COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX
De hominis immortalitate.	On the immortality of man.
ARTICULUS I. Quaestio I.	ARTICLE I Question 1
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 457-461. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 457-461. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
Solent quaeri plura de primo hominis statu etc.	Several (questions) are customarily asked etc.
DIVISIO TEXTUS.	DIVISION OF THE TEXT
Supra egit Magister de hominis productione; in hac parte agit de hominis duratione et conservatione. Et quoniam homo dupliciter habet in esse conservari, scilicet in se et in suo simili, in se per vitam et diuturnitatem, in simili vero per filiorum procreationem;¹ ideo pars ista habet duas. In prima determinat de hominis immortalitate. In secunda determinat de filiorum procreatione, infra distinctione vigesima: Post haec videndum est, qualiter etc.	Above Master (Peter) dealt with the production of man [hominis]; in this part he deals with the duration and conservation of man. And since man has to be conserved in ‘being’ in a twofold manner, namely in himself and in his similar, in himself through life and long duration [diuturnitatem], but in (his) similar through the procreation¹ of children [filiorum]; for that reason this part has two parts. In the first he determines concerning the immortality of man. In the second he determines concerning the procreation of children, below in the Twentieth Distinction (where he says): After this one must see, in what kind of manner etc..
Prima pars habet duas. In prima determinat veritatem. In secunda dissolvit dubitationes, ibi: Solet hic quaeri, cum primus homo etc. Prima pars habet duas. In prima parte veritatem narrat. In secunda veritatem explanat, ibi: In primo statu fuit corpus hominis animale etc. Similiter secunda pars habet duas. In prima movet determinationem quaestionem circa hominis immortalitatem. In secunda vero movet aliam dubitationem, quae habet ortum ex illa, et illam determinat secundum opiniones diversas, ibi: Sed adhuc quaeritur, si non esset praeceptum etc.	The first part has two (parts). In the first he determines the truth. In the second he dissolves the doubts, there (where he says): Here there is customarily asked, “Since the first man” etc.. The first part has two (parts). In the first part he narrates the truth. In the second he explains the truth, there (where he says): In the first state the body of man was animal etc.. Similarly the second part has two (parts). In the first he moves the determination of the question about the immortality of man. But in the second he moves another doubt, which has (its) rise out of the former one, and he determines that according to diverse opinions, there (where he says): But still there is asked, “If it was not precepted” etc..
TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.	TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ad intelligentiam huius partis, in qua agitur de hominis immortalitate secundum statum innocentiae, circa tria consistit dubitatio.	For an understanding of this part, in which one deals with the immortality of man according to the state of innocence, the doubting consists around three (questions).
Et primo quaeritur de immortalitate hominis, quantum est ex parte animae.	And first there is asked concerning the immortality of man, as much it is on the part of the soul.
Secundo vero, quantum est ex parte corporis.	But second, as much as it is on the part of the body.
Tertio vero, ex parte coniuncti.	But third, on the part of the conjunct (of the two).
Circa primum quaeruntur duo.	About the first, two (questions) are asked.
Primo quaeritur, utrum anima rationalis per naturam sit immortalis.	First there is asked, whether the rational soul through nature is immortal.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum omnis anima, quantum est de prima constitutione naturae, fuerit incorruptibilis.	Second there is asked, whether every soul, as much as concerns the first constitution of (its) nature, was incorruptible.
ARTICULUS I. De hominis immortalitate ex parte animae.	ARTICLE I On the immortality of man on the part of (his) soul.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum anima humana per naturam sit immortalis.	QUESTION 1 Whether the human soul is immortal through nature?
CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod anima rationalis non sit naturaliter immortalis.	ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is shown, that the rational soul is not naturally immortal.
1. Primo per auctoritatem Apostoli primae ad Timotheum ultimo:² Qui solus habet immortalitatem; loquitur de Deo: ergo immortalitas non convenit alicui creaturae. Si tu dicas, hoc esse dictum, quia soli Deo convenit per naturam, animae hominis vero non convenit per naturam, sed per gratiam; contra: gratia non repugnat naturae nec naturam variat, sed potius conservat. Si ergo mortalitas inest omni creaturae per naturam, immortalitas, quae est conditio opposita, nulli creaturae inest per gratiam, ergo nec animae.	1. First through the authority of the Apostle in the last (chapter) of (his) First (Letter) to Timothy,² says of God: Who alone has immortality: therefore immortality does not convene with any creature. If you say, that this has been said, because it convenes with God alone through nature, but it does not convene with the soul of man through nature, but through grace; on the contrary: grace is not repugnant to nature nor does it vary nature, but it rather conservers (it). Therefore, if mortality is in every creature through (its) nature, immortality, which is the opposition condition, is in no creature through grace, therefore neither in the soul.
2. Item, Damascenus: « Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit »; sed anima rationalis a versione incipit, cum sit creata, ut ostensum fuit supra: ergo tendit in versionem: ergo non est immortalis. Si tu dicas, quod tendit, quantum est de se, sed tenetur et sustentatur manu Conditoris; contra hoc est illud Augustini, septimo de Civitate Dei:⁴ « Sic res, quas condidit, administrat, ut eas agere proprios motus sinat »; loquitur de Deo. Si ergo de se ad corruptionem tendit, divinae manus potentia non obsistit.	2. Likewise, (St. John) Damascene (says). « Everything which starts from a turning [version], tends unto a turning »; but the rational soul started from a turning, since it was created (from nothing), as has been shown above: therefore it tends unto a turning: therefore it is not immortal. If you say, that it tends, as much as it is of itself, but it is held and sustained by the Hand of the Found; against this is that (verse) of (St.) Augustine, in the seventh (book) On the City of God:⁴ « The things, which He founded, He so administers, that He allows them to put in motion [agere] their own movements »; he is speaking of God. Therefore, if (the rational soul) tends of itself toward corruption, the power of the Divine Hand does not stand in its way [non obsistit].
3. Item, per auctoritatem Philosophi:⁵ « Intellectus corrumpitur, quodam interius corrupto »; sed . . .	3. Likewise, through the authority of the Philosopher:⁵ « The intellect is corrupted, with a certain (something) interiorly corrupted »; but . . .
¹ Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 creationem. ² Vers. 16. ³ Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3. et II. c. 27. — Quod anima creata sit, vide supra d. 17. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 18. a. 2. q. 3. ⁴ Cap. 30. — Paulo inferius post Si ergo de se supple cum cod. O anima rationalis. ⁵ Libr. I. de Anima, text. 60. (c. 4.). — In cod. I post corrupto subiungitur ut patet in phreneticis.	¹ Not a few codices, together with edition 1, have the creation [creationem]. ² Verse 16. ³ On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 3, and Bk. II, ch. 27. — That the soul has been created, see above d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 18, a. 2, q. 3. ⁴ Chapter 30. — A little below this after Therefore, if [Si ergo de se] supply together with codex O the rational soul [anima rationalis]. ⁵ On the Soul, Bk. I, text 60 (ch. 4). — In codex I after corrupted [corrupto] there is subjoined as is clear in frenetics [ut patet in phreneticis].

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non corrumpitur intellectus nisi a corruptione animae rationalis: ergo anima rationalis non est immortalis.	the intellect is not corrupted except by the corruption of the rational soul: therefore the rational soul is not immortal.
4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Anima patitur in corpore per naturam, sicut planum est; sed « passio magis et magis facta abiicit a substantia »;¹ a quacumque autem substantia fiat aliqua abiectio, fit etiam aliqua corruptio, per quam aliquid inde corrumpitur; et omnis talis substantia est corruptibilis: ergo anima rationalis est corruptibilis.	4. Likewise, this very (thing) seems by reason. The soul through nature suffers in the body, just as is plain; but « a suffering, wrought more and more, drives (one) away [abiicit] from substance »;¹ but from whatsoever substance any driving away [abiectio] comes to be, some corruption also comes to be, through which something is corrupted therefrom; and every such substance is corruptible: therefore the rational soul is corruptible.
5. Item, anima rationalis condolet corpori patienti: ergo magis patienti magis condolet et maxime patienti maxime compatitur: ergo videtur, quod morienti commoriatur.	5. Likewise, the rational soul grieves with [condolet] the suffering body: therefore it grieves more when (the body) suffers more and it suffers most of all with (the body) suffering most of all: therefore it seems, that it dies together with the dying (body).
6. Item, si substantia est incorruptibilis, et operatio correspondens illi substantiae, quia nunquam substantia privatur propria operatione:² ergo si destruitur et laeditur operatio, destruit et laeditur substantia. Sed ad laesionem corporis laeditur et impeditur actus substantiae rationalis, qui est intelligere: ergo videtur, quod laedatur et ipsa substantia: ergo substantia est corruptibilis et mortalis.	6. Likewise, if a substance is incorruptible, and the operation corresponding to that substance (is) also, because a substance is never deprived of its own operation:² therefore if the operation is destroyed and wounded, the substance is also destroyed and wounded. But at the wounding of the body the act of the rational substance, which is ‘to understand’, is wounded and impeded: therefore it seems, that the substance itself is also wounded: therefore the substance is corruptible and mortal.
Ad oppositum sunt innumerabiles auctoritates et philosophorum³ et Sanctorum, et ideo ostendamus hoc rationibus. Ut autem sufficienter animae ostendatur immortalitas, attendendum est, quod anima habet considerari in ordine, et habet considerari in se; in ordine respectu universae creaturae, vel respectu divinae iustitiae, vel respectu finis, qui competit proprie naturae; et in se quantum ad virtutem, quantum ad actum et quantum ad obiectum; et sic sex modis considerari habet.	For the opposite there are innumerable authorities from both philosophers³ and Saints, and for that reason let us show this by reasons. Moreover so that the immortality of the soul be sufficiently shown, one must attend, that the soul has to be considered in (its) order, and it has to be considered in itself; in (its) order in respect of each and every creature, and/or in respect of the Divine Justice, and/or in respect of the end, which properly suits (its) nature; and in itself as much as regards (its) virtue, as much as regards (its) acting and as much as regards (its) object; and thus it has to be considered according to six standards of measure.
1. 2. Et prima consideratio est secundum ordinem, quem habet inter creaturas universi, et secundum hanc considerationem ostenditur eius immortalitas ex duplici ratione. Prima est haec. In ordine creaturarum universi reperimus primam materiam et ultimam formam, et aeque vel magis est de complemento universi ultima forma, sicut et prima materia. Si igitur prima materia est incorruptibilis,⁴ ergo et ultima forma; sed haec est anima rationalis: ergo etc.	1. 2. And the first consideration is according the order, which (the soul) has among the creatures of the universe, and according to this consideration its immortality is shown out of a twofold reason. The first is this. In the order of creatures of the universe we find prime matter and ultimate form, and ultimate form concerns the complement of the universe equally and/or more, just as (does) also prime matter. If, therefore, prime matter is incorruptible,⁴ therefore also ultimate form; but this (ultimate form) is the rational soul: ergo etc..
Item, alia ratio ad idem. Ad hoc quod universum sit completum, necesse est reperire differentias creaturarum secundum perfectam combinationem; sed contingit reperire in universo substantiam habentem magnitudinem, existentem incorruptibilem, ut corpus caeli; et contingit reperire substantiam incorruptibilem, quae nec est magnitudo nec coniuncta magnitudini:⁵ ergo contingit reperire substantiam mediam incorruptibilem, quae non sit magnitudo, sed coniuncta magnitudini; sed haec est anima rationalis. — Ex perfectione igitur ordinis universitatis colligitur, animam esse immortalem.	Likewise, (there is) another reason regarding the same. For this, that the universe be complete, it is necessary to find (in it) differences of creatures according to (their) perfect combination; but one does happen to find in the universe a substance having magnitude, existing as one incorruptible, such as the body of a heaven; and one does happen to find an incorruptible substance, which is neither a magnitude nor conjoined to a magnitude:⁵ therefore one happens to find an intermediary incorruptible substance, which is not a magnitude, but conjoined to a magnitude; but this is the rational soul. — Therefore from the perfection of the order of the university (of things) there is gathered, that the soul is immortal.
3. 4. Ex secunda consideratione, scilicet ex ordine divinae iustitiae ostenditur sic. « Nullum bonum est irremuneratum, et nullum malum est impunitum »⁶ apud eum, qui iuste iudicat; sed multa bona remanent irremunerata, et multa mala impunita secundum praesentem vitam: ergo est ponere vitam aliam quam hanc; sed hoc non esset, nisi anima remaneret post corpus: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non cogit, quia, sicut suscitatur corpus, ita posset anima suscitari; non est conveniens talis instantia. Cum enim anima ex nihilo sit creata, si corrumperetur, in nihilum tenderet: ergo non suscitaretur, sed alia anima de novo crearetur.⁷	3. 4. From the second consideration, namely, from the order of Divine Justice, it is shown thus. « No good is unremunerated, and no evil is unpunished » before Him, who judges justly; but many goods remain unremunerated, and many evils unpunished according to the present life: therefore there is a positing of another life than this one; but this would not be, unless the soul remained after the body: ergo etc.. If you say, that this is not cogent, because, just as the body is suscitated [suscitari], so the soul could be suscitated; such an instance (i.e. contrary example) is not fitting. For since the soul has been created out of nothing, if it were corrupted, it would tend unto nothing: therefore it would not be suscitated, but another soul would be created anew.⁷
Item, ad divinam iustitiam spectat, quod nihil bene et iuste factum debet vergere in malum exitum; sed secundum moralem philosophum et secundum legem divinam et secundum etiam omnes sectas potius homo debet pati mortem quam recedere a veritate vitae et a veritate iustitiae.⁸ Sed si omnino perimeretur anima, perimeretur omnino iustitia, quae est in ipsa: ergo talis mortis perpessio, quae iusta est, et quam laudat omnis ratio recta, malum haberet simpliciter exitum; quod est . . .	Likewise, it pertains to the Divine Justice, that nothing done in a good or just manner [bene et iuste] ought to verge unto an evil outcome [in malum exitum]; but according to the philosopher of morals [moralem philosophum] and according to the Divine Law and even according to all the sects a man ought rather to suffer death than to recede from the truth of life and from the truth of justice.⁸ But if the soul were entirely destroyed [perimeretur], the justice, which is in it, would be entirely destroyed: therefore such an endurance [perpessio] of death, which is just, and which every upright reason praises, would simply have a bad outcome; which is . . .
¹ In cod. I additur ut dicit Philosophus, VI. Topic., in quo c. 3. (c. 6.): Nam omnis affectus (paqoV), cum magis fit, detrahit a substantia. — De maiori cfr. August., XXI. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. — Paulo superius codd. L O substituunt aliquando pro aliquid inde. ² Cfr. supra pag. 197, nota 5. ³ Sufficiat allegare Platonem, qui in Phaedone (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 69. seqq.) immortalitatem animae variis argg. probat et contrarias opiniones refutat; Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 65. seq. text. 82. et 92. (c. 4. seqq.); II. text. 11. 21 et 150 seqq. (c. 1. seq. et III. c. 3); III. text. 4. seqq. 15. 20. (c. 4. seqq.); II. de Generat. animal. c. 3; XII. Metaph. text. 17. (XI. c. 3.). In omnibus his locis profitetur Aristoteles, intellectum non dependere a corpore, posse ab ipso separari et esse incorruptibilem. Cfr. etiam Aristotelis fragmenta (ed. Firmin-Didot, tom. IV. pag. 48. seqq.), ubi testimonio variorum auctorum constat, Aristotelem scripsisse quendam dialogum, qui Eudemus intitulabatur, in quo immortalitas animae diversis argg. propugnabatur. Avicenna, V. de Anima sive sexti Naturalium, c. 2. et 4, decem signa affert, ex quibus colligi potest, animam rationalem esse incorruptibilem. ⁴ Ut docet Aristot., I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.). ⁵ Huiusmodi sunt tam primum movens sive Deus, ut probat Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 86 (c. 16.) et XII. Metaph. text. 41. (XI. c. 7.), quam aliae substantiae separatae sive Intelligentiae, ut docet ibidem, text. 43. (c. 8.). — Cod. A post substantiam incorruptibilem subiungit ut angelica natura. — De maiori cfr. supra pag. 210, nota 11. — Simile arg. proponit Gregor., IV. Dialog. c. 3. ⁶ Secundum Boeth., IV. de Consol. prosa 1. et 4. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 713, nota 2. Cfr. de hoc arg. Plato, Phaedo (ed. Serrani, tom. I. pag. 107.). Quod sequitur est Ier. 11, 20 ⁷ Aristot., II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 70. (c. 11.) dicit: Quorumcumque autem non [incorruptibilis est substantia], sed corruptibilis, necesse est specie, numero autem non, reverti. Cfr. supra d. 7. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. scholion II. n. 2, ubi aliquid simile ex S. Bonav. de actione creaturae respectu sui effectus asseritur. ⁸ Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 1: Quaedam autem fortasse sunt, ad quae perpetranda nemo cogi compellive potest (Enia o iswV ouc estiv anagcasqhnai), sed potius extrema quaeque pati ac mori convenit.	¹ In codex I there is added as the Philosopher says, in the sixth (book) of Topics [ut dicit Philosophus, VI. Topic.], in which ch. 3 (ch. 6) he says: For every affection (paqoV), when it becomes greater, detracts from the substance. — On the major (of the argument), cf. (St.) Augustine, On the City of God, Bk. XXI, ch. 3. — A little above this codices L and O substitute it is corrupted sometimes [aliquando] for something is corrupted therefrom [aliquid inde]. ² Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, p. 197, footnote 5. ³ Let is suffice to cite Plato, who in the Phaedo, (Serrani edition, tome I, p. 69 ff.) proves the immortality of the soul by various arguments and refutes the contrary opinions; Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, texts 65 f., 82, and 92 (ch. 4 ff.); Bk. II, texts 11, 21 and 150 ff. (ch. 1, and Bk. III, ch. 3); Bk. III, texts 4 ff., 15, and 20 (ch. 4 ff.); On the Generation of Animals, Bk. II, ch. 3; Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 17 (Bk. XI, ch. 3). In all these passages Aristotle professes, that the intellect does not depend from the body, that it can be separated from it and that it is incorruptible. Cf. also Aristotelis fragmenta (Firmin-Didot, tome IV, p. 48 ff.), where it is established on the testimony of various authors, that Aristotle wrote a certain dialogue, which is entitled Eudemon, in which the immortality of the soul is propounded by diverse arguments. Avicenna, On the Soul, Bk. V, or Of Natural Things, Bk. VI, chs. 2 and 4, cites ten signs, out of which it can be gathered, that the rational soul is incorruptible. ⁴ As Aristotle teaches, Physics, Bk. I, text 82 (ch. 9). ⁵ Of this kind are both the prime mover or God, as Aristole proves, in Physics, Bk. VIII, text 86 (ch. 16), and in Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 41 (Bk. XI, ch. 7), and the other separates substances or Intelligences, as he teaches in the same place, texts. 43 (ch. 8). — Codex A after incorruptible substance [substantiam incorruptibilem] subjoins such as the angelic nature [ut angelic natura]. — On the major (of the argument), cf. above d. 7, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, p. 210, footnote 11. — (Pope St.) Gregory (the Great) propounds a similar argument, Dialogues, Bk. IV, ch. 3. ⁶ According to (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. IV, prosa 1 and 4. Cf. Sent., Bk. I, d. 40, a. 2, q. 2, footnote 2. On this argument, cf. Plato, Phaedo, (Serrani edition, tome I, p, 107). What follows is Jer. 11:20. ⁷ Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. II, text 70 (ch. 11), says: But of whatever (things the substance of which is) not (incorruptible), but corruptible, it is necessary that they revert in species, but not in number. Cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, Scholium II, n. 2, where something similar is asserted from St. Bonaventure concerning the action of a creature in respect of its effect. ⁸ Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. III, ch. 1: Moreover there are perhaps certain (things), to the perpetrating of which no one can be driven or compelled (Enia o iswV ouc estiv anagcasqhnai), but (which are) extremes which it befits one both to suffer and die.

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contra divinam iustitiam. — Colligitur igitur ex ordine iustitiae,¹ animam immortalem esse.	contrary to the Divine Justice. — Therefore, there is gathered from the order of justice,¹ that the soul is immortal.
5. 6. Ex tertia consideratione, scilicet ex ordine ipsius animae ad proprium finem, ostenditur sic. Remoto ultimo fine, qui principaliter movet, omnes alii fines cassia sunt et vani; sed finis ultimus omnis operationis rationalis est beatitudo perfecta: ergo si illa non est, omnia quaecumque facit anima, facit frustra. Si ergo hoc est inconveniens, necesse est illum finem ponere. Sed « beatitudo est status omnium bonorum congregatione perfectus »;² ubi autem hoc est, necesse est, esse immortalem: ergo anima per naturam est apta nata ad incorruptionem et immortalitatem.	5. 6. From the third consideration, namely, from the order of the soul itself to its own end, it is shown thus. With the final end removed, which principally moves (the soul), all the other ends are worthless [cassi] and vain [vani]; but the final end of every rational operation is perfect beatitude: therefore if that does not exist [non est], all (the things) whatsoever the soul does, it does in vain [frustra]. If, therefore, this is unfitting, it is necessary to posit that end. But « beatitude is the state perfected by the congregation of all goods »; but where this is, it is necessary, that one be immortal: therefore the soul through nature is bound (to be) apt for incorruption and immortality.
Item, omnis anima rationalis naturaliter appetit beatitudinem; sed nihil est otiosum in fundamento naturae: ergo omnis anima rationalis nata est ad beatitudinem pervenire. Ubi autem beatitudo, ibi perfecta securitas; ubi perfecta securitas, ibi immortalitas; ubi enim mors potest accidere, necesse est timere. — Colligitur igitur ex ordine ipsius animae ad suum finem, ipsam habere immortalitatem. Et haec triplex consideratio sumta est secundum triplicem ordinem ipsius animae, scilicet ad finem proprium, ad divinam iustitiam, ad totum universum.	Likewise, every rational soul naturally desires beatitude; but nothing is idle [otiosum] in the fundament of a nature: therefore every rational soul is bound to arrive at beatitude. But where (there is) beatitude, there (is) perfect security; where (there is) perfect security, there (is) immortality; for where death can approach, it is necessary to be afraid. — Therefore, there is gathered from the order of the soul to its end, that it has immortality. And this threefold consideration has been taken according to the threefold order of the soul itself, namely to its own end, to the Divine Justice, (and) to the whole universe.
7. 8. Ex quarta consideratione, scilicet ipsius animae quantum ad propriam virtutem, arguitur sic. Nulla virtus materialis et corruptibilis nata est super se reflecti — haec per se manifesta est — anima rationalis secundum actum proprium nata est super se reflecti cognoscendo se et amando: ergo virtus animae rationalis non est materialis et corruptibilis:³ ergo est immaterialis et incorruptibilis. Sed si virtus est incorruptibilis, et substantia: ergo etc.	7. 8. From the fourth consideration, namely of the soul itself as much as regards is own virtue, it is argued thus. No material and corruptible virtue is bound to be reflected upon itself — this is manifest per se — the rational soul according to its own act is bound to be reflected upon itself by cognizing and loving itself: therefore the virtue of the rational soul is not material and corruptible:³ therefore it is immaterial and incorruptible. But if (its) virtue is incorruptible, (its) substance (is) also: ergo etc..
Item, omnis virtus, quae per recessum et impermixtionem cum corpore corruptibili fortificatur et potentior efficitur, est incorruptibilis per naturam; anima rationalis est huiusmodi, sicut patet, quia tanto magis relevatur spiritus et homo interior, quanto magis mortificatur homo exterior:⁴ virtus igitur animae rationalis est incorruptibilis. — Et sic ex sua virtute colligitur anima rationalis esse immortalis.	Likewise, every virtue, which is strengthened and made more potent through receding from [recessum] and being thoroughly unmixed [impermixtionem] with a corruptible body, is incorruptible through nature; the rational soul is of this kind, just as is clear, because the spirit and interior man is lifted up [relevatur] as much as the exterior man is more mortified:⁴ therefore the virtue of the soul is rational and incorruptible. — And thus the rational soul from its virtue is gathered to be immortal.
9. 10. Ex quinta consideratione, scilicet quantum ad operationem, arguitur sic. Cuiuslibet substantiae spiritualis, secundum esse et durationem pendentis ex corpore, operatio pendet ex corpore; sed anima rationalis propriam operationem habet, secundum quam non pendet ex corpore, scilicet intelligere, quia nullum organum sibi appropriat: ergo duratio animae non pendet ex corpore.⁵ Sed ipsa de se corrumpi non habet, cum nullam contrarietatem habeat: ergo de se est immortalis et incorruptibilis.	9. 10. From the fifth consideration, namely, as much as regards (the soul’s) operation, it is argued thus. The operation of whatever spiritual substance depends upon a body, according to the ‘to be’ and duration of the one depending upon [pendentis ex] the body; but the rational soul has its own operation, according to which it does not depend upon the body, namely ‘to understand’, because (this act) appropriates no organ to itself: therefore the duration of the soul does not depend upon the body.⁵ But (the soul) itself does not have a ‘being corrupted’ from itself, since it has no contrariety: therefore it is of itself immortal and incorruptible.
Item, cuiuslibet substantiae corruptibilis operatio antiquatur et senescit in tempore; sed animae rationalis operatio nec antiquatur nec senescit in tempore, immo iuvenescit, quia in antiquis est sapientia, et in multo tempore prudentia.⁶ — Ex propria ergo operatione colligere possumus, animam rationalem esse immortalem.	Likewise, the operation of any corruptible substance is antiquated [antiquatur] and grows old in time; but the operation of the rational soul is neither antiquated nor grows old in time, nay it grows young, because in the ancients there is wisdom, and in much time prudence.⁶ — Therefore from its own operation we can gather, that the rational soul is immortal.
11.12. Ex sexta consideratione, scilicet per comparationem ad obiectum, probatur anima rationalis immortalis esse sic. Necesse est, proportionem esse cognoscentis ad cognitum, sive potentiae ad obiectum; sed anima rationalis nata est cognoscere et intelligere veritatem; veritas autem est incorruptiblis, sicut probat Augustinus in Soliloquiis,⁷ cum sit talis naturae, quod ipsa negatio veritatis veritatem ponit: ergo anima rationalis, cum sit veritati proportionabilis, est immortalis. Haec autem ratio non solum concludit, animam esse immortalem, per veritatem intelligentiae sive conscientiae, sed etiam per veritatem vitae sive iustitiae, de qua Sapientiae primo⁸ dicitur: Iustitia est perpetua et immortalis, ac per hoc anima, quae est iustititae capax.	11. 12. From the sixth consideration, namely, through (its) comparison to (its) object, the rational soul is proven to be immortal thus. It is necessary, that there be a proportion of the one cognizing to the one cognized, or of a power to (its) object; but a rational soul is bound to cognize and understand truth; but truth is incorruptible, just as (St.) Augustine proves in (his) Soliloquies,⁷ since it is of such nature, that the very negation of truth posits truth: therefore the rational soul, since it is proportional to truth, is immortal. Moreover this reason does not only conclude, that the soul is immortal, through the truth of the intelligence or of the conscience, but also through the truth of (its) life or justice, concerning which there is said in the first (chapter) of Wisdom:⁸ Justice is perpetual and immortal, and through this the soul, which is capable of justice.
Item, omnis virtus corruptibilis laeditur ab obiecto improportionabiliter excellenti, et magis nata est delectari in medio quam in extremo. Sed anima rationalis, intelligens maiora et maxima, non propter hoc peius intelligit minora, et magis delectatur in cognitione summae lucis et perceptione sapientiae Dei quam in cognitione alicuius creati.⁹ — . . .	Likewise, every corruptible virtue is wounded by an object excelling (it) improportionally, and is bound to delight more in a mean than in an extreme. But the rational soul, understanding (things) greater and greatest, does not on this account understand lesser (things) worse, and delights more in the cognition of the Most High Light and (in) the perception of God’s Wisdom than in the cognition of any created (being).⁹ —
¹ Codd. Y aa divinae iustitiae. ² Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 2. — Principia huius et seq. arg. insinuantur ab Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 1. seq. et ab August., XIII. de Trin. c. 7. n. 10. seqq. ³ Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 15. (c. 4.): Et ipse [intellectus] etiam intelligibilis est, sicut ipsa intelligibilia. In his enim, quae sunt sine materia, idem est quod intelligit et quod intelligitur. Cfr. ibid. II. text. 136. seqq. (III. c. 2.), ubi ex materialitate sensuum ostendit, impossibile esse, quod eodem sensu, quo sentimus, etiam nos sentire percipiamus, adeoque alium sensum, scil. communem, esse admittendum. Idem dicit I. Magn. Moral. c. 17. (c. 18.) et Auctor libri de Causis, prop. 15. Avicenna, V. de Anima sive sexti Naturalium, c. 2. hoc arg. latius exponit. ⁴ Alluditur ad illud II. Cor. 4, 16: Sed licet is qui foris est noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is qui intus est renovatur de die in diem. ⁵ Vide Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 12. seq. (c. 1.) et III. text. 4. seqq. (c. 4.). — Ratio seq. prop. continetur in eo, quod anima cognoscere possit omnia (Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. c. 8.); si enim haberet contrarium, anima recipere non posset similitudinem sive speciem illius, ideoque nec illud cognoscere. Cfr. Plato, X. de Republ. (tom. II. pag. 608. seqq.), ubi ostendit, animae contraria esse vitia et ignorantiam, quae tamen nequeunt ipsam dissolvere. Idem respectu falsitatis asserit August., de Immortal. animae, c. 11. n. 18. seq. ⁶ Iob. 12, 12. — De hoc arg. cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 65. seq. (c. 4.); Problem. sect. 30. n. 4. (5.) Et Avicenna, loc. cit. ⁷ Libr. II. c. 2. — August. hoc arg. proponit ibid. c. 13. n. 24; de Immortal. animae, c. 1. n. 1; c. 4. n. 5; c. 6. n. 10; Epist. 3. (alias 151.) ad Nebrid. n. 4. ⁸ Vers. 15. — Supra cod. aa bene scientiae pro conscientiae. Deinde Vat. veritatem misericordiae pro veritatem vitae. ⁹ Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. 143. (c. 2. et III. c. 2.). et III. text. 7 (c. 4.) docet, sensum laedi ex obiecto excellente, non vero intellectum.	¹ Codices Y and aa read of Divine Justice [divinae iustitiae]. ² (St. Severinus) Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prosa 2. — The principles of this and the following argument are insinuated by Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, ch. 1 f., and by (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. III, ch. 13, n. 10 ff.. ³ Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 15 (ch. 4) says: And (the intellect) itself is also intelligible, just as intelligibles themselves. For among those, which are without matter, what understand and what is understood is the same. Cf. ibid., Bk. II, text 136 ff. (Bk. III, ch. 2), where from the materiality of the senses he shows, that it is impossible, that in the same sense, in which we sense, we also perceive ourselves to sense, and to such an extent another sense, that is the common (sense), must be admitted. He says the same in Greater Morals, Bk. I, ch. 17 (ch. 18), and (so does) the Author of The Book of Causes, in proposition 15. Avicenna, On the Soul, Bk. I, or Of Natural Things, Bk. VI, ch. 2, expounds this argument more at length. ⁴ An allusion to 2 Cor. 4:16: But though that which is outside, our man, i be corrupted, yet that which is within is renewed day by day [Sed licet is qui foris est noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is qui intus est renovatur de die in diem]. ⁵ See Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 12 f. (ch. 1), and Bk. III, text 4 ff. (ch. 4). — The following proposed reason is contained in this, that the soul can cognize all (things) (Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, text 37, ch. 8); for if it had a contrary, the soul could not receive its similitude or species, and for that reason (it could) neither cognize it. Cf. Plato, On the Republic, Bk. X (tome II, p. 608 ff.), where he shows, that vices and ignorance are the contraries of the soul, which, however, are not able to dissolve it. (St.) Augustine asserts the same in respect of falsehood, On the Immortality of the Soul, ch. 11, n. 18 f.. ⁶ Job 12:12. — On this argument, cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. I, text 65 f. (ch. 4); Problems, (among the works of Aristotle), section 30, n. 5 (n. 5). And Avicenna, loc. cit.. ⁷ Book II, ch. 2. — (St.) Augustine propounds this argument ibid., ch. 13, n. 24; On the Immortality of the Soul, ch. 1, n. 1; ch. 4, n. 5; ch. 6, n. 10; Epistle 3 (alias 151) to Nebrid., n. 4. ⁸ Verse 15. — Above this codex aa has well of knowledge [scientiae] for of the conscience [conscientiae]. Then the Vatican edition has the truth of mercy [veritatem misericordiae] for the truth of life [veritatem vitae]. ⁹ Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. III, texts 123 and 143 (ch. 2, and Bk. III, ch. 2), and Bk. III, text 7 (ch. 4), teaches, that the sense is wounded by an excelling object, but the intellect (is) not.

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Ex comparatione ergo ad obiectum colligitur anima rationalis esse immortalis. Si igitur substantia cognoscitur per virtutem, et virtus per operationem, et operatio per obiectum, cum secundum hanc triplicem considerationem ipsius animae ostensum sit, ipsam esse immortalem: omnis animae consideratio sive in se sive in ordine astruit animae immortalitatem.	Therefore from (its) comparison to (its) object the rational soul is gathered to be immortal. Therefore, if (its) substance is cognized through (its) virtue, and (its) virtue through (its) operation, and (its) operation through (its) object, since it has been shown through this threefold consideration of the soul itself, that it is immortal: every consideration of the soul, whether in itself or in (its) order, confirms [astruit] the immortality of the soul.
CONCLUSIO. Animam rationalem esse immortalem, quadruplici ratione probatur.	CONCLUSION That the rational soul is immortal, is proven by a fourfold reason.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedicta dicendum est, quod anima rationalis est immortalis, secundum quod dicit fides catholica, cui concordat philosophia et omnis ratio recta. Licet autem in cognitionem immortalitatis animae rationalis multiplici via possemus deduci et manuduci; potissimus tamen modus deveniendi in eius cognitionem est ex consideratione finis; et hunc modum praecipue approbat Augustinus in decimo tertio de Trinitate¹ et in libro de Civitate Dei. Nec immerito, quia finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem.	I RESPOND: To the aforesaid it must be said, that the rational soul is immortal, according to what the Catholic Faith says, with which philosophy and every right reason is concordant. Moreover, though we could be led and lead by hand unto the cognition of the immortality of the rational soul by a multiple way; yet the most able manner of coming unto its cognition is out of the consideration of (its) end; and this manner (St.) Augustine chiefly approves in the thirteenth book On the Trinity¹ and in the book On the City of God. Nor undeservedly, because the end imposes a necessity upon those which are for the end.
Hoc igitur primo supponendum est tanquam verum et certum, quod anima rationalis facta sit ad participandam summam beatitudinem. Hoc enim adeo certum est ex clamore omnis appetitus naturalis, quod nullus de eo dubitat, nisi cuius ratio est omnino subversa. Certissimum enim est nobis, quod omnes volumus esse beati. Si igitur beatus esse non potest qui bonum, quod habet, potest amittere, quia hoc ipso iam habet, unde timeat et unde etiam doleat, et ita unde miser existat, necesse est ergo, quodsi anima facta est capax beatitudinis, quod ipsa sit per naturam immortalis. Et sic colligitur eius immortalitas ex parte causae finalis.	This, therefore, must be supposed first as true and certain, that the rational soul has been made to participate in the highest beatitude [summam beatitudinem]. For this is so certain from the clamor of every natural appetite, that no one doubts concerning it, except (the one) whose reason has been entirely overthrown [est subversa]. For it is most certain to us, that we all wish to be blessed. Therefore, if one cannot be blessed who can loose the good, which he has, because by this very (thing) he already has, whence to feat and whence also to grieve, and thus whence to exist as one (who is) wretched, therefore it is necessary, that if the soul has been made capable of beatitude [capax beatitudinis], that it is itself immortal through nature. And in this manner its immortality is gathered on the part of (its) final cause.
Colligitur etiam nihilominus consequenter ex parte causae formalis. Quia enim facta est ad participandam beatitudinem, quae consistit in solo summo bono, facta est capax Dei, et ita ad ipsius imaginem et similitudinem.² Sed si est imago Dei, expresse ei assimilatur; hoc autem non esset, « si mortis termino clauderetur »:³ cum ergo de natura sua sit imago Dei, non potest mortis termino claudi.	Nevertheless (the immortality of the soul) is also gathered consequently on the part of (its) formal cause. For because (the soul) has been made to participate in the beatitude, which consists in the Most High Good alone, it has been made able to grasp God [capax Dei], and thus to His image and similitude. But if it the image of God, it is expressly assimilated to Him; but this would not be, « if it were enclosed by the terminus of death »:³ therefore since from its nature it is the image of God, (the soul) cannot be enclosed by a terminus of death.
Ex hoc etiam habetur et colligitur ratio ex parte materiae. Quia enim ipsum quo est anima sive forma tantae dignitatis, ut ipsam animam reddat Dei imagine insignitam, quae est conditio nobilissima; materia, quae huic formae unitur, tanto appetitu ei coniungitur, et ita eius appetitus in ipsa terminatur, quod nullatenus queat aliam formam appetere, cum optima colligantia iungantur ad invicem.	From this there is also had and gathered a reason on the part of (its) matter. For because the very (that) by which it is a soul or form of so great a dignity, as to render the soul itself marked by the image of God, which is the most noble condition; the matter, which is united to this form, is conjoined to it by so great an appetite, and thus its appetite is terminated in it, that is able to no extent to desire another form, since the best for being bound together [optima colligantia] are joined to one another.
Et quoniam « quod bona ratione iunctum est, dissolvi velle non est Dei »,⁴ hinc est, quod Deus, qui fuit animae auctor, est continuus animae conservator. — Et sic patet ratio immortalitatis animae ex quadruplici genere causae, quamvis principaliter sumatur ex fine. Et istae sunt rationes ostendentes non solummodo, quia est immortalis, sed etiam propter quid est.⁵ — Rationes vero superius inductae ostendunt, quod anima est immortalis, et verum concludunt, et ideo concedendae sunt.	And since « what has been joined for a good reason, it does not belong to God to will to be dissolved »,⁴ hence it is, that God, who was the Author of the soul, is the continuous Conserver of the soul. — And thus is clear the reason for the immortality of the soul from the fourfold genus of cause, though it is principally taken from (its) end. And these are the reasons showing not only, that it is immortal, but also (that) on account of which it is (immortal).⁵ — But the reasons brought forward above show, that the soul is immortal, and conclude the truth, and for that reason are to be conceded.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Apostolo, dicendum, quod Apostolus dicit, solum Deum habere immortalitatem, quia solus est, qui potest summe se perpetuare sine alterius iuvamine. Anima autem, etsi sit secundum suam originem idonea ad immortalitatem, non tamen potest sufficienter se continuare in esse, nisi conservetur a summo Auctore; et illa conservatio est a gratuita Dei bonitate nec repugnat naturae ipsius animae quantum ad principia, ex quibus constituitur, sed potius conservat illorum principiorum appetitum.⁶	1. To that, therefore, which is first objected unto the contrary from the Apostle, it must be said, that the Apostle says, that God alone has immortality, because He alone is (the One), who can perpetuate Himself in a most high manner without the help [iuvamine] of another. But the soul, even if it is suitable for immortality according to its origin, yet it cannot sufficiently continue itself in ‘being’, unless it is conserved by (its) Most High Author; and this conservation is from the gratuitous Goodness of God and it is not repugnant to the nature of the soul itself as much as regards the principles, out of which it is constituted, but it rather conserves the desire of those principles.⁶
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Damasceno, quod tendit in versionem; dicendum, quod tendentia illa non est per aliquem appetitum virtutis, sed potius per defectum vanitatis, quia creatura est ex nihilo. Hunc autem defectum summa Veritas et Potestas sua praesentia et manutenentia excludit a creatura. Et quia sic praesens est animae rationali, quam fecit, ut eam nunquam deserat, quin sit in ea per potentiam, praesentiam et essentiam; ideo anima rationalis nunquam potest corrumpi. — Nec valet instantia, quam obiicit de verbo Augustini. Augustinus enim intelligit de motibus, qui sunt a natura, secundum quod natura dicit originale principium alicuius effectus, non secundum quod dicit defectum. Et sic intelligendum est etiam, quod gratia naturam perficit et ei non repugnat; et hoc melius explicatum est in libro primo, distinctione octava.⁷	2. To that which is objected from (St. John) Damascene, that (the soul) tends unto a turning [versionem]; it must be said, that that tendency is not through any appetite of virtue, but rather through a defect of vanity, because the creature is out of nothing. But this defect Most High Truth and Power excludes from the creature by Its presence and maintenance [manutenentia]. And because He is thus present to the rational soul, which He made, that He never deserts her, Who is in her through (His) Power, Presence and Essence; and for that reason the rational soul can never be corrupted. — Nor is the instance, which it objects from the word of (St.) Augustine, valid. For (St.) Augustine understands (that) of the movements, which are by nature, according to which “nature” means the original principle of any effect, not according to which it means a defect. And thus must it also be understood, that grace perfects nature and is not repugnant to it; and this has been explained better in the First Book, in the Eighth Distinction.⁷
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Philosopho, quod intellectus corrumpitur etc.; dicendum, quod illud verbum pium debet habere intellectum. Non enim . . .	3. To that which is objected from the Philosopher, that the intellect is corrupted etc.; it must be said, that that word ought to be faithfully understood [pium deet habere intellectum]. For it must not . . .
¹ Cap. 7. n. 10. seq. — De Civ. Dei, VIII. c. 8; XIV. c. 25; XIX. c. 1. seqq. — Paulo inferius plures codd. percipiendum pro participandam. ² Secundum August., XIV. de Trin. c. 8. n. 11. ³ Cassiodor., de Anima, c. 8. et Auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 18. Cfr. supra pag. 411, nota 3. ⁴ Plato, in Timaeo (Chalcidio interprete, ed. Wrobel, pag. 43.). — Paulo superius post ad invicem Vat. addit Denique ex parte causae efficientis colligitur, et hic subiungit efficientis. ⁵ Supple: immortalis, quod in uno alteroque cod., in Vat. et aliis edd., excepta 1, etiam additur. ⁶ Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 86. m. 2. a. 2. § 1, ubi appetitum intrinsecum principiorum rerum explicat, de anima ait: Ergo cum anima sit substantia simplex et semper in actu, in ea fortis et potens actus et vigens est appetitus. Huius vigoris modum exprimens, maximus poetarum Virgilius (Aeneid. 6, 729) dixit: « Igneus est ollis vigor et calestis origo, Seminibus » etc. Igneus vigor, quia subtilis et acutus; et caelestis origo, quia vis est indita divinitus. ⁷ Part I. a. 2. q. 2. Cfr. etiam ibid. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et in hoc libro d. 37. a. 1. q. 2.	¹ Chapter 7, n. 10 f.. — On the City of God, Bk. VIII, ch. 8, Bk. XIV, ch. 25; Bk. XIX, ch. 1 ff.. — A little below this several codices have to perceive [ad percipiendum] for to participate in [ad participandam]. ² According to (St.) Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, ch. 8, n. 11. ³ Cassiodorus, On the Soul, ch. 8, and the Author of the book, On Spirit and the Soul, ch. 18. Cf. above d. 17, a. 1, q. 1, p. 411, footnote 3. ⁴ Plato, in the Timaeus, (Chalcidius’ translation, Wrobel’s edition, p. 43). — A little above this after to one another [ad invicem], the Vatican edition adds Next it is gathered on the part of (its) efficient cause [Denique ex parte causae efficientis colligitur], reading here hence it belongs to (its) efficient (cause) [efficientis hinc est] for hence it is [hinc est]. ⁵ Supply: immortal [immortalis], which is also added in one and the other codex, in the Vatican edition and in the other editions, except edition 1. ⁶ Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 86, m. 2, a. 2, § 1, where he explains the intrinsic appetite of things for (their) principles, saying of the soul: Therefore since the soul is simplex substance and always in act, there is in it a strong and potent act and a vigorous [vigens] appetite. Expressing the manner of this vigor [vigoris], the greatest of poets, Virgil (Aeneid, Bk. VI, v. 729) said: « Fiery is its vigor and heavenly (its) origin, By seeds » etc. Fiery (its) vigor, because (it is) subtle and acute; and heavenly (its) origin, because it is a force divinely endowed. ⁷ Part I, a. 2, q. 2. Cf. also ibid., Bk. I, d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1 f., and Bk. II, d. 37, a. 1, q. 2.

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credendum est, quod Philosophus voluerit dicere, intellectum esse corruptibilem, cum postea probet, ipsum impassibilem, incorruptibilem et immortalem esse, sicut in tertio de Anima¹ expresse patet; sed vult dicere, quod operatio intellectus, quam habet in corpore, impeditur propter aliquam laesionem factam interius in organo imaginationis, vel alterius virtutis sensibilis. Et quantum ad hoc verum dixit, sicut patet et est manifestum sensui.	be believed, that the Philosopher wanted to say, that the intellect is corruptible, since he afterwards proves, that it is impassible, incorruptible and immortal, just as is expressly clear in (his) third (book) On the Soul;¹ but he wants to say, that the operation of the intellect, which it has in the body, is impeded on account of some wound wrought interiorly in the organ of the imagination, and/or (in the organ) of another sensible virtue. And as much as regards this he spoke the truth, just as is clear and is manifest to the sense.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima patitur; responderi potest dupliciter. Primum quidem, quia passio eius non est per ipsius laesionem, sed per compassionem respectu corporis laesi; et hoc non ponit, aliquid de substantia eius abiici, sed de substantia, cui habet uniri. — Aliter potest responderi, quod ipsa anima non solum in corpore, sed etiam extra corpus habet pati; nec tamen sequitur, quod habeat corrumpi; non enim est illa corruptio per partis ademptionem, sed per quietis et pacis continuam impeditionem. Hoc autem in quarto² planius determinatum est, cum agitur de poenis animarum damnatarum.	4. To that which is objected, that the soul suffers; one can respond in a twofold manner. First indeed, because its suffering is not through its wounding, but through (its) compassion in respect of the wounded body; and this does not posit, that anything of its substance is lost, but (rather) of the substance, to which it has to be united. — One can respond in another manner, that the soul itself has to suffer not only in the body, but also outside the body; yet it also does not follow, that it has to be corrupted; for that corruption is not through the taking away [ademptionem] of a part, but through the continual impeding of (its) rest and peace. But this has been more plainly determined in the Fourth (Book),² when one deals with the punishments of damned souls.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima corpori condolet; dicendum, quod illa compassio non est, nisi salva coniunctione animae et corpus. Et quoniam mors separat illam coniunctionem, ideo non oportet compassionem mortis communicare, quia illa consequentia non tenet, nisi manente causa. Praeterea, illa consequentia non tenet, si anima maxime compatitur corpori maxime patienti, quod commoriatur morienti. Anima enim, cum sit capax laetitiae, et capax et doloris; sed cum sit capax vitae, nullo modo est susceptibilis mortis.	5. To that which is objected, that the soul grieves with the body; it must be said, that that compassion is not, but saving the conjunction of soul and body. And since death separates that conjunction, for that reason it is not necessary [non oportet], that the compassion communicate in death [mortis], because that consequence does not hold, except with the cause remaining. Moreover, that consequence does not hold, that (the soul) dies together with (the body) dying, if the soul suffers in the greatest manner with the body suffering in the greatest manner. For the soul, though it is capable of gladness, is also capable of sorrow [doloris]; but though it is capable of life, it is in no manner susceptible of death.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod operatio animae laeditur vel impeditur; dicendum, quod hoc est per accidens solum. Quia enim anima magna inclinatione inclinatur ad corpus et corpori suas operationes communicat, et virtutes sensitivae ipsi virtuti intellectivae immediate subministrant;³ inde est, quod laesis organis corporeis et impeditis viribus sensitivis, operatio intellectus, quamdiu est in corpore, habet impediri, ipso intellectu nullatenus in se laeso; quod ex hoc patet, quod statim cum a corpore separatur, habet suum usum completum. Et haec sufficiant quantum ad propositum.	6. To that which is objected, that the operation of the soul is wounded and/or impeded; it must be said, that this is only per accidens. For because the soul is inclined to the body by a great inclination and communicates its own operations to the body, and (since) the sensitive virtues serve beneath [subministrant] the intellective virtue itself;³ hence it is, that with the corporeal organs wounded and the sensitive forces impeded, the operation of the intellect, so long as it is in the body, has to be impeded, with the intellect itself wounded to no extent in itself; which is clear from this, that as soon as [statim cum] it is separated from the body, it has its complete use. And let these suffice as much as regards the proposed.
SCHOLION.	SCHOLIUM
I. Argumenta pro immortalitate animae humanae hoc loco allat et potissimum a S. Augustino accepta etiam in Summa de anima Ioannis a Rupella, p. I, c. 42. 43. (edita Prato 1882), aliis verbis proponuntur. — In solut. ad 3. Aristoteles absolvitur ab accusatione, quod immortalitatem animae non cognoverit; idem sentit S. Thom. cum communiore Scholasticorum sententia. Sed de hac re cum Henrico Gand. (cfr. supra schol. ad d. 18. a. 1. q. 1.) Scotus dubitat (VI. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. n. 16.) dicens: « Probabile est, quod Aristoteles in illa conclusione semper fuerit dubius »; Durandus autem (hic q. 1.), Aristoteli magis favens, primam opinionem reputat esse probabiliorem.	I. The arguments cited here for the immortality of the human soul, and accepted mostly from St. Augustine, are proposed in other words in the Summa on the Soul of (Friar) John of Rupella, p. I, chs. 42 and 43 (Prato 1882). — In the solution to n. 3 Aristotle is absolved from the accusation, that he did not know of the immortality of the soul; St. Thomas thought the same (thing), together with the more common sentence of the Scholastics. But on this matter (Bl. John Duns) Scotus doubted (Sent., VI, d. 43, q. 2, n. 16), together with Henry of Ghent (cf. the Scholium above on d. 18, a. 1, q. 1), (the former) saying: « It is probable, that Aristotle was always in doubt in regard to that conclusion »; but Durandus (here in q. 1), favoring Aristotle more, reputes the first opinion to be more probable.
II. Scot., loc. cit., IV. Report. d. 43. q. 2. n. 10. seqq., et apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 75. a. 6. — S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 1; S. I. q. 75. a. 6; S. c. Gent. II. c. 79. 80. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 73. m. 2, et tr. 13. q. 77. m. 5.). — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. et dub. lat. 1. — Durand., loc. cit. — Dionys. Carth. de hoc aliqua habet II. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 16. q. unica.	II. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, loc. cit., Reportatio., Bk. IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 10. ff., and in Jerome. of Montefortino, (Summa Scoti), tome II, p. I, q. 75, a. 6. — St. Thom as, here in the q. sole a. 1; Summa., I, q. 75, a. 6; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, chs. 79 and 80. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1; Summa., p. II, tr. 12, q. 73, m. 2, and tr. 13, q. 77, m. 5.). — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in q. 1, a. 1, and lateral doubt 1. — Durandus, loc. cit. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this some (things) are had in Sent., Bk. II, d. 18, q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, Sent., Bk. II, d. 16, q. sole.
III. Sequentis quaestionis conclusio inter catholicos doctores constat. Cfr. etiam supra d. 15. a. 1. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 2. a. 1. § 2, m . 3. a. 3. q. 62. m. 2. ad 2. — Scot., de Rerum princip. q. 10. n. 5, et apud. Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. I. q. 75. a. 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 75. a. 3; S. c. Gent. II. c. 82. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., (incidenter) hic q. 2. a. 1.	III. The conclusion of the following Question is established among Catholic doctors (of theology). Cf. also above d. 15, a. 1, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 87, m. 2, a. 1, § 2; m. 3, a. 3, q. 62, m. 2, in reply to n. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, de Rerum principio., q. 10, n. 5, and in Jerome of Montefortino’s, (Summa Scoti), tome II, p. I, q. 75, a. 3. — St Thomas, Summa., I, q. 75, a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 82. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 1, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, (incidentally) here in q. 2, a. 1.
¹ Text. 4. seqq. 15. 20. (c. 4. seq.). ² Dist. 44. p. II. a. 3. q. 2. et d. 50. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. seqq. — Paulo superius cod. O illa passio pro illa corruptio. ³ Vat. et virtutes sensitivas ipsi virtuti . . . subministrat.	¹ Texts 4 ff., 15, and 20 (ch. 4 f.). ² Distinction 44, p. II, a. 3, q. 2, and d. 50, p. II, a. 2, q. 1 ff.. — A little above this codex O has that suffering [illa passio] for that corruption [illa corruptio]. ³ The Vatican edition has and (since) it administers the sensitive virtues beneath the intellective virtue itself [et virtutes sensitivas ipsi virtuti . . . subministrat].

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX