S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX

ARTICULUS II.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE II

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 464-466.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 464-466.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS II.

 

De immortalitate Adae ex parte corporis.

ARTICLE II

 

On the immortality of Adam on the part of (his) body.

Consequenter quaeritur quantum ad secundum articulum de immortalitate Adae ex parte corporis.  Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Consequently there is asked, as much as regards the second Article, concerning the immortality of Adam on the part of (his) body.  And about this two (questions) are asked.

Primo quaeritur, utrum, anima non peccante, posset corpus Adae dissolvi.

First there is asked, whether, with (his) soul not sinning, the body of Adam could be dissolved.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum, ipsa peccante, posset per esum ligni vitae in vita perpetuari.

Second there is asked, whether, with it sinning, (the body of Adam) could be perpetuated in life through the eating of the Tree of Life.

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum corpus Adae, ipso non peccante, posset dissolvi.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether the body of Adam, with him not sinning, could be dissolved?

CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod etiamsi Adam non peccasset, corpus eius dissolvi potuisset, tali ratione.

ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is shown, that even if Adam had not sinned, his body could have been dissolved, by such a reckoning:

1. Adam in statu innocentiae habebat corpus mortale, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister in littera3, ergo corruptibile; sed « omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumpetur, sicut vult Philosophus, quamvis non omne generabile de necessitate generetur »:  ergo, corpus Adae corruptum fuisset, esto quod in statu innocentiae permansisset.

1. Adam in the state of innocence had a mortal body, just as (St.) Augustine and Master (Peter) says in the text,3 therefore a corruptible one; but « every corruptible of necessity will be corrupted », just as the Philosopher wants, « though not every generable of necessity is generated »:  therefore, let it be that (Adam) had remained thoroughly in the state of innocence, the body of Adam would have been corrupted.

2. Item, contrarietas est causa pugnae, et pugna in composito est causa dissolutionis:4  ergo in illo statu, in quo potest esse contrarietas, potest esse dissolutio; sed corpus Adae etiam secundum statum innocentiae ex contrariis habebat compositionem:  ergo, statu illo manente, poterat habere dissolutionem.

2.  Likewise, contrariety is the cause of battle [pugnae], and battle in a composite is the cause of (its) dissolution:4  therefore in that state, in which there can be contrariety, there can be dissolution; but the body of Adam had composition out of contrariety even according to the state of innocence:  therefore, remaining in that state, it could have a dissolution.

3. Item, cuicumque statui competit restauratio, competit deperditio; sed corpori Adae in statu innocentiae competebat restauratio per sumtionem ciborum:5  ergo et eidem corpori secundum statum innocentiae inerat deperditio. Sed cuicumque inest deperditio, inest et consumtio, et in quocumque ponitur consumtio, ponitur et corruptio:  ergo corpus Adae, in statu innocentiae persistens, dissolvi poterat et corrumpi, nulla culpa interveniente.

3. Likewise, to whatsoever state there suits a restoration, there suits a loss [deperditio]; but to the body of Adam in the state of innocence there suited a restoration through the taking of (diverse) foods [per sumtionem ciborum]:5  therefore there was also a loss in the same body according to the state of innocence.  But in whatsoever there is a loss, there is a consumption, and in whatsoever there is posited consumption, there is also posited corruption:  therefore the body of Adam, persisting in the state of innocence, could have been dissolved and corrupted, with no fault intervening.

4. Item, constans est, quod Adam non poterat vivere, nisi comederet, cum haberet corpus animale;6 sed poterat non comedere:  ergo poterat absque ullo peccato corpus eius deficere.  Si tu dicas, quod peccaret in non comedendo, quia tenebatur comedere; contra:  non semper tenebatur comedere — quia signemus aliquam horam, in qua tenebatur.  In illa hora aut Adam esuriet, aut non.  Si esuriet:  ergo pateretur, antequam peccaret; si non esuriret:  ergo natura non indigerat, cum natura bene disposita tempore necessitatis cibum appetat:7  ergo non teneretur tunc comedere nec alias:  ergo nunquam.

4. Likewise, it is established, that Adam could not live, unless he ate, since he had an animal body;6 but he could have not eaten:  therefore his body could fail apart from any sin.  If you say, that he would sin in not eating, because he was bound to eat:  on the contrary:  he was not always bound to eat — because let us indicate [signemus] any hour, in which he was bound.  In that hour either Adam will be hungry, or not.  If he will be hungry:  therefore he would suffer, before he sinned; if he will not be hungry:  therefore (his) nature had not the need, since a nature well disposed desires food in a time of necessity:7  therefore he would not be bound to eat then nor at other (hours):  therefore never.

5. Item, si Adam stetisset, aliquis de filiis eius poterat peccare.  Ponatur ergo, quod peccasset; sed possibile est, virum iustum a peccatore insidiante interfici absque sua culpa, sicut Abel interfectus est a Cain:8  ergo possibile esset, Adam saltem dor- / -mientem . . .

5. Likewise, if Adam had stood, any of his sons could have sinned.  Therefore let it be posited, that he sinned; but it is possible, that a just man be slain by a sinner in ambush [peccatore insidiante] without any fault of his own, just as Abel was slain by Cain:8  therefore it would be possible, that Adam at least while / sleeping  [saltem dormientem]. . .

3  Hic c. 2. seqq.  —  De dicto Aristotelis, ab Averroe contracto, cfr. I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 133. (c. 12.), et VI. Metaph. text. 7. (V. c. 3.).  —  Mox post Adae cod. O interserit de necessitate.

4  Damasc., I. de Fide orthod. c. 4:   Compositio enim causa (arch) pugnae, pugna dissidii (diastaswV), dissidium solutionis (lusewV).*

5  Cfr. quaest. seq. nec non a. 3. q. 1. et supra pag. 424, nota 7.

6  Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 6. (IV. c. 5.):  Necessarium dicitur, sine quo non contingit vivere tanquam concausa, ut respirare et alimentum animali necessarium est; impossibile enim est absque his animal esse.

7  Aristot., III. Ethic. c. 11:  Alimenti cupiditas naturalis est; siccum enim, vel humidum alimentum, vel etiam utrumque, cum indigent, omnes cupiunt.

8  Gen. 4, 8.  —  Codd. F aa:  Item, esto quod Adam pro Item, si Adam.

3  Here in ch. 2 ff..  —  On the saying of Aristotle, contracted by Averroës, cf. On Heaven and the World, Bk. I, text 133 (ch. 12), and Metaphysics, Bk. VI, text 7 (Bk. V, ch. 3).  —  Next after of Adam [Adae] codex O inserts of necessity [de necessitate].

4  (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 4:  For composition (is) the cause (arch) of a fight, fight (the cause) of falling apart (diastaswV), falling apart (the cause of) dissolution (lusewV).

5  Cf. the following Question, and also a. 3, q. 1, and above d. 17, a. 2, q. 3, p. 424, footnote 7.

6  Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 6 (Bk. IV, ch. 5):  (That) is said (to be) “necessary”, without which one does not happen to live as a co-cause, such as respiring and nourishment is necessary for an animal; for it is impossible that the animal be without these.

7  Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. III, ch. 11:  Cupidity for nourishment is natural; for all desire dry, and/or humid nourishment, and/or even both, when they need (them).

8  Gen. 4:8.  —  Codex F and aa read:  Likewise, let it be that Adam [Item, esto quod Adam] for Likwise, if Adam [Item, si Adam].

* [Trans. nota:  Hic in nota originalis, ex errore typographico olutionis pro solutionis, quod correctum est ex termini graeci sequentis significato.]

 

 

p. 465

 

dor- / -mientem ab eo iugulari et iugulatus interire nulla culpa sua interveniente.

at least while / sleeping  [saltem dormientem] have his throat slit [iugulari] by him and with his throat slit [iugulatus] be destroyed without any fault of his own intervening.

6. Item, impassibilitas est dos corporum glorificatorum;1 sed corpus Adae in statu innocentiae glorificatum non erat:  ergo in statu illo persistens impassibilitatem non habebat:  ergo persistendo in statu illo mori et non mori poterat:  ergo corpus Adae erat dissolubile, anima non peccante.

6. Likewise, impassibility is an endowment [dos] of glorified bodies;1 but the body of Adam in the state of innocence had not been glorified:  therefore persisting in that state he did not have impassibility:  therefore by persisting in that state he could have died and not died:  therefore the body of Adam was able to be dissolved, with (his) soul not sinning.

SED CONTRA:  1. Isidorus de Trinitate:2  « Si homo in paradiso innocenter viveret, nec ignis eum ureret, nec aqua mergeret, nec absentia aëris suffocaret, nec omnia, quae nocent mortalibus, impedirent »:  ergo videtur, quod ipso permanente in statu innocentiae, corpus eius non erat resolubile.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. (St.) Isidore (of Seville says) On the Trinity:2  « If man lived in paradise innocently, fire would neither burn him, nor water drown [mergeret] (him), nor the absence of air suffocate (him), nor  would all (those things) which harm mortals, impede (him) »:  therefore it seems, that with him remaining thoroughly in the state of innocence, his body would not able to be resolved [rsolubile].*

2. Item, mors est poena peccati;3 sed omnis poena est ordinata; poena autem non ordinatur nisi per culpam:  nulli ergo potest inesse nec poena nec mors nec corruptio, nisi cui prius inest culpa:  ergo anima non peccante, impossible fuit, dissolvi corpus Adae.

2. Likewise, death is the punishment for sin [poena peccati];3 but every punishment is ordinate; but a punishment is not ordered except through a fault:  therefore neither punishment nor death nor corruption can be in anyone, except in (him) whom there is first a fault:  therefore with (his) soul not sinning, it was impossible, that the body of Adam be dissolved.

3. Item, ad hoc, quod debite constituatur aliquod compositum, necesse est, materiam et formam proportionari ad invicem.  Si igitur anima ut forma et perfectio unita est corpori, impossibile erat, corpus illud resolvi et corrumpi, nisi aliqua corruptio prius incideret ex parte animae; sed corruptio, quae potest incidere ex parte animae, non est nisi culpae:  ergo impossibile fuit, corpus Adae resolvi et pati, nisi in anima culpa fuisset praeambula.

3. Likewise, for this, that some composite be duly constituted, it is necessary, that (its) matter and form be proportioned to one another.  Therefore, if the soul has been united to the body as (its) form and perfection, it was impossible, that that body be resolved and corrupted, unless some corruption fall beforehand on the part of the soul; but the corruption, which can fall on the part of the soul, is not but (that) of a fault:  therefore it was impossible, that the body of Adam be resolved and suffer, unless there was first a preambulary [praeambula] fault in the soul.

4. Item, status innocentiae medius erat inter statum gloriae et statum miseriae; sed dissolutio corporis omnino opponitur statui gloriae:  cum ergo statui gloriae non opponeretur directe status innocentiae, Adam in statu innocentiae persistente, corpus eius non fuit resolubile.

4. Likewise, the state of innocence was an intermediary one between the state of glory and the state of misery; but the dissolution of the body is entirely opposed to the state of glory:  therefore since the state of innocence was not directly opposed to the state of glory, with Adam persisting in the state of innocence, his body was not able to be resolved.

5. Item, omnis passio est ab aliquo repugnante et praedominante; sed Adam in statu innocentiae existente, vel omnia concordarent ei, vel subiacerent:  ergo nihil posset corpus eius laedere nec aliquam passionem inferre:  ergo corpus eius nec esset passibile nec dissolubile.

5. Likewise, every suffering is from something repugnant and predominant; but with Adam existing in the state of innocence, either all (things) were in concord with [concordaret] with him, and/or were subject (to him):  therefore nothing would be able to wound his body nor bring any suffering upon (it):  therefore his body would be neither passible nor dissolvable.

6. Item, impossibile est, stante rectitudine alicuius, ipsum obliquari; sed omnis rectitudo consistit in subiacendo Deo et praesidendo aliis creaturis, tam corpori suo quam etiam brutis:4  ergo spiritu rationali stante in puritate innocentiae et obedientiae, impossibile fuit, corpus ab eius voluntate recedere. Sed anima semper appetit uniri corpori:  ergo impossibile fuit, corpus in tali statu dissolvi.

6. Likewise, it is impossible, with the rectitude of anyone standing, that he be turned aside [obliquari]; but every rectitude consists in being subject [subiacendo] to God and presiding over the other creatures, both his own body and the brutes also:4  therefore with (his) rational spirit standing in the purity of innocence and obedience, it was impossible, that (his) body recede from his will.  But the soul always desires to be united to the body:  therefore it was impossible, that (his) body be dissolved in such a state.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Corpus Adae in statu innocentiae actu non poterat dissolvi, licet haberet potentiam, ut dissolveretur.

CONCLUSION

 

The body of Adam in the state of innocence could not actually be dissolved, thought it had the potency, to be dissolved.

RESPONDEO:  Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod quemadmodum, iuxta verbum Philosophi,5 haec est duplex:  aliquid est nunc immortale, quia adverbium potest determinare hoc quod est immortale ratione actus moriendi, vel ratione potentiae; ita et locutio praecedens:  utrum corpus hominis esset dissolubile sive posset dissolvi, ipso non peccante, distingui debet.  Illi enim ablativi absoluti6 possunt determinare hoc verbum posset, vel hoc verbum dissolvi.  Si hoc verbum posset determinent, veritatem habet locutio.  Est enim sensus, quod Adam, dum existeret in statu innocentiae, posse habebat, ut corpus eius dissolveretur.  —  Si autem ablativi illi referantur ad actum, qui est dissolvi, sic locutio falsa est.  Est enim sensus, quod Adam posset dissolvi in statu innocentiae, ita quod simul esset innocentia et mortis sive corruptionis poena; et hoc est impossible, providente ordine divinae iustitiae, quae nullam inordinationem in universo sustinet.  Si ergo poena deordinata est, nisi praecedat culpa, et corporis dissolutio non potest animae purae et innocenti non esse poena; inconveniens videtur et contra ordinem divinae iustitiae, quod corpus hominis dissolveretur in statu innocentiae.  —  Et hoc Sancti dicunt, et rationes ad hoc inductae ostendunt, et ideo concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt.

I RESPOND:  For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that in that manner [quemadmodum], according to the word of the Philosopher,5 this (proposition):  “something is now immortal”, is twofold, because the adverb (i. e. “now”) can determine that which is immortal by reason of the act of dying, and/or by reason of the potency (to die); thus too the preceding expression:  “whether the body of a man was dissolvable or was able to be dissolved, with him not sinning”, ought to be distinguished.  For those ablative absolutes6 (v. g. “with him not sinning”) can determine this verb “was able”, and/or this verb “to be dissolved”.  If they determine this verb “was able”, the expression has truth.  For the sense is, that Adam, while he existed in the state of innocence, had a ‘being able’, such that his body might be dissolved.  —  But if those ablatives are referred to the act, which is ‘to be dissolved’, thus the expression is false.  For the sense is, that Adam could have been dissolved in the state of innocence, such that there would be together an innocence and the punishment of death or corruption; and this is impossible, with the provident order of Divine Justice, which endures no inordinacy [inordinationem] in the universe.  Therefore, if a punishment is disordered [deordinata], unless a fault precedes, and the dissolution of the body cannot be a punishment for a pure and innocent soul; it seems unfitting [inconveniens] and contrary to the order of the Divine Justice, that the body of a man would be dissolved in the state of innocence.  —  And this the Saints say, and the reasons brought forward for this show, and for that reason they are to be conceded, because they conclude the truth.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumpitur;7 dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de illo corruptibili, cuius regimen non subiacet voluntati, sed soli virtuti naturali; et illud de necessitate habet corrumpi, quia habet causam corruptionis intra se.  Corpus autem Adae, etsi esset mortale et corruptibile, tamen voluntati subiacebat ex ordine divinae iustitiae; et ideo, nisi voluntas deordinaretur, corpus illud nunquam corrumperetur.

1. To that, therefore, which is first objected, that every corruptible is of necessity corrupted;7 it must be said, that the Philosopher is speaking of that corruptible, whose regimen is not subject to the will, but to natural virtue alone; and that of necessity has to be corrupted, because it has a cause of corruption within itself.  Moreover the body of Adam, even if it were mortal and corruptible, yet it was subject to (his) will out of the order of the Divine Justice; and for that reason, unless (his) will would be disordered, that body would never been corrupted.

1  Ostenditur IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. a. 1. princip. a. 2. q. 1, et a. 2. princip. a. 1. q. 1. seq.

2  Sive de Ordine creaturarum, c. 10. n. 8:  Dum vero ibi homo immortaliter et beate viveret, nunquid et totius orbis subiectio sibi non subiaceret?  Quid enim illum ab ingressu orbis intercluderet, qui in creaturis nocere sibi aliquid non timeret, dum ignis non ureret, non aqua mergeret, non bestiarum fortitudo mactaret, non spinarum vel cuiuscumque rei aculei vulnerarent, non absentia aëris suffocaret, non omnia, quae nocent mortalibus, impedirent?

3  Rom. 6, 23:  Stipendia enim peccati mors.  —  De propp. seqq. cfr. August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. n. 51.

4  Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 23. n. 44; Enarrat. in Ps. 145. n. 5 et de Quantit. animae, c. 36. n. 80; Anselm., I. Cur Deus homo, c. 11, plura docet de rectitudine sive iustitia voluntatis.  —  Pro omnis rectitudo nonnulli codd. rectitudo hominis.  Vat. post Deo adiungit vel subiiciendo se Deo.

5  Libr. VI. Topic. c. 3. (c. 6.):  Nam anceps secundum amphibologiam est nunc incorruptibile esse; aut enim, quoniam non corrumpitur nunc, significat, aut quoniam non possibile corrumpi nunc, aut quoniam huiusmodi est nunc, ut nunquam possit corrumpi.

6  Plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 non bene absolute.

7  Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 et uno alteroque cod. corrumpetur.

1  As shown in Sent., Bk. IV, d. 49, p. II, principle a. 1, a. 2, q. 1, and principle a. 2, a. 1, q. 1.

2  Or On the Order of Creatures, ch. 10, n. 8:  But while man lived there in an immortal and blessed manner, was not the subjection of the whole orb also subjected to him?  For (that) which included him from the entrance of the orb, which among creatures feared not to harm something of his, while fire did not burn, water did not drown [mergeret], the fortitude of beasts did not smite [mactaret], the stings of thorns and/or of whatever thing did not wound, the absence of air did not suffocate, everything, which harms mortals, did not impede?

3  Rom. 6:23:  For the wages of sin (is) death.  —  On the following propositions, cf. (St.) Augustine, On Free Will, Bk. III, ch. 18, n. 51.

4  Cf. (St.) Augustine, On the True Religion, ch. 23, n. 44; Enarrations of the Psalms, Ps. 145, n. 5, and On the Quantity of the Soul, ch. 36, n. 80; (St.) Anselm, Cur Deus homo, Bk. I, ch. 11, teaches several (things) concerning the rectitude or justice of the will.  —  For every rectitude [omnis rectitudo] not a few codices have the rectitude of man [rectitudo hominis].  The Vatican edition, after to God [Deo] adds and/or by subjecting one’s self to God [vel subiiciendo se Deo].

5  Topics¸ Bk. VI, ch. 3 (ch. 6):  For according to amphibology (i. e. the study of ambiguity in language) “that it is now incorruptible” is ambiguous; for either it signifies, that it is now not corrupted, or that (it is) not possible that it now be corrupted, or that it is now of this kind, that it can never be corrupted.

6  Very many codices and edition 1 and 2, have not well absolutes can absolutely [absolute] for ablative absolutes can [absoluti].

7  The Vatican edition, together with editions 3 and 4 and one or the other codex, has will . . . be corrupted [corrumpetur] for is . . . corrupted [corrumpitur].

 

* [Trans. note:  i. e. broken up into its constituent parts.]

 

p. 466

 

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod componi ex contrariis competebat corpori secundum illum statum; dicendum, quod alio modo se habent contraria in compositione corporis secundum statum naturae lapsae, aliter secundum statum naturae institutae.  Secundum statum enim naturae lapsae non solum agunt in aliquod extrinsecum, sed etiam ad invicem mutuo agunt et patiuntur, non solum in ipsa constitutione, sed etiam post constitutum esse.  In statu autem innocentiae taliter commixta fuerunt et proportionata in prima compositione et ad tantam concordiam redacta,1 ut, illo statu manente, mutuo non pugnarent.  Et ideo propter illam compositionem corpus illud dissolvi necesse non erat.

2. To that which is objected, that ‘to be composed out of contraries’ suited (his) body according to that state; it must be said, that contraries hold themselves in one manner in the composition of a body according to the state of lapsed nature, in another according to the state of instituted nature.  For according to the state of lapsed nature they not only act upon something extrinsic, but they also act and suffer mutually regarding themselves , not only in that constitution, but also after being constituted.  But in the state of innocence they were commingled in such a manner and proportioned in the first composition and brought back [redacta]1 to so great a concord, that, with that state remaining, they would not mutually fight.  And for that reason on account of that composition it was not necessary that that body be dissolved.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod secundum statum innocentiae in illo corpore fiebat deperditio; dicendum, quod sicut natura universalis patitur elementa corrumpi secundum partem, sed nullo modo patitur corrumpi secundum totum; sic et natura bene instituta in homine, regulata ab ordine iustitiae2 et providentiae admittebat, deperditionem* fieri in homine secundum aliquam partem propter statum animalitatis, in quo erat; sed nullo modo patiebatur corruptionem fieri in toto.  Sicut enim fiebat corruptio et deperditio, ita etiam fiebat restauratio; et ideo non consequebatur dissolutio.

3. To that which is objected, that according to the state of innocence a loss did come to be in that body; it must be said, that just as the nature of the universe [natura universalis] suffers the elements to be corrupted according to a part, but in no manner suffers (them) to be corrupted according to (their) whole; thus too the nature well instituted in man, regulated by the order of (Divine) Justice2 and Providence admitted, that a loss come to be in man according to some part on account of the state of animality [statum animalitatis], in which he was; but in no manner did it suffer corruption to come to be in the whole.  For just as there came to be corruption and loss, so also there came to be a restoration; and for that reason a dissolution (of his body) did not follow.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Adam a cibo poterat abstinere; dicendum, quod non poterat abstinere a comestione, quando esset locus et tempus;3 tum quia sibi expresse praeceptum erat, ut comederet de lignis paradisi, aliis a ligno scientiae boni et mali;4 tum etiam, quia, si Dominus non praecepisset, natura bene instituta dictaret, quae dictat, nullum debere manum sibi iniicere.  —  Nec valet illa obiectio, quam obiicit de fame; debebat enim famem praevenire, et ipse bene sciebat horam et indigentiam suae naturae, quam si pertansiret, omitteret et peccaret.

4. To that which is objected, that Adam could have abstained from food; it must be said, that he could not have abstained from eating [comestione], when it was the time and place (for eating);3 both because it had been expressly precepted to him, to eat of the trees of Paradise, other than the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil;4 and also, because, if the Lord had not precepted (this), a well instituted nature would have dictated (it), which (nature) dictates, that no one ought to lay hands upon [manum iniicere] himself.  —  Nor is that objection valid, which objects concerning hunger; for he ought to have prevented hunger, and he himself knew well the hour (for eating) and indigence of his nature, which if it passed by, he would omit (eating) and sin.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccator potest occidere innocentem; dicendum, quod verum est secundum statum naturae lapsae, in quo omnis homo merito peccati originalis est mortis debitor.  Unde permittere, innocentem occidi ab impio, non est contra ordinem divinae iustitiae secundum statum praesentem; in statu autem illo, quia nulla culpa praecesserat, ordo divinae iustitiae talem deordinationem vel punitionem admittere non debebat.

5. To that which is objected, that a sinner can slay an innocent (man); it must be said, that (this) is true according to the state of lapsed nature, in which every man by the merit of original sin is a debtor to death.  Wherefore to permit, that an innocent be slain by an impious (man), is not contrary to the order of Divine Justice according to the present state; but in that state, because no fault had preceded, the order of Divine Justice ought not have admitted such an (act of) disorder [deordinationem] and/or punishment [punitionem].

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod impassibilitas est dos corporum glorificatorum; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod impassibilitas privat et actum et potentiam passionis secundum omnem statum.  Illa autem impassibilitas corpori Adae non inerat nisi secundum statum determinatum, et ideo perfecta non erat nec dos dici debebat.

6. To that which is objected, that impassibility is an endowment of glorified bodies; it must be said, that (that) is true, according to which ‘impassibility’ deprives both the act and potency of suffering according to every state.  But that impassibility was not in the body of Adam except according to a determinate state, and for that reason it was not perfect nor ought it to have been called an endowment.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. Loquendo de facto, fide constat, quod corpus Adae nullo modo incurrisset mortem vel corruptionem, dummodo ipse non peccasset.  Unde statu innocentiae durante, excludebatur actus moriendi.  Loquendo autem de possibilitate vel impossibilitate moriendi, cum S. Augustino et Magistro distingui debet non posse mori, quo negatur aptitudo sive potentia ad moriendum, et posse non mori, quo asseritur potentia non moriendi.  In statu naturae glorificatae Beati omnino sunt inepti ad moriendum, unde habent simpliciter non posse mori.  In statu naturae lapsae homo moritur et non potest non mori.  In statu innocentiae, sicut habuit potentiam peccandi et non peccandi, ita etiam potentiam moriendi et non moriendi, sive « quodam modo erat mortalis, in quantum poterat mori, et quodam modo immortalis, in quantum poterat non mori » (S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 2; cfr. hic dub. 2.).  Stante autem statu innocentiae, ut dicunt fere omnes, in sensu composito primi parentes non potuerunt mori, bene vero in sensu diviso.  Scotus autem (in utroque Scripto hic q. unica n. 3.) contra modum loquendi, a Ss. Bonaventura et Thoma adhibutum, plura opponit.  Nam negat, quod homo, stante statu innocentiae, non potuit mori, et dicit:  « Stante statu innocentiae, potuit mori; ista tamen potentia non fuisset reducta ad actum, et sic poterat non mori ».  Ipse enim putat, primos homines non tam per donum intrinsecum integritatis, quam per protectionem Dei extrinsecum in statu innocentiae fuisse immortales, scil. quatenus « quilibet fuisset translatus, antequam virtus sua fuisset improportionabiliter debilitata ad hoc, quod anima cesset in corpore » (ibid. n. 6.).

I. Speaking of the fact, it is established by the Faith, that the body of Adam would have in no manner incurred death and/or corruption, so long as he did not sin.  Wherefore with the state of innocence enduring, the act of dying was excluded.  But speaking of the possibility and/or impossibility of dying, there ought to be distinguished, with St. Augustine and Master (Peter) a “not being able to die” [non posse mori], by which the aptitude or potency for dying is denied, and a “being able not to die” [posse non mori], by which the potency [potentia] of not dying is asserted.  In the state of glorified nature the Blessed are entirely unsuited [inepti] to dying, whence they have simply a ‘not being able to dye”.  In the state of lapsed nature man dies and cannot not die.  In the state of innocence, just as he had the power [potentia] of sinning and of not sinning, so also the potency [potentia] of dying and not dying, or « in a certain manner he was mortal, inasmuch as he could have died, and in a certain manner immortal, inasmuch as he could have not died » (St. Thomas, there in the q. sole, a. 2; cf. here Doubt 2).  But with the state of innocence standing, as nearly all say, (our) first parents could not have died in the composite sense, but (they) well (could) in the divided sense.  Moreover (Bl. John Duns) Scotus (in each version of his Commentary, here in the q. sole, n. 3) opposes several (arguments) against the manner of speaking, employed by Sts. Bonaventure and Thomas.  For he denies, that man, with the state of innocence standing, could not have died, and says:  « With the state of innocence standing, he could have died; yet this potency was not reduced to act, and thus he could have not died ».  For he himself thought, that the first men were immortal in the state of innocence, not so much through an intrinsic gift of integrity, as through the extrinsic protection of God, namely to the extent that « any (of them) would have been translated (to Heaven), before their virtue was improportionably debilitated regarding this, that the soul would cease (to be) in the body » (ibid. n. 6.).*

II. De hac et sequenti quaestione:  Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 1.  —  Scot., loc. cit.  —  S. Thom., hic loc. cit; S. I. q. 97. a. 1.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 2. 5; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 83, tr. 13. q. 78.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1, de seq. quaest. a. 2.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1, de seq. quaest. q. 2.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. —  Dionys. Carth., de hic et seqq. qq. hic q. 3.  —  Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

II. On this and the following Question:  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 88, m. 1.  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, loc. cit.  —  St. Thomas, here in loc. cit.; Summa., I, q. 97, a. 1.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in aa. 2 and 5; Summa., p. II, tr. 14 q. 83; tr. 13, q. 78.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1; on the following q., here in. a. 2.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2, q. 1, on the following q., here in q. 2.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 1. —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following qq., here in q. 3.  —  (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following qq., here in the q. sole.

1  Fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4 minus convenienter educta, cod. L adducta, cod. O ducta (reducta?).  Deinde pro non pugnarent aliqui codd. et ed. 1 non repugnarent.

2  Codd. M Y aa divinae iustitiae.

3  Scil. comedendi.  —  Paulo ante pro quando cod. cc et ed. 1 quin.

4  Gen. 3, 1. seqq.  Cfr. lit. Magistri hic c. 4.  —  Mox pro si Vat. etsi, quae et dein post dictaret cum ed. 4 addit cum sumere cibum.

1  Nearly all the codices, together with editions 1, 2, 3, and 4, have less fittingly brought forth [educta], codex L has brought forward [adducta], codex O lead [ducta] (reduced [reducta]?).  Then for would not fight [non pugnarent] some codices and edition 1 have would not fight back [non repugnarent].

2  Codices M Y and aa have Divine Justice [divinae iustitiae].

3  Namely for eating.  —  A little before this for when it was [quando] codex cc and edition 1 have if it were not [quin].

4  Gen. 3:1 ff..  —  Cf. the text of Master (Peter) here in ch. 4.  —  Next for if [si] the Vatican edition has even if [etsi], which (edition) also then, together with edition 4, adds when to take food [cum sumere cibum] for it.

* [Trans. nota:  Hic in textu criticalis fuit virgulam, quam propter contextus sequentis incongruentiam omisi.]

* [Trans. note:  Which is essentially, as much as regards the fact, the kind of immortality which some theologians propose as the one enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin Mary in Her assumption.]

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