COMMENTARIA IN QUATUOR LIBROS SENTENTIARUM -- Lib. II, d. 19, a. 3, q. 2: S. BONAVENTURAE

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis	St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio Cardinal Bishop of Alba & Doctor of the Church
Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum	Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences
Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis	of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris
SECUNDI LIBRI	BOOK TWO
COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.	COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX
ARTICULUS III. Quaestio II.	ARTICLE III Question 2
Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pag. 471-473. Cum Notitiis Originalibus	Latin text taken from Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, Ad Claras Aquas, 1885, Vol. 2, pp. 471-473. Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.
QUAESTIO II. Utrum immortalitas innocentiae eadem per essentiam fuisset cum immortalitate gloriae.	QUESTION 2 Whether the immortality of innocence would have been the same through essence with the immortality of glory?
SECUNDO QUAERITUR, utrum eadem esset immortalitas innocentiae per essentiam cum immortalitate gloriae, si homo stetisset. Et quod sic, videtur.	SECOND THERE IS ASKED, whether the immortality of innocence would have been the same through essence with the immortality of glory [immortalitate gloriae], if man had stood. And it seems, that (it was) so.
1. Augustinus de Vera Religione:¹ Per Christum recuperamus, quod perdidimus in Adam: ergo illam immortalitatem, quam in Adam perdidimus, per Christum recuperamus; sed illa immortalitas, quam recuperamus per Christum, est immortalitas gloriosa: ergo etc..	1. (St.) Augustine (says) On the True Religion:¹ “Through Christ we recuperate, what we lost in Adam”: therefore that immortality, which we lost in Adam, we recuperate through Christ; but that immortality, which we recuperate through Christ, is the immortality of glory [immortalitas gloriosa]: ergo etc..
2. Item, potentia materiae disposita est eadem per essentiam cum se ipsa indisposita;² sed immortalitas innocentiae et immortalitas gloriae sic se habent, sicut potentia indifferens et potentia disposita dispositione, quae est necessitas, cum in statu innocentiae poterat mori et non mori, in statu gloriae necesse habeat non mori, ergo etc.	2. Likewise, the power [potentia] of disposed matter is the same through essence with the self same indisposed [se ipsa indisposita];² but the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory so hold themselves, as an indifferent power and a power disposed by a disposition, which is a necessity, since (man) in the state of innocence could die and not die, (but) in the state of glory he has a necessity [necesse habeat] to not die, ergo etc..
3. Item, liberum arbitrium confirmatum et non confirmatum est idem per essentiam,³ similiter et caritas: ergo pari ratione et immortalitas; sed sic se habent haec immortalitas et illa: ergo etc.	3. Likewise, confirmed and unconfirmed free will is the same through essence,³ similarly too (confirmed and unconfirmed) charity: therefore for an equal reason also immortality; but the latter and former immortality hold themselves thus: ergo etc..
4. Item, mortalitas in statu innocentiae non est alia a mortalitate in statu miseriae, quia non est post peccatum data nova potentia nec ablata: ergo pari ratione in statu innocentiae et statu gloriae non est alia et alia immortalitas.	4. Likewise, the mortality in the state of innocence is not other than the mortality in the state of misery, because after sin there was given no new power, nor (was one) taken away: therefore for an equal reason in the state of innocence and the state of glory there is not one and another immortality.
5. Item, si homo stetisset, transferretur ad immortalitatem, ita quod nullius proprietatis nobilis in eo fieret deperditio: ergo cum immortalitas in homine diceret conditionem nobilem, si transferretur,⁴ illa immortalitas non amitteretur; sed non sunt in eodem homine duae immortalitates simul et semel: ergo immortalitas innocentiae et immortalitas gloriae non differunt.	5. Likewise, if man had stood, he would have been transferred to immortality, such that there would come to be in him the loss of no noble property: therefore since “immortality” in man meant a noble condition, if he were transferred (to glory),⁴ that immortality would not be lost; but in the same man there are not two immortalities at one and the same time [simul et semel]: therefore the immortality of innocence and the immortality of glory do not differ.
SED CONTRA: 1. Quod habet aliud et aliud prin- / -cipium proximum, . . .	BUT ON THE CONTRARY: 1. What has a different [aliud et aliud] proximate / principle, . . .
¹ Cap. 7. n. 13; c. 12. n. 25; c. 16. n. 30. seqq; c. 23. n. 44; c. 46. n. 88, quibus locis s. auctor dicit, in dispensatione divinae providentiae per Christum omnia quae per peccatum amissa fuerant, esse reparata, praecipue immortalitatem. ² Sive proxima materiae dispositio ad actum non differt essentialiter ab ipsa aptitudine et potentia ad actum, sed est eadem ac ista, differens tantum ab ea secundum statum perfectionis et imperfectionis; v. g. proxima dispositio ligni ad combustionem [in qua dispositione lignum necessitatur ad recipiendam formam ignis] est essentialiter eadem ac illa potentia ligni, quae per ignem ad talem dispositionem perducitur. Qualiter habeatur haec necessitas dispositionis, indicatur supra pag. 301, nota 3. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 88. m. 4. — Paulo inferius post cum nonnulli codd. cum edd. 2, 3 subiiciunt igitur, ed. 1 ergo. ³ Cfr. supra d. 7. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. — Quoad caritatem cfr. III. Sent. d. 31. a. 3. q. 1, ubi ostenditur, habitum caritatis in patria non evacuari, sed consummari per gloriam. — Paulo inferius pro haec immortalitas plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 haec mortalitas. ⁴ Non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 perperam transformaretur. In fine arg. plures codd. et omnes edd. perperam differrent [different?] pro differunt.	¹ Chapter 7, n. 13; ch. 13, n. 25; ch. 16, n. 30 ff.; ch. 23, n. 44; ch. 46, n. 88, in which passages the holy author says, that in the dispensation of Divine Providence all which had been lost through sin, was repaired through Christ, especially (man’s) immortality. ² Or the proximate disposition of matter to an act does not differ essentially from that aptitude or power to act, but is the same as the latter, differing only from it according to a state of perfection and imperfection; v. g. the proximate disposition of wood regarding combustion (in which disposition the wood is necessitated to receive the form of the fire) is essential the same as that power of the wood, which is lead through the fire to such a disposition. In what kind of manner this necessity of disposition is had, is indicated above in d. 12, a. 1, q. 3, p. 301, footnote 3. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. II. q. 88, m. 4. — A little below this after since [cum] not a few codices, together with editions 2 and 3, subjoin therefore [igitur], edition 1 therefore [ergo]. ³ Cf. above d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. — In regard to charity, cf. Sent., Bk. III, d. 31, a. 3, q. 1, where there is shown, that the habit of charity in the Fatherland is not emptied out, but is consummated through glory. — A little below this for the former immortality [haec immortalitas] several codices, together with editions 1, 2 and 3, have the former mortality [haec mortalitas]. ⁴ Not a few codices, together with edition 1, have faultily he were transformed [tranformaretur] for he were transferred (to glory) [transferretur]. At the end of the argument several codices, and all the editions, have faultily would not differ [differrent], which perhaps should be read will not differ [diferrent], for do not differ [differunt].

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aliud prin- / -cipium proximum, differens per essentiam, est differens per essentiam;¹ sed immortalitas in statu innocentiae et in statu gloriae habent aliud et aliud principium differens per essentiam, quia illa est a gloria, ista est gratia gratis data: ergo differunt per essentiam.	proximate / principle, differing [differens] through essence, is different [differens] through essence¹; but immortality in the state of innocence and (immortality) in the state of glory have a different [aliud et aliud] principle, differing [differens] through essence, because the latter is from glory, the former is a grace freely given [gratia gratis data]: therefore they differ through essence.
2. Item, non est transitus ab eodem in idem;² sed transitus esset ab immortalitate innocentiae ad immortalitatem gloriae: ergo illa immortalitas et ista non sunt eadem.	2. Likewise, there is not transit from the same into the same;² but there would be a transit from the immortality of innocence to the immortality of glory: therefore the latter and the former immortality are not the same.
3. Item, quorum opposita sunt diversa, ipsa sunt diversa;³ sed immortalitas status innocentiae non opponitur mortalitati, cum simul inessent eidem — Adam enim et mortalis erat et immortalis — sed immortalitas gloriae opponitur illi: ergo non est eadem cum illa immortalitate.	3. Likewise, whose opposites are diverse,³ they themselves are diverse; but the immortality of the state of innocence is not opposed to mortality, since they were in the same (man) together — for Adam was both mortal and immortal — but the immortality of glory is opposed to that: therefore it isn ot the same with that immortality.
4. Item, licet vita Adae esset una et continua, si stetisset in via et patria, status tamen vitae et conditio esset alia et alia, quia conditio animalitatis et spiritualitatis non habent identitatem, sed potius oppositionem et diversitatem: ergo cum immortalitas non dicat solum vitam, sed potius conditionem vitae secundum statum animalem et spiritualem,⁴ videtur, quod immortalitas sit alia et alia.	4. Likewise, though the life of Adam was one and continuous, if he had stood in the way and (in) the Fatherland, the status of (his) life and (his) condition (in each place) would have, nevertheless, been different [alia et alia], because the condition of animality and of spirituality do not have an identity, but rather an opposition and a diversity: therefore since “immortality” does not mean only ‘life’, but rather a condition of life according to the state of an animal and of a spirit,⁴ it seems, that the immortality (of each state) is different [alia et alia].
5. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per illud quod dicitur in littera:⁵ « Alia est immortalitas, quam amisimus, alia, quam in resurrectione speramus ». Ex hac auctoritate expresse colligitur, quod alia sit immortalitas viae, et alia patriae.	5. Likewise, this very (thing) seems through that which is said in the text:⁵ « One is the immortality, which we have lost, another, which we hope for in the resurrection ». From this authority there is expressly gathered, that one is the immortality of the way, and another (that) of the Fatherland.
CONCLUSIO. Immortalitas hominis in statu innocentiae et gloriae eadem est quoad potentiam, differens dispositione.	CONCLUSION The immortality of man in the state of innocence and of glory is the same in regard to power, different in disposition.
RESPONDEO: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod cum idem sit significatum in principali et sumto⁶ sive in abstracto et concreto, idem est significatum huius quod est immortale, et eius quod est immortalitas. Immortale autem dicitur quod est aptum natum sive potens non mori; immortalitas igitur idem est quod potentia sive aptitudo ad non moriendum. Et haec potentia sive aptitudo ad non moriendum non est aliud quam potentia animae in regendo et continuando corpus, ut numquam deficiat nec ab ea separetur. Haec autem potentia consequitur ipsum liberum arbitrium et ei conformatur. Unde sicut in statu innocentiae homo poterat peccare et non peccare, sic anima poterat corpus continere et non continere,⁷ et homo poterat mori et non mori. Quia vero in statu gloriae impossibile est, liberum arbitrium peccare, impossibile est etiam, animam corpus deserere. Et quia in statu miseriae necesse habet peccare et aliquando in peccato esse, saltem in sua origine; ideo impossibile est, animam corpori vitam⁸ continuare. — Quemadmodum igitur ipsius liberi arbitrii potentia in statu innocentiae et gloriae est eadem per essentiam, differens solum secundum statum et dispositionem superadditam; sic illa potentia continuandi et regendi corpus, quae dicitur immortalitas, per essentiam est eadem, differens sola superaddita dispositione. — Et ideo, cum quaeritur, utrum immortalitas innocentiae et gloriae, sive viae et patriae, esset eadem, responderi potest, quod eadem est quantum ad potentiam,⁹ sed alia quantum ad dispositionem superadditam; vel, ut proprius dicamus, una et eadem est, sed altera sive alterata, sicut Coriscus albus et niger idem est, sed alteratus. — Et ideo concedendae sunt ratione ostendentes, quod haec immortalitas et illa per essentiam essent una. Ad rationes ad oppositum facile est respondere.	I RESPOND: For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that since (what is) signified [significatum] in the principal (term) and the one taken (from it) [principali et sumto]⁶ or in the abstract (term) and the concrete one is the same, (what is) signified by that [huius] which is “immortal”, and that which is “immortality”, is the same. Moreover the “immortal” is said (to be) that which is apt, bound or able not to die; therefore “immortality” is the same as the power [potentia] or aptitude to not die. And this power or aptitude to not die is not other than the power of the soul in ruling and continuing the body, so that it never grows weak nor is separated from it. Moreover this power is consequent to free will itself and is conformed to it. Wherefore just as in the state of innocence man could have sinned and not sinned, so the soul could have held and not held the body together,⁷ and man could have died and not died. On the other hand, because in the state of glory it is impossible, that free will sin, it is also impossible, that the soul desert the body. And because in the state of misery it has a necessity to sin and sometimes to be in sin, at least in its origin; for that reason it is impossible, that the soul continue the life⁸ of the body. — Therefore according to which manner the power of free will itself in the state of innocence and of glory is the same through essence, differing solely according to the state and a superadded disposition; so that power of continuing and ruling the body, which is said (to be its) “immortality”, is the same through essence, differing in a superadded disposition alone. — And for that reason, when there is asked, whether the immortality of innocence and of glory, whether of the way or of the Fatherland, was the same, it can be responded, that it is the same as much as regards the power,⁹ but another [alia] as much as regards the superadded disposition; and/or, to speak more properly, it is one and the same, but one of two (states) [alter] or an altered (state), just as pale or tanned [albus et niger] Coriscus is the same (man), but altered.¹⁰ — And for that reason the reasons showing, that this immortality and that one were one through essence, are to be conceded. It is easy to respond to the reasons for the opposite.
1. Nam ad illud quod primo obiicit, quod principium proximum huius immortalitatis et illius est aliud et aliud; plana est responsio, quia principium praecipuum, scilicet potentia contentiva est . . .	1. For to that which is objected first, that the proximate principle of the former and latter immortality is one and another [aliud et aliud]; the response is plain, because the chief principle, namely the contentive power is . . .
¹ Aristot, VII. Topic. c. 1: Nam quaecumque simpliciter eadem, etiam generationes eorum et corruptiones eadem et effectiva et corruptiva. Et II. de Caelo et mundo, text. 86. (c. 13.): Easdem enim eorundem necessarium est esse causas eisdem. ² Sub quo respectu Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.) ait: Si Thebas quis it, impossibile est, simul ire Thebas et ivisse Thebas. Et Averroes in II. de anima, text. 67: Omne recipiens aliquid non recipit ipsum nisi in modo, secundum quem caret illo. — Minorem cod. B sic exhibet: sed transitus esset ab eodem in idem, si fieret transitus ab immortalitate innocentiae ad immortalitatem gloriae, si esset idem. ³ Colligitur ex Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13. et VII. c. 1. ⁴ Aristot., IV. Topic. c. 5: Quandoque autem peccant, et passionem [sive affectionem] in genere eius quod passum est ponentes, ut immortalitatem viam sempiternam dicentes esse. Passio enim vitae et accidens immortalitas videtur esse. Quod autem verum sit quod dicitur, manifestum fit, si quis admittat, aliquem ex mortali fieri immortalem; nullus enim dicit, aliam vitam eum sumere, sed accidens aliquod vel passionem huic eidem advenire, quare vita non genus immortalitatis. ⁵ Hic a. 6: Alia est immortalitas carnis, quam in Adam accepimus, alia etc. — Pro amisimus cod. aa accipimus. ⁶ Codd. I Q aa assumto, Vat. derivativo. Lectio nostra, quae est etiam plurimorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, confirmatur et explicatur illis verbis, quibus B. Albertus, II. Topic. tr. 2. c. 5, utitur ad explanadum, quid sint coniugata. Dicit enim auctor cit: Sunt autem coniugata principale et sumtum a principali per concretivam denominationem, quamvis secundum grammaticum, qui modos in formatione vocum attendit, principale descendit a sumto, ut iustus, -sti [i. e. iusti] addita –tia fit iustitia; considerando tamen ad rem et naturam, compositum descendit a simplici; principale simplex est abstractum, et sumtum ab ipso dicitur, et dicuntur coniugata quasi sub uno iugo principalis significationis coniuncta secundum modum significandi diversum. ⁷ Ed. 1: corpus continuare et non continuare. ⁸ Edd. 3, 4 cum Vat. unitam. Paulo inferius pro potentia continuandi nonnulli codd. potentia continendi. ⁹ Sola Vat. essentiam, quae etiam paulo ante pro esset eadem exhibet sit eadem. ¹⁰ Ut ex Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.) et c. 13. (c. 14.); II. c. 2. (c. 17.), c. 4. (c. 24.) et c. 5 (c. 26.) apparet, Sophistae utebantur Corisco ad exponendas fallacias. De Corisco cfr. etiam Aristot., II. Moral. Eudem. c. 3. (c. 1.) et supra pag. 100, nota 8. Quoad vocem alter sive alteratus cfr. supra pag. 184, nota 6.	¹ Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VII, ch. 1: For whatsoever simply (are) the same, their generations and corruptions (are) also the same, both according to effective (power) and corruptive (power). And On Heaven and the World¸ Bk. II, text 86 (ch. 13) he says: For it is necessary that the same of the same be the causes according to the same. ² Under which respect Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VI, text 7 (ch. 1) says: If one goes to Thebes, it is impossible to simultaneously go to Thebes and to have gone to Thebes. And Averroës (says), On the Soul, Bk. II, text 67: Everythng receiving something does not receive it except in the manner, according to which it lacks it. — Codex B exhibits the minor (of the argument) thus: but there would be a transit from the same into the same, if the transit was made from the immortality of innocence to the immortality of glory, if it was the same [sed transitus esset ab eodem in idem, si fieret transitus ab immortalitate innocentiae ad immortalitatem gloriae, si esset idem]. ³ As is gathered from Aristotle, Topics¸Bk. I, ch. 13, and Bk. VII, ch. 1. ⁴ Aristotle, Topics, Bk. IV, ch. 5: Moreover they sin whenever (they are) as ones positing that the passion (or affection) (is) in the genus of that which has suffered, such as the ones saying that immortality is sempiternal life. For the passion and accident of life seems to be immortality. Moreover it becomes manifest that what is said is true, fi one admits, that someone comes to be immortal from (being) mortal; for no one says, that he takes up another life, but (rather) that some accident and/or passion comes hither to the same, wherefore life is not a genus of immortality. ⁵ Here in a. 6: “One is the immortality of the flesh, which we have accepted in Adam, another” etc.. — For we have lost [amisimus] codex aa has we have accepted [accipimus]. ⁶ Codices I Q and aa have the one assumed (from it) [assumto], the Vatican the derivative [derivativo], for the one taken (from it) [sumto]. Our reading, which is also that of very many codices and editions 1 and 2, is confirmed and explained by these words, which Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Mangus), Topics, Bk. II, tr. 2, ch. 5, uses to explain, what conjugates are. For the said author says: “Moreover the principle (term) and the one taken [sumto] from the principle (term) thorugh a concretive denomination, though, according to grammar, which attends to the manner in the formation of words, the principle (term) descends from the sumtive (term) [sumto], so that iustus, -sti, with the addition of –tia, becomes iustitia; yet considering it according to thing and nature the composit descends from the simple (term); the simple principal (term) is abstract, and the one taken from it is said, and are said, (to be) conjugates, as if the conjuncts of the principle signification (are) under a yoke according to a diverse manner of signifying.” ⁷ Edition 1 reads: continued and not continued the body [corpus continuare et non continuare]. ⁸ Editions 3 and 4, together with the Vatican edition, have united to the body [corpori unitam] for the life of the body [corpori vitam]. A little below this for the power of continuing [potentia continuandi] not a few codices have the power of holding together [potentia continendi]. ⁹ The Vatican edition alone has essence [essentiam] for the power [potentiam], which (edition) also a little before this has is the same [sit eadem] for was the same [esset eadem]. ¹⁰ As appears from Aristotle, Lists of Sophistic Errors, Bk. I, chs. 4 (ch. 5) and 15 (ch. 14); Bk. II, chs. 2 (ch. 17), 4 (ch. 24) and 5 8ch. 26), that the Sophists used Coriscus to expound their fallacies. On Conscus cf. also Aristotle, Eudemean Morals, Bk. II, ch. 3 (ch. 1), and above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 3, p. 100, footnote 8. In reard to the term “one of two (states) or an altered (state)” [alter sive alteratus], cf. above d. 7, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, p. 184, footnote 6.

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una et eadem, licet stat aliter et aliter disposita, hinc gratia, inde vero gloria.	one and the same, thought it has been disposed in one and another manners, here by grace, but there by glory.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est transitus ab eodem in idem; dicendum, quod transitus ab hac immortalitate ad illam est per diversificationem statuum, quia est transitus a statu in statum; et ideo, sicut quod movetur a statu imperfectionis ad statum perfectionis non dicitur aliud et aliud, sed status dicitur alius et alius; sic in proposito intelligendum.	2. To that which is objected, that there is no transit from the same into the same; it must be said, that the transit from this immortality to that one is through a diversification of states, because it is a transitus from a state into a state; and for that reason, just as what is moved from a state of imperfection to a state of perfection is not said (to be) one (thing) and another [aliud et aliud], but the state is said (to be) one and another; so must it be understood in the proposed.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod habent diversa opposita; dicendum, quod illa diversitas oppositionis venit ex ratione superadditae dispositionis, sicut intelligitur in libertate arbitrii, quae est libertas a coactione et a culpa et a miseria. Libertas enim a culpa superaddit aliquam dispositionem, scilicet vel innocentiam, vel gloriam, ratione quarum dispositionum habet opponi diversis.¹ Sic et immortalitas gloriae superaddit ultra immortalitatem innocentiae, sicut dispositio, quae est necessitas, supra dispositionem, quae est congruitas.	3. To that which is objected, that they have diverse opposites; it must be said, that that diversity of opposition comes out of the reckoning of the superadded disposition, just as is understood in the liberty of judgment, which is a liberty from coercion and from fault and from misery. For liberty from fault adds upon (the will) [superaddit] some disposition, namely either innocence, and/or glory, by reason of which dispositions (the will) has to be opposed to diverse (objects).¹ So too, the immortality of glory adds over and beyond [superaddit ultra] (this) the immortality of innocence, just as a disposition, which is a necessity, (does) upon a disposition, which is a congruity.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod immortalitas dicit conditionem vitae sive statum; dicendum, quod verum est, sed non principaliter: immo principalius dicit potentiam corporis contentivam, sicut praedictum est; et ideo ratio illa non cogit.	4. To that which is objected, that “immortality” means a condition of life or of a state; it must be said, that (this) is true, but not principally: nay it more principally means a power contentive of the body, just as has been said beforehand; and for that reason that reckoning is not cogent.
5. Ad ultimum, scilicet ad auctoritatem Magistri, iam patet responsio. Quod enim dicitur, quod sit alia et alia, aut intelligitur hoc esse dictum, quia est altera et altera, aut intelligitur esse alia et alia, non quantum ad ipsam potentiam, quam principaliter importat ipsa immortalitas, sed quantum ad dispositionem superadditam. Et sic patet responsio ad quaesita.²	5. To the last (objection), namely regarding the authority of Master (Peter), the response is already clear. For what is said, that there is one and another [alia et alia], either this is understood to be said, because there is the one and the other [altera et altera], or it is understood to be one and another, not as much as regards the power itself, which principally conveys immortality itself, but as much as regards the superadded disposition. And thus the response to the (things) sought is clear.²
¹ De hac liberi arbitrii divisione, quae sumta est ex Bernardo, vide infra d. 25, p. II. dub.2. De dispositione necessitatis et congruitatis cfr. supra d. 9. q. 3. in corp. — Mox pro ultra cod. T supra. ² Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.	¹ On this division of ‘free will’, which is taken from (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux), see below d. 25, p. II, Doubt 2. On the disposition of necessity and congruity, cf. above d. 9, q. 3, in the body (of the Question). — Next for over and beyond [superaddit ultra] codex T has over and above [supraaddit supra]. ² See the Scholium to the preceding Question.

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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XIX.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XIX