S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

SECUNDI LIBRI

BOOK TWO

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX

ARTICULUS III.

 

Quaestio I.

ARTICLE III

 

Question 1

 

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 468-471.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

 

 

Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 468-471.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

 

ARTICULUS III.

 

De immortalitate primi hominis quantum ad coniunctum.

ARTICLE III

 

On the immortality of the first man as much as regards the conjunct.

Consequenter quaeritur de immortalitate primi hominis quantum ad coniunctum.  Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.

Consequently there is asked concerning the immortality of the first man [primi hominis] as much as regards the conjunct (of his body and soul).  And about this two (questions) are asked:

Primo quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas inesset homini a natura, vel a gratia.

First there is asked, whether that immortality was in man by nature, and/or by grace.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas esset eadem per essentiam cum immortalitate gloriosa.

Second there is asked, whether that immortality was the same through essence with the immortality of glory [immortalitate gloriosa].

QUAESTIO I.

 

Utrum immortalitas inesset homini a natura, vel a gratia.

QUESTION 1

 

Whether immortality was in man by nature, and/or by grace?

CIRCA PRIMUM sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum illa immortalitas esset a natura, vel a gratia.  Et quod a natura, videtur.

ABOUT THE FIRST (the argument) is advanced thus and there is asked, whether that immortality was by nature, and/or by grace.  And it seems, that (it was) by nature.

1. Illud est nobis naturale, quod nobis innascitur, et cum quo nati sumus;3 sed homo cum illa immortalitate productus est, et illa immortalitas indita est homini a sua conditione:  ergo fuit ei naturalis vel a natura.

1. That is natural to us, which is born in us, and with which we have been born;3 but man was produced with that immortality, and that immortality has been endowed to man from his foundation:  therefore it was natural to him and/or by nature.

2. Item, mors non poterat inesse homini, nisi praecedente culpa, sicut probatum est supra;4 sed culpa non poterat homini inesse, nisi deordinaretur natura:  si ergo mors inerat homini contra naturam, immortalitas inerat ei per naturam.

2.  Likewise, death could not have been in man, except by a preceding fault, just as has been proven above;4 but fault could not have been in man, unless (his) nature was disordered [deordinaretur]:  therefore, if death was in man contrary to nature, immortality was in him through nature.

3. Item, per hoc homo erat immortalis, per quod erat innocens;5 sed innocens erat ex conditione naturae; esto enim, quod nullam haberet gratiam, nihilominus tamen haberet innocentiam:  ergo immortalis erat ex conditione naturae, non ex beneficio gratiae.

3. Likewise, man was immortal thorough that, through which he was innocent;5 but he was innocent out of the condition of (his) nature; for let it be, that he had no grace, yet he would nevertheless have innocence:  therefore he was immortal out of the condition of (his) nature, not out of the benefice of grace.

4. Item, immortalitas hominis6 consistit in continua coniunctione animae et corporis, continua autem coniunctio animae et corporis est per continuum appetitum unius ad alterum; sed anima habet continuum appetitum ad corpus, et e converso, per naturam absque gratia:  ergo immortalitas inerat homini per naturam.

4. Likewise, the immortality of man6 consists in a continual conjunction of soul and body, but the continual conjunction of soul and body is through the continual appetite of one for the other; but the soul has a continual appetite for the body, and vice versa, through nature apart from grace:  therefore immortality was in man through nature.

5. Item, idem est principium, per quod datur rei esse, et per quod in esse continuatur; sed anima rationalis, quae est forma per naturam immortalis et incorruptibilis, corpori dabat naturaliter esse et complementum:7  ergo et ipsius corporis sive hominis esse naturaliter continuabat; sed a quo in esse . . .

5. Likewise, the same is the principle, through which ‘being’ is given to a thing, and through which it is continued in ‘being’; but the rational soul, which is an immortal and incorruptible form through nature, naturally gave the body ‘being’ and complement:7  therefore it also naturally continued the ‘being’ of the body itself or of the man; but by that which there is a continuation / in ‘being’, . . .

3  Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 9. (c. 8.) ait:  Atque his fere duobus a natura quippiam inesse determinamus, eo scil. quod a nativitate statim omnibus inest, et quod, generatione existente, facile consequimur.

4  Hic a. 2. q. 1.

5  Nam per contrarium innocentiae, scil culpam sive peccatum, homo factus est mortalis.

6  Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 perperam animae.  In fine arg. Vat. addit absque gratia.

7  Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima. text. 36. seq. (c. 4.), ubi ostenditur, animam esse causam corporis viventis in triplici genere causae, scil. formalis, finalis et efficientis.

3  Aristotle, in (his) Eudemian Morals, Bk. II, ch. 9 (ch. 8), says:  “And so we indeed now determine that (“the natural”) is generally [fere] in these two, in that, namely, which is in all immediately by (their) nativity, and (in that) which, existing by generation, we easily attain.”

4  Here in a. 2, q. 1.

5  For through the contrary of innocence, namely fault or sin, man was made mortal.

6  Not a few codices, together with edition 1, have faultily of the soul  [animae].  At the end of the argument, the Vatican edition adds apart from grace [absque gratia].

7  Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul, Bk. II, text 36 f. (ch. 4), where it is shown, that the soul is the cause of the body living in regard to the threefold genus of cause, namely formal, final and efficient.

 

p. 469

 

est continuatio, ab eodem est immortalitatis perpetuatio:  ergo etc.

there is a continuation / in ‘being’, by the same there is a perpetuation of immortality:  ergo etc..

6. Item, naturale est homini comedere ea quae sibi apponuntur; sed homo per esum ligni vitae et aliorum lignorum paradisi vitam suam poterat perpetuare, sicut dicit Augustinus et Magister:1  ergo videtur, quod hominis perpetuatio inerat homini per naturam.

6. Likewise, it is natural for man to eat [comedere] those (things) which are placed before him; but man, through eating [esum] of the Tree of Life and of the other trees of Paradise, could perpetuate his own life, just as (St.) Augustine says and Master (Peter too):1  therefore it seems, that the perpetuation of man was in man through nature.

SED CONTRA:  1. Augustinus super Genesim, et Magister dicit in littera:2  « Creatus est homo immortalis, quod erat ei de ligno vitae, non de conditione naturae; mortalis erat conditione corporis animalis, immortalis beneficio Conditoris ».  Et idem ipse Augustinus expressius dicit, quod sicut praestitum fuit filiis Israel, quod in quadraginta annis vestimenta eorum non veterascerent, ita praestitum fuit Adae, ut non moreretur.

BUT ON THE CONTRARY:  1. (St.) Augustine says On (a Literal Exposition of) Genesis, and Master (Peter) in the text:2  « Man was created immortal, which (gift) was his from the Tree of Life, not from the condition of (his) nature; he was immortal according to the condition of the animal body, immortal by the benefice of (his) Founder ».  And (St.) Augustine himself says the same more expressly, that just as it was guaranteed [praestitum fuit] to the sons of Israel, that in the forty years (of wandering in the desert) their clothing would not grow old [veterascerent], so it was guaranteed to Adam, that he would not die.

2. Item, super illud Lucae decimo:3  Exposliaverunt eum, et plagis impositis etc., Glossa exponit de primo homine, quem dicit expoliatum fuisse gratuitis et vulneratum in naturalibus:  si ergo immortalitas non fuit vulnerata, sed simpliciter ablata ipsi homini per culpam, ergo non inerat ei a natura, sed a gratia.

2. Likewise, on that (verse) in the tenth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Luke:3  They plundered him, and having inflicted (him) with wounds [plagis impositis] etc., the Gloss expounds (this) of the first man, whom, it says, had been despoiled of (his) gratuitous (gifts) and wounded in (his) natural ones:  if, therefore immortality was not wounded, but simply taken away from the man himself, through (his) fault, therefore it was not in him by nature, but by grace.

3. Item, hoc videtur ratione.  Proprietates naturales non derelinquunt subiectum propter culpam:4  ergo si immortalitas inerat homini a natura, non videtur, quod debuerit eum relinquere propter culpam; quodsi eam amisit, patet etc.

3. Likewise, this seems by reason.  Natural properties to not forsake [derelinquunt] a subject on account of a (moral) fault:4  therefore if immortality was in man by nature, it does not seem, that it ought to abandon [relinquere] him on account of a fault; wherefore if he did lost it, it is clear that etc..

4. Item, impossibile est, duo opposita inesse eidem secundum eadem principia, maxime secundum principia naturaliter causantia, quae non inclinant ad opposita;5 sed homo per naturam suam poterat mori:  ergo aut immortalis non erat, aut si erat, non erat per naturam, sed per gratiam solum.

4. Likewise, it is impossible, that two opposites be in the same according to the same principles, most of all according to principles causing (them) naturally, which do not incline to opposites;5 but man through nature could die:  therefore either he was not immortal, or if he was, he was not (such) through nature, but through grace only.

5. Item, corpus Adae per naturam propriam erat nobiliter complexionatum,6 ergo molles et teneras carnes habebat; sed naturaliter molle cedit duro:  ergo per naturam corpus Adae vulnerari poterat et secari:  ergo per naturam Adam non erat immortalis.

5. Likewise, the body of Adam through its own nature was complexioned in a noble manner,6 therefore it had soft and tender tissues [carnes]; but the soft naturally cedes to the hard:  therefore the body of Adam through nature could be wounded and cut apart [secari]:  therefore Adam through nature was not immortal.

6. Item, ignis naturaliter consumit corpus ex elementis quatuor constitutum, et corpus animale per naturam indiget aspiratione et respiratione:7  ergo, si homo caderet in aquam vel in ignem et non moreretur, hoc non esset per virtutem naturae, sed potius contra vel supra:  non ergo esset a natura, sed potius ex gratia.

6. Likewise, fire naturally consumes a body constituted out of the four elements, and an animal body needs through nature aspiration and respiration:7  therefore, if man fell into water and/or into fire and did not die, this would not be through the virtue of nature, but rather contrary to and/or above (nature):  therefore it would not be by nature, but rather out of grace.

CONCLUSIO.

 

Immortalitas Adae in statu innocentiae quoad aptitudinem erat a natura, sed quoad completionem a gratia.

CONCLUSION

 

The immortality of Adam in the state of innocence, in regard to (its) aptitude, was by nature, but in regard to (its) completion (it was) by grace.

RESPONDEO:  Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera,8 circa hoc multiplex et varia fuit opinio.  Quidam enim dicere voluerunt, quod immortalitas primi hominis esset a natura; quidam, quod esset a gratia.  Utraque autem harum opinionum habuit aliquam efficacem rationem moventem, et utraque habet aliquid veritatis, licet una plus habeat quam altera.  —  Sicut enim, cum dicitur:  homo est beatificabilis, duo tanguntur, et aptitudo et dispositio; ita etiam, cum dicitur:  homo est immortalis.  Unde, sicut homo quodam modo potest dici beatificabilis per naturam, quodam modo per gratiam; sic et in proposito.  Prout enim hoc quod est beatificabile importat aptitudinem, sic inest homini per naturam; homo enim a natura sua habet aptitudinem ad beatitudinem.  Secundum autem quod importat dispositionem sufficientem,9 per quam quis pervenit ad beatitudinem, sive sufficientem ordinem ad actum, sic inest homini non per naturam, sed per gratiam, per quam sufficienter disponitur ad gloriam, nec sine illa potest sufficere natura.  —  Sic et in proposito immortalis quantum ad statum innocentiae dici poterat homo per naturam, immortalis etiam per gratiam, quia a natura habebat aptitudinem, sed a gratia habebat completionem.

I RESPOND:  It must be said, that just as Master (Peter) says in the text,8 there was about this a multiple and varied opinion.  For certain ones wanted to say, that the immortality of the first man was by nature; certain ones, that it was by grace.  But each of these opinions hade some efficacious, moving reason, and each has something of the truth, though one has more than the other.  —  For just as, when there is said:  “man is beatifiable”, two (things) are touched upon, both (his) aptitude and (his) disposition; so also, when there is said:  “man is immortal”.  Wherefore, just as man can in a certain manner be said (to be) “beatifiable through nature”, in a certain manner “(beatifiable) through grace”; so also in the proposed.  For insofar as that which is “beatifiable” conveys an aptitude, so it is in man through nature; for man by his own nature has an aptitude for beatitude.  But according to which it conveys a sufficient disposition,9 through which one arrives at beatitude, or a sufficient order to the act, thus it is in man not through nature, but through a grace, through which he is sufficiently disposed to glory, and without it (his) nature cannot suffice.  —  Thus too in the proposed, man could be said (to be) “immortal through nature” as much as regards the state of innocence, (and) even “immortal through grace”, because he had an aptitude by nature, but by grace he had the completion.

Et hoc patet sic.  Tripliciter enim potest mors homini contingere:  aut per elementorum pugnam et dissolutionem, aut per humidi10 consumtionem, aut per extrinsecam laesionem.  Immortalitas ergo dicit privationem huius triplicis modi moriendi quantum ad actum et potentiam in Beatis, qui dicuntur immortales, quia non possunt mori; quantum ad actum vero solum in hominibus institutis, qui dicuntur immortales, quia poterant non mori hoc triplici genere moriendi; habebant enim aptitudinem evadendi hoc triplex genus mortis per id quod habebant a natura.

And this is clear in this manner.  For death can happen to a man in a threefold manner:  either through a battle of the elements [elementorum pugnam], or through the consumption of humor [humidi consumtionem],10 or through an external wound [extrinsecam laesionem].  Therefore “immortality” in the Blessed means the privation of this threefold manner of dying as much as regards the act and potency, which (Blessed) are said (to be) “immortal”, because they cannot die; but (“immortality”) in men as instituted (means the privation of this threefold manner of dying) only as much as regards the act, which (men) are said (to be) “immortal”, because they could not have died by this threefold genus of dying; for they had the aptitude of evading this threefold genus of death through that which they had by nature.

1  Hic c. 6. et infra d. XXIX. c. 6, ubi et verba Augustini exhibentur.  —  In seq. prop., quae in ed. 1 desideratur, Vat. cum aliis edd. et paucis codd. omnis pro hominis.

2  Hic c. 4, ubi et verba Augustini.  —  Seq. textus Augustini est ex I. de Peccatorum meritis et remiss. et de bapt. parvul. c. 3. n. 1:  Si enim Deus Israelitarum vestimentis et calceamentis praestitit, quod per tot annos non sunt obtrita (Deut. 29, 5.), quid mirum, si obedienti homini eiusdem potentia praestaretur, ut, animale ac mortale habens corpus, haberet in eo quendam statum, quo sine defectu esset annosus, tempore, quo Deus vellet, a mortalitate ad immortalitatem sine media morte venturus?

3  Vers. 30.  —  Glossam, quae est ex Beda (super Evang. Luc.), vide apud Lyranum.

4  Cfr. supra pag. 122, nota 8.  —  Paulo inferius pro relinquere aliqui codd. et ed. 1 derelinquere.

5  Vide supra pag. 100, nota 1.  —  In hac prop. post eadem principia Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 addit et.

6  Quod ostensum est supra d. 17. a. 2. q. 3.

7  Vide supra pag. 464, nota 6.

8  Hic. c. 4. seq.

9  Vat. cum ceteris edd. (exc. 1.) et nonnullis codd. addit et propinquam.

10  Cod. I humidi radicalis.  Aliquanto inferius pro hominibus institutis plurimi codd. et edd. 1, 2 hominibus constitutis.

1  Here in ch. 6, and below in d. XXIX, ch. 6, where the words of (St.) Augustine are also exhibited.  —  In the following proposition, which is wanting in edition 1, the Vatican edition, together with the other editions and a few codices, has of every (man) [omnis] for of man [hominis].

2  Here in ch. 4, where the words of (St.) Augustine (are) also (found).  —  The follow text is (that) of (St.) Augustine, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sinners and On the Baptism of Little Ones, Bk. I, ch, 3, n. 1:  “For if God guaranteed to the clothing and footwear of the Israelites, that they did not wear out through so many years (Dt. 29:5), what is to be wondered at, if He should guarantee to an obedient man power of the same (kind), so that, having an animal and mortal body, he might have a certain state in it, in which he would be full of years without growing weak, for the time, in which God might will, that he come from mortality to immortality without an intermediary death?

3  Verse 30.  —  See the Gloss, which is from (St.) Bede (On the Gospel of St. Luke), in (Nicholas) of Lyra.

4  Cf. above d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 2, p. 122, footnote 8.  —  A little below this for abandon [relinquere] some codices and edition 1 have forsake [derelinquere].

5  See above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, p. 100, footnote 1.  —  In this proposition after the same principles [eadem principia], the Vatican edition and edition 1 add and [et].

6  Which has been shown above in d. 17, a. 2, q. 3.

7  See above d. 19, a. 2, q. 1, p. 464, footnote 6.

8  Here in ch. 4 f..

9  The Vatican edition, together with all the other editions (excluding edition 1), and not a few codices, adds and proximate [et propinquam] after a sufficient [sufficientem].

10  Codex I has of the radical humor [humidi radicalis].  Somewhat below this for men as instituted [hominibus institutis], very many codices and editions 1 and 2, have men as constituted [hominibus constitutis].

 

p. 470

 

Nam corpus valde bene erat complexionatum, et anima de se incorruptibilis erat, quae illud corpus regebat et conservabat; et ita idoneus erat primus homo ex his constitutus, quod nunquam deficeret per elementorum pugnam.  Sed tamen illud non sufficiebat; hoc enim non posset anima peccatrix facere, si poneretur in consimili corpore.1  Et ideo datum fuit illi animae donum gratiae, per quam posset corpori praesidere et illud regere et elementa quasi in quadam amicitia custodire, et hoc, quamdiu vellet, suo auctori subiacere.  Hoc autem donum gratiae vocat Anselmus2 iustitiam originalem.  Et sic patet, quod quantum ad immortalitatem contra primum genus moriendi aptitudinem habebat a natura, sed complementum a gratia.

For (their) body was complexioned very well, and (their) soul, which ruled and conserved (their) body, was incorruptible of itself; and thus the first man was constituted so fit [ita idoneus] from these, that he never became weak [deficeret] through a battle of the elements.  But yet that was not sufficient; for this a sinful soul [anima peccatrix] could not do, if it were placed in an exactly similar [consimili] body.1  And for that reason there was given to the former soul the gift of grace, through which it could preside over the body and rule it and guard (its) elements as if in a certain friendship, and this, as long as it wanted to be subject to its Author.  Moreover, (St.) Anselm2 calls this gift of grace “original justice”.  And thus it is clear, that, as much as regards the immortality against the first genus of dying, he had an aptitude by nature, but the complement by grace.

Similiter quantum ad secundum genus moriendi, quod est per humidi consumtionem.  Vis enim nutritiva potens erat ad convertendum alimentum sibi sufficiens, et alimenta efficacem habebant virtutem ad nutriendum; et ex hoc homo idoneus erat, ut conservaretur in eo sine corruptione humidum naturale. Sed quia humidum radicale paulative consumitur nec potest reparari per quodcumque alimentum; ideo data est virtus specialis cuidam ligno, quod dictum est lignum vitae, per cuius sumtionem repararetur humidum radicale.  Et hoc quidem non fuit ex conditione naturae, sed ex beneficio Conditoris, sicut dicit Augustinus.

Similarly as much as regards the second genus of dying, which is through the consumption of humor.  For the nutritive force (of the body of the first man) was able [potens] to convert sufficient food for itself, and the foods (of Paradise) had an efficacious virtue to nourish; and from this man was fit [idoneus], so that (his) natural humor [humidum naturale] would be conserved in him without corruption. But because the radical humor [humidum radicale] is consumed little by little [paulative] and cannot be repaired through any food whatsoever; for that reason a special virtue was given to a certain tree, which (tree) was called “the Tree of Life”, through the taking up of which the radical humor might be repaired.  And this, indeed, was not on account of the condition of nature, but on account of the benefice of the Founder, just as (St.) Augustine says.

Similiter et quantum ad tertium genus, quod quidem fit per extrinsecam laesionem.  Adam enim fortis et potens erat ad repellendum nociva, sapiens et diligens ad praecavenda, nec habebat nociva extrinseca; et ideo idoneitatem habebat, ut per nullius laesionem incurreret mortem.  Verumtamen quod bestiae, et si qua alia3 sunt, quae nocere possent, ipsum omnino non laederent, nec in somno nec in vigilia; hoc non erat a natura, sed a Dei speciali providentia, quae ita eum custodiebat, ut sub pedibus eius omnia subiacerent,4 ut nihil cuperet ipsum offendere, et si cuperet, non valeret.

Similarly too as much as regards the third genus, which indeed is wrought through an external wound.  For Adam was strong and able to repel harmful (things), wise and diligent to take precautions against (them) beforehand [ad praecavenda], and had no external harmful (things); and for that reason he had a fitness [idoneitatem], such that he would incur death through the wounding of no (member of his body).  Nevertheless, that the beasts, and if there are any others [qua alia],3 which could have harmed (him), did not wound him in any manner [ominino], neither in (his) sleep nor when awake [in vigilia]; this was not by nature, but by a special providence of God, which guarded him thus, that all lay under his feet,4 so that nothing desired to offend him, and if it would desire (such a thing), it would not prevail (in doing it).

Et sic patet, quod immortalitas, quae fuit in statu innocentiae, quantum ad aptitudinem fuit a natura, quantum ad complementum fuit a gratia.*  —  Et per hoc pro magna parte patet responsio ad obiecta.  Rationes enim, quae probant, quod non fuit simpliciter a natura, concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt.

And thus it is clear, that the immortality, which was in the state of innocence, as much as regards the aptitude was by nature, (but) as much as regards the complement it was by grace.  —  And through this the response to the objections is clear for the most part.  For the reason, which prove, that it was not simply by nature, are to be conceded, because they conclude (on the basis of) the truth.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod fuit a natura, quia fuit ei innata; dicendum, quod non omne quod inest homini a principio suae nativitatis, naturale est, nisi extendatur hoc nomen naturale; multa enim bona gratis data concreantur et dantur cum natura, sicut planum est.  Et ideo illud non valet.

1. To that, however, which is objected, that it was by nature, because it was innate in him; it must be said, that not everything which is in man from the beginning of his nativity, is natural, unless this name “natural” be extended; for may goods, given freely, are co-created and given with the nature, just as is plain.  And for that reason that (objection) is not valid.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mors non poterat intervenire, nisi praevia culpa; dicendum, quod hoc non erat solum propter naturam, sed propter beneficium gratiae, quod erat naturae superadditum. Quia enim originalis iustitia faciebat, naturam immortalem esse, et hanc non poterat perdere nisi per culpam; ideo mors non poterat intervenire nisi per culpam.

2. To that which is objected, that death could not intervene, unless (there was) a previous fault; it must be said, that this was not only on account of nature, but (also) on account of the benefice of grace, which was super-added to nature.  For because original justice caused the nature to be immortal, and (because) it could not lose this except through fault; for that reason death could not intervene except through a fault.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod innocentia erat a natura, ergo similiter et immortalitas; dicendum, quod innocentia dupliciter potest dici:  uno modo privative, quia privat culpam; alio modo positive, quia ponit iustitiam contrariam.  Innocentia autem non erat causa immortalitatis, secundum quod dicit puram privationem, sed secundum quod importat originalem iustitiam, merito cuius erat in anima vis totius corporis contentiva.

3. To that which is objected, that (man’s) innocence was by nature, therefore similarly too (his) immortality; it must be said, that “innocence” can be said in a twofold manner:  in one manner privatively, because it deprives fault; in another manner positively, because it posits the contrary justice.  Moreover innocence was not the cause of (man’s) immortality, according to which it means a pure privation, but according to which it conveys original justice, by merit of which there was in the soul a force contentive of the whole body.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod continuatio vitae est ex coniunctione animae et corporis; dicendum, quod ad continuationem vitae non sufficit appetitus, sicut ad beatificationem non sufficit appetere beatitudinem; sed necessaria est ulterius virtus ad satisfaciendum appetitui.  Omnis enim natura appetit esse et durare, non solum hominum, sed etiam brutorum;5 non tamen in omnibus est immortalitas. Et ideo non sequitur, quodsi a natura sit continuatio appetitus, quod a natura sit continuatio immortalitatis.

4. To that which is objected, that the continuation of (human) life is from the conjunction of soul and body; it must be said, that for the continuation of life the appetite (of the soul for the body) does not suffice, just as to desire [appetere] beatitude does not suffice for beatification; but a further virtue is necessary to satisfy the appetite.  For every nature desires to be and to endure, not only (that) of men, but even (that) of brutes;5 yet there is not immortality in all.  And for that reason it does not follow, that if there is a continuation of appetite by nature, that there is a continuation of immortality by nature.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad aliud quod obiicitur, quod ab eodem est datio esse, et conservatio.  Dicendum enim, quod etsi illud sit verum de conservatione, quae est ad tempus, non tamen est verum de perpetuatione; multa enim sunt, quae possunt dare esse, et tamen non possunt perpetuare.6

5. And through this the response is clear to the other (argument), which is objected, that the giving of ‘being’, and the conservation (of ‘being’), is from the same.  For it must be said, that even if that is true concerning the conservation (of ‘being’), which is for a time, yet it is not true of the perpetuation (of ‘being’); for there are many (beings), which can give ‘being’, and yet cannot perpetuate (it).6

6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod per esum ligni vitae et aliorum lignorum poterat in . . .

6. To that which is objected last, that through the eating of the Tree of Life and of the other trees (man) could have been / conserved in ‘being’; . . .

1  Sensus est:  si haec, scil. regere et conservare tale corpus, ex parte animae essent quid mere naturale, tunc anima quoque peccatrix ista praestare posset; sed non potest, quia mors secuta est peccatum.

2  De conceptu virgin. et origin. peccat. c. 1, ubi duplex vis vocis originalis distinguitur, respectu scilicet iustitiae et respectu peccati. Dicit enim auctor:  originale « videtur dici aut ab originale humanae naturae . . . aut ab origine, hoc est ab origine uniuscuiusque personae . . . Sed quod [originale peccatum] ab initio humanae naturae descendat, non videtur; quoniam origo illius iusta fuit, quando primi parentes iusti facti sunt sine omni peccato.  Videtur itaque dici originale ab ipsa origine uniuscuiusque personae humanae . . . Simili ratione potest dici originalis et personalis iustitia:  siquidem Adam et Eva originaliter, hoc est in ipso sui initio, mox ut homines existerunt, sine intervallo, iusti simul fuerunt.  Personalis autem dici potest iustitia, cum iniustus accipit iustitiam, quam ab origine non habuit ».  —  Paulo superius pro et illud regere plures codd. et illud agere.

3  Vat. cum ceteris edd. si qua animalia.

4  Psalm. 8, 8:  Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius.

5  Quod fusius exponit Boeth., III. de Consol prosa 11.  De prop. praeced. cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. ad 1.

6  Vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 1.

1  The sense is:  if these (acts), namely ‘to rule’ and ‘to conserve’ such a body, were something merely natural on the part of the soul, then even a sinful soul could guarantee them; but it cannot, because death followed sin.

2  On the Conception of the Virgin and Original Sin, ch. 1, where a twofold signification of the word “original” is distinguished, namely, in respect of justice and in respect of sin.  For the author says:  “original” « seems to be said either from the original (principle) of human nature . . . or from the origin, that is from the origin of each person . . . But it does not seem, that (original sin) descends from the start of human nature; since the origin of that was just, when the first parents were made just without any sin.  And so it seems that “original” is said from the origin itself of each human person . . . For a similar reason justice can be said (to be) “original” and “personal”:  if indeed Adam and Eve then existed originally, that is at their very beginning, as men, without an interval, they were at once just.  But justice can be said (to be) “personal”, when an unjust (man) accepts the justice, which he did not have from (his) origin ».  —  A little above this for and rule it [et illud regere] several codices have and drive it [et illud agere].

3  The Vatican edition, together with all the other editions, has any animals [qua animalia] for any others [qua alia].

4  Ps. 8:8:  Thou has subjected all under his feet [Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius].

5  Which (St. Severinus) Boethius expounds at length, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prose 11.  On the preceding proposition, cf. above a. 1, q. 1, in reply to n. 1.

6  See below d. 37, a. 1, q. 1.

* [Trans. note:  Hic ex comparatione cum clausa primaria, in cursivo litteras gratia posui, quae originaliter in textu criticali planae fuerunt.]

 

 

p. 471

 

esse conservari; dicendum, quod ista non erat tota causa; immo necessaria erat divina virtus protegens et prohibens nociva, et interior virtus conservans et concilians contraria.  Praeterea, quod lignum vitae talem effectum haberet, hoc speciale donum erat Dei; sicut etiam, quod tanto tempore vestimenta et calceamenta populi Israel potuerunt sibi praebere obsequia.  Et sic patet illud.

could have been / conserved in ‘being’; it must be said, that that was not the whole cause; nay a Divine Virtue was necessary, protecting (him from) and prohibiting harmful (things), and an interior virtue conserving and conciliating the contrary (elements).  Moreover, that the Tree of Life had such an effect, this was a special gift of God; just as (was) also, that the clothing and footwear of the people of Israel could be of service to them [sibi praebere obsequia] for so much time. And thus that (objection) is clear.

SCHOLION.

SCHOLIUM

I. In hac quaestione S. Bonav. iam praeiudicavit errorem Baii, a S. Pio V. damnatum (prop. 78.):  « Immortalitas primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium, sed naturalis conditio » (cfr. ibid. prop. 6. et prop. 17. synodi Pistoriensis, damnata a Pio VI.).  —  Triplici generi mortis (sive tribus modis et causis corruptionis hic in resp. relatis) a S. Thoma (hic q. unica a. 4.) additur quartum, scil. quod « res materiales habent virtutem finitam ad essendum ».  —  Doctrinam huius quaestionis fere totam S. Doctor accepit ab Alexandro Ha. (S. p. II. q. 88. m. 2.).  —  Scotus (hic in utroque Scripto) Seraphico Doctori, cui concordat S. Thomas, non consentit quoad beneficium gratiae, quod erat naturae superadditum, per se et intrinsecus faciebat naturam immortalem, ita ut mors non posset intervenire nisi per culpam.  Docet enim Scot., quod status innocentiae sive iustitiae originalis formaliter non repugnet morti, quae secundum statum naturae purae homini fuisset omnino naturalis, sicut animalibus; unde tunc non poena culpae esset, sed conditio naturae.  Sed secundum statum iustitiae originalis, donis supernaturalibus exornatum, mors dicitur poena peccati, quatenus sequitur spoliationem donorum gratuitorum.  Porro secundum doctrinam Scoti illa dona non excludebant formaliter potentiam moriendi, sed tantum actum, ob hanc rationem, « quia quilibet fuisset translatus in paradisum, antequam fuisset alteratus alteratione improportionata animae sive formae » (hic q. unica n. 5.).  In fine autem (ad ult.) idem dicit, « quod stante illo statu, si Deus non transtulisset homines modo, quo dictum est, si fuissent mortui, non fuisset plus poena in hominibus quam in brutis » (cfr. Comment. Lycheti et supra a. 2, q. 1. schol.).

I. In this Question St. Bonaventure has already given a preliminary judgment concerning [praeiudicavit] the error of Baius, condemned by St. Pius V (in proposition 78):  « The immortality of the first man was not a benefice of grace, but a natural condition » (cf. ibid., propositions 6 and 7 of the Synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI).  —  To the threefold genus of death (or to the three manners and causes of corruption related here in the Response) a fourth is added by St. Thomas, namely, that « material things have a finite virtue to exist [ad essendum] ».  —  The Seraphic Doctor accepted nearly the entire doctrine of this Question from Alexander of Hales (Summa., p. II, q. 88, m. 2).  —  (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, (here in each version of his Commentaries) does not agree with the Seraphic Doctor, with whom St. Thomas concords, in regard to the benefice of grace, that it was superadded to nature, (and that) it per se and intrinsically caused (man’s) nature (to be) immortal, such that death could not intervene except through (some moral) fault.  For (Bl.) Scotus teaches, that the state of innocence or of original justice is not formally repugnant to death, which (death) was entirely natural to man according to the state of pure nature, just as (it is) to the animals; wherefore it was not then a punishment for fault, but the condition of nature.  But according to the state of original justice, embellished [exornatum] with supernatural gifts, death is said (to be) “the punishment for sin”, to the extent that it follows the spoliation of the gratuitous gifts.  Finally, according to the doctrine of (Bl.) Scotus, those gifts did not exclude formally the potency to die, but only the act (of dying), on account of this reason, « that each would have been transferred into Paradise, before he was altered by an alteration improportionate to the soul or the form (of the body) » (here in the q. sole, n. 5).  But at the end (in reply to the last objection) the same says, « that with that state standing, if God had not transferred men in the manner, in which has been said, if they had died, it would have been no more a punishment in men than in (it is) in brutes » (cf. Lychetus’ Commentary and above in a. 2, q. 1, Scholium).

II. Praeter auctores citatos; S. Thom., hic q. unica a. 4; S. I. q. 97. a. 1.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 4.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3.  —  Durand., hic q. 1.  —  Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

II. Besides the authors cited; St. Thomas, here in the q. sole, a. 4; Summa., I, q. 97, a. 1.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), hic in a. 4.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 1.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 3.  —  Durandus, here in q. 1.  —  (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 3.

III. Sequens quaestio facile ex praedictis solvitur, unde a multis Commentatoribus Lombardi explicite non tractatur.  De ea disputant in eadem sententia, sed non omnes eisdem modis loquendi:  Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 3.  —  B. Albert., hic a. 3.  —  Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2.  —  Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1.  —  Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 4.

III. The following Question is easily solved from the aforesaid, wherefore it is not explicitly treated by many of the Commentators on Lombard.  Disputing on it in the same sentence, but not all using the same manner of speaking are:  Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II, q. 88, m. 3.  —  Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 3.  —  (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 3, a. 2.  —  Richard of Middleton, here in a. 3, q. 1.  —  Giles the Roman, here in q. 2, a. 4.

This English Translation and the digitization of the Latin and English texts, the HTML markup,  all emendations and corrections of the Latin text, and all notes by the Translator, are © 2007, 2008 by Br. Alexis Bugnolo.  The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator.
Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.