S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX

ARTICULUS I.

 

Quaestio II.

ARTICLE I

 

Question 2

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 461-464.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 461.464.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

QUAESTIO II.

 

Utrum quaevis anima, etiam brutalis, ex prima conditione fuerit immortalis.

QUESTION 2

 

Whether every soul, even (that) of a brute, was from its first condition immortal?

SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum omnis anima, utpote brutalis, non solum rationalis, ex prima conditione fuerit immortalis.  Et quod sic, videtur.

SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether every soul, such as [utpote] (that) of the brute, not only the rational one, was from its first condition immortal.  And that (it was) so, seems:

1. Ecclesiastis tertio:4  Unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum; sed homines, etsi intereant quantum ad corpora, non tamen intereunt quantum ad animas:  ergo pari ratione nec bruta animalia.

1. According to the third (chapter) of Ecclesiastes:4  The ruin [interitus] of man and beasts of burden is one; but men, even if they are destroyed [intereant] as much as regards (their) bodies, yet they are not destroyed as much as regards (their) souls:  therefore for an equal reason neither the brute animals.

2. Item, Sapientiae primo:5  Deus mortem non fecit nec delectatur in perditione vivorum; igitur mors non est introducta nisi propter peccatum:  ergo si homo non peccasset, nec moreretur ipse, nec moreretur brutum animal.  Sed hoc non esset, nisi animae brutorum essent immortales:  ergo etc.

2.  Likewise, according to the first (chapter) of Wisdom:5  God did not made death nor does He delight in the perdition of the living; therefore death was introduced naught but on account of sin:  therefore if man had not sinned, neither would he die, nor would the brute animal die.  But this would not be, unless the souls of brute animals were immortal:  ergo etc..

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione.  Probato quod anima Petri sit immortalis, probatur, quod omnis anima sit immortalis per hypothesim,6 quia non . . .

3. Likewise, this seems by reason.  With it proven, that the soul of Peter is immortal, it is proven, that every soul is immortal per hypothesis [per hypothesim],6 because the reason / for one is not greater . . .

4  Vers. 19.

5  Vers. 13.

6  Aristot., III. Topic. c. 4. (c. 6.) inter locos argumentandi recenset illum ex suppositione sive ex hypothesi, in quo scil. proceditur a particulari ad universale, sive quando aliquis postulat, illud quod uni inest vel non inest omni inesse vel non inesse, « ut si hominis anima immortalis, et alias, si autem haec non, nec alias . . .. Manifestum igitur est, quod qui hypothesi utitur facit problema universale particulariter positum; nam particulariter confitentem universaliter postulabit confiteri, eo quod uni, et omni similiter postulaverit inesse ».

4  Verse 19.

5  Verse 13.

6  Aristot., Topics, Bk. III, ch. 4 (ch. 6) lists among the loci of arguing that (which is) ex suppositione or ex hypothesis, in which, that is, one proceeds from a particular to a universal, or when anyone postulates, that which is in, or not in, one is, or is not, in every, « such as if the soul of man (is) immortal, (so) also the others, but if this one (is) not, neither (are) the others . . ..  Therefore it is manifest, that he who uses a hypothesis causes a universal problem to be posited in a particular manner; for he will postulate that (a proposition) confessing (something) universally (is) one confession (the same) particularly, by this that he postulates what is in one to be similarly in every ».

 

p. 462

 

est maior ratio de una quam de alia, loquendo de animabus rationalibus; ergo pari ratione, loquendo de animabus sensibilibus, si una anima sensibilis est immortalis, ergo et omnes.  Sed anima sensibilis humana est immortalis, quia nunquam est rationalis sine sensibili:  ergo cum in hac communicet homo cum brutis, anima sensibilis brutorum animalium per naturam est immortalis.

the reason / for one is not greater than (the reason) for the other, speaking of rational souls; therefore for an equal reason, speaking of sensible souls, if one sensible soul is immortal, therefore also (are) all.  But the human sensible soul is immortal, because there never is a rational (soul) without the sensible (soul):  therefore since man communicates with brutes in this, the sensible soul of brutes is immortal through nature.

4. Item, omnis anima, quantumcumque parum habeat de nobilitate, excellit omne corpus, sicut vult Augustinus,1 ergo magis accedit ad Dei similitudinem; sed aliqua corpora per naturam sunt immortalia, sicut corpora caelestia:  ergo multo fortius animae brutorum animalium.

4. Likewise, every soul, howsoever much it has a bit of nobility [parum de nobilitate], excels every body, just as (St.) Augustine1 wants, therefore it approaches God’s similitude more; but some bodies are immortal through nature, such as the celestial bodies:  therefore much more strongly the souls of brute animals.

5. Item, substantia, cuius virtus et operatio non senescit in tempore, non corrumpitur in tempore; sed anima sensibilis est huiusmodi, quia, sicut dicit Philosophus,2 « si senex acciperet oculum iuvenis, ita videret, sicut iuvenis »:  ergo etc.

5. Likewise, the substance, whose virtue and operation do not grow old in time, is not corrupted in time; but the sensible soul is of this kind, because, just as the Philosopher2 says, « if an old man accepted the eye of a young man, he would see thus, just as a young man »:  ergo etc..

6. Item, quia homo servit Deo, est dignus remuneratione; et ideo necesse est ponere animam eius immortalem, ut remuneretur post mortem:  ergo pari ratione, cum bruta animalia serviant homini, et per hoc Deo in homine, videtur similiter, quod ipsa debeant remunerari.

6. Likewise, because a man serves God, he is worthy of remuneration; and for that reason it is necessary to posit that his soul is immortal, so that he might be remunerated after death:  therefore for an equal reason, since brute animals serve man, and through this, God in man, it seems similarly, that they ought themselves be remunerated.

CONTRA:  1. Nulla forma est separabilis a corpore, nisi quae habet operationem propriam praeter corpus; sed nullus spiritus brutalis est huiusmodi:  ergo etc.  Maior manifesta est, tum quia Philosophus3 dicit, tum etiam, quia nulla est substantia, quae omni careat operatione, cum nulla sit otiosa.  Secunda manifesta est ad sensum.

ON THE CONTRARY:  1. No form is separable from a body, except that which has its own operation apart from the body [praeter corpus]; but no spirit of a brute is of this kind:  ergo etc..  The major is manifest, both because the Philosopher3 says (so), and also, because there is no substance, which lacks every operation, since none is idle [otiosa].  The second (proposition) is manifest to the sense.

2. Item, omnia bruta animalia facta sunt propter usum hominis;4 sed usus hominis est in vescendo eis, et vescitur eis, dum ea occidit:  ergo facta sunt ad hoc, ut non tantum serviant homini per vitam, sed etiam per mortem; sed hoc non esset, si animae eorum essent immortales:  ergo etc.

2. Likewise, all brute animals were made for the sake of man’s use;4 but man’s use is in feeding on them, and he feeds on them, when he slays them:  therefore they were made for this, not to only serve man through (their) life, but also through (their) death; but this would not be, if their souls were immortal:  ergo etc..

3. Item, animae immortali debetur corpus immortale, quantum est ex institutione prima:5  ergo si animae brutorum erant immortales, habebant corpora immortalia.  Sed constat, quod bruta non peccaverunt:  ergo deberent adhuc esse immortalia.  Quodsi hoc constat esse falsum, patet etiam, quod et primum.

3. Likewise, to an immortal soul there is owed an immortal body, as much as is from (its) first institution:5  therefore if the souls of brutes were immortal, they had immortal bodies.  But it is established, that the brutes did not sin:  therefore they ought to still be immortal.  Wherefore if the this is established to be false, it is also clear, that the first (is) also.

4. Item, si animae brutorum essent immortales, ergo deberent omnia corpora brutorum redire,6 sicut et corpora hominum; sed si hoc, esset impossibile, quod omnia essent in terra, cum innumerabilis bestiarum multitudo et animalium continue sibi succedat:  ergo inconveniens est dicere, brutorum animas esse immortales.

4. Likewise, if the souls of brutes were immortal, therefore all the bodies of the brutes would have [deberent] to return,6 just as the bodies of men (will); but if this (is the case), it would be impossible, that all (of them) be on the Earth, since an innumerable multitude of beasts and animals continuously succeed one another:  therefore it is unfitting to say, that the souls of brutes are immortal.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Irrationales animae ex sua prima conditione sunt mortales.

CONCLUSION

 

Irrational souls are from their first condition mortal.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, brutorum animas esse immortales, pro eo quod eadem animae sunt, quae vivificant corpora brutorum et corpora hominum, cum merito peccatorum suorum de corpore ad corpus circumeundo pertranseant.  —  Et haec positio quorundam philosophorum et haereticorum fuit, sicut dictum est supra,7 et iam improbata est supra tanquam haeretica; et prorsus abiicienda est ista positio tanquam vilis et derogans dignitati creaturae rationalis, dum ponit, homines et bestias esse pares.  In hoc enim indicat, quod sui inventores et defensores sunt homines bestiales, dum animas suas credunt vel bestiarum fuisse, vel futuras esse.8

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that some (authors) wanted to say, that the souls of brutes are immortal, in virtue of this, that the souls, which vivify the bodies of brutes and the bodies of men, are the same, since they pass by going around from body to body according to the merit of their sins.  —  And this was the position of certain philosophers and heretics, just as has been said above,7 and (as) has already been disproved above as heretical; and in a word [prorsus] that position of their is to be rejected as vile and derogating from the dignity of the rational creature, since it posits, that men and beasts are peers.  For in this it indicates, that its inventors and defenders are bestial men, since they believe their own souls either to have been and/or that they are going to be (those) of beasts.8

Fuerunt et alii, qui dicere voluerunt, quod animae brutorum nec sunt adeo immortales, sicut animae rationales, ut possint post corpora vivere, nec sunt adeo corruptibiles, sicut aliae formae, quae habent contrarietatem; sed quantum est de sui natura, natae sunt continue durare, nisi impedimentum suae durationis habeant ex corpore, sine quo non possunt subsistere.  Huiusmodi autem impedimentum durationis introductum esse dicunt in corpora brutorum propter peccatum hominum.9  Si enim Adam non peccasset, nullum animal brutum decederet.  Unde sicut merito peccati humani quae ad eius obsequium facta sunt deteriorata fuerunt, sic et bruta animalia facta sunt morti obnoxia.  —  Sed istud prima fronte obviat ei quod dicit Augustinus per Genesim ad litteram libro tertio,10 quod si homo non peccasset, nihilominus essent animalia viventia de rapina, quae ad suam vitam servandam alia interficerent animalia.  —  Repugnat etiam rationi, cum nulla ratio dicat, congruum esse, ovem interfici propter hoc, quod homo peccavit, cum nullo modo ei in peccato communicaverit, nec peccatum suum in ovem transfuderit.  —  Repugnat etiam imaginationi sensibili.  Ubi enim essent tota animalia, quae multiplicata essent super terram ab initio . . .

There were also others, who wanted to say, that the souls of brutes are neither immortal to such an extent, just as rational souls, that they can live after (their) bodies, nor are then corruptible to such an extent, just as other forms, which have contrariety; but as much as it is of their nature, they are bound to endure continually, if they do not have an impediment to their duration from (their) body, without which they cannot subsist.  But an impediment of this kind to duration, they say was introduced into the bodies of brutes on account of the sin of men.9  For if Adam had not sinned, no brute animal would depart from life [decederet].  Wherefore, just as by the merit of human sin (those) which were made for his service [obsequium] deteriorated, so also the brute animals became liable [obnoxia] to death.  —  But this prima facie [prima fronte] obviates that which (St.) Augustine says in the third book On a Literal Exposition of Genesis,10 that if man [homo] had not sinned, there would be, nevertheless, animals living from plunder (i.e. from the hunt), which would, to conserve their own life, kill other animals.  —  It is also repugnant to reason, since no reason says, that it is congruent, that a sheep be killed on account of this, that man sinned, since in no manner does it communicate with him in (his) sin, nor does he transfuse his sin into the sheep.  —  It is also repugnant to the sensible imagination.  For where would all [tota] the animals be, which were multiplied upon the Earth form the start . . .

1  Libr. VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19. n. 25; XII. c. 16. n. 32; III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 16; de Duabus animabus contra Manich. c. 4. n. 4; Enarrat. in Ps. 145. n. 3.  Cfr. III. de Lib. Arb. c. 5. n. 12; IX. de Civ. Dei, c. 9.

2  Libr. I. de Anima, text. 65. (c. 4.).

3  Libr. I. de Anima, text. 12. seq. (c. 1.).  —  De seq. ratione cfr. supra pag. 197. nota 5.

4  Cfr. supra d. 15. a. 2. q. 1.

5  Vide art. 2. q. 1 et a. 3. q. 1.  —  Paulo inferius antiquiores codd. Quod etsi hac, cod. aa Et si hoc per Quodsi hoc, quod habet cod. cc cum ed. 1.

6  Cod. I. resurgere.

7  Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 2.

8  Vide August., VII: de Gen. ad lit. c. 10. n. 14. seqq.

9  Cod. cc et ed. 1 hominis.  —  Mox post peccati humani codd. R aa addunt cetera, et dein plures alii codd. cum ed. 1 substituunt deteriora pro deteriorata.

10  Cap. 16. n. 25.

1  On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VII, ch. 19, n. 25; Bk. XII, ch. 16, n. 32; On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 5, n. 16; On Two Souls against the Manichees, ch. 4, n. 4; Enarrations on the Psalms, P. 145, n. 3.  Cf. On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 5, n. 12; On the City of God, Bk. IX, ch. 9.

2  (Aristotle), On the Soul, Bk. I, text 65 (ch. 4).

3  On the Soul, Bk. I, text 12 f. (ch. 1).  —  On the following reason, cf. above d. 7, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, p. 197, footnote 5.

4  Cf. above d. 15, a. 2, q. 1.

5  See article 2, q. 1, and a. 3, q. 1.  —  A little below this the more ancient codices have Wherefore if this (previous proposition) [Quod etsi hoc], codex aa has And if this (previous saying) [Et si hoc] for Wherefore if this (previous saying) [Quodsi hoc], which codex c has, together with edition 1.

6  Codex I has rise again [resurgere].

7  Distinction 18, a. 2, q. 2.

8  See (St.) Augustine, On a Literal Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VII, ch. 10, n. 14 ff..

9  Codex cc and edition 1 has of man [hominis].  —  Next after of human sin [peccati humani] codex R and aa add all the other (creatures) [cetera] for (those), and then several other codices, together with edition 1, substitute were worse [deteriora fuerunt] for deteriorated [deteriorata fuerunt].

10  Chapter 16, n. 25.

 

p. 463

 

mundi usque in finem, si nulla essent mortua?  Quodsi dicas, quod non essent multiplicata, si homo non peccasset; quomodo etiam verum esset quod dicitur eis Genesis primo:1  Crescite et multiplicamini et replete aquas?  Quod si dictum est piscibus, cur non intelligendum est etiam dictum esse aliis animalibus?  Nunquid propter culpam hominis facta sunt fecundiora?  Quae omnia si inconvenientia sunt, positio ista tanquam inconveniens respuenda est.

of the world unto the end (of time), if they had not died?  Wherefore if you say, that they would not have been multiplied, if man had not sinned; in what manner would that which is said to them in the first (chapter) of Genesis even be true:  Grow and multiply and fill the waters?  Wherefore if that was said to the fishes (of the sea), why must it not be understood to have also been said to the other animals?  Were they made more fecund on account of man’s fault?  If all of which [Quae omnia si] are unfitting, this position of theirs is to be rejected as unfitting.

Et ideo dicendum est tertio modo, quod nulla alia anima nisi rationalis immortalis est.  —  Et ratio huius apparet, si aspiciamus ad finem, propter quem creaturae factae sunt, ex quo fine ponitur in rebus perpetuitas, vel corruptibilitas, secundum earum exigentiam.  Cum autem omnes creaturae factae sint propter Deum iuxta illud:2  Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus; sola creatura rationalis facta est ad fruendum Deo, et ut beatificetur in ipso, quae sola est ad imaginem.  Aliae vero creaturae, quae solum tenent rationem vestigii, factae sunt vel ad manifestationem divinae bonitatis, vel ad obsequium creaturae rationalis.

And for that reason one must say in the third manner, that no other soul except the rational is immortal.  —  And the reason of this is apparent, if we look to the end, for the sake of which creatures have been made, on account of which end there is posited in things perpetuity, and/or corruptibility, according to their exigency.  Moreover since all creatures were made for the sake of God in accord with that (verse):  Each and every (thing) has Thou worked, Lord, for Thy own sake; the rational creature alone has been made to enjoy God, and to be beatified in Him, which (creature) alone is to (His) image.  But the other creatures, which have only the reckoning of a vestige, were made either for the manifestation of the Divine Goodness, and/or for the service [obsequium] of the rational creature.

Manifestatio autem divini exemplaris et bonitatis Dei est in productione universi, quod est quodam exemplatum, complete repraesentans illud exemplar, et propter repraesentationis completionem completam debet habere et perpetuam durationem.  Universum autem dupliciter3 habet esse, videlicet decurrens et permanens.  Esse decurrens non potest esse perpetuam, quia necesse est, quod aliquando sit quietum.  Esse vero permanens est perpetuum.  Illae igitur partes, quae respiciunt universum quantum ad esse permanens, sicut sunt orbes caelorum et elementorum, perpetuitatem habent.  Illae vero quae respiciunt4 quantum ad esse decurrens, utpote quae consistunt in generatione et corruptione, qualia sunt mineralia, plantae et animalia bruta, non debent habere esse perpetuum, sed terminatum, quae quasi quodam transitu suo et quadam inveteratione et innovatione, morte et vivificatione decorant universum.  Et sic patet, quod bruta animalia quantum ad corpus et animam corruptibilia sunt per naturam, in quantum facta sunt ad repraesentandum divinam bonitatem et sapientiam.  Et haec ratio sumta est a fine principali.

Moreover the manifestation of the Divine Exemplar and of God’s Goodness is in the production of the universe, which is a certain copy [exemplatum], completely representing that Exemplar, and for the sake of the completion of the representation it ought to have also a perpetual duration.  But the universe has (its) ‘to be’ in twofold manner,3 namely decurrent and permanent.  Decurrent ‘being’ cannot be perpetual, because it is necessary, that it be at some time at rest.  But permanent ‘being’ is perpetual.  Therefore those parts (of the universe), which respect the universe as much as regards (its) permanent ‘being’, such as are the orbs of the heavens and of the elements, have a perpetuity.  But those which respect (the universe)4 as much as regards decurrent ‘being’, such as (those) which consist in generation and corruption, as are the minerals, plants and brute animals, ought not have a perpetual ‘to be’, but a terminated one, which (creatures) decorate the universe by their death and vivification, as if by a kind of [quodam] passing by and by a kind of growing old and by being renewed.  And thus it is clear, that brute animals, as much as regards (their) body and soul, are corruptible through nature, inasmuch as they have been made to represent the Divine Goodness and Wisdom.  And this reason has been taken from (their) principal end.

Est etiam alia ratio, sumta a fine non principali, in quantum scilicet creaturae, in quibus est sola ratio vestigii, factae sunt propter creaturam rationalem, scilicet hominem.  Quaedam enim factae sunt propter hominem secundum omnem statum sive viae, sive patriae; quaedam solum secundum statum viae; et quadam solum secundum statum patriae.  Et illa quae facta sunt propter hominem secundum omnem statum, sive viae, sive patriae,5 cum status patriae sint perpetuus, debent esse perpetua; et talia sunt quae integrant hominis habitaculum, sicut caelum et quatuor elementa.  Illa vero, quae facta sunt propter hominem secundum statum viae, cum ille status sit pertransitorius et habeat finem, debent esse corruptibilia; talia autem sunt animalia bruta, quae facta sunt ad supplendam corporis indigentiam secundum eum statum, in quo indiget cibis et alimoniis.  —  Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes, animas brutales esse mortales ex sua prima conditione.

There is also another reason, taken from the non-principal end, that is, inasmuch as the creatures, in which there is the reckoning of a vestige alone, have been made for the sake of the rational creature, namely man.  For certain ones have been made for the sake of man according to (his) every state, whether of the way, or of the fatherland; certain ones only according to the state of the way; and certain ones only according to the state of the fatherland.  And those which have been made for the sake of man according to every state, whether of the way, or of the fatherland,5 since the state of the fatherland is perpetual, ought to be perpetual; and such are (those) which made up the whole of [integrant] man’s dwelling, such as Heaven and the four elements.  But those, which were made for the same of man according to the sate of the way, since that state is thoroughly transitory [pertransitorius] and has an end, ought to be corruptible; but such are the brute animals, which have been made to supply the indigence of the body according to that state, in which it needs (diverse) foods and nourishments.  —  And thus there are to be conceded the reasons showing, that the brute animals are mortal out of their first condition.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Ecclesiaste, quod unus est interitus etc.; dicendum, quod loquitur quantum ad exteriorem intelligentiam; et propterea subiungit:6  Quis novit, si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum? quasi dicat:  non novit homo, qui ambulat secundum intellectum carnalem, qui ea sola considerat, quae exterius apparent; homo autem sapiens novit, qui illud attendit, quod ipse Ecclesiastes in fine7 dicit:  Scito, quod pro omni errato adducet te Deus in iudicium.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected from Ecclesiastes, that the ruin . . . is one; it must be said, that he speaks as much as regards an exterior understanding [intelligentiam]; and besides he subjoins:6  Who knows, if the spirit of the sons of Adam ascend upwards? as if to say:  “the man, who works according to a carnal understanding [intellectum], does not know, (he) who considers those alone, which appear exteriorly; but the wise man knows, who attends to that, which Ecclesiastes himself says at the end:7  “Know, that for every error God shall lead thee unto judgment.”

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de libro Sapientiae, dicendum, quod loquitur vel de morte damnationis aeternae, vel de morte temporali in eo cui mors est poena.  Tale autem est solum animal rationis capax, quod, sicut solum natum est esse beatum, solum natum est esse miserum, sic solum natum est praemiari, solum natum est puniri, quia solum ipsum est, cui data est vis discretiva inter bonum et malum, verum et falsum.8  Unde etsi bestia doleat, cum occiditur vel laeditur, non tamen punitur; non enim est capax miseriae:  solus enim ille est miser, qui vel scit, se esse miserum vel scire debet, cum malum habet.

2. To that which is objected from the book of Wisdom, it must be said, that he is speaking either of the death of eternal damnation, or of the temporal death in him for whom death is a punishment.  But such is only the animal capable of reason, which, just as he has been born to be blessed, (and) has been born to be wretched, so has he been born to be rewarded, (and) has been born to be punished, because he alone is, to whom there has been given a discretive force (to choose) between good and evil, true and false.8  Wherefore even if a beast grieves, when it is slain and/or wounded, yet it is not punished; for it is not capable of wretchedness:  for he alone is the wretch, who either knows, that he is a wretch and/or ought to know, when he has (done) evil [malum habet].

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis hominis est immortalis; dicendum, quod non est simile.  Sensibile enim in homine nominat potentiam, scilicet animae rationalis, sicut infra9 patebit; sensibile vero in brutis nominat formam, quae substantificatur in materia transmutabili; et quia pendet ex illa quantum ad esse, corrumpitur, illa corrupta.

3. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul of man is immortal; it must be said, that it is not similar.  For the “sensible” in man names a power, namely of the rational soul, just as will be clear below;9 but the “sensible” in brutes names a form, which is substantified [substantificatur] in the transmutable matter; and because it depends upon the latter as much as regards (its) ‘to be’, it is corrupted, with the latter corrupted.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis est nobilior omni corpore; dicendum, quod maior nobilitas et minor non facit ad maiorem dur- / -rationem . . .

4. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul is more noble than every body; it must be said, that a greater and lesser nobility does not work toward the greater du- / -ration . . .

1  Vers. 32.

2  Prov. 16, 4.  —  Cfr. supra d. 16. a. 1. q. 1, d. 1. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.

3  Cod. cc et ed. 1 duplex.

4  Supple cum cod. cc et ed. 1 universum.

5  Multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, omisso secundo disiunctionis membro:  quaedam solum secundum statum viae, omittunt etiam sequentia:  Et illa quae facta . . . sive patriae.

6  Cap. 3, 21.  —  Paulo superius codd. A I Y aa aliique apparentiam pro intelligentiam; fortasse melius.

7  Cap. 12, 14:  Et cuncta, quae fiunt, adducet Deus in iudicium pro omni errato, sive bonum, sive malum illud sit.

8  Cfr. supra pag. 453, nota 1.  De sequentibus cfr. August., de Natura boni c. 7. 8.

9  Dist. 31. a. 1. q. 1.

1  Verse 32.

2  Prov. 16:4.  —  Cf. above d. 16, a. 1, q. 1; d. 1, p. II, a. 2, q. 1.

3  Codex cc and edition 1 have a twofold ‘to be’ [duplex . . . esse] for (its) ‘to be’ in a twofold manner [dupliciter . . . esse].

4  Supply together with codex cc and edition 1 the universe [universum].

5  Many codices, together with editions 1, 2 and 3, having omitted the second member of the disjunction:  certain ones only according to the state of the way [quaedam solum secundum statum viae], omit also the following ones:  And those which have . . . or of the fatherland [Et illa quae facta . . . sive patriae].

6  Eccles. 3:21.  —  A little above this codices A I Y aa and others have appearance [apparentiam] for understanding [intelligentiam]; perhaps a better (reading).

7  Eccles. 12:14:  And all (the things), which came to be, God will lead forth unto judgment for every error, whether it is good, or evil [Et cuncta, quae fiunt, adducet Deus in iudicium pro omni errato, sive bonum, sive malum illud sit].

8  Cf. above d. 18, a. 2, q. 3, p. 453, footnote 1.  On the following, cf. (St.) Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, chs. 7 and 8.

9  Distinction 31, a. 1, q. 1.

 

p. 464

 

dur- / -rationem — magis enim nobilis est etiam secundum statum naturae lapsae homo, quam sit lapis; tamen lapis plus durat modo1 — sed hoc facit privatio corrumpentis causae.  Et hanc habet anima sensibilis propter hoc, quod fundatur et pendet ex corpore composito ex contrariis, supra quam contrarietatem sublimata est natura caelestis.

the greater du- / -ration of the creature — for man is more noble even according to the state of fallen nature, than a stone is; yet the stone now endures more1 — but the privation of a corrupting cause causes this.  And this the soul has on account of this, that it is founded and depends upon a body composed out of contraries, above which contrariety celestial nature has been raised [sublimata est].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima sensibilis non senescit; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum est per se; senescit tamen ratione eius in quo radicatur, scilicet ratione corporis, ratione cuius etiam habet corrumpi; et hoc ex conditione sua primaria.

5. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul does not grow old; it must be said, that it is true, as much as it is through itself; yet it does grow old by reason of that in which it is rooted, namely by reason of the body, by reason of which it also has to be corrupted; and this on account of its primary condition.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod bruta serviunt hominibus; dicendum, quod servitium remunerabile non est nisi illud quod est laudabile.  Sola autem potentia rationalis et deliberativa, in qua consistit arbitrii libertas, est, in qua cadit laus et vituperium, et ideo quantumcumque obsequium sit magnum et utile, non est dignum remuneratione, nisi factum fuerit ex arbitrii libertate:  ideo non decet, remunerari animas brutorum.  Et sic patet illud.2

6. To that which is objected, that the brutes serve men; it must be said, that there is no remunerable service [servitium] except that which is worthy of praise [laudabile].  But the rational and deliberative power, in which consists liberty of judgment, is alone (that), in which there falls praise and blame, and for that reason however so much a service [obsequium] is great and useful, it is not worth of remuneration, unless it was done out of a liberty of judgment:  for that reason it is not fitting [decet], that the souls of brutes be remunerated.  And thus that (objection) is clear.2

1  August., VI. de Musica, c. 4. n. 6, inter alia hoc exemplum affert:  Sanitas unius diei profecto est melior quam multorum dierum imbecillitas.

2  Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.

1  (St.) Augustine, On Music, Bk. VI, ch. 4, n. 6, among others offers this example:  The health of one day is indeed better than the feebleness [imbcillitas] of many days.

2  See the Scholium to the preceding Question.

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