier condita fuit; sed non erat nisi in costa; ergo in costa erat unde fieret mulier. Sed quod sic est in aliquo dicitur esse in eo secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.	1. First through the text:³ God consummated His work on the sixth day. If, therefore, the formation of the woman was after the sixth day, just as Scripture hints, therefore woman was founded in some manner in those works of the Six Days; but she was not but in (Adam’s) rib; therefore it was in (his) rib whence the woman would be made. But what is thus in another is said to be in it according to (its) seminal reason: ergo etc..
2. Item, Augustinus sexto super Genesim ad litteram:⁴ « Omnia quae consequentibus erant evolvenda temporibus, primitus Deus creavit simul, cum faceret mundum; consummata quidem, quoniam nihil habent illa in naturis propriis, quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt, quod non in istis causaliter factum sit; inchoata autem, quoniam quaedam erant semina futurorum ». Ergo si mulier postea producenda erat, semen mulieris praeexistebat; sed non nisi in costa: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says) in the sixth (book) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis⁴: « All which were to evolve in consequent times, God first [primitus] created together [simul], when He made the world; (things) consummated indeed, since they have nothing in their own natures, by which they drive the courses of their own times, which was not wrought in them causally; but inchoate, since certain ones (of them) were the seeds of future (things) ». Therefore if the woman was to be produced afterwards, the seed for the woman pre-existed; but not but in (Adam’s) rib: ergo etc..
3. Item, vir dicitur esse imago Dei, quia ex ipso fiunt omnes homines, sicut omnia sunt ex Deo;⁵ sed nulla creatura est ex Deo materialiter: ergo si recta est assimilatio, necesse est, quod vir respectu mulieris non solum habeat habitudinem principii materialis, sed etiam activi. Sed quod est ex aliquo sicut ex materiali et activo principio est secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, the man [vir] is said to be “the image of God”, because out of him come to be all men [homines], just as all (things) are out of God;⁵ but no creature is out of God materially: therefore, if the assimilation is right, it is necessary, that the man have, in respect of the woman, not only the habitude of a material principle, but also of an active one. But what is out of something just as out of a material and active principle is according to a seminal reason: ergo etc..
4. Item, vir productus est ex limo, et mulier de viro; aut ergo est maior habitudo et convenientior costae ad mulierem quam viri ad limum, aut non. Si non, ergo non magis attinet mulier viro quam vir limo. Si sic, ergo ultra rationem possibilis⁶ fuit ibi aliquo modo ratio activi. Si igitur haec est ratio seminalis, apparet, quod secundum rationem seminalem ex costa formatum fuit corpus mulieris.	4. Likewise, the man was produced out of slime, and the woman from the man; therefore either there is a greater and more convening habitude of the rib to the woman than of the man to the slime, or not. If not, therefore the woman does not hold herself [attinet] to the man more than the man to the slime. If so, therefore there was there, in some manner, beyond the reckoning of the possible,⁶ the reckoning of the active. If, therefore, this is a seminal reason, it appears, that according to (its) seminal reason the body of the woman was formed from (his) rib.
³ Gen. 2, 2. Secundum translationem Septuaginta et August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 1; c. 2. n. 6; VI. c. 11. n. 18. Vulgata autem: Complevitque Deus die septimo opus suum. — De formatione mulieris ibid. v. 21. seqq. ⁴ Cap. 11. n. 18, ubi textus originalis in fine: erant quasi semina futurorum. — Dein non pauci codd. cum primis edd. sed non nisi costa pro sed non nisi in costa. ⁵ Vide supra pag. 400, nota 7. — De ultima huius argumenti propositione cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. animal. c. 1. seqq. ⁶ Vat. passibilis.	³ Gen. 2:2. According to the translation of the Septuagint and (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. IV, ch. 1, n. 1; ch. 2, n. 6; Bk. VI, ch. 11, n. 18. The Vulgate, however, reads: And God completed His work on the seventh day [Complevitque Deus die septimo opus suum]. — On the formation of the woman, ibid., v. 21 ff.. ⁴ Chapter 11, n. 18, where the original text at the end has: were as the seeds of future (things) [erant quasi semina futurorum]. — Then not a few codices, together with the first editions, have but not but as (Adam’s) rib [sed non nisi costa] for but not but in (Adam’s) rib [sed non nisi in costa]. ⁵ See above d. 16, a. 2, q. 1, p. 400, footnote 7. — On the last proposition of this argument, cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. II, ch. 1 ff.. ⁶ The Vatican edition has the passible [passibilis].

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5. Item, cum Deus produxit corpus mulieris de costa, aut hoc fuit secundum naturam, aut contra. Si secundum naturam; cum natura quidquid facit, faciat secundum rationes seminales, videtur, quod seminaliter mulier de costa producta sit. Si contra naturam; contra: « Conditor naturae, ut dicit Augustinus,¹ non facit contra naturam »; et idem super Genesim ad litteram: « Tam non facit Deus contra causas, quas bonas constituit, quam contra voluntatem suam non facit ». Ergo si formatio Evae non potuit esse contra naturam, fuit ergo secundum naturam; et si hoc, fuit ergo secundum rationem seminalem.	5. Likewise, when God produces the body of the woman from the rib, either this was according to nature, or contrary to (it). If (it was) according to nature; since nature does whatever it does according to seminal reasons, it seems, that the woman was produced from the rib seminally. If contrary to nature: on the contrary: « The Founder of nature », as (St.) Augustine¹ says, « does not work against nature »; and the same On a Literal Exposition of Genesis (says): « God both does not work against the causes, which He established as good, and He does not work against His own Will ». Therefore if the formation of Eve could not be against nature, therefore it was according to nature; and of this, therefore it was according to a seminal reason.
6. Item, si productio illa fuit contra naturam, ergo formatio mulieris fuit miraculum; sed Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram² dicit, quod Deus in rerum conditione non utitur rebus ad miraculum suae potentiae, sed secundum quod proprie competit ipsarum rerum naturae: ergo si miraculum non faciebat, sed operabatur, secundum quod natura exigebat; videtur, quod mulierem produxerit secundum seminalem rationem, si eam produxit secundum exigentiam naturae.	6. Likewise, if that production was contrary to nature, therefore the formation of the woman was a miracle; but (St.) Augustine says On a Literal Exposition of Genesis,² that God, in the foundation of things, does not use things for the miracle of His Power, but (uses them) according to which it properly suits the nature of the things themselves: therefore, if He did not work a miracle, but operated, according to what nature required; it seems, that He produced the woman according to a seminal reason, if He produced her according to the exigency of nature.
CONTRA: 1. Magister dicit in littera,³ et est auctoritas Augustini: « Illa quae secundum causam seminalem fiunt, dicuntur naturaliter fieri, quia ita cursus naturae hominibus innotuit »: si ergo productio mulieris de costa non est secundum naturae cursum, ergo non erit secundum rationem seminalem.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Master (Peter) says in the text,³ and the quote is (St.) Augustine’s: « Those which come to be according to a seminal cause, are said to come to be naturally, because thus does the course of nature make itself known to men »: if, therefore, the production of the woman from the rib is not according to the course of nature, therefore it will not be according to a seminal reason.
2. Item, Magister in littera:⁴ « Corpus mulieris de costa factum dicitur eo sane miraculo, quo de quinque panibus quinque millia hominum saturata sunt »; sed illud non fuit secundum rationem seminalem: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, Master (Peter says) in the text:⁴ « The body of the woman is said sanely “(to have) been made from the rib” by that miracle, by which from five loaves the five thousand were sated [saturata] »; but that was not according to a seminal reason: ergo etc..
3. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Semen dicit principium activum et intrinsecum,⁵ unde non dicitur semen hominis humor quicumque, sed ille qui decisus est a lumbis paternis; sed in costa non erat vis activa ad mulieris productionem: ergo nec ratio seminalis.	3. Likewise, this seems by reason. A “seed” means an active and intrinsic principle,⁵ wherefore the seed of a man is not said (to be) any humor whatsoever, but that which has been shed [decisus] by the loins of (his) father; but in (Adam’s) rib there was no active force for the production of the woman: therefore neither a seminal reason.
4. Item, semen habet in se rationem totius et partium eius rei, quae ex ipso producitur. Unde Augustinus quinto super Genesim ad litteram:⁶ « In semine omnia producta sunt et fuerant primitus non mole magnitudinis, sed in potentia causali ». Sed in costa illa non erat virtus ad singula membra formanda: ergo non erat ibi mulier secundum rationem seminalem.	4. Likewise, a seed has in itself the reckoning of the whole and of the parts of that thing, which is produced out of it. Wherefore, (St.) Augustine in the fifth (book) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis⁶ (says): « All were produced in seed and had been at first not according to the mass of magnitude, but in the potency of a cause [in potentia causali] ». But in that rib there was no virtue to form the single members: therefore the woman was not there according to (her) seminal reason.
5. Item, impossibile est, aliquid crescere per virtutem creatam nisi per rarefactionem, aut appositionem; sed corpus mulieris de illa costa productum est, quod erat ipsa maius, non per costae rarefactionem nec extrinsecae materiae appositionem, sicut dicit Magister in littera:⁷ ergo productio illa ex costa non fuit secundum virtutem creaturae, sed solum creatricis essentiae. Sed seminalis ratio dicit virtutem creatam; non enim dicuntur in Deo res esse seminaliter: ergo haec productio mulieris ex costa non fuit secundum rationes seminales.	5. Likewise, it is impossible, that anything grow through a created virtue unless (it grows) through rarefaction, or apposition; but from that rib was produced a woman’s body, which was greater than itself, not through the rarefaction of the rib nor (through) the apposition of an extrinsic matter, just as Master (Peter)⁷ says in the text: therefore that production out of the rib was not according to the virtue of the creature, but solely (through the virtue) of the Creator Essence. But a “seminal reason” means a created virtue; for things are not said to be “in God” seminally: therefore this production of the woman out of the rib was not according to seminal reasons.
6. Item, secundum rationes seminales attenditur rerum propagatio et generatio; sed secundum eductionem corporis de costa non fit propagatio in humana specie: ergo productio alicuius corporis humani ex costa non est secundum rationem seminalem.	6. Likewise, the propagation and generation of things is attained according to seminal reasons; but propagation in the human species does not come to be according to the eduction of a body from a rib: therefore the production of any human body out of a rib is not according to a seminal reason.
Propter hoc est quaestio: cum Magister⁸ dicat, aliqua fieri secundum rationes causales, aliqua secundum rationes seminales, quae sit differentia inter haec duo. Si tu dicas, quod illa fiunt secundum rationes causales, quae fiunt secundum rationes incommutabiles vel aeternas; illa secundum rationes seminales, quae fiunt secundum exigentiam et virtutem potentiarum inditarum ipsis creaturis; obiicitur contra hoc per Augustinum. Dicit enim Augustinus sexto super Genesim ad litteram:⁹ « Nihil habent res in naturis propriis, quod non in primis diebus causaliter factum est ». Et iterum: « Causales illae rationes, quas mundo indidit, cum primum simul omnia creavit, quomodo institutae sunt, merito quaeri potest ». Et paulo post: « In illis primis rerum causis, quas mundo primitus Creator inseruit, non tantum posuit, quod de limo formaturus erat hominem, sed quemadmodum producturus ». Ergo rationes causales non dicunt quid increatum, sed creatum. — Item, ipse Augustinus rationes causa- / -les . . .	On account of this there is the question: “Since Master (Peter)⁸ says, that some (things) come to be according to causal reasons, some according to seminal reasons, what is the difference between these two?” If you say, that those come to be according to causal reasons, which come to be according to incommutable and/or eternal reasons; those according to seminal reasons, which come to be according to the exigency and virtue of the powers endowed to creatures themselves; there is objected against this through (St.) Augustine. For (St.) Augustine says in the sixth (book) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis:⁹ « Things have nothing in their own natures, which was not made causally in the first Days (of creation) ». And again: « In what manner those causal reasons, with which He endowed the world, were instituted, when He first created all (things) together, can be deservedly investigated [quaeri] ». And a little after (this): « In those first causes of things, which the Creator first engrafted in the world, He not only posited, that He was going to form man from the slime (of the earth), but the manner according to which He (was) going to produce (him) ». Therefore “causal reasons” do not mean something uncreated, but created. — Likewise, (St.) Augustine himself distinguishes / causal reasons, . . .
¹ Libr. XXVI. contra Faustum, c. 3: Deus autem creator et conditor omnium naturarum nihil contra naturam facit. Cfr. Prosper, liber Sent. ex August., sent. 283. — Seq. textus habetur VI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 18. n. 29: Tam enim non fecit Deus contra causam, quam sine dubio volens praestituit, quam contra voluntatem suam non facit. — Vat. cum edd. aliis, omisso in principio huius textus Tam, substituit mox quia pro quam. ² Libr. II. c. 1. n. 2. ³ Hic. c. 6. ⁴ Hic. c. 4. — Vat. cum aliis edd. saturati sunt, contra codd. et Magistrum. ⁵ Aristot., II. Phys. text. 31. (c. 3.), V. Metaph. text. 3. et VIII. text. 12. (IV. c. 2. et VII. c. 4.) connumerat semen inter causas agentes. Cfr. etiam II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. et August., III. de Trin. c. 8. n. 13. ⁶ Cap. 23. n. 44: In semine ergo illa omnia fuerunt primitus, non mole corporeae magnitudinis, sed vi potentiaque causali. — In hoc textu codd. H Q W cc ee et ed. 1 omittunt cum originali producta sunt et, insuper cod. H substituit fuerunt pro fuerant; nonnulli substituunt quae fuerant pro et fuerant. ⁷ Hic c. 4. — De ultima parte arg. cfr. ibid. c. 5. seq. ⁸ Hic. c. 4. seq. ⁹ Cap. 11. n. 18, ubi textus originalis post naturis propriis subiungit: quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt. — Secundus textus est ibid. c. 14. n. 25. — Tertius est ibid. c. 15. n. 26, cuius finem originale sic exhibet sed etiam quemadmodum formaturus, et in quo non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 creando inseruit pro Creator inseruit.	¹ Against Faustus, Bk. XXVI, ch. 3: Moreover God, the Creator and Founder of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature. Cf. Prosper’ book, Sentences of Augustine, sent. 283. — The following text is had in On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VI, ch. 18, n. 29: For God both does not work against the cause, which He without a doubt established beforehand as One willing, and does not work against His own Will. — The Vatican edition, together with the other editions, having omitted the both [Tam] at the beginning of this text, substitutes next because [quia] for the and [quam]. ² Book II, ch. 1, n. 2. ³ Here in ch. 6. ⁴ Here in ch. 4. — The Vatican edition, together with the other editions, has were sated [saturati sunt], contrary to the codices and Master (Peter). ⁵ Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 31 (ch. 3), Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 3 and Bk. VIII, text 12 (Bk. IV, ch. 2, and Bk. VII, ch. 4) numbers the seed together among acting causes. Cf. also On the Generation of Animals, Bk. II, ch. 3, and (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. III, ch. 8, n. 13. ⁶ Chapter 23, n. 44: Therefore in the seed all those first were, not according to the mass of corporeal magnitude, but according to the force and power of a cause. — In this text codices H Q W cc and ee and edition 1 omit, together with the original, were produced . . . and [producta sunt et], moreover codex H substitutes were [fuerunt] for had been [fuerant]. ⁷ Here in ch. 4. — On the final part of the argument, cf. ibid., ch. 5 f.. ⁸ Here in ch. 4 f.. ⁹ Chapter 11, n. 18, where the original text after in their own natures [naturis propriis] subjoins: by which they drive the courses of their own times [quibus suorum temporum cursus agunt]. — The second text is ibid., ch. 14, n. 25. — The third is ibid., ch. 15, n. 26, whose end the original exhibits thus: the manner according to which (He was) also going to form (him) [sed etiam quemadmodum formaturus], and in which not a few codices, together with edition 1, have He first inserted in the world by creating (it) [creando inseruit] for the Creator first inserted in the world [Creator inseruit].

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causa- / -les, quas dicit inditas primis rebus, distinguit contra incommutabiles rationes, tam in quinto super Genesim ad litteram,¹ quam in sexto.	causal reasons, which he says (were) endowed in the first things, against incommutable reasons, both in the fifth and the sixth (book) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis.¹
Quaeritur etiam, quae differentia sit inter rationes seminales et naturales; et videtur, quod nulla, quia Augustinus dicit, quod cum arbor germinatur de semine, quotidie est propagatio secundum rationem seminalem, in fine quinti super Genesim;² sed hoc idem est secundum rationem naturalem. — Item, operatio, quae est a vi seminali, aut est naturalis, aut est voluntaria. Cum enim non sit a causa per accidens et sit a causa creata, necesse est, quod sit a natura, vel ab intellectu.³ Sed non est ab intellectu: ergo a natura: ergo omne quod fit seminaliter, fit naturaliter. Pari ratione, cum natura sit vis propagativa, et propagatio fit mediante semine; omne quod fit naturaliter, videtur fieri seminaliter.	There is also asked, “What is the difference between seminal and natural reasons?”; and it seems, that (there is) none, because (St.) Augustine says, that as [cum] a tree is germinated from a seed, there is everyday a propagation according to seminal reason, at the end of the fifth (book) On (a Literal Exposition of) Genesis;² but this is the same as a natural reason. — Likewise, the operation, which is from a seminal force, is either natural, or it is voluntary. For since it is not from a per accidens cause and it is from a created cause, it is necessary, that it be from a nature, and/or from an intellect. But it is not from an intellect:³ therefore (its is) from a nature: therefore everything which comes to be seminally, comes to be naturally. For an equal reason, since nature is a propagative force, and propagation comes to be by means of seed; everything which comes to be naturally, seems to come to be seminally.
CONCLUSIO. Corpus primae mulieris formatum est de osse lateris Adae, in quo duplex est ordinis congruentia.	CONCLUSION The body of the first woman was formed from bone of the side of Adam, in which there is a twofold congruence of order.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum de his rationibus seminalibus egregius doctor Augustinus in quinto et sexto super Genesim ad literam⁴ ambigue loquatur, et ab ipso potissime habeamus horum nominum usum; non est facile inter huiusmodi vocabula recte distinguere. Ipse enim rationes causales modo dicit rebus fuisse insertas, modo dicit, quantum ad aliqua in divina voluntate fuisse servatas. Possumus tamen, quantum est de vi vocabuli, differentiam assignare in hunc modum.	I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that since the outstanding Doctor, (St.) Augustine, speaks ambiguously of these seminal reasons in the fifth and sixth (book) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis,⁴ and (since) we have the use of these names most of all from him; it is not easy to distinguish rightly among terms [vocabula] of this kind. For he himself sometimes [modo] says that “causal reasons” were “inserted into things”, (and) sometimes says, that as much as regards somethings they were “kept [servatas] in the Divine Will”. Yet we can, as much as concerns the force of the term, assign a difference in this manner.
Causa enim communis est ad principium intrinsecum et extrinsecum,⁵ similiter et ratio causalis, quantum est de vi nominis; semen vero dicit principium intrinsecum. Et ita ratio causalis se extendit ad rationes creatas et increatas; ratio vero seminalis solum ad rationes creatas. Quantum ergo est de vi nominis, usum est commune respectu alterius; in quantum autem ad invicem distinguuntur et connumerantur, sic causa et causalis ratio accipitur quantum ad principium increatum, semen vero et seminalis ratio spectat ad principium creatum. — Differunt autem causa et ratio causalis, quia causa dicit principium productivum, ratio vero causalis dicit regulam dirigentem illud principium in sua operatione. Similiter per hunc modum differt semen et ratio seminalis. Regula autem agentis increati est forma exemplaris sive idealis,⁶ regula vero agentis creati est forma naturalis: et ita rationes causales sunt formae ideales sive exemplares, rationes vero seminales sunt formae naturales.	For the common “cause” regards an intrinsic and extrinsic principle, similarly too a “causal reason”, as much as concerns the force of the name; but “seed” [semen] means an intrinsic principle. And thus a “causal reason” extends itself to created and uncreated reasons; but a “seminal reason” only to created reasons. Therefore as much as concerns the force of the name, the use is common in respect of the other; but inasmuch as they are distinguished regarding one another and numbered together, thus “cause” and “causal reason” is accepted as much as regards an uncreated principle, but “seed” and “seminal reason” pertain to a created principle. — Moreover “cause” and “causal reason” differ, because “cause” means a productive principle, but “causal reason” means a rule directing that principle in its operation. Similarly through this standard of measure “seed” and “seminal reason” differ. Moreover the rule of an uncreated agent is an exemplary or ideal form,⁶ but the rule of a created agent is a natural form: and thus causal reasons are ideal or exemplary forms, but seminal reasons are natural forms.
Et secundum hoc patet, quod rationes causales et primordiales idem sunt re, differentes sola ratione. Primordiales enim dicuntur per privationem prioris, sed causales per positionem posterioris; et primordiales, in quantum respiciunt Deum ut principium primum, causales, in quantum respiciunt Deum ut finem ultimum, qui est causa causarum.⁷ — Similiter naturales rationes et seminales re idem sunt, ratione vero differunt. Quia enim semen dicit ut ex quo, et natura dicit ut a quo, ratio seminalis attenditur, in quantum dirigit potentiam naturae, ut ex aliquo fiat aliquid; naturalis vero, ut ab aliquo fiat aliquid. — Vel ratio seminalis respicit inchoationem et intrinsecum virtutem, quae movet et operatur ad effectus productionem; naturalis vero concernit producentis ad productum assimilationem et modi agendi assuetudinem. Unde appropriate loquendo, cum magi et virgis fecerunt serpentes,⁸ hoc fuit secundum rationes seminales; cum vero serpentes, sicut assolent, serpentes generant, hoc fit secundum rationes naturales, licet utraeque et naturales et seminales congrue dici possint.	And according to this it is clear, that causal and primordial reasons are the same according to thing [re], (but) different according to reckoning alone [sola ratione]. For they are said (to be) “primordial” through a privation of the prior, but “causal” through the positing of a posterior; and “primordial”, inasmuch as they respect God as the First Principle, “causal”, inasmuch as they respect God as the Last End, which is the Cause of causes.⁷ — Similarly natural and seminal reasons are the same according to thing, but differ according to reckoning. For because one says “seed” as an ‘out of which’, and one says “nature” as a ‘by which’, a “seminal reason” is attained, inasmuch as it directs the power of the nature, so that out of something something comes to be; but a “natural (reason)”, so that by something something comes to be. — And/or a seminal reason respects the act of beginning [inchoationem] and intrinsic virtue, which moves and works for the production of the effect, but a natural (reason) concerns the assimilation of the one producing to the one produced and the customary use [assuetudinem] of the manner of acting. Wherefore appropriately speaking, when the magicians also made serpents of the rod,⁸ this was according to seminal reasons; but when serpents, as they are accustomed (to do), generate serpents, this comes to be according to natural reasons, though both can also be congruously said (to be) “natural” and “seminal”.
Quando ergo quaeritur, utrum aliquis effectus fiat secundum rationes causales aut seminales; respondendum est, quod aut sic est a Deo ille effectus, quod creatura non habet in eo potentiam aliquam, aut si habet, habet solam potentiam obedientiae;⁹ utpote cum mundus fit de nihilo, ubi nulla est potentia creaturae; vel cum multi panes multiplicantur ex pane uno, ubi est sola potentia obedientiae; et haec fiunt secundum rationes causales, quas Deus servavit in sua voluntate, quia non fiunt secundum exigentiam creaturae, sed secundum exigentiam dispositionis aeternae. — Si autem sic producitur effectus, quod est in potentia naturae, non solum obediente, sed etiam potente ad actum perducere;¹⁰ sic dicitur fieri secundum rationes seminales; sicut patet, cum homo generatur ex homine, vel arbor ex arbore.	Therefore when there is asked, whether any effect comes to be according to causal or seminal reasons; it must be responded, that either that effect is thus from God, that a creature does not have any power in regard to it, or if it does have, it has only the power of obedience [potentiam obedientiae];⁹ as for example when the world was made from nothing, where there is no power of a creature; and/or when many loaves are multiplied out of one loaf, where there is only the power of obedience; and these come to be according to the causal reasons, which God keeps in His Will, because they do not come to be according to the exigency of a creature, but according to the exigency of an eternal disposition. — But if an effect is produced thus, that it is in the power of a nature, not only in one obeying, but even in one potent to carry (it) through to act [ad actum perducere];¹⁰ thus it is said to be done according to “seminal reasons”; just as is clear, when a human [homo] is generated out of a human, and/or a tree out of a tree.
¹ Cap. 12. n. 28. seqq.; VI. c. 10. n. 17. et c. 15. n. 26. ² Cap. 20. n. 41. et c. 23. n. 44. Cfr. ibid. IX. c. 17. n. 32. ³ Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 48. seqq. (c. 5.), ubi ad stabiliendam definitionem et divisionem casus et fortunae sive causarum per accidens praemittit definitionem et divisionem causarum per se, quae scil. agunt propter finem, nempe eorum quae « ab intellectu aguntur, et a natura ». De communi definitione naturae, quod sit « vis insita rebus similia ex similibus procreans », vide tom. I. pag. 134, nota 10. ⁴ Locis citt. in argg. — Paulo superius post seminalibus codd. M Y aa adiungunt et causalibus. ⁵ Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 1. seqq. et XII. text. 23. (IV. c. 1. seq. et XI. c. 4.). ⁶ Vide I. Sent. d. 35. — In cod. Y additur scilicet essentia divina. ⁷ Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 3. (IV. c. 2.): Ipsum enim, cuius causa [i. e. causa finalis] optimum, et finis aliorum vult esse. ⁸ Exod. 7, 12. — Cf. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 2. ⁹ De qua vide tom. I. pag. 755, nota 3. — Paulo inferius codd. aa cc et ed. 1 et hoc fuit pro et haec fiunt. ¹⁰ Plurimi codd. cum primis edd. non bene producere Vat. obedientiae, sed etiam potentiae ad actum perducere pro obediente, sed etiam potente ad actum perducere.	¹ Chapter 12, n. 28 ff; Bk. VI, ch. 10, n. 17, and ch. 15, n. 26. ² Chapter 20, n. 41, and ch. 23, n. 44. Cf. ibid., Bk. IX, ch. 17, n. 32. ³ Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 48 ff (ch. 5), where to establish the definition and division of chance and fortune or of per accidens causes, he prefaces with the definition and division of per se causes, which, that is, act for the sake of an end, namely, of those which « are enacted by an intellect, and by nature ». On the common definition of “nature”, which is « a force engrafted into things, procreating similars out of similars », see Sent., Bk. I, d. 7, a. sole, q. 1, p. 134, footnote 10. ⁴ In the passages cited in the argument. — A little above this after seminal [seminalibus] codices M Y and aa adjoin and causal [et causalibus]. ⁵ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 1 ff., and Bk. XII, text 23 (Bk. IV, ch. 1 f., and Bk. XI, ch. 4). ⁶ See Sent., Bk. I, d. 35. — In codex Y there is added namely the Divine Essence [scilicet essential divina]. ⁷ Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 3 (Bk. IV, ch. 2): For that very (thing), the (final) cause of which (is) the best (thing), wants also to be the end of the others. ⁸ Exod. 7:12. — Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. ⁹ Concerning which see Sent., Bk. I, d. 42, a. sole, q. 3, p. 755, footnote 3. ¹⁰ A little below this codices aa and cc and edition 1 read and this was [et hoc fuit] for and these come to be [et haec fiunt].

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Sed attendendum est, quod illa potentia naturae ad effectus istos aut est propinqua et sufficiens, sicut est in semine deciso a lumbis ad generationem humani corporis; et sic dicitur proprie habere in se rationem seminalem; aut est remota et insufficiens, sicut est in pane vel in alimento, ut ex eo fiat homo; et sic minus proprie dicitur esse ibi ratio seminalis. Non enim dicitur in pane esse ratio seminalis respectu hominis producendi, nisi valde large accipiatur. — Quod autem sic est in remota¹ dispositione respectu effectus, aut perducitur ad illum effectum mediantibus illis, ad quae habebat ordinem immediatum, aut immediate. Si mediate, tunc potest dici, quod effectus ille sit secundum rationem seminalem, utpote si panis comedatur et digeratur et convertatur in humorem, et postmodum in lumbis convertatur in semen, deinde in hominem. Si autem immediate perducatur ad effectum, utpote si de pane statim formaretur corpus hominis; sic nullo modo dicitur esse factum secundum rationes seminales, sed secundum rationes causales. Quamvis enim ibi esse aliqua potentia activa ad hoc, quod inde fieret corpus per multa intermedia; tamen quod immediate fieret, hoc habuit in sola potentia obedientiae.	But one must attend (to this), that that power of the nature for those effects is either proximate [propinqua] and sufficient, just as in the semen shed from the loins for the generation of a human body; and thus it is said properly to have in itself a “seminal reason”; or it is remote and insufficient, just as in bread and/or in foot, so that from this there comes to be a man; and thus there is said less properly to be there a “seminal reason”. For there is not said to be in a loaf a seminal reason in respect of producing a man, unless it be accepted very broadly. — Moreover what is thus in a remote¹ disposition in respect of the effect, either is lead thoroughly to that effect by means of those, to which it has an immediate order, or (it is led) immediately. If mediately, then it can be said, that that effect is according to a seminal reason, as for example if a loaf is eaten and digested and converted into a humor, and afterwards is converted in the loins into semen, then into a man. But if it is lead thoroughly to the effect immediately, as for example if a human body would be formed immediately from bread; thus it is in no manner said to have been done according to seminal reasons, but (rather) according to causal reasons. For though there is there some active power for this, that a body come to be thence through many intermediaries; yet that it comes to be immediately, this it had in (its) power of obedience alone.
Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum corpus mulieris fuerit in costa seminaliter; dicendum, quod si proprie accipiatur ratio seminalis, non; si autem accipiatur large pro quacumque potentia activa existente in materia, sic potest dici in costa fuisse ratio seminalis. Rursus, si quaeratur, utrum mulier facta sit de costa secundum rationes seminales; respondendum est, quod non; quia costa respectu talis modi producendi et respectu tanti corporis ex ea formandi absque additione non habuit nisi solam potentiam obedientiae. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.	Therefore when there is asked, whether the body of the woman was in (Adam’s) rib seminally; it must be said, that, if “seminal reason” is accepted properly, (it was) not; but if it is accepted broadly for any active power whatsoever, existent in the matter, thus a seminal reason can be said to have been in the rib. Again, if there is asked, whether the woman was made from the rib according to seminal reasons; it must be responded, that (she was) not; because the rib in respect of such a manner of producing and in respect of so great a body to be formed out of it, apart from an addition, did not have but a power alone of obedience. Wherefore the reasons brought forward for this are to be conceded.
1. 2. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nihil novum fecit Deus ultra diem sextum; dicendum, quod illud argumentum deficit dupliciter. Primo, quia, etsi formatio mulieris post diem sextum narretur, non est tamen credendum, quod tam longo tempore viri formatio praecesserit, sed quod die sexto de latere viri producta est. Illud autem quod subditur, intelligendum est per recapitulationem; recapitulat enim Scriptura, ut addat. Deficit etiam in hoc, quod Deus non dicitur facere novum, non solum in hoc, quod omnia producta sint in ratione seminali, sed quia producta sunt in suo simili; et hoc necessarium est dicere propter creationem animae, quae non exit in esse secundum seminalem rationem. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens, quia formatio mulieris non fuit de consequentibus ad opera sex dierum; vel si fuit, causaliter dicitur fuisse facta, quia praecessit potentia obedientiae in costa, vel etiam aliqua ratio seminalis longinqua, licet secundum illam mulier non sit formata, sed secundum potentiam divinam.	1. 2. But to that which is first objected unto the contrary, that God made nothing new after [ultra] the sixth day; it must be said, that that argument is deficient in a twofold manner. First, because, even if the formation of the woman is narrated after [post] the sixth day, yet it must not be believed, that the formation of the man preceded by so long a time, but that she was produced from the side of the man on the sixth day. Moreover that which is subjoined, must be understood through recapitulation; for Scripture recapitulates, so as to add. It is also deficient in this, that God is not said “to make (something) new”, not only in this, that all (things) have been produced in (their) seminal reason, but because they have been produced in their own similar; and this is necessary to say on account of the creation of the soul, which does not go forth into ‘being’ according to a seminal reason. — And through this the response to the following (objection) is clear, because the formation of the woman did not concern the (those things) consequent to the works of the Six Days; and/or if it did, she is said to have been made causally, because the power of obedience in the rib, and/or even some remote [longinqua] seminal reason, preceded, though the woman was not formed according to the former, but according to the Divine Power.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vir est imago Dei, quia principum omnium hominum; dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo. Deus enim est principium sufficiens respectu omnium; vir autem non est per se principum sufficiens respectu hominum; aliquo tamen modo tenet rationem principii; et hoc facit ad maiorem expressionem imaginis, ad cuius expressionem aliquo modo amplificandam non solum facit assimilatio perfecta, sed etiam assimilatio modica.³	3. To that which is objected, that the man [vir] is the image of God, because (he is) the principle of all men [hominum]; it must be said, that there is not an omnimodal similitude (between them). For God is the sufficient Principle in respect of all (beings); but the man is not a per se sufficient principle in respect of men; yet he does have the reckoning of a principle in some manner; and this works for a greater expression of the image, to amplify in some manner the expression of which not only does a perfect assimilation work, but even a very limited [modica] assimilation.³
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior erat convenientia costae ad mulierem, quam limi ad virum; dicendum, quod costa dupliciter potest considerari: aut in se, aut in quantum fuit pars viri. In se quidem ita bene distabat a formatione corporis mulieris, sicut limus a formatione corporis viri. Si autem consideretur, in quantum est pars viri; sic, quia vir et mulier sunt personae, in quibus potest esse affinitas et attinentia, talis formatio faciebat, quoddam maius vinculum attinentiae esse inter virum et mulierem; quod quidem non poterat esse inter virum et elementum terrae.⁴	4. To that which is objected, that there was a greater convening of the rib to the woman, that of the slime to the man; it must be said, that the rib can be considered in a twofold manner: either in itself, or inasmuch as it was part of the man. Indeed, in itself it was as well distant from the formation of the body of the woman, as the slime (was) from the formation of the body of the man. But if it would be considered, inasmuch as it is part of the man; thus, because the man and the woman are persons, in whom there can be an affinity and a holding-together [attinentia], such a formation caused there to be a certain greater bond of being held together [attinentiae] between the man and the woman; which, indeed, could not be between the man and the element of earth.⁴
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod productio mulieris de costa non fuit contra naturam; dicendum, quod dupliciter dicitur natura. Uno modo dicitur natura omne illud quod competit rei a sua naturali origine; et sic competit creaturae, ut ex ea producatur omne quod Deus vult. Opus enim respectu sui artificis habet in se potentiam perfectae obedientiae, cum per omnia subiaceat eius voluntati; propter quod dicitur,⁵ quod spiritus Domini ferebatur super aquas; et contra hanc naturam Deus nunquam facit, immo quidquid facit de creatura, secundum hanc naturam facit. Et secundum hunc modum accipiendi naturam, mulier de costa non est formata contra naturam. — Alio modo dicitur natura proprie vis insita rebus, secundum quam res naturales peragunt cursus suos et motus solitos; et hoc modo accipiendo naturam, aliquando Deus facit contra naturam, aliquando supra naturam. — Tunc facit contra naturam, quando facit aliquid, cuius simile in natura et a natura produci habet, tamen alio modo omnino diverso; ut patet in hoc, quod na- / -tura . . .	5. To that which is objected, that the production of the woman from the rib was not contrary to nature; it must be said, that “nature” is said in a twofold manner. In one manner “nature” is said (to be) every that which suits a thing from its natural origin; and thus it suits a creature, that everything which God wills be produced out of it. For the work in respect of its own Craftsman has in itself a power of perfect obedience, since it is subject to His Will through all (things); on account of which it is said,⁵ that the Spirit of the Lord was borne over the waters; and contrary to this “nature” God never works, nay whatever He works from the creature, He does according to this “nature”. And according to this manner of accepting “nature”, the woman was not formed from the rib contrary to nature. — “Nature” is said in another manner, properly, (to be) the force engrafted into things, according to which natural things conduct [peragunt] their own courses and customary movements; and according to this manner of accepting “nature”, God sometimes works contrary to nature, sometimes above nature. — He then works contrary to nature, when He makes something, the similar of which has (its) ‘being produced’ in nature and by nature, yet in an entirely diverse other manner; as is clear in this, that na- / -ture . . .
¹ Multi codd., verbis transpositis, est in sic remota. ² Simile habetur supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 3. ad 1. — De seq. ratione vide supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 3. ³ Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 2. q. 1. ⁴ Cod. T et limum terrae. ⁵ Gen. 1, 2: Spiritus Dei ferebatur etc. — Eodem modo hic textus explicatur ab August., VI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 13. n. 23. — De duplici acceptione naturae cfr. August., loc. cit. c. 13. n. 24. seqq.; IX. c. 17. n. 32; et XXVI. contra Faustum, c. 3. — Paulo superius cod. cc et ed. 1 perfecte obediendi pro perfectae obedientiae.	¹ Many codices, with transposed words, read is in a thus remote [est in sic remota]. ² The similar is had above in d. 17, a. 1, q. 3, in reply to n. 1. — On the following reason, see above d. 15, a. 2, q. 1. ³ Cf. above d. 16, a. 2, q. 1. ⁴ Codex T has and the slime of the earth [et limum terrae] for and the element of earth [et elementum terrae]. ⁵ Gen. 1:2: The Spirit of the Lord was born etc. [Spiritus Dei ferebatur etc.]. — This text is explained in the same manner by (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VI, ch. 13, n. 23. — On the twofold acceptation of “nature”, cf. (St.) Augustine, loc. cit., ch. 13, n. 24 ff.; Bk. IX, ch. 17, n. 32; and Against Faustus, Bk. XXVI, ch. 3. — A little above this codex cc and edition 1 have of obeying perfectly [perfecte obediendi] for of perfect obedience [perfectae obedientiae].

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na- / -tura dat alicui visum et successive in primaria generatione; similiter et dat vitam; nunquam tamen caecum reducit ad visum nec mortuum ad vitam. Si ergo Deus sua virtute hoc faciat, ut alicui caeco visum restituat et mortuo vitam, tunc dicitur facere contra naturam, id est contra solitum cursum naturae, et tunc dicitur miraculum. — Quando vero Deus facit aliquid, cuius simile natura facere non potest, et ad quod natura non habet ordinem secundum propriam virtutem, sicut quando Deus factus est homo, vel quando corpus mortale fit gloriosum; tunc facit supra naturam, et illud opus proprie dicitur mirabile, non miraculum.¹ — Quoniam igitur in operibus sex dierum naturae rerum nondum erant conditae, nec cursus earum determinati; ideo tam in productione mulieris ex costa viri, quam in productione aliarum rerum operabatur supra naturam, non contra; et ideo opera illa mirabilia, non miracula dici debebant.	that na- / -ture gives someone sight and (does so) successively in (his) primary generation; similarly it also gives (him) life; yet it never leads the blind back to sight nor the dead to life. Therefore if God does this by His own Virtue, so that to some blind (man) He restores sight and to (some) dead (man) life, He is then said “to work contrary to nature”, that is contrary to the customary course of nature, and then (His work) is said (to be) a “miracle”. — On the other hand, when God does anything, the similar of which nature cannot do, and to which nature does not have an order according to its own virtue, just as when God became man, and/or when the mortal body becomes glorious; then He works above nature, and that work is properly said (to be) a “wonder” [mirabile], not a “miracle”.¹ — Therefore since in the works of the Six Days the natures of things had not yet been founded, nor their courses determined; for that reason both in the production of the woman from the rib of the man, and in the production of the other things, He operated above nature, not contrary to (it); and for that reason those works ought to have been called “wonders”, not “miracles”.
6. Et per hoc patet responsio ad ultimum obiectum; quia non fuit proprie contra naturam nec est miraculum dicendum.	6. And through this the response to the last objection is clear; because it was not properly contrary to nature nor must it be said (to be) a “miracle”.
Patet etiam responsio ad illud quod consuevit quaeri, quae differentia est inter miraculum et mirabile, et in quo differt facere aliquid contra naturam et supra; postremo, qualiter verum est, quod Deus nihil facit contra naturam, et tamen miracula² aliquo modo sunt contra naturam. — Patet etiam, quae differentia sit inter rationes primordiales, causales, seminales et naturales. Duo enim prima membra, scilicet primordiales rationes et causales, differunt ratione; similiter duo ultima, scilicet rationes seminales et naturales. Duo vero intermedia, scilicet rationes causales et seminales, uno modo se habent sicut generale et speciale; alio modo, si fiat appropriatio, causales sunt, quae servatae sunt in mente divina, seminales vero, quae sunt rebus insertae. — Et hinc est, quod Augustinus causales rationes dicit esse rationes ad ea quae fiunt miraculose et naturaliter; dicit etiam quasdam rationes causales in mente divina reservatas, quasdam autem esse rebus insertas, sexto super Genesim.³ Et sic patet, quod nulla est contrarietas.	The response is also clear to that which is accustomed to be asked, (namely) what difference is there between a miracle and a wonder, and in what does doing something contrary to nature and above (nature) differ; finally, in what kind of manner is it true, that God does nothing contrary to nature, and yet miracles² are in some manner contrary to nature. — It is also clear, what is the difference between primordial, causal, seminal and natural reasons. For the first two members (of the division), namely primordial and causal reasons, differ according to (their) reckoning; similarly the two last ones, namely seminal and natural reasons. But the two intermediary ones, namely causal and seminal reasons, hold themselves in one manner just as the general and the special (do); in another manner, if an appropriation is made, they are the causal (reasons), which are kept in the Divine Mind, but the seminal (reasons), which are inserted into things. — And hence it is, that (St.) Augustine says that causal reasons are the reasons for those which come to be miraculously and naturally; he also says that certain causal reasons (have) been reserved in the Divine Mind, but certain ones have been inserted into things, in the sixth (book) On (a Literal Exposition of) Genesis.³ And thus it is clear, that there is no contrariety.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. S. Doctor, doctrinam Alexandri Hal. secutus, hic utitur distinctione inter esse in costa et produci de costa, unde duas conclusiones ponit. Omnes auctores conveniunt in secunda conclusione, scil. quod Eva de costa facta sit non secundum rationes seminales, sed praeter ordinem naturae immediate a Deo, cum ex parte costae non fuerit ad productionem istam nisi potentia obedientialis (cfr. hic dub. 1.). — Prima autem conclusio non ab omnibus conceditur, scil. quod fuerit in costa aliquo modo ratio seminalis, si ratio seminalis intelligitur in sensu largo pro quaecumque potentia activa existente in materia. Ratio huius dissidi fundata est in eo, quod multi non concedunt, materiae concreatum esse aliquod seminarium ut principum activum et substantiale; de quo in seq. quaestione plura dicuntur.	I. The Seraphic Doctor, having followed the doctrine of Alexander of Hales, here uses the distinction between ‘being in the rib’ [esse in costa] and ‘being produced from the rib’ [produci de costa], whence he posits two conclusions. All authors convene in the second conclusion, namely, that Eve was made from (Adam’s) rib, not according to seminal reasons, but beside the order of nature, immediately by God, since on the part of (his) rib there was not present [ad] to that production of her but an obediential power (cf. here Doubt 1). — Moreover the first conclusion is not conceded by all, namely, that there was in the rib, in some manner, a seminal reason, if “seminal reason” is understood in the broad sense for “any active power whatsoever, existing in the matter”. The reason for this disagreement is in this, that many do not concede, that there is any seed-bed co-created with matter as an active and substantial principle (of future natures); concerning which several (things) are said in the following Question.
S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 92. a. 3. ad 1.) reprobat opinionem Hugonis a S. Victore et Magistri (hic c. 4.), quod sine alicuius rei exterioris additione vel novae materiae creatione corpus mulieris formatum sit; quam positionem dicit esse impossibilem. Sed Aegid R. (loc. infra cit.) sententiam Magistri nititur aliter explicare eamque defendere.	St. Thomas (here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 92, a. 3, in reply to n. 1) reproves the opinion of Hugo of Saint Victor and Master Peter (here in ch. 4), that without the addition of any exterior thing and/or the creation of new matter the body of the woman was formed; which position he says is impossible. But Giles the Roman (in the passage cited below) strives to explain the sentence of Master (Peter) in another manner and to defend it.
II. Cum August. saepe nominet rationes primordiales, causales, seminales, naturales, hic in corp. et ad 6. distinctio horum nominum accurate determinatur, in quo antiqui auctores satis conveniebant, non autem in determinatione, quid in se sit ratio seminalis secundum rem et sententiam S. Augustini, de quo miro modo dissentiebant. — Opinio S. Bonaventurae circa rationes seminales iam explicata est supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et in scholio, et magis declaratur in seq. quaestione.	II. Since (St.) Augustine often mentions primordial, causal, seminal (and) natural reasons, there is accurately determined herein the body (of the Question) and in the reply to n. 6 the distinction of these names, in which the ancient authors sufficiently convened, but not in the determination, what a seminal reason is in itself according to thing nor (in the determination of) the sentence of St. Augustine, concerning which they disagreed in a wonderful manner. — The opinion of St. Bonaventure about seminal reasons has already been explained above in d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, and in the Scholium (to the same), and is made more clear in the Question (here) following.
Praenotanda autem est distinctio inter semen in sensu proprio et rationem seminalem. Semen, secundum Scot. (hic q. unica, n. 8.), « est corpus quoddam, cuius forma non est intenta propter se, sed propter aliud, ut scil. ex illo generetur aliquid simile generanti ». Ratio autem seminalis est quaedam vis activa, quae est vel in semine ut subiecto, connaturalis eidem, vel generatim in elementis, sive in materia sub aliqua forma existente. De hac autem ratione seminali disputatur, quid proprie sit, et in specie, utrum sit qualitas activa et passiva, an forma substantialis, sed incompleta. — Item, praenotanda est distinctio S. Bonaventurae inter rationes seminales proprie dictas et generationi viventium propinquas, quales sunt in semine, et easdem minus proprie dictas et a generatione longinquas, sicut « in materia unius elementi est ratio seminalis ad formam alterius elementi » (Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2.).	Moreover there is to be noted beforehand the distinction between a “seed” [semen] in the proper sense and a “seminal reason” [rationem seminalem]. A “seed”, according to (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (here in the q. sole, n. 8), « is a certain body, whose form is not intended for its own sake, but for the sake of another, so that, namely, there be generated out of it something similar to the one generating (it) ». But a “seminal reason” is a certain active force, which is either in the seed as (its) subject, connatural to the same, and/or (is) generally in the elements, or in the matter existing under some form. Moreover of this seminal reason there is a dispute, what it is properly, and in particular, whether it is an active and passive quality, or whether (it is) a substantial, but incomplete, form. — Likewise, there is to be noted before hand St. Bonaventure’s distinction between “seminal reasons” properly said and proximate [propinquas] to the (act of) the generation of the living (things), of which kind are (those) in a seed, and the same less properly said and remote [longinquas] from the (act of) generation, just as « in the matter of one element there is a seminal reason for the form of the other element » (Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 2.).
III. Quoad distinctionem inter mirabilia et miracula etc., de qua hic ad 5. agitur, S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 3.) paulo aliter loquitur. Applicat enim terminum miraculi, proprie sumtum, ad ea quae fiunt immediate a virtute divina et alio modo, quam se habeat ordo causarum naturalium; et terminum mirabilium (admirabilium) ad ea quae fiunt vel per solam operationem divinam, vel per agentium creatarum operationem, sed occultam et insolitam. Deinde idem distinguit tres species miraculorum, scil. quae sunt vel supra naturam (a S. Bonav. nominata mirabilia), vel praeter naturam, vel contra naturam (quae duo ultima membra a S. Bonav. sub uno termino contra naturam intelliguntur). Hic modus loquendi S. Thomae nunc communiter tenetur; in ipsa autem doctrina non est dissidium. De distinctione miraculorum etc. cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 3-6; S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 31. m. 2. a. 1-3. q. 32.	III. In regard to the distinction between wonders [mirabilia] and miracles [miracula] etc., which is dealt with here in reply to n. 5, St. Thomas (here in q. 1, a. 3) speaks in a slightly different manner. For he applies the term “miracle”, properly taken, to those which come to be immediately by the Divine Virtue and in a manner other than that which the order of natural causes has; and the term “wonder” (wonderful thing) to those which come to be either through the Divine Operation alone, and/or through the operation of created, but hidden and uncustomary, agents. Then the same distinguishes three species of miracles, namely, those which are either above nature [supra naturam] (which St. Bonaventure names “wonders”), and/or besides nature [praeter naturam], and/or contrary to nature [contra naturam] (which last two are understood by St. Bonaventure under the one term “contrary to nature”). This manner of speaking of St. Thomas is now commonly held; but there is no disagreement in the doctrine itself. Concerning the distinction of miracles etc., cf. Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in aa. 3-6; Summa., p. II, tr. 8, q. 31, m. 2, aa. 1-3; q. 32.
IV. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 85. m. 3; (de rationibus seminalibus aliisque in genere) ibid. q. 42. m. 5. a. 1-4. — S. Thom., hic loc. cit.; S. I. q. 92. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 81. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Durand., hic q. 2.	IV. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II. q. 85, m. 3; (on seminal reasons and the others in general) ibid., q. 42, m. 5, aa. 1-4. — St. Thomas, here in the loc. cit.; Summa., I, q. 92, a. 4. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 7; Summa., p. II, tr. 13. q. 81. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1. q. 3. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 3. — Durandus, here in q. 2.
¹ Cfr. I. Sent. d. 42. q. 3. seq.; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 42. m. 1-6; B. Albert., hic a. 3. seqq. et S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 31. m. 2; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. ² Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 mirabilia, sed contra praedicta ad 5. ³ Cap. 14. n. 25. seqq. — Paulo superius Vat. et ed. 4 dicit esse communes pro dicit esse rationes.	¹ Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 42, q. 3 f.; Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II. q. 42, mm. 1-6; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 3 ff., and Summa., p. II, tr. 8, q. 31, m. 2; St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. ² Not a few codices, together with edition 1, have wonders [mirabilia], but contrary to the aforesaid in the reply to n. 5. ³ Chapter 14, n. 25 ff.. — A little above this the Vatican edition and edition 4 have are common to [dicit esse communes] for are the reasons for [dicit esse rationes].

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII