S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE II

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 448-451.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 448-451.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum animae omnium fuerint simul productae.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether the souls of all (men) were produced together?

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum animae omnium fuerint simul productae.  Et quod sic, videtur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the souls of all (men) were produced together.  And that (it is) so, seems:

1. Iob quadragesimo:1  Ecce Behemoth, quem feci tecum:  ergo Iob factus est simul cum lucifero; sed non est factum corpus:  ergo est facta anima:  ergo anima Iob facta est simul cum lucifero:  ergo pari ratione et animae aliorum hominum productae sunt in primordio.

1. According to the fortieth (chapter) of Job:1  Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee:  therefore Job was made together with Lucifer; but his body was not made:  therefore his soul was made:  therefore the soul of Job was made together with Lucifer:  therefore for an equal reason the souls of other men were also produced at the first rise (of creation) [in primordio].

2. Item, Angeli simul producti sunt et corpora caelestia propter immortalitatem et incorruptibilitatem:2  si ergo animae rationales sunt huiusmodi, videtur etc.

2.  Likewise, Angels and celestial bodies were produced together on account of (their) immortality and incorruptibility:2  if, therefore rational souls are of this kind, it seems, that etc..

3. Item, animae omnes aequalis sunt durationis cum Angelis ex parte post:  ergo pari ratione videtur, quod debeant esse aequalis durationis ex parte ante.  ergo omnes simul cum Angelis fuerunt creatae.

3. Likewise, all souls are of a duration equal with the Angels on the part of (their) thereafter [post]:  therefore for an equal reason it seems, that they ought to be of a duration equal on the part of (their) before:  therefore all (souls) were created together with the Angels.

4. Item, non est anima propter corpus, sed corpus propter animam:3  ergo potius corpus deberet formari secundum exigentiam animae, quam anima produci secundum exigentiam corporis; sed illud, ad cuius exigentiam fit alterum, prius est:  ergo videtur, quod omnes animae, antequam sua corpora sint, productae fuerint.

4. Likewise, the soul is not on account of the body, but the body on account of the soul:3  therefore the body would have [deberet] to be formed according to the exigency of the soul, than the soul to be produced according to the exigency of the body; but that, for the exigency of which the other comes to be, is prior:  therefore it seems, that all souls have been produced, before their bodies are.

5. Item, reperimus spiritum, qui per naturam suam est omnino separatus, et spiritum, qui per naturam suam semper est coniunctus:  ergo videtur, quod sit reperire spiritum, qui sit natus esse separatus et coniunctus;4 talis autem non est nisi anima humana.  Ergo si anima humana de sua natura est separata, ergo videtur, quod animae separatim a suis corporibus debuerint produci, et ita simul.

5. Likewise, we find a spirit, which through its nature is entirely separated (form a body), and a spirit, which through its nature is always conjoined:  therefore it seems, that there is the finding of a spirit, which is bound to be separated and conjoined;4 but such is not but the human soul.  Therefore, if the human soul of its nature has been separated (from the body), therefore it seems, that souls will have [debuerint] to be produced separately from their bodies, and thus together.

Ad oppositum arguitur sic.

For the opposite it is argued thus:

1. In Psalmo:5  Qui finxit singillatim corda eorum; Glossa exponit, id est animas:  ergo animae factae sunt singillatim et successive, sicut et corpora.

1. On the Psalm:5  Who fashions singly their hearts; the Gloss expounds, “that is (their) souls”:  therefore souls have been made singly and successively, just as even bodies.

2. Item, Augustinus in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus:6  Tenendum est, quod animae non sunt simul creatae.

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine (says) in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas:6  It must be held, that souls were not created together.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione.  Si animae essent creatae ante corpus, aut haberent usum rationis, aut non.  Si non; quaero, quid impediret? et cum non sit dare, restat, quod si simul conditae fuerunt, statim habuerunt usum rationis; et si hoc, ergo meruerunt, vel demeruerunt, quorum utrumque est contra Apostolum ad Romanos nono:7  Antequam aliquid boni vel mali egissent etc.

3. Likewise, this seems by reason.  If souls had been created before (their) body, either they would have the use of reason, or not.  If not; I ask, “What would impede (this)? and since there is no giving (of a reply to this question), it remains, that if they were founded together, they would immediately have the use of reason; and if this, therefore they merited, and/or demerited, both each of which is contrary to the Apostle in the ninth (chapter of his Letter) to the Romans:7  Before they had done anything of good and/or evil etc..

4. Item, si animae fuerunt simul creatae, aut volunt venire ad corpus, aut non.  Si volunt, cum corpora illa sint infecta et poenalia:  ergo sunt impiae et stultae, cum veniant voluntarie ad contra- / -hendam . . .

4. Likewise, if souls were created together, either they will to come to a body, or (they do) not.  If they will (this), since those bodies are tainted [infecta] and as a punishment [poenalia]:  therefore they are impious and foolish, since they come voluntarily to contract . . .

1  Vers. 10. —  Paulo superius post omnium in aliquibus codd. additur hominum.  Subinde cod. N legit:  sed non quantum ad corpus, ergo quantum ad animam:  ergo anima Iob etc.

2  Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 3.

3  Vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 36. seq. (c. 4.).

4  Simile invenitur supra pag. 210, nota 1.

5  Psalm. 32, 15.  —  Glossam ordinariam, quae est secundum Breviarium in Psalmos (inter opera Hieronymi) in hunc locum, vide apud Lyranum; idem dicit Glossa interlinearis.

6  Cap. 14:  Animas hominum non esse ab initio inter ceteras intellectuales naturas, nec simul creatas, sicut Origenes fingit etc.  —  Hic liber est Gennadii.

7  Vers. 11.

1  Verse 10.  —  A little above this after of all [omnium] there is added in some codices men [hominum].  Then (after the quote from v. 10), codex N reads:  but not as much as regards (their) body, therefore as much as regards (their) soul:  therefore the soul of Job etc. [sed non quantum ad corpus, ergo quantum ad animam:  ergo anima Iob etc]

2  Cf. above d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 3.

3  See Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 36 f. (ch. 4).

4  The similar is found above in d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 210, footnote 1.

5  Psalm 32:15.  —  See the Glossa ordinaria, which is according to the Breviarium in Psalmos, (numbered among the works of St. Jerome), on this passage, in (Nicholas) of Lyra; the Glossa interlinearis says the same.

6  Chapter 14:  That the souls of men are not from the start (of creation) among all the other intellectual natures, nor created together, just as Origen feigned etc.  —  This book is by Gennadius.

7  Verse 11.

 

p. 449

 

culpam et poenam.  If nolunt, et mittuntur in corpora:  ergo cum sint innocentes, fit eis iniuria, dum ante infligitur poena, quam commisisent culpam.1

fault and punishment.  If they do not will (this), and are sent into bodies:  therefore since they are innocent, injury is done to them, since a punishment is inflicted before they had committed a fault.1

5. Item, anima quamdiu est in corpore, mole corporis gravatur:2  ergo melius est ei et perfectius est esse extra carnem quam in carne; sed non est ordo, sed perversio, procedere ad statum minus perfectum a statu magis perfecto.  Si ergo Deus et natura ordinate facit quidquid facit, nec ordine naturae nec ordine divinae providentiae decet, animas simul creari et postmodum corporibus uniri.  —  Ad hoc etiam faciunt rationes, quae supra3 adductae sunt de anima Adae, ubi ostenditur, quod anima creata fuerit in corpore, et non ante.

5. Likewise, the soul, as long as it is in the body, is weighed down [gravatur] by the mass of the body:2  therefore it is better for it and more perfect to be outside of the flesh than in the flesh; but it is not an order, but a perversion, to proceed to a less perfect state from a more perfect state.  If, therefore, God and nature do, whatever they do, ordinately, it befits [decet] neither the order of nature nor the order of Divine Providence, that souls are created together and after a while are united to bodies.  —  For this also work the reasons, which were adduced above3 concerning the soul of Adam, where it is shown, that (his) soul was created in the body, and not before.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Animae humanae non fuerunt simul creatae.

CONCLUSION

 

Human souls were not created together.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi:  unus secundum aestimationem aliquorum philosophorum, alter secundum inventionem quorundam haereticorum, tertius secundum instructionem sanctorum Doctorum.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that there is a threefold manner of speaking about this:  one, according to the estimation of some philosophers, another, according to the invention of certain heretics, a third, according to the instruction of the holy Doctors.

Primus modus dicendi est, quod animae simul fuerunt creatae in stellis comparibus, et post, formatis corporibus sibi idoneis, ad haec corpora vivificanda descendunt per lacteum caelum et alios orbes planetarum, et postmodum, corruptis corporibus, illuc revertuntur, et postmodum suo loco et tempore iterum descendunt; et cum descendunt, obliviscuntur malorum, quae in corpore habuerunt.  Haec autem positio Platonis4 fuit et suorum sequacium, et hanc multum nititur approbare Macrobius, explanans somnium Scipionis.  —  Sed vere ista positio plus est somnium quam aliquod dictum authenticum.  Primum quidem, quia talis creatio et descensus et ascensus nullam omnino potest habere certitudinem, cum nemo possit hoc convincere ratiocinando, nemo etiam sit, qui possit dicere, se talium recordari.5  Secundo vero, quia manifestam continet absurditatem:  quia, dum ponit talem animarum circulationem, ponit, quod anima non sit vera corporis perfectio, cum « proprius actus in propria materia habeat fieri ».6  Ponit etiam, quod nulla possit esse beatitudo, cum illa non sit, nisi ubi est perpetuitas et certitudo, sicut ostendit Augustinus de Trinitate decimo quarto.7

The first manner of speaking is, that souls were created in companion stars [stellis comparibus], and afterwards, with bodies suitable to them being formed, they descend to vivify these bodies through a milky heaven [lacteum caelum] and the other orbs of the planets, and after a while, with (their) bodies corrupted, they revert thither, and after a while they descend again according to their place and time; and when they descend, they forget the evils, which they had in the body.  Moreover this was the position of Plato4 and his followers, and Macrobius, explaining the dream of Scipio, strives much to approve it.  —  But truly this position of theirs is more a dream than any authentic saying.  First, indeed, because such a creation and descent and ascent an have entirely no certitude, since no one can conclusively prove [convincere] it by reasoning, (and) there is no one, who can say, that he remembers such (things).5  But second, because it contains a manifest absurdity:  because, when it posits such a circulation of soul, it posits, that the soul is not the true perfection of a body, since « one’s own act has to come to be in one’s own matter ».6  It also posits, that there can be no beatitude, since the latter is not, but where there is perpetuity and certitude, just as (St.) Augustine shows in the fourteenth (book) On the Trinity.7

Secundus modus dicendi est, quod animae humanae simul fuerunt create in caelo cum Angelis, utpote quia sunt eiusdem naturae, et postmodum ad suggestionem dei tenebrarum peccaverunt, et merito illius peccati in corpora sunt detrusae tanquam in carceres, ut ibi purgentur, et cum purgatae fuerint, ad caelestem patriam revocentur.  —  Haec autem positio est haereticorum, qui dicuntur Manichaei,8 et non solum est contra fidem catholicam, sed etiam contra philosophiam et contra sensibilem experientiam.  Contra fidem Catholicam est, cum ponat, animas ante peccasse, quam corporibus essent unitae, cum dicat Apostolus de Iacob et Esau ad Romanos nono:9  Antequam aliquid boni et mali egissent; ponat etiam, nullam animam damnari finaliter, et ita timorem Dei auferat de corde.  —  Contra philosophiam est, dum ponit, animas circuire diversa corpora, cum « propria forma in propria materia habeat fieri »;10 dum etiam ponit, quod corpus comparatur ad animam non sicut perfectibile, sed sicut carcer; quod si verum est, homo non est vera species, cum ex anima et corpore non fiat unum.  —  Contra rationem et sensibilem experientiam est, quia videmus, animam, quantumcumque bonam, nolle a corpore separari, secundum quod dicit Apostolus:11  Nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri; quod mirum esset, si ad corpus naturalem aptitudinem et inclinationem non haberet sicut ad suum sodalem, non sicut ad carcerem.  Videmus etiam, quod nihil novimus, nisi ea quae, postquam nati sumus, didicimus; quod non esset, si animae nostrae a primordio creatae fuissent et in caelo peccassent; multa enim alia scirent.  Quodsi tu dicas, quod mole corporis oppressae obliviscuntur; quaero tunc:  quare processu temporis non recordantur aliqua?

But the second manner of speaking is, that human souls were created together with the Angels in Heaven, seeing that they are of the same nature, and after a while they sinned at the suggestion of the god of darkness, and by the merit of that sin they were thrust down as into prisons, to be purged there, and when they have been purged, to be recalled to their heavenly fatherland.  —  But this is the position of the heretics, who are called “Manichees”,8 and it is not only against the Catholic Faith, but even against philosophy and against sensible experience.  It is against the Catholic Faith, when it posits, that souls sinned before they were united to (their) bodies, since the Apostle says of Jacob and Esau in the ninth (chapter of his Letter) to the Romans:9  Before they did anything of good and evil; it also posits, that no soul is ultimately [finaliter] damned, and thus it takes away the fear of God from the heart.  —  It is against philosophy, since it posits, that souls go round diverse bodies, since « one’s own form hast to come to be in one’s own matter »;10 since it also posits, that the body is compared to the soul not as a perfectible, but as a prison, which if (this) is true, ‘man’ is not a true species, since one (thing) does not come to be out of soul and body.  — It is against reason and sensible experience, because we see, that the soul, howsoever good, does not want to be separated from the body, according to what the Apostle11 says:  We do not wish to be despoiled, but to be clothed over; which would be wonderful, if it did not have a natural aptitude and inclination for the body just as for its own attendant [sodalem], not just as for a prison.  We also see, that we know nothing, except those which we have learned, after we were born; which would not be, if our souls had been created from the first rise (of creation) and had sinned in Heaven; for they would know many other (things).  Wherefore if you say, that after they are oppressed by the mass of the body they forget; then I ask:  “Why do they not remember some (things) after the passing [processu] of time?”

Tertius modus dicendi est, quod animae non simul sunt creatae, sed successive producuntur in suis corporibus; et in hoc consenserunt omnes catholici tractatores, et adeo certum est, quod non licet alicui dubitare de animabus aliorum hominum . . .

The third manner of speaking is, that souls were not created together, but are produced successively in their own bodies; and in this all Catholic tract writers consented, and it is so certain, that it is not licit for anyone to doubt (this) concerning the souls of any men . . .

1  Vide supra pag. 417, nota 6.

2  Sap. 9, 15:  Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam.  —  De minori vide supra pag. 330, nota 5.

3  Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 3.  —  Paulo superius ante divinae providentiae in non paucis codd. omittitur ordine.

4  In Timaeo, (ed. Serrani, tom. III. pag. 41. seqq.) et in Phaedro (ibid. pag. 246, seqq.), ubi triplicem animae describit statum, scil. cum est in caelo nondum cum corpore coniuncta, cum in corpore est, denique cum e corpore discessit.  Cfr. etiam supra pag. 22, nota 1.  —  Macrobius, I. in Somnium Scip. c. 14. et 21.  —  Paulo inferius codd. I (Q a secunda manu) aa quia talis circulatio pro quia talis creatio.

5  Cfr. August., XII. de Trin. c. 15. n. 24.

6  Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.).

7  Cap. 14. n. 20.  Melius allegaretur liber XIII. c. 7. n. 10. seq., sed secuti sumus codd.  Cfr. X. de Civ. Dei, c. 30; XII. c. 20; XXII. c. 27.

8  Idem docent secundum August., de Haeresibus, c. 70, Priscillianistae et Origines, sicut ibid. c. 42, ac XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 23. dicitur.  —  Paulo inferius edd. cum aliquibus codd. et etiam sensibilem pro et contra sensibilem.

9  Vers. 11.

10  Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 26. (c. 2.).

11  Epist. II. Cor. 5, 4.  —  Paulo inferius edd. 3, 4 cum Vat. sed sicut pro non sicut.

1  See above d. 17, a. 1, q. 3, p. 417, footnote 6.

2  Wis. 9:15:  For the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul [Corpus enim, quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam].  —  On the minor (of the argument) see above d. 13, Doubt 2, p. 330, footnote 5.

3  Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 3. —  A little above this in not a few codices there is had nor (that) of Divine Providence [nec divinae providentiae] for nor the order of Divine Providence [nec ordine divinae providentiae].

4  In (his) Timaeus, (Serrani Edition, tome III, p. 41 ff.) and in Phaedro, (ibid., p. 246 ff.), where he describes the threefold state of the soul, namely, when it is in Heaven, not yet conjoined with the body; when it is in the body, and then when it has departed out of the body.  Cf. also above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, p. 22, footnote 1.  —  Macrobius, On the Dream of Scipio, Bk. I, chs. 14 and 21.  —  A little below this codices I (Q by a second hand) and aa have because such a circulation [quia talis circulatio] for because such a creation [quia talis creatio].

5  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XII, ch. 15, n. 24.

6  Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 26 (ch. 2).

7  Chapter 14, n. 20.  It would have been better to cited Bk. XIII, ch. 7, n. 10 f., but we have followed the codices.  Cf. On the City of God, Bk. X, ch. 30; Bk. XII, ch. 20; and Bk. XXII, ch. 27.

8  According to (St.) Augustine, On Heresies, ch. 70, the Priscilianists and Origen teach the same, just as is said ibid., ch. 42, and On the City of God, Bk. XI, ch. 23.  —  A little below this the editions, together with some codices, have and even sensible [et etiam sensibilem] for and against sensible [et contra sensibilem].

9  Verse 11.

10  Aristotle, On the Soul, bk. II, text 26 (ch. 2).

11  2 Cor. 5:4.  —  A little below this editions 3 and 4, together with the Vatican edition, have but just [sed sicut] for not just [non sicut].

 

p. 450

 

ab Adam.  Nam de anima Adae dubitasse videtur Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram,1 utrum fuerit ante corpus, vel in corpore creata.  De istis autem non dubitat, immo improbat, quod ante corpus productae fuerint, duplici ratione movente circa animas aliorum hominum, quarum nulla reperitur in anima Adae.  Prima est, quod animae, cum corporibus uniuntur, orginalem culpam contrahunt et inficiuntur, ita quod nullam habent culpam actualem:  ergo in eis nec meritum nec demeritum potuit praecedere nec liberi arbitrii usus nec deliberatio veniendi vel non veniendi ad corpus.2  —   Alia vero ratio est, quia animae nostrae a sua prima origine sunt ignorantes nec noverunt ista quae per sensus addiscunt; non enim addiscere est reminisci, ut probant Sancti et philosophi.3  —  Et ideo animae nostrae hac duplici de causa non possunt dici ante corpora productae, tum propter ignorantiam, tum propter originalem culpam, quarum neutra fuit in anima Adae, quando in corpus fuit infusa; et ideo magis de illa dubitavit, quam de istis.  Probabilius tamen est de illa dicere, sicut supra4 ostensum fuit, quod fuerit creata in corpore.

(who have descended) from Adam.  For (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis,1 seems to have doubted concerning the soul of Adam, whether it was created before (his) body, and/or in (his) body.  But of those (who have descended from him) he does not doubt, nay he disproves, that they were produced before (their) body, by a twofold moving reason concerning the souls of other men, none of which is found in the soul of Adam.  The first is, that souls, when they are united to bodies, contract the original fault [culpam originalem] and are tainted, such that they have no actual fault:  therefore in them neither merit nor demerit could precede nor the use of free will nor the deliberation to come and/or not come to a body.2  —  But the other reason is, that our souls are ignorant from their first origin and they do not know those (things) which they learned additionally [addiscunt] through the senses; for learning (something) more [addiscere] is not reminiscing, as the Saints and philosophers prove.3  —  And for that reason our souls cannot be said (“to have been) produced before (their) bodies” from this twofold cause, both on account of (their) ignorance, and on account of the original fault, neither of which was in the soul of Adam, when it was infused into (his) body; and for that reason he doubted more concerning the latter, than concerning them.  Yet it is more probable concerning the latter to say, just as has been shown above,4 that it was created in (his) body.

De istis autem non solum debemus opinari probabiliter, sed etiam cogimur credere fideliter, quod ante corpora creatae non fuerint; et hoc omnes catholici sentiunt tractatores.  Et sic, quando invenitur eorum auctoritas, quae videatur aliud sonare, pie intelligenda est; quia vel loquuntur secundum aliorum opinionem, vel si secundum propriam loquuntur, intelligunt, quod anima, priusquam corpori uniatur, creata est, non ordine temporis, sed naturae.  Et sic intelligenda sunt verba Gregorii Nazianzeni et verba Damasceni5 et verba etiam Augustini in libro de Anima et spiritu, qui dicit, quod concupiscibilitas et irascibilitas prius insunt animae, quam ipsa uniatur corpori.  In omnibus enim istis magis notatur ordo naturae quam temporis.  —  Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod animae non fuerunt simul creatae.

But of these we ought not only probably opine, but we are driven also to faithfully believe, that they were not created before (their) bodies; and all Catholic tract writers think this.  And thus, when a quote [auctoritas] of theirs is found, which seems to sound different [aliud], it must be piously understood; because either they are speaking according to the opinion of others, and/or if they are speaking according to their own opinion, they understand, that the soul was created before it was united to the body, not according to the order of time, but (according to the order) of nature.  And thus are the words of (St.) Gregory Nazianzen and the words of (St. John) Damascene5 to be understood and even the words of (St.) Augustine in the book On Soul and Spirit, who says, that concupiscibility and irascibility are in souls before they are united to the body.  For in all these (quotes) there is noted the order of nature rather than (that) of time.  —  Therefore the reasons showing, that souls were not created together, are to be conceded.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo de Iob, dicendum, quod tecum non dicit ibi associationem quantum ad simultatem durationis, sed dicit conformitatem in participatione rationis, quasi diceret:  Feci tecum, id est tibi similem.6

1. To that which is objected first from Job, it must be said, that “with thee” does not mean there an association as much regards the togetherness of a duration, but means a conformity in the participation in reason, as if it said:  I made with thee, that is “(whom I made) a similar to thyself”.6

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Angeli sunt simul creati, quia incorruptibiles; dicendum, quod ista non est ratio tota; sed quia sunt incorruptibiles, ita quod non habeant inclinationem ad alicuius alterius rei perfectionem.  Anima vero, cum sit perfectio corporis, naturalem habet inclinationem ad corpus; et ideo, quamvis sit incorruptibilis et a corpore separabilis, debet tamen tunc produci, quando facta est formatio corporis, secundum7 exigentiam inclinationis ad corpus, quam non est ponere in Angelis.  Qui autem hanc inclinationem negat esse in animabus, indiget sensu.

2. To that which is objected, that the Angels were created together, because (they are) incorruptible; it must be said, that this is not the whole reason; but because they are incorruptible, such that they do not have an inclination to the perfection of any other thing.  But the soul, since it is the perfection of the body, has a natural inclination to the body; and for that reason, though it is incorruptible and separable from the body, yet it ought to be produced at that time [tunc], when the formation of the body is wrought, according to7 the exigency of the inclination to the body, of which there is no positing in the Angels.  But he who denies that this inclination is in souls, is lacking in sense.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis animae duratio a parte post est aequalis durationi Angeli, ergo et a parte ante; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia duratio aeviterni a parte post est infinita, et infinitum infinito non est maius;8 et ideo nulla substantia spiritualis incorruptibilis potest aliam excedere quantum ad durationem ex parte post.  Quantum autem ad durationem ex parte ante est finitas, et ex illa parte potest esse excessus, et excedit duratio Angeli durationem animae propter naturam animae, per quam habet uniri proprie corpori ut perfectibili.  Et quia corpora non decuit simul esse, sed successive produci; spiritus similiter humanos oportuit non simul produci, sed succesive.

3. To that which is objected, that the duration of every soul on the part of (its) thereafter is equal to the duration of an Angel, therefore also on the part of (its) before; it must be said, that it is not similar, because the duration of an eviternal on the part of (its) thereafter is infinite, and an infinite is not greater than an infinite;8 and for that reason no spiritual substance can exceed another as much as regards (its) duration on the part of (its) thereafter.  But as much as regards (its) duration on the part of (its) before there is a finity, and on that side there can be an excess, and the duration of an Angel does exceed the duration of a soul on account of the nature of the soul, through which (nature) it has to be united properly to a body as to a perfectible.  And because it was not fitting [non decuit] that bodies be together, but be produced successively; similarly it was necessary [oportuit] that human spirits not be produced together, but successively.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corpus est propter animam; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen non oportet propter hoc, quod anima praecedet secundum rem, sed solum secundum inten- / -tionem . . .

4. To that which is objected, that the body is on account of the soul; it must be said, that (it is) true, but, yet, it is not necessary [non oportet] on account of this, that the soul precede (the body) according to thing, but only according to the inten- / -tion . . .

1  Libr. VII. c. 24. n. 35. seqq.  —  Paulo inferius non pauci codd. originaliter culpam pro originalem culpam.

2  Hanc rationem insinuat August., VI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 9, n. 15; X. c. 7. n. 12; c. 15. n. 27; c. 17. n. 30; I. de Anima et eius origine, c. 8. n. 8; c. 12. n. 15; II. c. 7. n. 11. seq.; III. c. 8. n. 11; Epist. 166 (alias 28.) ad Hieronym. c. 9. n. 27. et Epist. 190. (alias 157.) ad Optatum, c. 3. n. 22.

3  Aristot., II. Prior. c. 21. (c. 23.); I. Poster. c. 1; August., XII. de Trin. c. 15. n. 24; VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 11. n. 16.  —  Aliquanto inferius plurimi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 substituunt in corpore fuit infusa pro in corpus fuit infusa.

4  Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 3.

5  Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 12. aperte sententiam catholicam docet:  « Porro corpus et anima simul creata sunt, non autem uti deliravit Origenes, haec prius, illud posterius ».  Eandem doctrinam profitetur Greg. Naz., Orat. 31. n. 9.  Hoc non obstante, apud Scholasticos invenitur argumentum in contrarium, quod fundabatur in quadam propositione, quam hi duo doctores formaverunt de creatione Angelorum.  B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 3, hoc arg. ita affert:  Adhuc in idem sentit Damascenus in secundo libro [de Fide orthod.] c. 3, ubi inducens Gregorium Nazianzenum, quem vocat theologum, dicit sic:  « Ego autem consentio Gregorio theologo [Orat. 42. n. 12.]; docebat [eprepe, i  e. decebat] enim, primo intellectualem substantiam creari, et ita, hoc est consequenter, sensibilem » [textus originalis addit:  atque ita demum hominem ex utraque constantem].  Cum ergo anima sit substantia intellectualis, et corpus substantia sensibilis, anima est ante corpus creata etc.  —  Retinuimus cum Vat. Gregorii Nazianzeni, quamvis in multis codd. et edd. 1, 2 substituatur Gregorii Nysseni, tum quia lectio nostra in aliquibus codd. habetur, tum quia confirmatur ex verbis B. Alberti modo relatis.  Immo idem in comment. super III. de anima, tr. 2. c. 10, censet, Gregorium Nyssenum sententiae Platonis de praeexistentia animae adhaesisse.  Insuper in S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 3. quatuor rationes affert, quibus Gregorius utitur in suo libro de Anima contra Eunomium, qui animam definivit substantiam incorpoream, in corpore conditam.  Cfr. tamen Gr. Nyss. liber de Hominis opificio, c. 28. seq.  —  Verba auctoris libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 13. sunt:  Nec aliud nec minus est irascibilitas vel concupiscibilitas, quam anima . . . Has potentias habet antequam corpori misceatur.

6  Haec ex Gregorio sumta solutio iam supra d. 12. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. habetur.

7  Codd. Y aa propter.

8  Cfr. supra pag. 20, nota 7.

1  Book VII, ch. 24, n. 35 ff..  —  A little below this not a few codices have originally contract the fault [originaliter culpam] for contract the original fault [originalem culpam].

2  (St.) Augustine insinuates this reason, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VI, ch. 9, n. 15; Bk. X, ch. 7, n. 12; ch. 15, n. 27; ch. 17, n. 30; On the Soul and Its Origin, Bk. I, ch. 8, n. 8; ch. 12, n. 15, Bk. II, ch. 7, n. 11 f.; Bk. III, ch. 8, n. 11; Epistle 166 (alias 28) to Jerome, ch. 9, n. 27, and Epistle 190 (alias 157) to Optatus, ch. 3, n. 22.

3  Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 21 (ch. 23); Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 1; (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XII, ch. 15, n. 24; On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VII, ch. 11, n. 16.  —  Somewhat below this very many codices, together with editions 1 and 2, substitute in (his) body [in corpore] for into (his) body [in corpus].

4  Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 3.

5  On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 12 he openly teaches the Catholic sentence:  « Furthermore, the body and the soul were created together, but not as Origin madly asserted [deliravit], the latter first, the former afterwards ».  (St.) Gregory Nazianzen professes the same doctrine, Oration 31, n. 9.  This not withstanding, among the Scholastics there is found an argument unto the contrary, which was founded upon a certain proposition, which these two doctors formed concerning the creation of the Angels.  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 4, a. 3, reports this argument thus:  Also holding the same is (St. John) Damascene, in the second book (On the Orthodox Faith), ch. 3, where introducing (St.) Gregory Nazianzen, whom he calls “the theologian”, he speaks thus:  « But I consent with Gregory the theologian (Oration 42, n. 12); for he taught (Gk. eprepe, it was fitting), that intellectual substance is created first, and thus, that is consequently, sensible (substance) » (the original Greek text adds:  and thus at last man being established out of each).  Therefore since the soul is an intellectual substance, and the body a sensible substance, the soul was created before the body etc.  —  We retain with the Vatican edition Gregory Nazianzen [Gregorii Nazianzeni], although in many codices and editions 1 and 2, there is substituted (St.) Gregory Nyssa [Gregorii Nysseni], both because our reason is had in some codices, and because it is confirmed from the words of Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), just related.  Nay he judges the same in (his) Commentary on the 3rd Book On the Soul, tr. 2, ch. 10, that Gregory Nyssa adhered to the sentence of Plato concerning the preexistence of the soul.  Moreover in (his) Summa., p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 4, a. 3, he cites four reasons, which Gregory uses in his book On the Soul against Eunomius, who defined the soul as an incorporeal substance, founded in the body.  Cf. however, (St.) Gregory of Nyssa’s book, On the Work of Man, ch. 28 f..  —  The word of the author of the book On Spirit and Soul, ch. 13 are:  Irascibility and/or concupiscibility is neither other nor less than the soul . . . It has these powers before it is mixed in the body.

6  This solution taken from (St.) Gregory is already had above in d. 12, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to n. 3.

7  Codices Y and aa have on account of [propter] for according to [secundum].

8  Cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, p. 20, footnote 7.

 

p. 451

 

inten- / -tionem artificis; finis enim, etsi praecedat in intentione, tamen habet sequi in executione.1

the inten- / -tion of the Craftsman; for an end, even if it precedes in the intention, yet it has to follow in the execution.1

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deberet esse spiritus, qui modo sit separatus, modo coniunctus; dicendum, quod illa combinatio non est congrua, nec debet esse per naturam.  Spiritus enim, qui naturaliter coniungitur corpori, nunquam natus est a corpore separari nisi propter poenam peccati.  Cum enim sit incorruptibilis secundum naturalem institutionem, debet ei aptari corpus incorruptibile, cum non possit ab eo separari absque dolore;2 et ideo illa tertia differentia spiritus non debet naturaliter reperiri.  —  Posset tamen dici, quod competentius est, animam manere post corpus quam ante, quia incorruptibile necessario excedit corruptibile duratione ex parte post; sed commetiri se potest duratione ex parte ante.  Et hoc quidem decebat esse in anima et corpore, cum proportio debeat esse perfectionis ad perfectibile, quanta potest esse.

5. To that which is objected, that there would have to be a spirit, which is now separated, now conjoined; it must be said, that that combination is not congruous, nor ought it be through nature.  For the spirit, which is naturally conjoined to a body, is never bound to be separated from the body except on account of the punishment for sin.  For since it is incorruptible according to (its) natural institution, an incorruptible body ought to be fitted [aptari] to it, since it cannot be separated from it apart from sorrow [dolore];2 and for that reason that third difference of spirit ought not naturally be found.  —  Yet it could be said, that it is more suitable [competentius], that the soul remain after the body than before (it), because the incorruptible necessarily exceeds the corruptible according duration on the part of the thereafter; but it can be commensurate [commetiri] according to duration on the part of the before.  And, indeed, it was fitting that this be in the soul and body, since there ought to be a proportion of the perfection to the perfectible, as much as there can be.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

Haec quaestio iam tacta est supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 3. respectu animae Adae.  Errorem Platonis et Origenis refellunt omnes Scholastici; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 2.  —  Scot., in utroque Scripto, d. 17. q. 1.  —  S. Thom., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 90. a. 4; S. c. Gent. II. c. 83; de Potent. q. 3. a. 10.  —  B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 1.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1; II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1. a. 3. quaestiunc. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3.  —  Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2. a. 2. dub. lat. 1.  —  Durand., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 2.  —  Dionys. Carth., II. Sent. d. 17. q. 3.  —  Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1, in fine.

This Question has already been touched upon above in d. 17, a. 1, q. 3, in respect of the soul of Adam.  The error of Plato and Origin is refuted by all the Scholastics; Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 62, m. 2.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, in each version of his Commentary, d. 17, q. 1.  —  St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 2, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 90, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 83; de Potentia, q. 3, a. 10.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus, Summa., p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 4, a. 1.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in a. 2, a. 1; Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiuncula 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 3.  —  Giles the Roman, Sent, Bk. II, d. 17, q. 2, a. 2, 1st lateral doubt.  —  Durandus, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 2.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 3.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, a. 1, at the end.

1  Vide Aristot., II. Phys. text. 89. (c. 9.); VII. Metaph. text. 23. (VI. c. 7.); III. de Anima, text. 49. (c. 10.).

2  Cfr. infra d. 19. a. 2. q. 1. et a. 3. q. 1, ubi hoc explicatur.

1  See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 89, (ch .9); Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 23 (Bk. VI, ch. 7); On the Soul, Bk. III, text 49, (ch. 10).

2  Cf. below d. 19, a. 2, q. 1, and a. 3, q. 1, where this is explained.

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