COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 18, a. 1, q. 3: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio III.	ARTICLE I Question 3
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 439-444. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 439-444. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO III. Utrum ratio seminalis sit forma universalis, vel singularis.	QUESTION 3 Whether a seminal reason is a universal form, and/or a singular one?
TERTIO QUAERITUR, quid sit ratio seminalis secundum essentiam; et cum constet, eam esse formam, est quaestio, utrum sit forma universalis, an singularis. Et quod sit forma universalis, videtur:	THIRD THERE IS ASKED, what is a seminal reason according to (its) essence; and since it is established, that it is a form, the question is, whether it is a universal form, or a singular one. And that it is a universal form, seems:
1. Primo per Philosophum in decimo sexto de Animalibus,¹ ubi dicit, quod « prius est animal quam homo »: ergo natura producit formam speciei mediante forma generis; sed illa est ratio seminalis, mediante qua natura pervenit ad ultimum complementum: ergo ratio seminalis non est aliud quam forma universalis.	1. First through the Philosopher in the sixteenth (book) On Animals,¹ where he says, that « the animal is prior to man »: therefore nature produces the form of a species by means of the form of the genus; but that is the seminal reason, by means of which a nature arrives at (its) final complement: therefore the seminal reason is not other than a universal form.
2. Item, quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto prius; sed forma quanto universalior, tanto simplicior: ergo tanto prior.² Sed in processu ordinato per id quod prius est, devenitur ad id quod posterius est: ergo natura, procedens ad generationem formae singularis, pervenit ad ipsam mediante universali. Sed ratio seminalis est illa, mediante qua pervenit ad effectum completum: ergo etc.	2. Likewise, as much as something (is) more simple, so much (is it) more before [prius]; but a form as much as (it is) more universal, so much (is it) more simple: therefore so much (is it) more before.² But in the process ordered through that which is prior, one comes down to that which is posterior: therefore the nature, proceeding to the generation of a singular form, arrives to it by means of a universal (form). But the seminal reason is that, by means of which it arrives at (its) complete effect: ergo etc..
3. Item, intellectus, si verus est, intelligit, sicut est in re; alioquin, si non respondet ei ita in re, sicut intelligit, falsus est et vanus; sed tam rationalis philosophus quam etiam metaphysicus dicit, differentias extrahi de potentia generis:³ ergo oportet, quod ita sit in re, quod formae minus universales exeant in esse a formis magis universalibus; aut consideratio logici et philosophi est omnino vana. Quod si est inconveniens, restat, quod formae universales sunt illae, mediantibus quibus educuntur singulares in esse; sed huiusmodi sunt rationes seminales: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, the intellect, if it is true, understands, just as it is in the thing; otherwise, if there does not respond to it thus in the thing, just as it understands, it is false and vain; but both the rational philosopher and even the metaphysician say, that differences are extracted from the potency of the genus [potentia generis]:³ therefore it is necessary [oportet], that it be thus in the thing, that less universal forms go forth into ‘being’ from more universal forms; or the consideration of the logician and philosopher is entirely vain. Wherefore if it is inconvenient, it remains, that universal forms are those, by means of which singular (forms) are educed into ‘being’; but (forms) of this kind are seminal reasons: ergo etc..
4. Item, forma particularis dicit ens in actu completo, quia nulla potest ulterius fieri additio, materia vero dicit ens omnino in potentia; sed inter ens omnino in actu et omnino in potentia cadit medium ens, quod est partim in actu et partim in potentia; huiusmodi autem est forma universalis, quae respectu materiae est ens in actu, respectu ulterioris formae est ens in potentia: ergo si non pervenitur ab extremo in extremum nisi per medium, materia non perducitur ad actum completum, nisi mediantibus formis universalibus.⁴ Sed rationes seminales sunt illae, mediantibus quibus pervenitur ad actum completum: ergo etc.	4. Likewise, a “particular form” means a being in complete act, because there can be no further addition, but “matter” means a being entirely in potency; but between a being entirely in act and entirely in potency falls a middle being, which is partly in act and partly in potency; but (a being) of thing kind is a universal form, which in respect of matter is a being in act, in respect of a further form is a being in potency: therefore if one does not arrive from an extreme into an extreme except through a medium, matter is not lead thoroughly to a complete act, except by means of universal forms.⁴ But seminal reasons are those, by means of which it arrives at a complete act: ergo etc..
5. Item, ex homine generatur homo, non asinus; hoc autem non est nisi propter aliquam convenientiam, quae est inter hominem et hominem, et non inter hominem et asinum; illa autem convenientia non est nisi in forma universali: ergo ratio, quare homo generat hominem, est forma universalis. Sed illa est ratio seminalis: ergo etc.	5. Likewise, out of a man [homine] there is generated a man, not a donkey; but this is not but on account of some convening, which exists [est] between man and man, and (does) not (exist) between man and donkey; but that convening is not but in a universal form: therefore the reason, why man generates man, is a universal form. But the fomer is a seminal reason: ergo etc..
6. Item, hoc videtur per deductionem ad impossibile. Ex eo incipit generatio, in quod terminatur corruptio, et e converso;⁵ si igitur natura nihil producit ex nihilo, corruptione naturali nulla forma naturalis cedit in nihil. Cum igitur ex aëre fit ignis, forma aëris non corrumpitur in nihil nec in materiam, quia materia non erat aliquid de essentia ipsius formae: corrumpitur ergo in aliquam formam. Illa ergo forma aut est universalis, aut singularis; si singularis: aut ergo est forma ignis, aut forma alia ab igne. Non alia ab igne, quia in igne generato non sunt duae formae singulares, sed una tantum. Si est forma ignis: ergo forma aëris et forma ignis sunt una forma numero; quod est impossibile. Restat ergo, cum non possit esse forma singularis, quod sit forma universalis. Si ergo habet incipi generatio ad quod terminatur corruptio, generatio uniuscuiusque rei naturalis incipit a forma universali; sed a quo generatio incipit est ratio seminalis: ergo ratio seminalis non est aliud quam forma universalis.	6. Likewise, this seems through a deduction to the impossible. Generation starts out of that, unto which corruption is terminated, and vice versa;⁵ if, therefore, nature produces nothing ex nihilo, by natural corruption no natural form cedes into nothing. Therefore since fire comes to be out of air, the form of air is not corrupted into nothing nor into matter, because matter was not something from the essence of the form itself: therefore it is corrupted into some form. Therefore that form is either a universal one, or a singular one; if (it is) a singular (form): therefore either it is the form of fire, or a form other than fire. Not one other than fire, because in generated fire there are not two singular forms, but only one. If it is the form of fire: therefore the form of air and the form of fire are one form in number; which is impossible. Therefore it remains, that, since it cannot be a singular form, it is a universal form. If, therefore, generation has to start at that which corruption is terminated, the generation of each natural thing starts from a universal form; but (that) by which generation starts is a seminal reason: therefore a seminal reason is not other than a universal form.
CONTRA: 1. Philosophus in libro de Anima:⁶ « Universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est »; sed ratio seminalis semper prior est: ergo ratio seminalis non potest esse forma universalis.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. The Philosopher (says) in the book On the Soul:⁶ « A universal is either nothing, or it is (something) posterior »; but a seminal reason is always prior: therefore a seminal reason cannot be a universal form.
2. Item, « universale est semper et ubique »;⁷ sed ratio seminalis respicit hanc materiam, in qua fundatur determinate: ergo ratio seminalis non potest esse forma universalis.	2. Likewise, « the universal is always and everywhere »;⁷ but a seminal reason looks back to this matter, in which it is founded in a determinate manner: therefore a seminal reason cannot be a universal form.
3. Item, ratio seminalis non praedicatur de eo cuius est seminalis ratio — non enim potest dici, quod homo sit semen, vel quod corpus hominis sit embryo — sed universale praedicatur de singulari:⁸ ergo ratio seminalis non potest esse forma universalis.	3. Likewise, a “seminal reason” is not predicated of that of which the seminal reason is — for it cannot be said, that man is a seed, and/or that the body of a man is an embryo — but the universal is predicated of the singular:⁸ therefore a seminal reason cannot be a universal form.
¹ Sive II. de Generat. animal. c. 3, ubi docet, quod in generatione hominum prius introducitur anima vegetabilis, dein sensibilis, et demum rationalis. ² Cfr. de hoc Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.). ³ Nam secundum logicum et metaphysicum differentiae potentia continentur in genere, ut dicit Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, et dicunt Commentatores super Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 42. seq. (VI. c. 12.). — De maiori vide tom. 1. pag. 707, nota 5. ⁴ Vide supra pag. 109, nota 8. et hic in corp. quaest., ubi Averroes pro hac sententia allegatur. — Paulo superius in Vat. desiderantur verba quae respectu materiae est ens in actu, respectu ulterioris formae est. ⁵ Cfr. Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 23. (c. 4.). ⁶ Libr. I. text. 8. (c. 1.): Animal autem universale, aut nihil est, aut posterius. — De minori cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. ⁷ Aristot., I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 31.), ubi etiam de singulari propter oppositionem ad universale dicit, quod sit ubi et nunc. ⁸ Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.): Dico autem universale quod de pluribus praedicari natum est, singulare vero quod non.	¹ Or On the Generation of Animals, Bk. II, ch. 3, where he teaches, that in the generation of men there is first introduced the vegetable soul, then the sensible (soul), and finally the rational (soul). ² Cf. on this Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 1 (Bk. X, ch. 1). ³ For according to logic and metaphysics differences according to power are contained in the genus, as Porphyry says, On the Predicables, ch. “On Difference”, and as the commentators say on Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 42 f. (Bk. VI, ch. 12). — On the major, see Sent, Bk. I, d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, p. 707, footnote 5. ⁴ See above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, p. 109, footnote 8, and here in the body (of the Question), where Averroës is cited in favor of this sentence. — A little above this in the Vatican edition there is wanting the words which in respect of matter is a being in act, in respect of a further form is [quae respectu materiae est ens in actu, respectu ulterioris formae est]. ⁵ Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 23 (ch. 4). ⁶ Book I, text 8, (ch. 1): Moreover the universal ‘animal’, either is nothing, or (something) posterior. — On the minor (of the argument), cf. here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 5. ⁷ Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 24 (ch. 31), where he says of the singular on account of (its) opposition to the universal, that it is here and now [ubi et nunc]. ⁸ Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 6 (ch. 7): Moreover I say a universal (is) that which is bound to be predicated of several, but a singular (is) that which (is bound) not (to be thus predicated).

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4. Item, omnis operatio naturae terminatur ad hoc aliquid et est circa hoc aliquid;¹ hoc aliquid autem dicit formam cum materia, universale autem dicit formam tantum: ergo forma universalis, secundum quod huiusmodi, nec est operationis principium nec est operationis terminus per se; sed ratio seminalis dicit operationis principium: ergo ratio seminalis non potest esse forma universalis.	4. Likewise, every operation of nature is terminated at a this something [hoc aliquid] and is about a this something;¹ but a “this something” means a form with matter, but a “universal” means a form only: therefore a universal form, according to which (it is) of this kind, is neither the principle of operation nor the terminus of operation through itself; but a “seminal reason” means a principle of operation: therefore a seminal reason cannot be a universal form.
5. Item, si ratio seminalis dicit formam universalem, aut ergo formam generis, aut formam speciei. Si formam generis: ergo in homine est ratio seminalis respectu asini; si formam speciei: ergo humanitas est ratio seminalis alicuius, quod ante praeexistit in materia, quam sit res completa in actu: ergo ante erit forma humanitatis in materia, quam sit res² completa. Sed hoc est falsum et non intelligibile, quod forma humanitatis sit in aliquo, et illud non sit res completa: ergo non est ponere, quod forma universalis dicat rationem seminalem.	5. Likewise, if a “seminal reason” means a universal form, therefore either the form of a genus, or the form of a species. If the form of a genus: therefore in man there is a seminal reason in respect of a donkey; if the form of a species: therefore humanity is a seminal reason of something, which pre-existed in the matter before there is a complete being in act: therefore the form of humanity will be in the matter before there is a completed thing.² But it is false and not intelligible, that the form of humanity be in something, and that not be a complete thing: therefore there is no positing, that a “universal form” means a seminal reason.
6. Item, si forma universalis respectu particularis esset ratio seminalis; cum ergo haec albedo dicat formam singularem, et albedo dicat formam speciei, et color formam generis, et qualitas sensibilis adhuc formam superioris generis, et qualitas corporalis adhuc formam universalissimam;³ tunc natura in productione huius albedinis perveniret mediantibus omnibus paredictis: ergo prius faceret qualitatem quam qualitatem corporalem, et qualitatem corporalem prius quam qualitatem sensibilem, et qualitatem sensibilem prius quam colorem, quod non est intelligibile.	6. Likewise, if a universal form in respect of a particular would be a seminal reason; therefore since “this whiteness” means a singular form, and “whiteness” means the form of a species, and “color” the form of a genus, and “sensible quality” the form of a still more superior genus, and “corporal quality” a still most universal form; then nature in the production of this whiteness could arrive by means of all the aforesaid: therefore it would made a quality before a corporal quality, and a corporal quality before a sensible quality, and a sensible quality before a color, which is not intelligible.
CONCLUSIO. Ratio seminalis non est forma universalis in proprio sensu; in sensu autem largiore ita vocari potest.	CONCLUSION A seminal reason is not a “universal” form in the proper sense; but in a broader sense it can be called thus.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum satis constet, rationem seminalem esse potentiam activam, inditam materiae; et illam potentiam activam constet esse essentiam formae, cum ex ea fiat forma mediante operatione naturae, quae non producit aliquid ex nihilo:⁴ satis rationabiliter ponitur, quod ratio seminalis est essentia formae producendae, differens ab illa secundum esse completum et incompletum, sive secundum esse in potentia et in actu. — Utrum autem illa forma, sive potentia activa, quam dicimus rationem seminalem, sit forma universalis, hoc non est ita planum. Diversi enim sunt modi dicendi secundum diversas positiones, quas habent diversi de forma universali.	I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that since it is sufficiently established, that a seminal reason is an active power, endowed to the matter; and (since) it is established that that active power is the essence of a form, since out of it there comes to be a form by means of the operation of a nature, which does not produce something out of nothing [ex nihilo]:⁴ it is posited in a sufficiently reasonable manner, that a seminal reason is the essence of a form to be produced, differing from it according to a complete and incomplete ‘being’, or according to a ‘being’ in potency and in act. — But whether that form, or active power, which we call a “seminal reason”, is a universal form, this s not so plain. For there are diverse manners of speaking according to the diverse positions, which diverse (authors) have concerning a universal form.
Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod cum universalia non sint fictiones, realiter et secundum veritatem non solum sunt in anima, sed etiam in natura; et quia omne quod est in natura, habet fundari in materia, tam formae universales quam singulares in materia habent esse. Et ita non differunt forma universalis et singularis per abstractionem a materia, et concreationem in materia, sed differunt per additionem unius ad alteram,⁵ et per magis completum et minus completum. Cuius signum est, quia in coordinatione generum et specierum forma speciei est completissima et compositissima. Forma vero generis respectu illius est ens in potentia, et fit magis in actu per differentiam sibi superadditam. Et ita, cum ratio seminalis dicat formam ratione incompleta, dixerunt, nihil aliud esse rationem seminalem quam formam universalem.	For certain (authors) wanted to say, that since universals are not fictions, they are really and according to the truth not only in the soul, but also in nature, and because everything which is in nature, has to be founded in matter, both universal forms and singular ones have to be in matter. And thus the universal and singular form do not differ through abstraction from matter, and co-creation in matter, but differ through the addition of the one to the other,⁵ and through the more complete and the less complete. A sign of which is, because in the coordination of genera and species the form of a species is the most complete and the most composed. But the form of a genus in respect of it is a being in potency, and comes to be more in act through a difference superadded to it. And thus, since a “seminal reason” means a form according to an incomplete reckoning, they said, that a seminal reason is nothing other than a universal form.
Haec autem positio parvipendenda non est; magnorum enim est et concors esse videtur et auctoritati et rationi et sensui. Auctoritati, quia ipse Commentator dicit super Metaphysicam⁶ in capitulo Quoniam autem in fundamento, quod materia suscipit formas singulares mediantibus formis universalibus. — Rationi etiam concordat, quia, cum singulare dicat ens in actu, et materia ens in potentia, et forma universalis quodam modo dicat ens in actu, et quodam modo in potentia; rectum videtur et congruum, quod materia perducatur ad formam completam mediantibus formis universalibus. — Sensui etiam concordat, quia, sicut vult . . .	Moreover this position is not to be little esteemed [parvipendenda]; for it is (the position) of great (men) and seems concord both with authority and reason and sense. With authority, because the Commentator himself says On (Aristotle’s) Metaphysics,⁶ in the chapter Quoniam autem in fundamento, that matter suscepts singular forms by means of universal forms. — It also concords with reason, because, since the “singular” means a being in act, and “matter” a being in potency, and a “universal form” in a certain manner means a being in act, and in a certain manner a being in potency; it seems right and congruous, that matter be lead thoroughly to complete form by means of universal forms. — It also concords with sense, because, just as the Philosopher / wants . . .
¹ Vide supra pag. 197, nota 3. et de seq. prop. cfr. super pag. 109, nota 7. ² Plures codd. omittunt res, pro quo aliqui substituunt materia. Cod T post completa repetit in actu. ³ Aristot., de Predicam., enumerat inter decem praedicamenta qualitatem tanquam genus supremum. ⁴ Cfr. quaest. praec. et supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ⁵ Plures codd. cum ed. 1 alterum. ⁶ Libr. I. text. 17. (c. 8.), qui secundum versionem Greaco-latinam incipit: Quanto autem nil erat separatum, secundum versionem autem Arabico-latinam: Quoniam autem in fundamento naturae [i. e. in materia] non est aliquid distinctum. In explicatione huius textus Averroes ostendit, quod materia non sit idem cum genere, dicens: Cum genus sit forma universalis, materia vero non est forma universalis; quia non habet in se actu aliquid omnino, quia ex his quae recipit, nullam habet formam omnino, nec universalis nec particularis, sed primo recipit formam universalem, demum mediante illa recipit formas alias usque ad individuales, et est una numero, secundum quod est subiectum formarum individualium, sed multa secundum formas, quia dividitur per eas. Et in hoc similis est generi, quia dividitur per formas, sicut genus per differentias dividitur; dissimilis vero, quoniam materia est una numero in multis, quatenus eius esse consistit in potentia receptiva. At genus est unum in forma media inter actum et potentiam in multis, et sic est ens in potentia contrahibilitatis, quoniam per plures differentias contrahi potest ad plures species; propterea praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie et de individuis suarum specierum, materia vero nequaquam, nisi denominative. (Ita ed. Venet. a. 1560, dum ed. Venet. a. 1489 nonnulla omittit). — Multi codd. cum edd., excepta 1, Quando autem pro Quoniam autem.	¹ See above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, p. 197, footnote 3 and on the following proposition, cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, p. 109, footnote 7. ² Several codices omit thing [res], in place of which some substitute matter [materia]. Codex T after completed thing [res completa] repeates in act [in actu]. ³ Aristotle, On Predicaments, enumerates quality among the ten predicaments, as (their) supreme genus. ⁴ Cf. the preceding Question and above in d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1. ⁵ Several codices, together with edition 1, have the one to the other [unius ad alterum] for the one (form) to the other (form) [unius ad alteram]. ⁶ Book I, text 17 (ch. 8), which according to the Greco-Latin version begins: Moreover as much as nothing was separated [Quanto autem nihil erat separatum], but according to the Arabic-Latin version: Moreover since in the fundament of nature (i. e. in matter) there is nothing distinct [Quoniam autem in fundamento naturae non est aliquid distinctum]. In the explanation of this text Averroës shows, that the matter (of a thing) is not the same with the genus (of the thing), saying: Since the genus is a universal form, but matter is not a universal form; because it does not have in itself something entirely in act, because out of those which it receives, it has entirely no form, neither of a universal nor of a particular, but it first receives a universal form, then by means of that it receives other forms up to individual ones, and it is one in number, according to which it is the subject of individual forms, but many according to forms, because it is divided through them. And in this it is similar to a genus, because it is divided through forms, just as a genus is divided through differences; but dissimilar, since matter is one in number in many (things), to the extent that its ‘being’ consists in a receptive potency. But a genus is one in an intermediary form between act and potency in many, and thus is a being in the potency of contractibility, since it can be contracted through several differences to several species; on which account it is predicated of several (things) different in species and of individuals in its own species, but matter (is) never (predicated thus) at all, except denominatively. (Thus the Venetian edition of A. D. 1560, while the Venetian edition of A. D. 1489 omits not a few things). — Many codices, together with the editions, except edition 1, have Quando autem for Quoniam autem.

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Philosophus in principio Physicorum,¹ progressus nostrae cognitionis assimilatur progressui naturae in sua operatione; sed nobis innata est via ab universalioribus ad minus universalia: ergo consimiliter erit in natura. — Si quis autem hanc positionem sustinere velit, poterit declinare rationes ad oppositum adductas, dicens, quod loquuntur de universali, secundum quod habet esse abstractum in anima; et sic praedictae positioni non obviant.	the Philosopher / wants at the beginning of (his) Physics,¹ the progress of our cognition is assimilated to the progress of nature in its operation; but to use the way from more universals to less universals is innate; therefore it will be in nature in a completely similar manner. — But if anyone wants to sustain this position, he can decline the reasons adduces for the opposite, saying, that they speak of the universal, according to which it has an abstract ‘being’ in the soul; and thus they do not run against the aforesaid position.
Aliorum vero positio est, quod universale forma est, sed non quaelibet forma proprie universale est; est enim forma partis, et forma totius; et universale non est forma partis, sed forma totius. Anima enim non dicitur esse universale respectu unius hominis, sed potius homo. Illam autem dicunt esse formam totius, quae quidem dat esse toti, et haec dicitur essentia rei, quia totum esse complectitur; et hanc formam considerat metaphysicus. Formam vero partis, quae in genere non habet esse nisi per reductionem,² non est dicere proprie universalem; potest tamen aliquo modo dici universalis radicatione, cum illa est indifferens ad multa, quae possunt fieri ex ipsa; sicut causa dicitur esse universalis, quia potest in multa.³ Et sic illa potentia activa, quae est in materia, quae dicebatur ratio seminalis, potest dici universalis, non proprie, secundum quod universale consideratur a metaphysico, sed large, ut dicat quandam principii indifferentiam, quam etiam considerat physicus.	But the position of the others is, that a universal is a form, but not any form is properly a universal; for there is the form of the part, and the form of the whole; and a universal is not the form of a part, but the form of a whole. For the soul is not said to be a “universal” in respect of one man, but rather “man” [homo] (is). Moreover they say that it is the form of a whole, which indeed gives ‘being’ to the whole, and this is said (to be) the “essence” of the thing, because it comprises the whole ‘being’ (of it); and this form the metaphysician considers. But of the form of the part, which does not have ‘being’ in the genus except through a reduction,² there is not saying, properly, that (it is) a “universal”; yet it can in some manner be said to be a “universal” according to (its) radication [radicatione], when it is indifferent to the many, which can come to be out of it; just as a cause is said to be “universal”, because it can (act) upon many.³ And thus that active power, which is in matter, which used to be called a “seminal reason”, can be called a “universal”, not properly, according to which the universal is considered by the metaphysician, but broadly, so that it means a certain indifference of principle, which the physician also considers.
Et haec positio magnorum est et multorum, et magis eam approbat via communis; nec immerito, quia concordat rationi, auctoritati et sensui. — Rationi quidem, quia necesse est ponere universales formas propter cognitionem et praedicationis univocationem. Si igitur non est integra cognitio, nisi totum esse rei cognoscatur; et non est cognitio nisi per formam:⁴ necesse est, aliquam formam esse, quae complectatur totum esse; hanc autem dicimus essentiam, et haec est universalis forma, ut dicit Avicenna.⁵ Dicit enim, quod essentia nihil aliud est quam quidditas rei universalis. — Similiter, non est vera univocatio, nisi quando aliqua in una forma communi realiter assimilantur, quae de ipsis essentialiter praedicatur. Forma autem, in qua plura assimilantur, non potest esse nisi forma universalis; quae vero essentialiter praedicatur de illis, non potest esse nisi forma totum complectens. Forma igitur universalis non est aliud quam forma totius, quae, cum de se nata sit esse in multis, universalis est; particularizatur autem non per additionem ulterioris formae, sed per coniunctionem sui cum materia, ex qua coniunctione materia appropriat sibi formam, et forma materiam, sicut dictum est supra.⁶ Et quia nunquam est forma haec separata a materia, nunquam est forma universalis sine particulari. Quamvis autem unum non sit sine altero, differt tamen unum ab altero. Quamvis enim albedo non posit esse sine corpore, differt tamen a corpore, unde inseparabilitas non ponit identitatem omnimodam.	And this is the position of great (men) and many (authors), and the common way approves it more; and not undeservedly, because it concords with reason, authority and sense. — Indeed with reason, because it is necessary to posit universal forms on account of (our) cognition and the univocation of predication. If, therefore, there is not a whole cognition, unless the whole ‘being’ of a thing is cognized, and there is not cognition except through form:⁴ it is necessary, that there be some form, which comprises the whole ‘being’; but this we call the “essence”, and this is a universal form, as Avicenna⁵ says. For he says, that the essence is nothing than the universal quiddity of the thing. — Similarly, there is no true univocation, except when somethings are really assimilated in one common form, which is predicated of them essentially. Moreover the form, in which several are assimilated, cannot be but a universal form; but what is essentially predicated of them, cannot be but a form comprising the whole. Therefore a universal form is not other than the form of the whole, which, since it is of itself bound to be in many, is universal; but (which) is particularized [particularizatur] not only through the addition of a further form, but through the conjunction of it with matter, out of which conjunction the matter appropriates the form to itself, and the form the matter, just as has been said above.⁶ And because this form is never one separated from matter, a universal form is never without a particular one. But even though the one is not without the other, yet the one differs from the other. For even though whiteness cannot be without a body, yet it differs from a body, wherefore (its) inseparability does not posit an omnimodal identity.
Concordat etiam haec positio auctoritati. Dicit enim Philosophus,⁷ quod « cum dico caelum, dico formam; cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam »: ergo individuum super formam universalem non addit formam, sed solum materiam. Dicit etiam Boethius,⁸ « quod species est totum esse individui »: ergo forma universalis, quae est species, est forma totius, quae complectitur totum esse, et quae est sufficiens ratio cognoscendi quantum ad esse substantiale; et hoc melius tactum est supra distinctione tertia.⁹	This position concords also with authority. For the Philosopher⁷ says, that « when I say “heaven”, I mean a form; when I say “this heaven”, I mean the matter »: therefore the individual does not add a form upon the universal form, but only the matter does. (St. Severinus) Boethius⁸ also says, « that a species is the whole ‘being’ of the individual »: therefore a universal form, which is a species, is the form of the whole, which comprises the whole ‘being’, and which is the sufficient reason for cognizing as much as regards the substantial ‘being’ (of the thing); and this was better touched upon above in the Third Distinction.⁹
¹ Libr. I. text. 2. seqq.: Innata autem est ex notioribus nobis via et manifestioribus ad manifestiora naturae et notiora; non enim sunt eadem et nobis nota et simpliciter . . . Sunt autem primum nobis dilucida ac manifesta confusa magis . . . Quapropter ex universalibus ad singularis procedere oportet; totum enim secundum sensum notius est; universale autem totum quoddam est, multa enim comprehendit, ut partes, universale. ² Cfr. supra pag. 48, nota 1. ³ Triplex enim universale distinguitur, scil. universale in causando i. e. quando una causa plures effectus respicit, in repraesentando i. e. quando unum plura repraesentat, et in essendo i. e. quando unum est aptum inesse pluribus et praedicari de illis. Hoc tertium universale vocatur universale simpliciter et formaliter non habet esse, sicut paulo superius S. Doctor dicit, nisi in anima, quod, prout fundatur in rebus, considerat metaphysicus; ipse enim considerat essentias rerum in se spectatas. Ratio seminalis igitur secundum hanc opinionem non est universale in essendo, neque in repraesentando, sed magis convenit cum universali in causando, in quantum ipsa est radix, ex qua plura sive multa fieri possunt, sicut est suo modo materia prima, quam considerat physicus. Cfr. Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.). Sub hoc respectu August., V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 11. ait: Causaliter ergo tunc dictum est, produxisse terram herbam et lignum, id est producendi accepisse virtutem. In ea quippe iam tanquam in radicibus, ut ita dixerim, temporum facta erant, quae per tempora futura erant. — Paulo superius aliqui codd. cum edd. 1, 4 et Vat. universalis reductione pro universalis radicatione. ⁴ Cfr. Aristot.., II. de Anima, text. 121. (c. 12.) et III. text. 38. (c. 8.). ⁵ Colligi hoc potest partim ex definitione quidditatis, quam ipse in III. Metaph. c. 8. dat: « Quidditas est, cuius natura est esse in signata non ut in subiecto », i. e. quod est primum esse singularium; partim ex distinctione modorum universalis (IV. Metaph. c. 1. 2.): universale enim est, quod vel actu praedicatur de multis, vel possible est praedicari de multis; partim ex distinctione statuum, in quibus essentia (natura) rei considerari potest, scil. prout est in singularibus per aliquid adiunctum contracta, et sic est singularis — prout est in intellectu, et ab ipso intellectu additur comparatio ad singularia, et sic est formaliter universalis (universale logicum) — prout consideratur in se, et sic est neque singularis neque universalis, habet tamen aptitudinem universalitatis (universale metaphysicum). ⁶ Dist. 3, p. I. a. 2, q. 3. — Paulo superius plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 particulatur pro particularizatur. ⁷ Libr. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 92. (c. 9.). Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 7. ⁸ Libr. III. comment. in Porphyr. c. de Specie. Vide supra pag. 108, nota 6. In libro de Divisione ait: Omnis enim species constituit esse. ⁹ Part. I. a. 2. q. 3.	¹ Book I, text 2 ff.: Moreover to us the way from (things) more known and more manifest to the more manifest and more known (things) of nature is innate; for both (the things) known to us and (things) simply are not the same . . . Moreover (the things) first clear and manifest to us are more confused . . . On which account it is necessary to proceed from universals to singulars; for the whole according to sense is more known; but a universal is a certain whole, for the universal comprehends many, as parts. ² Cf. above d. 1, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, p. 48, footnote 1. ³ For there is distinguished a threefold “universal”, namely the universal in causing, i. e. when one cause looks back to several effects, (the universal) in representing, i. e. when one represents several, and (the universal) in being, i. e. when one is apt to be in several and to be predicated of them. This third universal is called a universal simply and it does not have a ‘being’ formally, just as the Seraphic doctor says a little above this, except in the soul, wherefore, insofar as it is founded in things, it is considered by the metaphysician; for he considers the essences of things observed in themselves. Therefore a seminal reason according to this opinion is not a universal in causing, nor (a universal) in representing, but convenes rather with a universal in causing, inasmuch as it is the root, out of which several or many can come to be, just as in its own matter prime matter is, which is considered by the physicist. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. VI, text 2 (Bk. VI, ch. 1). Under this respect (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. V, ch. 4, n. 11 says: Therefore it was then said causally, that the earth produced herb and wood, that is, that it accepted the virtue of producing (them). Indeed in that (virtue) already, as in roots, as I have thus said, had been made for the ages [temporum] (those), which were going to be throughout the ages [per tempora]. — A little above this some codices, together with editions 1 and 4 and the Vatican edition, have a “universal” by reduction [universalis reductione] for a “universal” according to (its) radication [universalis radicatione]. ⁴ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 121 (ch. 12), and Bk. III, text. 38 (ch. 8). ⁵ This can be partly gathered from the definition of “quiddity”, which he gives in Metaphysics, Bk. III: « Quiddity is, the nature of that which is to be in (things) signed not as in a subject », i. e. which is the first ‘being’ of singulars; partly from the distinction of the manners of a universal (Metaphysics, Bk. IV, ch. 1 and 2): for a universal is, what either is predicated in act of many, and/or is able [possible] to be predicated of many; partly from the distinction of states, in which the essence (or nature) of a thing can be considered, namely insofar as it is in singulars through something adjoined to the contracted (nature), and thus is a singular — insofar as it is in an intellect, and (insofar as) a comparison is added by the intellect itself to the singulars, and thus it is formally a universal (i. e. a logical universal) — insofar as it is considered in itself, and thus is neither a singular nor a universal, yet has an aptitude for universality (i. e. the metaphysical universal). ⁶ Distinction 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above this very many codices, together with editions 1, 2 and 3, have made particular [particulatur] for particularized [particularizatur]. ⁷ On Heaven and the World, Bk. I, text. 92 (ch. 9). Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 89, footnote 7. ⁸ Commentary on Porphyry, Bk. III, ch. “On Species”. See above d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, p. 108, footnote 6. In the book On Division he says: For every species constitutes a ‘being’. ⁹ In p. I, a. 2, q. 3.

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Concordat etiam sensui. Alius est enim ordo et modus in egressus specierum a genere, et in eductione formarum de potentiae materiae. Naturalis enim dicit, quod materia prius suscipit formam elementarum, et mediante illa venit ad formam mixtionis, et mediante illa venit ad formam complexionis,¹ quia considerat illam potentiam materiae, secundum quod per operationem naturae habet in effectum prodire. Metaphysicus vero, qui considerat universales formas sive essentias, in quibus res singulares habent assimilari, ponit magis universale et minus, secundum quod plura vel pauciora habent assimilari in illo; et illud, in quo est prima assimilatio, dicit esse genus generalissimum; illud vero, in quod est perfecta assimilatio, dicit esse speciem specialissimam. Et propterea dicit, speciem addere ad genus, et hoc totum invenit in re;² dicit etiam, genus simplicius specie et in pluribus reperiri. Et hinc est, quod genus in aliquo assimilatur Deo magis quam species, in aliquo e converso. Deus enim, quia nobilissimus est in fine totius nobilitatis,³ simul habet in se omnem perfectionem, ita quod ipse est simplicissimus et omnino incorruptibilis; est etiam perfectus et in omnimoda actualitate constitutus. Creatura vero, secundum quod potest, semiplene assimilatur Deo; et quantum ad rationem simplicitatis et incorruptibilitatis magis assimilatur magis universale; quantum ad rationem actualitatis magis assimilatur minus universale.⁴	It also concords with sense. For there is one order and manner in the egress of species from a genus, and (another) in the eduction of forms from the potency of matter. For the natural (philosopher) says, that matter first suscepts the form of the elements, and by means of that comes to the form of the mixture, and by means of that comes to the form of the complexion,¹ because he considers that potency of matter, according to which through the operation of the nature it has (its) going-forth [prodire] into an effect. But the metaphysician, who considers universal forms or essences, in which singular things have (their) ‘being assimilated’, posits a greater and lesser universal, according to which more and/or fewer (beings) have (their) ‘being assimilated’ in it; and that, in which is (their) first assimilation, he says, is the most general genus [genus generalissimum]; but that in which is (their) perfect assimilation, he says, is (their) most particular species [speciem specialissimam]. And on this account he says, that the species adds to the genus, and this whole is found in the thing;² he also says, that the genus is found more simply in the species and (is found) in the many. And hence it is, that in something the genus is assimilated to God more than the species, in something (it is) the other way around. For God, because He is the Most Noble One on the confines of all nobility,³ has together in Himself every perfection, such that He Himself is the Most Simple and entirely Incorruptible One; He is also Perfect and constituted in an omnimodal Actuality. But the creature, according to which it can, is assimilated to God semi-fully; and as much as regards the reckoning of simplicity and incorruptibility the greater universal is more assimilated (to God); as much as regards the reckoning of actuality the less universal is more assimilated.⁴
Harum autem duarum positionum quae sit probabilior et verior, difficile est videre stanti in communi consideratione; descendenti vero ad particulares operationes naturae videbitur consideratio physici et metaphysici diversificari nec posse bene simul sibi correspondere. Aliter enim definitur albedo, sicut prius tactum est, aliter a natura producitur. Definitur enim per genus suum, quod⁵ est color, et color per genus superius, et sic usque ad summum generis sui. Sed natura in producendo non servat hunc ordinem, sed sic producitur albedo, sicut exigit operatio qualitatum elementarium cum virtute luminis. Et ideo positio ultimo dicta communior est et intelligibilior et sensui vicinior.	But which of these two positions is more probable and more true, is difficult to see to the one standing in the common consideration; but to the one descending to the particular operations of nature the consideration of the physicist and metaphysician will seem to be diverse nor (will it seem) that they are able to correspond well with themselves together. For ‘whiteness’ is defined in one manner, just as has been touched upon before, and is produced in another by nature. For it is defined through its own genus, which⁵ is ‘color’, and ‘color’ through a superior genus, and thus unto the highest of its genus. But nature does not keep this order in producing (something whiteness), but whiteness is thus produced, just as the operation of the elementary qualities requires with the virtue of the light. And for that reason the position last called the “common one” is both more intelligible and closer to sense.
Hanc igitur iuxta viam communem sustinendo respondere possumus ad quaestionem propositam, quod si forma universalis dicatur proprie, secundum quam res est ordinabilis in genere, quam metaphysicus habet considerare, ratio seminalis non est forma universalis. Si autem dicatur forma universalis forma existens secundum esse incompletum in materia et indifferens et possibilis ad multa producenda; sic potest dici ratio seminalis forma universalis.	Therefore in accord with this common way we can respond to the proposed Question by sustaining, that if “universal form” is said properly, according to which a thing is orderable in a genus, which (form) the metaphysician has to consider, a seminal reason is not a universal form. But if “universal form” is said (to be) a form existing according to an incomplete ‘being’ in matter and indifferent and possible regarding producing many; thus a seminal reason can be said (to be) a “universal form”.
Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad obiecta quantum ad utramque partem. Rationes enim, quae probant, quod ratio seminalis non sit forma universalis, loquuntur de universali proprie; rationes vero ad oppositum adductae loquuntur de forma universali secundum aliam acceptionem, secundum quam forma universalis dicitur quaecumque forma existens in potentia, sive sit forma totius sive sit forma partis; et hoc patet discurrendo per singula.	And according to this the response to the objections is clear, as much as regards each side. For the reasons, which prove, that a seminal reason is not a universal form, speak of the “universal” properly, but the reasons adduced for the opposite speak of a “universal form” according to another acceptation, according to which a “universal form” is said (to be) any form whatsoever existing in potency, whether it be the form of a whole or the form of a part; and this is clear to the one reading through each (objection).
1. Nam illud quod primo obiicit, quod prius est animal quam homo; non cogit, quod ratio seminalis sit forma universalis proprie dicta. Nam homo et animal et quacumque alia universalis forma non dicitur esse nisi per eductionem alicuius singularis. Unde auctor Sex Principiorum⁶ dicit, quod « natura in his occulte operatur ».	1. For that which it objects first, that the animal is prior to man; is not cogent, because a seminal reason is a “universal form” properly said. For man and animal and any other universal form whatsoever is not said to be except through the eduction of some singular. Whence the author of the Six Principles⁶ says, that « in these (things) nature operates in a hidden manner ».
2. Ad illud similiter quod obiicit, quod universale est simplicius; patet responsio. Verum est enim, quod universale est simplicius secundum eam viam, secundum quam habet coordinationem ad id quod est minus universale, scilicet secundum esse definitivum. Secundum autem viam generationis non habet coordinationem nisi solum per accidens; accidit enim, quod per operationem naturae prius sit aliquando genus quam species; species autem nunquam est, quin sit individuum.	2. To that, similarly, which it objects, that a universal is more simple; the response is clear. For it is true, that a universal is more simple according to that way, according to which it has a coordination to that which is less universal, namely, according to a definitive ‘being’. But according to the way of generation it does not have a coordination except only per accidens; for it happens, that through the operation of the nature the genus is sometimes before the species; but the species never is, if there is no individual.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod considerationi philosophicae aliquid respondet in re; dicen- / -dum, . . .	3. To that which is objected, that something in the thing responds to the consideration of the philosopher; it must / be said, . . .
¹ Cfr. Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 82. seqq. (c. 10.) et II. text. 46. seqq. (c. 7. seq.). Averroes in III. de Caelo et mundo, text. 67, explicans mixtionem, haec dicat: « Dicemus, quod formae istorum elementorum substantiales sunt diminutae a formis substantialibus perfectis, et quod suum esse est medium inter formas et accidentia; et ideo non fuit impossibile, ut formae eorum substantiales admiscerentur et proveniret ex collectione earum alia forma, sicut, cum albedo et nigredo admiscentur, fiunt ex eis multi colores medii ». Idem insinuat in textibus ex libro de Generat. citt. ² Vide de his Porphyr., de Predicab. c. de Specie, ubi explicantur termini, qui hic occurrunt v. g. genus generalissimum i. e. substantia, in qua species specialissima est homo. Universalia enim et praedicamenta ad logicam pertinent et ad metaphysicam, sed sub diverso respectu. Metaphysicus considerat ipsam naturam sine individuis menti repraesentatam cum proprietatibus, quae naturae per se conveniunt; logicus vero spectat eandem naturam, non quidem in se, sed prout refertur ad sua inferiora. Brevius: metaphysicus considerat naturam abstractam a multis, logicus vero ut relatam ad multa. Dein metaphysicus considerat praedicamenta, ut sunt membra dividentia ens in communi, quod est obiectum metaphysicae: logicus autem considerat ipsa, quatenus sunt suprema genera seu species predicabilium. ³ Cfr. supra pag. 24, nota 8. — Paulo inferius codd. X Y et ideo pro et omnino. ⁴ Vide tom. I. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. ad 1; q. 4. et d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1 fundam. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 14. m. 6. a. 3. § 1. — Paulo superius verbis magis universale Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. praemittit ei quod est. ⁵ Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 qui. ⁶ Cap. 1. — Auctor huius libri est Gilbert. Porretanus. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. ad 1, eandem obiectionem ita solvit: Loquitur [Aristoteles] de prioritate naturae, non temporis; ratio vero seminalis praecedit etiam tempore, non solum natura.	¹ Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 82 ff. (ch. 10), and Bk. II, text 46 ff. (ch. 7 f.). Averroës, On Heaven and the World, Bk. III, text 67, explaining (what) a mixture (is), says these (things): « We will say, that the substantial forms of those elements have been diminished from perfect substantial forms, and that its ‘being’ is an intermediary between forms and accidents; and for that reason it was not impossible, that their substantial forms would be mixed together and that there would come forth out of a collection of them another form, just as, when whiteness and blackness are mixed together, there come to be out of them many intermediary colors ». He insinuates the same in the texts cited from the book On Generation. ² On these (statements) see Porphyry, On the Predicables, ch. “On Species”, where there are explained the terms, which occur here, v. g. “the most general genus”, i. e. the substance, in which the most particular species is ‘man’. For universals and predicaments pertain to logic and to metaphysics, but under a diverse respect. The metaphysician considers a nature itself, without individuals, as represented to the mind with (its) properties, which convene with the nature through themselves; but the logician looks at the same nature, not indeed in itself, but insofar as it is referred to its inferiors. Briefly: the metaphysician considers a nature abstracted from the many, but the logician as related to the man. Then the metaphysician considers the predicaments, as they are members dividing being in common [ens in communi], which is the object of metaphysics: but the logician considers the same, insofar as they are the supreme genera or species of predicables. ³ Cf. above p. 24, footnote 8. — A little below this, codex X and Y have and for that reason [et ideo] for and entirely [et omnino]. ⁴ See Sent, Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, q. 1, in reply to n. 1; q. 4, and d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, 1st argument of the fundament; Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 14, m. 6, a. 3, § 1. — A little above this the Vatican edition, together with one and the other codex, read is more assimilated to that which is a greater universal [ei quod est magis universale] for the greater universal is more assimilated (to God) [magis univerale]. ⁵ Many codices, together with editions 1 and 2 that which [qui] for which [quod]. ⁶ Chapter 1. — The author of this book is Gilbert of Porretain. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 3, in reply to n. 1, solves the same objection thus: (Aristotle) speaks of a priority of nature, not of time; but a seminal reason precedes also in time, not only in nature.

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dicen- / -dum, quod verum est. Vera enim et realis est similitudo inter Petrum et Paulum; et ita necesse est ponere aliquid tertium, in quo assimilantur.¹ Similiter inter hominem et asinum realis est similitudo, et ideo consideratio philosophica non est vana; nec tamen oportet, ita essentias rerum produci, sicut habent cognosci; sufficit enim, quod sic se habeant ad esse, sicut se habent ad cognitionem,² sed non oportet, quod sic se habent ad productionem.	it must / be said, that (this) is true. For there is a true and real similitude between Peter and Paul; and thus it is necessary to posit a third something, in which they are assimilated.¹ Similarly between man and donkey there is a real similitude, and for that reason the consideration of the philosopher is not vain; yet it is not necessary [non oportet], that the essences of things be produced, just as they have to be cognized; for it suffices, that they thus hold themselves to ‘being’, just as they hold themselves to cognition,² but it is not necessary [non oportet], that they thus hold themselves to production.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod forma particularis dicit ens in actu completo; dicendum, quod verum est, quod illud, quo mediante pervenitur ab ente in potentia ad esse completum, est quodam modo ens in actu, quodam modo in potentia. Sed hoc non est quocumque modo ens in potentia, sed illud quod habet ordinationem ad hoc; et hoc est potentia materiae activa, quae rationem universalis non habet, cum sit forma partis, quamvis sit quodam modo in actu, quodam modo in potentia.	4. To that which is objected, that the “form of a particular” means a being in complete act; it must be said, that it is true, that that, by means of which it arrives from a being in potency to a complete ‘being’, is in a certain manner a being in act, in a certain manner (a being) in potency. But this is not a being in potency in any manner whatsoever, but that which has an ordination to this; and this is the active potency of the matter, which does not have the reckoning of a universal, since it is the form of a part, even though it is in a certain manner in act, in a certain manner in potency.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo generat hominem, non asinum; dicendum, quod hoc non est propter formam humanitatis, sed hoc est propter vim datam illi naturae ad producendum sui simile.	5. To that which is objected, that man generates man, not a donkey; it must e said, that this is not on account of the form of humanity, but this is on account of the force given to that nature to produce the similar of itself.
6. Ad ultimum patet responsio. Concedo enim, quod potentia illa activa non est forma singularis nec ignis nec aëris, sed est indifferens ad utrumque; et ideo ex illa quaelibet earum potest educi, et in illam quaelibet earum habet resolvi; et illa dici potest ratio seminalis.³	6. To the last (objection) the response is clear. For I do concede, that that active power is not the form of a singular, neither of fire nor of air, but is indifferent to each; and for that reason each of them can be educed out of it, and each of them has to be resolved into it; and it can be called a “seminal reason”.³
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Doctrinam de rationibus seminalibus Scholastici acceperunt a S. Augustino eamque adhibuerunt ad solvendas aliquo modo quaestiones de naturali generatione et corruptione rerum corporalium, praesertim viventium. Haec autem problemata iam in se sunt obscurissima et maioribus difficultatibus obscurabantur in suppositione generationis aequivocae (sive per putrefactionem, ut dicebant), quae illa aetate communiter admittebatur. Nodus autem, qui est solvendus, hic est: si formae substantiali producendae non praecedit in materia aliquid, ex quo producatur, videtur, quod producatur ex nihilo; et si hoc, tunc vel tribuenda esset agentibus naturalibus potentia creativa, vel dicendum, quod in generationibus naturalibus omnes novae formae sint a Creatore (cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.). — Utrumque autem sententia communis Scholasticorum, saltem posteriorum, negebat et asserebat, tum formas illas educi de potentia materiae, tum ad hanc eductionem concurre rationes seminales. Quid autem proprie est et in sententia S. Augustini sint rationes seminales, et quo sensu ipsae concurrant ad productionem formarum, difficile est determinare. Unde dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.): « Haec est una praecipuarum difficultatum in philosophia, in qua etiam magni theologi diversimode sentiunt ». Opinamur autem, respectu harum diversarum opinionum locum habere ea quae de similibus opinionum dissidis dicit S. Bonav. supra d. 15. dub. 3. Aliter autem iudicandum est de multis recentioribus theoriis circa « descendentiam » viventium, quae, ut Creatorem excludant, vano conatu leges fingunt, ut imperfectissima quaeque propria virtute paulatim ascendere possint ad perfectionem supremarum formarum.	I. The Scholastics accepted the doctrine of seminal reasons from St. Augustine and employed it to solve, in a certain manner, questions concerning the natural generation and corruption of corporal things, especially of living (things). Moreover these problems are already in themselves most obscure and are obscured by greater difficulties in the supposition of equivocal generation (or putrefaction, as they used to call it), which in that age was commonly admitted. Moreover the knot, to be loosened, is this: if something does not precede the substantial form to be produced in matter, out of which it is produced, it seems, that it is produced out of nothing; and if this, then either a creative power would have to be attributed to natural agents, and/or it must be said, that in natural generations all new forms are from the Creator (cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1). — But the sentence common to the Scholastics, at least the later ones, denied each and asserted, that those forms are educed from the potency of the matter, and that seminal reasons concur for this eduction. Moreover what seminal reasons are properly in the thought of (St.) Augustine, and in what sense they concur for the production of forms, is difficult to determine. Wherefore (St.) Dionysius the Carthusian (here in q. 2) says: « This is one of the chief difficulties in philosophy, in which even the great theologians think in diverse manners ». Moreover we opine, that in respect of these diverse opinions those (things) which St. Bonaventure says above in d. 15, Doubt 3, concerning similar disagreements of opinion, have a place. But one must judge otherwise concerning the more recent theories about the « descent » of living (things), which, to exclude the Creator, by a vain daring fabricate laws, so that any most imperfect (beings) can ascend little by little on their own virtue to the perfection of supreme forms.
II. Breviter referre iuvat principales sententias antiquorum quid proprie sint rationes seminales.	II. It helps to report briefly the principal sentences of the ancients on what seminal reasons properly are.
1. Quidam voluerunt, quod non sint nisi potentia passiva sive receptiva materiae; quae sententia communiter reprobatur. — 2. Scotus primae sententiae in eo appropinquat, quod negat, rationem seminalem in viventibus esse principium aptum, ut active concurrat ad ultimum terminum generationis producendum: unde in productione viventium recurrendum esse vult « ad virtutem divinam; sicut et Averroes facit » (hic q. unica, n. 10; cfr. supra d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. in schol.; sed de Rerum princ. q. 10. a. 3. dubie loquitur). — 3. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 115, a. 2.) ait: « Convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas et passivas, quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium, seminales rationes vocat ». — 4. Fere idem dicit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 2.): « Ratio seminalis proprie dicta est quaedam vis activa, causata in semine a generante vel a causante, alia a forma substantiali ipsius seminis, quae iuvat ad conservandum formam illam, ad quam determinavit materiam et transmutavit ». — 5. Aegid. R. (hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. et dub. lat. 1-6.) latissime disputat contra praedictas aliasque opiniones, et etiam contra sententiam S. Thomae, scil. tum contra modum, quo hic terminum rationes interpretatur tum contra determinationem earundem. Tamen de hac sententia dicit, quod magis veritati appropinquet, sed non sufficiat. Ipse autem vult, quod, formaliter loquendo, istae sunt « quaedam aptitudines vel habitudines, insitae rebus naturalibus a Deo, ex quibus educuntur naturales effectus et formae rerum naturalium per virtutes activas et passivas ».	1. Certain (authors) wanted, that they be naught but the passive or receptive power of matter, which sentence is commonly reproved. — 2. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus approaches the first sentence in this, that he denies, that the seminal reason in living (things) is a principle apt to concur actively for the production of the final term of generation: wherefore in the production of living (things) he wants that one recur « to the Divine Virtue; just as even Averroës does » (here in the q. sole, n. 10; cf. above d. 15, a. 1, q. 1, in the Scholium; but in de Rerum Principium, q. 10, a. 2, he speaks uncertainly). — 3. St. Thomas (Summa, I, q. 115, a. 2) says: « (St.) Augustine fittingly calls all active and passive virtues, which are the principles of generations and natural movements, “seminal reasons” ». — 4. Richard of Middleton says nearly the same thing (here in a. 1, q. 2): « A “seminal reason” properly said is a certain active force, caused in the seed by the one generating and/or causing (it), other than the substantial form of the seed itself, which helps to conserve that form, according to which it has determined and transmuted the matter ». — 5. Giles the Roman (here in q. 2, aa. 1 and 2, and lateral doubts 1-6) disputes at great length against the aforesaid (sentences) and other opinions, and even against the sentence of St. Thomas, that is, both against the manner, in which he interprets this term “reasons” and against the determination of the same. Yet he says of this sentence, that it approaches the truth more, but does not suffice. Moreover he himself wants, that, formally speaking, these (seminal reasons) be: « certain aptitudes and/or habitudes, engrafted into natural things by God, out of which there are educed natural effects and the forms of natural things through active and passive virtues ».
III. Hi sexto loco adiungimus sententiam S. Bonaventurae, quae breviter hic in principio corp., et supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et in scholio diffusius exposita est (cfr. etiam supra d. 8. p. I, a. 2. q. 1; d. 12. a. 1. q. 3; d. 15. a. 1. q. 1.). Infra autem d. 30, a. 3. q. 1. fundam. 3, in corp. et ad 5. 6. aliqua adduntur, quibus explicatur, quomodo istae rationes se habeant ad materiam; et inter alia dicitur (in corp.), quod ratio seminalis sit « potentia convertendi ad se aliam naturam, ita ut sufficeret [cum aliquanta materia] ad omnium procreationem, addito sibi illo, in quo posset se multiplicare ». Et ibi ad 5. legitur: « Quantitas virtutis se tenet ex parte formae et potest dici ratio seminalis; et haec, cum sit forma, multiplicabilis est, hoc est, potest sibi similem inducere in materiam sibi appositam ». Praecipue autem S. Bonav. mentem suam explicat in tractatu de resurrectione IV. Sent. in locis supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. citatis (cfr. etiam supra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. schol.).	III. Here in the sixth place we adjoin the sentence of St. Bonaventure, which has been expounded briefly here at the beginning of the body (of the Question), and above in d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 and more diffusely in the Scholium (cf. also above d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1; d. 12, a. 1, q. 3; d. 15, a. 1, q. 1). Moreover below in d. 30, a. 3, q. 1, 3rd argument of the fundament, in the body (of the Question) and in reply to nn. 5 and 6, there are added others, by which there is explained, in what manner these reasons hold themselves to matter; and among other (things) there is said (in the body of the Question), that a seminal reason is « a power of converting some nature to itself, such that it would suffice (with some amount of matter) for the procreation of all, with that added to it, in which it could multiply itself ». And there in reply to n. 5 there is read: « The quantity of virtue holds itself on the part of the form and can be called a “seminal reason”; and this, since it is a form, is multipliable, that is, it can induce a similar to itself in matter placed before it ». Moreover St. Bonaventure explains his mind chiefly in the tract on the Resurrection, Sent., Bk. IV, in the passages cited above in d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 (cf. also above d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, Scholium).
Hanc doctrinam, quam, teste Dionys. Carth., etiam Gulielmus Paris. profitetur, accepit S. Bonav. ab Alex. Hal., qui S. p. II. q. 87. in tractatu insigni de vita, m. 2. a. 1. § 2. ad 6, praeter plurima alia dicit: « Elementis mundi indita est quaedam natura simplex et incorporea, alia a natura elementari, quae cooperans virtuti operativae in plantis et animalibus, concurrente virtute corporum caelestium modo con- / -venienti . . .	This doctrine, which, as (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian testifies, even William of Paris professed, St. Bonaventure accepted from Alexander of Hales, who in (his) Summa., p. II, q. 87, in the outstanding tract on life, m. 2, a. 1, §. 2, in reply to n. 6, in addition to very many other things, says: « There has been endowed to the elements of the world a certain simple and incorporeal nature, other than the nature of an element, which cooperating with the operative virtue in plants and animals, with the virtue of celestial bodies concurring / in a convenient manner . . .
¹ Secundum Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20 (IV. c. 15.), fundamentum similitudinis est unitas qualitatis in utroque extremorum repertae, quatenus scil. haec qualitas actualiter in extremis multiplicata, fundamentaliter est una, et formaliter una tantum per intellectum, sive in quantum haec qualitas actualiter multiplicata propter suam similitudinem intellectui fundamentum praebet formandi conceptum unitatis istorum multorum. — In principio solut. et paulo inferius auctoriate paucorum codd. posuimus considerationi philosophicae pro considerationi physicae, quod Vat. cum aliis edd. et codd. habet, quorum tamen non pauci sunt dubiae lectionis. ² Sicut dicit Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 4. (I. brevior, c. 1.). ³ Cfr. Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 70. (c. 11. in fine).	¹ According to Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 20 (Bk. IV, ch. 15), the fundament of a similitude is the unity of quality found in each of the extremes, to the extent, that is, that this quality (is) actually multiplied in the extremes, it is fundamentally one, and formally one only through understanding, or inas much as this quality, actually multiplied on account of its similitude proffers to the fundament of the intellect a concept of the unity of these many. — At the beginning of the solution and a little below this, we have on the authority of a few codices, put of the philosopher [philosophicae] for of the physicist [physicae], which the Vatican edition has, together with the other editions and codices, yet of which there are not a few doubtful readings. ² Just as Aristotle says, Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 4 (in the shorter version, Bk. I, ch. 1). ³ Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, text 79, (ch. 11 at the end).

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con- / -venienti prodeunt (sic!) in esse animae vegetabilium et animalium. Hae autem virtutes sive naturae possunt dici corporales, quia radicantur in corporibus sive naturis corporum, et spirituales, quia mole carent corporali . . . Dico ergo opinando, non asserendo, quod illa natura, quae est simplex et incorporea, indita partibus mundi, qua dicit Philosophus inferiora ista plena esse, est principium et origo, ut ex quo est quod est animarum huiusmodi; a virtute vero decisa a generante est quo est; a virtue demum primi orbis et aliorum corporum supercaelestium sunt ipsae animae huiusmodi ut a disponente et corroborante alia operativa ad hoc, quod procreant in actum ». — Eandem viam sequuntur B. Albert., (S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 31. m. 1.) eiusque discipulus Uldaricus, et favent Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 1. a. 3. et q. 2. a. 4.) aliique, qui simul cum propugnantibus contrarias sententias supra in scholio ad d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. citati sunt.	in a convenient manner, go forth (sic) into ‘being’ as the souls of vegetables and animals. Moreover these virtues or natures can be said (to be) “corporal”, because they are rooted in bodies or the natures of bodies, and “spiritual”, because they lack corporal mass . . . Therefore I say by opining, not asserting, that that nature, which is simple and incorporeal, endowed to the parts of the world, of which the Philosopher says these inferior (things) are full, is a principle and origin, such that that out of which it is belongs to souls of this kind; but that by which it is is by the virtue shed by the one generating; finally from the virtue of the first orb and of the other supercelestial bodies there are souls themselves of this kind, so that that they go forth into act, is from one disposing and corroborating the others operative for this ». — Following the same way are Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), (Summa, p. II, tr. 8, q. 31, m. 1) and his disciple Ulrich, and favoring it are (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 1, a. 3, and in q. 2, a. 4) and the others, who have been cited together with the promoters of the contrary sentences above in the Scholium to d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1.
IV. Respectu specialis quaestionis, utrum ratio seminalis sit ratio universalis, vel singularis, S. Bonav. primam opinionem, quam posteriores Scholastici omnino reprobant, satis benigne iudicat, licet alteram sententiam praeferat. Hanc autem secundam sententiam Petr. a Tar. (qui solus explicite de hac speciale quaestione agit) approbat et sic explicat (hic q. 1. a. 3.): « Ratio seminalis est forma particularis, non universalis, et forma partis, non totius; est tamen forma incompleta. Est enim quasi initium quoddam seu seminarium formae completae in materia, adeo quod per actionem agentis naturalis de potentia ad actum educitur. Fuit autem seu transit de uno esse ad aliud, usquequo perveniat ad esse formae ultimae complentis; sicut ratio seminalis, quae est in semine animalis alicuius, primo habet esse quasi lactis, deinde quasi sanguinis, deinde carnis, deinde embryonis, deinde perfecti animalis, et a principio indistincta, per diversa postmodum distinguibilis. Ideo similitudinem habet quandam formae universalis ratione suae indistinctionis et potentialitatis; non tamen est vere universalis, sed particularis ». Et ad 1. idem dicit, quod istae formae non erant « prius in esse actuali et completo, sed potentiali et incompleto et confuso, sicut forma pulli in ovo ».	IV. In respect of the particular Question, whether a seminal reason is a universal reason, and/or a singular one, St. Bonaventure judges the first opinion, which later Scholastics entirely reprove, in a sufficiently kind manner, though he prefers the other sentence. Moreover this second sentence (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (who also explicitly deals with this particular Question) approves and explains thus (here in q. 1, a. 3): « A seminal reason is a particular form, not a universal one, and the form of a part, not of a whole; yet it is an incomplete form. For it is a certain quasi beginning or seed-bed for the form completed in the matter, to such an extent that through the action of a natural agent it is educed from potency to act. Moreover it was or passed from one ‘to be’ to another, until it arrives at the ‘to be’ of the ultimate completing form; just as a seminal reason, which is in the seed of some animal, first has the ‘to be’ as of milk, then as of blood, then as of flesh, then as of an embryo, then as a perfect animal, and (such) undistinguished from the beginning, distinguishable through diverse (things) thereafter. For that reason it has a certain similitude of a universal form by reason of its indistinction and potentiality; yet it is not truly a universal (form), but a particular one ». And in reply to n. 1 he says the same, that these forms were not « first in an actual and complete ‘to be’, but in a potential and incomplete and confused one, just as the form of a chicken (is) in an egg ».
V. Posteriores Scholastici cum S. Thoma, Scoto, Aegidio, Henrico Gand. sententiam S. Bonav. de rationibus seminalibus non approbant, et plura obiiciunt, quae non facile possunt clare solvi. Opinamur autem, etiam sententias aliorum non posse eliminare omnes difficultates. Constat quidem, formas naturales, praesertim viventium, praeditas esse mirabili virtute se propagandi tum secundum esse reale in materia, tum secundum esse intentionale per speciem in medio (cfr. supra d. 13. a. 3. q. 2.); sed si de modo utriusque propagationis intimius quaeratur, post tot sapientum virorum studia plura remanent sub velamine abscondita et admiranda, quam certa ratione explicata. Verbum etiam Apostoli (I. Cor. 13, 9.): Ex parte cognoscimus, saepissime locum habet etiam in his, quae quotidiana experientia oculis nostris obversantur.	V. Later Scholastics together with St. Thomas, (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Giles (the Roman), (and) Henry of Ghent do not approve of the sentence of St. Bonaventure concerning seminal reasons, and make several objections, which cannot be easily solved in a clear manner. Moreover we are of the opinion, that even the sentences of the others cannot eliminate all difficulties. Indeed it is established, that natural forms, especially (those) of living (things), have been endowed beforehand with a wonderful virtue for propagating themselves both according to (their) real ‘being’ [esse reale] in matter, an according to (their) intentional ‘being’ through a species in a medium (cf. above d. 13, a. 3, q. 2); but if one ask more intimately of the manner of each propagation, after all the studies of wise men more hidden and wonderful (things) remain under a veil, than (those) explained by certain reason. The word of the Apostle (1 Cor. 13:9): We know in part, has most frequently a place even in these (things), which are conduced in our daily experience before our very eyes.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII