COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII
ARTICULUS II. Quaestio III.	ARTICLE II Question 3
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 451-454. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 451-454. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO III. Utrum anima rationalis sit ex traduce.	QUESTION 3 Whether a rational soul is out of a transduction?
TERTIO QUAERITUR, supposito, quod animae producantur successive, utrum anima rationalis sit ex traduce. Et quod sic, videtur.	THIRD THERE IS ASKED, having supposed, that souls are produced successively, whether the rational soul is out of a transduction [ex traduce].* And that (it is) so, seems:
1. Genesis quadragesimo sexto:³ Omnes animae, quae egressae sunt de femore Iacob, sunt septuaginta duo. Si tu dicas, quod anima non stat ibi pro substantia rationali, sed pro vita carnali sive homine exteriori; obiicitur de Genesis secundo:⁴ in formatione mulieris nunquam dicitur, quod Deus inspiraverit in eam spiraculum vitae: ergo videtur, quod tota mulier de Adam producta fuerit quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus.	1. According to the forty-sixth (book) of Genesis:³ All the souls, which have stepped froth from the thigh [femore] of Jacob, are seventy-two. If you say, that “soul” [anima] does not stand there for the rational substance, but for the carnal life or the exterior man; there is objected from the second (chapter) of Genesis:⁴ in the formation of the woman there is never said, that God breathed into her the breath of life: therefore it seems, that the whole woman, as much as regards soul and as much as regards body, was produced from Adam.
2. Item, ad Ephesios secundo:⁵ Nascimus omnes natura filii irae; sed non sumus filii irae ex parte carnis, sed ex parte animae, nec sumus filii irae, nisi quia sumus filii Adae: ergo anima nostra procedit ex anima Adae.	2. Likewise, according to the second (chapter of St. Paul’s Letter) to the Ephesians:⁵ All of us are by nature born sons of wrath, but we are not sons of wrath on the part of the flesh, but on the part of the soul, nor are we sons of wrath, but because we are sons of Adam: therefore our soul proceed out of the soul of Adam.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Actus generandi est entis completi — tunc etiam unumquodque completum est, cum potest generare tale, quale ipsum est⁶ — sed anima humana inter omnes formas naturales est perfectissima: ergo si alia forma naturalis habet potentiam multiplicandi se in diversis materiis, sicut una flamma in diversis candelis, multo fortius hoc videtur esse in anima rationali.	3. Likewise, this very (thing) seems by reason. The act of generation belongs to the complete being — for each one has been completed then, when it can generate such, as it itself is⁶ — but the human soul is the most perfect among all natural forms: therefore if another natural form has the power of multiplying itself in diverse matters, just as one flame (does) among diverse candles, much more strongly does this seem to be in the rational soul.
4. Item, vis generativa principaliter residet penes animam: ergo si « homo generat hominem »,⁷ cum generatio consistat in productione similis, principalius producit animam quam carnem: ergo si caro est ex carne, multo fortius anima est ex traduce.	4. Likewise, the generative force resides principally within the soul: therefore if « a human generates a human »,⁷ since generation consists in the production of a similar, it produces more principally the soul than the flesh: therefore if the flesh is out of flesh, much more strongly is the soul out of a transduction [ex traduce].
5. Item, aequae magna vel maior congruentia est hominis ad hominem, quam sit bruti ad brutum; et perfectior est vis generativa in homine, quam sit in aliquo bruto animali. Si ergo brutum totaliter potest producere brutum, et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, et non est necesse, animam brutorum creari: multo fortius videtur, quod anima rationalis possit traduci et per coitum seminari.	5. Likewise, an equally great and/or greater congruence is of a man to a man, than of a brute to a brute; and more perfect is the generative force in man, than it is in any brute animal. If, therefore, a brute can produce a brute totally, both as much as regards soul and as much as regards body, and it is not necessary, that the soul of brutes are created: much more strongly does it seem, that the rational soul can be transduced [traduci] and sown through carnal union.
6. Item, hoc videtur per deductionem ad inconveniens: aut enim anima rationalis est per propagationem, aut per creationem. Si per propagationem, habeo propositum, scilicet quod sit ex . . .	6. Likewise, this seems through a deduction to the unfitting: for either the rational soul is through propagation, or through creation. If through propagation, I have (attained) the proposed, namely that it is out of . . .
³ Vers. 26. seq., ubi Vulgata: Cunctae animae, quae ingressae sunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum, et egressae sunt de femore illius, absque uxoribus filiorum eius, sexaginta sex. Filii autem Ioseph, qui nati sunt et in terra Aegypti, animae duae. Omnes animae domus Iacob, quae ingressae sunt in Aegyptum, fuerunt* septuaginta. — Codd. cum primis edd., contra Vat., quae ponit sexaginta sex, exhibent lectionem in textu receptam, de qua cfr. Hieronym., Qq. hebraic. in Gen, et August., I. Qq. in Gen. q. 152, ubi ait: « Quod legitur, sexaginta sex animas intrasse cum Iacob in Aegyptum, exceptis videlicet filiis Ioseph, et deinde illis annumeratis, infertur: septuaginta quinque animae erant, cum quibus Iacob intravit in Aegyptum, sic accipiendum est, qui erant in domo Iacob, quando intravit in Aegyptum. Nam utique quos ibi invenit, non cum eis intravit » etc. Idem dicit XVI. de Civ. Dei, c. 40. ⁴ Vers. 22. ⁵ Vers. 3: Eramus natura filii irae. ⁶ Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.): « Naturalissimum enim operum, quae in viventibus, quaecumque perfecta et non mutilata sunt, aut generationem spontaneam habent, est facere alius, quale ipsum ». Idem dicit IV. Meteor. text. 19. (c. 3.). ⁷ Arisot., II. Phys. text. 26. (c. 2.) et VII. Metaph. text. 22. (VI. c. 7.), ubi etiam seq. prop. insinuatur.	³ Verse 26 f., where the Vulgate reads: All the souls, which stepped into Egypt with Jacob, and stepped froth from his thigh, apart from the wives of his sons, (were) sixty-six. Moreover the sons of Joseph, who were born too in the land of Egypt, (were) two souls. All the souls of the House of Jacob, who stepped into Egypt, were seventy [Cunctae animae, quae ingressae sunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum, et egressae sunt de femore illius, absque uxoribus filiorum eius, sexaginta sex. Omnes animae domus Iacob, quae ingressase sunt in Aegyptum, fuerunt septuaginta]. — The codices, together with the first editions, contrary to the Vatican edition, which has sixty-six [sexaginta sex], exhibit the reading received in the text, concerning which cf. (St.) Jerome, Question on the Hebrew Text of Genesis, and (St.) Augustine, Questions on Genesis, Bk. I, q. 152, where he says: « Wherefore there is read, that sixty-six souls entered with Jacob into Egypt, excepting that is the sons of Joseph, and then with them added, there is inferred: there were seventy five souls, with whom Jacob entered into Egypt, thus must it be accepted, they who were in the House of Jacob, when he entered into Egypt. For indeed those whom he found there, did not enter with him » etc. He says the same On the City of God, Bk. XVI, ch. 40. ⁴ Verse 22. ⁵ Verse 3: We were by nature sons of wrath [Eramus natura filii irae]. ⁶ Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 34 (ch. 4): « For the most natural of the works, which among (those) living (things), whichsoever (of them) are perfect and not mutilated, or have a spontaneous generation, is the making of another, of the kind as oneself ». He says the same On Meteorology, Bk. IV, text 19 (ch. 3). ⁷ Aristotle, Physics, Bk. II, text 26 (ch. 2), and Metaphysics, Bk. VII, text 22 (Bk. VI, ch. 7), where even the following proposition is insinuated.
* [Trans. nota: Hic videtur perperam quod nota originalis lectus est fuere pro fuerunt.]	* [Trans. note: Here ex traduce requires some explanation. In Latin a tradux in the sense employed here, is the cutting or slip from which one mature plant is ultimately propagated from the mature plant, from which the slip was cut. Thus de traduce is often rendered from (a) propagation, and ex traduce as on account of (a) propagation; however, the concept is more precise in Latin, since the term refers to that manner of propagation in which something properly of the parent becomes properly the offspring; whereas natural propagation in animals is such that something accidental in the parents, conjoined, becomes properly the offspring. For the translation transduction, cf. St. Bonaventure’s equivalent use of per traductionem, here the Response, in the third paragraph.]

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traduce. Si per creationem, cum Deus, cuius est creare, nihil possit vel debeat inordinate facere; videtur, quod sicut adultero non dat gratiam, quae immediate procedit ab ipso, sic etiam corpori per adulterium generato non debeat infundere animam. Quodsi infundat, videtur esse reprehensibilis et acceptare coitum adulterii.¹	a transduction. If through creation, since God, to whom ‘creating’ belongs, can and/or ought do nothing inordinately; it seems that just as He does not give the grace, which proceed immediately from Him, to the adulterer, so also He ought not infuse a soul in a body generated through adultery. Wherefore if He does infuse (one), it seems, that He is reprehensible and that He accepts the carnal union of the adulterer.¹
CONTRA: 1. Isaiae quinquagesimo septimo:² Omnem flatum ego feci; constat, quod de flatu corporali non intelligit, ergo de flatu spirituali, qui est anima rationalis: ergo sicut solus Deus insufflavit in faciem Adae spiraculum vitae, ita creat animam cuiuslibet hominis.	ON THE CONTRARY: 1. According to the fifty-seventh (chapter) of Isaiah:² Every breath I have made; it is established, that (Scripture) does not understand this of corporal breath, therefore (it does) of the spiritual breath, which is the rational soul: therefore just as God alone breathed in upon the face of Adam the breath of life, so He creates the soul of each man.
2. Item, Philosophus in decimo sexto de Animalibus:³ « Solus intellectus intrat ab extrinseco »; sed si traduceretur, non intraret ab extrinseco: ergo anima rationalis non est ex traduce.	2. Likewise, the Philosopher (says) in the sixteenth (book) On Animals:³ « The intellect alone enters from outside [ab extrinseco] »; but if it were transduced, it would not enter from outside: therefore the rational soul is not out of a transduction.
3. Item, ratione videtur. Omne quod est per naturam propagabile, est per naturam corruptibile; sed anima rationalis, secundum philosophos et secundum etiam omnes leges et sectas, est incorruptibilis: ergo non est per naturam propagabilis:⁴ ergo non est ex traduce.	3. Likewise, it seems by reason. Everything which is propagatable through nature, is corruptible through nature; but the rational soul, according to philosophers and according even to all laws and sects, is incorruptible: therefore it is not propagatable through nature:⁴ therefore it is not out of a transduction.
4. Item, si anima est ex traduce, aut ergo anima est ex carne, aut anima ex anima. Ex carne esse non potest, quoniam impossibile est, ex corpore fieri non-corpus; anima autem est non-corpus, sicut multipliciter probat Philosophus et Augustinus.⁵ Si ex anima; aut ergo ex toto, aut ex parte. Ex parte non, quia anima est simplex; si ex toto: ergo cum aliquis generat aliquem, cum det ei totam animam suam, desinit habere animam, et sic desinit vivere. Quodsi hoc est manifeste falsum, patet etc.	4. Likewise, if the soul is out of a transduction, therefore either the soul is out of the flesh, or the soul is out of a soul. It cannot be out of the flesh, since it is impossible, that out of a body there come to be a non-body; but the soul is a non-body, just as the Philosopher and (St.) Augustine⁵ proves in a manifold manner. If out of a soul; therefore either out of the whole, or out of a part. Not out of a part, because the soul is simple; if out of the whole: therefore when anyone generates anyone, since he gives him his whole soul, he ceases to have a soul, and thus ceases to live. Wherefore if this is manifestly false, it is clear that etc..
5. Item, anima rationalis, cum sit substantia per se existens et incorruptibilis, habet materiam et formam, sicut probatum est supra.⁶ Cum ergo producitur, aut producitur ex materia praeiacente, aut simul cum ipsa producitur sua materia. Si simul cum ipsa* producitur sua materia, ergo necesse est, quod producatur ex nihilo: ergo a solo Deo. Si producitur ex materia praeiacente; quaero de illa materia: aut est corporalis, aut spiritualis. Si corporalis; ex ea non potest fieri anima. Si spiritualis, aut habet formam, aut non. Si non, quomodo potest esse in rerum natura sine forma, cum « omne esse sit a forma »?⁷ Si habet: ergo vel erit Angelus, vel anima. Non Angelus, constat: ergo anima; sed ex eodem non fit idem numero: ergo ex ea non potest fieri anima.	5. Likewise, the rational soul, since it is a per se existent and incorruptible substance, has matter and form, just as has been proven above.⁶ Therefore when it is produced, it is either produced out of pre-existent matter [materia praeiacente], or its own matter is produced together with it. If its own matter is produced together with it, therefore it is necessary, that it is produced out of nothing: therefore (it is) from God alone. If it is produced out of pre-existing matter; I ask of that matter: either it is corporal, or spiritual. If (it is) corporal, the soul cannot be made of it. If spiritual, either it has a form, or not. If not, in what manner can it be in the nature of thing without a form, since « every ‘to be’ is from a form »?⁷ If it does have (a form): therefore either it will be an Angel, and/or a soul. Not an Angel, it is established: therefore a soul; but out of the same there does not come to be the same in number: therefore a soul cannot be made out of it.
6. Item, si anima rationalis esset ex traduce, necessario oporteret tunc discindi,⁸ quando deciditur semen; sed multa semina sunt, quae nunquam perveniunt ad organizationem, immo plura effunduntur, quam ad formam producantur:⁹ ergo vel essent animae rationales sine corporibus, vel periret tam nobilis forma; quorum utrumque absurdum est dicere et impium.	6. Likewise, if the rational soul were out of a transduction, it then would necessarily have to be split off [necessario oporteret discindi],⁸ when the semen is shed [deciditur]; but there is much semen [multa semina], which never arrives at the organization (of a body), nay more is poured forth, than is produced for the form:⁹ therefore either there would be rational souls without bodies, and/or such a noble form would perish; each of which is absurd and impious to say.
CONCLUSIO. Animae rationales non sunt ex traduce, sed per creationem.	CONCLUSION Rational souls are not out of transduction, but through creation.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est triplex modus dicendi.	I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that there is a threefold manner of speaking about this.
Quidam namque dixerunt, quod animarum productio est mediante Intelligentia, ut, sicut corpus caeleste ad productionem facit corporis humani, sic etiam Intelligentia ad productionem animae; et hoc plures senserunt philosophi, et sensisse videtur auctor in libro de Causis.¹⁰ — Ratio autem, quae movit eos ad hoc ponendum, fuit et divina unitas, quae non patiebatur, ut Deus immediate produceret multa, et divina immutabilitas, quae non patiebatur, ut Deus produceret nova. — Sed haec tanquam haeretica abiicienda sunt et ostensa sunt esse falsa, supra distinctione prima.¹¹ Unde verbum illud de Causis tanquam haereticum est respuendum, nisi quis intelligat, quod anima dicitur creari ab Intelligentia in hoc, quod aliquam illuminationem . . .	For indeed certain (authors) have said, that the production of soul is by means of an Intelligence, so that, just as a heavily body works for the production of a human body, so also an Intelligence for the production of the soul; and this several philosophers have thought, and the author of the book On Causes seems to have thought.¹⁰ — But the reason, which moves them to posit this, was both the Divine Unity, which did not suffer, that God would produce many (things) immediately, and the Divine Immutability, which did not suffer, that God would produce new (things). — But these are to be cast away as heretical and they have been shown to be false, above in the First Distinction.¹¹ Wherefore that verse (from the book) On Causes is to be rejected as heretical, unless one understands, that the soul is said “to be created by an Intelligence” in this (regard), that it suscepts / some illumination . . .
¹ Cfr. August., Epist. 166. (alias 28.) ad Hieronym. c. 5. n. 15, ubi dicitur, quod, teste Hieronymo (III. contra Rufinum, n. 28.), quidam hoc arg. usi sint ad inferendam praeexistentiam animarum. Verba Hieronymi sunt: « Et si dixero illud Ecclesiasticum: Quotidie Deus operatur animas et in corpore eas mittit nascentium, illico magistri tendiculas proferas: et ubi est iustitia Dei, ut de adulterio incestuque nascentibus animas largiatur? Ergo cooperatur est malorum hominum et adulteris seminantibus corpora ipse fabricatur animas »? Vide etiam Greg. Nyssen., de Anima. ² Vers. 16; iuxta translationem Septuaginta, cfr. supra in lit. Magistri, d. XVII. c. 2. — Text. seq. est Gen. 2, 7. ³ Sive II. de Generat. animal. c. 3. ⁴ Vide infra d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. ⁵ Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 46-90. (c. 3. seqq.) ostendit, quod anima non sit magnitudo neque corpus mixtum (harmonia) neque subtilissimum corpus. Idem probat August., de Immort. animae, c. 10. n. 17. seqq; de Quant. animae, c. 18. n. 32. seqq.; I. de Anima et eius origine, c. 5. n. 5. et IV. c. 12. n. 18. seqq.; VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 18. seqq. et X. c. 24. n. 40. seqq., ubi impugnat Tertullianum, qui putabat, Deum et anima esse corpus. — Paulo superius post fieri retinuimus cum Vat. non-corpus pro nisi corpus, quod in plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 perperam habetur; vel lege: fieri aliquid aliud, nisi corpus. Mox plures codd. bis ex tota pro ex toto. ⁶ Dist. 17. a. 1. q. 2. ⁷ Ut dicit Boeth., de Unitate et uno. Cfr. supra pag. 445. nota 5. — Simili arg. usus est August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 7. n. 10. seq., in solutione quaestionis: utrum in prima creatione praecesserit animam aliqua materia, ex qua facta sit. — In plurimis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desiderantur verba Non Angelus usque numero. ⁸ Codd. scribunt descindi. ⁹ Ed. 1. cum paucis codd. producuntur. Magis placeret perducuntur. ¹⁰ Prop. 5. 9. et 19. Cfr. supra pag. 29, nota 3. ¹¹ Part. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 6. et a. 2. q. 2.	¹ Cf. (St.) Augustine, Epistle 166 (alias 28) to (St.) Jerome, ch. 5, n. 15, where it is said, that, on the testimony of (St.) Jerome (Against Rufinus, Bk. III, n. 28), that certain (authors) used this argument to infer the pre-existence of souls. The words of (St.) Jerome are: « And if I said that (verse of) Ecclesiasticus: “Daily does God work souls and send them in the body of (those) being born,” to that you proffer the traps of (your) master: “And where is the justice of God, that He bestows souls upon (those) being born from adultery and incest? Therefore, has He cooperated in the evils of men and does He Himself fabricate souls for adulterers sowing bodies »? See also (St.) Gregory Nyssa, On the Soul. ² Verse 16; according to the Septuagint’s translation; cf. also the text of Master (Peter) above in d. XVII, ch. 2. — The following text is Gen. 2:7. ³ Or, On the Generation of Animals, Bk. II, ch. 3. ⁴ See below d. 19, a. , q. 1. ⁵ Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, texts 46-90 (ch. 3 ff.), shows, that the soul is not a magnitude nor a body mixed (in harmony) nor a most subtle body. (St.) Augustine proves the same (thing), On the Immortality of the Soul, ch. 10, n. 17 ff.; On the Quantity of the Soul, ch. 18, n. 32 ff.; On the Soul and Its Origin, Bk. I, ch. 5, n. 5, and Bk. IV, ch. 12, n. 18 ff; On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VII, ch. 12, n. 18 ff, and Bk. X, ch. 24, n. 40 ff., where he impugns Tertullian, who thought, that God and the soul are a body. — A little above this, after there come to be [fieri], we have retained a non-body [non-corpus] for but a body [nisi corpus], which is had faultily in very many codices and in editions 1, 2 and 3; and/or read: there come to be (something other,) but a body [fieri aliquid aliud, nisi corpus]. Next several codices have twice out of the whole (soul) [ex tota] for out of the whole (being of the soul) [ex toto]. ⁶ Distinction 17, a. 1, q. 2. ⁷ As (St. Severinus) Boethius, On Unity and the One. Cf. above d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, p. 445, footnote 5. — (St.) Augustine used a similar argument, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VII, ch. 7, n. 10 f., in the solution to the question: “Whether in the first creation there preceded the soul any matter, out of which it was made?” — In very many codices and editions 1 and 2, there are wanting the words Not an Angel . . . similar in number [Non Angelus . . . numero]. ⁸ The codices write discindi as descindi. ⁹ Edition 1, together with a few codices, has is produced [producuntur] in the indicative mood. It would be more pleasing to write arrives at [perducuntur] for is produced for [producuntur]. ¹⁰ Propositions 5, 9, and 19. Cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, p. 29, footnote 3. ¹¹ Part I, a. 1, q. 2, in reply to n. 6, and a. 2, q. 2.
* [Trans. nota: Videtur perperam quod textus criticalis originaliter hic legitur ipso pro ipsa, quoniam non est quodlibet nomen masculinum seu neutrum praeiacentem pro quo hic ipso supponere possit. Ideo ipso in ipsa mutavi ex contextu.]

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suscipit mediante illa. Intelligentia enim, secundum Philosophum,¹ excedit animam in claritate cognitionis; et ideo dicit quidam philosophus, quod « anima rationalis creatur in umbra intelligentiae, et sensibilis in umbra rationalis ». Hoc autem dictum est, quia una deficit a perfectione alterius, non quia una producatur ab altera.	it suscepts / some illumination from the latter. For an Intelligence, according to the Philosopher¹, exceeds the soul in the clarity of (its) cognition; and for that reason a certain philosopher says, that « the rational soul is created in the shadow of an intelligence, and the sensible (soul) in the shadow of the rational (soul) ». But this has been said, because one is lacking in the perfection of the other, not because one is produced by the other.
Est et alius modus dicendi, quod animarum productio est per traductionem, ut anima traducatur ex anima, sicut caro ex carne; et sicut ab una candela accenduntur multae, sic ab una anima per sui multiplicationem absque diminutione vivificentur multa corpora. Et de hoc aliquando dubitaverunt catholici tractatores, et Augustinus maxime, sicut patet in libro super Genesim ad litteram,² et in libro de Libero Arbitrio, et in libro Retractationum, ubi etiam dicit, quod non potuit pervenire ad certitudinem istius quaestionis. Ratio autem, quae potissime fecit eum dubitare, fuit transfusio originalis peccati. — Verumtamen ipse Augustinus hanc positionem expresse reprehendit in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, cuius auctoritatem Magister ponit in littera,³ et ipse istum eundem modum improbat super Genesim ad litteram: quoniam, si propter originale peccatum anima transfunditur ex anima, aut anima Christi non esset de genere aliarum animarum, aut habuisset originale peccatum, quorum utrumque falsum est et impium.	There is also another manner of speaking, that the production of souls is through a transduction [per traductionem], so that a soul is transduced out of a soul, just as the flesh (is) out of flesh; and just as from one candle many are lit, so from one soul, through its multiplication, many bodies are vivified without (its) diminution. And for a time Catholic tract-writers doubted concerning this, and (St.) Augustine most of all, just as is clear in (his) book On a Literal Exposition of Genesis,² and in (his) book On Free Will, and in (his) Book of Retractations, where he also says, that he could not arrive at the certitude of this question. Moreover the reason, which caused him to doubt most of all, was the transfusion of original sin. — Nevertheless (St.) Augustine himself expressly reprehends this position in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, the quote from which Master (Peter) puts in the text,³ and he himself disproves this same manner (of reasoning) On a Literal Exposition of Genesis: since, if for the sake (of explaining the transmission of) original sin (one must say that) a soul is transfused out of a soul, either the Soul of Christ would not be of the genus of other souls, or it would have had original sin, each of which is false and impious.
Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi catholicus et verus, quod animae non seminantur, sed formatis corporibus a Deo creantur et creando infunduntur et infundendo producuntur. — Animarum enim creationem Deus sibi soli debuit reservare, tum propter earum dignitatem, tum propter earum immortalitatem. Propter animarum dignitatem, quia, cum anima sit imago Dei et nata immediate ferri in Deum et beatificari in ipso diligendo eum ex toto corde, totum suum esse immediate debuit ab ipso habere, ut ipsum ex toto corde teneretur diligere.⁴ — Decuit etiam hoc propter animarum immortalitatem. Cum enim solus Deus sit, qui habeat vitam in semetipso et vitam indeficientem;⁵ solus est, qui potest producere principium vitae perpetuum. Cum igitur res incorruptibilis substantificari non possit in materia transmutabili, et operatio creaturae sit super materiam transmutabilem; impossibile est, aliquam creaturam animam rationalem producere: et ideo eius productionem Deus sibi soli debuit reservare.	And for that reason there is a third manner of speaking (which is) the Catholic one and the true one, that souls are not sown, but with (their) bodies formed they are created by God and by being created are infused and by being infused are produced. — For God ought to have reserved the creation of soul to Himself alone, both on account of their dignity, and on account of their immortality. On account of souls’ dignity, because, since the soul is the image of God and bound to be born immediately into God and to be beatified in Him by loving (Him) with (its) whole heart, it ought to have had its whole ‘being’ immediately from Him, so that it might be bound to love Him with (its) whole heart.⁴ — This was also fitting on account of the immortality of souls. For since God alone is, He who has life in His very Self and Life unfailing;⁵ He also is, the One who can produce a perpetual principle of life. Therefore since an incorruptible thing cannot become a substance [substantificari] in transmutable matter, and the operation of the creature is over transmutable matter; it is impossible, that any creature produce a rational soul: and for that reason God ought to have reserved its production to Himself alone.
Concedendae sunt ergo rationes probantes, quod animae rationales non sint ex traduce, sed a creatione.	Therefore the reasons proving, that rational souls are not out of a transduction [ex traduce], but by a creation, are to be conceded.
1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium de textu Genesis, dicendum, quod anima ibi accipitur pro homine, et homo dicitur egressus de corpore ratione partis corporalis. — Nec valet illud quod contra hoc obiicit, quod non dicitur in productione animae Evae: inspiravit in faciem eius etc., quia, cum idem modus producendi esset animam Evae et animam Adae, non oportuit iterari.⁶	1. To that, however, which is objected unto the contrary from the text of Genesis, it must be said, that “soul” is accepted there for “man”, and “man” is said “(to have) stepped forth) from (his) body on the part of the corporal. — Nor is that, which it objects against this, valid, that there is not said in the production of the soul of Eve: He breathed into her face etc., because, since the manner of producing the soul of Eve and the soul of Adam were the same, it was not necessary [non oportuit] that it be repeated.⁶
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnes nascimur natura filii irae; dicendum, quod hoc est, quia anima, cum unitur carni infectae, statim inficitur et contrahit culpam originalem; non quia ipsa traducatur, sed quia traducitur caro, cui unitur. Quomodo autem hoc fieri possit, infra⁷ determinabitur, cum agetur de peccato originali.	2. To that which is objected, that we are all by nature born sons of wrath; it must be said, that this is, because the soul, when it is united to tainted flesh [carni infectae], is immediately tainted and contracts the original fault; not because it itself is transduced, but because the flesh, to which it is united is transduced. However in what manner this is able to come to be, will be determined below,⁷ when one deals with original sin.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus generandi est entis completi; dicendum, quod non est cuiuslibet entis completi, sed eius rei, quae habet materiam transmutabilem, ex qua potest produci. Et quia anima non habet talem materiam, non potest aliam similem producere, quamvis sit forma completa.	3. To that which is objected, that the act of generating belongs to a complete being; it must be said, that it does not belong to any complete being, but to that thing, which has transmutable matter, out of which (an offspring) can be produced. And because the soul does not have such a matter, it cannot produce another similar (to itself), even though it is a complete form.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vis generativa principaliter residet penes animam; dicendum, quod etsi principaliter respiciat animam per modum moventis et agentis, principaliter tamen respicit corpus tanquam illud, ex quo producit. Et quoniam decisio potest fieri a corpore, non ab anima, hinc est, quod ordinatur ad productionem corporis humani, non ad productionem animae rationalis.	4. To that which is objected, that the generative force resides principally within the soul; it must be said, that even if it respects the soul principally through the manner of one moving and of one acting; yet it respects the body principally as that, out of which it produces. And since there can be a shedding from the body, not from the soul, hence it is, that (the generative force) is ordered to the production of a human body, not to the production of a rational soul.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod brutum potest producere brutum; dicendum, quod non est . . .	5. To that which is objected, that a brute can produce a brute; it must be said, that it is not . . .
¹ Cfr. XII. Metaph. text. 39. seqq. (XI. c. 7. seq.), ubi agit de intellectu divino et dein de aliis Intelligentiis. Vide etiam librum de Causis, prop. 10, 18, 23. — Verba, quae mox sequuntur, sumta sunt, ut iam cod. F notavit, ex Isaac, de Definitionibus, et continent summam eorum quae ibi dicuntur de speciebus animarum. Nam secundum cod. lat. 8001 bibl. Regiae Monacensis ibi legitur: Restat scire, quod animarum sunt ordines tres, anima rationalis, bestialis, vegetalis. Omnibus autem excellentior est ratio, eo quod ipsa creata est ex intelligentia et de natura eius, et ob hoc factus est homo rationalis perceptibilis disciplinae, discernens inter bonum et malum et inter ea, per quae sit salvandus, vel damnandus. Inferior autem ea claritate et ordine est anima bestialis, quoniam [eo quod?] ex anima rationali creata est, et ideo elongata est a splendore, integre manens in tenebris, expers discretionis . . . Anima vero vegetalis, quae est desiderativa, est inferior omnibus animabus dignitate et ordine, eo quod creata est ex umbra animae bestialis, et proper hoc obtenebratur, procul remota a splendore intelligentiae propter multitudinem suarum tenebrarum privata sensui et motu . . . Ipsum [caelum] enim in horizonte animae vegetalis generatum est etc. ² Libr. X. c. 6. n. 9. seqq. — Libr. II. de Lib. Arb. c. 21. n. 59. et 62; — Libr. I. Retract. c. 1. n. 3. — Cfr. etiam Epist. 166. (alias 28.) et 190. (alias 157); III. de Peccatorum meritis remiss. c. 10. n. 18. ³ Hic c. 7. — August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 18. n. 32. seqq. — Liber de Ecclesiast. Dogm et Gennadii. ⁴ Alluditur ad Deut. 6, 5; Matth. 22, 37. — Hoc arg. utitur August., de Quantit. animae, c. 34. n. 77. seq. Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. ⁵ Ioan 5, 26: Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio etc. — Paulo inferius aliqui codd. sustentari, plures sustentificari pro substantificari. In fine articuli Vat. cum aliis edd., exc.1, Creatore pro creatione. ⁶ Cfr. August., X. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 2. ⁷ Dist. 31. a. 2. q. 1.	¹ Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 39 ff. (Bk. XI, ch. 7, f.), where he deals with the Divine Intellect and then of the other Intelligences. See also the Book of Causes, propositions 10, 18, and 23. — The words, which next follow, have been taken, as codex F has already noted, from Isaac’s, On Definitions, and contain a summary of those (things) which are said there concerning the species of souls. For according to the Codex Lateranensis 8001, of the Royal Library of Munich, there is read there: It remains to know, that there are three orders of souls, the rational, bestial, (and) vegetal soul. But reason is more excellent than all, by this that it itself has been created by an Intelligence and from its nature, and on account of this rational man has been made perceptible of discipline, discerning between good and evil and among those, through which he is to be saved, and/or damned. Moreover the bestial soul is inferior in clarity and order, since it has been created out of the rational soul, and for that reason it has been elongated from the splendor, remaining whole in the shadows, destitute of discretion . . But the vegetal soul, which is desiderative, is inferior to all the souls in dignity and order, by this that it has been created out of the shadow of the bestial soul, and on this account it is overshadowed, very far removed from the splendor of an Intelligence on account of the multitude of its shadows, deprived of sense and movement . .. For a (heaven) itself has been created on the horizon of the vegetal soul etc.. ² Book X, ch. 6, n. 9 ff. — On Free Will, Bk. II, ch. 21, nn. 59 and 62; — Retractations, Bk. I, ch. 1, n. 3. — Cf. also Epistles 166 (alias 28) and 190 (alias 157); On the Merits and Remission Sins, Bk. III, ch. 10, n. 18. ³ Here in ch. 7. — (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. X, ch. 18, n. 32 ff. — The book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas is by Gennadius. ⁴ An allusion to Deut. 6:5; Mt. 22:37. — (St.) Augustine uses this argument, On the Quantity of the Soul, ch. 34, n. 77 f.. Cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 2. ⁵ John 5:26: For just as the Father has Life in Himself, so has He given also to the Son etc. [Sicut enim Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit et Filio etc.]. — A little below htis some codices have be sustained [sustentari], several have sustentificari for become a substance [substantificari]. At the end of the article, the Vatican edition, together with the other editions, except edition 1, has by the Creator [Creatore] for by a creation [creatione]. ⁶ Cf. (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis¸ Bk. X, ch. 1, n. 2. ⁷ Distinction 31, a. 2, q. 1.

p. 454

simile, quia anima bruti, cum sit forma tantum et forma corruptibilis, potest de potentia materiae educi; anima vero rationalis cum sit hoc aliquid et incorruptibilis nec educatur de materia praeiacente, necesse est, eam ex nihilo educi et ita creari. Quod autem non potest produci ex materia praeiacenti, multipliciter ostendit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram libro septimo,¹ quod illa materia praeexistens nec possit esse corporalis nec spiritualis.	similar, because the soul of a brute, since it is only a form an a corruptible form, can be educed from the potency of the matter; but the rational soul, since it is a this something [hoc aliquid] and incorruptible and is not educed from the pre-existent matter [materia praeiacente], it is necessary, that it be educed from nothing and thus be created. Moreover that it cannot be produced from pre-existent matter, (St.) Augustine shows in a manifold manner On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, in the seventh book,¹ that that pre-existing matter [materia preexistens] can neither be corporal nor spiritual.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de generato per adulterium, dicendum, quod in hoc ostenditur potius laus divinae bonitatis quam reprehensio; quia beneficium, quod disposuit servare sive continuare, propter peccata hominum non immutat vel interrumpit; unde, cum animam infundit, non considerat vitium, sed considerat naturam.² Nec est simile de gratia, quae non respicit naturam, secundum quod natura est, sed magis, secundum quod ad Deum conversa est. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Patent etiam ea quae dicuntur in littera.	6. To that which is objected concerning the one generated through adultery, it must be said, that in this praise is shown to the Divine Goodness rather than reprehension; because the benefice, which He has arranged [disposuit] to guard or continue, He does not change and/or interrupt on account of the sins of men; wherefore, when He infuses a soul, He does not consider the vice, but considers the nature.² Nor is it similar concerning the grace, which does not respect nature, according to which it is a nature, but rather, according to which it has been converted to God. And through this the response to the objections is clear. Those (things), which are said in the text are (now) also clear.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. De celebri circa hanc quaestionem controversia dicit Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2.): « Circa quaestionem hanc egregius Doctor Augustinus diu inter opiniones quatuor fluctuavit, ut ipse in fine libri de Libero Arbitrio ait: Harum quatuor de anima sententiarum, utrum de propagine veniant, an in singulis quibuscumque nascentibus novae fiant, an in corpora nascentium iam alicubi existentes impellantur, vel sponte illabantur, nullam temere affirmare oportebit. Ipse idem tamen postmodum unam ex iis, scil. eas in singulis corporibus nascentium novas creari, elegit et tenendam definivit, ut patet in littera ». — Notandum autem, quod liber de Ecclesiast. Dogmatibus (inter opera S. August. ed. Maurina t. 8.), cuius testimonio tanquam auctoritate Augustini Magister innititur, est Gennadii, presbyteri Massiliensis. Sententia autem traducianismi iam a Scholasticis communiter reprobata est.	I. Of the celebrated controversy around this question (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise (here in q. 2, a. 2) says: « About this question the egregious Doctor (St.) Augustine fluctuated for a long time between four opinions, as he himself says at the end of the book On Free Will: It will be necessary to affirm none of the four of these sentences concerning the soul, whether it comes from a propagation [propagine], or whether new (souls) are made in each one, whomsoever, (who is) being born, or whether already existing somewhere there, they are impelled into the bodies of those being born, and/or spontaneously fall into (them). He himself, after a while chose one of these, namely that they are created new in each body of those being born, and he defined (this sentence) as to be held, as is clear in the text ». — But note, that the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, (numbered among the works of St. Augustine in Maurinus’ Edition, tome 8), upon whose testimony, as a quote from (St.) Augustine, Master (Peter) is supported, is (a work) of Gennadius, a priest of Marseilles. However, the sentence of traducianism had already been commonly reprobated by the Scholastics.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 3. a. 3. — Scot., de Rerum princip. q. 10. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 118. a. 2; S. c. Gent. II. c. 86-89; de Potent. q. 3. a. 9; Quodlib. 12. a. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 19. q. 1. a. 3. et 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 17. q. 1.	II. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 60, m. 3, a. 3. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, de Rerum princip., q. 10, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 2, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 118, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles., Bk. II, chs. 86-89; de Potentia., q. 3, a. 9; Quodlibetals., 12, a. 10. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 8; Summa., p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, loc. cit.. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, Sent., Bk. II, d. 19, q. 1, a. 3 and 2. — Durandus, here in q. 3. — (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. II, d. 17, q. 1.
¹ Gen. 2, 24, ubi Vulgata: Quamobrem relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una. ² Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. in corp.; Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 79. m. 1. et q. 85. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 2. seqq., S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 80. et q. 81; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. et circa lit.; Petr. a Tar., hic. q. 1. a. 4. et circa lit.; Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 17. seq. — Vat. omittit qui fuit principium omnium hominum.	¹ Gen. 2:24, where the Vulgate has: On which account a man leaves his father and mother and cleaves to his own wife, and there shall be two in one flesh [Quamobrem relinquet homo patrem suum et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae, et erunt duo in carne una]. ² Cf. above a. 1, q. 1, in the body (of the Question); Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 79, m. 1, and q. 85, m . 3; Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 2. ff., Summa., p. II, tr. 13, q. 80 and q. 81; St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3, and on the text; (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in. q. 1, a. 4, and on the text; Richard of Middleton, here on the text; Giles the Roman, here in the 17th doubt on the text, f..

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XVIII.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XVIII