COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE II Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 444-448. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 444-448. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
ARTICULUS II. De productione animae Evae aliorumque hominum.	ARTICLE II On the production of the soul of Eve and of other men.
Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de productione animae ipsius Evae et per consequens omnis alterius animae ab anima Adae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.	Consequently there is asked concerning the second Article, that is concerning the production of the soul of Eve herself and per consequens (concerning the production) of every other soul from the soul of Adam. And about this three (questions) are asked.
Prima quaestio est, utrum animae omnium hominum sint una substantia, vel diversae.	The first question is, whether the souls of all men are one in substance, and/or diverse (in substance).
Secundo, data quod diversae, quaeritur, utrum simul, vel successive sint in esse productae.	Second, granted that (they are) diverse, there is asked, whether they were produced together, and/or successively, into ‘being’.
Tertio, dato quod succesive, quaeritur, utrum anima sit ex traduce.	Third, granted that (they are produced) successively, there is asked, whether the soul is out of a transduction [ex traduce].*
QUAESTIO I. Utrum animae omnium hominum sint una substantia, an diversae.	QUESTION 1 Whether the souls of all men are one in substance, or diverse?
CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod animae omnium hominum sint una anima numero, non diversae.	ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is shown, that the souls of all men are one soul in number, not diverse (souls).
1. Omne quod individuatur et multiplicatur ad alterius multiplicationem et individuationem, substantialiter dependet ab illo;¹ sed anima intellectiva non dependet substantialiter a corpore, cum possit esse substantialiter sine illo: ergo non individuatur nec multiplicatur secundum individuationem corporis vel multiplicationem.	1. Everything which is individuated and multiplied according to the multiplication and individuation of another, depends substantially from it;¹ but the intellective soul does not depend substantially from the body, since it can be substantially without it: therefore it is not individuated nor multiplied according to the individuation and/or multiplication of the body.
2. Item, plus assimilantur in complexione et natura duorum hominum corpora quam eiusdem corporis membra diversas, ut caro mea carni tuae, quam os meum carni meae: ergo si una anima potest esse vivificativa diversorum membrorum unius corporis, ita quod in illa membra diversas habet influentias secundum eorum dispositiones varias; videtur multo fortius, quod una anima possit esse perfectio duorum corporum sibi similium.	2. Likewise, the bodies of two men [hominum] are more assimilated in complexion and nature than the diverse members of the same body, so that my flesh (is more assimilated) to your flesh, than my mouth (is) to my flesh: therefore if one soul can be vivificative of the diverse members of one body, such that in those members it has diverse influences according to their various dispositions; it seems much more strongly, that one soul can be the perfection of two bodies similar to themselves.
3. Item, multiplicatio in individuis eiusdem speciei attenditur propter conservationem, ut perpetuetur esse in pluribus quod non poterat perpetuari in uno; sed anima rationalis est incorruptibilis, sicut infra² patebit: ergo videtur, quod in ea non sit multiplicatio secundum numerum: ergo in diversis hominibus non numeratur, sed est eadem numero.	3. Likewise, multiplication in individuals of the same species is attained on account of a conservation, so that there is perpetuated to be in several which could not have been perpetuated to be in one; but the rational soul is incorruptible, just as will be clear below:² therefore it seems, that in it there is no multiplication according to number: therefore in diverse men it is not numbered, but is the same in number.
4. Item, si anima intellectiva individuaretur . . .	4. Likewise, if the intellective soul would be individuated . . .
¹ Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 20. (c. 2.) et VII. Metaph. text. 28. (VI. c. 8.). — Rationes pro hac opinione praecipue inveniuntur in Averrois Comment. super III. de Anima, text. 4-8; text. 18-20; Destruct. destruct. Disput. physica secunda, in qua, relatis 10 rationibus huius opinionis et Algazelis dubitationibus de ipsis, Averroes illas explicat et has solvit; Tract. de Animae beatitudine; Libell. seu epistola de connexione intellectus abstracti cum homine. — Plures codd. cum ed. 2 in hoc arg. bis substituunt dividuationem pro individuationem. ² Dist. 19. a. 1. q. 1. — Maior est secundum Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 59. (c. 10.) et II. de Anima, text. 35. (c. 4.).	¹ Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 20 (ch. 2), and Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 28 (Bk. VI, ch. 8). — The reasons in favor of this opinion are found chiefly in Averroës’ Commentary (on Aristotle’s) On the Soul, Bk. III, texts 4-8; texts 18-20; (and his) Destruction of Destructions, second physical Disputation, in which, having related the 10 reasons for this opinion and Al-Gazel’s doubts on them, Averroës explains the former and solves the latter; Tract on the Beatitude of the Soul; Libellus or Epistle on the Connection of the Abstract Intellect with Man. — Several codices, together with edition 1, substitute twice in this argument dividuation [dividuationem] for individuation [individuationem]. ² Distinction 19, a. 1, q. 1. — The major (of the argument) is according to Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, text. 59 (ch. 10), and On the Soul, Bk. II, text 35 (ch. 4).
	* [Trans. note: Here ex traduce requires some explanation. In Latin a tradux in the sense employed here, is the cutting or slip from which one mature plant is ultimately propagated from another mature plant, from which the slip was cut. Thus de traduce is often rendered from (a) propagation, and ex traduce as on account of (a) propagation; however, the concept is more precise in Latin, since the term refers to that manner of propagation in which something properly of the parent becomes properly the offspring; whereas natural propagation in animals is such that something accidental in the parents, conjoined, becomes properly the offspring.]

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secundum corpus, per consequens quod reciperetur in illa, individuaretur secundum exigentiam corporis; sed anima intellectiva suscipit formam universalem, ut est universalis: ergo si forma existens in anima non individuatur, pari ratione nec anima, prout est in hoc corpore, individuari potest.¹	according to the body, per consequens what would be received in the former, would be individuated according to the exigency of the body; but the intellective soul suscepts a universal form, as it is a universal: therefore if the form existing in the soul is not individuated, for an equal reason neither can the soul, insofar as it is in this body, be individuated.¹
5. Item, ad hoc quod anima rationalis aliquid intelligat, necesse est, quod ex se intelligente et intellecto fiat unum; sed contingit animas diversorum hominum omnino idem intelligere: ergo contingit unum et idem eis uniri. Sed quaecumque uniet eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem:² ergo animae plurium hominum sunt una et eadem substantia numero.	5. Likewise, for this that the rational soul understands anything, it is necessary, that one (thing) come to be out of itself understanding and the one understood; but it happens that the souls of diverse men understand entirely the same (thing): therefore it happens that one and the same is united to them. But whatever (an act of understanding) will unite to the same are the same, among themselves they are the same:² therefore the souls of several men are one and the same substance according to number.
6. Item, actus et officium substantiae spiritualis est regere et movere substantiam corporalem: ergo si nihil est otiosum in natura,³ nunquam est ponere substantiam spiritualem, quae non moveat corporalem; sed si diversae essent substantiae in diversis hominibus, cum contingat, eas separari a corporibus propriis, contingeret, eas aliquando ab actu cessare, et ita otiosas esse: quod si hoc est inconveniens, inconveniens est, plures homines diversas animas rationales habere.	6. Likewise, the act and office of a spiritual substance is to rule and to move a corporal substance: therefore if nothing is unemployed [ostiosum] in nature,³ there is never a positing of a spiritual substance, which does not move a corporal one; but if there were diverse substances in diverse men, since it happens, that they are separated from their own bodies, it would happen, that they sometimes cease from act, and thus are unemployed: which if this is unfitting, it is unfitting, that several men have diverse rational souls.
CONTRA: 1. Sicut dicit Philosophus,⁴ « proprius actus habet fieri in propria materia »; sed anima rationalis est actus et entelechia corporis humani: ergo cum diversa sint corpora humana, diversae erunt animae rationales illorum corporum perfectivae.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Just as the Philosopher says,⁴ « one’s own act has to come to be in one’s own matter »; but the rational soul is the act and entelechy of the human body: therefore since the bodies of men are diverse, the perfective rational souls of those bodies will be diverse.
2. Item, perfectionem et perfectibile necesse est ad invicem esse proportionabilia: ergo nec perfectibile excedit perfectionem, nec perfectio ipsum perfectibile. Si ergo anima rationalis est perfectio corporis humani, illa anima rationalis, quae est perfectio istius corporis, non est perfectio alterius corporis; et ita impossibile est, quod perficiat aliud corpus.	2. Likewise, it is necessary that the perfection and the perfectible be proportionable to one another: therefore neither does the perfectible exceed the perfection, nor the perfection the perfectible itself. If, therefore, the rational soul is the perfection of the human body, that rational soul, which is the perfection of this body, is not the perfection of the other body; and thus it is impossible, that it perfect another body.
3. Item, ab eodem est esse, et esse unum sive esse distinctum;⁵ sed unumquodque habet esse a sua perfectione: ergo distinctionem. Si igitur homo ab homine distinguitur, ergo et perfectio unius hominis a perfectione alterius; sed perfectio hominis, secundum quod est homo, est ipsa anima rationalis, non tantum sensibilis: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, from the same is the ‘to be’ (of a being), and (its) ‘being one’ [esse unum] or ‘being distinct’ [esse distinctum];⁵ but each one has (its) ‘to be’ from its perfection: therefore (each one has its) distinction (from its perfection). If, therefore, man is distinguished from man, therefore the perfection of one man (is) also (distinguished) from the perfection of the other (man); but the perfection of a man, according to which he is a man, is the rational soul itself, not only the sensible one: ergo etc..
4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per deductionem ad impossibile multiplex. Quorum primum est, quia, si eadem anima est in multis hominibus, cum unus sit sciens, alter ignorans, unus bonus, alter malus, unus etiam odiat alterum; sequitur tunc, quod duo contrari erunt in eodem subiecto secundum numerum, et idem ipsum contrariabitur sibi ipsi. Quodsi hoc est impossibile,⁶ restat, quod et illud ex quo sequitur, scilicet unam et eandem animam esse in pluribus hominibus.	4. Likewise, this very (thing) seems through a multiple deduction to the impossible. The first of which is, because, if the same soul is in many men, since one is knowing, the other ignorant, one good, the other evil, (and) one even hates the other; it then follows, that there will be two contraries in the same subject according to number, and the same itself will be contrary to its very self. Wherefore if this is impossible,⁶ it remains, that that too, out of which it follows, namely that there is one and the same soul in several men, (is impossible).
5. Item, si una et eadem anima est in pluribus, post mortem nihil plus habet iustus quam impius: ergo bonum remanet irremuneratum et malum impunitum:⁷ ergo mundus est inordinatus, et Deus est iniustus, et stultus est qui facit aliquod bonum. Ergo si hoc est adeo impossibile, ut non tantum sit contra fidem, sed etiam contra rationem rectam, impossibile est, plures homines eandem animam rationalem habere.	5. Likewise, if one and the same soul is in several (men), after death the just (man) has nothing more than the impious (man): therefore good remains unremunerated and evil unpunished:⁷ therefore the world is inordinate, and God is unjust, and foolish is he who does something good. Therefore if this is so impossible, that it is not only contrary to the Faith, but even contrary to right reason, it is impossible, that several men have the same rational soul.
6. Item, si una anima rationalis est in diversis hominibus, ergo post mortem non est magis beatus unus quam alter. Si igitur ad beatitudinem non pervenitur nisi per virtutem, et multi sunt, qui in hac vita non habent virtutes: ergo multi sunt, qui non perveniunt ad beatitudinem. Si igitur eadem est . . .	6. Likewise, if one rational soul is in diverse men, therefore after death one is not more blessed than the other. If, therefore, one does not arrive at beatitude except through virtue, and there are many, who in this life do not have the virtues: therefore there are many, who do not arrive at beatitude. If, therefore, the soul of all is / the same, . . .
¹ Averroes, in III. de Anima, text. 5 causam diversitatis inter intellectum et materiam ita assignat: Causa propter quam ista natura [intellectus] est distinguens et cognoscens, prima autem materia neque cognoscens neque distinguens, est, quia prima materia recipit formas diversas, scilicet individuales et istas [singulares]; ista autem recipit formas universales. Et ex hoc apparet, quod ista natura non est aliquod hoc [hoc aliquid sive singulare], neque corpus neque virtus in corpore, quoniam si ita esset, tunc reciperet formas, secundum quod sunt diversa et ista [i. e. individuales et singulares], et si ita esset, tunc formae existentes in ipsa essent intellectae in potentia, et sic non distingueret naturam formarum, secundum quod sunt formae etc. — In maiori, quae fundatur in illo axiomate: Omne quod recipitur, recipitur per modum recipientis, non recepti, cod. cc et ed. 1 recipitur pro reciperetur. ² Aristot., I. Poster. c. 25. (c. 32.): Eadem iisdem eadem erunt. Cfr. VII. Topic. c. 1. et I. Phys. text. 17. (c. 2.). — Hoc et seq. arg. ponit Averroes in III. de Anima, text. 5. ³ Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 9.) iuxta translationem Arabico-latinam: Si igitur natura nihil facit otiose etc. — Averroes, in XII. Metaph. text. 44. ait: Et ideo dicit Aristoteles, quod si aliquae substantiae essent non moventes, essent otiosae. — Paulo inferius post essent in cod. A additur spirituales. ⁴ Libr. II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.), ubi etiam principia seq. arg. insinuantur. Cfr. ibid. I. text. 53. (c. 3.). — De entelechia vide supra pag. 35, nota 3. ⁵ Cfr. Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 3. (III. c. 2.); August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 6. n. 8; Boeth., de Unitate et uno: « Quidquid est, ideo est quod unum est; quod sic ostenditur. Omne enim esse ex forma est in rebus creatis; sed nullum esse ex forma est, nisi cum forma materiae unita est. Esse enim non est nisi ex coniunctione formae cum materia. Unde philosophi dicunt illud describentes: Esse est existentia formae in materia. Cum autem forma materiae unitur, ex coniunctione utriusque necessario aliquid unum construitur » etc. Idem ostendit III. de Consol. prosa 11. — Averroes ipse haec argg., sicut et plura impossibilia, quae ex sua opinione sequuntur, sibi obiecit, et propter ipsa fatetur, hanc quaestionem esse valde difficilem (III. de Anima. text. 5.). ⁶ Arisot., II. Periherm. c. 4. (14.): Simul autem non contingit eidem inesse contraria. August., de Quantit. animae, c. 32. n. 69: Si enim dixero, unam esse animam, conturbaberis, quod in altero beata est, in altero misera; nec una res simul et beata et misera potest esse. — Paulo superius post secundum numerum Vat. cum aliis edd., excepta 1, subiungit et in eadem parte, cum non habeat diversas partes. Dein post restat multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt quod; in fine huius propositionis supple: impossible est. ⁷ Secundum Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4, nullum bonum irremuneratum et nullum malum impunitum. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 713, nota 2.	¹ Averroës, (commenting) on (Aristotle’s) On the Soul, Bk. II, text 5, assigns the cause of diversity between the intellect and matter thus: The cause on account of which this nature (i. e. the intellect) is distinguishing and cognizing, but prime matter (is) neither cognizing nor distinguishing, is, because prime matter receives diverse forms, namely, individual and these (singular forms); but that (nature) receives universal forms. And from this it appears, that that nature is not this something (i e. a singular being), neither a body nor a virtue in the body, since if it were thus, it would then receive forms, according to which (beings) are diverse and these (individuals and singulars), and if it were thus, then the existent forms in it would have been understood in potency, and thus it would not distinguish the nature of forms, according to which they are forms etc.. — In the major (of the argument), which is founded upon this axiom: ‘Everything which is received, is received through the manner of the recipient, not (through the manner) of the received’, codex cc and edition 1 have is received [recipitur] for would be received [reciperetur]. ² Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 25 (ch. 32): The same to the same will be the same. Cf. Topics, Bk. VII, ch. 1, and Physics, Bk. I, text. 17 (ch. 2). — This and the following argument is posited by Averroës, (commenting on Aristotle’s) On the Soul, Bk. III, text 5. ³ Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 45 (ch. 9) according to the Arabic-Latin translation: If, therefore, nature does nothing in the manner of one unemployed etc. — Averroës, (commenting on Aristotle’s) Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 44, says: And for that reason Aristotle says, that if any substances were not moving, they would be unemployed. — A little below this after were diverse [essent] in codex A there is added spiritual [spirituales]. ⁴ On the Soul, Bk. II, text 26 (ch. 2), where even the principles of the following argument are insinuated. Cf. ibid., Bk. I, text 53 (ch. 3). — On entelechy, see above d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2, p. 35, footnote 3. ⁵ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IV, text 3 (Bk. III, ch. 2); (St.) Augustine, On the Morals of the Manichees, Bk. II, ch. 6, n. 8; (St. Severinus) Boethius, On Unity and the One: « Whatever is, is, therefore, what is one; which is shown thus. For every ‘to be’ is on account of form in created things; but no ‘to be’ is on account of a form, except when the form has been united to matter. For there is no ‘to be’ except on account of the conjunction of form with matter. Wherefore the philosophers, describing this, say: A ‘to be’ is the existence of a form with matter. But when form is united to matter, there is necessarily constructed out of the conjunction of each one something » etc. He shows the same On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prose 11. — Averroës himself objected these arguments, just as also several impossible ones, which follow from his opinion, to himself, and says on their account, that this question is very difficult (On the Soul, Bk. III, text 5). ⁶ Aristotle (says), On Interpretation¸ Bk. II, ch. 4 (14): But it does not happen that contraries are in the same together. (St.) Augustine, On the Quantity of the Soul, ch. 32, n. 69 (says): For if I will say, that there is one soul, you will be completely disturbed, that in the one (man) it is blessed, in the other wretched; nor can one thing at the same time be both blessed and wretched. — A little above this after according to number [secundum numerum] the Vatican edition, together with the other editions, except edition 1, subjoins and in the same part, since it does not have diverse parts [et in eadem parte, cum non habeat diversas partes]. Then after it remains [restat], many codices, together with editions 1 and 2, omit (the first) that [quod]; at the end of this proposition supply the is impossible [impossibile est]. ⁷ According to (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. IV, prose 1 and 4, no good (is) unremunerated and no evil unpunished. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 40, a. 2, q. 2, p. 713, footnote 2.

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omnium anima, nulli beatificantur: ergo frustra factus est homo, frustra factus est etiam totus mundus. Et si hoc est omnino falsum et impium, falsum et impium est, unam animam esse in pluribus.	the soul of all is / the same, none are beatified: therefore in vain has man been made, in vain too has the whole world been made. And if this is entirely false and impious, it is false and impious (to hold), that one soul is in several (men).
CONCLUSIO. Secundum fidem, rationem et experientiam constat, quod diversi homines diversas habent animas rationales.	CONCLUSION According to the Faith, reason and experience it is established, that diverse men have diverse rational souls.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in hac quaestione multi philosophantes multa dixerunt falsa et vana.	I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that in this question many, philosophizing many (things), said false and vain (things).
Quidam enim philosophi crediderunt, non solum eandem esse animam in omnibus hominibus, sed etiam in omnibus animalibus. Crediderunt enim, animam non esse aliud quam Deum; et huius positionis fuit Pythagoras et Varro, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei de Varrone.¹ Maxime autem hoc putaverunt de anima humana propter sui dignitatem et spiritualitatem quantum ad intellectum agentem; quantum vero ad intellectum possibilem crediderunt esse idem quod hyle,² quia anima potest recipere omnia, et ita denudata est a formis omnibus. — Hoc autem ponere non est philosophia, sed manifesta insipientia. Cum enim anima sit variabilis et transmutabilis et bonitatis et malitiae susceptibilis, omnino Deus esse non potest.³ Cum iterum sit forma nobilissima inter naturales formas, dans actum et complementum corpori et distincta ab aliis formis naturalibus, hyle esse non potest.	For certain philosophers believed, that there is not only one soul in all men, but even in all animals. For they believed, that the soul is not other than God; and to this position belonged Pythagoras and Varro, just as (St.) Augustine says of Varro in (his) book On the City of God.¹ But most of all they thought this of the human soul on account of its dignity and spirituality as much as regards the agent intellect; but as much as regards the possible intellect they believe that it is the same as hyle,² because the soul can receive all, and thus it is denuded of all forms. — But to posit this is not philosophy, but manifest foolishness. For since the soul is variable and transmutable and susceptible of goodness and wickedness, it cannot entirely be God.³ Again since it is the most noble form among natural forms, giving act and complement to the body and distinct from other natural forms, it cannot be hyle.
Alii autem aliter opinati sunt, quod anima humana sive intellectualis, secundum quod intellectualis est, una est in omnibus hominibus, non solum quantum ad intellectum agentem, sed etiam quantum ad intellectum possibilem. — Et ratio, quae movit ad hoc ponendum, fuit ipsius animae immaterialitas et incorruptibilitas. Quia enim immaterialis est et a corpore non dependens, per corpus non potest individuari, cum nec sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, ut dicit Philosophus.⁴ Cum sit incorruptibilis, non indiget multiplicari, cum una numero conservari possit. — Et haec fuit positio Commentatoris super librum de Anima,⁵ quam etiam vult imponere Aristoteli et trahere ex verbis suis, tum quia ponit mundum aeternum, et ita homines innumerabiles praecesserunt; tum etiam, quia ponit, quod nulla sit substantia spiritualis, quae non habeat corpus movere; quodsi diversae animae essent in diversis hominibus, aliquando cessarent ab actu movendi, cum separantur; essent etiam infinitae actu, cum motus caeli non habuerit principium, secundum Philosophum.⁶ — Ad vitandas autem obiectiones in contrarium adductas distinguit Commentator tres partes in humana anima. Cuius verba sunt haec super tertium de Anima:⁷ « Opinandum est, quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus, quarum una est intellectus recipiens, secunda autem efficiens, tertia autem factum; et duae istarum sunt aeternae, scilicet agens et recipiens, tertia autem est generabilis et corruptibilis ». Animam autem tertiam, quam dicit generabilem et corruptibilem, vocat intellectum passivum; et illud dicit quod nihil aliud est quam imaginatio. Unde postmodum subiungit:⁸ « Intellectus passivus est corruptibilis, et absque hoc nihil intelligitur. Per intellectum autem passivum intelligo virtutem imaginariam ». Unde vult dicere, quod, sicut in visu est color, et est lux, et est oculus videns; sic in intellectu se habet, quod species imaginariae sunt sicut color, intellectus agens est sicut lux, intellectus possibilis est sicut oculus. Et sicut ex concursu illorum trium efficitur visus, ita ex concursu illorum trium efficitur intellectus; et sicut ex diversitate vel defectu coloris causatur diversitas vel defectus actus videndi, sic ex diversitate existente in similitudinibus imaginariis vel imaginatione causatur diversitas in intellectu plurium et defectus etiam actus intelligendi in eodem homine, quia nihil intelligimus nisi in phantasmate. Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus,⁹ corrumpi intellectum, quodam interius corrupto; intellectum, inquam, non quemlibet, sed adeptum. Et per haec quae dicta sunt, nititur declinare inconvenientia, quae ad hanc opinionem sequuntur.	But others opined otherwise, that the human or intellectual soul, according to which it is intellectual, is one in all men, not only as much as regards the agent intellect [intellectum agentem], but even as much as regards the possible intellect [intellectum possibilem]. — And the reason, which moved (them) to posit this, was the immateriality and incorruptibility of the soul itself. For because it is immaterial and not dependent from the body, it cannot be individuated through the body, since it is neither the body nor a virtue in the body, as the Philosopher⁴ says. Since it is incorruptible, it does not need to be multiplied, since it can be conserved one in number. — And this was the position of the Commentator on (Aristotle’s) book On the Soul,⁵ which (position) he even wants to impose upon Aristotle and to draw out of his words, both because he posits an eternal world, and thus innumerable men have preceded; and also, because he posits, that there is no spiritual substance, which does not have to move a body, wherefore if there were diverse souls in diverse men, they would at some time cease from the act of moving (their bodies), when they are separated (from them in death); they would also be infinite in act, since the movement of a heaven has no beginning, according to the Philosopher.⁶ — But to avoid the objections adduced unto the contrary the Commentator distinguished three parts in the human soul. Whose words, on the third (book) On the Soul,⁷ are these: « It must be opined, that in the soul there are three parts of the intellect, one of which is the recipient intellect, but the second the efficient (intellect), but the third the wrought (intellect); and two of these are eternal, namely the agent and recipient (intellect), but the third is generable and corruptible ». Moreover the third soul, which he says (is) “generable and corruptible”, he calls the passive intellect; and he says that it is nothing other than the imagination. Whence he afterwards subjoins:⁸ « The passive intellect is corruptible, and apart from it nothing is understood. But through the “passive intellect” I understand the imaginary power ». Wherefore he wants to say, that just as in sight there is color, and there is light, and there is a seeing eye; so in understanding [intellectu] it is held [se habet], that the imaginary species are as color, the agent intellect is as light, the possible intellect is as the eye. And just as out of the concourse of the former three there is effecting seeing, so out of the concourse of the latter three there is effected understanding; and just as out of the diversity and/or defect of color there is caused a diversity and/or defect of the act of seeing, so out of the diversity existing in imaginary similitudes and/or in the imagination there is caused a diversity in the intellect [intellectu] of several (men) and a defect too of the act of understanding in the same man, because we understand nothing except in a phantasm [phantasmate]. And forasmuch as the Philosopher⁹ says, that the intellect is corrupted, when a certain interior (phantasm is) corrupted; not any “intellect”, I say, but the attained (intellect or understanding). And through these which have been said, he strives to divert the unfitting (consequences), which follow after this opinion.
Quantumcumque autem hanc opinionem coloret, pessima est et haeretica. Est enim contra chri- / -stianam religionem, . . .	But however so much he improves [coloret] this opinion, it is the worst one and heretical. For it is contrary to the Chr- / -istian Religion, . . .
¹ Libr. IV. c. 31; VII. c. 6. et 23, ubi hanc opinionem tribuit Varroni. Isidor., VIII. Etymol. c. 6. n. 19. referens sententias philosophorum de Deo ait: « Quidam [Deum esse dicunt] animum in omnibus commeantem (alias: commanentem) et lucidum, ut Pythagoras ». Idem dicit Cicero, I. de Natura Deor. c. 11; Lactantius, I. Div. Inst. c. 5; Minucius Felix in Octavio, c. 19. ² Graece ulh, i. e. materia prima, de qua vide supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 1. ³ Cfr. supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. — Paulo superius nonnulli codd. maxima pro manifesta. ⁴ Libr. III. de Anima, text. 4. (c. 4.), ubi dicit de intellectu, quod sit immixtus i. e. ut explicat Averroes, quod sit nec corpus nec virtus in corpore. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 445, nota 1. ⁵ Libr. III. text. 4-8. et text. 18. seqq. ⁶ Vide supra d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, ubi etiam in fundam. 5. haec opinio tangitur. ⁷ Text. 5. ⁸ Loco cit. — In his verbis edd. Venet. an. 1489 et 1560 legunt: et absque hoc nihil intelligit [intellectus recipiens sive materialis]; et intendit [Aristoteles] per intellectum passivum imaginativam. — Ibid. etiam comparatio visus cum intellectu habetur. — Paulo superius codd. M aa substituunt Illam autem tertiam pro Animam autem tertiam. ⁹ Libr. I. de Anima, text. 66. (c. 4.). — Quid sit intellectus adeptus declarat Averroes, loc. cit. Relata enim praedicta comparatione visus cum intellectu, ait: Secundum hoc igitur est intelligendum de intellectu materiali [recipiente] et agente. Et cum intellectus materialis fuerit copulatus, secundum quod perficitur per intellectum agentem, tunc nos sumus copulati cum intellectu agente; et ista dispositio dicitur adeptio, et intellectus adeptus.	¹ Book VI, ch. 31; Bk. VII, chs. 6 and 23, where he attributes this opinion to Varro. (St.) Isidore (of Seville), Etymologies, Bk. VIII, ch. 6, n. 19, reporting the sentence of the philosophers concerning God, says: « Certain ones (say that God is) the spirit going and coming (other codices have: remaining together) and shining in all, such as Pythagoras ». Cicero says the same, On the Nature of the Gods, Bk. I, ch. 11; Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, Bk. I, ch. 5; Minucius Felix, On Octavius, ch. 19. ² In Greek ulh, i. e. prime matter, concerning which, see above d. 12, a. 1, q. 1. ³ Cf. above d. 17, a. 1, q. 1. — A little above this not a few codices have the greatest [maxime] for manifest [manifesta]. ⁴ On the Soul, Bk. III, text 4 (ch. 4), where he says of the intellect, that it is unmixed, that is, as Averroës explains, that it is neither a body nor a virtue in the body. Cf. also the previous page here, footnote 1. ⁵ Book III, texts 4-8, and texts 18 ff.. ⁶ See above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, where this opinion is also touched upon in the 5th argument of the fundament. ⁷ Text 5. ⁸ Loc. cit.. — In these words the Venetian editions of A. D. 1489 and 1560 read: and apart from it (the receiving or material intellect) understands nothing; and (Aristotle) intends through “passive intellect” the imaginative (power). — Ibid., the comparison of seeing with understanding is also had. — A little above this codices M and aa substitute But the third (part) [Illam autem tertium] for But the third soul [Animam autem tertiam]. ⁹ On the Soul, Bk. I, text 66 (ch. 4). — What the adapted intellect is, Averroës explains, loc. cit.. For having related the aforesaid comparison of seeing with understanding, he says: Therefore, according to this, one must understand concerning the material (recipient) and agent intellect. And when the material intellect has been joined, according to which it is perfected through the agent intellect, then we have bee joined with the agent intellect, and this disposition is said (to be) an “attainment” [adeptio], and the intellect an “attained” one.

p. 447

chri- / -stianam religionem, dum aufert meritorum retributionem, quae non esset, si omnium anima una esset. — Et etiam contra rectam rationem. Planum est enim, quod anima intellectiva, ut intellectiva est, est perfectio hominis, secundum quod homo. Si ergo homines non sunt diversi solum, secundum quod animalia, sed secundum quod homines, non solum habent diversas imaginationes et animas sensibiles, immo etiam diversos intellectus et animas rationales. — Est etiam contra sensibilem experientiam, quoniam diversi homines diversas habent et contrarias cogitationes et affectiones. Quodsi tu dicas, quod hoc venit ex diversitate specierum existentium in imaginatione; hoc nihil est, quia non solummodo diversificantur in his intelligibilibus, quae extrahuntur a sensu, immo etiam in his quae sunt supra omnem imaginationem, sicut sunt virtues, quae intelliguntur per suam essentiam, non per speciem imaginariam, sicut etiam est ipse Deus,¹ quem quidam diligunt, quidam contemnunt.	the Chr- / -istian Religion, since removes the retribution of merits, which would not be, if the soul of all were one. — It is also contrary to right reason. For it is plain, that the intellective soul, as it is intellective, is the perfection of a man, according to which (he is) a man. Therefore, if men are not only diverse according to which (they are) animals, but (also) according to which (they are) men, they not only have diverse imagines and sensible souls, nay also diverse intellects and rational souls. — It is also contrary to sensible experience, since diverse men have both contrary thoughts and affections. Wherefore if you say, that this comes out of the diversity of species existing in the imagination; this is nothing, because they are not only diversified in these intelligibles, which are extracted from sense, nay (they are) also (diversified) in those which are above every imagination, just as are the virtues, which are understood through their own essence, not through an imaginary species, just as even God Himself is,¹ whom certain (men) love [diligunt], (and) certain (men) contemn.
Hanc igitur positionem repudiando tanquam haereticam et falsam, dicendum, est secundum fidem et veritatem, quod diversi homines diversas habent animas rationales, et concedendae sunt rationes hoc probantes.	Therefore repudiating this position as heretical and false, it must be said, that it is according to the Faith and truth, that diverse men have diverse rational souls, and (that) the reasons proving this are to be conceded.
1. Ad illud autem quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod intellectus non dependet a corpore, ergo ab eo non potest individuari; dicendum, quod intellectus individuatur secundum corporis indigentiam; non tamen eius individuatio est a corpore, sed a propriis principiis, materia scilicet et forma sua, quas de se habet, sicut in se subsistit, sicut determinatum est supra.²	1. To that, however, which is first objected unto the contrary, that the intellect does not depend from the body, therefore it cannot be individuated by it; it must be said, that the intellect is individuated according to (its) need for a body [corporis indigentiam]; yet its individuation is not from the body, but from its own principles, namely the matter and form, which he has of itself, just as it subsists in itself, just as has been determined above.²
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod una anima potest perficere diversa membra; dicendum, quod non est simile, pro eo quod omnia membra continuantur et reducuntur ad unum principale membrum in corpore, mediante quo est defluxus, motus et sensus ad alia membra, ut patet in corde;³ diversorum autem hominum corpora non continuantur nec reducuntur ad unum membrum: et ideo non possunt habere unam perfectionem.	2. To that which is objected, that one soul can perfect diverse members; it must be said, that it is not similar, in virtue of this that all members are continuous with and are lead back to one principal member in the body, by means of which there is a down-flow, movement and sense for the other members, as is clear in the heart;³ but the bodies of diverse men are not continuous with nor are reduced to one member: and for that reason they cannot have one perfection.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multiplicatio numeralis fit propter conservationem speciei; dicendum, quod sicut in praededentibus⁴ dictum est, haec non est tota causa nec praecipua, immo principalis ratio est ad manifestationem bonitatis divinae, et haec praecipue est in animabus, quae multae sunt, ut eis distribuatur gratiarum Dei multiformitas, et compleatur illius supernae civitatis integritas et numerositas.	3. To that which is objected, that a numeral multiplication comes to be on account of the conservation of the species; it must be said, that just as has been said in the preceding,⁴ this is not the whole cause nor the chief one, nay the principal reason is for the manifestation of the Divine Goodness, and this is chiefly in the souls, which are many, so that there be distributed to them the multiformity of God’s graces, and there be completed (by them) the integrity and numerosity of that supernal City.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima recipit formam universalem, ut est universalis; dicendum, quod etsi illa forma, quam anima recipit, sit universalis per indifferentiam ad multa singularia cognoscenda, tamen revera illa species, quae est in anima, est quoddam accidens singulare, quae qualificat et disponit ipsam animam et in diversis animabus diversificatur; sicut et scientia, quae in diversis cognoscentibus est alia et alia, quamvis sit de re unica.⁵	4. To that which is objected, that the soul receives a universal form, as it is a universal; it must be said, that even if that form, which the soul receives, is a universal through (its) indifference regarding cognizing many singulars, yet in truth that species, which is in the soul, is a certain singular accident, which (species) qualifies and disposes the soul itself and is diversified in diverse souls; just as the knowledge [scientia], which is in diverse (men) cognizing is different [alia et alia], even through it concerns a unique thing.⁵
5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens. Quando enim dicitur, quod ad actum intelligendi requiritur, quod ex intellecto et intelligente fiat unum; hoc intelligitur quantum ad speciem, quae unitur intellectui, non quantum ad ipsum obiectum extrinsecum. Illa autem species, quae intellectui unitur, habet comparationem ad intellectus, in quo est, et ad obiectum, ad quod est et quod repraesentat: et quamvis in comparatione ad obiectum habeat unitatem quodam modo in diversis cognoscentibus, quia ad idem, in quantum est ratio et similitudo eiusdem; tamen in comparatione ad animam, in qua est, habet diversitatem. Et potest poni exemplum de speciebus receptis in duobus speculis, vel in duobus oculis.	5. And through this the response to the following (objection) is clear. For when it is said, that for the act of understanding there is required, that one (thing) come to be out of the one understood and the one understanding; this is understood as much as regards the species, which is united to the intellect, not as much as regards the extrinsic object itself. Moreover that species, which is united to the intellect, has a comparison to the intellect, in which it is, and to the object, regarding which it is and which it represents: and though in the comparison to the object it has in a certain manner a unity in the diverse (men) cognizing it, because (it) regards the same, inasmuch as it is the reckoning and similitude of the same; yet in comparison to the soul, in which it is, it has a diversity. And an example (of this) can be posited concerning the appearances [speciebus] received in two mirrors, and/or in two eyes.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantiae spiritualis officium est movere corpus; dicendum, quod illud argumentum dupliciter deficit. Primum quidem, quia propter hoc non est substantia spiritualis principaliter facta. Cessabit enim omnis motus, quod ignoravit Philosophus; unde vana est ratio sua, quando assumsit numerum motorum secundum numerum mobilium et motuum;⁶ multo enim plures sunt Angeli, quam sint orbes, qui moventur; non enim facti sunt ad hoc, sed ad fruendum Deo. . . .	6. To that which is objected, that it is the office of a spiritual substance to move a body; it must be said, that that argument fails in a twofold manner. First, indeed, because the spiritual substance has not been made principally on account of this. For every movement will cease, (the truth) of which the Philosopher was ignorant; whence his reckoning is vain, when he assumed that the number of movers (is) according to the number of movables and movements;⁶ for there are many more Angels, than there are orbs, which are moved; for they have not been made for this, but to enjoy God. . . .
¹ Cfr. infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. in corp. circa finem, et I. Sent. d. 17. p. I. q. 4, ubi verba Augustini hac de re explicantur. ² Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 2. ³ De quo cfr. Aristot., III. de Partib. animal. c. 3. seq. Vide etiam I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. ⁴ Dist. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. ad 2. ⁵ Avicenna, V. Metaph. c. 2: Quod igitur in anima intelligitur de homine est id quod est universale; eius autem universalitas non est ex hoc, quod est in anima, sed ex hoc, quod consideratur ad multa signata habentia esse vel opinata; eorum enim iudicium quantum ad ipsum idem est. Ex hoc autem, quod haec forma est dispositio in anima aliqua, est unum de individuis scientiarum vel formationum; quia, sicut aliquid diversis respectibus est genus et species, similiter aliquid diversis respectibus est universale et singulare. Haec igitur forma, secundum hoc quod est in anima, est aliqua formarum animae et est singularis, et secundum hoc, quod in ea multa conveniunt secundum aliquem trium praedictorum modorum, est universalis. Inter haec autem duo non est contrarietas. Non enim est impossibile, haec simul esse, scil. ut sit una essentia, et accidat ei communio relatione multorum; communio enim multitudinis non potest esse nisi relatione tantum; nisi enim relatio fieret ad multa, non esset communio etc. — Paulo superius plures codd. quod qualificat, Vat. quod vel quae qualificat pro quae qualificat. ⁶ Sicut fecit in XII. Metaph. text. 42. seqq. (XI. c. 8.) et Averroes, Epitom. in Metaph. tract. 4. — Paulo inferius nonnulli codd. cum edd. 2, 3 si in huiusmodi defecit pro si in huiusmodi deficit.	¹ Cf. below d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, in the body (of the Question), near the end, and Sent., Bk. I, d. 17, p. I, q. 4, where the words of (St.) Augustine on this matter are explained. ² Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 2. ³ Concerning which, cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, Bk. III, ch. 3 f.. See also Sent., Bk. I, d. 8, p. II, a. 3. ⁴ Distinction 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, in reply to n. 2. ⁵ Avicenna, Metaphysics, Bk. V, ch. 2: Therefore what is understood in the soul concerning man is that which is a universal; but its universality is not out of this, that it is in the soul, but out of this, that it is considered regarding the many signified [signata] as having a ‘to be’ and/or opined (to be); for the judgment of them as much as regards it is the same. Moreover out of this, that this form is a disposition in some soul, it is one concerning the individuals of knowings [scientiarum] and/or of formations; because just as something is a genus and a species in diverse respects, similarly something is a universal and a singular in diverse respects. Therefore this form, according to this, that it is in the soul, is one [aliqua] of the forms of the soul and is a singular, and according to this, that many convene in it according to any three of the aforesaid manners, it is a universal. But between these two there is no contrariety. For it is not impossible, that these be together, namely, that there be one essence, and a commonality [communio] accedes to it according to the relation of many; for the commonality of a multitude cannot be but according to a relation only; for unless a relation were to come to be regarding many, there would be no commonality etc.. — A little above this several codices have which (accident) qualifies [quod qualificat], the Vatican edition which (accident) and/or which (species) qualifies [quod vel quae qualificat] for which (species) qualifies [quae qualificat]. ⁶ Just as he did in Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 42 ff. (Bk. XI, ch. 8), and Averroës (does in his), Epitome on (Aristotle’s) Metaphysics, tract 4. — A little below this (on the following page) not a few codices, together with editions 2 and 3, have he was deficient [defecit] for he is deficient [deficit].

p. 448

— Deficit etiam in hoc, quod etsi anima separetur a corpore, resumet tamen aliquando corpus suum per resurrectionem; quod etiam Philosophus ignoravit; et ideo non est mirum, si in huiusmodi deficit. Necesse est enim, philosophantem in aliquem errorem labi, nisi adiuvetur per radium fidei.	— It also fails in this, that even if the soul is separated from the body, yet it will resume its own body some day through the resurrection; (the truth) of which the Philosopher was also ignorant; and for that reason it is not to be wondered at, if in (matters) of this kind he is deficient. For it is necessary, that the one philosophizing fall into some error, if he is not assisted through a ray of the Faith.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Haec quaestio militat contra pessimum errorem philosophorum Arabum, qui unitatem numericam animarum, vel saltem intellectus agentis docebat et in hoc sensu Aristotelem interpretabantur. Erroneae hae opiniones etiam scholas catholicas inficere minitabantur, ut satis apparet ex censura plurium thesium huc spectantium, facta ab Universitate Parisiensi (vide D’Argentré, Collectio iudicio. t. I. pag. 192, c. 8. Errores de anima et intellectu, praesertim thes. 20. 22. 27.). Et merito dicit Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. n. 26.), quod hic error, « qui proprius est et solius Averrois, pessimus est, non tantum contra veritatem theologiae, sed etiam contra veritatem philosophiae. Destruit enim scientiam . . . et ita omnes virtutes » (cfr. ibid. n. 5.). Unde principales Scholastici tota vi contra hanc doctrinam insurrexerunt, praesertim B. Albert. (S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 77. m. 3.), qui 30 argg. Arabum, praesertim Averrois, recenset et refutat, et aliis pluribus argg. contrarium probat; et S. Thom. multis locis, ut in suo opusculo (15.): De unione intellectus contra Averroistas; II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 76. a. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 73-78; de Spiritual. Creat. a. 9. 10; de Anima a. 3. — Ipsum Aristotelem Scholastici communiter a dicto errore vindicabant, sed Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 9. q. 14.) dicit: « Mihi videtur, non esse mirum, quod homines dubitant, quid sensit Aristoteles super his duobus, scil. an intellectus sit forma et actus corporis, et an sit idem numero in diversis, an singuli in singulis. Immo ut arbitror, ipse super illis in dubio fuit » etc.	I. This Question militates against the worst error of the Arabic philosophers, who taught the numeric unity of souls, and/or at least of the agent intellect and interpreted Aristotle in this sense. These erroneous opinions also threatened to infect Catholic schools, as is sufficient apparent from the censure of several theses pertaining to this, made by the University of Paris (see D’Argentré, Collectio iudiciorum, tome I, p. 192, ch. 8, “Errors on the Soul and Intellect”, especially theses 20, 22, and 27). And (Bl. John Duns) Scotus rightly says (Sent., Bk. IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 26), that this error, « which properly and solely belongs to Averroës, is the worst, not only contrary to the truth of theology, but even contrary to the truth of philosophy. For it destroys knowledge . . . and thus all the virtues » (cf. ibid., n. 5). Wherefore the principal Scholastics rose up against this doctrine with all their strength, especially Bl. (now) Albertus Magnus, (Summa., p. II, tr. 13, q. 77, m. 3), who lists and refutes 30 arguments of the Arabs, especially (that) of Averroës, and proves the contrary to several other arguments; and St. Thomas in many passages, such as in his 15th opuscle, De unione intellectus contra Averroistas; Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1; Summa., q. 76, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 73.78; de Spiritual. Creat., aa. 9 and 10; de Anima, a. 3. — The Scholastics commonly vindicated Aristotle himself of the said error, but Henry of Ghent (Quodlibetals, 9, q. 14) says: « It seems to be, that it is not to be wondered at, that men doubt, what Aristotle thought on these two (questions), namely whether the intellect is the form and the act of the body; and whether it is the same in number in diverse (men), or single in each one. Nay, as I judge it, he himself was in doubt on these » etc..
II. Scot. loc. cit.; de Rerum princ. q. 9. a. 2. n. 12; apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 76. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. et II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.	II. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, loc. cit.; de Rerum principio primo, q. 9, a. 2, n. 12; in Jerome of Montefortino’s, (Summa Scoti), tome. II, p. I, q. 76, a. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula . 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1. — Durandus, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 3, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 1.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII